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NAPOLEON  THE  FIRST 

A  BIOGRAPHY 


AUGUST   FOURNIER 


TRANSLATED  BY   MARGARET  BACON  CORWIN 
AND   ARTHUR   DART  BISSELL 


EDITED    BY 

EDWARD  GAYLORD  BOURNE 

Professor  of  History  in  Yale  University 


NFAV  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COAnWNY 
1903 


Copyright,  1903, 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY. 


ROBERT  PRUMMCND,   PRINTER,  NEW  YORK. 


EDITOR^S   PREFACE 

Before  the  appearance  of  the  recent  Lives  of  Napoleon  by 
Professor  Sloane  and  Mr.  J.  H.  Rose,  the  work  here  presented 
in  English  was  generally  recognized  by  competent  judges  to 
be  the  best  brief  history'  of  Napoleon  that  had  been  written. 
Whatever  relative  position  would  be  accorded  to  it  to-day,  com- 
pared with  these  biographies,  it  may  be  affirmed  confidently 
and  without  invidiousness  that  its  positive  merits  are  vj  less 
great  than  formerly  and  that  it  has  the  relative  advantage  in 
this  edition  of  being  comprised  in  one  volume  and  of  being 
accompanied  by  a  classified  bibliography  equally  well  adapted, 
within  its  limits,  to  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  student  of  Napo- 
leonic history  and  as  a  manual  for  the  librarian. 

Among  the  positive  merits  of  Fournier's  Napoleon  I.  should 
be  mentioned  the  thorough  research  upon  which  the  narrative 
is  based,  the  interesting,  vivid,  and  at  times  dramatic  style  in 
which  it  is  written,  its  broad  historical  spirit  and  impartiality 
of  judgment,  its  excellent  proportions,  not  allotting  undue  space 
to  certain  phases  nor  neglecting  the  civil  side  of  Napoleon's 
career,  and,  finally,  its  lucid  exposition  of  the  general  historical 
situation  and  of  the  various  contending  factors. 

These  merits  so  strongly  impressed  me  at  the  time  of  its 
original  publication  that  I  felt  that  a  good  translation  would 
be  a  distinct  and  valuable  addition  to  the  large  mass  of  Napo- 
leonic literature  already  accessible  to  the  English  reader.  Some 
years  later  I  secured  the  author's  sanction  for  such  an  under- 
taking and  entrusted  the  work  of  translation  to  my  friend  and 
former  pupil  Mr.  F.  H.  Schwan  of  Cleveland.  Mr.  Schwan 
executed  the  task  with  scholarly  fidelity.  As  I  was  not  able, 
however,  at  the  time  arrangements  were  made  for  publication  to 


iv  Editor's  Preface 

give  the  manuscript  the  Hterary  revision  which  seemed  desirable 
to  the  publishers  and  to  myself,  I  enlisted  the  services  of  Mrs. 
Corwin  for  the  work.  After  revising  the  first  chapters  Mrs. 
Corwin  became  convinced  that  she  could  accomplish  better 
results  if  she  could  labour  with  a  freer  hand,  and  she  therefore 
proceeded  to  make  a  new  translation.  Mr.  Bissell's  experience 
was  similar  with  his  part  of  the  work,  which  is  to  an  equal 
degree  an  independent  version,  although  its  preparation  was 
facilitated  by  consulting  Mr.  Schwan's  manuscript.  Mr, 
Schwan's  contribution  to  the  production  of  the  book,  there- 
fore, although  not  exactly  measurable,  deserves  appreciative 
recognition.  For  Mrs.  Corwin's  part  of  the  volume,  the 
first  fifteen  chapters,  the  French  translation  of  the  first 
two  volumes  of  the  original  by  E.  Jaegle  proved  of  consid- 
erable assistance,  and,  in  most  cases  where  the  French  text 
differed  from  the  German,  it  was  followed  as  representing  a 
revised  edition.  Mr.  Bissell  translated  the  third  volume  of  the 
German,  i.e.,  the  last  six  chapters  in  this  edition  and  the  bibli- 
ograpMes  accompanying  them.  The  index,  in  the  main,  is 
the  work  of  the  translators. 

As  editor,  I  have  gone  carefully  over  the  entire  work  in  manu- 
script and  in  proof,  making  such  changes  as  seemed  desirable, 
translated  the  Table  of  Contents  and  the  bibliographies  for 
Chapters  I-XV,  and  supplied  the  material  supplementary  to  the 
bibliographies  as  contained  in  the  original.  I  have  refrained 
almost  entirely  from  editorial  comment,  and  beyond  adopting 
the  readings  of  the  French  version  in  most  cases  of  variation, 
I  have  made  no  changes  in  Fournier's  text  except  a  very  few  of 
minor  character,  such,  for  the  most  part,  as  the  correction  of 
obvious  errors  in  dates  or  numbers.  I  cannot  flatter  myself 
that  no  mistakes  have  escaped  my  eye  or  that  I  have  made  none 
of  my  own,  but  I  hope  that  few  serious  errors  will  be  found.  I 
shall  be  glad  to  have  my  attention  called  to  any  that  may  be 
discovered. 

E.  G.  B. 
New  Haven,  August,  1903. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE* 

The  purpose  of  the  following  pages  is  to  recount  briefly  and 
simply  for  the  benefit  of  the  wide  circle  of  cultivated  readers 
the  rise,  the  ventures,  and  the  achievements  of  a  man  of  incom- 
parable historical  importance.  I  am  well  aware  that  persons 
competent  to  judge  have  recently  and  repeatedly  stated  that 
the  time  has  not  yet  come  for  the  history  of  Napoleon  I.  to  be 
written.  If  I  undertake  the  task  in  spite  of  this  warning,  it  is 
due  to  the  conviction  that  the  historian,  even  if  unable  to  pre- 
sent definite  and  final  results,  is  nevertheless  under  obligation 
to  supply  those  far  from  the  laboratories  of  science  with  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  the  existing  state  of  knowledge,  just  as  it 
is  their  right  to  demand  of  him  such  information.  To  delve 
for  ore  and  never  do  anything  but  delve  for  ore  cannot  be  the 
chief  aim  of  his  life's  work;  the  world  demands  ornaments  and 
arms,  and  their  makers  may  not  be  idle. 

To  the  historian  of  Napoleon  I.  the  task  is  moreover  not 
such  an  easy  one  as  would  be  involved  in  simply  clothing  in 
appropriate  w'ords  a  record  of  present  results  in  historical  re- 
search. For  these  results  are  frequently  contradictory  to  one 
another  and  again  often  not  sufficiently  substantiated  to  allow 
of  their  being  at  once  accepted  as  settled.  Consider  the 
changes  that  have  come  over  the  memory  of  the  mighty  Corsican 
even  in  France,  from  the  hymns  of  Beranger  to  the  satires  of 
Barbier,  from  the  glorifying  narrative  of  Thiers  to  the  anni- 
hilating criticism  of  Lanfrey.  The  latter  work,  which  was 
published  between  1S67  and  1S75.  overthrew  forever  the  legend 
of  the  immaculate  glory  of  Napoleon  I.,  and  since  that  time  the 

*  To  the  first  volume  of  the  German  edition. 


vi  Author's  Preface 

general  judgment  in  regard  to  the  first  Emperor  of  the  French 
has  but  increased  in  severity.  Two  causes  have  been  espe- 
cially prominent  in  bringing  about  this  result.  In  the  first 
place  authentic  memoranda  made  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  and 
published  since  Lanfrey's  work — such,  for  instance,  as  the 
memoirs  of  Madame  de  Remusat — have  kept  disclosing  new 
faults  and  weaknesses  in  this  the  most  celebrated  seK-made 
man  of  all  ages,  and  have  so  influenced  and  affected  the  esti- 
mate of  history  in  respect  to  him  that  at  the  present  time  the 
inclination  is  but  too  marked  to  overlook  his  greatness  in 
dwelling  upon  what  is  petty.  In  the  second  place  the  imperial 
reign  of  his  nephew,  Napoleon  III.,  which  had  been  founded 
upon  the  basis  of  the  as  yet  unshaken  Bonapartist  tradition, 
was  in  1870  compelled  to  give  place  to  the  Republic,  that  is 
to  say,  to  that  form  of  government  which  Napoleon  I.  earlier 
violently  and  arbitrarily  destroyed.  France  having  again 
decided  in  favour  of  a  republic,  the  historians  who  had  been  its 
opponents  were  thrown  as  it  were  for  reasons  of  state  into  dis- 
credit, while  the  acts  and  achievements  of  the  great  Revolution 
were  brought  forward  into  undeservedly  favourable  light.  Not 
until  quite  recently  has  it  been  recognized  among  earnest 
French  scholars,  detached  from  party  strife, — having  perhaps 
been  incited  thereto  by  the  investigations  of  the  Germans, — 
that  there  is  not  only  a  Napoleonic  but  also  a  Revolutionary 
legend  which  must  needs  be  rejected  as  the  other  has  been,  and 
be  replaced  by  the  truth  without  reserve.  The  efforts  made 
in  this  direction  have  not  as  yet  produced  incontestable  results, 
nor  has  the  light  yet  been  turned  upon  all  the  questions  involved 
in  the  history  of  the  last  hundred  years  in  France.  But  already 
it  may  be  seen  that  with  a  more  correct  estimate  of  the  first 
Republic,  1792-1799,  a  more  accurate  appreciation  is  at  the 
same  time  to  be  gained  of  the  historical  importance  of  Napo- 
leon I.  The  fact  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  he  was  at  the 
same  time  the  product  and  the  consummation  of  the  Revo- 
lution, and  that  he  still  continued  to  tread  the  path  which  it 
had  marked  oiit  even  while  his  hand  was  boldly  preparing  to 
grasp  the  diadem  of  France. 


Author's  Preface  vii 

It  is  from  tliis  point  of  view  that  Napoleon's  biographer  of 
to-day  must  approach  his  problem,  and  it  is  from  such  a  stand- 
point that  I  have  attempted  in  a  most  modest  way  to  make  my 
contribution  to  its  solution  in  so  far  as  permitted  by  the  nar- 
row limits  imposed  by  circumstances  upon  this  work.  It  makes 
no  pretence  to  being  anything  further  than  a  simple  outline. 
To  what  extent  I  am  indebted  to  earlier  works  it  is  impossible 
to  acknowledge  in  detail ;  it  will  be  obvious  at  once  to  specialists. 
At  times  I  have,  however,  preferred  to  follow  my  own  course, 
which  I  hope  has  led  me,  avoiding  political  bias  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  mere  cavilling  of  a  moralizer  on  the  other,  to  a  portrait 
which,  though  imperfect  and  indefinite  in  its  lines,  is  perhaps 
a  faithful  picture  of  the  character  and  work  of  this  man  who 
more  than  any  one  before  him  has  influenced  the  destinies  of 
the  world. 

Bibliographical  notes  are  appended,  but  they  are  of  course 
far  from  complete  even  in  regard  to  the  most  essential  points. 
Neither  they  nor  the  notes  at  the  bottom  of  the  pages  are  in 
the  least  intended  to  corroborate  statements  in  the  text,  but 
arc  offered  rather  as  guidance  in  finding  the  works  which  may 
best  be  relied  upon  to  serve  such  readers  as  maj'  be  stimulated 
through  this  book  to  wider  reading  and  deeper  research  into 
the  subject.  Only  by  stimulating  such  a  desire  will  this  work 
accomplish  the  result  which  is  desired  for  it. 

The  Author. 

Vienna,  December,  1885. 


CONTENTS 


PAOB 

Editor's  Preface iii 

Author's  Preface v 


CHAPTER  I 

The    Bonapautes    in    Corsica.     Napoleon's    Birth    and    Early 
Training,  1769-1788 

J.  J.  Rousseau  on  Corsica.  P.  Paoli  and  the  French  Occupa- 
tion. Carlo  l^uonaparte  and  his  Family.  La^titia.  Napo- 
leon's Birth  and  Childhood.  Autun  and  Brienne.  Character 
of  the  Boy.  Studios  and  Day-dreams.  Napoleon  at  the  Ecole 
militaire.  Appointment  as  Lieutenant  of  Artillerj-.  Judg- 
ment of  his  Teachers.  Officers  of  the  Ancien  Rt^'gime.  Valence. 
Rousseau  and  Raynal.  Literary  Essays.  Various  Perplexities. 
Napoleon's  Twofold  Nature.  His  Patriotism  as  a  Corsican.  His 
Ambition  and  the  Obstacles  to  it  under  the  Prevailing  Conditions. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Revolutio.n.     Napoleon's  Corsican  Adventures,  1789-1793     19 

The  Inevitable  Decaj-  of  the  Old  R(?gime.  The  National  As- 
sembly and  its  Laws  Establisliing  Equality.  The  Revolution 
in  Paris  and  in  the  Provinces.  Napoleon  at  .Auxonne.  His  Views 
in  Regard  to  Corsica.  Parties  in  Corsica.  Napoleon  at  Ajaccio. 
He  .\cts  the  Demagogue.  First  Lieutenant  Bvionaparte.  Love 
of  Books  and  .Attempts  at  Authorship.  The  Constitution  of 
1791  and  the  Flight  of  Louis  X^T.  The  Volunt<>ers  of  Ajaccio 
and  their  Commander  The  Easter  Uprising  of  1792.  Napo- 
leon in  Paris.  The  10th  of  August.  Captain  Buonapart-e.  New 
Ventures  in  Corsica.     Critical  Incidents.     Without  a  Countrj'. 


Contents 


CHAPTER  III 


AGE 


The  Siege   of  Toulon,  and  the  Defence  of  the  Convention, 

1793-1795 38 

The  Girondists  and  the  Mountain.  The  System  of  the  Terror^ 
The  Opposition  to  it.  Lyons,  Marseilles,  Toulon.  Napoleon 
with  the  Army  of  the  South.  Before  Avignon.  "The  Supper  of 
Beaucaire."  Important  Acquaintances.  Napoleon  in  Com- 
mand of  a  Battalion.  His  Part  in  the  Siege  of  Toulon.  Ap- 
pointed Brigadier-General  of  Artillery.  Relations  with  Robes- 
pierre. Mission  to  Genoa.  Recalled  and  Imprisoned.  Sali- 
cetti.  Restored  to  the  Army.  Expedition  to  Corsica.  In  Paris. 
Jacobin  or  Thermidorian.  Napoleon's  Plan  of  Campaign.  Hopes 
and  Disappointments.  His  Precarious  Situation.  The  Con- 
sti<^.ution  of  the  Year  III  (1795).  The  Opponents  of  the  Con- 
vention. Barras.  The  13th  of  Vend^miaire.  Major-General 
Bonaparte. 

CHAPTER  IV 

Jo.aRPHINE,  1796 CO 

Society  under  the  Directory.  Napoleon  and  the  Women. 
Plans  for  Marriage.  Desiree  Clary.  Madame  de  Permon.  The 
Marchioness  de  Beauhamais.  Descriptions  of  Contemporaries. 
Napoleon  in  Love  with  Josephine.  Intervention  of  Barras.  Pas- 
sion and  Calculation.  Wooing  and  Marriage.  Command  of  the 
Italian  Expedition.     Josephine's  Character. 

CHAPTER   V 

T)«K  Campaigns  in  Italy  and  the  Peace  of  Campo  Formio,  1796- 

1797 72 

Foreign  Policy.  The  Revolutionary  Sj'stem  of  Conquest. 
The  Scene  of  War  in  Italy.  Sch(5rer  and  Bonaparte.  A  Promise 
and  its  Fulfilment.  Montenottc,  Milesimo,  Dego,  Mondovi. 
Severing  the  Alliance  between  Austria  and  Sardinia.  Lodi  and 
Milan.  The  Directory  and  Napoleon's  Victories.  Borglvtto. 
The  lilockade  of  Mantua.  Spoils  of  War.  Napoleon's  Tactics. 
Struggle  for  Mantua.  Lonato  and  Castiglione.  The  Battle  of 
Bas.sano  and  its  Importance.  Verona  and  Arcole.  Rivoli. 
Surrender  of  Mantua.  The  French  Invade  the  Papal  States. 
The  Peace  of  Tolentino.  Ambition  on  Historic  Ground.  The 
Campaign  of  1797.  The  French  in  Styria.  The  Preliminaries  of 
Leoben.     Napoleon  and  the  Republic  of  Venice.     Criticism  of 


Contents  xi 

PAGE 

the  Opposition  in  Paris.  The  Coup  d'Etat  of  the  18tli  of  Frutti- 
dor.  Napoleon's  Independent  Activity.  The  Negotiations  of 
Passariano.     The  Peace  of  Campo  Formio. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Egypt,  179&-1799 Ill 

Oriental  Plans.  France  and  Egypt.  Napoleon  in  Paris. 
His  Attitude  on  the  Eastern  Question.  Celebrations  and  Public 
Addresses.  The  Code  Complet  de  Politique.  Aiming  at 
Supreme  Power.  Momentary  Hopelessness  of  the  Idea.  Reasons. 
The  Egyptian  Expedition  Resolved  upon.  Napoleon's  Real  In- 
tentions. Malta.  Landing  in  Egypt.  The  Mamelukes.  Dis- 
appointments and  Difficulties.  The  Battle  of  the  Pyramids. 
The  Disaster  at  Aboukir.  Its  Con.sequences.  Rising  in  Cairo. 
Fighting  the  Turks.  Syrian  Expedition.  Actual  and  Alleged 
Plans.  El  Arish,  Gaza,  Jaffa.  The  Resistance  of  Acre.  The 
Battle  of  Mt.  Tabor.  Enforced  Retreat.  Distresses.  Victory 
of  the  .Irmy  near  Aboukir.  Resolution  to  Return  to  France, 
This  Resolution  Examined. 

CHAPTER   VII 

The  Coup  d'Etat  and  the  Consulate,  1799 154 

The  Return.  Landing  at  Frojus.  Enthusiasm  of  the  French. 
Causes  of  the  Change  in  Public  C^pinion.  The  Dictatorsliip  of 
the  Directorate.  Renewal  of  the  War  on  the  Continent  in  1799. 
Inadequate  Preparation.  Defeat  Follows  Defeat.  Reaction 
on  Internal  Affairs.  Opposition  Gains  at  the  Elections.  The 
Parliamentary  Coup  d'Etat  of  the  30th  of  Prairial.  SieySs 
Director.  His  Views.  The  Opposition  of  the  Jacobins.  New 
Defeats  in  Italy.  Hopes  Resting  on  Sieyes  Shattered.  Public 
Opinion  Declares  for  Napoleon.  His  Conduct  in  Paris.  The 
Plans  of  the  Reformers  and  the  Plot  against  the  Constitution. 
The  18th  and  19th  of  Brumaire.  The  Resolution  of  the  "Rump 
Pariiament."  The  Consuls  and  the  Constitutional  Commissions. 
Sieyes'  Outline  of  the  Constitution.  Napoleon's  Changes  in  it. 
He  is  Named  First  Consul  and  Head  of  the  Executive.  New 
Chambers. 

CHAPTER  VIII 

War  and  Peace,   1800-1802 188 

Napoleon  and  the  Revolution.  The  Principle  of  Equality 
and  the  Spirit  of  Conquest.     Love  of  Peace  and  Preparation  for 


xii  Contents 

PAGE 

War.  Plan  of  Campaign  for  1300.  The  Passage  of  the  Great 
Saint  Bernard.  Milan.  The  Battle  of  Marengo.  Armistice. 
The  Mission  of  Saint-Julien.  The  Battle  of  Hohenlinden.  The 
Peace  of  Lmieville.  Napoleon  and  Paul  I.  The  Limitation  of 
the  French  Sphere  of  Influence.  Understanding  with  Spain,  \ 
Naples,  and  Rome.  The  Concorda^;^  T)eath  of  Paul  I.,  and  its 
Results.  Negotiations  with  England.  The  Preliminaries  of  Oc- 
tober 1st,  1801.  General  Peace.  The  Programme  of  the  French 
Hegemony. 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  New  France  and  her  Sovereign,  1802 221 

Napoleon's  Contribution  to  the  Reorganization  of  France. 
The  Council  of  State.  The  Ministries.  The  General  "Directions." 
The  Secretaryship  of  State.  The  Reorganization  of  the  Admin- 
istration. Its  Problems.  Public  Finances  before  the  I8th  of 
Brumaire.  Financial  Pteform.  The  Caisse  d'Amortissement. 
The  Bank  of  France.  Judicial  Reforms.  The  Code  Napoleon. 
The  Organization  of  Public  Instruction.  Scholars  and  the  Legion 
of  Honour.  The  Laws  against  the  Emigres  Repealed.  The  Op- 
position of  the  Liberals,  of  the  Radicals,  and  of  the  Royalists. 
Conspiracies.  Regulation  of  the  Tribunate.  Napoleon  First 
Consul  for  Life.     The  Mistake  of  the  French. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate.     The  Emperor,  1802-1804.  242 

France  after  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  Political  Reaction.  The 
Court  of  the  First  Consulate.  His  Family.  Warlike  Projects. 
The  Dependent  States.  The  Constitutional  Changes  in  Holland 
and  in  the  Cis-Alpine  Republic.  Incorporation  of  Piedmont  in 
France.  Liguria,  Lucca,  Elba.  Switzerland.  The  Seculariza- 
tions in  Germany  and  the  Isolation  of  Austria.  LTnpopularity 
of  the  Peace  in  England.  Rxvusons.  Bonaparte's  Colonial  Policy. 
San  Domingo  and  Louisiana.  Malta.  Otto's  Instructions, 
The  Demands  of  the  British.  The  Outbreak  of  War.  Hanover 
and  Taranto.  The  Contributions  of  the  Dependencies  and  the 
Army  of  Boulogne.  The  Plot  against  the  First  Consul.  The 
Affair  of  the  Due  d'Engliicn.  Its  I''.ffects.  Tlie  People  Demand 
that  the  Chief  Magistracy  be  HcTcditary.  The  Proposition  of 
Cur<''e.  The  Constitutif)ii  of  tlic  Year  XII  (1804).  Emperor 
Napoleon  I.  and  his  Court.     Empire  and  State. 


Contents  xiii 

CHAPTER  XI 

p\(ii-: 

The  \Yar  of  1S05 283 

The  Emperor's  Army.  The  Project  of  the  Invasion  of  England. 
Discu.s.sion  of  it.  Napoleon's  Plan  of  a  Continental  War.  Breach 
with  Russia.  The  Intermediate  Powers.  Austria's  Submissive 
Neutrality.  Pius  VII.  in  Paris.  The  Coronation.  The  Italian 
Question.  Austria  in  the  Camp  of  the  Coalition.  Demonstrations 
at  Boulogne.  The  Beginning  of  the  War  on  the  Continent. 
Austria's  Preparations  and  Plans.  Mack  on  the  Iller.  Napo- 
leon's Manreuvre  to  Surround  the  Austrians.  The  Disaster  at 
Ulm.  Trafalgar.  Napoleon's  Advance  on  Vienna.  Kutusoff. 
Murat  and  the  Affair  at  HoUabrunn.  Prussia's  Approaches  to 
the  Coalition.  Napoleon  in  Briinn.  His  Precarious  Situation. 
Helped  out  by  the  Enemy.  Austerlitz.  The  Russians  Fall 
Back.  Armistice  with  Austria.  Haugwitz.  Peace  of  Press- 
burg.     National  Patriotism  and  the  Revolution  on  the  Throne. 

CHAPTER  XII 

N"aj»oleonic  Creatioks.     BiiEAcn  WITH  Prussia,     1806 325 

The  Effects  of  Recent  Events  on  the  French.  Their  Twofold 
Mistake.  Naples.  The  Italian  Titular  Fiefs.  Their  Inter- 
national Character.  Emperor  and  Pope.  Extension  of  the 
Napoleonic  System.  The  Kingdom  of  Holland.  South  German 
Princes  are  Made  Sovereigns  and  Vassals  of  Napoleon.  Family 
Alliances.  Dalberg  and  the  Founding  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine.  The  Attitude  of  the  Gennan  Powers.  Francis  II.  Re- 
signs the  Imperial  Crown  and  Dissolves  the  German  Empire. 
Permanent  Occupation  of  South  German}'  by  the  French.  Its 
Meaning.  The  Treat}'  between  France  and  Prussia,  February 
13th,  1800.  Negotiations  with  England  and  Russia.  Their 
Failure.  Prussia  is  Threatened  by  France.  She  Takes  Arms. 
Napoleon's  Plan.  National  I'prising  in  Germany.  Pahn. 
Prussia  Refuses  to  Disarm.     "War  again. 

CHAPTER  XIII 

From  Jena  to  Tilsit,  180G-1S0? 356 

Napoleon's  Prudent  Plan  of  Campaign.  Confusion  in  the  Prus- 
sian Headquarters.  The  Advance  of  the  French  from  lianibcrg 
to  Thuringia.  They  Take  the  Enemy  in  the  Rear.  The  Battles 
of   Jena    and    Auerstadt.     Dispersion    of   the    Prussian   Army. 


xiv  Contents 

PAGE 

Napoleon  in  Berlin.  He  Refuses  to  Negotiate.  Russia  Inter- 
venes. Napoleon's  Counter-measures.  His  Relations  with  Po- 
land and  Turkey.  The  Berlin  Decree  against  England.  Advance 
toward  the  East.  Pultusk.  The  Army  in  Cantonments  in  Po- 
land. Bennigsen's  Offensive  Movement  toward  the  West. 
Napoleon's  Counter-march  to  the  North.  The  Battle  of  Eylau. 
The  French  on  the  Passarge.  Napoleon  at  Osterode  and  Finken- 
stein.  His  Critical  Situation,  Negotiations  with  Prussia, 
Austria,  and  the  Eastern  Powers.  Reinforcements.  Resump- 
tion of  Hostilities.  Friedland.  Napoleon  and  Alexander  I. 
The  Agreements  at  Tilsit.  The  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Secret 
Alliance.     Their  Significance. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Situation  of  Affairs  in  France.      Bayonne  and  Erfurt, 

180S 391 

Napoleon  and  the  French.  Secret  Opposition.  Napoleon's 
Counter-measures.  Averting  Want  and  Promoting  Prosperity. 
The  Jewish  Question.  Financial  Policy.  Hereditary  Official 
Nobility.  The  Army  Denationalized.  Restraints  upon  the 
Freedom  of  the  Press.  The  Tribunate  Abolished.  The  Judges. 
The  Senators.  Educating  Imperialists.  The  University.  Per- 
sonality of  Napoleon.  The  Court  at  Fontainebleau.  Steps 
Taken  against  Prussia.  Napoleon's  Intrigues.  His  Conduct 
toward  Prussia  and  Austria.  Tuscany  Annexed  to  France. 
Action  Taken  in  Regard  to  the  States  of  the  Church.  Napoleon 
in  Spain.  His  Designs.  Portugal  and  the  Treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau. Its  Significance.  Contentions  at  the  Spanish  Court. 
The  French  Occupation.  The  Intrigue  at  Bayonne.  Napoleon's 
Mistake.  The  Uprising  of  the  Spanish  People.  The  Capitulations 
of  Baylen  and  Cintra.  Reaction  upon  Napoleon's  Position  in 
Europe.  Hostile  Disposition  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  Ihider- 
standing  between  France  and  Russia.  The  Days  at  Erfurt. 
The  New  Treaty.     Napoleon  and  the  Great  German  Authors. 

CHAPTER  XV 

/  The  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria.     Marie  Louise,  180&-1810  445 

The  "Grand  Army"  directed  toward  Spain.  Napoleon  Fights 
for  his  Prestige.  Weakness  and  Lack  of  Unity  of  the  Spaniards. 
Espinosa  and  Tudcla.  Napoleon  in  Madrid.  Expedition  of  Sir 
John  Moore.     Napoleon  Marches  against  Him.     His  Plan.     The 


Contents  xv 

PAGE 

Enemy  Escapes.  The  Object  in  Spain  only  Half  Attained.  [ 
Return  of  the  lOinpcror  to  Pari.s.  The  Causes,  'lalleyraud  and 
Fouch(f>.  Threatening  Preparations  of  Austria.  Her  Unavail- 
ing EfTorts  to  Secure  Help  from  Prus.sia  and  Russia.  War  Un- 
avoidable. Austrian  Plan  of  Campaign.  Their  Loss  of  Time. 
13erthier's  Errors.  Napoleon  at  Headquarters.  His  Successes 
at  Abersberg,  Landshut,  Eggmiihl,  and  Ratisbon.  Their  Sig- 
nificance. Advance  on  Menna.  The  Battle  of  Aspem.  The 
Political  Situation  Changes.  Wagram.  Armistice  of  Znaim. 
The  Negotiations  at  Altenburg.  The  Peace  of  Schonbrunn. 
Dissatisfaction  of  the  French.  Their  Desire  for  a  Legitimate 
Heir  to  the  Throne.  Napoleon's  Divorce  from  Jo.sephine.  He 
Plaj's  with  Russia.  Secret  Negotiation  for  Marriage  with  Marie 
Louise.  Its  Reception  in  Vienna.  The  New  Empress.  Mo- 
tives of  Napoleon.     The  King  of  Rome. 

CHAPTER  XYI  

At  the  Zexith,  1810-1S12 [ .'. 493 

The  Resistance  of  the  Nations.  Pius  VII.  Excommimicates 
Napoleon.  He  is  Taken  to  Savona.  The  Council  of  the  Em- 
pire. Guerilla  Warfare  on  the  Spanish  Peninsula.  Incorpora- 
tion of  Spain  as  far  as  the  Ebro  with  Spain.  Massena's  Expedition 
to  Portugal.  ^Mi}'  Napoleon  did  not  Take  the  Command.  The 
Continental  Blockade  as  a  Weapon  of  the  Revolution.  Napoleon 
and  Neutral  Commerce.  The  Edict  of  Trianon.  Holland 
Becomes  a  French  Province.  The  Incorporation  of  the  German 
North  Sea  States  and  the  Hanseatic  Cities  with  the  Empire. 
Relations  with  Denmark  and  Sweden.  Designs  on  Sicily.  Plan 
to  Annihilate  England.  French  Finances.  Lordship  of  the 
World.  Difficulties  with  Russia.  Their  Causes.  Russia  and 
the  Neutrals.  Preparations  and  Diplomatic  Fencing.  Internal 
Policy  of  Napoleon.  The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  Relations 
with  Prussia.  Franco-Prussian  Alliance.  Policy  of  Mqttemich, 
and  the  Austro-French  Alliance.  Failure  of  the  Effort  to  Gain 
Turkej'^  and  Sweden.  Congress  of  Princes  at  Dresden.  The 
Significance  of  Napoleon  in  Historj\ 

CHAPTER  XVII 
Moscow,  1812 536 

Warnings  of  the  Generals.  Napoleon's  Reply.  His  Care 
of  the  -Army.  The  Strategy  of  the  Advance.  Attitude 
of    the    Russians.      Their    Mistake    and    its    Effect    upon   the 


xvi  Contents  » 

PAGE 

Course  of  Events.  To  Vilna.  Indifference  of  the  Lithuanians. 
Its  Causes.  First  Misfortunes.  To  Drissa.  Sacrifices  of  the 
March.  Napoleon's  Personalit}^  Longing  for  a  Battle.  Vi- 
tebsk. The  Fight  for  Smolensk.  Dehberations.  Patriotism  of 
the  Russians.  The  Battle  of  Borodino.  To  Moscow.  Entering 
the  City.  The  Fire.  Great  Plans.  Napoleon's  Hope  of  Peace 
Disappointed.  Resoluteness  of  Alexander  I.  and  its  Causes, 
Necessity  of  Retreat.  Reopening  of  Hostilities.  Plans  for  the 
March.  Retirement  from  Moscow.  Affair  at  Malojaroslavetz. 
Deciding  in  Favour  of  the  Old Fload.  Fighting  at  Viasma.  Cold 
^^'eather.  In  Smolensk.  Fighting  at  &issnoi.  Pitiable  Con- 
dition of  the  .\rmy.  At  the  Beresina.  The  Battle  of  November 
2Sth.  The  Disaster  to  the  Rear.  Break-up  of  the  Army.  Bulle- 
tin No.  29  and  Napoleon's  Journey  to  Paris.     Its  Dangers. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 
Leipzig,  1813 580 

Shattered  Plans.     The  Beginnings  of  the  European  Coalition 
against  Napoleon.     New  Levies.     Uncertainty  of  the  Allies  of 

1812.  Yorck's  Revolt.  Its  Effects.  Napoleon's  Arrangement 
with  the  Pope  at  Fontainebleau.  Financial  Measures.  The 
Corps  L(5gislatif  and  the  Speech  from  the  Throne  February  14th, 

1813.  Foreign  Policy.  Fidelity  of  the  Princes  of  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine.  Hardenberg's  Territorial  Policy.  Austria 
During  tlie  Last  War.  Mctternich's  Peace  Policy.  Popular 
National  Movement  in  Prussia.  Russia  Makes  Use  of  it.  The 
Treaty  of  ]5reslau.  Saxony.  Forming  the  Coalition.  Reaction 
on  lli(!  Court  of  Vienna.  Renewal  of  War.  Napoleon's  New 
Army.  Battle  of  Lijtzen.  The  King  of  Saxony.  Austria  Draws 
off.  Napoleon's  Plan  for  a  Separate  Peace  with  Russia.  Battle 
of  Bautzen.  Armistice.  Motives  Therefor.  Armed  Inter- 
vention Ijy  Austria.  Treaty  of  Reichenbach.  Mettcrnich  in 
Dresden.  Extension  of  tiie  Armistice.  P^ffect  of  the  English 
\'ictiiry  at  Vittoria.  Austria  Joins  the  Coalition.  The  Congress 
of  Prague.  Reinforcements  of  Napoleon  and  of  the  Allies. 
Plans  of  W'lir  on  Both  Sides.  Napoleon  against  Bliicher.  The 
liat  1  le  of  I  )resden.  Why  Napoleon  did  not  Follow  up  His  Victory. 
Kulni.  His  Designs  on  Berlin.  Their  Failure.  Distress  of  the 
Army,  iiiiieher's  Withdrawal  to  the  Right  and  its  Consequences. 
Napoleon  Lejives  Dresden.  At  Diiben.  To  Leipzig.  The  Bat- 
tl<'  of  Wa<'liau  and  tiie  Fighting  at  Mockcrn.  Napoleon's  Delay. 
'I'lie  Hut  tie  of  Leipzig.  The  Disaster  of  October  19th.  Retreat 
to  the  Khiac.     The  Victory  ut  Ilanau.     Napoleon  in  Mainz. 


Contents  xvii 

CHAPTER   XIX 

PAOB 

Elba,  1814 643 

Nations  and  Princes.  Dissolution  of  the  Empure.  Negotia- 
tions with  Ferdinand  oT^Spain  and  Pius  VII.  St.  Aignan's 
Mission.  Manifesto  of  the  Allies.  Its  Effects.  The  Closing  of 
the  Corps  L^gislatif.  Napoleon  as  the  General  of  France.  The 
Allies  Press  Forward.  The  Plan  of  Operations.  The  Fighting 
at  Brienne.  The  Resolutions  at  Langres.  The  Battle  of  La 
Rothiere.  Napoleon  and  the  Boundaries  of  1792.  His  Victory 
over  Bliicher.  He  Faces  Schwarzenberg.  Bliicher  Decides  it. 
Fighting  at  Craonne.  Battle  at  Laon.  The  Treaty  of  Chaumont. 
The  Feeling  in  Paris.  The  Battle  of  Arcis  sur  Aube.  Napoleon's 
Plan  to  Transfer  the  Campaign  to  the  East  Ignored  by  the  Allies, 
The  Manifesto  from  Vitry.  Napoleon's  Desperate  Condition. 
He  Hastens  Back  to  Paris.  Entry  of  the  Allies.  Their  Declara- 
tion of  March  31st.  Napoleon  in  Fontainebleau.  France  Deserts 
Him.  The  Marshals.  Napoleon'Abdicates  in  Favour  of  His  Son. 
Desertion  of  Marmont.  Unconditional  Abdication,  April  6th. 
Napoleon's  Treaty  with  Europe.  Attempted  Suicide  (?).  Depart- 
ure for  Elba.  Dangers  of  the  Journey.  Activity  at  Elba.  The 
Idyll  of  Marciana.  Hopes.  Discontent  in  France.  Its  Causes. 
Dissentions  of  the  Powers  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  Napoleon's 
Calculations.  He  Leaves  Elba.  From  Cannes  over  the  Moim- 
tains  into  Dauphin^.  Winning  Over  the  Troops.  Grenoble, 
Lyons,  Paris. 


CHAPTER   XX 

Waterloo,  1815 694 

"Peace  and  Liberty."  Napoleon  Gives  Guarantees.  Benja- 
min Constant.  War  Instead  of  Peace.  Hostile  Resolution  of 
the  Powers  at  Vienna.  Its  Decisive  Effects  in  P'rance  upon  the 
Civilians  and  upon  the  Army.  Gloomy  Mood  of  the  Emperor. 
His  Constituent  Assembly.  The  "Acte  Additionnel"  of  April 
22d.  Dissatisfaction  with  it.  The  Cliamp  de  Mai.  The  Opening 
of  the  Chambers.  Distrust  on  All  Sides.  War.  Strength  of  the 
Parties.  Napoleon  Resolves  upon  the  Offensive.  His  Reasons. 
Surprising  the  Enemy.  It  is  Incomplete.  Napoleon  Deceived 
in  Regard  to  it.  The  Battle  of  Ligny.  Gneisenau's  Act.  Na^ 
poleon's  Second  Mistake.  Grouchy  Sent  to  the  East.  The 
Battle  of  June  18th.    Napoleon  in  Flight.    "Courage,  Resolution." 


xviii  Contents 


CHAPTER   XXI 

I'AGE 

St.  Helena,  1815-1821 721 

Paris  During  the  Battles.  Napoleon  at  the  Elyste.  The 
Ministry  and  the  Chambers.  The  Chambers  Request  the  Em- 
peror to  Abdicate.  He  Hesitates.  "Hors  la  loi!"  Abdication 
Follows.  Napoleon  at  Malmaison.  To  Rochefort.  England's 
Prisoner.  The  Traces  of  the  Hundred  Days.  In  the  Harbour  at 
Plymouth.  The  Sentence.  On  the  Northumberland.  Landing 
at  St.  Helena.  Longwood.  Sir  Hudson  Lowe.  The  Prison- 
er's Manner  of  Life.  "Letters  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope." 
Calculations  on  the  British  Opposition  Prove  False.  Napoleon 
Seriously  111.  His  Last  Arrangements.  His  Death.  The  Intel- 
lectual Legacy  of  the  Emperor.  "The  Campaign  of  1815." 
Discourses  on  the  Wars  of  the  Republic.  Their  Purpose.  The 
Legend  of  St,  Helena  and  History. 

Bibliography  745 

Index 789 


Napoleon   the    First 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   BONAPARTES   IN"    CORSICA.     NAPOLEON'S   BIRTH   AND 
EARLY  TRAINING 

"There  is  still  one  country  in  Europe  susceptible  of  mould- 
ing by  legislation — the  island  of  Corsica.  The  courage  and 
steadfastness  which  enabled  this  brave  people  to  regain  and  to 
defend  its  Uberty  well  deserve  that  a  sage  should  teach  it  how 
that  blessing  should  be  preserved.  I  have  a  presentiment  that 
this  Uttle  island  will  some  day  astonish  Europe."  Thus  wTote 
Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  in  1762  in  his  immortal  book  "Le  Con- 
trat  Social."  A  few  years  later  the  prophecy  of  the  philosopher 
was  fulfilled  in  the  birth,  on  "this  little  island,"  of  one  by  the 
power  of  whose  genius  the  whole  world  was  to  be  convulsed. 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  was  not  alone  in  his  sympathetic 
interest  in  Corsica.  The  attention  of  all  Europe  was  attracted 
toward  the  patriotic  httle  nation  which  since  1729  had  been  wag- 
ing a  war  for  independence  against  Genoa,  under  whose  sov- 
ereignty it  had  groaned  for  centuries.  The  best  minds  of  Europe 
were  interested  in  its  fortunes;  the  works  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
of  Voltaire,  and  of  Montesquieu  speak  with  respect  and  sym- 
pathy of  these  energetic  mountaineers  and  of  the  imposing 
personality  of  their  leader,  Pasquale  Paoli.  The  latter,  having 
been  declared  regent  of  the  "kingdom"  by  his  compatriots,  had 
wrested  the  island,  with  the  exception  of  the  seaboard  cities, 
from  the  grasp  of  Genoa;  had  established  a  wise  and  beneficent 
government  without  infringing  upon  the  liberties  of  the  people, 


2  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i769 

and  had  thereby  exempHfied  within  narrow  bounds  the  poHtical 
ideal  of  the  advocates  of  progress  and  of  a  rational  system  of 
government.  And  success  would  certainly  have  attended  his 
efforts  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  these  last  positions  and  to  win 
complete  independence  for  his  country  had  there  not  interposed 
a  power  whose  superior  resources  finally  drove  both  combatants 
from  the  field.     That  power  was  France. 

This  took  place  during  the  course  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
when  Genoa  gave  its  adhesion  to  France,  and  Louis  XV.  prom- 
ised in  return  to  support  that  republic  in  its  contest  with  Corsica. 
For  three  years  (1756-1759)  the  French  occupied  the  harbours 
of  San  Fiorenzo,  Calvi,  and  Ajaccio,  and  attempted  to  mediate 
between  the  belligerents.  Soon,  however,  they  took  measures 
toward  securing  for  themselves  this  important  island  in  the 
Mediterranean. 

■  Negotiations  with  the  Doge  of  Genoa  resulted  in  a  treaty  in 
1768,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  King  of  France,  in  return  for 
the  remission  of  sums  due  him  from  Genoa,  and  the  payment 
of  an  annual  subsidy,  was  granted  the  sovereignty  of  Corsica 
"as  security."  Despite  the  restrictive  clause  the  whole  world 
understood  it  to  mean  a  definitive  annexation.  And  indeed 
who  was  to  prevent  it?  The  attention  of  the  great  powers  was 
focussed  on  a  different  object  and  Louis  XV.  had  thus  but  a  single 
antagonist  to  deal  with — the  Corsican  people.  To  surrender 
their  independence  to  France  seemed  in  nowise  more  endurable 
than  to  submit  to  the  rule  of  Genoa,  and  Paoli  ventured  the  un- 
equal contest,  but  only  to  succumb.  After  gaining  a  few  unim- 
portant victories  he  suffered  defeat  in  a  decisive  battle  on  the 
Golo  (May,  1769)  and  was  obliged  to  flee.  In  July  he  left  the 
island  to  find  in  England  a  hospitable  refuge.  Only  a  few  of 
his  most  faithful  companions  in  arms  acconii)anied  him  thither. 
The  greater  part  of  them  had  retreated  to  Monte  Rotondo,  and, 
having  been  offered  favourable  terms  by  the  French,  they  laid 
down  their  arms.     France  was  in  possession  of  the  island. 

Among  the  speakers  of  the  deputation  sent  to  sue  for  peace 
from  the  victor  was  Carlo  Buonaparte,  the  father  of  Napoleon. 
This  confidential  mission  was  entrusted  to  him  doubtless  on 


Napoleon's  Father  ^ 

account  of  the  respect  in  which  his  family  was  held  at  Ajaccio, 
where  they  had  lived  for  two  centuries.  In  later  years,  when  the 
little  Corsican  had  become  great,  inventive  flatterers  were  not 
wanting  who  traced  back  his  lineage  to  a  Byzantine  emperor 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  His  line  can,  however,  be  traced,  with  any 
degree  of  certainty,  only  to  the  sixteenth  century,  when  one 
Gabriel  Buonaparte  quitted  Sarzana  in  Tuscany  to  establish 
himself  at  Ajaccio.  The  Buonapartes  were  of  the  nobility.  At 
least  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany,  Leopold  of  Austria,  did  not 
hesitate  to  confirm  the  nobility  of  Napoleon's  grandfather  in 
1757.  It  was  also  confirmed  later  by  the  Heralds'  College  of 
France.  The  Buonapartes  (this  was  the  original  spelling  of 
the  name  and  thus  Napoleon  himself  wTote  it  until  1796),  like 
most  of  the  residents  of  the  seaboard  cities,  remained  loyal  to 
Genoa  until  no  longer  able  to  withstand  the  patriotic  uprising. 

When  war  with  France  opened.  Carlo  joined  the  ranks  of  the 
patriots  and  was  rewarded  with  special  distinction  by  Paoli. 
After  the  victory  of  the  enemy,  however,  he  soon  became  a 
zealous  supporter  of  the  newly-established  government.  A 
cordial  welcome  was  ever  extended  to  the  foreigners  in  Carlo's 
house  at  Ajaccio,  where  his  beautiful  young  wife  La^titia  (nee 
Ramolino)  made  a  charming  hostess,  and  the  French  command- 
ant, Count  Marbceuf,  was  a  frequent  visitor. 

Carlo  Buonaparte  was  a  man  of  some  attainments,  although 
not  remarkably  gifted;  ambitious,  also  somewhat  frivolous  and 
fond  of  pleasure,  yet  solicitous  withal  in  caring  for  his  numerous 
family.  He  was  a  lawyer  by  profession,  and  his  own  client; 
he  had  nothing  more  at  heart  than  the  litigation  he  was  carry- 
ing on  for  the  recovery  of  a  valuable  estate  bequeathed  by  a 
pious  relative  to  the  Jesuits.  The  latter  were  for  this  reason 
detested  by  him,  and  indeed  he  could  never  have  been  counted 
a  very  devout  Catholic.  The  lawsuit  carried  on  by  the  French 
authorities  as  legal  successors  to  the  banished  monks  wasted 
much  time  and  money,  as  did  also  the  repeated  journeys  to 
Versailles,  whither  his  office  of  deputy  of  the  Corsican  nobility 
led  him.  It  was  while  on  an  expedition  of  this  kind  that  death 
overtook  him  at  Montpellier  in  1785,  at  the  early  age  of  thirty- 


4  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i769 

eight.  He  left,  besides  the  iindecided  lawsuit,  but  scant  means 
of  subsistence  for  his  family. 

Maria  Lsetitia  had  borne  her  husband  thirteen  children. 
When  he  died  eight  were  still  living,  five  of  them  boys.  Je- 
rome, the  youngest,  was  but  three  months  old.  It  was  no  easy 
task  for  the  widow  to  carry  on  her  household  and  provide  for 
so  large  a  family  with  these  limited  resources.  But  Laetitia 
solved  the  problem.  A  woman  of  quick  perception  and  sagacity, 
with  the  tenacious  energy  that  overcomes  difficulties;  impul- 
sive yet  thoughtful,  undaunted  and,  at  the  same  time,  calculating, 
she  was  a  true  Corsican.  With  no  great  mental  gifts  and  slight 
pretensions  to  education,  she  had  much  common  sense  and  was 
not  wanting  in  a  certain  loftiness  of  sentiment.  When,  at  the 
time  of  the  war  with  France,  Carlo  joined  Paoli,  she  had  coura- 
geously followed  her  husband  into  the  mountains,  and,  although 
she  was  with  child,  had  willingly  borne  all  the  hardships  of  the 
campaign.  Now  she  governed  her  household  with  a  firm  hand 
and  utilized  her  limited  means  with  prudence  and  economy. 

In  truth  Carlo's  unreserved  adherence  to  France  and  the 
friendship  of  the  governor  had  at  length  proved  of  practical 
benefit.  The  elder  sons  had  been  put  to  school  in  French  insti- 
tutions at  the  king's  expense;  now  at  his  father's  death  Joseph, 
the  eldest,  returned  to  Corsica  to  help  his  mother,  and  in  the 
same  year,  1785,  Napoleon,  the  second  son,  left  the  Paris  Military 
Academy  as  lieutenant,  no  less  ready  to  help  those  at  home  to 
the  extent  of  his  ability.  Who  would  have  dreamed  that  under 
the  protection  of  this  little  officer  the  whole  family  should  some 
day  attain  to  grandeur,  power,  and  distinction? 

Napoleon  was  born  in  Ajaccio  on  the  15th  of  August,  1769; 
a  date  the  accuracy  of  which  is  put  in  question  by  the  most 
recent  investigation.  Indeed  the  latest  researches  cast  no 
little  doubt  upon  the  much-celebrated  Napoleon's  Day.*  Accord- 
ing to  these  the  year  of  his  birth  should  be  1768,  and  his  birth- 
place Corte. 

*  See  the  bibliogrui)liy,  cfi.  I,  for  the  arguments  for  and  against  the 
accepted  date. — B. 


^T.  1-10]  Napoleon's  Boyhood  5 

The  evidence,  however,  is  not  so  strong  as  to  give  cause  for 
abandoning  the  traditional  date,  to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that 
it  is  a  matter  of  comparatively  little  importance  whether  our 
hero  was  born  a  year  earlier  or  later,  whether  in  the  interior 
of  the  island  or  on  the  coast.  Suffice  it  that  there  he  was  and 
that  he  soon  made  his  presence  felt. 

In  his  childhood  he  is  said  to  have  resembled  his  mother  in 
appearance,  having  inherited  also  Laetitia's  energetic  disposi- 
tion, while  his  brothers  were  more  like  their  father.  Wilful 
and  stubborn,  Napoleon  gave  trouble  to  all  about  him.  To 
quote  his  own  words  written  toward  the  close  of  his  life:  "I 
was  self-willed  and  obstinate,  nothing  awed  me,  nothing  discon- 
certed me.  I  was  quarrelsome,  exasperating;  I  feared  no  one. 
I  gave  a  blow  here  and  a  scratch  there.  Every  one  was  afraid 
of  me.  My  brother  Joseph  was  the  one  with  whom  I  had  the 
most  to  do;  he  was  beaten,  bitten,  scolded;  I  complained  that 
he  did  not  get  over  it  soon  enough."  His  mother  alone  was 
able,  by  the  exercise  of  great  severity,  to  control  the  headstrong 
boy,  while  his  father  usually  defended  him.  As  is  evident,  his 
early  training  was  not  of  the  best.  Under  the  instruction  of 
his  uncle  Fesch,  a  half-brother  of  Laetitia's,  Napoleon  learned 
the  alphabet,  and,  later,  in  a  girls'  school  of  the  little  town,  he 
acquired  the  essentials  of  his  mother  tongue. 

Doubtless  he  gave  much  greater  attention  to  the  many  tales 
which  he  overheard  of  Paoli  and  the  war  for  independence 
and  eagerly  constructed  ideals  from  the  material  which  lay  so 
near  at  hand.  He  was  overflowing  with  heroic  dreams  of  this 
kind  when  he  afterward  went  to  France. 

The  lad's  untamable  spirit  may  have  led  his  father  to  dis- 
cover his  predisposition  for  a  military  life.  He  applied  for  a 
scholarship  for  his  son  at  one  of  the  royal  schools  where  the 
scions  of  the  French  nobility  were  prepared  for  a  military  career, 
and  his  request  was  granted.  Toward  the  end  of  the  year  1778 
he  left  home  in  order  to  place  his  two  elder  sons  in  the  College 
of  Autun,  where  Napoleon  was  to  learn  French  before  entering 
the  military  school  at  Brienne,  while  Joseph  was  to  finish  his 
classical  studies  preparatory  to  taking  orders.     In  three  months 


6  Birth  and  Early  Training        [1769-1779 

the  former  had  made  some  progress  in  learning  to  express  him- 
self in  French,  and  on  the  23d  of  April,  1779,  Napoleone  do 
Buonaparte  was  enrolled  among  the  students  at  Brienne.  The 
die  was  cast — he  was  to  be  a  soldier. 

The  five  years  spent  in  this  place  were  not  of  the  happiest 
for  the  young  Corsican.  To  be  transported  from  the  ever- 
smiling  scenes  of  the  south  to  the  northern  gloom  of  Champagne, 
from  the  sea  to  the  most  monotonous  province  of  the  interior, 
from  untrammelled  freedom  to  a  monastic  discipline,  where 
he  knew  no  one  of  the  trifling  pleasures  which  made  home 
happy,  what  wonder  that  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  boy  should 
become  gloomy  and  morose?  What  above  all  brought  about 
this  unhappy  state  of  affairs  was  his  unsociable  disposition. 
His  imperious,  defiant  temperament  found  all  too  soon  resolute 
antagonists  in  the  haughty  sons  of  the  Castries,  the  Comminges, 
and  all  the  other  illustrious  houses  represented  by  his  fellow 
students  at  Brienne.  He  had  to  endure  the  mortification  of 
learning  that  they  considered  his  title  to  nobility  defective, 
and  that  they  spoke  insultingly  of  his  father,  whom  they  dubbed 
the  "usher"  in  derision  of  his  incessant  petitioning  at  Ver- 
sailles. For  a  time  Napoleon  revenged  himself  in  his  own  un- 
governed  fashion,  but  at  length  sullenly  withdrew  from  the 
society  of  them  all. 

Two  of  his  schoolfellows  have  left  us  credible  accounts  of 
his  life  at  the  Military  Academy  and  of  his  unsociable  demean- 
our. One  of  them  writes:  "Gloomy  and  even  savage,  almost 
always  solf-absorbed,  one  would  have  supposed  that  he  had 
just  come  from  some  forest  and,  unmindful  until  then  of  the 
notice  of  his  fellows,  experienced  for  the  first  time  the  sensations 
of  surprise  and  distrust;  he  detested  games  and  all  manner  of 
boyish  amusements.  One  part  of  the  garden  was  allotted  to 
him  and  there  he  studied  and  brooded,  and  woe  to  him  who 
ventured  to  disturb  him!  One  evening  the  boys  were  setting 
off  fireworks  and  a  small  powder-chest  exploded.  In  their 
fright  the  troop  scattered  in  all  directions  and  some  of  them 
took  refuge  in  Napoleon's  domain,  whereat  he  rushed  upon  the 
fugitives  in  a  passion  and  attacked  them  with  a  spade."     Winter 


^T.  10-15]  At   Brienne  7 

alone  compelled  him  to  be  more  companionable.  Then  was 
his  opportunity  to  show  the  others  how  to  build  snow  forts  and 
defences  of  all  sorts,  and  how  to  attack  and  defend  them.  But 
the  first  day  of  spring  found  him  again  in  his  corner  of  the 
garden,  serious  and  solitary.  Naturally  he  made  no  friends 
among  his  schoolmates, — he  never  had  one  during  his  life. 
One  is  even  inclined  to  doubt  whether  he  ever  had  any  youth; 
it  seems  indeed  as  if  no  ray  of  the  springtime  of  life,  which  fills 
so  many  hearts  with  gladness,  had  ever  brightened  the  path 
of  this  early  embittered  nature. 

It  was  not  long  before  troubles  of  a  more  material  nature 
were  added  to  the  pangs  of  wounded  pride.  The  straitened 
condition  of  the  family  did  not  admit  of  keeping  the  boys  at 
school  supplied  with  an  abundance  of  pocket-money,  a  new 
mark  of  inferiority  to  the  hated  Frenchmen.  On  this  account 
Napoleon,  then  twelve  years  old,  sent  to  his  father  a  letter  of 
expostulation  which  is  exceedingly  characteristic  of  the  disposi- 
tion and  mental  attitude  of  the  writer.  He  begs  to  be  taken 
away  from  Brienne,  and  rather,  if  need  be,  to  be  set  to  learn 
some  handicraft,  than  to  be  compelled  further  to  exhibit  his 
poverty.  He  \\Tites:  "I  am  weary  of  advertising  my  destitu- 
tion and  of  seeing  it  ridiculed  by  insolent  schoolboys  whose 
only  point  of  superiority  to  me  is  in  their  wealth,  for  there  is 
not  one  amongst  them  who  is  not  a  hundred  degrees  below  me 
in  nobility  of  feeling.  What!  Sir,  would  you  have  your  son 
continually  the  butt  of  a  lot  of  high-born  clowns,  who,  vain 
of  the  pleasures  they  are  enabled  to  enjoy,  insult  me  in  laugh- 
ing at  the  privations  which  I  am  obliged  to  undergo?"  *  He 
learned  in  reply  that  it  was  indeed  impossible  for  those  at  home 
to  furnish  him  with  funds  neccssar}^  to  keep  up  appearances. 
Another  cause  of  embitterment  augmented  by  his  distress  over 
the  situation  of  the  family  at  home. 

Napoleon  was  neither  a  verj^  industrious  nor  talented  scholar. 
When  he  left  the  school  after  five  years  of  study  his  spelling  was 
wretched.  Indeed  he  never  was  able  to  UTite  pure  French. 
His  acquirements  in  Latin  were  of  so  limited  a  character  that 

*  This  letter  is  rejected  by  Masson,  "Napoleon  inconnu,"  I.  55. — B. 


8  Birth  and   Early  Training        [1779-1784 

there  were  among  his  teachers  men  narrow-minded  enough 
to  consider  him  on  this  account  without  intellectual  gifts.  His- 
tory and  geography,  on  the  contrary,  he  studied  with  pleasure, 
and  above  all  he  preferred  mathematics.  "It  was  the  general 
opinion,"  said  he  in  later  days,  "that  I  was  fit  for  nothing  except 
geometry."  Taken  all  in  all  he  matured  early.  The  letters 
which  he  wrote  from  Brienne  to  his  uncle  Fesch  are  throughout 
serious,  clear,  and  logical.  He  showed  ability  to  compare,  dis- 
criminate, and  judge  acutely.  One  hears  with  astonishment 
the  way  in  which  this  boy  of  fourteen  characterizes  his  elder 
brother  who  proposed  to  enter  the  military  service  in  place  of 
the  priesthood.  "He  is  mistaken  in  this  for  several  reasons," 
wrote  Napoleon  to  Fesch.  "1.  As  my  father  says,  he  has  not 
the  intrepidity  necessary  to  confront  the  dangers  of  a  battle. 
His  feeble  health  does  not  permit  his  undergoing  the  hardships 
of  a  campaign.  Indeed  my  brother  considers  a  military  career 
only  from  the  standpoint  of  garrison  life.  He  would  unques- 
tionably make  an  excellent  officer  of  the  garrison.  Well  built, 
with  ready  wit,  therefore  fitted  for  paying  frivolous  compliments, 
and  with  his  talents  he  will  make  an  excellent  appearance  in 
society.  But  in  battle? — That  is  the  point  whereon  my  father 
has  his  doubts.  2.  He  has  been  educated  for  the  church;  it  is 
now  very  late  to  make  a  change  of  profession.  The  bishop  of 
Autun  would  have  given  him  a  rich  living  and  he  would  with  cer- 
tainty have  become  a  bishop.  What  advantages  that  would  entail 
to  the  family!  My  Lord  Bishop  of  Autvm  has  done  his  utmost 
to  induce  him  to  persevere  in  his  original  course,  assuring  him 
that  he  will  never  have  cause  to  regret  it.  All  in  vain, — he  is 
not  to  be  moved.  I  should  commend  his  determination  if  it 
arose  from  a  decided  taste  for  that  calling,  which  is  after  all  the 
finest,  and  if  the  great  Controller  of  human  affairs  had  planted 
in  his  breast  (as  in  mine)  a  real  love  of  things  military. 
3.  He  wants  a  place  in  the  army;  very  good, — but  in  what 
branch  of  the  service?  .  .  .  Doubtless  he  prefers  the  infantry, 
that  is  readily  understood;  he  wants  nothing  to  do  the  livelong 
day,  to  promenade  up  and  down  the  streets  all  day.  And  to 
add  to  all  this  what  does  a  petty  officer  of  infantry  amount  to? 


^T.  If)]  His   Devotion  to   Corsica  9 

A  loafer  three  quarters  of  the  time,  and  that  is  one  thing  whicli 
neither  my  father,  nor  you,  nor  my  mother,  nor  my  uncle  the 
Archdeacon  desire,  so  much  the  less  that  he  has  already  shown 
himself  somewhat  frivolous  and  extravagant,  etc." 

In  his  moments  of  leisure  Napoleon  gave  free  play  to  his 
lively  imagination.  In  his  reveries  he  was  carried  back  to  his 
island  home  with  its  high  mountains  and  the  ever-clear  sky 
above  them,  its  picturesque  seacoavst  and  the  deep  blue  sea, — 
back  to  the  happier  days  of  his  childhood.  These  day-dreams 
were  his  sole  recreation  and  comfort,  and  in  his  cheerless  solitude 
in  the  midst  of  strangers,  his  longing  for  the  land  of  his  birth 
grew  to  be  a  glowing  patriotism.  Are  not  those  who  humiliate 
and  sneer  at  him  here  at  the  same  time  the  foes  and  subjugators 
of  his  native  land? 

The  thought  that  his  father  had  helped  to  further  the  cause 
of  the  French  in  Corsica  was  unbearable, — forgive  him  he  could 
not,  and  he  took  no  pains  to  conceal  his  feelings.  The  heroic 
figure  of  Paoli  appears  before  his  mind  in  radiant  splendour,  and 
he  expresses  the  wish  to  become  another  such  as  he.  "I  hope," 
he  exclaims,  "some  time  to  be  in  a  position  to  restore  her  free- 
dom to  Corsica." 

The  fact  that  he  was  preparing  himself  for  that  purpose  at 
the  expense  of  France  gave  him  not  the  least  uneasiness.  But 
first  of  all  he  feels  impelled  to  acquaint  himself  thoroughly 
with  the  history  of  the  Corsican  people,  and  begs  those  at  home 
to  send  him  Boswell  and  other  books  dealing  with  the  subject. 
Perhaps  the  plan  has  even  now  taken  shape  in  his  mind  to 
become  himself  the  historian  of  his  native  island.  In  short, 
he  was  an  out-and-out  Corsican,  and  implacably  hostile  toward 
the  French.  But  above  all  he  detested  those  among  them  who 
arrogantly  vaunted  their  superiority  of  birth  and  fortune  and 
looked  with  scorn  upon  those  who  were  not  their  equals  in  rank. 

Thus  in  the  solitary  broodings  of  this  mind,  naturally  given 
to  reflection,  were  developed  those  revolutionary  ideas  which 
were  just  then  beginning  to  agitate  the  whole  of  France.  "When 
once  he  meets  them  in  the  minds  of  others,  they  will  appear 
neither  strange  nor  unfamiliar. 


lo  Birth  and   Early  Training  [i784 

According  to  his  father's  wishes  and  his  own  inclinations 
Napoleon  was  to  have  entered  the  navy.  But  Fate  willed  it 
otherwise.  So  large  a  number  of  applications  had  already  been 
made  by  boys  from  the  military  schools  who  preferred  the  marine 
service  that  had  he  insisted  upon  carrying  out  his  intention  he 
would  have  been  obliged  to  lose  a  whole  year.  The  straitened 
circumstances  of  the  family  scarcely  admitted  of  this,  and  he 
decided  without  delay  upon  entering  the  artillery,  a  branch  of 
the  service  usually  avoided  by  the  boys  on  account  of  the  heavier 
work  involved.  His  resolution  once  taken  he  was  placed  in  the 
company  of  cadets  of  the  nobility  in  Paris,  to  which  place  he 
removed  on  the  23d  of  October,  1784.  This  change  had  but 
slight  effect  on  the  inward  workings  of  his  mind.  At  Paris,  as 
at  Brienne,  the  difference  was  manifest  between  the  sons  of  the 
great  families  and  those  of  the  lesser  nobility  who  were  edu- 
cated at  the  king's  expense.  The  same  insurmountable  barrier 
which  separated  him  from  the  Comminges  and  the  Castries  at 
Brienne  interposed  here  to  keep  him  from  the  Rohans  and  the 
Montmorencys,  and  wounded  anew  his  unbounded  self-esteem. 
He  made  himself  no  more  beloved  in  Paris  than  at  Brienne  and 
even  added  to  his  unpopularity  by  protesting  in  a  memorial 
against  the  effeminate  luxury  which  made  the  Ecole  militaire 
one  of  the  most  costly  institutions  of  the  state,  while  it  at  the 
same  time  unfitted  its  graduates  for  active  service. 

Just  at  this  time  came  the  tidings  of  his  father's  death,  and 
his  attention  was  turned  entirely  to  the  question  of  an  appoint- 
ment as  officer  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  an  advance- 
ment to  which  he  was  entitled  to  aspire,  having  reached  the 
required  age  of  fifteen  years.  His  examination  passed  after  a 
fashion,  he  presented  a  petition  to  be  assigned  to  the  Artillery 
regiment  of  La  FSre  stationed  at  Valence;  his  commission  as 
second  lieutenant  followed  on  the  1st  of  September,  and  in 
October — having  borrowed  the  money  necessary  to  defray  his 
travelling  expenses — he  departed  for  the  garrison. 

The  instructors  at  the  military  school,  among  whom  at  that 
time  was  Monge,  the  celebrated  mathematician,  gave,  in  regard 
to  the  student  who  had  just  taken  leave,   the  following  dis- 


Mr.  15]  Garrison   Life  1 1 

criminating  report:  "Reserved  and  studious,  he  prefers  study 
to  amusement  of  any  kind,  and  takes  pleasure  in  reading  the 
works  of  good  authors;  while  diligent  in  his  study  of  abstract 
science,  he  cares  little  for  any  other;  he  has  a  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  mathematics  and  geography.  He  is  taciturn,  preferring 
solitude,  capricious,  haughty,  and  inordinately  self-centred. 
While  a  man  of  few  words,  he  is  vigorous  in  his  replies,  ready 
and  incisive  in  retort;  he  has  great  self-esteem,  is  ambitious, 
with  aspirations  that  stop  at  nothing;  he  is  a  young  man  worthy 
of  patronage." 


"When  I  entered  the  service,"  said  Napoleon  one  day  to 
Madame  de  R^musat,  "I  found  garrison  life  tedious;  I  began 
reading  novels,  and  that  kind  of  reading  proved  interesting. 
I  made  an  attempt  at  writing  some ;  this  task  gave  range  to  my 
imagination.  It  took  hold  of  my  knowledge  of  positive  facts, 
and  often  I  found  amusement  in  giving  myself  up  to  dreams  in 
order  to  test  them  later  by  the  standard  of  my  reasoning  powers. 
I  transported  myself  in  thought  to  an  ideal  world,  and  I  sought 
to  discover  wherein  lay  the  precise  difference  between  that  and 
the  world  in  which  I  lived."  He  was  then  the  same  dreamer 
as  of  old!  The  fondness  for  seclusion  and  meditation,  which 
appeared  under  the  restraint  of  his  school  days,  was  not  lost  in 
the  free  intercourse  of  every-day  life  without  its  walls.  What 
sort  of  men  could  have  peopled  his  ideal  world  if,  on  comparison 
with  them,  his  fellow  mortals  no  longer  appeared  worthy  of  his 
companionship? 

One  thing  at  least  we  may  gather  with  safety  from  his  con- 
fessions: that  the  officers  of  the  royal  army  had  ample  time 
for  novel-reading,  for  dreaming,  and  for  meditation.  And  as 
a  matter  of  fact  under  the  old  regime  the  organization  of  the 
army  was  such  that  neither  private  soldiers  nor  their  superiors 
had  cause  to  complain  of  hardship.  Thorough  drill,  camp- 
exercises,  manoeuvres,  were  things  unknown.  To  be  sure, 
after  the  discomfiture  at  Rossbach  in  1757  there  had  been  those 
who  demanded  reform,  but  no  one  heeded  them;  the  weakness 
of  the  government  and  the  indolent  ease  of  the  officers  of  the 


12  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i784 

nobility  proved  an  insurmountable  obstacle.  There  was  then 
no  want  of  leisure,  but  the  prospect  of  the  future  presented  to 
the  mind  of  one  of  these  young  officers,  had  he  cared  to  employ 
his  leisure  in  considering  it,  could  not  appear  brilliant  unless  he 
belonged  to  a  powerful  and  wealthy  family.  Such  alone  might 
aspire  to  the  rank  of  staff-officer  and  general,  while  the  poor 
and  inferior  nobility  must  be  satisfied  throughout  their  lives 
with  subaltern  positions. 

Imagine  the  fiery-natured  Napoleon,  with  his  feverish  thirst 
for  appreciation,  facing  the  barren  prospect  of  a  half-dozen 
years  of  waiting  for  his  promotion  to  the  rank  of  first  fieutenant 
with  at  least  the  same  time  of  weary  waiting  before  he  could  be- 
come captain,  finally  as  such  to  retire  and  end  his  days,  having 
been  faithfully  accompanied  throughout  his  career  by  want 
and  privation. 

Who  wonders  that  his  thoughts  turned  into  other  channels, 
or  even  that  he  openly  held  aloof  from  those  who  found  pleasure 
in  so  modest  a  lot?  He  associated  with  his  comrades  in  the 
garrison  as  little  as  he  had  with  those  at  school.  Indeed,  they 
differed  at  bottom  from  the  youths  at  Brienne  and  Paris  only 
in  being  a  httle  more  mature.  Napoleon  found  much  more 
to  his  taste  the  society  of  royal  officials,  lawyers,  and  other 
persons  of  the  middle  class  who  suffered  in  a  way  similar  to  his 
own  from  the  rigid  distinctions  of  society  and  who  paid  more 
attention  to  the  outbreaks  in  which  he  vented  his  radical  opin- 
ions than  did  the  officers  of  La  Fere,  who,  incensed  at  his  keen 
derision,  threw  him,  one  day,  into  the  Rhone. 

For  a  time  he  consorted  with  the  social  circle  of  Valence  and 
frequented  particularly  the  house  of  Madame  de  Colombier,  in 
which  the  Abb4  de  Saint-Ruf  was  the  most  prominent  guest, 
and  in  which  assembled  the  daughters  of  the  neighbouring  fami- 
lies of  rank,  liut  this  was  only  transitory.  He  soon  resumed 
his  former  solitary  manner  of  life. 

Was  it,  perchance,  through  some  tender  attachment  that 
he  had  been  drawn  toward  this  house,  and  had  his  feeling  re- 
mained imreqiiited?  We  have  no  certain  knowledge  as  to  this. 
But  five  years  later — at  the  age  of  twenty-two — he  wrote  the 


Mr.  15]  Literary  Studies  1 3 

following  in  his  "Dialogue  on  Love":  "I  was  once  in  love  and 
I  still  retain  enough  of  its  recollections  not  to  rcciuire  these 
metaphysical  definitions  which  never  do  anything  but  confuse 
matters.  I  go  further  than  to  deny  its  existence;  I  consider 
it  dangerous  to  society  as  well  as  to  the  happiness  of  the  indi- 
vidual. In  short,  I  hold  that  love  does  more  harm  than  good 
and  that  it  would  be  a  beneficent  act  on  the  part  of  a  protecting 
divinity  to  rid  us  of  it  and  deliver  mankind  from  its  thrall." 

But  his  leisure  time  was  by  no  means  entirely  devoted  to 
novel-reading  and  the  fantastic  play  of  his  imagination.  He 
developed  an  interest  greater  than  ever  in  serious  study  and 
read  especially  political  and  historical  works. 

This  was  the  time  in  which  the  greatest  minds  of  France 
had  appeared  as  leaders  and  teachers  of  the  nation  to  proclaim 
those  rationalistic  theories  which  condenmed  existing  conditions 
and  demanded  in  their  place  a  new  form  of  state  and  of  society. 
The  writings  of  Voltaire  and  Montesquieu,  Rousseau  and  d'A- 
lembert  were  in  the  hands  of  every  one.  Bonaparte*  had  already 
given  himself  wdth  eagerness  to  the  study  of  their  works  while 
at  the  Military  School  in  Paris,  and  rarely  have  the  words  of 
Jean  Jacques  fallen  upon  more  fruitful  soil.  He  made  excerpts 
from  the  "Contrat  Social"  and  added  notes  thereto,  and  eagerly 
adopted  the  extravagant  enthusiasm  of  the  Genevan  philosopher 
for  the  state  of  nature.  He  likewise  read  Filangieri's  "Scienza 
della  legislazione,"  which  had  enjoyed  since  1780  a  quite  un- 
deserved consideration,  Adam  Smith's  "Wealth  of  Nations," 
Necker's  "Comptc-rendu,"  and  much  else.  But  more  than  any 
of  these,  Raynal  appears  to  have  influenced  his  further  develop- 
ment. Raynal  was  during  the  eighties  the  most  widely  read 
author  in  France.  His  "  Histoire  philosophique  et  politique 
des  EtabUssements  et  du  Commerce  des  Europeens  dans  les  Deux 
Indes"  had  acquired  an  unrivalled  popularity  on  account  of  its 
revolutionary  tendencies.  The  book  offered  more  than  was  to 
be  inferred  from  its  title.  It  discussed,  for  instance,  not  only 
the  political  situation  of  China,  but  compared  the  same  with 
that  of  France  to  the  distinct  disadvantage  of  the  latter.     It 

*  I  shall  henceforth  adopt  this  spelling. 


14  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i784 

depicted  with  impressive  eloquence  the  condition  of  his  native 
land,  the  unreasonable  privileges  of  the  nobility  and  higher 
clergy,  the  immense  abyss  separating  the  rich  from  the  poor, 
and  the  wrongs  suffered  by  the  middle  class  without  power  of 
redress;  the  demoralizing  corruption  shown  in  the  sale  of  office, 
and  the  wretched  administration  of  the  finances.  It  prophesied 
the  collapse  of  the  government  soon  to  follow,  nay,  more,  it 
summoned  openly  to  revolution  as  a  clear  duty  under  such 
circumstances.  This  doctrine  made  a  profound  impression  on 
Napoleon,  more  profound  than  that  made  by  any  of  the  teach- 
ings of  Rousseau.  He  acknowledged  himself,  later,  a  zealous 
disciple  of  Raynal  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  "Discours  sur  le 
Bonheur,"  which  he  presented  (blunders  in  speUing  included) 
to  the  Academy  of  Lyons  in  1791.  In  1787  he  became  personally 
acquainted  with  Raynal,  and  spoke  with  him  about  his  studies 
into  the  history  of  his  native  land.  A  few  years  later  he  be- 
stowed upon  Raynal  a  fragment:  "Lettres  sur  I'Histoire  de 
la  Corse,"  which  he  had  begun  writing  in  1786  and  in  which  he 
narrated  the  history  of  the  island  down  to  the  time  of  Paoli. 
Napoleon's  brother  Lucien  would  have  us  believe  that  Raynal 
showed  the  "Lettres"  to  Mirabeau,  and  that  the  latter  extolled 
the  genius  of  their  author.  But  Lucien's  veracity  is  not  un- 
impeachable. 

However  that  may  be.  Napoleon  had  become  a  writer  and 
now,  with  indefatigable  pen,  composed,  in  addition  to  his  history, 
a  novel,  the  scene  of  which  is  laid  in  Corsica,  a  drama — "le 
Comte  d'Essex,"  and  stories  after  the  manner  of  Diderot  and 
Voltaire.* 

But  to  him  it  was  not  sufficient  to  put  his  thoughts  on  paper; 
he  could  not  be  satisfied  until  they  should  be  printed  and  read, 
and  this  not  merely  for  the  sake  of  vanity  and  ambition,  but  in 
order  to  gain  money.  For  pecuniary  cares  had  not  deserted 
him  in  his  garrison  life;  on  the  contrary,  they  had  become 
more  than  ev(>r  importunate   and  tormented  him   beyond  en- 

*  lionaparte  himself  eventually  burned,  with  but  few  exceptions,  all 
"the  rubbish  of  his  youthful  literary  attempts."  (Th.  Jung,  "Lucien 
Bonaparte  et  ses  Mdmoires,"  t.  II.  p.  144.) 


Mt.  17]  Family   Adversities  1 5 

durance.  Not  that  the  one  hundred  Uvres  a  month  which  he 
received  as  pay  would  have  been  insufhcient  for  his  personal 
expenses;  his  wants  were  not  many  or  great.  His  lodgings 
at  the  house  of  Mademoiselle  Bon  cost  him  something  more 
than  eight  livres,  and  for  a  time  he  ate  but  one  meal  a  day; 
the  fact  that  he  had  little  intercourse  with  his  gay  fellow  soldiers 
was  in  itself  an  additional  economy.  But  there  were  times  when 
real  want  threatened  those  at  home.  In  September,  17S6,  death 
bereaved  them  of  their  benefactor  and  patron,  Marbcruf,  the 
governor  of  Corsica,  and  a  great-uncle,  the  archdeacon  Lucien, 
who  had  always  helped  them  with  his  watchful  care  and  advice, 
lay  seriously  ill.  Joseph,  who,  in  spite  of  remonstrance,  had 
discarded  the  clerical  for  the  military  profession,  and  who,  after 
his  father's  death,  had  been  obliged  to  renounce  this  also  in 
order  to  find  a  position  at  home,  was  still  seeking  remunerative 
work.  Up  to  this  time  the  Bonapartes  had  been  the  annual 
recipients  of  a  certain  sum  of  money,  in  return  for  the  care  of 
one  of  the  nurseries  of  mulberry-trees  which  the  government 
had  established  in  Corsica;  now  notice  was  given  that  this 
stipend  was  to  be  discontinued.  It  was  not  long  before  the 
household  was  without  money. 

This  succession  of  disappointments  and  troubles  was  more 
than  even  Latitia's  spirited  nature  could  endure.  She  wrote 
her  son  Napoleon  of  her  distress  and  besought  him  to  return  to 
her.  The  impression  made  upon  him  by  this  letter  was  both 
deep  and  painful.  He  resembled  his  father  in  his  solicitude 
for  the  welfare  of  his  family,  and  to  know  them  to  be  in  difficul- 
ties caused  him  unaffected  sorrow.  This  feeling  became  the 
more  intense  when  his  request  for  immediate  leave  of  absence 
met  with  the  reply  that  such  could  be  granted  him  only  by 
the  beginning  of  the  following  year.  Bitter  were  the  words 
in  which  his  emotions  found  vent  in  his  diary: 

"Always  alone  when  in  the  midst  of  men,  I  return  to  my 
room  to  dream  by  myself  and  to  give  myself  up  to  the  full  tide 
of  my  melancholy.  Whither  did  my  thoughts  turn  to-day? 
Toward  death.  In  the  springtime  of  my  life,  I  may  still  hope 
to  live  for  a  long  time.     I  have  been  away  from  my  native 


1 6  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i786 

land  now  for  six  or  seven  years.  What  pleasure  shall  I  not 
feel  in  seeing  once  more,  four  months  hence,  both  my  com- 
patriots and  my  relatives?  From  the  tenderness  felt  in  recalling 
the  pleasures  of  my  childhood  may  I  not  infer  that  my  happiness 
will  be  complete?  What  madness  then  impels  me  to  desire 
my  own  destruction?  What,  forsooth,  am  I  here  for  in  this 
world?  Since  death  must  come  to  me,  why  would  it  not  be  as 
well  to  kill  myself?  If  I  were  sixty  years  old  or  more,  I  should 
respect  the  prejudices  of  my  contemporaries  and  would  patiently 
wait  for  Nature  to  finish  her  course,  but,  since  I  begin  life  in 
suffering  misfortune,  and  nothing  gives  me  pleasure,  why  should 
I  endure  these  days  when  nothing  with  which  I  am  concerned 
prospers? 

"  How  far  men  have  departed  from  Nature!  How  dastardly, 
abject,  and  servile  they  are!  What  sight  awaits  me  at  home? 
My  fellow  countrymen  loaded  with  chains  kissing  with  trembling 
the  hand  which  oppresses  them.  These  are  no  longer  the  gal- 
lant Corsicans  roused  by  the  virtues  of  a  hero,  enemies  of  tyrants, 
of  luxury,  of  base  courtiers.  .  .  .  Frenchmen,  not  content  with 
having  ravished  us  of  all  that  we  held  most  dear,  you  have  in 
addition  corrupted  our  morals!  (The  picture  thus  presented 
of  my  country,  and  my  own  powerlessness  to  change  it,  are  a 
new  reason  for  leaving  a  world  where  duty  compels  me  to  praise 
those  whom  virtue  bids  me  despise.)  When  I  reach  my  own 
country  again  what  attitude  am  I  to  take;  in  what  manner  am 
I  to  speak?  When  his  country  ceases  to  exist,  a  loyal  citizen 
should  die.  .  .  .  My  life  is  a  burden  to  me,  for  I  relish  not  a  single 
pleasure  and  everything  causes  me  pain;  it  is  a  burden  to  me 
because  the  men  among  whom  I  live,  and  shall  probably  always 
live,  have  habits  of  mind  as  far  remote  from  mine  as  the  light 
of  the  moon  differs  from  that  of  the  sun.  I  am,  therefore, 
unable  to  follow  the  only  manner  of  living  which  could  make 
life  endurable,  from  which  results  a  disgust  toward  everything." 

Nothing  could  be  more  characteristic  than  this  effusion  of  a 
soul  filled  with  discontent.  It  is  evident  that  Goethe's  Werther 
(which  Napoleon  claims  to  have  read  five  times)  and  Rousseau's 
impassioned   writings   have   had   their   effect   upon   his   mind; 


^T.  17]  Napoleon   Returns  Home  17 

their  influence  is  plainly  discernible  in  more  than  one  place. 
And  yet,  side  by  side  with  this  apparent  subserviency,  there 
exists  a  vigorous  and  self-reliant  judgment,  and  one  is  at  once 
convinced  that  the  writer  of  the  diary,  however  readily  he 
may  speak  of  his  thoughts  of  death,  has  as  little  real  intention 
of  making  his  words  good  as  had  the  dethroned  emperor  at 
Fontainebleau,  twenty-eight  years  later,  of  taking  his  own  life. 
It  is  always  the  same  double  nature  to  which  he  himself  bears 
witness  in  the  conversation  with  Madame  de  Remusat  above 
cited;  the  same  fantastic  dreaming,  to  which  nevertheless  is 
always  applied  the  measuring-rod  of  a  calm  and  methodical 
deliberation;  an  idealism  subdued,  corrected,  and  controlled 
by  a  highly  developed,  realistic  inteUigence.  This  is  the  funda- 
mental trait  of  his  character  and  at  the  same  time  its  key. 

And  now  he  has  suddenly  fixed  upon  a  practical  resolution. 
Once  in  Ajaccio,  he  will  get  his  leave  of  absence  prolonged,  "on 
the  ground  of  ill  health,"  as  far  as  the  forbearance  of  the  Minis- 
ter of  War  will  permit.  In  this  way  his  family  will  profit  by 
his  pay,  while  he  himself  will  have  the  opportimity  to  carry 
out  his  literary  projects.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  did  not 
rejoin  his  regiment  at  Auxonne  before  May,  1788. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  young 
ofheer's  concern  for  the  support  and  future  of  his  family  and 
the  cheerlessness  of  his  own  prospects  were  alone  responsible 
for  his  dejection.  What  tormented  him  beyond  all  these  was 
the  conflict  between  what  he  recognized  as  his  duty  and  what 
he  himself  honoured  as  civic  virtue  in  the  light  of  his  specula- 
tions on  the  natural  rights  of  mankind. 

He  had  once  written  in  a  letter  to  Fesch:  "A  soldier's  sole 
attachment  should  be  to  his  flag."  But  did  not  this  flag  bind 
him  to  the  cause  of  the  French  whom  he  had  learned  to  hate 
even  while  at  school,  before  whose  doors  liis  pride  had  been 
obliged  to  huml)le  itself  to  beg  assistance  and  benefits  for  the 
Buonaparte  family — the  French  who  had  subjugated  his  country, 
in  the  hberation  of  which  he  saw  realized  the  most  audacious 
dreams  of  his  fancy?  He,  to  whom  Sampiero  and  Paoli  had 
been  shining  ideals,  had  sworn  allegiance  to  their  victorious 


1 8  Birth  and  Early  Training  [i786 

foes  and  thereby  imposed  upon  himself  fetters  which  para- 
lyzed his  ambition  and  condemned  his  existence  to  insigni- 
ficance. He  had  purposed  to  become  the  hero  of  his  nation 
and  he  had  become  merely  one  of  its  armed  custodians.  This 
state  of  affairs  was  intolerable  and  yet  it  was  scarcely  to  be 
changed. 

For  unheard-of  things  must  take  place  in  order  to  overcome 
the  obstacles  which  towered  before  the  feverishly  urgent  deter- 
mination of  this  ambitious  youth.  The  established  order  of  a 
world  must  be  overturned  to  make  way  for  the  flight  of  this 
extraordinary  genius. 

And  behold!  the  unheard-of  came  to  pass:  the  order  of  the 
world  was  disestablished  and  a  new  era  opened. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  REVOLUTION.     NAPOLEON'S  CORSICAN  ADVENTURES 

It  is  impossible  to  undertake  to  set  forth  here  all  the  caases 
and  occasions  which  brought  about  in  France  that  revolutionary- 
movement  to  which  a  large  proportion  of  our  modem  political 
and  social  conditions  owe  their  existence.  In  point  of  fact, 
the  necessity  for  these  changes  was  felt  long  before  the  decisive 
year  of  1789.  As  early  as  the  middle  of  the  century,  during  the 
reign  of  I.ouis  XV.,  notorious  in  history  for  his  mistresses  and 
his  defeats,  the  word  "Revolution"  had  been  uttered  with 
something  of  that  prophetic  tone  with  which  the  Old  Testa- 
ment seers  pronounced  the  name  Messiah,  and  having  once 
acquired  a  foothold,  it  never  again  disappeared  from  the  lan- 
guage. Upon  the  succession  of  Louis  XVI.  to  the  throne  of  his 
grandfather  he  showed  the  best  of  intentions  toward  the  cor- 
rection of  abuses,  but  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  evil  was 
too  deep-rooted  to  be  moved  by  well-intentioned  attempts  at 
reform.  No  minister,  however  able,  could  hope  by  means  of 
judicious  measures  to  overcome  the  difficulty.  Ever  since  the 
seventeenth  century  the  government  in  France  had  been  tend- 
ing toward  despotism  and  centralization;  the  welfare  of  the 
nation  rested  solely  upon  the  caprice  of  the  king  and  the  will  of 
ms  domineering  ministers.  The  fundamental  rights  of  the 
people  were  ignored;  the  States  General — the  legal  representa- 
tives of  the  three  political  classes,  the  clergy,  nobility,  and 
commons — had  for  a  long  time  not  been  convoked  for  partici- 
pation in  the  framing  of  laws,  though  this  right  was  accorded 
to  them  by  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  realm.  As  a  conse- 
quence there  existed  a  constant  feud  between  the  government 
and  the  Parliaments,  the  highest  judicial  courts  of  the  country. 
The  clergy  and  nobility  had  submitted  to  the  position  of  political 

19 


20  The   Revolution  [i789 

insignificance  which  the  new  system  gave  them,  and  were  re- 
warded with  lavish  liand  by  the  king  for  their  loyalty;  their 
exemption  from  taxation,  together  with  all  other  prerogatives 
formerly  granted  them  by  the  state  in  acknowledgment  of 
their  services  as  judges  and  guardians,  was  preserved  to  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  third  estate,  which  had  not  shared 
in  any  of  these  privileges,  was  obliged  to  assume,  almost  unaided, 
the  burden  of  the  state's  expenses.  Of  the  land  two  thirds 
were  owned  by  the  two  privileged  classes  and  were  accordingly 
free  from  taxation,  while  the  remaining  third  was  divided  among 
a  large  number  of  small  property-holders  who  were  in  nowise 
entitled,  as  were  their  superiors,  to  exact  feudal  service  and 
levy  turnpike  and  bridge  toll  of  the  peasantry,  but  were  com- 
pelled to  pay  taxes  of  all  descriptions  upon  their  meagre  lands. 
The  peasants,  living  exclusively  upon  the  domains  of  the  privi- 
leged classes,  had  to  pay  taxes  to  state,  church,  and  stewards 
of  the  landlord,  and  there  remained  to  them  after  the  deduc- 
tion of  these  imposts  an  all  too  scanty  means  of  subsistence. 
In  the  cities  a  few  rich  and  favoured  circles  were  opposed  to  a 
populace  without  property,  who,  excluded  from  guilds,  corpo- 
rations, and  all  municipal  offices,  earned  their  living  in  daily 
labour  for  the  upper  classes.  Thus  the  poor  man  of  France  was 
oppressed,  while  the  aristocracy  squandered  the  fruit  of  others' 
labour  in  Paris  or  at  the  prodigal  royal  court  at  Versailles  in 
leading  the  brilliant  and  luxurious  life  of  the  salons. 

That  these  conditions  were  contrary  to  nature  had  long  been 
recognized  by  thinking  minds.  In  imperishable  works,  con- 
spicuous for  their  brilliancy  and  elegant  simplicity  of  language, 
they  attacked  the  intolerance  of  the  church,  which,  even  after 
1760,  incited  the  willing  authorities  to  harsh  measures  against 
the  members  of  the  reformed  churches;  they  demonstrated  that 
existing  social  conditions  were  in  violation  of  the  rights  of  man, 
and  sought,  in  sundry  ways,  the  ideal  government  to  replace 
the  present  one  when  that  should  collapse  as  it  deserved  to  do. 

And  the  catastrophe  followed  soon.  Bad  financial  admin- 
istration on  th(!  one  side,  with  failure  of  crops  and  distressing 
need  on  the  otiicr,  hastened  tlie  crisis.     After  the  disclosure  by 


/El.  20J     The  Meeting  of  the  States  General  21 

Necker,  Minister  of  Finance,  in  the  early  eighties,  of  the  des- 
perate condition  of  the  State's  treasury;  after  the  inefTectual 
labours  of  his  successor  Calonne  over  the  problem  of  how  to  draw 
upon  the  wealth  of  the  two  privileged  classes  for  the  benefit  of 
the  country;  after  repeated  borrowings  had  exhausted  credit 
and  bankruptcy  seemed  inevitable,  the  king  at  last  decided  to 
yield  to  the  universal  demand  and  to  convoke  the  States  General 
at  Versailles  early  in  May,  1789. 

The  States  General  as  they  had  assembled  for  the  last  time 
in  1614  was  no  such  united  deliberative  body  as,  for  instance, 
the  English  Parliament  or  the  modern  German  Reichstag. 
The  deputies  of  the  three  estates  debated  and  voted  separately, 
and  the  majority  of  votes  of  all  three — two  to  one — was  neces- 
sary to  enact  or  reject  a  bill.  Under  such  conditions  the  com- 
mons were  of  necessity  at  a  disadvantage  when  opposed  to  the 
clergy  and  the  nobility. 

But  the  third  estate  of  1789  was  a  different  body  from  that 
of  1614.  The  example  of  two  great  and  successful  revolutions, 
that  of  England  in  the  seventeenth  and  that  of  America  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  had  not  remained  without  effect  upon  the 
minds  of  its  members. 

The  doctrines  of  philosophers  and  political  writers  had 
penetrated  their  minds,  the  conviction  of  the  injustice  of  exist- 
ing conditions  was  pre-eminently  theirs,  and  the  wish  to  give 
expression  to  this  conviction  in  deeds  impelled  them  to  take 
the  first  step  toward  revolution. 

Contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the  ancient  constitution,  as 
well  as  to  the  wish  of  Louis  XVI.,  the  representatives  of  the 
third  estate,  who  equalled  in  number  those  of  the  other  two 
combined,  refused  to  conform  to  the  former  manner  of  sitting. 
They  declared  themselves  to  be  the  representatives  of  the  nation, 
and  summoned  the  deputies  of  the  other  two  estates  to  co-operate 
with  them  in  their  deliberations  and  decrees.  (June  17th,  1789.) 
This  purpose  was  accomplished  and  thus  the  feudal  States 
General  were  transformed  into  a  modern  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
which,  far  from  contenting  itself  with  complacently  approving 
the  government  loans,  felt  itself  called  upon  to  do  away  en- 


22  Corsican  Adventures  [i789 

tirely  with  the  old  regime  and  to  constitute  in  its  place  a  new 
France.  The  first  part  of  this  task  was  accomplished  before  the 
end  of  the  year.  In  the  night  session  of  the  4th  of  August, 
amidst  universal  excitement,  those  memorable  decrees  were 
passed  which  annulled  all  privileges  of  rank,  removed  all  feudal 
burdens  from  the  peasant,  declared  ecclesiastical  tithes  re- 
deemable, suppressed  the  selling  of  public  offices,  and  pro- 
claimed all  citizens  eligible  to  any  office  whether  civil  or  military. 
By  this  action — too  precipitate,  to  be  sure — was  demolished 
the  crumbling  edifice  of  ancient  France  and  the  foundation  laid 
for  a  new  and  habitable  structure. 

These  decrees  were,  however,  not  the  result  of  calm  considera- 
tion and  deliberate  judgment.  While  the  lawmakers  at  Ver- 
sailles were  drawing  up  the  code  of  newly-acquired  liberty  the 
capital  near  by  was  in  the  wildest  uproar.  Riots  had  for  years 
been  frequent  in  Paris,  but  now  they  became  the  established 
order  of  the  day.  Shortly  before  the  above-mentioned  decrees 
were  passed  by  the  National  Assembly,  the  populace  of  Paris, 
having  become  "sovereign,"  had  repulsed  the  royal  troops  on 
the  Place  Vendome,  had  taken  by  storm  the  Hotel  des  Invalides, 
and  had  razed  to  the  ground  the  Bastille.  It  was  with  tho 
greatest  difficulty  that  the  Deputies  were  able  to  restrain  the 
mob  from  further  excesses.  Strange  and  varied  elements 
constituted  the  populace  of  Paris:  fairly-educated,  honest 
enthusiasts  in  the  cause  of  freedom  stood  side  by  side  with 
brutish  vagabonds  whom  the  poverty  of  the  open  country  had 
driven  by  thousands  into  the  city ;  oppressed  labourers  who  were 
contending  for  their  just  right  to  live  decently,  marched  beside 
impudent  adventurers  and  light-fingered  gentry  who  brazenly 
declared  war  upon  all  movable  property;  theorists  ready  to 
push  their  cherished  ideas  to  the  last  extreme  were  beside 
legions  of  ignorant  beings  who  blindly  acted  upon  any  suggestion 
overheard  in  the  streets — an  imposing  array  enlisted  in  the 
interests  of  anarchy  and  soon  to  assume  a  fearful  imjiortance. 

The  capital  did  not  remain  alone  a  prey  to  revolt.  The 
provinces  also  felt  the  force  of  the  current  from  the  beginning 
of  the  political  movement.     Here  hunger  assumed  the  executive 


/Et.  20]  Outbreaks   in   the   Provinces  23 

power.  Hundreds  of  grain  riots  were  but  the  precursors  to 
further  excesses.  The  harvests  of  1789  in  the  south  of  France 
had  proved  a  failure.  In  the  middle  and  northern  parts  of  the 
country,  where  the  yield  had  been  sufficient,  no  one  showed  the 
spirit  necessary  to  put  the  grain  on  the  market.  The  high 
prices  kept  up  and  occasioned  new  disturbances.  Proprietors 
were  forced  by  threats  of  violence  to  deliver  up  their  supplies. 
Peasants  assembled  before  the  castles  of  the  nobility  and  com- 
pelled them  to  yield  not  only  their  feudal  rights,  but  their 
possessions.  Whoever  resisted  forfeited  his  life.  Eastern 
France,  from  the  extreme  north  down  to  Provence,  was  dis- 
tracted by  peasant-uprisings  and  confiscations  of  property. 
Murder  and  assassination  were  nothing  unusual.  All  authority 
was  powerless  to  restrain  the  disorder. 

Auxonne  on  the  Saone,  where  the  artillery  regiment  La  Fere 
was  stationed  in  garrison,  was  not  undisturbed  by  the  Revolu- 
tion. In  July,  1789,  the  alarm-bell  had  sounded  here  also,  the 
toll-gates  had  been  broken  down,  the  office  of  the  tax-collector 
destroyed.  A  detachment  of  cannoniers,  appointed  to  re- 
establish order,  refused  obedience  to  commands  and  stood  with 
their  weapons  passive  spectators  of  the  disturbance.  Their 
captain,  who  attempted  to  arrest  one  of  the  ringleaders,  was 
pursued  by  the  mob  and  barely  escaped  with  his  life.  Not  until 
some  companies  of  the  city's  National  Guard  began  to  quell 
the  tumult  would  the  troops  give  the  least  assistance.  Whether 
the  young  Lieutenant  Bonaparte  participated  in  this  affair  is 
unknown,  nor  can  we  gain  any  knowledge  as  to  his  attitude  in 
these  da3's,  interesting  as  any  information  on  this  subject  would 
be.  We  know  only  that  after  his  return  from  Ajaccio  he  was 
more  than  ever  friendly  to  the  idea  of  a  radical  change  in  the 
government.  In  his  diary  we  find  under  date  of  October  23d, 
1788,  the  outline  of  a  "Dissertation  sur  I'Autorite  Royale." 
"This  work,"  it  reads,  "will  begin  with  setting  forth  general 
ideas  upon  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  name  of  king  in  the 
mind  of  man.  Military  government  is  favourable  to  it.  This 
work  will  enter  next  into  the  details  of  usurped  authority  en- 
joyed by  the    monarchs  of    the    twelve  kingdoms  of  Europe. 


24  The   Revolution  [i789 

There  are  but  very  few  kings  who  have  not  deserved  dethrone- 
ment." Tolerably  advanced  ideas  for  a  lieutanant  in  the  royal 
army  at  the  age  of  twenty! 

Still  his  mind  remains  fixed  upon  Corsica.  He  revises  his 
''Lettres  sur  I'Histoire  de  la  Corse"  and  purposes  dedicating 
them  to  the  banished  Paoli.  In  a  letter  of  June,  1789,  in  which 
he  attempts  to  approach  his  hero,  he  manifests  most  immis- 
takably  his  hatred  toward  the  French  oppressors.  Presently 
a  single  idea  seizes  possession  of  his  mind — to  take  advantage 
of  the  Revolution  to  obtain  power  and  influence  in  his  native 
land,  and  to  acquire  at  the  same  time  with  his  own  independence 
that  of  his  people.  This  is  no  longer  the  hour  for  written  words. 
The  "Lettres  sur  I'Histoire  de  la  Corse,"  which  Paoli  declined 
to  have  dedicated  to  himself,  remain  unprinted.  Their  author 
is  seeking  for  himself  a  place  in  the  history  of  his  country. 

Since  their  conquest  by  the  French,  the  Corsicans  had  been 
divided  into  two  parties — the  partisans  of  the  foreigner,  who 
had  reconciled  themselves  with  the  new  order  of  things  and 
turned  the  same  to  their  own  advantage,  and  the  Nationalists, 
who  submitted  with  the  greatest  reluctance  to  the  yoke  of  the 
new  supremacy.  To  the  former  faction,  the  Conservatives, 
belonged  the  inferior  nobility  and  the  clergy  with  its  blind 
following,  as  did  also  a  part  of  the  residents  of  the  seaport  towns; 
indeed  those  who  lived  along  the  coast  and  were  thus  at  the 
mercy  of  every  passing  frigate  speedily  learned  submission  to 
the  will  of  a  foreign  power,  while  the  mountaineers  of  the  in- 
terior, not  unlike  their  neighbours,  the  Montenegrins,  preserved 
more  readily  their  free  and  independent  spirit. 

The  Nationalists  were  themselves  cleft  into  two  divisions, 
of  which  one  hoped  to  secure  civil  liberty  by  making  common 
cause  with  the  revolutionists  in  France,  while  the  other  wished  to 
have  nothing  to  do  with  them  or  with  any  compact  in  which 
they  were  concerned. 

The  Conservatives  elected  to  the  States  General  the  official 
candidates.  General  Buttafuoco  and  the  Abb(5  Peretti.  The 
Nationalists  chose  Salicetti  and  Colonna  di  Cesare  Rocca, 
members  of  the  opposition.     The  latter  succeeded  in  making 


^T.  20]        Napoleon's   Designs   in   Corsica  25 

the  wishes  of  their  constituents  prevail  in  the  National  Assembly: 
the  Commission  of  Nobles,  who  acted  as  ach'isory  board  to 
the  governor  of  the  island,  was  to  give  place  to  an  elective 
Council  of  Administration,  and  a  paid  native  militia  was  to  be 
maintained. 

While  the  idea  of  a  native  administrative  body  originated 
in  the  ambition  of  a  group  of  young  Corsicans,  Pozzo  di  liorgo, 
Peraldi,  Cuneo,  and  others,  who  were  already  dreaming  of  them- 
selves as  Regents,  the  creation  of  a  militia  was  the  suggestion 
of  Lieutenant  Bonaparte  in  Auxonne,  who  was  kept  informed 
by  his  uncle  Fesch  as  to  all  events  on  the  island,  and  whose 
family  after  the  death  of  Marbaaif  had  joined  the  opposition. 
He,  too,  aspired  to  the  highest  office  at  home,  but  his  ambition 
did  not  rely  upon  elections  and  debates  and  fickle  pubhc  senti- 
ment. Even  now  the  bayonet  was  to  him  the  surest  means 
of  acquiring  power.  He  felt  that  his  military  education  would 
assure  him  a  high  command  in  the  Corsican  miUtia  and  that  he, 
once  in  possession  of  such  a  command  .  .  .  But  such  projects 
demand  one's  presence  on  the  scene  of  action.  Accordingly 
he  again  obtains  a  somewhat  extended  leave  of  absence  and  the 
month  of  September,  1789,  finds  him  back  in  Ajaccio. 

Difficulties  present  themselves  at  once  upon  his  arrival. 
The  Conservative  deputy  Buttafuoco  had  prevailed  upon  the 
royal  government  to  defer  the  carrying  out  of  the  changes 
demanded  by  the  opposition.  For  the  present  there  was  no 
hope  of  a  popular  council  or  a  paid  militia. 

But  the  time  has  come  in  which  the  opposition  resorts  to 
violence.  Napoleon,  also,  has  not  passed  through  the  expe- 
rience of  this  revolutionary  summer  without  result.  He  has 
seen  the  National  Guard  form  in  French  cities  and  recognized 
the  magic  of  the  cockade;  he  now  utilizes  his  observations  and 
displays  a  feverish  zeal  in  making  preparations  for  carr\4ng  out 
his  aims.  He  plans  to  \\Test  the  power  from  the  hands  of  the 
reactionary  authorities,  to  organize  a  National  Guard,  to  seize 
the  Bastille  of  Ajaccio  and  drive  the  French  from  the  island. 
The  patriotic  club  of  the  city,  to  which  he  confides  his  piu-poses, 
is  full  of  the  wildest  enthusiasm  in  favour  of  them. 


26  Corsican  Adventures  [1789 

And  in  fact  a  National  Guard  was  formed,  and  the  revolu- 
tion, under  the  leadership  of  the  young  lieutenant  in  the  royal 
army,  started  under  most  favourable  auspices.  One  of  his 
biographers  tells  us  that  "in  Ajaccio  he  moved,  he  electrified 
everything  with  his  indefatigable  activity."  But  at  this  point 
Napoleon's  plans  were  interfered  with  by  the  reinforcement  of 
the  French  garrison,  the  suppression  of  the  club,  and  the  dis- 
banding of  the  National  Guard;  the  leaders  of  the  revolution 
had  to  content  themselves  with  addressing  a  protest,  drawn  up 
by  Napoleon,  to  the  National  Assembly  at  Paris  begging  its  pro- 
tection to  their  hberties.     (Last  of  October,  1789.) 

Meanwhile,  in  imitation  of  Ajaccio,  other  towns  had  revolted, 
and  in  some  instances,  as  in  Bastia  and  Isola  Rossa,  remained 
victorious.  Upon  the  advice  of  Buttafuoco  the  government 
determined  to  quell  the  insurrection  by  levying  for  that  purpose 
a  large  detachment  of  troops,  and  orders  therefor  had  already 
been  issued,  when  the  National  Assembly,  at  the  instigation  of 
SaUcetti,  raised  Corsica,  hitherto  considered  merely  as  con- 
quered territory,  to  the  dignity  of  a  French  province  enjoying 
all  the  rights  and  immunities  to  which  others  were  entitled. 

No  regard  was  paid  to  the  treaty  of  1768  by  which  Genoa 
had  surrendered  the  island  to  France  "as  security."  An  am- 
nesty made  it  possible  for  Paoli  and  his  companions  in  exile  to 
return  to  Corsica.  The  government  at  Paris  was  forced  to 
abstain  from  carrying  out  the  harsh  measures  intended,  and  the 
radicals  of  the  island  recovered  complete  liberty  of  action.  In 
Ajaccio  the  club  resumed  its  sessions  in  the  summer  of  1790, 
the  National  Guard  was  drilled  under  Napoleon's  directions, 
and  a  new  municipal  council  was  elected  wherein  Joseph  Bona- 
parte at  last  found  employment. 

What  was  more  natural  than  to  resume  the  plans  inter- 
rupted the  year  before?  Nothing  but  the  watchfulness  of  the 
garrison  which  occupied  the  citadel  prevented  Napoleon  from 
carrying  out  his  plan  of  seizing  the  stronghold;  to  his  proposal 
of  laying  a  n^gular  siege  the  chilj  would  not  consent.  The  hated 
French  remaincMl  in  possession. 

Shortly   afterwards   Paoli  returned.     Thousands  assembled 


^T.  21]         Napoleon   Returns  to   France  27 

to  do  him  honour  aiul  greotcHl  liuu  witli  ecstasy  and  transports 
of  joy.  Deputations  from  all  cities  met  him.  The  former 
dictator,  the  glorious  chief,  whom  the  recollections  of  the  struggle 
for  independence  and  the  martyrdom  of  exile  surrounded  with 
a  subhme  halo,  was  the  object  of  unmixed  veneration.  When, 
in  accordance  with  the  new  constitution  of  France,  the  election 
of  pubhc  officers  took  place  in  each  of  the  departments  in  Sep- 
tember, 1790,  Paoli  was  unanimously  chosen  president  of  the 
Council  of  Administration.  All  who  had  political  aspirations 
gathered  around  him.  Napoleon  was  among  these,  always  con- 
fident that  the  paid  militia,  to  the  command  of  which  he  so 
ardently  longed  to  be  appointed,  was  about  to  become  a  reality. 
This  would  have  enabled  him  to  resign  his  commission  in  the 
royal  army  which  was  such  a  burden  to  him  and  withheld  him 
from  the  real  scene  of  his  ambition.  At  the  side  of  Paoli,  who 
was  not  a  trained  soldier,  he  would  have  played  a  distinguished 
part — and  Paoli  was  already  an  old  man.  Vain  hopes!  The 
ministry  refused  to  arm  the  Corsican  people  at  the  expense  of 
France,  and  Bonaparte  at  last  was  obliged  in  February,  1791, 
to  rejoin  his  regiment. 

Meanwhile  the  emigration  of  the  royalists  had  deprived 
the  regiment  of  La  Fere  of  many  of  its  officers,  and  it  was  owing 
to  this  circumstance  that  Napoleon  was  not  called  to  account 
for  being  deficient  in  liis  sense  of  duty  and  in  discipline,  but  was 
even  promoted,  June  1st,  1791,  to  the  position  of  first  lieutenant 
in  the  fourth  regiment  of  artillery  at  Valence. 

The  country  was  enjoying  then  an  apparent  calm,  and  he 
was  able  to  resume  his  manner  of  fife  such  as  it  had  been  two 
years  earher,  except  that  he  now  shared  his  modest  lodging  and 
meagre  pay  with  his  younger  brother  Louis,  the  future  king  of 
Holland.  When,  twenty  years  later,  Louis  created  difficulties 
for  the  Emperor  of  the  French  by  arbitrarily  resigning  his  crown. 
Napoleon  alluded  in  conversation  with  Caulaincourt  to  these 
bygone  days.  "What ! "  exclaimed  he,  "my  brother  injure  instead 
of  helping  me!  This  Louis  whom  I  brought  up  on  my  pay  of 
a  lieutenant,  at  the  price  of  Heaven  knows  what  privations!  I 
found  means  of  sending  money  to  pay  the  board  and  lodging  of 


28  The  Revolution.  [i79i 

my  younger  brother.  Do  you  know  how  I  managed  it?  It 
was  by  never  setting  foot  inside  a  caf6  or  appearing  in  the  social 
world;  it  was  by  eating  dry  bread  and  brushing  my  clothes 
myself  so  that  they  should  remain  the  longer  presentable. 
In  order  not  to  be  conspicuous  among  my  comrades  I  hved 
like  a  bear,  always  alone  in  my  little  room  with  my  books — 
then  my  only  friends.  And  those  books !  By  what  strict  econ- 
omies, practised  on  actual  necessities,  did  I  purchase  the  enjoy- 
ment of  possessing  them!  When,  by  dint  of  abstinence,  I  had 
at  length  amassed  the  sum  of  twelve  livres,  I  turned  my  steps 
with  the  joy  of  a  child  toward  the  shop  of  a  bookseller  who  Uved 
near  to  the  bishop's  palace.  I  often  went  to  visit  his  shelves 
with  the  sin  of  envy  within  me;  I  coveted  long  before  my  purse 
allowed  of  buying.  Such  were  the  joys  and  dissipations  of  my 
youth." 

But  frequently  his  small  income  could  not  be  brought  to  cover 
his  expenses.  Debts  had  to  be  contracted,  modest  to  be  sure, 
but  nevertheless  oppressive  with  the  hopelessness  of  increasing 
his  resources. 

Presently  he  resumed  his  hterary  projects.  His  "Discours 
sur  le  Bonheur,"  presented  to  the  Academy  of  Lyons  in  the 
hope  of  its  being  awarded  the  prize  of  twelve  hundred  francs, 
brought  nothing  but  disappointment  to  its  author.  His  literary 
reveries  were  resumed  and  resulted  in  the  above-mentioned 
"Dialogue  sur  TAmour."  Besides  this  he  wrote  "Reflexions 
sur  I'Etat  Naturel,"  in  which  he  combated  Rousseau's  hy- 
potheses and  gave  evidence  of  being  a  keen  observer  of  human 
affairs. 

All  at  once  the  speculative  solitude  of  the  young  officer  is 
interrupted  by  the  noise  of  unprecedented  excitement  which 
prevails  throughout  all  France. 

During  the  first  months  of  1791  the  fundamental  provisions 
of  the  new  Constitution  of  France  had  been  formulated,  and 
they  needed  but  the  royal  sanction  to  become  law.  But  since 
this  Constitution  reduced  the  royal  authority  almost  to  insig- 
nificance, and  the  radical  laws  concerning  the  church  wounded 
the  rehgious  conscience  of  the  king,  Louis  XVI.  decided  to  flee 


JEt.  21]  Political  Activity  29 

from  Paris  and  seek  in  some  foreign  land  safoty  and  defence 
for  his  person  and  kingly  dignity. 

The  plan  failed;  the  king  and  his  escort  were  stopped  on 
the  way  ana  brought  back  to  Paris. 

A  storm  of  indignation  swept  the  country  against  the  king 
and  against  those  who  had  persuaded  him  to  abandon  his  people. 
The  National  Assembly  suspended  the  royal  authority,  and 
in  all  the  towns  of  France  the  clubs,  the  militia,  and  the  troops 
of  the  line  swore  unswerving  fidelity  to  the  decrees  of  the  Par- 
liament and  to  the  new  Constitution.  With  difficulty  only 
could  the  more  moderate,  the  "  Feuillants,"  restrain  the  radical 
"Jacobins."  Only  when  the  king  had  accepted  the  Constitution 
was  order  in  some  slight  degree  restored. 

At  this  time  First  Lieutenant  Bonaparte  subscribed  to  the 
following  oath: 

"I  swear  to  use  the  arms  delivered  into  my  hands  in  the 

defence  of  my  country,  and  to  support  against  all  enemies, 

whether  from  within  or  from  without,  the  Constitution  decreed 

by  the  National  Assembly,  to  perish  rather  than  suffer  the 

invasion  of  French  territory  by  foreign  troops,  and  to  obey  only 

such  orders  as  are  given  in  accordance  with  the  decrees  of  the 

National  Assembly. 

Buonaparte, 

Officer  in  the  4th  Regiment  of  Artillery. 

Valence,  the  6th  of  July,  1791." 

Napoleon  was  taking  an  active  part  in  the  political  clubs.  He 
was  secretary  of  the  "Amis  de  la  Constitution"  of  Valence,  who 
were  affiliated  with  the  Jacobins  in  Paris,  and  in  that  capacity 
he  composed  an  address  to  the  National  Assembly  in  which  its 
acts  were  approved  by  the  members  of  the  club. 

On  the  occasion  of  a  patriotic  banquet  he  offered  a  toast  in 
honour  of  the  radicals.  But  it  would  be  an  error  to  regard  these 
acts  as  evidence  of  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  with  which  at  that 
time  all  Frenchmen  were  carried  away  and  which  raised  to  a 
new  significance  the  word  "Nation." 

In  the  midst  of  all  this  Napoleon  remained  a  Corsican,  and 
only  a  Corsican,  and  held  firmly  to  the  plans  which  linked  his 


30  Corsican   Adventures  [1701 

destiny  with  that  of  his  native  land.  These  projects  were  soon 
to  assume  more  sohd  form. 

In  the  session  of  July  22d,  1791,  the  National  Assembly 
.determined  to  create  battahons  of  paid  volunteers,  the  force 
to  include  something  over  one  hundred  thousand  men.  The 
department  of  Corsica  was  to  furnish  four  such  battalions. 

Hardly  had  the  news  reached  Napoleon  when  it  became  an 
impossibility  for  him  to  remain  longer  at  Valence,  The  long 
and  ardently  desired  opportunity  to  play  a  military  part  in  his 
native  island  had  presented  itself.  Before  the  end  of  September 
he  was  again  on  furlough  in  Ajaccio.  What  mattered  it  to  him 
that  France  was  on  the  eve  of  war?  He  was  equally  uncon- 
cerned that  his  leave  of  absence  would  terminate  on  the  1st  of 
January,  1792.  He  sought  later  to  exculpate  himself  on  the 
ground  of  "unforeseen  circumstances,"  and  of  "the  dearest  and 
most  sacred  duties  to  be  fulfilled."  "In  these  difficult  cir- 
cumstances," he  writes  to  Sucy,  the  Commissary  of  War,  "the 
post  of  honour  of  a  good  Corsican  is  in  his  own  country."  That 
he  was  at  the  same  time  a  French  officer,  educated  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  king,  and  that  he  had  just  sworn  to  defend  France, 
counted  for  nothing  with  him.  He  succeeded  in  getting  his 
name  struck  off  from  the  army  list,  the  act  taking  effect  January 
1st,  1792,  and  more  zealously  than  ever  endeavoured  to  obtain 
the  position  of  lieutenant-colonel  in  the  volunteer  battalion 
of  Ajaccio,  which  appointment  lay  with  the  vote  of  the  troops. 

For  years  he  had  ingratiated  himself  with  the  mountaineers 
who  now  voted  for  him,  and  this  resulted  in  giving  him  a  majority 
above  his  rival.  Meanwhile,  until  the  election  should  be  over, 
Napoleon  took  the  precaution  to  seize  and  detain  in  his  own 
house  one  of  the  commissioners  of  the  election  who  was  hostile 
to  him.  With  an  insignificant  man  chosen  as  first  lieutenant- 
colonel,  Bonaparte  became  virtual  commander  of  the  battalion 
from  his  native  city.  This  was  his  first  coup  d'(5tat.  Again 
his  eyes  turned  toward  the  citadel,  still  the  residence  of  French 
officers  and  soldiers.  Now,  at  the  head  of  a  band  of  devoted 
men,  the  blow  could  not  fail.  Nothing  was  needed  but  to  await 
ft  favourable  opportunity. 


^T.  22]  Conditions   in    Corsica  31 

There  was  in  Ajaccio,  as  in  other  Corsican  cities,  a  coasider- 
able  number  of  ardently  pious  CathoHcs  to  whose  religioas 
feehng  the  new  laws  governing  the  church  seemed  no  less  iniqui- 
tous than  to  the  King  of  France.  It  was  no  difficult  matter 
for  the  nimierous  priests  of  the  island  to  strengthen  this  element 
in  its  hatred  toward  the  new  order  of  things  and  its  advocates. 
It  was  no  wonder  that  there  were  many  bitter  enemies  of  the 
Jacobin  Club,  which  was  in  close  touch  with  the  clubs  of  Toulon 
and  Marseilles.  Napoleon  was  particularly  detested,  not  only 
as  having  attached  himself  at  home,  as  in  Valence,  to  the  radical 
party,  but  as  having,  with  the  collaboration  of  his  uncle  Fesch, 
published  a  pamphlet  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  oath 
required  of  priests. 

Even  as  far  back  as  in  July,  1790,  there  had  been  tumults  in 
which  were  heard  such  cries  as  "Vive  la  Revolution!  Death  to 
Jacobins,  death  to  the  officer!" 

Once  the  frenzied  mob  had  hurled  itself  upon  him,  and  his 
rescue  from  its  hands  was  due  alone  to  the  intervention  of  a 
friendly  bandit.  This  feeling  had  not  modified  since  that  time, 
and  the  church  laws  were  accorded  but  sHght  respect.  Napo- 
leon now  made  use  of  this  circumstance. 

"In  order  to  secure  respect  for  the  decrees  of  the  National 
Assembly,"  he  took  possession  with  his  volunteers  of  the  con- 
vent of  the  Capuchins  in  the  city.  He  calculated  that  in  the 
confhct  which  must  ensue  with  the  friars,  the  moderate  sup- 
porters of  the  Constitution  among  the  civil  authorities  would 
be  obhged  to  take  their  stand  on  his  side,  which  would  afford 
him  the  desired  influence  against  which  the  gates  of  the  citadel 
could  not  remain  closed.  Having  gained  an  entrance,  his  plan 
was  to  fraternize  with  the  French  soldiers,  compel  the  officers 
to  decamp  and  make  himself  master  of  the  city.  As  he  had 
anticipated,  during  Easter  week,  1792,  a  furious  brawl  arose 
in  the  streets  and  Napoleon  hastened  to  occupy  the  most  im- 
portant points  throughout  the  city.  He  had  already  erected 
a  mighty  barricade  facing  the  gate  of  the  citadel,  in  preparation 
for  a  contest  with  the  garrison,  when  commissioners  of  the  gov- 
ernment, sent  by  Paoli,  appeared  and  demanded  a  cessation  of 


32  Corsican  Adventures  [1792 

hostilities,  and  delivered  to  Bonaparte  the  censure  of  the 
governor  for  instigating  the  disorder,  and  the  order  to  leave 
Ajaccio  at  once  with  his  forces  for  the  interior  of  the  island. 
The  occurrence  was  further  reported  to  the  Minister  of  War, 
and  only  the  turmoil  of  the  time  prevented  the  trial  by  court- 
martial  of  the  officer  guilty  of  such  misdemeanours. 

Again  all  seemed  lost.  Hated  at  home  by  a  large  number 
of  his  countrymen  and  regarded  with  just  suspicion  by  the 
authorities,  with  charges  filed  against  him  in  France,  and  with- 
out a  position  in  the  regular  army,  to  what  could  he  look  forward 
when  the  brief  one  year's  term  of  service  of  the  volunteers 
came  to  an  end? 

Nothing  but  decisive  measures  taken  at  the  right  place 
could  help  in  this  quandary.  With  the  consent  of  the  govern- 
ment Napoleon  betook  himself  to  Paris. 

He  found  the  capital  a  prey  to  the  most  violent  agitation. 
The  truce  between  Crown  and  Revolution  had  been  of  short 
duration.  Louis  XVI.  had  incurred  anew  the  resentment  of 
the  progressive  parties  by  denying  his  sanction  to  the  decrees 
of  the  legislative  assembly  against  the  priests  who  refused  to 
take  oath  to  support  the  new  church  laws,  and  against  the  emi- 
grant princes  and  aristocrats,  whose  assembling  in  arms  on  the 
frontiers  was  to  be  punished  by  confiscation  of  their  property. 
The  Jacobin  clubs  already  openly  declared  themselves  in  favour 
of  a  republic. 

Besides,  there  could  be  no  longer  any  doubt  concerning  the 
relations  between  the  Court  and  foreign  countries,  and  the 
opposition  was  persuaded  that  a  successful  war  against  foreign 
powers  would  be  at  the  same  time  a  triumph  over  the  French 
monarchy.  Accordingly  the  republicans  of  the  Assembly 
agreed  to  foster  a  war  against  foreign  princes,  overthrew  the 
ministry  desirous  of  peace,  and  compelled  the  king  to  declare 
war  against  Austria,  a  court  to  which  he  was  personally  related. 
(April  20th,  1792.) 

The  result  was,  however,  at  first  disappointing.  An  attack 
upon  the  Austrian  Netherlands  was  easily  r(>pulsed  and  the 
defeat  of  the  French  troops  created  prodigious  excitement  in 


.Et.  22]  The  Fall  of  the  Monarchy  33 

Paris.  "Treason,"  was  the  cry  on  all  sides.  The  king  was 
regarded  as  personally  responsible  and  a  conspirator  against  his 
own  people,  a  suspicion  which  was  strengthened  by  the  fact  that 
just  at  this  time,  June  1.3th,  1792,  Louis  dismissed  the  radical 
ministry  and  surrounded  himself  with  advisers  chosen  from 
among  the  moderate  royalists. 

The  leaders  of  the  racHcal  jiarties  profited  by  this  feeling  in 
playing  the  animosity  of  the  anarchistic  elements  of  the  capital 
against  the  Crown.  On  the  20th  of  June  a  great  crowd  con- 
sisting mainly  of  an  armed  rabble  .streamed  into  the  Tuileries  to 
compel  the  sanction  of  the  two  decrees.  Nothing  but  the  calm, 
dignified  manner  of  the  king  averted  an  attempt  upon  his  life. 
But  on  August  10th,  at  the  instigation  of  the  Jacobins,  the 
populace  returned  to  the  charge.  Bands  of  pikemen,  workmen 
from  the  suburbs  of  St.  Antoine  and  St.  Marcel,  and  all  manner 
of  riffraff  besieged  the  royal  palace  and  forced  Louis  XVL  to 
seek  protection  in  the  National  Assembly.  But  here  his  dignity 
as  sovereign  was  declared  forfeited  and  the  monarchy  sus- 
pended. With  him  fell  likewise  the  conservative  ministry, 
giving  place  to  a  government  consisting  of  republican  Girond- 
ists. 

This  change  in  the  course  of  the  revolution  was  to  Bona- 
parte of  the  greatest  importance.  Without  means  of  sub- 
sistence, in  disrepute  at  home,  he  had  come  to  the  capital  to 
solicit  readmission  into  the  army.  He  was  not  entirely  without 
patrons,  but  they  were  powerless  in  dealing  \^^th  the  June 
ministry,  which  was  perfectly  informed  as  to  the  recent  occur- 
rences in  Corsica.  It  was  not  long  before  he  was  unable  to 
secure  the  necessaries  of  life.  He  chanced  to  meet  Fauvelet  de 
Bourrienne,  a  former  schoolfellow  at  Brienne,  whom  he  tried 
to  induce  to  enter  with  him  into  a  scheme  for  subletting  apart- 
ments, but  nothing  eventually  came  of  the  plan  as  Bourrienne 
just  then  received  an  appointment  at  the  Legation  in  Stuttgart. 
Napoleon's  embarrassment  increased  so  that  he  was  at  length 
obliged  for  a  time  to  part  with  his  watch.  Those  were  hard, 
distressing  days.  The  only  possible  chance  of  help  lay  in  the 
do^-nfall  of  the  refractory  Minister  of  War  who  had  shown  him- 


24  The  Revolution  [1792 

self  so  obdurate  in  regard  to  Bonaparte's  application.  For 
this  reason  was  the  10th  of  August  a  day  of  great  significance 
to  Napoleon.  Whether  it  was  a  fact,  as  has  been  asserted,  that 
he  helped  to  keep  up  the  agitation  by  harangues  in  wine-shops 
is  unknown.  His  own  account  of  what  took  place,  given  at  a 
somewhat  later  time,  would  not  indicate  that  such  had  been 
the  case:  "I  felt,  on  the  10th  of  August,  that,  had  I  been  called 
upon  to  do  so,  I  should  have  defended  the  king.  I  was  opposed 
to  those  who  would  establish  the  Republic  by  means  of  the 
populace;  besides  I  saw  civilians  attacking  men  in  uniform, 
that  gave  me  a  shock."  No  doubt  that  was  his  inmost  feeling; 
but  it  did  not  accord  with  his  personal  interests  of  that  time. 
These  demanded  victory  to  the  despised  rabble,  and  that  vic- 
tory was  welcome  to  him. 

At  any  rate  Napoleon's  circumstances  now  improved  of  a 
sudden.  To  the  new  radical  ministry  the  machinations  of  the 
young  officer  seemed  nothing  extremely  blameworthy;  he 
was  again  received  into  favour,  and  more,  he  was  appointed 
captain  in  his  regiment,  the  commission  being  dated  February  6th, 
1792,  that  is,  on  the  day  when  his  promotion  would  have  oc- 
curred if  he  had  not  quitted  the  army.  Indeed,  in-  consequence 
of  the  flight  of  aristocrats,  advancement  of  officers  was  at  this 
time  unusually  rapid.  It  will  be  supposed  that  Napoleon 
now  went  to  rejoin  his  regiment  at  the  front,  to  fulfil  the  duties 
for  which  he  was  at  least  receiving  payment.  Not  at  all.  The 
fate  of  France  did  not  interest  him  in  the  least.  The  horizon 
of  his  thoughts  and  efforts  was  still  bounded  by  the  coast-line 
of  his  native  island.  To  regain  there  his  lost  repute  was  to  him 
a  higher  aim  than  honours  and  triumphs  in  the  service  of  those 
principles  for  which  at  that  time  thousands  of  Frenchmen 
joyfully  met  death.  Had  accident  not  furnished  a  pretext 
for  his  return  to  Corsica  he  would  nevertheless  have  found  some 
means  of  accomplishing  that  purpose.  But  it  so  happened  that 
the  new  ministry  closed  the  boarding-schools  for  young  gentle- 
women and  sent  the  pupils  back  to  their  homes.  Among  these 
young  ladies  was  Napoleon's  sister,  Marianne  Bonaparte.  Who 
could  wish  to  hinder  a  brother  from  accompanying  his  sister  in 


Mr.2:i]  The   Crisis   in    Corsica  35 

times  such  as  these  with  the  entire  country  in  a  state  of  agita- 
tion? By  the  middle  of  vSeptember  they  were  both  again  in 
Ajaccio.  Napoleon  remained  there  into  the  summer  of  1793. 
This  period  of  nine  months  was  decisive  for  his  career,  and 
likewise  for  the  fate  of  the  world.  At  once  upon  his  arrival 
Napoleon  had  several  violent  altercations  with  Paoli,  owing  to 
the  fact  that  Napoleon  resumed  his  conmiand  of  the  volunteer 
forces  just  as  if  nothing  had  meanwhile  occurred  and  he  were 
not  a  captain  in  the  regular  army.  The  young  officer  was, 
indeed,  in  so  far  successful  in  what  he  desired  as  to  be  granted 
the  command  of  the  troops  provisionally  and  for  the  time  during 
which  they  were  engaged  in  an  (unsuccessful)  expedition  against 
the  island  of  Sardinia.  But  the  relations  between  him  and  the 
aged  governor  grew  more  and  more  strained  in  the  course  of 
the  next  few  months,  to  end  eventually  in  complete  rupture. 
The  cause  lay  to  a  large  extent  in  the  general  situation  of  affairs. 
Paoli  had  returned  from  England  with  a  strong  predilection 
for  constitutional  monarchy  and  had  approved  the  French 
Constitution  and  agreed  to  serve  under  it  only  because  it  was 
in  accordance  with  that  condition  of  affairs  which  he  had  learned 
to  admire  on  British  soil.  But  this  Constitution  had  been 
shattered  in  its  most  essential  provisions,  the  new  National 
Convention  had  abolished  royalty,  the  king  had  been  deposed, 
accused  of  treason,  tried,  and  put  to  death,  January  21st,  1793. 
The  government  was  in  the  hands  of  extremists  who  could  give 
no  assurance  of  stability.  Futhermore,  at  the  time  of  his  return 
to  Corsica,  Paoli,  moved  by  a  sense  of  gratitude  to  those  who 
had  received  him  so  hospitably  during  his  exile,  had  stipulated 
that  he  should  never  be  called  upon  to  bear  arms  against  Eng- 
land. Now,  after  the  execution  of  Louis  XVL,  war  had  broken 
out  with  England,  and  Paoli  was  a  French  general.  He  refused 
to  comply  with  the  order  to  leave  Corsica  and  attach  himself 
to  the  Army  of  the  South,  and  when,  in  reply  to  this  resistance 
to  command,  the  Convention,  on  April  2d,  1793,  issued  a  warrant 
for  his  arrest  (later  withdrawn  as  having  been  the  result  of 
misapprehension),  nine  tenths  of  the  Corsican  population  of 
the  island  declared  themselves  for  their  aged   chieftain   and 


36  Corsican  Adventures  [1793 

against  the  republican  government  and  its  adherents  upon  the 
island. 

Among  the  latter  figured  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  It  was  the 
critical  moment  of  his  life;  two  courses  lay  before  him,  and  he 
had  to  choose  between  them.  Another  had  achieved  what  it 
had  been  his  dream  to  accomplish  in  Corsica,  what  he  had  striven 
for.  Should  he  attach  himself  to  the  Paolists  it  was  certain  that 
there  would  be  nothing  but  a  subordinate  part  for  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  his  duty  as  an  officer  of  the  French  army  imperatively 
demanded  his  presence  with  his  regiment.  Moreover,  all  the 
political  opinions  which  he  had  entertained  up  to  this  time 
drew  him  toward  the  Convention,  where  the  Radicals  were 
continually  gaining  ground.  If  there  were  still  a  possibility 
of  his  mastering  Corsica,  his  ambition  could  be  realized  only  with 
the  aid  of  France.  Accordingly,  early  in  May,  1793,  he  broke 
openly  with  Paoli, — who  had  made  one  more  effort  to  win  over  the 
son  of  his  friend  Carlo, — and  threw  himself  unreservedly  into 
the  arms  of  the  French  who  had  for  so  long  been  the  objects  of  his 
bitter  hatred.  Shortly  afterwards  a  Corsican  popular  council 
declared  him  an  outlaw  and  the  whole  Bonaparte  family  in- 
famous. It  was  with  difficulty  that  LjEtitia  escaped  to  Calvi 
with  her  children;  her  house  in  Ajaccio  was  sacked  and  set 
afire. 

A  final  effort  was  made  by  Napoleon  to  conquer  Ajaccio. 
Relying  upon  the  continued  devotion  of  his  battalion  in  the 
militia,  he  planned  an  attack  upon  the  city  with  the  aid  of 
French  expeditionary  troops.  But  the  enterprise  miscarried. 
On  the  11th  of  June,  1793,  he  and  his  family  left  the  island 
and  withdrew  to  Toulon.  His  brother  Lucien  had  preceded 
them  by  a  few  weeks,  having  hurried  over  to  France  with  a 
deputation  of  like-minded  men,  to  denounce  Paoli  as  a  con- 
spirator against  the  Republic,  and  at  the  same  time  to  demand 
support  of  the  Jacobins.  Napoleon  had  himself  made  accusa- 
tions against  the  aged  patriot  in  a  memorial  of  the  4th  of  June, 
and  therein  cahunniatod  and  insulted  the  ideal  of  his  boyhood 
and  youth. 

His  r61e  in  Corsica  has  been  played  to  the  end.     Two  motives 


JEr.  2:i]      Napoleon  Ceases  to  be  a  Corsican  37 

had  guided  him  in  his  revolutionary  undertakings  there:  a 
strong  local  patriotism  which  almost  ignored  everything  which 
lay  beyond  the  confines  of  the  island,  and  an  uncontrollable 
impulse  toward  the  acquisition  of  power  and  influence  by  the 
aid  of  which  he  believed  himself  called  to  be  the  deliverer  and 
ruler  of  his  people.  Of  these  two  motives  one  had  lost  its 
object.  The  curse  of  his  own  nation  had  deprived  him  of  his 
country  and  annihilated  in  him  every  tender  feeling  which  he 
had  hitherto  cherished  toward  it.  In  truth  the  desire  to  con- 
quer the  island  was  still  active  within  him  during  the  next  two 
years,  and  many  were  the  schemes  which  he  conceived  to  carry 
out  this  purpose;  but  these  were  no  longer  due  to  patriotism, 
but  rather  to  hatred  toward  the  patriots  and  to  fulfil  his  craving 
for  revenge.  When  later,  in  1796,  he  actually  brought  Corsica 
again  under  French  dominion  this  feeling  also  had  ceased  to 
exist  and  his  native  country  could  inspire  no  greater  interest 
in  him  than,  for  example,  Corfu  or  Malta. 

If  sympathetic  interest  in  the  weal  and  woe  of  his  own  people 
be  a  moral  element  in  the  nature  of  a  man,  Napoleon's  subsequent 
life  and  acts  were  lacking  in  this  characteristic.  He  ceased 
of  necessity  to  be  a  Corsican,  he  never  succeeded  in  becoming 
a  Frenchman.  His  ambition,  likewise,  became  divested  of 
national  feeling;  this  ambition,  hitherto  circumscribed  by  the 
coast-line  of  a  small  island,  knew  henceforth  no  bounds. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    SIEGE   OF    TOULON    AND    THE    DEFENCE    OF   THE 
CONVENTION 

The  revolt  of  Corsica  was  but  one  of  a  long  series  of  uprisings 
in  opposition  to  the  rule  of  the  Jaicobins  which  had  developed 
in  Paris  after  the  execution  of  the  king.     The  contest,  carried  on 
over  the  grave  of  Louis  XVI.,  between  the  two  repubhcan  factions 
of  the  Convention — the  radicals  of  the  Mountain,  and  the  mod- 
erate Girondists — ended  in  the  defeat  of  the  latter  in  the  summer 
of  1793.     All  among  them  who  had  not  fled  were  imprisoned 
and  perished  on  the  scaffold.     The  victors  thenceforth  governed 
France  by  means  of  that  body  appointed  by  the  Convention 
and  known  as  the  Cominittee  of  Public  Safety,  the  members  of 
which,  led  by  Robespierre,  relied  upon  the  Jacobin  Club  and  its 
branches  for  support.     This  Jacobin  government  possessed  one 
quality  lacking  to  its  Girondist  predecessor  and  indispensable 
to  success   under  the  extraordinary   conditions  then  existing: 
unparalleled  energy.     The  Girondists,  the  greater  part  of  whom 
were  young  orators,  entirely  unequal  to  the  political  issues  ("des 
fous  extremement  honnetes"),  had  plunged  France  into  an  inter- 
minable war  with  almost  the  whole  of  Europe,  unprovided  as  the 
country  was  with  either  information  or  resources  necessary  to 
encounter  the  dangers  they  had  conjured  up.     Their  successors 
in  executive  power  assumed  with  this  war  a  gigantic  problem, 
and  they  found  its  solution,  though  not  without  constant  resort 
to  illegal  measures,  unsparing  bloodshed,   and  cruelty.     Com- 
missioners of  the  Convention  travelled  throughout  the  country 
overseeing   the   compulsory   recruiting   among   the   people   and 
supporting,  "in  the  name  of  the  Representatives  of  the  People," 
the   courts-martial   and   revolutionary   tribunals   appointed   to 

38 


Mr.  23]    Conservative  Reaction  in  the  South  39 

punish  the  refractory  and  to  judge  the  suspicious.  And  since 
those  now  in  power  owed  their  advancement  solely  to  absolute 
subservience  to  the  will  of  the  lowest  class  and  could  preserve 
their  authority  only  by  further  concessions  to  it,  there  arose  in 
the  capital,  as  in  the  cities  of  the  provinces,  a  tyranny  of  the 
common  people  which,  not  content  with  threatening  and  perse- 
cuting holders  of  moderate  political  opinions,  eventually  accused 
as  "traitors  to  their  country"  all  wealthy  and  educated  people. 

Such  a  Reign  of  Terror  could  not  long  remain  unopposed. 
It  was  not  only  in  those  parts  of  the  country  where  the  partisans 
of  the  king  and  of  the  old  faith  had  taken  up  arms  against  the 
Parisians  that  the  opposition  manifested  itself,  as  in  Vendee 
and  Brittany,  but  also  among  those  who  had  originally  and 
enthusiastically  promoted  the  revolutionary  movement.  Such 
was  the  case  particularly  in  the  towns  of  southern  France,  which 
had  zealously  taken  part  in  the  contest  against  the  old  regime, 
but  which  now,  incited  by  fugitive  Girondists,  rose  up  against 
radicalism  carried  to  the  point  of  anarchy. 

In  Lyons,  Marseilles,  and  Toulon  the  Jacobins  were  overcome 
by  the  more  moderate  and  peace-loving  element  in  the  commu- 
nity, and  in  Provence  there  arose  a  central  committee  which 
constituted  itself  an  independent  government  and  decreed  armed 
resistance  to  the  terrorism  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety. 
Battalions  of  insurgents  had  already  advanced  from  the  south  as 
far  as  Avignon,  when  the  Convention,  wliich  by  the  exercise  of 
a  little  moderation  could  have  easily  restored  order  without 
bloodshed,  eagerly  accepted  the  challenge,  proclaimed  as  the 
primary  object  of  the  government  the  complete  extermination 
of  all  domestic  opponents  and  directed  its  Commissioner,  Dubois 
de  Crance,  to  subjugate  Lyons  and  prevent  the  concentration 
of  the  forces  of  the  insurgents.  Dubois  hurriedly  collected  a 
corps  of  men  from  troops  of  the  line  and  volunteers  and  sent  it 
under  command  of  his  subordinate  Carteaux  against  the  rebels 
at  Avignon.  In  the  middle  of  July,  1793,  this  force  encamped 
before  the  ancient  residence  of  the  popes. 

Here  aid  was  forthcoming  to  Carteaux.  He  wa.s,  to  be  sure, 
reinforced  only  to  the  extent  of  a  single  petty  officer  of  artillery, 


40  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1793 

but  yet  a  man  who  was  to  render  no  slight  service  in  the  expedi- 
tion against  the  cities  of  the  south:  Captain  Bonaparte. 

After  his  flight  from  Corsica,  Napoleon  had  established  his 
family  in  needy  circumstances  at  La  Vallette  near  Toulon  and 
gone  to  rejoin  his  company,  stationed  at  that  time  in  Nice,  which 
had  been  recently  conquered.  He  bore  a  certificate  from  his 
fellow  countryman  and  friend,  Salicetti,  Commissioner  of  the 
Convention,  to  the  effect  that  his  presence  in  Corsica  had  been 
imperatively  necessary  during  the  last  few  months,  and  this 
attestation  shielded  him  from  censure.  On  the  25th  of  June, 
1793,  he  began  his  service  in  the  shore  battery  established  on  the 
Riviera.  The  defences  at  Nice  being  inadequate,  Napoleon 
was  ordered  to  Avignon  to  bring  back  the  cannon  parked  there. 
Here  he  came  upon  the  before-mentioned  corps  commanded  by 
Carteaux,  who  straightway  took  him  into  his  own  service,  and 
assigned  to  him,  as  officer  of  artillery,  a  small  flying  column. 
Soon  afterwards  the  insurgents  and  the  troops  of  the  Convention 
disputed  in  battle  the  possession  of  Avignon,  and  the  forces  under 
Carteaux  were  successful.  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  aimed  the 
cannon  himself  in  this  engagement,  and  to  have  brought  about 
the  flight  of  the  enemy  through  his  personal  efforts.  The  former 
statement  is  not  improbably  true,  the  latter  is  supported  only  by 
the  assertions  of  sycophants  of  a  later  day.  As  the  result  of  this 
victory,  the  neighbouring  towns  of  Tarascon,  Cavaillon,  and 
Beaucaire  had  to  be  abandoned  forthwith  by  the  insurgents, 
and  the  way  to  Marseilles  lay  open  to  the  troops  of  the  govern- 
ment. Napoleon  was  despatched  back  to  Avignon  to  organize 
an  artillery  park.  The  leisure  afforded  him  by  this  task  he 
utiUzed  in  writing  "Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  in  which  he  dis- 
cussed the  (juestion  of  the  civil  war,  the  object  being  to  convince 
the  Marseillais  of  the  futility  of  their  resistance  to  the  Convention. 
Two  merchants  of  Marseilles,  a  native  of  Nimes,  a  manufacturer 
from  Montpellier,  and  a  soldier  of  the  line  accidentally  meet  one 
evening  at  an  inn  in  Beaucaire,  and  the  soldier,  aided  by  the 
travelk^rs  from  Nimes  and  Montpellier,  attempts  to  prove  to  one 
of  the  merchants  from  Marseilles  that  from  a  military  point  of 
view  the  position  of  that  city  is  untenable  and  that  its  political 


iEr.  24J  "  Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire"  41 

stand  is  to  be  condemned.  One  passage,  particularly,  is  interest- 
ing historically,  in  which,  the  citizen  of  Marseilles  having  adduced 
the  Girondists  as  testimony  in  behalf  of  his  views,  the  soldier, 
who  voices  the  personal  opinions  of  Napoleon,  replies:  "The 
case,  as  I  am  satisfied,  is,  that  'the  Mountain,'  actuated  by  public 
or  by  party  spirit,  having  proceeded  to  the  harshest  extremities 
against  them,  having  outlawed,  imprisoned,  and,  I  will  atlinit,  ca- 
lumniated them,  the  Brissotins  (Girondists)  were  lost  without  a 
civil  war  which  would  put  them  into  a  position  for  laying  down 
the  law  to  their  enemies.  It  is  then  in  reality  to  them  that  your 
war  is  useful.  Had  they  merited  their  early  reputation  they 
would  have  thrown  down  their  arms  upon  the  formulation  of  the 
Constitution,  they  would  have  sacrificed  their  own  interests  to 
public  welfare;  but  it  is  easier  to  cite  Decius  than  to  imitate 
him."  To  this  the  traveller  from  Marseilles  makes  answer  that 
he  and  his  friends  also  desired  the  Republic,  but  wanted  a  Con- 
stitution formulated  by  representatives  who  were  free  to  act; 
they  also  desired  liberty,  but  liberty  as  granted  by  worthy 
deputies;  what  they  did  not  want  was  a  Constitution  favouring 
pillage  and  anarchy.  To  this  Napoleon  makes  repl}'  through 
the  manufacturer  from  Montpellier,  who  reproaches  the  insur- 
gents with  rebellion  and  counter-revolution,  "for,"  he  declares, 
"the  Convention  is  the  centre  of  unity,  the  real  sovereign,  espe- 
cially when  the  nation  is  divided." 

Hardly  was  this  piece  finished  when  the  Commissioners  of 
the  Convention  arrived  in  Avignon.  These  were  his  friend 
Salicetti,  the  younger  Robespierre,  brother  of  the  autocrat  at 
Paris,  and  the  deputy  Gasparin;  they  were  on  their  way  to  the 
Army  of  the  South.  Napoleon  was  introduced  to  the  others  by 
Salicetti,  and  his  penetration  and  culture  charmed  Robespierre, 
with  whom  he  from  this  time  entered  into  near  relations.  The 
"Souper"  was  listened  to  with  attention  and  satisfaction  by  the 
Commissioners,  who  at  once  published  it  at  the  expense  of  the 
state.  In  this  wise  Napoleon  made  his  entrance  into  the  political 
movement. 

Meanwhile    Carteaux    had    marched    upon    Marseilles    and, 
after  a  victorious  engagement,  retaken  the  city  for  the  Con- 


42  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1793 

vention.  The  "treason  "  of  the  inhabitants  toward  their  country- 
was  punished  with  frightful  barbarity.  After  a  short  interval 
the  march  was  resumed  toward  Toulon.  The  conquest  of 
this  port  was  the  more  essential  as  the  insurgents  there  had 
opened  negotiations  with  England  and  had  actually  already 
delivered  into  her  hands  the  fleet  which  lay  before  the  town 
and  was  the  best  in  France.  In  the  siege  laid  to  this  strong- 
hold Napoleon  was  now  to  play  a  distinguished  part.  During 
an  engagement  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Toulon,  one  of  the 
superior  officers  in  the  artillery  had  been  wounded,  and  on  the 
19th  of  October,  1793,  Napoleon  was  promoted  to  the  command 
of  a  battalion  in  the  Second  Regiment  of  Artillery;  from  this 
time  he  was  able  to  act  with  greater  independence.  To  add 
to  this  his  new  friends  had  made  every  effort  to  recommend  him 
to  the  Convention,  representing  him  as  the  only  man  in  the 
besieging  army  capable  of  projecting  a  plan  of  operations.  He 
himself  had  addressed  a  memorial  to  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  in  which  he  complained  of  the  neglected  condition  of 
his  branch  of  the  service,  and  asked  for  the  appointment  of  an 
artillery  general  with  full  powers,  "who,  by  virtue  of  his  very- 
rank,  would  increase  respect  and  make  an  impression  upon  a 
lot  of  ignorant  fellows  on  the  staff  with  whom  one  has  to  be 
continually  laying  down  first  principles  and  coming  to  terms 
in  order  to  carry  out  plans  approved  both  by  theory  and  by 
experience." 

Carteaux  was  soon  afterward  removed  from  his  position  and 
the  chief  command  given  Major-General  Dugommier,  whose 
coolness,  perseverance,  and  military  perception  Napoleon  com- 
mends; General  Dutcil  was  entrusted  with  the  command  of 
the  artillery,  while  Napoleon  himself  was  put  in  charge  of  the 
battery  establishetl  to  the  west  of  the  city.  He  proposes  now — 
this  is  the  plan  which  he  submitted  to  the  Council  of  War — 
to  capture  the  peninsula  of  C6pet  lying  to  the  southwest_, 
from  this  point  to  clear  the  harbour,  and  by  this  roundabout  way 
to  bring  the  city  to  surrender.  His  plan  having  been  adopted 
by  the  generals,  he  at  once  set  about  the  task  with  the  greatest 
zeal.     It  was  not  long  before  his  guns  were  placed  in  the  desired 


ffiT.  24]  The   Fall  of  Toulon  43 

locations;  a  sally  on  the  part  of  the  English  was  repulsed  on 
the  30th  of  November,  and  for  his  Eno  contluct  on  this  occasion 
Bonaparte  was  appointed  coloneI|_On  the  17th  of  December 
Fort  I'Eguillette,  and  with  it  the  before-mentioned  peninsular 
fell  into  his  powder.  When  this  gain  was  followed  up  by  a  con- 
centric attack  of  all  the  divisions  upon  the  defences  of  the  city, 
the  besieged  Toulonese,  menaced  with  certain  destruction  by 
Napoleon's  batteries,  dared  make  no  further  energetic  resist- 
ance. The  English  and  Spaniards,  allies  of  the  insurgents, 
promptly  embarked  their  troops  and  sailed  out  of  the  harbour, 
taking  with  them  many  fugitive  inhabitants  of  the  city.  On 
the  19th  of  December  the  victors  made  their  entrance  into 
Toulon,  and,  in  mad  rage  for  vengeance,  as  at  Marseilles  and 
Lyons,  relentlessly  condemned  all  who  were  under  suspicion 
or  who  were  in  any  w^ay  compromised.  Hundreds  of  such  were 
assembled  together  and  shot  down.  It  was  the  intention  of 
Fr^ron,  one  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Convention,  to  leave 
not  a  single  rebel  ahve,  but  this  was  opposed  by  Dugommier, 
and  one  readily  accepts  the  statement  that  Bonaparte  also 
counselled  moderation.  He  was  not  inclined  to  the  exercise  of 
useless  cruelty,  and  was  animated  in  no  degree  by  that  spirit 
of  bloody  fanaticism  to  which  in  that  awful  year  such  innumer- 
able victims  were  sacrificed. 

While  the  part  played  b}'  Bonaparte  before  Toulon  was  one 
of  great  importance,  he  occupied  but  an  inconspicuous  position; 
he  was  nothing  more  than  commander  of  a  battalion.  He  had 
none  the  less  rendered  great  service  to  the  government  through 
the  strategy  which  he  advised.  An  attack  from  the  north  and 
east  would  not  have  led  to  such  prompt  results,  and  upon  this 
pohit  much  depended  just  at  this  time  when  the  allied  foes  of 
France  were  beginning  to  turn  the  closest  attention  to  Toulon, 
when  already  the  Enghsh  had  despatched  an  expedition,  pri- 
marily intended  for  Vendue,  toward  southern  France,  and  the 
Austrian  court  had  determined  to  send  forces  thither.  Accord- 
ingly it  was  but  a  well-earned  acknowledgment  of  his  services 
when  Napoleon  was  now  appointed  brigadier-general  of  artillery 
by  a  provisional  decree   of   the   Commissioners  of  the  Conven- 


44  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1794 

tion  on  the  22d  of  December,  1793,  a  nomination  afterwards 
confirmed  by  the  Committee  of  Pubhc  Safety. 

When  on  this  occasion  the  authorities  demanded  the  neces- 
sary record  of  his  hfe  he  disclaimed  all  nobility  of  origin.  It 
could  but  have  told  against  him  with  the  Jacobins,  to  whom  he 
had  alhed  himself,  and  in  whose  service  he  was  employing  his  great 
talents.  Whether  he  was  really  in  sympathy  with  them,  whether 
he  inwardly  espoused  their  cause,  or  whether  it  was  due  to 
anything  more  than  ambition  that  he  cast  in  his  lot  with  the 
Radicals,  is  not  made  clear  by  this  act.  Once, — shortly  after 
his  appointment  as  general, — unmindful  of  the  prevailing  radi- 
calism and  on  purely  strategic  grounds,  he  recommended  the 
rebuilding  of  the  Marseilles  Bastille,  Fort  St.  Nicholas.  He 
was  at  once  declared  "suspect,"  and  called  upon  to  justify  him- 
self before  the  Convention.  Salicetti  had  much  difficulty  in 
disposing  of  the  matter.  From  that  time  Napoleon  lost  no 
opportunity  of  showing  himself  a  zealous  republican.  Says 
Mile.  Robespierre  in  her  memoranda:  "Bonaparte  was  a  repub- 
lican, I  should  say  even  that  he  was  a  republican  of  the  Moun- 
tain, at  least  he  made  that  impression  upon  me  from  his  manner 
of  regarding  things  at  the  time  when  I  was  at  Nice  (1794).  Later 
his  victories  turned  his  head  and  made  him  aspire  to  rule  over  his 
fellow  citizens,  but  then,  while  he  was  but  a  general  of  artillery  in 
the  Army  of  Italy,  he  was  a  believer  in  thoroughgoing  liberty  and 
genuine  equality."  The  younger  brother  of  the  dread  Presi- 
dent of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  recommended  him  in 
April,  1794,  as  a  man  of  transcendent  merit,  and  reposed  such 
confidence  in  him  that  the  initiated  called  him  the  "privy 
counsellor"  of  the  Commissioner.  Yet  the  latter  did  not  fail 
to  add  to  his  praise  this  observation:  "He  is  a  Corsican,  and 
offers  only  the  guaranty  of  a  man  of  that  nation  who  has  with- 
stood the  petting  of  Paoli  and  whose  property  has  been  laid 
waste  by  that  traitor." 

But  Robespierre  had  absolute  confidence  in  Napoleon's 
military  counsels  and  discussed  with  him  and  Ricord,  the  Com- 
missioner, a  secret  plan  of  operations  for  the  so-called  "Army 
of  Italy."     That  portion  of  the  French  forces  was  encamped 


^T.  24]  The  Fall  of  Robespierre  45 

on  the  Riviera,  engaged  in  war  against  the  allied  Sardinians 
and  Austrians,  who  occupied  the  heights  of  the  Apennines.  The 
revolt  in  southern  France  had  exhausted  the  land,  and  the  Army 
of  Italy  was  compelled  to  draw  its  supplies  from  the  neutral 
territoiy  of  Genoa.  Two  problems  presented  themselves  in 
the  management  of  this  part  of  the  army:  first,  to  protect  these 
indispensable  importations  against  interception  and  attack  by 
the  allies,  and,  second,  by  some  fortunate  offensive  movement 
to  clear  the  way  into  the  rich  plain  of  Piedmont.  This  plan  of 
offensive  operations  was  elaborated  in  several  ways  by  Bona- 
parte, who  had  been  detailed  as  general  of  artillery  to  the  Army 
of  Italy  in  May,  1794.  In  July  he  himself  went  on  a  mission  to 
Genoa,  officially  to  treat  with  the  Doge  on  the  subject  of  the 
condition  of  roads  and  coasts,  but  secretly  to  investigate  the 
fortifications  of  Savona  as  a  possible  gateway  of  invasion. 
Two  aides,  Marmont  and  Junot, — the  subsequent  Dukes  of 
Ragusa  and  Abrantes, — accompanied  him;  he  was  himself 
filled  with  joyful  hope  of  being  able  soon  to  carry  his  plans  into 
execution  as  General-in-chief . 

But  too  soon  these  high-soaring  dreams  were  to  come  to 
naught.  When,  at  the  end  of  July,  he  returned  to  Nice,  affairs 
in  France  had  taken  a  complete  change.  Robespierre,  who 
had  gradually  rid  himself  of  his  rivals  in  the  Convention,  Danton, 
Hebert,  and  their  adherents,  and  had  been  more  and  more 
openly  aiming  to  secure  the  dictatorship,  was  overthrowTi  by  a 
coalition  of  the  radical  and  conservative  elements  of  the  Con- 
vention and  condemned  to  the  scaffold,  July  27th,  1794  (Ther- 
midor  9th).  With  him  fell  the  government  to  which  Napoleon 
had  but  recently  offered  his  services.  His  fate  could  not  but 
be  affected  by  this  change,  particularly  as  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign upon  which  he  had  been  labouring  had  been  under  dis- 
cussion between  him  and  Robespierre  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  Convention  and  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety.  The  Jaco- 
bins, regardful  of  their  own  safety  upon  the  fall  of  their  powerful 
leader,  sought  to  protect  themselves  in  the  denunciation  of 
others.  And  thus  it  came  to  pass  that  Salicetti  accused  his 
fellow    countryman    Bonaparte    to    the    Convention    of   being 


46  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1794 

"plan-maker"  to  the  Dictator.  Napoleon  was  deprived  of  his 
commission  as  general,  and  on  the  12th  of  August,  1794,  im- 
prisoned in  Fort  Carre.*  What  a  tempest  of  distracting  re- 
flections must  have  assailed  him  here!  In  the  midst  of  his 
ambitious  hopes  he  found  himself  paralyzed  and  suddenly  cast 
out  of  the  way  whereby  so  many  had  already  arrived  with 
rapidity  at  power  and  influence.  The  reform  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  army,  begun  in  1793  under  Dubois  de  Crance,  a 
member  of  the  Convention,  with  its  principle  of  universal  mili- 
tary obligation  and  its  revised  list  of  officers,  had  already  begun 
to  bear  fruit.  At  the  end  of  the  year  1792  there  had  been  not 
more  than  a  hundred  and  twelve  thousand  men  of  the  regular 
troops  in  France,  by  the  summer  of  1794  there  were  not  less 
than  seven  hundred  and  thirty  thousand,  animated  by  a  fatal- 
istic patriotism,  controlled  by  rigorous  discipline,  and  com- 
manded by  generals  whose  abilities,  developed  by  equal  com- 
petition in  the  open  field,  were  brought  to  recognition  with 
unexampled  rapidity.  At  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  North 
stands  Pichegru,  who  had  at  one  time  superintended  as  sergeant 
the  little  cadets  at  Brienne;  he  was  now  driving  the  enemy  out 
of  France  and  conquering  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  Jourdan, 
one  of  the  volunteer  officers  of  1792,  is  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Sambre-et-Meuse,  fighting  victoriously  against"  the 
Austrians  in  the  battle  of  Fleurus,  June  26th,  1794,  while  the 
decisive  attack  is  led  by  General  Marceau,  a  man  of  Napoleon's 
own  age.  Another,  Hoche,  his  senior  by  a  year,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Revolution  a  mere  subaltern,  had,  as  general-in-chief, 
vanquished  the  Austrians  at  Weissenburg  and  driven  them  out  of 
Alsace  in   December  of  the  preceding  year,   thereby  covering 

*  He  may  have  anticipated  this  outcome,  for  he  wrote  a  letter  a  few 
days  previous  to  his  arrest  to  'rilly,  the  French  Charg6  d'Affaires  at 
Genoa,  who  would,  as  he  knew,  make  report  in  Paris  concerning  it.  In 
this  he  speaks  of  his  relations  with  the  younger  Hohespierre  Jind  adds:  "I 
was  somewhat  affected  b}'  the  catastrophe  of  Kobespierre  the  younger, 
to  whom  I  was  attached  and  whom  I  believed  to  be  pure;  but,  had  he 
been  my  father,  I  would  have  stabbed  him  myself  if  he  had  aspired  to 
tyranny."  Napoleon  III.  considered  it  advisable  to  omit  this  letter  from 
the  official  edition  of  the  correspondence  of  his  imcle. 


^T.  25]  Napoleon's   Appeal  47 

himself  with  fame  and  honour.  Following  these  was  a  long 
succession  of  others:  Saint-Cyr,  in  1792  still  a  captain  of  volun- 
teers, was  now  general  of  division;  Bcrnadotte,  sergeant- 
major  at  the  opening  of  the  Revolution,  commanded  in  1794 
likewise  a  division;  Kleber,  a  volunteer  in  the  year  1792,  had, 
a  year  later,  reached  the  same  rank;  and  so  on.  And  he,  the 
most  ambitious  of  them  all,  fully  conscious  of  his  abilities  and 
qualifications,  saw  himself  shut  out  of  this  circle,  perhaps  for- 
ever, and,  moreover,  threatened  by  an  accusation  which  had 
already  cost  many  their  lives  in  that  terrible  year. 

But  he  was  not  the  man  to  give  himself  up  to  despair.  One 
thing  already  in  his  favour  was  that  he  had  not  been  sent  to 
Paris.  In  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Commissioners  of  the  Con- 
vention, he  attempted  above  all  to  manifest  his  unqualified 
patriotism.  "Have  I  not,"  it  reads,  "been  attached  to  its 
principles  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution?  Have 
I  not  been  seen  in  the  struggle  here  with  the  domestic  enemy, 
or  there  as  a  soldier  against  the  foreign  foe?  I  have  sacrificed 
my  residence  in  my  own  department,  I  have  abandoned  my 
property,  I  have  lost  all  for  the  Republic.  .  .  .  Ought  I  then 
to  be  confounded  with  the  enemies  of  my  country;  and  are 
pay-iots  heedlessly  to  lose  a  general  who  has  not  been  unservice- 
able to  the  Republic?  Should  Representatives  put  the  govern- 
ment under  necessity  of  being  unjust  and  impolitic?  Hear  me, 
make  way  with  the  oppression  which  surrounds  me,  and  restore 
to  me  the  esteem  of  the  patriots.  An  hour  later,  if  the  evil- 
minded  desire  my  life,  I  will  yield  it  to  them  gladly;  I  care  so 
little  for  it,  and  I  have  so  often  wearied  of  it.  Yes,  only  the 
idea  that  it  may  still  be  of  service  to  my  country  helps  me  to 
bear  the  burden  of  it  with  courage." 

Necessity  had  taught  him  to  use  the  word  "Patrie"  in 
speaking  of  France;  his  own  country  had  become  to  him  merely 
a  "  D6partement." 

The  letter  produced  the  desired  effect.  Furthermore,  Sali- 
cetti  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  himself  no  longer 
in  danger  and  again  took  up  the  defence  of  his  fellow  countryman, 
whose  papers  he  examined  personally  and  declared  to  be  free 


4^  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1794 

from  anything  of  a  suspicious  character.  On  the  20th  of  August 
Napoleon  was  released  from  custody.  A  few  weeks  later,  on 
the  14th  of  September,  he  was  rehabilitated  with  his  rank  of 
general,  and  in  the  same  month  was  permitted  to  take  part  in 
the  offensive  movement  of  the  Army  of  Italy  by  means  of  which 
the  Austrians  were  driven  back  from  the  crest  of  the  mountains 
of  the  Riviera  as  far  as  Dego  and  Acqui.  Upon  the  return  of 
the  French  to  the  coast  Bonaparte  was  avssigned  the  post  of 
commander  of  artillery  in  the  expedition  fitting  out  for  the 
reconquest  of  Corsica. 

There  the  last  remaining  French  strongholds  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  English:  San  Firenze  on  the  17th  of 
February,  Bastia  on  the  24th  of  May,  and  finally  Calvi,  on  the 
1st  of  August.  In  the  interior  of  the  island  the  British  had 
established  themselves  somewhat  earlier.  Paoli  was  invited 
by  King  George  III.  to  come  to  England.  Influenced  by  the 
English,  a  popular  meeting  was  held  at  Corte  on  the  18th  of 
June,  1794,  in  which  the  Corsicans  declared  their  island  a  con- 
stitutional monarchy  under  the  protection  of  England  and 
under  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot  as  viceroy.  Upon  hearing  of  these 
events  the  new  Committee  of  Public  Safety  at  Paris  undertook 
once  more  to  wrest  the  department  from  the  enemy.  But 
while  the  division  of  troops  intended  for  this  service  stood  ready 
by  the  end  of  autumn,  the  wretched  condition  of  the  navy 
delayed  the  expedition  into  the  following  February.  Napoleon 
in  one  of  his  letters  represented  the  prospective  conquest  as  a 
mere  military  "promenade,"  but  the  result  was  far  from  justify- 
ing this  assumption.  When  in  March,  1795,  the  French  fleet  at 
last  set  sail  to  clear  the  Corsican  waters  of  English  craft,  an 
encounter  which  took  place  between  Cape  Corso  and  Livorno 
ended  disastrously  to  the  French.  Two  of  their  ships  fell  into 
the  hands  of  their  adversary  and  the  remainder  were  obliged  to 
retreat  into  the  Gulf  of  Saint-Juan.  After  this  rebuff  the 
expedition  was  abandoned;  the  troops  already  on  board  the 
transports  were  disembarked  and  detailed  to  the  Army  of 
Italy;   Corsica  was,  for  the  present,  lost. 

Again  Napoleon  was  without  a  command.     Unexpectedly 


.ET..25]       The  Reaction  from  the  Terror  49 

came  the  order  to  betake  himself  to  the  Army  of  the  West. 
On  the  2d  of  May,  1795,  he  left  Marseilles;  on  the  10th  he 
reached  Paris.  He  had  no  intention  of  leaving  that  city  for 
some  time. 

After  the  events  of  the  27th  of  July,  1794  (Thcrmidor  9th),  the 
more  calm  and  cautious  elements  of  the  population  of  Paris  had 
waked,  as  from  a  state  of  torpor,  into  life.  As  if  with  the  death 
of  one  man  all  terror  had  ended,  they  now  fearlessly  expressed 
their  opinions  and  set  forth  their  demands.  In  newspapers 
and  pamphlets,  no  longer  under  any  restraint  of  censorship, 
and  in  all  public  resorts  of  the  capital  the  abhorrence  in  which  the 
Jacobins  were  held  came  to  unreserved  expression.  For  the 
first  time  the  number  of  their  victims  began  to  be  appreciated. 
There  were  but  few  families  who  had  not  suffered  under  the 
iron  yoke;  many  among  them  had  lost  one  or  more  members, 
many  had  lost  their  property  during  the  Terror.  The  opening 
of  the  prisons  brought  day  by  day  new  horrors  to  light  and 
increased  the  indignation  of  those  who  had  suffered  injury. 
In  the  Convention  itself,  where  the  factions  of  the  "Mountain'' 
had  formed  an  alliance  to  depose  the  Dictator  Robespierre,  one 
of  these,  composed  of  the  former  adherents  of  Danton,  with- 
drew from  the  Jacobins.  They  styled  themselves  Thermidorians, 
as  they  claimed  the  merit  of  having  brought  about  the  decisive 
step  of  that  day.  Their  leaders.  Merlin  and  Tallien,  Fr^ron  and 
Barras,  sought  to  come  into  touch  witli  the  moderate  element 
of  the  Centre  against  the  extreme  Left.  The  banished  Girond- 
ists were  recalled  to  the  Convention,  and  the  readiest  tools 
of  the  fallen  government,  after  making  a  futile  attempt  at 
resistance,  expiated  their  offences  on  the  scaffold. 

Just  at  this  time  Napoleon  arrived  in  Paris.  Hardly  a 
favourable  moment  in  which  to  make  an  appearance  for  a  man 
recently  under  accusation  of  being  a  sharer  in  the  designs  of 
the  abhorred  tyrant.  \'ery  likely  he  had  not  pictured  to  him- 
self so  complete  a  change  in  the  situation  of  affairs.  For  his 
outward  circumstances  this  was  exceedingly  unfavourable. 
The  mere  order  to  betake  himself  to  the  Army  of  the  West  and 
serve  under  Hoche,  who  was  barely  his  elder,  as  simple  brigadier- 


^6  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1795 

general,  was  intolerable  to  his  boundless  ambition.  And  this 
in  a  war  against  peasants  and  irregular  troops  where  little 
opportunity  would  offer  for  his  art  to  display  itself!  He  was 
determined  not  to  obey  the  order,  and  sought  above  all  to  gain 
time  and  await  the  outcome  of  a  new  move  on  the  part  of  the 
Jacobins,  for  he  still  belonged  to  that  party.  But  this  new 
insurrection  against  the  Convention,  that  of  the  1st  Prairial 
(20th  of  May,  1795),  ended  in  the  defeat  of  the  rebellious  Jaco- 
bins and  increased  the  difficulty  of  Bonaparte's  situation.  He 
was  transferred,  as  being  a  supernumerary  in  the  artillery,  to 
the  infantry,  and  received  peremptory  orders  to  depart  for  the 
west.  If  he  now  hoped  to  maintain  himself  under  the  new 
condition  of  things,  he  must  cut  loose  from  the  radicals  and 
try  to  come  into  touch  with  the  Thermidorians.  He  under- 
took this  feat  and  was  successful  in  accomplishing  it.  At  no 
time  did  Fortune  completely  forsake  him.  It  was  certainly  a 
happy  coincidence  for  him  that  two  of  the  leaders  of  the  party 
now  in  power,  Fr^ron  and  Barras,  had,  as  Commissioners  of  the 
Convention,  been  present  at  the  council  of  war  held  before 
Toulon,  when  the  proposals  of  the  young  captain  of  artillery  had 
been  accepted.  To  them,  at  least,  the  conduct  of  Bonaparte, 
in  serving  a  government  they  were  themselves  at  that  time 
endeavouring  to  uphold,  could  not  appear  blameworthy.  They 
accordingly  received  him  well  and  lent  him  their  support. 

Those  plans  which  Napoleon  now  submitted  to  them  were 
essentially  his  projects  of  an  offensive  war  which  he  had  com- 
municated a  year  before  to  Robespierre,  but  with  certain  altera- 
tions imposed  by  the  general  political  situation.  Prussia  had 
retired  from  the  list  of  the  enemies  of  France  and  had  concluded 
a  separate  treaty  of  peace,  April  5th,  1795.  Negotiations  had 
already  been  entered  into  with  Spain  which  were  soon  also  to 
lead  to  peace.  There  remained  on  the  Continent  but  one  of 
the  great  powers  as  adversary,  but  Austria  was  making  prepa- 
rations to  prosecute  the  war  with  all  possible  vigour.  These 
changes  in  the  situation  of  affairs  necessitated  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  young  general's  plan  of  campaign.  The  year  before 
it  had   been    his   proposal   to   have   the   Army  of   Italy   take 


iEr.  25]  Plan  of  an  Italian  Campaign  51 

the  offensive,  co-operating  with  tlie  troops  in  Germany,  accord- 
ing to  which  plan  the  weight  of  action  would  fall  upon  the  last- 
named  country.  "It  is  Germany,"  said  he  in  the  memorial 
addressed  to  Robespierre,  "which  should  be  overpowered;  that 
accomplished,  Spain  and  Italy  will  fall  of  themselves.  .  .  .  The 
defensive  system  should  be  adopted  on  the  Spanish  frontier, 
and  the  offensive  system  on  that  of  Piedmont.  Our  blows 
should  be  directed  against  Germany,  never  against  Spain  or 
Italy.  If  we  have  great  success,  we  should  not  allow  ourselves 
to  be  thrown  off  the  scent  by  penetrating  into  Italy  while  Ger- 
many still  presents  a  formidable  and  unweakened  front."  * 

Now  that,  through  the  withdrawal  of  Prussia,  the  power 
of  resistance  on  the  German  side  had  become  weaker,  he  pro- 
poses striking  the  decisive  blow  against  the  Austrians  in  Italy. 
For  this  purpose  the  force  of  the  Italian  Army  should  be  sub- 
stantially increased,  an  achievement  easily  possible  by  drawing 
for  that  purpose  upon  the  troops  set  free  by  the  peace  with 
Spain.  The  Riviera  having  been  seized  and  secured  as  far  as 
Vado,  the  army  thus  reinforced  would  press  forward  along  the 
coast  and  across  the  mountains  toward  Piedmont,  cutting  off 
the  King  of  Sardinia,  known  to  be  already  desirous  of  peace, 
from  Austria  and  winning  him  over  to  the  cause  of  France. 
Once  in  the  plains  the  army  could  support  itself  by  levying 
requisitions.  If  the  expedition  were  started  at  the  most  fa- 
vourable time,  in  February,  j\Iantua  could  be  conquered  before 
the  end  of  spring,  and  by  the  termination  of  this  first  campaign 
the  army  could  have  reached  Trent.  In  a  second  campaign, 
united  with  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  it  would  penetrate  into  the 
heart  of  Austria  and  dictate  terms  of  peace. 

Such  was  the  daring  plan  which  a  year  later  he  was  to  carry 
into  execution  with  amazing  abihty,  laying  thereby  the  founda- 
tion of  his  fame  and  power.  This  plan  was  not  entirely  original. 
For  a  great  part  of  it  he  was  indebted  to  the  profound  study 
which  he  had  made  of  military  history,  particularly  of  the  cam- 
paign in  Italy  conducted  by  Count  de  Maillebois  in  1745.  This 
campaign  had  been  the  object  of  his  conscientious  study  while 

*  Jung,  "  Bonaparte,"  II.  43G. 


r2  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1795 

captain  of  artillery  at  Nice,  as  we  are  assured  by  a  credible 
witness.* 

This  plan  was  based  upon  his  knowledge  of  a  territory  which 
he  had  studied  minutely  during  the  last  few  years,  and  of  an 
adversary  who  was  no  stranger  to  him.  And  now  he  was  called 
upon  to  remove  himself  from  both  in  order  to  play  a  secondary 
part  in  Vendee,  while  perhaps  another  would  be  carrying  out 
these  plans  of  his  in  Italy !  He  could  not  submit  to  such  a  fate. 
Hardly  had  the  conservative  Aubry,  who  had  been  the  occasion 
of  his  transference  to  the  infantry,  retired  from  the  Committee 
of  Public  Safety,  when  he  made  bold,  relying  upon  the  pro- 
tection of  his  friends,  to  make  an  energetic  protest  against  such 
an  arrangement.  He  says  in  this  document:  " General  Bona- 
parte relies  upon  the  justice  of  the  members  of  the  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  to  reinstate  him  into  his  former  position,  and 
to  spare  him  the  pain,  after  having  commanded  the  artillery 
under  the  most  unfavourable  conditions  during  the  war  and 
having  contributed  to  its  most  brilliant  successes,  of  seeing  his 
place  occupied  by  men  who  have  always  kept  in  the  rear,  who 
are  absolute  strangers  to  our  successes,  unknown  in  our  armies, 
and  who  have  the  impudence  to  present  themselves  to-day  to 
grasp  from  you  the  fruit  of  victory  which  they  have  not  been 
willing  to  incur  risk  in  obtaining."  He  was  so  much  the  more 
confident  of  a  favourable  reply  to  this  complaint  as  Aubry's 
successor,  Doulcet  de  Pontecoulant,  had  accepted  his  plan  of 
operations  and  had  sent  it  to  the  generals  commanding  the 
Italian  Army  for  consideration.  He  was  temporarily  assigned 
to  serve  on  the  committee  having  the  duty  of  directing  the 
armies  and  plans  of  campaign,  and  was  full  of  happy  confidence. 
The  same  hope  that  had  been  frustrated  by  the  sudden  down- 
fall of  Robespierre   animated   him  once  more.     He  writes  at 

*  See  the  excellent  article  ",Sur  la  Campagne  de  Napoleon  en  I'Ann^e 
1796,"  in  the  third  supplement  of  the  "  Militiir-Wochenblatt,"  1889,  where 
it  is  shown  that  the  young  gciieral-in-chiof  followed  the  "  Histoire  des 
Canipagnes  du  Mar6chal  de  Maillebois  en  1745  et  1746,"  by  Pezay  (Paris, 
177.5),  with  regard  to  tht;  ruling  idea  which  was  to  separate  the  Piedmont- 
ese  from  the  Austrian^,  impose  peace  upon  the  former,  and  drive  back 
the  latter  as  far  aa  the  Adige. 


^T.  26]  The   Plan   Rejected  c-7 

this  time:  "My  offensive  plans  have  been  adopted;  we  shall 
soon  have  serious  action  in  Lonibardy."  Under  date  of  Sep- 
tember 8th,  1795,  he  writes  to  Joseph:  "I  see  nothing  but 
pleasant  prospects  before  me,  and,  should  it  be  otherwise,  one 
must  nevertheless  live  in  the  present.  A  man  of  courage  may 
disregard  the  future." 

And  "otherwise"  it  resulted,  and  his  courage  was  soon  put 
to  a  new  and  severe  test.  It  was  his  fate  henceforward  to  cut 
his  way  through  ceaseless  vicissitudes  of  good  and  evil  fortune. 
The  end  of  Doulcct  de  Pontecoulant's  term  of  service  on  the 
Committee  of  PubUc  Safety  arrived,  in  accordance  with  the 
law  of  rotation  in  office,  before  the  protest  of  the  young  general 
had  been  acted  upon.  In  him  the  supphant  lost  his  strongest 
supporter.  Nor  was  he  without  personal  enemies,  and  when 
the  time  for  decision  of  his  case  arrived,  his  petition  was  rejected 
by  the  officials  of  the  War  Department,  and  his  name  was  again 
stricken  from  the  list  of  French  generals  on  duty,  on  account  of 
his  refusal  to  proceed  to  the  post  assigned  him.  (Decree  of 
September  15th,  1795.) 

And  now  once  more  his  brightest  hopes  had  been  dashed. 
Without  a  position  at  a  period  whose  uncertainties  had  already 
been  the  ruin  of  thousands;  without  money,  for,  as  Marmont 
relates,  "the  small  fund  of  bank-bills  which  he  had  brought 
back  from  the  army  "  had  been  lost  in  unfortunate  speculations; 
without  credit  in  a  financial  crisis  in  which  by  the  end  of  July, 
1795,  paper  money  had  depreciated  to  one  fortieth  of  its  face 
value,  he  was  impotent  to  help  liis  family  again  in  need  through 
the  changed  poUtical  situation.  He  had  been  mistaken:  one 
cannot  always  "live  in  the  present." 

And  what  made  his  situation  appear  the  more  gloomy  was 
the  fact  that  a  new  and  great  danger  was  already  imminent. 
The  royahsts  and  the  liberals  of  '89  and  '91  menaced  the  hated 
Convention  in  which  his  friends  sat.  If  they  should  be  successful, 
he  and  his  friends  were  lost  together. 

The  last  revolts  of  the  Jacobins  had  incUned  the  factions  of 
the  centre  of  the  Convention,  the  Thennidorians  and  indepen- 
dents,— to  use  a  modem  expression, — farther  toward  the  right. 


54  The  Siege   of  Toulon  [1795 

The  new  Constitution,  drafted  during  the  summer  of  1795,  was 
moderate  in  character  and  was  to  render  a  return  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  last  few  years  forever  impossible.  First  of  all, 
the  executive  and  legislative  powers  were  no  longer  to  be  united 
in  the  hands  of  the  national  representatives.  The  legislative 
power  was  to  be  entrusted  to  two  bodies  instead  of  one:  a 
"Council  of  Five  Hundred,"  and  a  "Council  of  Ancients"  (An- 
ciens)  numbering  two  hundred  and  fifty  members;  while  the 
executive  authority  was  to  be  vested  in  a  "Directory"  of  five 
men  who  must  be  at  least  forty  years  of  age.  One  third  of  the 
members  of  each  of  these  legislative  councils  was  to  retire  an- 
nually, their  places  to  be  filled  by  election.  It  did  not  come 
within  the  domain  of  the  executive  body  to  propose  bills,  nor 
could  it  refuse  to  execute  laws  passed  by  the  legislature;  one 
of  the  Directors  must  retire  yearly,  and  the  outgoing  member 
was  not  eligible  for  re-election  until  five  years  had  elapsed. 
The  Directors,  to  whom  the  ministers  of  departments  were  sub- 
ordinated, were  chosen  by  the  Ancients  from  a  list  drawn  up  by 
the  Five  Hundred.  They  were  to  have  the  charge  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Finance,  War,  Justice,  and  Affairs  of  the  Interior.  The 
Constitution  accorded  liberty  of  the  press,  of  worship,  of  com- 
merce, and  of  trade;  it  extended  its  protection  to  home  and 
property,  but  clubs  were  forbidden  and  political  societies  were 
tolerated  only  on  condition  that  no  public  meetings  should  be 
held  and  that  there  should  be  no  affiliation  between  them;  no 
petitions  of  the  masses,  no  banding  together  of  the  people  was 
allowed;  the  Emigres  were  forbidden  to  return  home,  and  the 
Jacobins  were  prohil)ited  from  reappearing  at  their  club. 

These  were  the  distinctive  features  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
year  III  (1795).  It  was  as  httle  in  keeping  with  the  desires  of 
the  Jacobins  as  with  those  of  the  Royalists.  The  moderation 
of  the  parties  in  power  tended  rather  to  convince  the  latter  that 
the  hour  for  them  to  strike  had  come.  Already  there  was  talk 
of  restoring  the  monarchy  and  of  proclaiming  the  son  of  the 
decapitated  king  as  constitutional  sovereign  under  the  name 
of  Louis  XVII.,  when  the  child  died,  worn  out  by  the  inhuman 
treatment  to  which  he  had  been  subjected  during  the  preceding 


Mr.  26]  The   Royalist   Reaction  55 

years.  At  once  the  partisans  of  the  Bourbons  turned  to  Louis 
XVIII.,  the  emigrant  brother  of  the  former  king,  who  from 
Verona  was  flooding  France  with  his  unskilful  agents. 

The  agitation  was  accompanied  by  outrages  on  the  part  of 
the  royahsts  in  the  provinces  almost  equal  to  the  horrors  of  the 
Reign  of  Terror.  In  Vendue  the  civil  war,  but  just  quenched  by 
Hoche,  blazed  up  anew.  In  Paris  itself  the  common  people, 
who  were  royalists,  or  at  least  of  the  moderate  party,  armed 
themselves  against  the  Convention.  These  events  made  a  deep 
impression  upon  that  body;  its  republican  elements,  who 
recognized  that  with  the  loss  of  control  their  very  existence 
was  threatened,  imitcd  and  decreed  that  two  thirds  of  the  new 
legislative  body  of  Five  Hundred  must  be  composed  of  members 
of  the  Convention,  the  remainder  to  be  elected  without  restriction. 
This  transition  decree  as  well  as  the  Constitution  was  to  be 
submitted  to  the  people  of  France  for  approval  by  vote.  While 
they  thus  secured  for  themselves  a  majority  in  the  new  con- 
stitutional legislature  these  members  of  the  Convention  believed 
also  that  they  were  assuring  in  the  best  way  the  new  dispensa- 
tion and  preventing  the  return  of  the  old  monarchical  govern- 
ment. To  protect  themselves  further  against  probable  attack 
from  the  Paris  populace,  the  Thermidorians  united  once  more 
with  the  Jacobin  deputies,  gathered  to  the  capital  a  few  thousand 
soldiers  of  the  line  and  formed  a  "battalion  of  patriots"  from 
those  brigand  elements  upon  whose  pikes  the  throne  of  Ter- 
rorism had  been  erected. 

This  last  precaution  increased  beyond  measure  the  wrath 
of  the  Parisians  who  were  opposed  to  the  Convention.  The 
Constitution  they  were  ready  to  accept,  it  is  true,  but  they 
rejected  the  additional  decree,  and  when,  in  spite  of  their  re- 
monstrance, the  Convention  promulgated,  as  law,  the  new 
Constitution  including  the  transition  provisions,  the  citizens 
from  forty-four  out  of  the  forty-eight  sections  revolted, 
assembled  some  thirty  thousand  men  of  the  National  Guard, 
and  on  October  4th  successfully  resisted  General  Menou  in 
command  of  the  troops  of  the  Convention,  who  in  consequence 
of  this  defeat  was  charged  with  treason  and  removed.     The 


56  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1795 

situation  of  the  legislature  was  distinctly  critical.  Barely  six 
to  eight  thousand  men  were  available  with  which  to  confront 
the  militia  of  the  National  Guard,  and  absolutely  no  artillery. 
The  Convention  declared  itself  a  permanent  body  and  appointed 
from  the  Commissioners  of  Government  a  committee  of  five 
who  were  empowered  to  maintain  order.  Barras  was  one  of 
these,  and  as  he  had  formerly  been  an  officer  in  the  navy  he 
assumed  charge  of  the  military  part  of  the  task.  He  was  indeed 
courageous,  but  he  was  without  the  requisite  breadth  of  view 
for  the  emergency  and  shrank  from  extraordinary  efforts  for 
which  he  did  not  feel  himself  equal.  On  the  same  day  that 
he  was  appointed  he  called  to  his  assistance  his  friend  Bonaparte 
and  discussed  with  him  the  problem  of  protecting  the  legislature 
against  an  attack  which  had  been  planned  for  the  ensuing  day. 
Barras  having  been  made  commander-in-chief  of  the  Army 
of  the  Interior  as  the  result  of  a  stormy  night-session  of  4th-5th 
October,  he  induced  the  Committee  to  appoint  Napoleon  second 
in  command  and  invest  him  with  full  power  necessary  to  the 
defence  of  the  Convention. 

In  later  life  Napoleon  gave  Madame  de  R^musat  the  following 
account  of  this  decisive  moment  of  his  career :  *  "  One  evening  I 
was  at  the  theatre,  it  was  the  12th  Vendemiaire  (October  4th, 
1795).  I  overheard  some  one  say  that  there  was  to  be  a  'row' 
('du  train')  on  the  following  day;  you  know  that  was  the  cus- 
tomary expression  of  the  Parisians  who  had  come  to  view  with 
indifference  changes  in  the  government,  since  they  did  not  in- 
terfere with  their  business,  their  pleasures,  or  even  their  dinner. 
After  the  Reign  of  Terror  they  were  satisfied  with  anything  which 
did  not  disturb  their  way  of  Uving.  They  were  saying  around 
me  that  the  sittings  of  the  Assembly  were  permanent;  I  hurried 
thither,  I  found  nothing  but  confusion,  hesitation.  From 
the  depths  of  the  hall  a  voice  was  suddenly  raised  which  said: 
'If  any  one  knows  the  address  of  General  Bonaparte,  he  is 
requested  to  go  and  say  to  him  that  his  presence  is  desired  by 
the  Conunittee  of  the  Assembly.'  I  have  always  liked  to  take 
note  of  the  element  of  chance  in  certain  events;  this  determined 

*  Mme.  de  R6musat.  "  M6moires."  I.  269. 


^T.  26]  Napoleon's   Account  57 

me;  I  went  to  the  Committee;  I  found  there  several  deputies 
who  were  quite  distracted;  among  others  Cambac6r6s.*  They 
expected  to  be  attacked  on  the  morrow  and  did  not  know  what 
course  to  pursue.  My  advice  was  asked;  I  repUed  by  demand- 
ing cannon.  This  suggestion  appalled  them;  the  whole  night 
passed  without  coming  to  any  conclusion.  The  next  morning 
brought  bad  news.  Thereupon  the  whole  affair  was  turned 
over  to  me,  after  which  they  began  to  deUberate  whether  after 
all  they  had  the  right  to  repel  force  by  force.  *  Do  you  expect/ 
I  said,  'that  the  people  are  going  to  give  you  permission  to  fire 
upon  them?  I  am  now  involved,  since  you  have  nominated 
me;  it  is  no  more  than  just  that  you  should  let  me  act  according 
to  my  own  discretion.'" 

Unfortunately  we  are  compelled  to  accept  with  great  mis- 
trust all  accounts  given  by  Napoleon  of  events  in  his  own  life. 
He  seldom  restricted  himself  to  the  exact  truth,  least  of  all  where 
his  purpose  was  to  disguise  his  obvious  ambition  in  the  garb 
of  unconstrained  and  disinterested  conduct.  Who  is  going  to 
believe  that  the  intimate  of  Barras  and  Tallien  first  learned  of 
the  permanent  sittings  of  the  Assembly  on  the  decisive  night 
while  innocently  attending  the  theatre?  No  one.  Even 
though  we  had  no  knowledge  of  a  certain  note  from  Barras, 
dated  on  the  3d  of  October,  summoning  Napoleon  to  meet  him, 
to  the  suspension  of  all  other  business,  on  the  morning  of  the 
4th  of  October.  It  is  nothing  unusual  to  encounter  in  the  Ufe 
of  this  ambitious  man  an  attempt  to  make  his  decisive  measures 
appear  to  be  the  work  of  the  last  moment  and  a  sudden  inspira- 
tion of  his  genius.  In  the  present  instance  also  he  would  have 
one  beUeve  that  the  really  masterly  arrangements  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  Convention  were  devised  only  on  the  morning  of 
the  5th  and  immediately  carried  into  execution.  But  it  would 
be  safe  to  conclude  that  everything  had  been  carefully  weighcil 
and  considered  on  the  previous  day  and  the  essentials  deter- 
mined upon  when  the  deputies  gave  Napoleon  permission  to 
"act  according  to  his  own  discretion." 

*  One  of  the  leaders  of  the  moderates  who  appreciated  Napoleon's 
genius.     Cambac(!'res  liad  recommended  him  to  Doulcet. 


58  The  Siege  of  Toulon  [1795 

It  was  but  natural  that  he  should  insist  upon  the  use  of 
energetic  measures.  His  fate  was  linked  to  that  of  the  Con- 
vention. As  a  good  artilleryman  he  knew  the  power  of  his 
weapon.  The  National  Guard  had  no  cannon.  Everything 
depended  upon  getting  the  ordnance  from  an  artillery  park 
outside  the  city  to  the  Tuileries.  A  spirited  cavalry  officer, 
Murat,  the  future  brother-in-law  of  Napoleon,  was  despatched, 
doubtless  at  the  suggestion  of  the  latter,  to  assure  their  safe- 
conduct  before  daybreak.  He  was  successful,  and  when,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th  of  October  (13th  Vendemiaire),  the 
National  Guard  advanced  upon  the  Tuileries  where  the  Con- 
vention was  in  session,  they  found  it  already  flanked  by  guns 
behind  which  the  general  in  command  had  posted  infantry  and 
cavalry.  Seeing  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  sections,  the 
deputies  wavered  and  were  disposed  to  parley  with  the  insurgents. 
But  a  shot  was  fired  which  gave  the  signal  for  battle.  It  will 
never  be  known  whether  this  shot  came  from  the  side  of  the  assail- 
ants or  the  defenders,  or  whether,  perchance,  in  obedience  to  a 
secret  order  from  Napoleon.  The  police  reports  on  the  occur- 
rences of  this  day  are  missing  from  among  the  archives  of  Paris. 
At  once  the  strong  position  held  by  the  insurgents  at  the  church 
of  Saint-Roch  was  carried,  and  the  street  of  Saint-Honore  effec- 
tively raked  by  cannon,  the  bank  of  the  Seine  was  swept  clean 
by  volleys  of  grapeshot,  and  the  Guards  were  driven  back 
during  the  night  of  the  5th  of  October  to  the  most  remote  quar- 
ters of  the  city,  where  they  were  easily  overmastered  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  by  separate  detachments  of  troops  of  the  line. 

Napoleon  had  saved  the  Convention  and  the  Convention 
showed  its  gratitude.  In  the  session  of  October  10th,  upon 
the  motion  of  Barras  and  Freron,  his  appointment  as  second  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Interior  was  confirmed.  But 
this  did  not  satisfy  Napoleon.  He  understood  striking  while 
the  iron  was  hot.  He  first  of  all  urged  his  reassignment  to  ser- 
vice in  the  artillery,  then — in  a  petition  of  the  16th  of  October — 
he  requested  for  himself  the  connnission  of  gencral-of-division, 
and  on  the  26tli  of  the  same  month  ho  was  appointed  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  Army  of  the  Interior  in  the  place  of 


Bt.  26]  Napoleon's   Belief  in   Fate  59 

Barras,  who  now  at  the  close  of  the  session  assumed  the  duties 
of  Director  in  the  new  government. 

But  a  few  weeks  before  without  a  position  and  with  forbid- 
ding prospects,  a  suppUcant  for  a  mission  to  Constantinople, 
he  had  suddenly  attained  to  one  of  the  highest  military  posi- 
tions in  France.  It  was  not  without  cause  that  he  wTote  to 
Joseph  on  the  day  after  the  13th  Vend^miaire:  "Fortune  is  on 
my  side."  It  is  said  that  destiny  can  make  fatalists  of  men; 
it  produced  in  Napoleon,  with  its  sudden  changes  of  favour,  a 
man  who  from  that  time  forth  journeyed  through  hfe  with  full 
confidence  in  his  star.  "Au  destin"  became  his  motto,  and  this 
was  engraved  in  the  wedding-ring  of  her  w^hom  he  chose  to 
become  his  partner  in  life.  But  this  reliance  on  fate  was  not 
bhnd.  Whenever  fortune  appeared  to  hesitate,  he  had  learned 
to  put  forward  the  whole  of  his  own  reckless  power,  his  abundant 
talent,  and — that  heritage  of  his  nation — subtlety  and  cunning. 
Fortune  did  not  make  a  slave  of  him,  he  understood  controlling 
it  and  making  it  serve  his  ends.  Certainly  the  paths  by  which 
he  climbed  unremittingly  to  power,  if  regarded  merely  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  moralist,  were  not  always  of  the  straightest,  the 
means  employed  to  accomplish  his  purposes  sometimes  equivocal 
and  objectionable,  and  if  history  had  but  to  pass  judgment  upon 
the  way  in  which  such  assertive  individuals  come  to  dominate 
over  others,  words  could  not  be  found  harsh  enough  to  charac- 
terize the  conduct  of  this  man.  But  there  yet  remains  the  far 
more  important  question:  how  was  the  acquired  power  utilized 
and  turned  to  account?  Only  in  the  answer  to  this  question 
can  be  found  the  means  of  deciding  upon  the  historical  signifi- 
cance of  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 


CHAPTER  IV 

JOSEPHINE 

The  downfall  of  Robespierre  and  his  associates  had  brought 
about  not  merely  a  political  revolution,  but  also  a  profound  social 
change.  It  did  more  than  simply  to  replace  one  of  the  political 
factions  in  power  by  another.  The  population  itself,  heretofore 
paralyzed  by  terror,  now  came  forward  to  demand  and  recover 
the  freedom  of  action  of  which  it  had  so  long  been  deprived. 
Every  one  rejoiced  to  feel  that  his  life  was  safe  once  more  and 
the  general  joy  was  unbounded.  The  theatres  were  crowded, 
and  poets,  enthusiastic  in  the  cause  of  peace  and  order,  lashed 
the  overthrown  rule  of  arbitrary  cruelty,  eliciting  unprece- 
dented applause  from  the  audience.  From  the  houses  and 
apartments,  in  which  they  had  been  living  in  retirement,  the 
timid  thronged  into  the  streets,  rejoicing  in  their  deliverance 
from  self-imposed  captivity;  and  in  the  open  squares  where  the 
guillotine  had  but  recently  done  its  cruel  work,  thousands  of 
happy  couples  joined  in  the  whirling  dance.  In  the  salons  of 
the  people  of  rank  assembled  a  heterogeneous  company  of  up- 
starts of  both  sexes  who  tried  to  assume  the  manner  and  appear- 
ance of  the  aristocracy  of  the  "  ancien  regime."  Everywhere 
reigned  joy  and  pleasure,  with  gallantry  and  levity,  corruption 
and  undisguised  indulgence.  The  iron  bondage  of  the  Reign 
of  Terror  had  deprived  womankind  of  her  ruling  influence  oyer 
the  other  sex.  Now  u})on  its  overthrow  they  again  exercised  the 
power  of  their  charms.  As  if  to  make  amends  for  the  lost  years 
of  sway,  they  now  attempted  to  captivate  the  men  by  the  practice 
of  all  the  arts  of  seductive  beauty,  their  dress  was  designed  to 
reveal  much  of  the  person,  and  conversation  became  more  than 
ever  frivolous  and  animated.  Those  who  like  Madame  de  Stael 
had  wit,  brought  that  also  into  play.     The  other  leading  ladies 

60 


Mr.  2G]  The   Revival   ot   Social    Life  6 1 

of  the  new  society,  Madame  Tallicn,  the  beautiful  Madame 
Recamier,  Mesdames  de  Bcauharnais,  Hamehn,  and  others  were 
the  centre  of  the  society  which  gathered  about  the  victors  of 
Thermidor.  Barras,  the  hero  of  the  daj^,  was  the  idol  of  this 
female  throng,  but  not  the  only  object  of  their  devotion. 

No  man  however  uncouth  and  unsociable  could  resist  the 
charm  of  this  newly-awakened  life  of  heedless  enjoyment.  One 
of  those  attracted  and  dazzled  by  this  gay  existence  was  the 
young  General  Bonaparte,  the  author  of  the  "Dialogue  sur 
I'Amour, "  who  held  the  omnipotence  of  love  in  contempt.  We 
Icnow  that  his  interests  led  him  also  to  seek  the  society  of  Barras 
and  Tallien ;  but  he  failed  to  acquire  in  their  salons  such  polish  as 
to  make  him  a  particularly  attractive  member  of  society.  Care- 
lessly dressed  and  indifferent  as  to  his  personal  appearance,  with 
nothing  engaging  in  his  looks  or  manners,  he  attracted  attention 
only  by  his  singular  appearance.  The  wife  of  his  friend  Bourri- 
erme  says  of  him  that  he  was  ill-dressed  and  negligent  in  his 
toilet,  his  character  cold  and  often  gloomy,  his  smile  forced  and 
often  badly  out  of  place.  To  be  sure  he  could  relate  anecdotes 
of  his  campaigns  in  a  way  which  was  sprightly  and  charming, 
though  sometimes  tinged  with  cynicism.  He  gave  way  at 
times  to  outbursts  of  wild  hilarity  which  gave  offence  and  repelled 
those  who  were  about  him.  At  the  theatre,  w^hile  the  rest  of  the 
audience  was  convulsed  with  laughter,  he  would  remain  entirely 
unresponsive  antl  change  no  line  of  his  face,  or  he  would  sit  brood- 
ing with  a  gloomy  and  sullen  expression  as  if  totally  unaffected 
by  what  was  taking  place  before  him.  And  yet  we  know  from 
his  own  account  that  the  unrestrained  conviviality  of  this  new 
life  with  its  surroundings  of  splendour  and  beauty  made  a  pro- 
found impression  upon  him.  His  letters  bear  witness  to  this. 
"  Luxury ,  pleasure,  and  the  arts  are  reviving  here  in  an  astonishing 
way,"  he  writes  from  Paris  to  his  brother  Joseph  in  July,  1795. 
"Carriages  and  people  of  fashion  reappear,  or  rather  they  remem- 
b(5r  only  as  a  long  dream  that  they  had  ever  ceased  to  shine.  All 
that  can  help  to  pass  the  time  and  make  life  agreeable  is  here 
crowded  together.  One  is  torn  away  from  incongruous  reflec- 
tions, and  indeed  how  is  it  possible  to  regard  anything  in  a  dismal 


62  Josephine  [1795 

way  in  the  midst  of  such  ready  wit  and  such  a  whirlwind  of  activ- 
ity? The  women  are  everywhere :  at  the  theatre,  on  the  prome- 
nades, at  the  hbraries.  In  the  study  of  the  scholar  you  find 
charming  young  ladies.  Here  alone  among  all  the  places  of  the 
earth  do  they  deserve  to  control  the  rudder;  and  the  men  are 
all  crazy  about  them,  think  of  nothing  but  them,  and  live  only 
for  them.  A  woman  needs  just  six  months  of  Paris  to  know 
what  is  due  to  her  and  what  the  extent  of  her  dominion."  A 
few  days  later  he  adds:  "This  great  people  gives  itself  up  to 
pleasure;  dances,  plays,  and  women,  who  are  here  the  most 
beautiful  in  the  world,  are  the  questions  of  chief  importance." 
On  the  9th  of  August  he  writes:  "Life  is  pleasant  here  and 
much  inclined  to  gaiety;  it  seems  as  if  every  one  were  seeking 
to  indemnify  himself  for  his  sufferings  in  the  past,  and  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  future  prompts  them  to  be  unsparing  for  the  pleas- 
ures of  the  present.  Good-bye,  my  dear  fellow;  do  not  be 
anxious  about  the  future,  be  happy  in  the  present  and  gay,  and 
learn  to  enjoy  yourself." 

What  a  transformation  in  this  solitary  nature!  He  who 
had  hitherto  preferred  seclusion,  for  whom  society  had  no 
charms,  was  now  its  captive.  Not  only  that,  but  woman, 
who  had  become  all-powerful,  cast  her  spell  upon  him.  He 
was  seriously  considering  taking  unto  himself  a  wife  and 
beginning  family  life.  He  was  then  at  work  in  the  Central 
Committee,  full  of  hope  and  with  bright  prospects  before  him. 
A  year  previous  Joseph  had  married  Julie  Clary,  the  daughter 
of  the  rich  silk-merchant  of  Versailles;  Napoleon  had  her  sister 
D6sir6e  in  mind.  He  wrote  to  Joseph  requesting  him  to  make 
advances  for  him  to  this  lady,  "for,"  as  he  says  in  his  letter, 
"I've  taken  the  notion  to  have  a  home  of  my  own."  His 
removal  from  the  army  on  September  15th  put  an  end  to  this 
plan  for  the  time  being,  and  the  outcome  of  the  13th  Vend6- 
miaire  turned  the  thoughts  of  the  suitor  in  another  direction.* 

Now  that  he  had  made  such  a  position  for  himself  why 

*  Three  years  later  D6sir6e  married  General  Bernadotte,  and,  after 
a  further  lapse  of  twenty  years,  ascended  the  throne  of  Sweden  as  the 
wife  of  Charles  XIV. 


Mt.2c,]        The  Earlier   Life   of  Josephine  63 

should  he  not  choose  from  among  those  brilUant  women  who 
were  leaders  of  fashion  at  the  capital  and  who  had  influence 
and  prestige?  There  was,  for  instance,  Madame  Permon,  a 
widow.  She  was  of  very  ancient  lineage,  known  in  Corsica,  and 
had  been  moreover  a  friend  of  his  father's.  This  lady  was  by 
many  years  his  senior,  but  wealthy  and  highly  esteemed.  It 
is  said  that  Napoleon  made  proposals  to  her,  but  was  rejected. 
Shortly  afterwards  another  woman  inspired  him  with  genuine 
passion — a  passion  as  real  and  true  as  his  soul  was  susceptible 
of.  The  object  of  this  affection  was  the  Marquise  Josephine, 
widow  of  General  de  lieauharnais. 

Josephine,  the  eldest  of  the  three  daughters  of  Joseph  Gas- 
pard  Tascher  de  la  Pagerie,  was  born  June  23d,  1763,  on  the  Island 
of  Martinique,  where  her  father,  formerly  a  captain  of  the  Royal 
Dragoons,  managed  his  estates.  The  family  was  originally  of 
Chateauneuf  in  Thimerais  (central  France).  Educated  in 
Paris  at  Port-Royal,  Josephine  was  married  in  1779  to  the 
young  Viscount  Alexandre  de  Beauharnais,  son  of  the  fomier 
governor  of  Martinique,  who  had  long  been  an  acquaintance 
and  friend  of  the  Tascher  family.  The  first  fruit  of  this  marriage 
was  a  son,  Eugene  (born  September  3d,  1781).  But  the  union 
was  not  a  happy  one.  Beauharnais  left  for  the  Antilles  the 
following  year  to  fight  against  the  English,  and  there  fell  in 
love  with  a  Creole  and  tried  to  get  a  divorce.  Meanwhile  his 
wife  gave  birth  to  a  daughter  who  is  known  in  history  as  "Queen 
Hortense."  When  the  Revolution  broke  out,  Beauharnais,  who 
had  returned  to  France,  was  elected  deputy  of  the  First  Estate, 
and  was  one  of  the  few  of  that  order  who  gave  energetic  support 
to  the  new  Constitution.  In  the  memorable  night  of  August 
4th,  1789,  he  was  particularly  zealous  in  taking  part  against  the 
old  regime.  Furthermore,  he  did  not  emigrate  but  remained 
as  an  officer,  and  when  the  monarchy  was  replaced  by  a  republic 
he  became  a  general  and  was  given  an  independent  conmiand 
in  the  Army  of  the  Rhine. 

Not  until  the  Prussians  had  retaken  Mayence  in  1793  did 
he  resign  his  commission.  During  the  Reign  of  Terror  he  was, 
as  an  aristocrat,  accused  of  treason  toward  his  country,  and, 


64  Josephine  [1795 

though  innocent  hke  many  others,  was  executed  four  days 
before  the  fall  of  Robespierre. 

Josephine,  who  had  rejoined  her  husband  while  he  was 
playing  a  part  in  the  National  Assembly,  was  also  imprisoned, 
and  her  release  was  due  to  the  intervention  of  her  fellow  prisoner 
Madame  de  Fontenay-Cabarrus  and  of  this  lady's  lover,  Tallien. 

But  Josephine  had  lived  too  many  years  out  of  sympathy 
with  her  husband  to  mourn  him  now  for  long.  She  was  too 
fickle,  weak,  and  fond  of  pleasure  to  turn  her  back  on  the  gay 
life  which  the  salons  of  the  "nouvelles  couches"  of  1795  offered 
her.  She  showed  her  preference  by  attaching  herself  the  more 
closely  to  Madame  Cabarrus,  and  soon  became  one  of  the  best- 
known  members  of  Parisian  society  and  the  intimate  friend 
of  Barras.  Her  relations  with  him  have  been  disclosed  in  re- 
cent times  by  the  publication  of  his  "Memoires,"  but  she  did  not 
at  that  time  have  the  reputation  of  a  prude.*  To  the  captivating 
charm  of  her  person  all  witnesses  testify.  Even  Lucien,  who 
was  not  particularly  well-disposed  toward  her,  had  to  admit 
this.  In  his  "Memoires"  he  gives  us  the  following  picture: 
"Hardly  to  be  noticed  in  the  midst  of  this  circle  of  pretty  women, 
generally  reputed  to  be  of  easy  morals,  is  the  widow  of  the 
Marquis  de  Beauharnais.  With  httle,  very  Uttle  wit,  she  had 
no  trace  of  what  could  be  called  beauty,  but  there  were  certain 
Creole  characteristics  in  the  pliant  undulations  of  her  figure 
which  was  rather  below  the  average  height.  Her  face  was 
without  natural  freshness,  it  is  true,  but  the  artifices  of  the 
toilet  remedied  this  defect  so  as  to  make  it  appear  fairly  well 
by  the  light  of  the  chandeliers.  In  short,  her  person  was  not 
entirely  bereft  of  some  of  the  attractions  of  her  youth." 

Arnault,   in  his  "Souvenirs   d'un    Sexag^naire,"  does    her 

*  "At  that  time  her  reputation  was  badly  compromised."  (Madame 
de  R^miisat,  "Memoires,"  I.  138.) 

"My  father  was  chamberlain  to  the  Empress  Josephine.  He  had 
been  her  lover  prior  to  her  marriage  to  Napoleon,  and  resumed  his  rela- 
tions with  her  after  her  divorce."      (Viel-Castel,  "  M6moircs,"  II.  16.) 

Barras'  "M^-moires"  were  publi-shcd  1895-06,  but  critical  readers  will 
make  some  reservations  as  to  Barras'  veracity  in  recounting  his  gallantries 
and  in  characterizing  those  to  whom  he  bore  ill  will. — B. 


Mt  2g]  Her   Character  65 

better  justice.  He  says:  "The  evenness  of  her  disposition,  her 
good-nature,  the  amiabihty  that  shone  in  her  eye  and  which 
exprc^ssed  itself  not  only  in  her  words  but  in  the  tones  of  her 
voice,  a  certain  indolence  pecuUar  to  Creoles  which  was  recog- 
nizable in  her  carriage  and  movements  even  when  she  was 
making  an  effort  to  please,  all  these  lent  to  her  a  charm  which 
transcended  the  dazzling  beauty  of  her  two  rivals  Mesdames 
R^camier  and  Tallien." 

Madame  de  R^musat,  who  had  known  Josephine  since  1793, 
gives  perhaps  the  most  accurate  description  of  her  friend  in  these 
words:  "Without  being  precisely  beautiful,  her  whole  person 
was  possessed  of  a  peculiar  charm.  Her  features  were  delicate 
and  harmonious,  her  expression  gentle,  her  tiny  mouth  dex- 
terously concealed  defective  teeth;  her  somewhat  dark  com- 
plexion was  improved  by  her  clever  use  of  cosmetics.  Her 
figure  was  perfect,  every  outline  well  rounded  and  graceful; 
every  motion  was  easy  and  elegant.  Her  taste  in  dress  was 
excellent,  and  whatever  she  wore  seemed  to  have  its  beauty 
enhanced.  With  these  advantages  and  her  constant  care  for 
her  appearance,  she  succeeded  in  being  never  outshone  by 
the  beauty  and  youth  of  so  many  women  around  her.  She  was 
not  a  person  of  especial  wit;  a  Creole  and  coquette,  her  education 
had  been  rather  neglected;  but  she  knew  wherein  she  was 
wanting,  and  never  betrayed  her  ignorance.  Naturally  tactful, 
she  found  it  easy  to  say  agreeable  things.  .  .  .  Unfortunately 
she  was  lacking  in  earnestness  of  feeling  and  true  elevation  of 
mind." 

At  that  time  she  felt  no  warm  affection  for  the  young  general. 
And  indeed  Napoleon  was  by  no  means  a  handsome  man.  Short 
of  stature,  hardly  five  feet  in  height,  with  an  abnormally  de- 
veloped chest  and  disproportionately  short  legs,  he  was  far 
from  irresistible.  Moreover,  he  was  thin  at  the  time,  and  the 
angular  lines  in  his  face  sharply  prominent;  his  sallow  skin 
made  him  look  hke  a  sick  man;  the  glance  of  his  gray  eyes  was 
full  of  determination  and  resolve,  frank  and  straightforward, 
hut  often  with  something  wild  about  it.  The  nervousness  of 
his  disposition,  which  had  been  marked  even  in  childhood,  had 


66  Josephine  [1795 

developed  in  later  years  under  the  stress  of  violent  emotions 
caused  by  the  continual  changes  in  his  fortunes  and  the  re- 
peated disappointments  to  his  inordinate  ambition,  until  it  had 
become  morbid.  A  contemporary  informs  us  that  at  this  time  Na- 
poleon slept  but  three  hours  a  day  and  was  in  reaUty  ill.  Later 
a  facial  neuralgia  asserted  itself  together  with  several  idiosyncra- 
sies, such  as  shrugging  of  the  right  shoulder  and  an  involuntary 
moving  of  the  lips.  We  may  safely  attribute  to  this  extreme 
nervousness  much  of  his  downright  selfishness  and  rudeness  and 
the  irritability  which  suffered  no  contradiction,  as  well  as  his 
distrust  of  every  one  and  his  occasional  strange  and  excited 
behaviour.  On  the  other  hand  his  confidence  in  himself  im- 
pressed everybody  and  involuntarily  one  became  interested 
in  him.  To  Josephine  he  became  an  object  of  interest  if  nothing 
more. 

Very  different  was  the  impression  which  she  produced  upon 
him.  "I  was  not  insensible  to  the  charms  of  women,"  he  said 
later  at  St.  Helena,  "but  up  to  that  time  I  had  not  been  petted 
and  spoiled  by  them  and  my  disposition  made  me  timid  in  their 
company.  Madame  de  Beauharnais  was  the  first  to  reassure 
me.  She  said  some  flattering  things  to  me  about  my  military 
talents  one  day  when  I  chanced  to  be  seated  next  to  her.  That 
praise  intoxicated  me;  I  addressed  myself  continually  to  her; 
I  followed  her  everywhere;  I  was  passionately  in  love  with  her, 
and  my  infatuation  was  generally  known  among  our  acquaint- 
ances long  before  I  ventured  to  declare  myself  to  her.  When  this 
rumour  became  general.  Barras  spoke  to  me  about  it.  I  had 
no  reason  for  denying  it.  'If  that  is  the  case,'  he  said  to  me, 
'you  ought  to  marry  Madame  de  Beauharnais.  You  have  rank 
and  talents  to  be  turned  to  good  account,  but  you  stand  alone, 
without  fortune  and  without  connections;  you  must  marry; 
that  will  give  you  position.'" 

To  what  maimer  of  man  did  Barras  say  this?  Napoleon 
was  capable  of  suppressing  any  passion  if  it  were  found  to  inter- 
fere with  his  ambition.  He  gave  way  to  this  one  because  it 
was  evident  to  him  that  his  union  with  this  lady  of  rank,  the 
influential  friend  of  the  Directory,  would  strengthen  his  social 


Mt.  2t)]       Her   Feeling  Toward   Napoleon  67 

position  and  secure  advantages  for  the  future.  He  felt  himself 
to  be  exalted  by  this  marriage  which  enabled  him  to  ascend 
from  his  rank  of  plebeian  to  a  higher  social  station  wherein  his 
past  could  sink  into  oblivion.  Even  while  still  a  Jacobin  he 
could  not  conceal  a  certain  predilection  for  the  aristocratic 
mode  of  life;  the  coarse  instincts  of  the  masses  were  repugnant 
to  him,  and  the  courtesy  and  politeness  of  people  of  culture 
were  all  the  more  agreeable  to  one  who  was  himself  completely 
lacking  in  social  talent.  There  was  still  another  reason  in 
favour  of  this  union.  Barras  valued  Napoleon's  genius  at  its 
true  worth,  and  his  somewhat  indolent  nature  led  him  to  try 
to  put  under  obligations  to  himself  a  man  whose  ambition  and 
abiUty  might  some  day  raise  his  benefactor  again  to  power.  It 
is  said  that  he  made  an  attempt  to  have  Napoleon  appointed  Min- 
ister of  War,  but  that  his  colleagues  refused  their  consent.  Now 
Barras  undertakes  to  obtain  Josephine's  hand  for  him.  In  a 
letter  to  a  friend  she  admits  that  she  does  not  really  love  Napo- 
leon, but  that  she  does  not  feel  any  aversion  toward  him;  her 
feeling  is  rather  that  of  indifference,  which  is  as  little  favourable 
to  love  as  it  is  to  religion.  "I  admire  the  General's  courage," 
continues  she,  "the  extent  of  his  knowledge  upon  all  sorts  of 
topics,  upon  all  of  which  he  talks  equally  well,  the  vivacity  of 
his  mind,  which  enables  him  to  grasp  the  thoughts  of  other.« 
almost  before  they  have  been  expressed,  but  I  am  frightened. 
I  admit,  at  the  control  he  tries  to  exercise  over  everything  about 
him.  His  searching  glance  has  something  unusual  and  inex- 
plicable in  it,  but  which  compels  the  respect  even  of  our  Directors : 
judge  for  yourself  whether  a  woman  has  not  good  cause  to  feel 
intimidated  by  it !  Finally,  that  which  ought  to  please  me,  the 
force  of  his  passion,  which  he  expresses  with  an  energy  which 
leaves  no  room  for  doubt  of  his  sincerity,  is  precisely  that  which 
makes  me  ^^•ithhold  the  consent  which  I  have  often  been  ready 
to  give.  Can  I,  a  woman  whose  youth  is  past,  hope  to  hold 
for  any  length  of  time  this  violent  affection  winch  in  the  General 
resembles  a  fit  of  delirium?  If,  after  our  marriage,  he  should 
cease  to  love  me,  will  he  not  reproach  me  with  what  he  has  done 
for  me?   Will  he  not  regret  having  failed  to  make  a  more  ad- 


68  Josephine  [1796 

vantageous  marriage?  And  what  answer  can  I  make  then? 
What  will  there  be  for  me  to  do?  Tears  will  be  my  only  re- 
source." And  yet  the  fatalistic  confidence  with  which  Napoleon 
spoke  to  her  of  his  plans  and  his  future  allured  her,  and  when 
the  rumour  became  general  that  the  Directory  would  make  him 
Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Italy  she  yielded  to  his 
suit.  As  a  matter  of  fact  her  friends  wondered  that  she  could 
marry  a  man  so  little  known.* 

On  the  9th  of  March,  1796,  the  civil  marriage  ceremony 
was  performed.  Barras  and  TaUien  acted  as  witnesses.  But 
Truth  veiled  her  face  when  the  couple  presented  their  forged 
certificates  of  baptism  to  the  magistrate  of  the  deuxieme 
arrondissement.  Napoleon  pretended  to  have  been  born  Feb- 
ruary 5th,  1768,  and  Josephine,  who  was  in  reality  six  years 
his  senior,  gave  as  the  date  of  her  birth  June  23d,  1767 — a 
sacrifice  of  facts  to  the  cause  of  female  vanity  to  which  the 
bridegroom  gladly  consented.  People  were  then  not  very 
(scrupulous  in  such  matters,  and  Napoleon  was  the  last  man  to 
hesitate  at  straining  the  truth.  Joseph  and  Lucien  likewise 
made  false  representations  at  their  marriages.  By  an  absurd 
coincidence  each  of  the  three  brothers  declared  as  his  birthday 
a  different  day  of  the  same  year,  1768.  Indeed  the  moral  stand- 
ard of  the  whole  family  was  low. 

Two  days  before  the  marriage,  upon  the  motion  of  Carnot, 
the  Directory  had  signed  the  decree  (dated  March  2d)  appoint- 

*  A  genuine  love-letter  from  the  man  who  a  few  years  before  had 
spoken  so  harshly  of  love  will  not  be  without  interest.  "I  awake  f\ill  of 
thoughts  of  thee.  Your  portrait  and  the  intoxicating  evening  of  yester- 
day give  my  senses  no  rest.  Sweet  and  incomparable  Josephine,  what  a 
strange  effect  you  have  on  my  heart;  are  you  angry,  do  I  see  you  sad,  are 
you  anxious,  .  .  .  my  soul  is  bowed  down  with  anguish  and  there  is  no 
rest  for  your  lover;  but  is  there  then  more  for  me,  when,  yielding  to  the 
immeasurable  feeling  which  overpowers  me,  I  draw  from  your  lips,  from 
your  heart,  a  flame  which  consumes  me?  Ah!  it  was  but  this  very  night 
that  I  realized  fully  that  your  portrait  was  not  you.  Thou  Icavest  at  noon, 
in  three  hours  I  shall  see  thee.  Meanwhile,  '  mio  dolcc  amor,'  a  thousand 
kisses,  but  do  not  give  me  any,  for  they  set  my  blood  on  fire."  (Mme. 
de  R6musat,  "  M6moires,"  I.  182.) 


^Et.  20]  Napoleon's  Opportunity  69 

ing  Napoleon  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Italy;  on 
the  11th  he  took  leave  of  his  wife  and  set  out  for  his  post. 

To  what  an  extent  were  his  interests  already  advanced  ! 
Here  was  an  independent  command  and  with  it  the  opportunity 
of  showing  the  world  what  he  could  do,  and  of  turning  from 
Hoche  to  himself  the  universal  admiration  which  that  general 
had  won  by  his  unbroken  series  of  victories.  To  be  sure  his 
former  position  as  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Interior  had 
been  both  high  and  important,  for  he  had  soon  acquired  a  con- 
siderable following  of  men  whose  hopes  for  the  future  rested 
in  this  general  who  had  become  so  influential.  On  the  other 
hand  he  had  been  detested  by  the  Parisian  populace  ever  since 
the  13th  Vendemiaire,  and  he  was  bcsid:'S  pursued  by  the  envy 
of  those  who  begrudged  him  his  rapid  advancement  and  who 
were  systematic  and  persistent  in  calling  attention  to  his  errors 
and  defects,  his  adventures  in  Corsica,  and  his  connection  with 
Robespierre,  even  to  his  foreign  accent  and  his  lack  of  breeding, 
all  of  which  were  made  much  of  and  used  against  him.  Who 
could  assure  him  that  he  would  not  soon  be  pushed  aside  by 
new  elements,  inasmuch  as  the  Constitution  provided  for  changes 
in  the  highest  positions  of  the  government?  While  at  Paris 
and  General  of  the  Army  of  the  Interior  he  was  but  the  hero 
of  a  single  party,  and  victory  in  the  streets  of  the  capital  could 
secure  for  him  nothing  more  than  the  thanks  of  one  faction. 
But  in  conflict  with  foreign  enemies,  upon  what  he  himself  had 
designated  the  most  important  theatre  of  war,  glory  and  honour 
were  to  be  acquired  in  the  eyes  of  the  whole  nation,  the  nation 
to  which  he  had  more  closely  aUied  himself  by  marrying  a  French 
gentlewoman  of  ancient  family.  This  was  more  in  accordance 
with  the  extravagant  plans  for  the  future  which  his  exuberant 
fancy  invented  and  which  were  too  vast  and  undefined  to  depend 
upon  the  fortunes  of  a  political  coterie.  Power  was  his  party, 
and  its  possession  his  aim. 

Even  before  her  marriage  Josephine  had  written  these  re- 
markable words  to  her  friend:  "Barras  assures  me  that  if 
I  marry  the  General  he  will  obtain  for  him  the  appointment 
of  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  Italy.     Yesterday,  iii 


7©  Josephine  [i796 

speaking  to  me  of  this  favour, — which  is  already  the  occasion  of 
grumbling  among  his  companions  in  arms,  although  it  has  not 
yet  been  bestowed, — Bonaparte  said:  'Do  they  suppose  that 
I  am  in  need  of  their  protection  in  order  to  succeed?  They  will 
all  be  but  too  happy  some  day  if  I  will  grant  them  mine.  My 
sword  is  at  my  side  and  with  it  I  shall  go  far.'  What  say  you 
of  such  certainty  of  success?  Is  it  not  a  proof  of  assurance 
born  of  excessive  self-esteem?  A  brigadier-general  protect  the 
chiefs  of  the  State!  I  know  not,  but  sometimes  this  absurd 
self-reliance  leads  me  to  the  point  of  believing  possible  every- 
thing that  this  singular  man  would  put  it  into  my  head  to  do." 

If  the  letter  be  genuine,  the  woman's  instinct  in  Josephine 
recognized  in  the  soul  of  this  extraordinary  man  what  the  acute 
observation  of  his  teachers  had  before  discovered — "an  ambi- 
tion with  aspirations  that  stop  at  nothing."  * 

Whatever  Josephine  lacked  in  love  for  her  husband  she  made 
amends  for  in  her  belief  in  him,  in  his  genius,  in  his  future;  nor 
did  that  faith  deceive  her.  Yet  she  does  not  seem  to  have  had 
the  necessary  moral  strength  to  fulfil  her  duty  of  fidelity  to  the 
man  she  admired.  Hers  was  a  sensual  nature;  not  like  that  of 
Catharine  II.,  whom  not  even  the  risk  of  participating  in  crime 
prevented  the  satisfaction  of  her  passion ;  Josephine  was  passive, 
weak,  vacillating,  and  in  danger  even  of  becoming  a  victim  like 
Mary  Stuart.  Her  faithful  friend,  Madame  de  Remusat,  who 
fondly  dwells  upon  her  merits,  does  not  conceal  the  fact  that  her 
reputation  was  badly  compromised  before  she  made  Napoleon's 
acquaintance,  and  we  cannot  but  gather  from  his  letters  that 
during  the  early  years  of  their  married  life  she  never  ceased  to 
play  the  coquette  with  the  men  with  whom  she  came  in  contact. 

*  HLs  brother  Lucien  in  his  "M^moiros"  (II.  314)  also  furnishes 
proof  of  the  fact  that  Napoleon  obtained  command  of  the  Army  of  Italy 
on  account  of  his  marriage  with  Josephine.  Seven  years  later,  in  1803, 
Lucien  dared  to  brave  the  anger  of  his  all-powerful  brother  who  tried  to 
compel  him  to  .separate  himself  from  his  wife  and  marry  the  Queen  of 
lOtruria.  "What  absurd  presmnption,"  said  Lucien  to  Cambaci^nXs, — or 
at  least  claims  to  hav(!  said, — "to  dare  to  hope  that  he  could  make  nie 
abandon  my  wife!  A  wife  who  was  not  forced  upon  me  and  who  brought 
me  neither  dowry  nor  command  of  an  army." 


iEr.  20]  His   Unhappy   Marriage  71 

Some  weeks  after  his  parting  with  his  bride  he  wrote  a  letter 
full  of  yearning  desire  asking  her  to  follow  him  into  Italy.  She 
waits  two  months,  until  the  close  of  the  Paris  seasoa,  before  she 
decides  to  comply.  He  writes  to  Carnot  at  this  time:  "I  am  in 
despair,  my  wife  does  not  come;  she  nmst  have  some  lover  who 
detains  her  in  Paris.     Cursed  be  all  women!" 

During  the  summer  and  autumn  in  which  Napoleon  was  win- 
ning his  immortal  triumphs,  she  whiled  away  the  time  in  Milan, 
Bologna,  and  Rome.  The  beginning  of  winter  finds  her  again  in 
the  beloved  capital  on  the  Seine.  Later,  in  the  spring  of  1798, 
when  Napoleon  undertook  his  Egyptian  expedition,  she  remained 
in  France,  and  her  conduct  during  that  time  caused  much  anxiety 
to  her  distant  husband,  who  was  minutely,  although  perhaps  not 
always  accurately,  informed  of  all  that  was  taking  place.  From 
Cairo  he  wrote  in  July,  1798,  to  Joseph  in  these  resigned  words: 
"I  have  many  domestic  sorrows,  for  the  veil  is  at  last  entirely 
removed.  You  alone  are  left  to  me  on  earth,  your  love  is  very 
dear  to  me,  nothing  more  is  needed  to  make  me  a  complete 
misanthrope  but  to  lose  that  and  to  find  myself  betrayed  by  you. 
...  It  is  a  sad  condition  to  have  to  harbour  at  the  same  time 
all  kinds  of  feelings  toward  one  person  in  one  poor  heart.  You 
will  understand  me.  See  to  it  that  on  my  return  I  have  a 
country-seat  near  Paris  or  in  Burgundy;  I  count  upon  shutting 
myself  up  there  and  spending  the  winter;  I  am  tired  of  human 
nature.  I  need  solitude  and  isolation ;  greatness  wearies  me,  my 
feelings  are  dried  up." 

After  the  Coup  d'Etat,  when  Napoleon  had  made  himself  the 
master  of  France, — it  was  at  the  time  when  her  charms  began  to 
be  less  alluring  to  other  men, — Josephine  clung  to  him  with  a 
lasting  affection,  and  she  was  almost  beside  herself  with  jealous 
rage  whenever  his  heart  was  occupied,  even  if  but  temporarily, 
in  some  other  quarter.  This  devotion  on  her  part  and  the  beUef 
that  his  good  fortune  was  associated  with  her  prevented  him  for 
a  long  time  from  divorcing  himself  from  her.  In  the  end  his 
selfish  policy  triumphed  over  this  last  vestige  of  sentiment. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   CAMPAIGNS  IN   ITALY  AND  THE  PEACE  OF 
CAMPO  FORMIO 

The  fact  has  already  been  mentioned  that  in  1795  Prussia 
and  Spain  withdrew  from  the  great  coalition  which  had  been 
formed  two  years  previous  against  revolutionary  France,  Even 
before  this  act  Tuscany  had  been  led  to  conclude  a  separate 
treaty  of  peace  with  the  great  republic  in  order  to  secure  its 
own  immunity  in  case  of  the  advance  of  the  French  army  into 
upper  Italy.  Holland  also  had  been  conquered  during  the  win- 
ter and  compelled  to  become  the  humble  ally  of  France  under  the 
name  of  "The  Batavian  Republic."  It  was  even  rumoured 
that  Austria  was  secretly  making  negotiations  in  Paris,  but  such 
report  was  entirely  without  foundation;  Emperor  Francis  II. 
had  not  the  slightest  intention  of  effecting  a  separate  treaty  of 
peace.  In  view  of  the  victories  of  the  enemy  during  the  fore- 
going year,  such  a  peace  would  have  but  entailed  losses  to 
Austria,  and  Thugut,  the  chief  adviser  of  the  Emperor,  was 
intent  upon  making  gains.  Since  the  loss  of  Silesia,  the  conquest 
of  which  had  raised  Prussia  to  one  of  the  Great  Powers,  the 
Court  of  Vienna  was  seeking  compensation  everywhere:  in 
Poland,  Turkey,  Germany — where  Bavaria  was  the  coveted 
territory, — and  in  Italy — where  the  object  was  to  acquire  Venice 
in  order  to  connect  Lombardy  with  the  hereditary  domains  of  the 
house  of  Habsburg.  Thugut  had  made  advance  toward  the  real- 
ization of  his  ]ilans  to  the  extent  of  receiving  from  Russia,  on 
January  .3(1,  1795,  a  promise  of  support  together  with  a  portion 
of  Poland,  on  condition  that  Austria  should  continue  to  oppose 
France.  This  put  all  thought  of  treaty  with  the  Republic  out  of 
the  (juesiion.  On  the  contrary,  Thugut  entered,  May  20th, 
1795,  into  a  treaty  of  alliance  and  nuitual  guaranties  with  Pitt. 

72 


Mt.2(\]  Social   Disintegration  73 

Prime  Minister  of  England,  the  aim  of  whose  secret  stipulations 
was  to  induce  the  Czarina  to  take  part  in  active  hostilities 
against  France.  On  September  28th  of  the  same  year  Catharine 
II.  agreed  to  be  a  third  party  to  this  alliance. 

The  majority  of  the  German  States  having  refused  Prussia's 
offer  to  mediate  for  peace,  they,  with  Sardinia,  Portugal,  and 
Naples,  joined  also  in  this  powerful  coalition.  Peace  was  not  to 
be  thought  of  in  that  quarter. 

A  pacific  outcome  of  affairs  between  France  and  Austria  might 
perhaps  have  been  possible  had  the  Republic  been  willing  to 
renounce  its  recent  conquests  and  restore  them  to  the  great 
power  on  the  Danube.  The  situation  of  internal  affairs  in 
France  during  the  last  months  of  the  Convention  had  been 
discouraging  enough  to  make  a  conciliatory  attitude  appear 
not  unadvisable.  The  demoralization  was  unprecedented.  In 
its  precipitate  zeal  the  Revolution  had  made  an  end  of  the  rotten 
feudal  system,  but  had  not  yet  been  able  to  set  up  in  its  stead  a 
more  enduring  form  of  government.  As  with  "  Liberty "  for 
the  watchword  all  political  institutions  had  been  destroyed,  so, 
in  the  name  of  "Equality," — which  had  degenerated  into  an 
ever-increasingly  tyrannical  principle, — the  entire  social  edifice 
had  been  overthrown.  Laws  of  marriage  and  inheritance  were 
changed  to  accord  with  revolutionary  ideas,  with  the  sole  result 
of  depriving  the  family  of  its  former  importance  and  respect. 
The  government  had  confiscated  the  estates  of  the  Church  as 
well  as  the  property  of  the  emigrants,  who  were  for  the  most  part 
victims  of  arbitrary  proscription.  Public  credit  had  been  based 
on  what  had  been  thus  appropriated  without  heed  to  the  fact 
that  the  value  of  real  estate  decreases  as  the  protection  of  the 
laws  becomes  insecure,  and  where  that  protection  is  wanting 
becomes  a  mere  fiction.  In  consequence  P>ance  was  now 
flooded  with  worthless  paper  money;  honest  tradesmen  were 
reduced  to  poverty,  speculators  and  gamblers  flourished,  deahng 
in  stocks  took  the  place  of  legitimate  business,  corruption  and 
fraud  reigned  supreme. 

In  addition  to  th(>se  (lishoartening  circumstances  came  the 
confusion  in  the  affairs  of  the  Church  and  the  inadequacy  of  the 


74  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1796 

new  educational  system,  which  decreed  compulsory  education 
without  being  able  to  enforce  its  commands.  The  Marquis  of 
Poterat,  a  man  of  dubious  character  but  of  unusual  intelligence, 
describes  the  situation  of  France  in  a  memorial  addressed  to  the 
government  in  July,  1795,  and  verily  his  picture  is  in  every  respect 
accurate  and  faithful.  "Consider  the  dangers  of  your  position, 
they  are  truly  alarming;  with  the  exception  of  Prussia,  which  I 
mistrust,  you  have  as  declared  enemies  all  the  Great  Powers  of 
Europe;  most  of  the  young  men  of  the  land  you  have  lost  in 
battle  or  hospital ;  before  long  recruiting  will  have  become  im- 
possible. Agriculture  is  neglected  for  want  of  hands,  horses, 
and  fertilization;  trade,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  is  destroyed; 
labourers  in  the  arts,  manufactures,  and  trades  have  lost  either 
life  or  reason.  You  are  in  need  of  provisions  and  of  naval 
stores  as  well  as  of  every  variety  of  imports,  and  you  are  without 
credit  either  at  home  or  abroad.  Currency  is  inflated  with  an 
immense  amount  of  worthless  paper  money.  The  administra- 
tion of  the  Interior  does  not  work  because  it  is  subdivided  into 
too  many  departments  and  because  those  departments  are 
wretched.  In  short,  you  have  as  yet  no  government  at  all. 
When  shall  you  have  one?  Shall  you  ever  do  so?  If  so,  will 
there  yet  be  time  for  it  to  avail?" 

There  was  indeed  every  reason  for  thinking  of  peace  and  giving 
the  country  opportunity  to  recuperate.  And  in  fact  there  was  in 
the  Convention's  Committee  of  Safety  a  party  which  was  desirous 
of  a  general  peace  even  at  the  price  of  contenting  itself  with  the 
old  boundaries  of  France.  But  the  old  boundaries  represented 
the  system  of  the  Old  Regime.  The  radical  Revolution  had 
wider  aspirations,  and  for  this  reason  its  leaders  would  agree  upon 
peace  only  on  condition  that  France  should  retain  her  conquests 
of  the  previous  year  and  that  the  "natural  boundary  "  along  the 
banks  of  the  Rhine  should  be  secured  to  the  state.  This  idea 
was  due  to  the  doctrines  of  Rousseau,  who  derived  from  nature 
not  only  his  theory  of  law  and  morals,  but  was  indebted  to  her  as 
well  for  his  views  of  what  constitut(Ml  the  frontiers  of  his  country. 

Inasnnich  as  the  need  of  rest  was  dee})ly  felt  throughout  the 
country  and  especially  in  Paris,  the  conservative  policy  naturally 


^T.  2(i]  The   Expansion   of   France  y^ 

received  the  support  of  the  people,  while  the  Progressives  placed 
themselves  in  violent  opposition  to  it  and  eventually  brought 
the  Convention  into  that  critical  position  from  which  it  was 
rescued  by  Napoleon's  strategic  talent  on  October  5th,  1795. 
Three  days  previous  the  majority  of  the  Convention  had  acceded 
to  the  proposition  of  the  government  committee  to  incorporate 
Belgium  with  France,  thereby  giving  sanction  to  a  principle  of 
conquest  which  was  henceforth  for  twenty  years  to  remain  the 
policy  of  France.* 

*  Whoever  reads  the  acts  and  debates  of  the  year  1795  with  reference 
to  the  question  then  under  consideration  of  the  natural  boundaries  of 
France  and  the  incorporation  of  Belgium  will  find  therein  the  already 
developed  germs  of  Napoleon's  subsequent  insatiable  policy  of  conquest 
with  its  contempt  for  traditional  rights.  In  an  edict  of  the  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  dated  June  26th,  1795,  addressed  to  Barthclemy,  Charged 
d'Affaires,  occurs,  for  example,  this  query:  "  Of  what  use  to  us  then  would 
have  been  this  terrible  war  and  this  long  Revolution  if  everything  were 
to  return  to  former  conditions;  and  do  you  suppose  that  the  Republic 
could  maintain  its  existence  in  the  midst  of  circumstances  which  had 
undergone  no  change?" 

Rewbell,  who  wiis  afterwards  to  direct  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Di- 
rectory, discussing  this  question  with  a  diplomat,  gives  utterance  to  his 
views,  saying  that  one  must  be  but  little  enlightened  in  regard  to  the  true 
interests  of  the  Republic  or  be  completely  given  over  to  Austria  and  Eng- 
land to  dare  to  propose  a  return  to  the  former  limits  of  the  country  in 
order  to  obtain  peace;  such  a  peace  would  not  only  cover  France  with 
disgrace,  but  would  infallibly  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the  Republic; 
that  one  could  not  shut  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  country  was  insufh- 
ciently  provided  with  manufactured  goods,  gold,  silver,  and  produce; 
that,  on  the  return  of  the  armies  to  a  country  without  means  for  recom- 
pensing its  defenders  and  without  other  resources  than  valueless  paper 
money,  discontent  would  soon  become  general;  the  soldiers  would  of 
necessity  take  part  in  political  and  religious  dissensions,  and  the  inevitable 
result  would  be  civil  war  of  the  most  cruel  order;  foreign  powers  would 
not  fail  to  take  advantage  of  such  circumstances,  and  as  a  consequence 
France  would  suffer  the  same  fate  as  Poland.  .  .  .  Those  who  advocate 
peace  at  any  price  should  not  omit  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  in 
Belgium  alone  there  was  public  property  to  the  amount  of  at  least  three 
billions  in  specie,  and  that  there  was  still  more  in  the  other  countries 
which  had  been  conquered  and  annexed,  and  that  this  was  the  only 
resource  for  the  redemption  of  the  assignats.  (Revue  historique, 
XVIII.  208,  308.) 

Tallien  never  wearied  of  recalling  the  principle  of  1792,  that  France 


^6  The  Campaigns  in  Italy  [i796 

Wlien,  shortly  afterwards,  the  Directory  succeeded  to  the 
Convention,  it  accepted  with  other  responsibiUties  the  war 
against  three  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  together  with 
their  dependencies;  and  inasmuch  as  the  five  men  who  now 
were  placed  at  the  head  of  the  French  government,  Barras, 
Rewbell,  Carnot,  Letourneur,  and  La  Revelliere-Lepeaux,  all 
belonged  to  the  dominant  party  a  change  of  policy  was  not  to  be 
expected.  Their  close  alliance  with  the  republican  Thermi- 
dorians  (under  Tallien)  and  the  Jacobins  (under  Sieyes)  gave 
them  no  choice  but  to  make  war  upon  existing  monarchies. 
This  was  a  war  apparently  without  end  and,  indeed,  not  intended 
to  have  one,  as  its  termination  would  have  brought  about  the 
close  of  the  Revolution,  and  thereby  the  end  of  the  power  of 
its  ambitious  leaders.  To  them  the  revolutionary  tendencies  of 
foreign  countries  were  the  most  welcome  of  allies,  and  for  that 
reason  Germany,  Switzerland,  and,  if  possible,  Italy  were  to  be 
roused  to  insurrection  by  a  systematic  propaganda  and  drawn 
within  the  range  of  P>ench  political  action.  It  was  a  programme 
of  expansion  in  every  direction. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  at  the  outset  the  execution  of 
this  plan  was  greatly  inferior  to  the  boldness  of  its  conception. 
Generals  Jourdan  and  Pichegru,  who  had  crossed  the  Rhine  in 
order  to  take  the  offensive,  were  repulsed  by  the  Austrian  com- 

should  surround  herself  with  a  circle  of  repubUcs  of  her  own  founding 
and  which  should  be  dependent  upon  the  mother  country.  Sieyes  had 
even  elaborated  a  plan  for  the  secularization  of  the  ecclesiastical  princi- 
palities of  Germany  which  was  in  all  respects  similar  to  that  which  was 
carried  out  in  1803. 

Mallet  du  Pan,  the  clear-sighted  correspondent  of  the  Cabinet  at 
Vienna,  writes  as  follows  in  a  letter  of  August  23d,  1795 :  "  The  Monarchists 
and  many  of  the  deputies  of  the  Convention  would  sacrifice  all  conquests 
made  for  the  sake  of  hastening  and  securing  peace,  but  the  fanatical 
Girondists  and  the  committee  led  by  Sieyes  persist  in  this  plan  of  expansion. 
Three  motives  impel  them  to  this  course:  1st.  The  scheme  of  extending 
their  doctrine  with  their  territory;  2d.  The  desire  of  uniting  Europe 
by  degrees  in  a  federation  with  the  French  Republic;  3d.  That  of  pro- 
longing a  war,  involving  a  part  of  the  nation,  which  prolongs  at  the  same 
time  extraordinary  powers  and  revolutionary  measures."  (Correspond- 
ance  in6dite,  I.  288.)     Cf.  Chapter  VIII  below. 


/Et.  20]  The   Military   Situation  77 

niandcrs  Clcrfayt  and  Wunnsor  and  thrown  back  to  the  other 
side  of  the  river;  at  the  south,  likewise,  the  ItaUan  Army  was 
accomplishing  but  little.  The  latter  had  indeed  been  reinforced 
by  troops  drawn  from  Spain  and  put  under  command  of  Sch^rer, 
a  general  of  advancing  years  who  had  hitherto  been  active  m 
the  Pyrenees.  His  instructions  from  Paris  were  to  press  forward 
through  the  passes  of  the  Apennines  into  the  plains  beyond, 
and  success  attended  liis  first  efforts  in  the  victor}^  of  Loano 
(November  23d-25th,  1795),  but  the  winter  season  opened  and 
interrupted  hostiUties  against  the  united  Austrian  and  Sardinian 
armies.  Fortmiately  Russia  sent  no  aid  to  Austria,  and  the 
latter,  being  unsupported  in  her  endeavors  to  hold  France  in 
check,  could  not  bring  her  forces  to  bear  on  the  ItaUan  theatre 
of  war.  For  a  moment,  it  is  true,  Vienna  had  considered  re- 
moving the  weight  of  her  army  from  the  Rhine  to  Italy,  a  move 
which  would  probably  have  made  far  more  difficult  the  victories 
which  Napoleon  was  soon  after  to  gain  in  those  regions.  Thugut 
was  indeed  informed  that  the  French  govcnnnent  was  seeking 
to  separate  Sardinia  from  Austria  by  offering  her  Lombardy 
in  exchange,  and  the  reports  which  Mallet  du  Pan  sent  to  Vienna 
in  the  beginning  of  the  year  1796  asserted  confidently  that  the 
French  were  determined  to  penetrate  into  Piedmont  and  Milan, 
cost  what  it  might. 

But  in  spite  of  everything  no  decisive  measures  were  taken. 
The  EngUsh  were  able  by  means  of  subsidies  to  keep  the  Austrian 
forces  in  Germany,  which  was  in  accordance  with  her  interests; 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  refused  to  allow  Xeapohtan  auxiliary 
troops  to  pass  through  his  territory;  Thugut  himself  feared 
aggressive  measures  on  the  part  of  Prussia  and  wished  to  be 
armed  for  resistance  in  Bohemia,  and  therefore  refrained  from 
sending  reinforcements,  beyond  a  few  battaUons,  to  the  army 
in  Italy;  in  short,  everything  conspired  to  the  neglect  of  a  field 
of  operations  upon  which  events  of  the  utmost  importance  were 
soon  to  take  place. 

While  Scherer  and  his  troops  remained  inactive  in  the  South, 
the  plan  of  campaign  as  elaborated  by  Napoleon  demonstrated 
not  only  the  possibility  but  the  necessity  of  commencing  hos- 


78  The  Campaigns  in   Italy  [1796 

tilities  as  early  as  February.  To  Scherer's  complaints  that 
his  troops  were  needy  and  in  distress  (a  situation  which  the 
financial  state  of  the  repubUc  did  not  admit  of  rectifying), 
Napoleon  made  reply  by  pointing  to  the  rich  plain  of  Lombardy 
and  promised  to  support  the  army  upon  the  enemy's  country. 
On  the  19th  of  January,  1796,  his  plan  was  at  length  adopted 
and  sent  to  the  Army  of  Italy  for  execution.  This  Scherer 
refused  to  do.  Such  projects,  he  said,  might  be  carried  out  only 
by  the  man  who  had  conceived  them,  and  asked  for  his  own 
discharge.  The  request  came  opportunely.  On  the  13th  Ven- 
demiaire  the  little  general  had  saved  the  lives  of  the  men 
who  were  at  present  in  power;  now  he  showed  them  the  way  in 
which  their  policy  might  be  saved.  Then,  when  every  military 
reverse  shook  the  foundations  of  the  Directory  and  strengthened 
the  opposition,  he  promised  triumphs  which  would  justify 
the  conduct  of  the  governing  body  and  assure  its  position, 
Scherer  was  relieved  of  his  command  and  Napoleon  took  his 
place.  On  March  27th  he  assumed  in  Nice  the  command  of  the 
army. 

The  new  general-in-chief  found  his  troops  in  deplorable 
condition.  Of  his  effective  force  of  six  divisions,  numbering 
60,282  men,  something  more  than  22,000  were  in  hospital, 
leaving  about  38,000  in  fighting  trim.  These  were  men  inured 
to  war  and  hardened  to  fatigue,  but  suffering  for  the  want  of 
proper  nourishment  and  equipment,  for  the  declivities  of  the 
Apennines  with  their  poor  little  villages  could  contribute  but 
Uttle  to  the  support  of  the  soldiers,  and  the  state's  treasury  was 
empty.  To  these  troops  the  manifesto  now  issued  by  the  young 
commander-in-chief — for  Napoleon  was  younger  than  any  one 
of  his  generals — fell  on  their  ears  like  a  message  of  deliverance: 
"Soldiers,  you  are  ill-fed  and  almost  naked;  the  government 
owes  you  much,  it  can  give  you  nothing.  Your  patience,  the 
courage  which  you  exhibit  in  the  midst  of  these  crags,  are  worthy 
of  all  admiration;  but  they  bring  you  no  atom  of  glory;  not 
a  ray  is  reflected  upon  you.  I  will  conduct  you  into  the  most 
fertile  plains  in  the  world.  Rich  provinces,  great  cities  will 
be   in    your   power;    there   you    will    find    honour,  glory,  and 


Mr.  2f>]  Supporting   War   by   Plunder  79 

wealth.  Sokliors  c»f  Italy,  will  you  be  lacking  in  courage  or 
perseverance?" 

This  language,  of  which,  tt)  be  sure,  we  have  no  record 
beyond  the  recollections  dictated  by  the  Emperor  at  St.  Helena, 
is  the  unvarnished  expression  of  that  policy  to  which  finan- 
cial embarrassment  now  for  some  time  had  reduced  France. 
Before  this  time  the  Convention  had  instructed  the  armies 
which  crossed  the  Rhine  that  they  nuist  support  themselves 
at  the  expense  of  the  enemy,  and  their  leaders  were  to  use 
every  means  to  obtain  the  required  articles  of  subsistence  from 
their  adversary.  The  Directory  made  no  change  in  this  maxim 
beyond  extending  its  significance.  But  these  words  are  at  the 
same  time  characteristic  of  the  man  who  uttered  them;  he 
knew  human  nature  too  well  to  fail  to  promise  wealth  and 
glory  to  the  poor  and  ambitious.  It  required  audacity  to 
make  such  promises,  but  still  greater  was  the  audacity  of  action 
by  means  of  which  they  were  to  be  realized. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  two  years  previous  to  this  time 
Napoleon  had  demonstrated  to  Robespierre  the  importance  of 
effecting  a  passage  of  the  Apennines  from  Savona,  and  that 
he  had  in  secret,  under  orders  of  the  Dictator,  informed  himself 
minutely  as  to  the  territory  and  fortifications  of  the  enemy.* 
He  was  now  able  to  profit  by  the  knowledge  thus  acquired, 
availing  himself  of  the  very  same  strategic  principles  which 
he  had  submitted  in  1794  to  the  all-powerful  deputy  in  Paris. 
He  said  then:  "In  the  management  of  a  war,  as  in  the  siege  of  a 
city,  the  method  should  be  to  direct  the  fire  upon  a  single  point. 
The  breach  once  made,  equilibrium  is  destroyed,  all  further 
effort  is  useless,  and  the  place  is  taken.  .  .  .  Attacks  should 
not  be  scattered,  but  united.  An  army  should  be  divided  for 
the  sake  of  subsistence  and  concentrated  for  combat.  Unity 
of  command  is  indispensable  to  success.     Time  is  everything." 

The  road  wliich  leads  from  Savona  to  the  north  over  the 
crest  of  the  Apennines  divides  upon  the  further  side  into  two 
branches,  one  of  which  proceeds  westward  by  way  of  Millesimo 
and  Ceva  to  Turin,  the  other  northeastward    through   Cairo 

*  p.  45. 


8o  The  Campaigns  in  Italy  [i796 

and  Dego  to  Alessandria  and  thence  to  Milan.  The  former 
was  held  by  the  Piedmontese,  the  latter  by  the  Austrians,  the 
two  armies  being  in  close  touch  with  one  another.  How  to 
make  his  way  through  between  them  was  the  problem  which 
confronted  Napoleon.  It  was  the  plan  of  Beaulieu,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Austrian  forces,  to  attack  from  the  east  the  French 
division  of  Laharpe  which  had  been  thrown  forward  as  far  as 
Voltri,  while  the  Austrians  under  Argenteau  were  to  fall  upon 
its  rear  from  Montenotte,  a  village  to  the  north  of  Savona. 
The  plan  was  badly  conceived,  and  in  order  to  take  advantage 
of  this  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  foe  Napoleon  was  obliged  to 
give  battle  before  the  arrival  of  the  expected  army  supphes. 
Laharpe  retreated  before  Beaulieu  to  Savona,  while  Argenteau 
was  surprised  at  Montenotte  on  the  12th  of  April  by  a  force 
twice  outnimibering  his  own  and  defeated  with  great  loss.  On 
the  following  day  a  second  Austrian  division  which  had  been 
detailed  to  the  assistance  of  Colli,  the  Piedmontese  general, 
was  dispersed  at  Millesimo  by  Massena  and  Augereau,  Bona- 
parte's subordinates. 

Without  loss  of  time  Napoleon  turned  in  person  again  toward 
the  north,  and  on  the  15th,  at  Dego,  completely  wiped  out  the 
remnant  of  Argenteau's  corps.  Beaulieu,  fearing  to  be  cut  off 
with  the  main  body  of  his  army  on  the  road  to  Alessandria, 
withdrew  on  the  16th  from  the  mountains  into  the  plain  near 
Acqui.  Napoleon  had  accordingly  scored  a  success  in  his  first 
move  on  the  chess-board.  He  had  forced  his  army  between  those 
of  the  allies,  driven  back  the  Austrians,  and  isolated  the  Pied- 
montese at  Ceva.  The  latter  soon  abandoned  their  advanced 
position,  and  on  their  retreat  were  overtaken  at  Mondovi,  April 
22d,  where  they  suffered  grievous  defeat. 

The  promised  plain  now  lay  open  before  the  French,  and 
their  advance  guard  soon  extended  as  far  as  Cherasco  and  Alba. 
Napoleon  had  generously  fulfilled  his  promise  to  his  soldiers. 
From  this  time  they  clung  with  blind  confidence  to  him.  His 
genius  had  triumphed  not  only  over  the  Austrians  and  Pied- 
montese, but  also  over  a  third  foe — mistrust  and  the  envy  of 
his  subordinate  generals.     The  greater  number  of  them  were 


Mr.2fi]  Treaty  with  Sardinia  8 1 

henceforward  devoted  to  him,  and  thanks  to  his  talent  for  giving 
precise  orders  with  the  requisite  firmness,  he  was  able  to  exact 
absolute  obedience  from  such  as  were  not  personally  attached 
to  him.  The  Directory  in  Paris  was  again  compelled  to  recognize 
the  superiority  of  his  policy  when  he,  contrary  to  their  orders, 
pursued  Colli  rather  than  Beaulieu,  his  unanswerable  argument 
being  that  he  could  not  operate  with  a  hostile  army  in  his  rear. 

King  Victor  Amadeus  of  Sardinia  took  precisely  the  course 
which  Napoleon  had  foreseen;  insufficiently  supported  by 
Austria,  and  threatened  in  his  own  country  by  revolutionar}' 
tendencies,  without  means  of  strengthening  himself,  he  turned 
to  the  French  and  requested  an  armistice  preliminary  to  peace. 
Bonaparte  granted  this  on  condition  that  three  forts  should  be 
surrendered  to  him  as  security  and  that  his  army  should  have 
freedom  of  passage  throughout  Piedmont.  On  April  28th  the 
treaty  was  signed  whereby  France  rid  herself  of  her  Sardinian 
opponent.  At  once  Napoleon  hastened  to  pursue  the  Austrians, 
who  had  retreated  from  Piedmont  into  Lombardy,  and  were 
awaiting  the  enemy  in  a  strong  position  behind  the  Ticino. 
But  Bonaparte  failed  to  appear  at  the  place  where  Beaulieu 
was  expecting  him;  he  had  instead  marched  down  the  Po  with 
a  view  to  crossing  it  at  Piacenza  and  thus  come  upon  the  Aus- 
trians in  the  rear.  By  the  time  that  Beaulieu  became  aware 
of  this  step  he  was  able  only  with  the  utmost  exertion,  and  at 
the  price  of  abandoning  Milan,  to  reach  Lodi  and  take  up  his 
stand  behind  the  Adda.  But  even  this  position  was  untenable. 
On  the  10th  of  May  the  French  columns  appeared  at  Lodi  and 
forced  a  passage  across  the  river  with  unheard-of  gallantry. 
The  Austrians  fled,  and  the  remains  of  the  scattered  and  crest- 
fallen army  gathered  only  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Mincio 
and  in  the  fortress  of  Mantua.  Lombardy  was  conquered. 
On  the  16th  of  May  Napoleon  made  his  triumphal  entry  into 
Milan. 

But  at  the  seat  of  government  in  France  this  unprecedented 
series  of  victories  by  the  ambitious  general  was  followed  with 
a  certain  feeling  of  apprehension.  Without  consultation  with 
Salicetti,  who  accompanied  the  army  as  commissioner  of  the 


82  The  Campaigns  in  Italy  [i796 

government,  Bonaparte  had  agreed  upon  a  truce  with  Pied- 
mont, while  the  government  had  intended  to  make  this  land 
a  republic.  When  at  last  the  Directory  reluctantly  signed  the 
treaty,  he  wrote  to  Paris:  "I  have  received  the  articles  of  peace 
with  Sardinia,  the  army  has  approved  it."  This  was  a  new 
tone.  The  army  now  gave  its  sanction  to  the  acts  of  the  govern- 
ment and  set  up  in  opposition  to  it  a  purpose  and  decision  of  its 
own !  Hitherto  it  had  been  the  docile  instrument  of  the  leaders 
in  Paris.  A  decisive  change  in  the  order  of  things  announced 
itself  in  these  few  words  which  did  not  pass  unnoticed.  There 
were  indeed  some  who  were  of  opinion  that  the  writer  of  such 
language  should  be  shot.  But  his  protector  Barras  and  the 
Jacobinical  war-party  put  up  even  with  this  insult. 

But  with  a  view  to  controlling  in  the  future  the  course  of  a 
general  so  prone  to  act  according  to  his  own  desires,  Kellerman, 
Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Alps,  was  ordered  with 
his  troops  to  strengthen  the  army  in  Italy,  he  himself  to  share 
with  Bonaparte  the  command  of  the  whole  force  and  the  direc- 
tion of  further  operations,  while  to  Salicetti  was  to  be  reserved 
the  management  of  all  diplomatic  affairs.  The  news  of  this 
decree  reached  Napoleon  just  after  his  victory  on  the  Adda,  and 
he  was  incensed  by  it.  Give  up  to  another  the  glory  and  the 
power  which  he  was  on  the  point  of  acquiring!  The  thought 
was  intolerable.  His  ambition  dictated  a  reply  which  his  acute- 
ness  of  perception  enabled  him  to  put  in  a  form  at  once  tactful 
and  unmistakable:  ''If  you  impose  all  sorts  of  fetters  upon  me," 
he  wrote.  May  14th,  1796,  to  the  Directory,  "if  I  must  refer 
every  step  to  the  Government  Commissioners,  if  they  have  the 
right  to  alter  my  dispositions,  to  remove  or  send  me  troops,  you 
may  look  for  no  further  successes.  ...  In  the  present  situation 
of  affairs  it  is  indispensable  that  you  should  have  a  general  in 
whom  you  have  entire  confidence.  If  I  am  not  the  person  I 
shall  have  no  complaint  to  make,  l)ut  shall  use  redoubled  zeal 
to  merit  your  esteem  at  whatever  post  you  may  see  fit  to  entrust 
to  me.  Each  person  has  his  own  way  of  making  war.  General 
K(»llerman  has  had  more  experience  and  will  do  it  better  than  I; 
but  both  together  we  shall  do  it  badly."     To  Carnot,  the  Director 


^T.  2G]   The  Directory  Yields  to  Napoleon         8  3 

in  charge  of  military  affairs,  he  wrote:  "I  can  be  useful  to  you 
only  if  granted  the  same  confidence  which  you  bestowed  on 
me  when  in  Paris.  Whether  I  wage  war  here  or  elsewhere  is 
a  matter  of  indifference  to  me;  to  ser\^e  my  country,  to  merit 
from  posterity  a  page  in  our  history,  to  give  the  government 
some  proofs  of  my  attachment  and  of  my  devotion,  that  is  the 
sum  of  my  ambition." 

Most  certainly  it  was  not  a  question  of  indifference  to  him 
where  he  should  make  war;  of  the  whole  asseveration  only  the 
appeal  to  posterity  was  sincere;  the  judgment  of  succeeding 
generations  was  ever  present  in  Napoleon's  mind,  and  even 
during  the  last  hours  of  his  Ufe  he  sought  to  influence  that 
opinion  by  a  vast  tissue  of  inventions  and  embellishments. 
"Human  pride,"  said  he  to  ]\Iadame  de  Remusat  while  Consul, 
"creates  a  public  to  its  own  taste  in  that  ideal  world  which  it 
calls  posterity.  If  one  has  brought  himself  to  think  that  in  a 
hundred  years  beautiful  verses  will  recall  some  fine  action,  that 
a  picture  will  preserve  its  memory,  then  imagination  rises, 
the  field  of  battle  has  no  further  dangers,  the  cannon  roars 
in  vain,  it  seems  but  the  voice  which  is  to  carry  through  a 
thousand  years  the  name  of  a  brave  man  to  our  remotest 
descendants." 

WTiatever  the  case,  whether  he  was  sincere  or  not,  the 
Directory  yielded.  Kellerman  was  to  them  a  person  of  small 
consequence,  and  Bonaparte,  with  his  talent  for  making  requisi- 
tions of  which  he  had  just  given  such  marvellous  proof,  was 
hardly  to  be  spared  while  the  treasury  of  France  remained  in 
the  impoverished  condition  of  that  time.  The  order  was  re- 
tracted and  the  Directory  contented  itself  with  merely  expressing 
the  wish  that  an  expedition  toward  Rome  and  southern  Italy 
should  precede  the  march  northward.  "From  this  time," 
according  to  the  recollections  at  St.  Helena,  "Napoleon  had 
faith  in  his  own  greatness  and  in  his  call  to  play  a  decisive 
part  in  the  politics  of  France."  The  fact  was  that  he  was  now 
completely  at  liberty  to  do  as  seemed  best  to  him  in  Italy. 
And  the  matter  of  first  importance  was  to  reduce  Bcauheu  to 
entire  harmlessness. 


84  The  Campaigns  in   Italy  [1796 

The  territory  of  the  RepubUc  of  Venice  extended  at  that 
time  a  long  distance  westward,  as  far  as  the  Lake  of  Como ;  Brescia 
and  Bergamo  formed  Venetian  provinces.  Bonaparte  marched 
a  portion  of  his  army  into  this  country,  thereby  threatening 
the  retreat  of  the  Austrian  commander  from  the  Mincio  toward 
the  north  and  leading  him  to  suppose  that  the  French  were  going 
to  invade  the  Tyrol.  Beaulieu  fell  into  the  snare  and  scattered 
his  forces  along  the  whole  length  of  the  Mincio  from  Mantua  to 
Peschiera.  Suddenly  Bonaparte  turned  toward  the  southeast 
and  on  the  30th  of  May  forced  his  way  with  but  little  difficulty 
across  the  Mincio  at  Borghetto.  He  thus  cut  in  twain  the 
Austrian  army,  one  portion  being  driven  back  into  Mantua  and 
the  other  on  to  the  Adige  and  toward  Tyrol.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  12,000  men  who  occupied  Mantua,  there  was  not  an 
Austrian  corps  left  on  Italian  soil  and  Bonaparte  could  turn 
his  attention  toward  subjugating  the  allies  of  the  emperor,  or 
at  least  to  extorting  from  them  the  heaviest  possible  contribu- 
tions. The  Directory  had  charged  him  to  "bring  away  from 
Italy  everything  which  was  of  value  and  capable  of  transporta- 
tion." He  fulfilled  these  instructions  to  the  letter.  On  the 
9th  of  May  he  concluded  a  truce  with  the  Uuke  of  Parma,  and  on 
the  17th  with  the  Duke  of  Modena,  in  both  cases  at  the  price 
of  many  millions  of  francs  besides  works  of  art  and  supplies  of 
all  kinds,  for  paintings  by  the  old  masters  figured  beside  beeves 
and  corn  in  the  list  of  his  demands.  After  his  victory  on  the 
Mincio  Naples  was  constrained  to  sign  a  treaty  according  to  the 
terms  of  which  that  state  promised  to  remain  neutral  and  to 
withdraw  her  ships  from  the  British  fleet.  Thereupon  the 
Papal  government,  fearing  to  see  the  Eternal  City  occupied 
by  the  godless  republicans,  ransomed  the  capital  on  the  23d  of 
June  by  surrendering  to  the  French  the  Legations  of  Ferrara 
and  Bologna  and  the  important  harbour  of  Ancona,  promising 
that  English  ships  should  be  kept  at  a  distance  from  the  coast  of 
the  Papal  States,  Ijesitles  making  payment  of  something  over 
20,000, 000  francs  and  yielding  from  their  galleries  a  great  number 
of  works  of  art.  Finally,  the  trading  port  of  Leghorn  was  seized 
and  occupied  a  few  days  later,  with  a  view  to  further  crippling 


iE-r.  20]      The  Old  and  the  New   Warfare  85 

the  English,  whose  merchandise  was  confiscated  and  sold  to  the 
profit  of  the  French  treasury. 

But  the  French  were  yet  far  from  being  where  they  could 
enjoy  their  successes  in  peace.  Austria,  whose  interests,  as  has 
been  shown,  depended  upon  maintaining  her  possessions  and 
influence  in  Italy,  was  straining  every  nerve  to  reconquer  her 
lost  position.  General  Wurmser,  who  had  been  in  command 
of  the  Army  on  the  Rhine,  was  ordered  thence  to  the  Tyrol  to 
replace  Beauheu  at  the  head  of  the  army  and,  with  the  aid  of 
fresh  troops,  to  advance  to  the  relief  of  Mantua. 

Napoleon  was  fully  aware  that  he  had  before  him  a  struggle 
of  no  mean  extent,  upon  the  issue  of  which  depended  the  question 
whether  he  were  able  or  not  to  maintain  his  own  despotic  position, 
and  he  took  his  measures  accordingly.  What  the  young  general 
accomplished  during  the  ensuing  months,  in  combat  with  four 
armies  successively  relieving  one  another,  belongs  among  the 
wonders  of  military  history.  His  successes  were  due  to  the 
superiority  of  a  genius  of  inexhaustible  resources,  a  clear-sighted- 
ness which  recognized  at  a  glance  favourable  or  unfavourable 
points  in  a  territory,  as  well  as  the  weakness  or  strength,  ad- 
vantages or  mistakes  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Napoleon's 
watchfulness  was  always  on  the  alert,  he  grasped  all  phases  and 
all  details  of  an  action  and  kept  them  in  mind,  and  he  fully 
appreciated  the  value  of  making  use  of  the  right  moment. 

To  these  considerations  must  be  added  another.  The 
generals  who  were  his  opponents  in  these  ItaUan  campaigns 
were  trained  and  experienced  in  a  methodical  kind  of  strategy 
only  and,  like  all  the  generals  of  the  older  governments,  in 
duty  bound  to  be  as  saving  as  possible  of  their  costly  armies 
of  mercenaries;  to  them  a  series  of  bloodless  manoeuvres  was 
the  object  aimed  at.  The  generals  of  the  Revolution,  on  the 
contrary,  commanded  armies  composed  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  their  countiymen,  animated  by  a  frenzy  for  conquest  and 
liberation ;  their  recruits  cost  nothing,  and  \^^th  war  thus  carried 
on  at  the  expense  of  foreign  nations  they  had  an  immense  atl- 
vantage  over  those  who  were  obliged  to  subordinate  strategy 
to  economic  considerations;    their  object  was  decisive  battle 


86  The  Campaigns  in  Italy  [i796 

at  whatever  cost.  Frederick  the  Great,  of  whose  writings  Na- 
poleon was  an  assiduous  student,  had  advocated  the  same  prin- 
ciple ;  dire  necessity  and  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  against  him 
by  allied  and  superior  forces  had  compelled  him  to  act  upon  it. 
In  one  essential  point,  however,  his  method  of  warfare  differed 
from  Bonaparte's,  for,  as  has  been  very  justly  remarked,  "he 
did  not,  like  the  French  general,  have  10,000  men  a  month  to 
spend."  Dubois  de  Crance  and  Carnot  share  the  merit  of  having 
organized  the  revolutionary  armies.  But  to  Napoleon  belongs 
the  honour  of  having  applied  these  tactics  in  offensive  warfare 
in  a  manner  displaying  transcendent  genius.  Throughout  the 
campaign  which  was  about  to  take  place,  the  contrast  between 
the  leaders  of  the  antagonistic  forces  was  but  too  clearly  dis- 
played. The  general  of  the  repubhcan  army  was  scarce  twenty- 
seven  years  old,  reckless  and  daring,  heeding  only  the  commands 
of  his  own  inspiration,  while  the  commander  of  the  Austrian 
troops  at  the  age  of  seventy-nine  was  dependent  for  direction 
upon  the  Emperor,  his  ministers,  and  the  Aulic  Council. 

At  the  end  of  July — far  too  late — the  Austrians,  in  two 
divisions,  advanced  impetuously  southward  from  the  Tyrol. 
One  of  these  columns,  under  command  of  Quosdanovich 
marched  down  the  western  bank  of  Lake  Garda,  the  other, 
under  Wurmser,  followed  the  course  of  the  Adige.  Their 
forces  outnumbered  those  of  the  French  by  more  than  10,000 
men,  the  latter  having  not  more  than  42,000  in  fighting  condi- 
tion, including  those  who  were  engaged  in  laying  siege  to  Mantua. 
Should  they  succeed  in  the  execution  of  their  plan  to  surround 
Napoleon's  army  by  means  of  concerted  and  simultaneous 
action,  its  fate  was  sealed,  and  the  outlook  appeared  so  much 
the  more  ominous  since  the  Austrians  gave  proofs  in  the  very 
first  engagements  of  unusual  courage  and  firnmcss,  and  had  cut 
off  the  avenue  of  retreat  for  the  French  to  cither  Milan  or  Verona. 
Napoleon  recognized  to  the  full  the  danger  of  the  situation  and 
considered  the  advisability  of  making  a  retreat  behind  the 
Adda,  but  fitially  jiHowcmI  himself  to  bo  led  by  the  audacious 
confidence;  of  Augereuu,  one  of  l\is  g(>iierals,  and  risked  an  engage- 
ment, though  in  constant  danger  of  being  caught  between  two 


M-r.  27]     The  Attempt  to   Relieve   Mantua  87 

fires.  The  daring  venture  was  successful.  With  all  available 
troops  he  threw  himself  first  on  Quosdanovich,  defeated  him 
on  the  3d  and  4th  of  August  at  Lonato,  and  compelled  his  re- 
treat toward  the  Tyrol.  Then  he  turned  against  Wurmser, 
whose  overcautious  advance  cost  him  a  crushing  defeat  at 
CastigUone  on  the  5th  of  August;  for  him  also  the  only  way  of 
escape  lay  toward  the  mountains.  Mantua,  whose  blockade  had 
been  necessarily  abandoned,  was  at  once  reinvested  by  the 
French. 

But  no  decisive  outcome  had  yet  been  reached  notwith- 
standing these  victories.  As  long  as  this  important  fortress 
was  not  within  his  power  Napoleon  could  not  consider  making 
further  advance,  inasmuch  as  the  mere  investiture  of  the  city 
required  so  great  a  proportion  of  his  troops  as  to  make  it  impossi- 
ble for  the  rest  to  penetrate  unsupported- into  the  Tyrol  or  the 
interior  of  Austria. 

The  Court  of  Vienna,  moreover,  appreciated  as  clearly  the 
significance  of  this  stronghold  to  themselves;  its  loss  would 
entail  that  of  all  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Italy,  and  for  this 
reason  their  efforts  were  redoubled  to  relieve  and  liberate  the 
city.  On  the  19th  of  August  positive  instructions  were  sent  to 
Wurmser  by  Emperor  Francis  bidding  him  advance  again  to 
the  relief  of  Mantua.  This  order  he  obeyed  early  in  September 
with  one  division  of  the  army  through  the  valley  of  the  Brenta, 
while  the  second,  under  command  of  Davidovich,  was  to  hold  a 
position  on  the  Adige,  whence,  in  case  Wurmser  should  turn 
westward  from  Bassano  and  draw  the  enemy  upon  himself, 
they  were  to  descend  the  valley  of  that  river  at  full  speed  to  his 
assistance.  But  shortly  after  the  opening  of  this  action  the  whole 
scheme  was  shattered  by  the  course  pursued  by  Napoleon,  who 
marched  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  into  the  Tyrol,  where  he  de- 
feated Davidowich  and  drove  him  far  behind  Trent,  then,  turn- 
ing into  the  valley  of  the  Brenta,  hastened  to  overtake  Wurmser, 
and  inflicted  upon  him  an  overwhelming  defeat  on  September 
8th. 

Only  by  the  practice  of  the  most  strenuous  exertions  did  the 
aged  general  with  the  remnants  of  his  vanquished  army  succeed 


88  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [i796 

in  gaining  the  sheltering  walls  of  Mantua.  One  division  had 
made  its  retreat  eastward  behind  the  Isonzo.  This  enterprise 
had  cost  Austria  more  than  100  cannon,  all  her  munitions  of  war, 
and  far  above  10,000  men. 

For  Bonaparte  the  achievement  was  one  of  much  wider- 
reaching  importance  than  had  been  his  victory  at  Castiglione. 
Its  significance  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  it  came  just  at 
the  time  when  disaster  had  overtaken  the  armies  at  the  North 
under  Moreau  and  Jourdan,  who  had  lost  the  advantages  which 
they  had  previously  obtained  in  Germany.  By  the  recall  of  a 
portion  of  her  troops  from  the  Rhine  to  the  aid  of  the  forces  con- 
tending against  Napoleon,  Austria  had  considerably  weakened 
her  forces  in  the  North.  The  young  Archduke  Charles,  who 
had  given  evidence  of  military  talent  in  the  Netherlands,  now 
succeeded  Wurmser  in  the  chief  command  of  the  army.  To 
him  it  seemed  advisable  (overestimating  as  he  did  the  strength 
of  his  adversary)  to  withdraw  his  troops  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine. 
Moreau,  who  now,  in  place  of  Pichegru,  commanded  the  Army 
of  the  South,  took  this  as  a  challenge  to  cross  the  river,  where- 
upon he  defeated  the  Archduke  and  forced  him  to  retreat 
beyond  the  Danube.  Jourdan  also  was  successful  in  an  advance 
made  against  the  second  division  of  the  Austrian  army  under 
Wartensleben  which  enabled  him  to  invade  Franconia.  Wiir- 
temberg  and  Baden  hastened  to  make  peace  with  France,  while 
Saxony  recalled  her  troops  from  the  field  and  declared  herself 
neutral.  It  seemed  as  if  the  projected  junction  of  the  Repub- 
lican armies  in  the  Tyrol  for  a  united  advance  upon  Vienna 
were  really  about  to  take  place.  Just  then,  early  in  September, 
Archduke  Charles  met  Jourdan  at  Wiirzburg  and  totally  de- 
feated him,  thus  compelling  both  his  army  and  Moreau's  to 
retreat  from  southern  Germany  back  to  the  Rhine.  The  honour 
of  the  Austrian  arms  was  at  least  splendidly  retrieved.  More 
than  ever  now  everything  depended  upon  the  fate  of  Mantua. 

After  his  last  victories  Bonaparte  had  again  acted  contrary 
to  the  intentions  of  the  Directory,  which  purposed  restoring 
Lombardy  to  Austria  when  peace  should  be  agreed  upon  in 
return  for  Belgium  and  the  Rhine  frontier.     His  method  of  pro- 


iEr.  27]     Renewed   Efforts   of  the   Austrians  89 

cedure  had  been  to  stir  up  revolt  among  the  peoples  of  northern 
Italy  against  their  hereditary  rulers,  and  to  incite  them  to  the 
creation  of  national  legions;  such  were,  in  fact,  organized  in 
Milan  and  Bologna.  Austrian  prestige  hung  in  the  balance. 
The  most  strenuous  efforts  were  put  forth  to  maintain  it.  Ex- 
tensive armaments,  especially  in  Croatia  and  the  military  borders, 
were  fitted  out,  the  Tyrolese  sharpshooters  were  called  into 
requisition.  Everything  was  done  to  increase  the  effective 
force  of  the  Imperial  Army,  so  that  presently  Davidovich  found 
himself  at  the  head  of  upward  of  18,000  men  in  the  Tyrol,  while 
Quosdanovich  was  in  command  in  Friuli  of  more  than  25,000. 

The  command  of  the  whole  army  was  entrusted  to  Alvinczy, 
a  brave  but  aged  general  who  had  become  immovably  attached 
to  the  old  methods.  It  seemed  as  if  Fate  had  ordained  that  the 
generals  opposed  to  this  young  and  energetic  genius  should  be  of 
the  oldest  and  those  most  wedded  to  tradition,  thus  giving  to  his 
victories  the  appearance  of  being  the  triumph  of  a  new  era.*  The 
Austrians  again  had  the  advantage  in  point  of  numbers  when  on 
November  1st  they  advanced  westward  from  the  Piave  under 
command  of  Alvinczy,  and  southward  toward  Verona  under 
Davidovich.  But  these  troops  consisted  largely  of  young 
recruits,  who,  like  the  Croatians,  showed  their  best  points  in 

*  In  1797  Bonaparte  expressed  himself  thus  in  regard  to  the  enemy: 
"My  military  successes  have  been  great;  but  then  consider  the  senice  of 
the  Emperor!  His  soldiers  are  good  and  brave,  though  heavy  and  inac- 
tive as  compared  with  mine;  but  what  officers!  They  are  wretched. 
The  generals  who  were  sent  against  me  were  unfit  and  absurd.  A  Beaulieu 
who  had  not  the  slightest  knowledge  about  localities  in  Italy;  a  Wurmser, 
deaf  and  eternally  slow;  an  Alvinczy  who  was  altogether  incompetent. 
They  have  been  accused  of  being  bribed  by  me;  those  are  nothing  but 
falsehoods,  for  I  never  had  such  a  thing  in  view.  But  I  can  prove  that  no 
one  of  these  three  generals  had  a  single  staff  of  which  several  of  the 
superior  officers  were  not  devoted  to  me  and  in  my  pay.  Hence  I  was 
apprised  not  only  of  their  plans  but  of  their  designs,  and  I  interfered 
with  them  while  they  were  still  under  deliberation."  (Jung,  "Bona- 
parte," III.  154.) 

To  what  extent  this  harsh  judgment  is  justified  there  is  no  way  of 
ascertaining.  Other  evidence  indeed  indicated  that  demoralization  did 
exist  among  the  officers  of  the  Austrian  army. 


90  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [i796 

attack,  while  their  lack  of  firmness  and  endurance  soon  put  them 
at  a  recognizable  disadvantage. 

And  in  truth  the  opening  of  this  new  campaign  was  in  every 
way  unfavourable  to  Napoleon,  so  that  for  a  time  he  stood  in  the 
same  danger  as  at  Castiglione  of  being  attacked  by  both  divisions 
of  the  Austrian  army  at  the  same  time. 

But  the  enemy  did  not  take  advantage  of  the  victory  which 
they  gained  on  November  12th  at  Verona,  where  the  French  lost 
some  3,000  men,  and  Napoleon  thus  had  time  to  prepare  a  new 
stroke  of  genius  by  means  of  which  he  caught  Alvinczy  in  both 
flank  and  rear. 

With  unheard-of  daring  he  reduced  to  a  minimum  the  forces  in 
Verona  and  before  Mantua,  and  with  all  available  troops,  about 
20,000  men,  descended  the  course  of  the  Adige,  which  he  crossed  at 
Ronco  to  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river,  in  order  to  surprise  the 
enemy.     But  this  was  by  no  means  to  be  so  easily  accomplished. 

At  Arcole  on  the  little  river  Alpon  two  battalions  of  Croatians, 
commanded  by  their  colonel,  Brigido,  stationed  themselves  so  as 
to  defend  the  bridge  until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  Every- 
thing depended  upon  forcing  a  passage  across  and  securing  the 
hamlet  which  commands  the  position  before  the  strength  of  the 
foe  should  be  increased  by  the  expected  forces.  The  successive 
assaults  of  the  French  were  repulsed  by  the  murderous  fire  of  the 
enemy,  who  were  under  cover;  thereupon  Napoleon  in  person 
seized  a  flag  and  rushed  upon  the  bridge,  followed  by  his  staff; 
an  aide-de-camp  fell  at  his  side  and  several  officers  were  wounded. 
But  all  in  vain :  an  attack  of  the  Austrians  brought  everything 
into  confusion,  and  the  commander-in-chief,  who  was  swept 
backwards  in  the  rush  of  the  fleeing  soldiers,  fell  into  a  quagmire, 
where  his  life  was  in  the  utmost  peril.  With  difficulty  his  aide 
Marmont  and  his  brother  Louis  succeeded  in  extricating  him 
from  the  morass  and  in  concealing  him  from  the  pursuing  enemy. 
Only  under  cover  of  the  night  did  the  French  regain  their  position 
on  the  Adige  (November  ir)ih).  MeanwhiU^  the  wliole  force 
under  Alvinczy  had  massed  itself  around  Arcole  and  there  the 
battle  was  renewed  on  the  next  day  and  the  following  in  a  bloody 
and  long-indecisive  struggle,  until  at  length  the  physical  cndur- 


vEt.  27]  Rivoli  gi 

ance  of  Napoleon's  hardened  troops  carried  the  day  against 
the  brave  Austrian  recruits,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  17th 
the  bold  charge  of  a  handful  of  mounted  officers  sufficed  to  assure 
the  victory  on  the  Alpon.  The  French  had  won  in  the  three 
days'  batttle  of  Arcole  (November  15th  to  17th,  1796). 

Davidovich,  who  through  delay  had  failed  to  take  part 
therein,  was  in  Uke  manner  attacked  immediately  after  the 
battle  and  compelled  to  withdraw  into  the  Tryol.  The  third 
attempt  to  relieve  Mantua  had  failed. 

But  Austria  ventured  a  fourth  trial,  being  unwilling  to  yield 
this  advanced  position  in  Italy  until  her  utmost  endeavours 
had  been  put  forth.  In  the  opening  of  the  year  1797  Alvinczy 
made  another  advance  against  the  enemy,  this  time  from  the 
Tyrol,  while  two  lesser  subdivisions  commanded  by  Provera 
and  Bajalich  marched  from  the  east  to  overcome  Napoleon. 
Alvinczy  had  himself  no  further  hope  of  victory  and  was  only 
acting  under  orders  of  the  Emperor.  And  yet  there  came  a 
critical  moment,  on  the  plateau  of  Rivoli,  which,  properly  put 
to  advantage,  might  have  brought  about  decisive  results  in 
favour  of  the  Austrians.  This  was  on  the  14th  of  January, 
when  one  of  the  Austrian  columns  fell  upon  the  French  position, 
threatening  its  rear,  while  four  others  attacked  it  from  the  front 
with  marked  success.  But  Bonaparte  was  no  longer  the  same 
man  as  before  Lonato;  he  hurled  all  his  available  forces  against 
one  of  these  columns,  which  recoiled  under  the  shock,  the  three 
others  followed,  and  soon  all  the  forces  of  the  enemy  attacking 
from  the  front  were  put  to  flight.  The  column  executing  the 
flank  movement  found  itself  cut  off  and  was  taken  captive  by 
the  French.  The  battle  of  Rivoli  terminated  in  a  total  rout 
of  the  Austrians.  Their  last  attempt  had  gone  against  them. 
On  the  3d  of  February  the  fortress  of  Mantua  capitulated. 
Austria's  dominion  in  Italy  was  at  an  end. 

Thugut,  a  man  of  inflexible  purpose  and  of  great  political 
ability,  was  scarcely  able  to  believe  the  fact.  Hardly  two  years 
previous,  when  Austria  had  divided  with  Russia  all  that  re- 
mained of  Poland,  he  had  obtained  the  promise  of  pohtical 
support   from    this    northern    neighbour    for  whatever  further 


92  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

acquisitions  Austria  should  make  in  Italy,  an  agreement  similar 
to  that  which  had  formerly  been  made  with  Kaunitz  and  Joseph 
II.  But  in  November,  1796,  Catharine  II.  died,  just  at  the  time 
when  the  command  had  been  issued  for  the  mustering  of  the 
Russian  auxiliary  troops,  and  her  successor  Czar  Paul  I.  refused 
to  contribute  aid  toward  the  aggrandizement  of  Austria.  And 
when  in  addition  to  this  disappointment  Austria's  other  ally, 
England,  withdrew  her  fleet  from  the  Mediterranean,  thereby 
greatly  facihtating  the  operations  of  the  French  in  Italy,  the 
task  became  more  than  ever  difficult.  And  now  the  struggle 
had  ended  in  a  decisive  overthrow.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  Thugut 
was  of  opinion  that  the  contest  ought  not  to  cease.  At  the 
close  of  the  preceding  year,  relying  upon  the  strength  of  the 
Austrian  forces  alone,  he  had  refused  the  proposal  of  the  Direc- 
tory which  required  the  cession  of  Belgium  and  the  Rhine 
frontier.  Even  recent  events  had  not  sufficed  to  shake  this 
confidence.  "We  are  not  yet  at  the  end  of  our  resources,"  he 
exclaimed;  "all  we  need  is  to  gather  together  all  our  courage." 
He  advocated  removing  all  troops  from  the  Rhine  so  as  to  con- 
centrate their  entire  force  in  Italy,  a  step  which  might  in  truth 
far  better  have  been  taken  a  year  earlier.  Archduke  Charles, 
who  had  been  victorious  in  the  preceding  year,  was  to  assume 
the  chief  command  of  the  ItaHan  army,  reinforced  by  the  divi- 
sions which  had  been  active  on  the  Rhine,  and  to  make  a  vigorous 
advance  toward  the  South  and  thus  bar  the  passage  for  Bona- 
parte through  central  Austria  to  Vienna.  It  was,  of  course, 
essential  that  this  move  should  be  made  as  promptly  as  possible. 
But  the  contrary  occurred.  The  Empress  was  a  daughter  of 
the  Queen  of  Naples,  and  she,  at  her  mother's  solicitation,  be- 
sought the  Emperor  to  make  peace;  he  was  moreover  prejudiced 
by  the  Tory  party  against  his  minister,  Thugut,  who  was  a 
commoner  who  had  risen  to  power.  Accordingly  he  hesitated 
which  course  to  pursue,  and  it  was  several  weeks  before  he 
finally  determined  to  continue  the  war.  And  when  at  length 
this  resolution  had  been  taken,  it  was  not  in  the  Tyn^l  that  the 
main  body  of  the  army  was  assembled,  but  in  Friuli,  whither  it 
had  retreated  after  the  defeat  of  RivoU  and  where  it  had  re- 


Ml.  27]  The  Attack  on   the   Pope  93 

maincd,  e\ddently  because  there  it  was  most  easily  supported. 
The  fatal  drawback  to  this  arrangement  was  that  the  reinforce- 
ments from  the  Rhine  were  thus  detained  several  weeks  longer 
on  the  way  to  their  destination,  communication  between  Friuli 
and  the  Tyrol  by  means  of  the  Val  Sugana  being  interrupted. 
These  troops  were  in  fact  still  on  the  way  when  operations 
were  begun  by  the  French  in  the  early  part  of  March,  1797. 

Upon  the  part  of  the  French,  also,  hostilities  against  Austria 
had  not  been  continued  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Mantua. 
Bonaparte's  army,  as  well,  had  suffered  and  was  in  need  of 
considerable  additions  from  the  Rhine  and  the  Sambre  to  fit  it 
for  new  and  daring  enterprises.  The  intervening  time  was  turned 
to  account  in  a  move  upon  Rome.  Pius  VI.  had  refused  the 
proposals  of  peace  made  by  the  Directory,  since  they  encroached 
upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Church  in  demanding  recognition 
of  the  civil  constitution  of  the  clergy  in  France,  the  suppression 
of  the  Romish  Inquisition,  and  sundry  other  similar  concessions. 
In  accordance  with  an  agreement  entered  into  wdth  Austria 
he  had  also  failed  to  pay  to  France  the  millions  of  indemnity 
promised  in  June.  But  with  the  fall  of  Mantua  the  cause  of 
the  Holy  Father  was  lost,  and  on  the  1st  of  February,  1797, 
Napoleon  declared  war  against  him.  With  a  small  force  he 
dispersed  the  Papal  troops,  who  proved  to  be  unspeakable 
cowards,  and  opened  up  a  way  for  himself  through  the  Romagna 
and  the  Duchy  of  Urbino  as  far  as  Ancona.  It  will  never  be 
forgotten  how  Lannes,  who  commanded  the  advance-guard,  at 
the  slightest  possible  cost  compelled  thousands  of  the  foe  to 
surrender,  nor  how,  while  himself  escorted  by  a  few  officers,  he 
came  one  day  upon  some  hundreds  of  cavalrymen  of  the  army 
of  the  Pope,  who,  upon  being  ordered  to  dismomit,  were  entirely 
disconcerted  and  allowed  themselves  to  be  disarmed.  It  was 
in  vain  that  the  monks  exhorted  the  Papal  soldiery  to  courage 
and  steadfastness,  in  vain  that  everywhere  images  of  the 
Madonna  stood  with  averted  eyes  in  wTath  against  the  French; 
the  soldiers  of  the  Pope  were  not  a  whit  the  more  courageous, 
and  the  fall  of  Rome  was  imminent.  But  here  Napoleon  stayed 
his  hand.      To  threaten  the  capital  would  have  entailed  the 


94  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

flight  of  the  Pope  and  prolonged  a  war  which  the  General  re- 
garded as  a  mere  episode  in  the  greater  conflict  and  wished  to 
bring  to  a  close  with  the  greatest  speed  consistent  with  profit. 
He  was  far  too  shrewd  a  statesman  to  miderestimate,  as  did  the 
Directory,  the  immense  pohtical  importance  of  the  Church, 
and  his  sagacity  in  that  respect  contributed  much  to  his  success. 
Instead  of  striking  at  the  root  of  Catholicism,  as  he  was  in- 
structed to  do,  he  left  the  Pope  entirely  at  liberty  in  all  matters 
pertaining  to  religion,  and  Rome  unmolested;  on  the  19th  of 
February  he  concluded  at  Tolentino  a  treaty  which  was,  from 
a  material  and  political  point  of  view,  advantageous  to  the 
French  in  every  particular:  Pius  renounced  every  alliance 
antagonistic  to  France,  closed  his  harbours  to  the  English,  re- 
linquished the  Legations  of  Bologna,  Ferrara,  and '  Romagna 
together  with  the  important  port  of  Ancona  to  the  French, 
and  paid  14,000,000  francs  in  addition  to  the  16,000,000  still  due. 
Once  more  Bonaparte  had  carried  out  his  own  intentions, 
contrary  to  those  of  the  Directory,  precisely  as  he  had  concluded 
the  armistice  with  the  King  of  Sardinia  upon  his  own  authority. 
It  was  evident  that  his  designs  in  regard  to  Italy  differed  from 
those  of  the  government.  And  what  may  these  designs  have 
been?  Something  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  he  at 
one  time  thought  it  necessary  to  defend  himself  against  the 
charge  of  having  had  thoughts  of  setting  himself  up  as  Duke  of 
Milan  or  even  King.  It  is  not  impossible  that  he  may  have  had 
some  such  object  in  view  and  consequently  sought  a  modus 
Vivendi  with  the  Pope.  More  probably,  however,  he  now  had 
a  clear  and  definite  apprehension  of  the  possibility  of  himself 
reigning  some  time  on  the  Seine  and  of  then  establishing  his 
rule  on  a  firmer  basis  and  extending  his  sway  over  a  wider 
territory  than  the  Directory  had  su(;ceetled  in  doing.  Carnot 
suspected  him  of  being  "a  second  Ccssar,  who  would  not  hesitate 
to  cross  the  Rubicon  as  soon  as  the  occasion  should  present." 
Certain  it  is  that  of  the  tremendous  contributions  levied  in 
Italy  but  a  small  portion  was  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  govern- 
ment and  used  in  the  support  of  the  other  armies.  On  the  con- 
trary, Napoleon  was  far  from  displeased  when  his  generals  seized 


iET.  27]  The   Vision   of  the   Orient  95 

their  share  of  the  booty;  he  thus  assuretl  liiinscH'  of  their  devo- 
tion. The  treasure  thus  obtained  was  secretly  conveyed  to 
Switzerland  for  safe-keeping. 

When  Bonaparte  arrived  in  Ancona  the  proximity  of  Turkey 
made  a  profound  impression  upon  him.  "Ancona  is  an  excellent 
port,"  he  wrote  to  Paris;  "in  twenty-four  hours  from  here  one 
can  reach  Macedonia,  and  in  ten  days  Constantinople.  We 
must  keep  this  port  when  a  general  peace  is  made,  and  it  must 
remain  always  a  French  possession;  this  point  will  give  us  in- 
valuable influence  upon  the  destinies  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
and  will  give  us  the  mastery  of  the  Adriatic  Sea  as  we  now 
have  that  of  the  Mediterranean  through  Marseilles,  the  island 
of  Corsica,  and  St.  Pierre."  Doubtless  the  form  of  Alexander 
the  Great  appeared  at  this  time  to  his  imagination  and  suggested 
to  his  ambition  the  idea  of  an  Oriental  Empire  of  the  like  of 
which  the  Directory  then  scarcely  dreamed.  Under  its  spell 
he  afterwards  made  his  expedition  into  Egypt,  and  it  was  only 
upon  his  return  thence  in  order  to  establish  his  dominion  in 
France  that  the  alluring  vision  of  the  conquering  Macedonian 
gave  place  to  that  of  Charlemagne  as  model.  It  was  in  just  this 
respect  that  Napoleon  differed  from  his  immediate  precursors 
in  their  systems  of  revolutionary  conquest  of  the  world, — from 
the  doctrinaire  Girondists  with  their  ideal  of  universal  liberty, 
and  from  the  Directors  with  their  system  of  purposeless  agita- 
tion,— that  his  ambitious  designs  were  based  upon  the  solid 
ground  of  history  and  carried  out  according  to  a  policy  with  a 
definite  aim.  Only  the  fact  that  he  too  was  never  able  entirely 
to  free  himself  from  the  spell  of  the  Revolution  fuially  caused 
his  downfall.* 

*  At  the  very  time  when  Bonaparte's  victories  in  Italy  were  occurring 
in  such  rapid  succession  Mallet  du  Pan  addressed  these  remarkable  words 
to  the  Court  at  Vienna:  "Those  who  think  that  the  imperishable  Republic 
will  perish  in  the  course  of  time  are  certainly  correct  in  their  surmises, 
but  if  they  mean  thereby  that  this  downfall  more  or  less  near  is  to  insure 
actual  stability  to  the  rest  of  Europe,  if  they  expect  that  everything 
then  will  change  from  white  to  black,  they  are  greatly  mistaken;  for  to  the 
Republic  of  to-day  there  may  succeed  another  Republic  xvhich  may  be  under 
either  a  monarcJi  or  a  dictator.  Who  knows?  In  the  course  of  twenty  years 
a  nation  in  commotion  may  give  a  hundred  different  forms  to  a  revolution  of 


96  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

The  campaign  of  1796  had  estabUshed  Napoleon's  mihtary 
fame;  he  had  even  eclipsed  Hoche,  who  had  been  so  much 
admired.  But  he  knew  very  well  that  public  opinion  in  France 
was  more  in  favour  of  peace  than  of  new  victories,  and  that  the 
Directory  was  detested  and  execrated  because  of  its  war  policy. 
Elections  for  replacing  one  third  of  the  members  of  the  Council 
of  Five  Hundred  were  at  hand,  and  no  one  doubted  that  their 
places  would  be  filled  by  conservatives  in  favour  of  peace,  and 
a  majority  thus  created  hostile  to  the  Directors.  Bonaparte 
foresaw  that  if  he  should  succeed  in  compelling  Austria  to 
conclude  a  preliminary  peace  upon  terms  favourable  to  France 
he  would  thus  not  only  gain  the  favour  of  the  people,  who  had 
not  yet  forgotten  the  13th  Vendemiaire,  but  he  would  also 
put  the  five  Directors  vmder  obligations  to  himself,  since  they 
would  then  be  in  a  position  to  face  the  elections  more  composedly. 
But  Bonaparte  knew  also  how  highly  Austria  valued  her  footing 
in  Italy,  and  that  she  would  not  permit  herself  to  be  thrust  out 
of  the  peninsula  without  determined  resistance,  and  that  for  a 
long  time  the  power  on  the  Danube  had  planned  the  conquest 
of  Venice.  He  accordingly  resolved  upon  availing  himself  of 
the  first  opportunity  to  offer  Emperor  Francis  the  territory  of 
San  Marco  and  its  dependencies  in  Istria  and  Dalmatia  in 
exchange  for  Lombardy  and  Belgium.  The  fact  that  he  should 
thereby  destroy  an  independent  neutral  state  was  no  obstacle 
in  the  eyes  of  this  man  whose  ruling  principle  it  was  to  press 
forward  toward  his  aim  regardless  of  the  consequences  to  others. 
Had  not  the  legitimate  monarchies  dealt  with  Poland  in  the 

this  kind."  Mallet  du  Pan  did  not  at  all  events  suspect  then  that  the  "revo- 
lutionary monarch  "  was  to  be  the  very  man  of  whom  he  then  wrote  con- 
temptuously. "This  Bonaparte,  this  little  puppet  with  dishevelled  hair, 
whom  the  orators  of  the  Councils  delight  to  call  'the  young  heto'  and 
'the  conqueror  of  Italy,'  will  soon  have  to  suffer  for  his  mountebank 
glory,  his  misconduct,  his  thefts,  his  fusillades,  his  insolent  slanders  It 
would  be  an  entire  mistake,  in  reading  the  last  declaration  which  the 
Directory  had  printed  in  eulogy  of  the  General,  to  suppose  its  expressions 
sincere.  There  were  voices  in  favour  of  sending  'the  >oung  hero'  to  the 
'Place  de  la  Revolution'  to  have  a  .score  of  bullets  lodged  in  his  pate; 
but,  as  a  friend  of  liarras,  protected  by  the  Jacobins  of  all  classes,  he  has 
escaped  the  penalty  of  his  folly." 


^T.  271  The   Campaign   of   1 797  97 

same  manner?  It  is  evident  that  this  plan  already  filled  his 
mind  when  he  began  the  campaign  of  1797.  To  accomplish 
his  purpose  it  was  indispensable  that  Austria  should  be  placed 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  such  a  situation  as  to  make 
this  offer  acceptable,  and  that  before  the  armies  on  the  Rhine 
under  Hoche  and  Moreau  might  be  able  to  dispute  his  laurels. 

While  the  Austrian  reinforcements  were  yet  far  distant, 
those  of  the  French  arrived  at  headquarters  during  the  latter 
days  of  February;  the  beginning  of  March  Napoleon  resumed 
hostilities.  Three  small  divisions  under  General  Joubert  were 
ordered  to  the  Tyrol  to  protect  the  flank  of  the  French  army 
against  more  than  20,000  Austrians.  With  but  four  others, 
amounting  in  all  to  about  34,000  men,  Bonaparte  himself  under- 
took the  expedition  which  was  to  lead  to  peace.  As  in  the 
preceding  year  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  his  plan  was 
once  again  to  prevent  the  armies  of  the  adversary  from  effecting 
a  union  of  forces  by  placing  himself  between  the  two,  and  then, 
with  a  superior  number  of  troops,  to  defeat  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy.  On  March  10th  he  brushed  aside  the  advance- 
guard  of  the  Austrians  stationed  on  the  Piave  and  hastened 
on  to  the  Tagliamento,  behind  which  Archduke  Charles  had 
\N-ithdrawn  with  the  main  body  of  his  army,  while  Massena 
upon  the  French  left  endeavoured  to  turn  the  right  wing  of  the 
enemy.  Before  these  superior  forces  the  Austrians,  instead 
of  receding  to  the  northeast  along  the  valley  of  the  Tagliamento 
to  Pontebba,  retreated  southeastward  to  Udine  and  Cividale 
and  at  length  to  the  Isonzo,  where  they  intended  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  troops  from  the  Rhine.  But  these  did  not  come, 
and  Bonaparte,  who  continued  to  press  impetuously  forward, 
threatened  their  position,  which  now  became  untenable.  The 
Austrians  withdrew  in  two  columns,  one  marching  from  Goerz 
straight  toward  Tarvis,  the  other  aiming  for  Laibach.  They 
planned  to  unite  at  Villach,  but  that  proved  impracticable,  for 
the  Pontebba  Pass,  inadequately  defended  after  a  struggle  of 
some  days,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Massena  on  the  23d  of  March, 
thus  cutting  off  communication  with  the  Pusterthal,  through 
which  the  eagerly  expected  reinforcements  were  to  haAe  come. 


98  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

For  the  present  any  serious  resistance  to  the  French  was  out  of 
the  question.  In  these  few  days  the  losses  of  the  Austrians 
had  been  enormous,  particularly  in  prisoners;  the  Archduke 
had  remaining  at  his  disposal  only  about  15,000  men;  these 
he  conducted  first  to  Klagenfurt  and  then  northward  on  the 
high  road  to  Vienna. 

This  seemed  to  Napoleon  the  favourable  moment,  before 
Hoche  and  Moreau  could  strike  a  decisive  blow  in  Germany, 
for  making  his  proposals  of  peace,  especially  as  his  position  was 
more  or  less  critical  in  the  heart  of  a  hostile  country,  without  any 
possibility  of  support  from  the  army  in  Germany.  On  the 
31st  of  March  he  wrote  from  Klagenfurt  to  the  Prince  a  letter 
which  he  himself  designated  as  "philosophical."  He  alludes 
therein  to  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Directory  to  conclude 
peace  with  Austria,  which  attempt  had  been  frustrated  by 
England.  "Is  there  then  no  hope  whatever  of  coming  to  some 
agreement  between  us,  and  must  it  be  that,  for  the  sake  of  the 
interest  or  passions  of  a  nation  untouched  by  the  evils  of  this 
war,  we  must  continue  to  cut  each  other's  throats?  I  appeal  to 
you.  Sir,  the  Commander-in-chief,  who  by  your  birth  are  so  near 
the  throne  and  above  all  the  petty  passions  which  so  often 
animate  ministers  and  governments,  are  you  determined  to  win 
for  yourself  the  title  of  benefactor  of  all  mankind  and  of  true 
deliverer  of  Germany?  ...  As  for  myself.  Monsieur  the  General- 
in-chief,  if  the  proposals  which  I  have  the  honour  to  submit  to 
you  could  be  the  means  of  saving  the  life  of  a  single  human  being, 
I  should  account  myself  more  justly  proud  of  the  civic  crown  to 
which  I  should  feel  myself  thus  entitled  than  of  the  melancholy 
glory  which  may  come  as  the  reward  of  military  successes," 

In  order  to  give  proper  emphasis  to  these  words,  he  recalled 
to  himself  at  Lienz,  Joubcrt,  who  had  made  a  victorious  advance 
as  far  as  Brixen  and  had  driven  back  the  enemy  to  the  north- 
west as  far  as  Stcrzing  and  to  the  west  as  far  as  M^ran,  and 
ordered  Massena  to  seize  the  passes  at  Neumarkt,  an  operation 
during  the  course  of  which,  in  truth,  the  life  of  more  than  "one 
human  being"  was  sacrificed.  Thence  he  was  to  advance  far 
enough  into  the  valkiy  of  the  Mur  to  be  able  to  cut  off  at  St. 


Mv.  27]        The   Preliminaries  of  Leoben  99 

Michael  and  Leoben  all  communication  remaining  to  the  enemy 
with  the  west.  On  April  7th,  this  task  having  been  accom- 
pHshecl,  Massena  entered  Leoben  with  his  troops. 

Archduke  Charles  meanwhile  had  lost  no  time  in  transmit- 
ting Napoleon's  letter  to  Thugut.  This  statesman  was  Uke^^dse 
unwiUing  to  enter  unsupported  by  a  military  force  into  negotia- 
tions with  a  general  who  had  perhaps  already  advanced  too  far 
into  the  territory  of  his  foe.  Thousands  of  volunteers  were 
enhsted,  the  Hungarians  were  called  upon  for  assistance,  and 
preparations  made  for  the  defence  of  Vienna  before  the  plenipo- 
tentiaries were  sent  by  the  minister  to  Leoben. 

Here,  at  the  Chateau  Gocss,  were  carried  on  the  negotiations 
between  General  IMcrvcldt  and  Marquis  Gallo,  representing 
Austria,  and  Bonaparte,  in  which  the  latter  made  the  astounding 
offer  of  the  Venetian  mainland  in  exchange  for  Milan  and  Bel- 
gium. The  proposal  made  a  sensation  at  Vienna.  Importuned 
by  both  Court  and  nobility  to  make  peace,  unsupported  by 
Russia,  deluded  by  England,  whence  he  had  been  led  to  expect  a 
fleet  in  the  Adriatic  in  addition  to  considerable  subsidies,  and 
convinced  of  Prussia's  determination  to  extend  her  borders,  the 
outlook  was  indeed  unpromising  and  Thugut  reluctantly  yielded. 
The  acquisition  of  the  long-desired  territory  seemed  in  a  measure 
to  indemnify  his  countiy  for  the  losses  she  was  sustaining;  there 
still  remained  to  her  a  firm  foothold  on  Italian  soil,  and  at  the  first 
favourable  opportunity  the  lost  preponderance  might  be  re- 
gained. But  argeemcnt  became  more  difficult  when  Napoleon 
introduced  his  demand  for  the  relinquishment  of  i\Iodena.  It 
was  clear  that  his  intention  was  to  restrain  Austrian  influence  in 
Italy  within  the  Une  traced  by  the  river  OgUo,  or,  if  possible,  to 
make  the  Adige  the  boundary  of  the  dominion  of  Francis  II. 
Thugut,  on  the  contraiy,  sought  to  preserve  Modena  to  its  prince 
and  the  House  of  Habsburg,  and  to  establish  a  boundary  line  to 
the  poUtical  power  of  France  which  should  extend  from  Lake  Iseo 
along  the  OgUo  to  the  Po,  and  then  should  follow  the  valley  of 
the  Enza,  and  strike  the  coast  near  Massa  and  Carrara,  thus 
cutting  off  the  peninsula  from  the  territory  of  the  Republic. 
But  Austria  failed  to  secure  her  point  in  this  diplomatic  contro- 


loo  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

versy;  Modena  had  to  be  yielded  and  remained  a  portion  of  the 
Repubhc.  On  April  18th,  1797,  the  compact  was  signed  in  the 
Eggenwald  Garden  at  Leoben.  It  was  merely  a  preliminary 
convention,  containing  indeed  the  principles  of  agreement,  but 
capable  of  modification  in  regard  to  sundry  points  when  the  final 
treaty  should  be  ratified.  According  to  its  secret  articles  Austria 
was  to  cede  Milan  and  the  Duchy  of  Modena  to  the  newly- 
created  Republic  of  Lombardy,  while  Belgium  was  to  be  given  to 
France;  Austria  was,  on  the  other  hand,  to  acquire  the  mainland 
of  Venice  as  far  as  the  Oglio,  besides  its  dependencies  (Istria  and 
Dalmatia)  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic,  for  which  Venice 
was  to  be  indemnified  by  the  bestowal  of  the  three  former  papal 
legations,  Bologna,  Ferrara,  and  Romagna. 

At  the  very  moment  when  Napoleon  was  putting  his  signa- 
ture to  the  contract  which  ended  hostilities,  Hoche  was  winning  a 
momentous  victory  from  the  Austrians  on  the  Rhine,  which  he 
followed  up  by  penetrating  deep  into  the  country  of  the  Germans. 
But  these  victories  came  too  late.  Bonaparte  had  rendered  them 
fruitless,  that  is,  provided  that  the  Directory  were  willing  to 
ratify  a  treaty  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  had  been  totally 
unauthorized  to  make.  In  a  letter  accompanying  the  papers 
he  had  artfully  laid  stress  upon  the  merely  preliminary  character 
of  the  agreement,  and  laid  at  Austria's  door  the  initiative  in  the 
detestable  Venetian  business  which  had  in  reality  been  his  own 
work.  The  government,  thus  misled,  and  desirous  of  remain- 
ing upon  friendly  terms  with  the  mighty  General,  raised  no  objec- 
tion and  ratified  the  treaty  making  the  one  stipulation  that  no 
further  steps  were  to  be  taken  against  Venice,  inasmuch  as  the 
transaction  which  had  been  proposed  was  in  violation  of  the  prin- 
ciples that  a  people  should  have  the  right  to  determine  their 
own  future.  The  exhortation  came  too  late.  One  week  before, 
on  the  3d  of  May,  Napoleon  had  declan^d  war  on  the  Senate  of  the 
island  city.  He  had  deemed  it  quite  unnecessary  to  inform  the 
Directory  that  he  had  midertaken  in  Leoben  to  obtain  the 
Venetian  territory  for  Austria,  and  for  this  cause  would  open 
hostilities  against  the  Republic  of  San  Marco  immediately  upon 
the  conclusion  of  the  treaty. 


^T.  27]         Napoleon's   Designs  on   Venice  loi 

The  pretext  for  this  he  had  long  been  holding  in  readiness. 
In  spite  of  his  statements  to  the  contrary,  it  may  safely  be 
assumed  that  Napoleon  before  invading  Austria  had  organized 
in  the  Venetian  cities  also  a  democratic  revolution  against  the 
aristocratic  rule  of  that  state.    The  "Patriots"  rose  in  revolt. 
The  unlooked-for  result  was  that  the  peasantry,  who  were  friendly 
to  the  government,  turned  upon  the  insurgents,  and  a  number 
of  French  soldiers,  who  had  openly  taken  part  in  the  uprising, 
were  killed.     Thus  in  Verona  there  occurred  a  counter-revolution 
which  cost  the  lives  of  many  democrats  and  Frenchmen,  and  it 
was  quelled  only  by  the  energetic  intervention  of  the  French 
garrison.     Two  days  later  there  took  place  in  the  harbour  of 
Venice  a  fight  between  a  French  and  a  Venetian  war-ship  in 
which  the  captain  of  the  former  was  killed.     Thereupon  fol- 
lowed   Napoleon's   declaration   of   war   against   the    Doge.     A 
democratic  uprising  in  the  city  openly  supported  by  a  French 
Charge  d'Affaires    contributed    largely    toward    increasing   the 
disturbance.     On  May  15th  the  "Great  Council"  was  forced  to 
abdicate  and  a  provisional  government  was  set  up  by  the  "Pa- 
triots," who  at  once  disbanded  such  troops  as  the  government 
still  had  at  its  disposal  and  came  to  an  agreement  with  Napo- 
leon according  to  which  that  general,  in  return  for  a  consideration 
of  5,000,000  francs  and  a  number  of  war-ships,  promised  to  cease 
hostilities  and  to  give  the  Republic  the  protection  of  his  arms 
(May  16th,  1797).     How  little  in  earnest  he  was  with  this  promise 
of  protection  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  within  a  few^  days  he 
offered  to  the  Marquis  Gallo,  who  had  been  sent  by  Thugut  to 
Milan  to  conduct  negotiations  for  the  final  treaty,  to  surrender 
to  Austria  the  city  of  Venice  in  addition  to  the  mainland  territory, 
on  condition  that  the  Austrian  boundary  line  be  receded  from 
the  Oglio  to  the  Adige  (May  24th,  1797).     In  order  to  reassure 
the  Venetians,  he  wrote,  two  days  later,  to  the  new  nmnicipality: 
"Whatever  the  circumstances,  I  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  give 
proof  of  my  warm  desire  to  see  your  liberty  confirmed  and  to  see 
unhappy  Italy  at  length  take  her  place  with  glory,  free  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  foreign  powers,  upon  the  world's  stage,  to  resume 
among  the  great  nations  the  rank  to  which  she  is  entitled  by 


I02  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

nature,  position,  and  destiny.  .  .  .  Venice  has  the  only  popu- 
lation worthy  of  the  blessing  of  liberty."  Directly  contradic- 
tory to  all  of  these  statements  was  his  report  to  the  Directory 
written  on  the  following  day,  which  reads:  "Venice,  which  has 
been  in  process  of  decay  ever  since  the  discovery  of  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  and  the  rise  of  Triest  and  Ancona,  can  but  with 
difficulty  survive  the  blows  which  we  have  just  dealt  her.  This 
is  a  wretched,  cowardly  people,  entirely  unfit  for  liberty,  without 
land  and  under  water;  it  seems  but  natural  that  they  should  be 
turned  over  to  those  to  whom  we  are  giving  the  mainland.  We 
shall  take  all  their  ships,  we  shall  despoil  the  arsenal,  carry  off 
all  their  cannon,  and  destroy  their  bank.  Corfu  and  Ancona  we 
will  reserve  for  ourselves."  The  haughty  city  was  to  be  bled  ere 
her  carcass  should  be  delivered  over  to  Austria. 

It  was  questionable  whether  the  Court  of  Vienna,  which 
desired  above  all  things  to  acquire  the  three  papal  legations, 
would  accept  the  new  proposals  made  by  Napoleon.  But 
meanwhile  affairs  in  Paris  were  assuming  an  aspect  which  of  neces- 
sity affected  Bonaparte's  attitude.  In  these  affairs  he  was  per- 
sonally concerned,  and  in  consequence  they  reacted  upon  foreign 
relations. 

The  elections  of  April,  1797,  had  resulted,  as  was  to  have 
been  foreseen,  in  an  outcome  entirely  unfavourable  to  the 
Directory,  giving  the  Moderates  a  majority  in  the  Councils 
both  of  the  Five  Hundred  and  of  the  Ancients.  A  new  Director 
was  also  to  be  appointed  at  this  time.  The  choice  fell  upon 
Barthclcmy,  who  with  Carnot,  likewise  a  Moderate,  formed  a 
Conservative  minority  in  opposition  to  Barras,  Rewbcll,  and 
Larevclliere.  Consequently  from  this  time  the  democratic- 
Jacobin  element  prevailed  in  the  Directory,  while  the  Conserva- 
tives and  Royalists  controlled  the  legislature.  The  antagonism 
grew  fiercer  from  day  to  day  and  a  clash  was  inevitable.  One 
day  the  opposing  majority  would  spring  an  attack  on  the 
wretched  financial  policy  of  the  government,  which  with  diffi- 
culty continued  its  existence  despite  a  double  bankruptcy; 
next  day  its  dealings  with  jiricsts  aiul  6migr6s  would  be  arraigned, 
then   its   colonial    administration,    its    commercial    policy,    and 


;Et.  27]    Napoleon   Supports   the    Directory  103 

finally  its  foreign  policy,  which  was  more  and  more  clearly  re- 
vealing its  character  of  revolutionary  propagandism,  whose 
acknowledged  aim  was  to  make  Europe  republican.  The 
Directory  was  openly  accused  of  prosecuting  an  endless  war 
because  it  could  not  maintain  the  troops  at  home.  The  suicide 
of  several  naval  officers,  who  took  their  lives  because  they  were 
unable  to  procure  food,  produced  a  deep  impression.  The 
proceedings  in  Italy  were  censured  with  especial  severity,  and 
particularly  the  dealings  against  Venice.  The  Directory  was 
accused  by  the  right  wing  of  the  opposition  of  declaring  war 
without  securing  consent  of  the  legislature  as  the  Constitution 
demanded,  and  of  interfering,  equally  unconstitutionally,  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  foreign  states,  thus  systematically  pre- 
venting the  settlement  of  a  definitive  peace. 

Bonaparte,  who  felt  himself  personally  implicated  in  these 
charges,  espoused  the  cause  of  the  majority  of  the  Directory 
against  the  majority  of  the  legislature.  On  July  14th,  in  honour 
of  the  anniversary  of  the  storming  of  the  Bastille,  he  issued  a 
manifesto  to  his  army  which  contained  a  formal  declaration  of 
war  against  the  adversaries  of  his  party.  The  opposition  thus 
menaced  was  composed  in  part  of  royalists,  and  these  were 
detested  by  the  republican  armies  chiefly  on  account  of  the 
Emigres.  "Soldiers,"  said  he,  "I  see  that  you  are  profoundly 
affected  by  the  misfortunes  which  threaten  your  country;  but 
the  country  cannot  undergo  any  real  dangers.  The  same  men 
who  have  made  her  triumphant  over  Europe  in  coalition  are 
at  hand.  Mountains  separate  us  from  France,  but  you  would 
clear  these  with  the  rapidity  of  the  eagle  if  necessary  to  uphold 
the  Constitution,  to  defend  liberty  and  protect  the  government 
and  republicans.  Soldiers,  the  government  keeps  watch  over 
the  laws  which  are  entrusted  to  its  custody.  The  Royalists 
will  cease  to  exist  from  the  moment  that  they  show  themselves. 
Let  us  not  be  disquieted  and  let  us  swear  by  the  spirits  of  the 
heroes  who  have  died  beside  us  in  the  cause  of  liberty,  let  us 
swear  upon  our  new  banners,  implacable  war  to  all  enemies  of 
the  Republic  and  of  the  Constitution  of  the  year  III!"  This 
summons  found  an  echo  in  every  garrison  of  his  army,  and  in 


I04  The   Campaigns   in    Italy  [1797 

the  other  armies  as  well,  and  sundry  detachments  affirmed  their 
loyal  devotion  to  the  Republic  in  addresses  to  the  Directory. 
In  addition  Bonaparte  composed  a  number  of  memorials  which, 
in  a  way  as  masterly  as  it  was  false,  were  intended  to  justify 
his  course  in  relation  to  Venice.  "  I  forewarn  you,"  he  vocifer- 
ates to  the  orators  of  the  opposition,  "and  I  speak  in  the  name 
of  80,000  men,  that  the  day  is  past  when  cowardly  lawyers  and 
wretched  babblers  sent  soldiers  to  the  guillotine!"  And  he 
was  not  the  man  to  content  himself  with  words.  He  sent  one 
of  his  generals,  Augereau,  to  Paris  bearing  the  addresses  of  the 
divisions,  and  put  him  at  the  disposal  of  Barras  and  his  two 
colleagues  for  their  defence  in  case  of  need.  Hardly  had  he 
arrived  before  he  was  put  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Interior.  Besides  this  Napoleon  rendered  the  three  Directors 
another  and  peculiar  service.  In  Venice  one  of  the  principal 
agents  of  the  Bourbons,  the  Comte  d'Antraigues,  had  fallen 
into  Napoleon's  hands,  and  in  conversation  with  him  the  count 
made  disclosures  concering  Pichegru's  relations  with  the  Bourbon 
Prince  de  Conde  in  1795.  Such  revelations  were  now  the  more 
valuable  since  Pichegru  had  become  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
majority  and  President  of  the  "Five  Hundred."  By  means  of 
promises  or  threats  Napoleon  induced  d'Antraigues  to  commit 
these  statements  to  paper,  and  before  long  this  writing  found 
its  way  to  Paris,  where  it  served  the  three  Directors  as  an  effec- 
tive means  and  ostensible  reason  for  a  Coup  d'Etat  by  means  of 
which  they  rid  themselves  on  September  4th,  1797  (18th  Fruc- 
tidor),  first  of  their  two  colleagues  Carnot  and  liarthelemy  and 
then  of  a  considerable  number  of  conservative  deputies.  The 
vacant  places  in  the  Directory  were  filled  by  two  men  of  con- 
firmed democratic  principles,  Merlin  de  Doiiai  and  Frangois  de 
Neufchateau.  The  attempt  had  been  successful  in  every  par- 
ticular. As  justification  for  it  Pichegru's  alleged  treason  was 
made  public,  liut  the  real  victor  of  Fructidor  was  Bonaparte, 
exactly  as  he  had  been  on  the  1.3th  Vendemiaire.  There  is  m 
truth  warrantable  doubt  whether,  in  giving  his  support  to  the 
Directory,  he  had  desired  that  affairs  should  assume  this  aspect, 
whether  his  intention  was  not  simply  to  overthrow  Pichegru. 


Mt.2s]      Napoleon   on   the    i8th   Fructidor         105 

It  is  possible  that  Augcreau  coniproniised  him  more  deeply 
than  was  necessary  in  regard  to  his  designs.  That  at  least 
would  appear  to  be  the  case  judging  by  the  M^moires  of  Barante 
recently  published.  But  in  face  of  the  accomplished  fact,  in 
order  to  remain  master,  he  was  obliged  to  lay  claim  to  the  victory 
for  himself  and  his  army,  and  this  he  publicly  did  in  a  bulletin 
issued  on  the  22d  of  September,  the  anniversary  of  the  birth 
of  the  Republic.  Therein  occurs  this  passage:  "Soldiers,  far 
from  your  native  land  and  victorious  over  Europe,  chains  were 
being  prepared  for  you;  you  knew  it,  you  spoke,  the  people 
roused  itself  and  secured  the  traitors,  and  already  they  are  in 
fetters." 

He  was  more  than  ever  in  favour  with  the  government. 
Augereau,  who  had  supposed  himself  the  ruling  power  in  the 
Coup  d'Etat,  though  he  was  in  reality  but  the  undiscerning  tool, 
was  put  out  of  the  way  by  his  appointment  as  Commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  Hoche,  the  Corsican  general's 
only  rival  worthy  of  mention,  died  just  at  this  time  of  an 
acute  pulmonary  disease,  though  the  report  then  current  that 
his  death  was  due  to  poison  seemed  all  too  probable.  The 
Army  of  the  Alps  was  united  with  that  of  Italy  and  Napoleon's 
forces  thus  very  considerably  increased.  The  Royalists  were 
vanquished,  the  Moderates  condemned  to  inaction,  and  the 
new  Directory,  which  was  under  obligation  to  the  General, 
avoided  any  resolute  opposition  to  his  wishes.  His  ambition 
no  longer  knew  any  bounds.  Some  years  later  he  said,  in  con- 
versation with  Madame  de  Remusat:  "It  has  been  said  of  me 
as  a  reproach  that  I  facilitated  the  events  of  the  18th  Fructidor. 
They  might  as  well  reproach  me  for  having  upheld  the  Revolu- 
tion. Advantage  had  to  be  taken  of  that  Revolution,  some 
profit  derived  from  the  blood  which  it  had  caused  to  flow. 
What!  consent  to  yield  unconditionally  to  the  princes  of  the  House 
of  Bourbon,  who  would  have  thrown  in  our  faces  the  calamities 
which  we  have  suffered  since  their  departure,  and  imposed 
silence  upon  us  by  pointing  to  the  need  which  we  had  shown 
of  their  return!  Exchange  our  victorious  banner  for  that  white 
flag  w^hich  had  not  feared  to  take  its  place  amid  the  standards 


1 06  The   Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

of  the  enemy;  and  finally  I  myself  be  content  with  some  millions 
and  with  some  dukedom  or  other!  *  Of  a  surety,  the  part 
played  by  Monk  is  not  a  difficult  one;  it  would  have  cost  me 
less  trouble  than  the  Egyptian  campaign  or  than  the  18th  Bru- 
maire;  most  certainly  I  should  have  found  a  way,  if  there  had 
been  need  for  it,  to  dethrone  the  Bourbons  a  second  time,  and 
the  best  advice  which  could  have  been  given  them  would  have 
been  to  rid  themselves  of  me." 

How  well  this  avowal  accords  with  what  attentive  observers 
say  of  him  in  that  same  year !  One  of  his  old  friends,  Sucy,  the 
Commissioner  of  War,  writes  in  August,  1797:  "I  know  for 
him  no  halting-point  other  than  the  throne  or  the  scaffold." 
And  the  before-mentioned  Comte  d'Antraigues  says  in  a  report 
made  that  September:  "This  man  means  to  subjugate  France 
and,  through  France,  Europe.  .  .  .  Were  there  a  king  in  France 
other  than  himself,  he  would  wish  to  have  enthroned  him,  and 
that  the  royal  authority  should  rest  upon  the  point  of  his  own 
sword,  from  which  sword  he  would  never  be  separated  so  that 
he  might  plunge  it  into  the  heart  of  his  sovereign  should  that 
monarch  for  a  moment  cease  to  be  subservient  to  his  will." 

Was  this  calumny  or  exaggeration?  Neither  one  nor  the 
other.  Napoleon  himself  made  some  strange  confidences  to 
Melzi  and  Miot  in  June,  1797,  before  the  Coup  d'Etat  of  Fruc- 
tidor:  "Do  you  suppose  that  I  gain  victories  to  increase  the 
glory  of  the  lawyers  in  the  Directory,  for  Carnot,  or  for  Barras? 
Have  you  the  impression  that  I  have  any  thoughts  of  establish- 
ing a  Republic?  What  an  absurd  idea!  A  RepubUc  of  30,- 
000,000  souls!  And  with  our  customs  and  our  vices?  How 
would  such  a  thing  be  possible?  .  .  .  The  nation  wants  a  chief- 
tain covered  with  glory,  and  cares  nothing  for  theories  of  gov- 

*  Bonaparte,  like  Pichegru,  had  been  approached  by  agents  of  the 
Bourbons.  The  claimant  to  the  throne  had  even  written  him  a  letter  in 
his  own  hand,  and  in  December,  1796,  he  was  promised  the  title  of  Duke, 
the  hereditary  viceroyalty  of  Corsica,  and  the  baton  of  a  Marshal  of 
France  on  condition  lliat.  he  would  declare  himself  for  tlu>  hereditary 
monarchy  Thcsi!  short -sigiited  conspirators  had  indeed  no  idea  that 
wliat  they  thus  offered  him  had  long  ceased  to  be  sufficient  to  curb  Napo- 
leon's ambition. 


Mt.  28]  His   Characterization   of  the   ItaHans      107 

eminent,  fine  words,  or  dreams  of  idealists,  none  of  which  the 
French  understand.  .  .  ,"  No  one  questioned  who  was  to  be 
this  chieftain,  for  already  his  outward  bearing  gave  evidence 
of  his  independent  power.  He  held  court,  like  a  prince,  in  his 
villa  of  Montebello  in  the  vicinity  of  Milan.  There,  like  a 
prince,  he  received  ambassadors  from  Austria,  Naples,  and 
Piedmont.  He  even  took  his  repasts  in  public  with  a  few 
privileged  persons,  exhibiting  himself  to  the  gaze  of  the  curious 
as  was  customary  with  monarchs.  And  like  a  monarch  he 
now  negotiated  the  final  treaty  of  peace  with  Austria,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  designs  and  in  no  wise  in  accordance  with  the 
intentions  of  the  government  at  Paris.  The  latter  did  indeed 
attempt  to  make  Bonaparte  follow  the  line  of  conduct  prescribed 
by  its  democratic  doctrinairism,  to  force  him  to  revolutionize  all 
Italy,  and  to  exclude  the  Emperor  completely.  But  he  rejected 
this  demand  as  impracticable  with  so  much  decision,  and  with 
the  threat  of  his  own  abdication  in  case  of  persistence  in  it, 
that  there  remained  to  the  Directory  no  choice  but  to  let  him 
follow  his  own  inchnations.  In  the  letters  which  he  addressed 
to  the  Foreign  Office  at  the  capital  he  assumes  throughout  a 
superior  and  didactic  tone.  In  one  of  the  most  noteworthy, 
dated  October  7th,  1797,  and  addressed  to  Talleyrand,  the 
newly-appointed  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  he  says:  "You 
but  little  know  these  Italians.  They  are  not  worthy  that 
40,000  Frenchmen  should  be  killed  for  them.  I  see  by  your 
letters  that  you  are  acting  upon  a  mistaken  presumption;  you 
imagine  that  the  possession  of  liberty  will  bring  about  the 
accomplishment  of  great  deeds  by  a  people  effeminate  and 
superstitious,  buffoons  and  cowards.  .  .  .  The  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  our  nation  is  to  be  far  too  rash  in  time  of  pros- 
perity. If,  as  the  basis  of  all  our  dealings,  we  make  use  of  true 
pohcy,  which  is  nothing  else  than  the  reckoning  of  combinations 
and  chances,  we  shall  for  a  long  time  be  the  great  nation  and 
arbiter  of  Europe.  More  than  that:  we  hold  the  balance  of 
Europe;  we  will  make  it  incline  according  to  our  wishes,  and, 
should  it  be  the  will  of  fate,  I  see  no  reason  why  it  should  be 
impossible  for  us  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  to  attain  even  to 


io8  The  Campaigns  in   Italy  1797 

those  great  results  already  dimly  seen  by  the  heated  and  enthu- 
siastic imagination,  and  which  only  the  extremely  cool,  per- 
severing, and  rational  man  may  ever  hope  to  reach." 

It  was  soon  to  be  the  turn  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  to  feel 
this  pre-eminence  and  superior  bearing  of  Bonaparte.  Thugut 
had  expressed  a  readiness  to  deviate  from  the  stipulations  of 
the  preliminary  convention  of  April,  his  intention  being,  of 
course,  to  add  to  Austria's  territory  in  Italy  through  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  Legations.  But  in  this  he  failed.  Napoleon,  to 
be  sure,  had  wilUngly  consented  to  the  alteration  of  the  former 
treaty,  but  only  in  order  to  reduce  still  further  the  influence  of 
Austria.  It  was  to  gain  this  point  that  he  had  in  May  offered 
the  city  of  Venice  with  the  Adige  as  a  boundary.  Thugut  had 
at  once  rejected  this  proposal.  But  in  vain  he  prolonged  the 
negotiations  for  months,  evidently  in  the  hope  that  a  victory 
of  the  Moderates  in  Paris  would  also  bring  about  a  more  con- 
servative foreign  policy  in  France;  in  vain  he  sent  to  Udine  to 
treat  with  Bonaparte,  Count  Louis  Cobenzl,  the  ablest  diplomat 
in  the  service  of  the  Emperor;  in  September  the  situation  was 
such  that,  in  view  of  the  isolation  of  Austria  and  the  supremacy 
of  the  peace  party  at  court,  not  even  the  terms  offered  at  Leoben 
could  be  insisted  upon,  and  those  now  proposed  by  their  ad- 
versary had  to  be  accepted.  It  was  at  the  end  of  a  series  of 
stormy  sessions  that  the  final  treaty  was  at  length  concluded. 
Bonaparte  used  all  the  resources  of  his  temperament  for  the 
purpose  of  influencing  the  Austrian  envoy;  he  flattered,  he 
cajoled  him  with  seductive  promises,  he  threatened  and  insulted 
him.  Once,  upon  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  Cobenzl  to  some  pro- 
posal, Napoleon  was  seized  with  a  veritable  paroxysm  of  fury; 
snatching  up  a  porcelain  vase,  he  hurled  it  to  the  floor  and 
rushed  out  of  the  room,  cursing  and  shrieking;  a  scene  similar 
to  those  which,  in  later  years,  he  repeatedly,  and  not  without 
premeditation,  enacted  in  the  presence  of  the  envoys  of  foreign 
powers.  At  last,  on  October  17th,  1797,  after  two  occasions 
upon  which  negotiations  were  on  the  verge  of  being  completely 
broken  off,  the  definitive  treaty  was  signed  at  Passariano,  near 
Udine,  though  the  paper  was  dated  Campo  Formio.     Belgium 


jEt.  28]      The  Treaty  of  Campo   Formio  1 09 

and  the  Ionian  Isles  were  to  belong  to  France,  while  Austria 
received  the  city  of  Venice  and  the  mainland  of  that  republic 
as  far  as  the  Adige  and  southward  from  this  river  the  district 
between  the  Bianco  Canal  and  the  main  branch  of  the  Po.  The 
territories  of  Mantua,  Milan,  Bergamo,  Brescia,  Modena,  and 
the  three  Legations  were  collectively  to  constitute  the  Cisalpine 
Repubhc.  The  Duke  of  Modena  was  to  receive  the  Austrian 
Breisgau  as  indemnity  for  his  former  possessions.  Austria, 
which,  in  addition  to  the  Breisgau,  was  obliged  to  surrender 
the  county  of  Falkenstein  and  the  Frickthal  in  the  Aargau 
was  to  receive  in  compensation  the  archbishopric  of  Salzburg 
together  with  that  portion  of  Bavaria  lying  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Inn,  and  France  engaged  to  sustain  these  claims  in  behalf 
of  the  Emperor.  In  return  for  this  Austria  promised  her 
friendly  intervention  in  the  treaty  yet  to  be  concluded  with 
the  Empire,  whereby  France  was  to  obtain  the  long-desired 
Rhenish  boundary-line  between  Basel  and  Andernach.  The 
affairs  of  the  German  Empire  were  to  be  regulated  at  a  special 
congress  soon  to  assemble  at  Rastatt.  The  German  princes 
whose  lands  might  be  encroached  upon  were  to  receive  com- 
pensation in  territory  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  In 
token  of  his  good  faith  the  Emperor  at  once  put  the  French  in 
possession  of  the  commanding  fortress  of  Mainz. 

The  tidings  that  peace  had  been  concluded  brought  boundless 
joy  at  Vienna  among  the  people  at  large  as  well  as  at  the  court. 
Only  a  few  clear-sighted  statesmen,  Thugut  especially,  deplored 
the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  as  a  misfortune  to  the  monarchy, 
and  had  no  faith  in  the  durabiUty  of  the  situation  thus  brought 
about.  The  Emperor  had  consented  to  the  diminution  of  the 
territory  of  the  Empire  and  had  expressed  his  willingness  to 
annex  to  his  own  the  domain  of  an  ecclesiastical  prince  when  it 
was  precisely  these  ecclesiastical  States  of  the  Empire  upon 
which  the  House  of  Habsburg  most  depended  for  its  hold  on 
the  imperial  crowTi.  If  only  Austria  could  have  gainetl  the 
longed-for  increase  of  power,  there  would  have  been  some  con- 
solation, but  instead  she  had  been  driven  inexorably  backward 
toward  the  East. 


iio  The  Campaigns  in   Italy  [1797 

Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  had  every  reason  to  contemplate 
his  achievement  with  satisfaction.  It  is  said  that  on  the  day 
that  the  treaty  was  signed  he  gave  unreserved  expression  to  his  joy 
and  showed  the  Austrian  ambassador  a  charming  amiability  of 
manner  which  was  as  much  at  command  of  his  talent  as  an  actor 
as  had  been  his  former  anger  and  violence.  To  him  personally 
the  failure  to  reach  a  conclusion  through  these  negotiations 
would  have  entailed  the  undesired  discomfort  of  a  winter  cam- 
paign in  the  inhospitable  Alpine  regions,  with  the  possibility  in 
the  mean  time  that  the  decisive  victory  might  be  gained  elsewhere 
by  another,  while  their  successful  termination  enabled  him  to 
carry  out  the  vast  designs  which  he  had  been  maturing  during 
the  course  of  the  summer — designs  which,  for  their  world-em- 
bracing extent  and  clear  conception  of  purpose,  have  rarely  been 
equalled  in  the  mind  of  a  human  being. 


©HAPTER  VI 
EGYPT 

When  Napoleon,  under  the  guise  of  a  faithful  ally,  concluded 
the  treaty  with  the  new  government  of  Venice,  his  object  was  not 
merely  to  secure  a  compensation  which  he  could  dehver  to  Austria; 
he  reserved  to  France  a  portion  of  the  Venetian  inheritance :  the 
position  of  the  ancient  Republic  as  a  power  in  the  Orient  was  to 
descend  to  the  French.  In  May,  1797,  Bonaparte  sent  General 
Gentili,  a  French  officer,  with  a  Venetian  fleet  to  occupy  the  Ionian 
Isles,  whose  population  joyfully  received  the  emissary  of  the 
illustrious  general  as  their  deliverer  from  the  oppressive  rule  of  the 
I.ion  of  St.  Mark.  He  had  thus  taken  a  momentous  step  toward 
the  Orient,  where  he  saw  extended  a  vast  field  for  the  develop- 
ment of  French  influence  and  his  own  ambition,  provided  that 
they  could  be  made  to  coincide.  As  long  before  as  the  previous 
May  he  had  insisted  that  France  must  retain  Corfu.  "Corfu  and 
Zante,"  he  afterward  wrote  to  Talleyrand,  "make  us  masters  of 
the  Adriatic  and  of  the  Levant.  It  is  useless  for  us  to  attempt 
to  sustain  the  Turkish  Empire ;  we  shall  see  its  downfall  within 
our  own  times;  the  occupation  of  these  four  beautiful  Ionian 
islands  will  put  us  in  a  position  to  support  it  or  to  secure  a  portion 
for  ourselves."  It  was  in  accordance  with  this  scheme  that  he 
by  means  of  clever  agents  established  relations  for  himself  from 
the  Ionian  Islands  with  the  Greeks,  the  Mainotes,  and  the  Pashas 
of  Janina.  Scutari,  and  Bosnia.  And  already  his  far-seeing  eye 
had  discovered  new  objects  for  his  activity.  It  had  long  been  a 
part  of  the  policy  of  France  to  cut  off  England's  commimication 
with  India,  and  to  this  end  to  secure  as  much  foothold  as  possible 
in  the  Mediterranean. 

It  was  on  this  account  that,  upon  the  departure  of  the  English 
fleet  from  those  waters  in  1796,  Napoleon  had  had  Corsica  re- 


1  1 2  Egypt  [1797 

occupied  by  General  Gentili,*  and  for  the  same  reason  also,  during 
the  ensuing  spring,  similar  proceedings  were  carried  out  against 
Genoa  as  had  been  instituted  against  Venice,  and  on  June  5th, 
1797,  a  treaty  was  concluded  making  France  the  absolute  master 
of  the  "Ligurian  Republic,"  which  now  received  a  new  demo- 
cratic constitution.     Finally,  on  the  16th  of  August,  1797,  he 
wrote  to  the  Directory:  "The  time  is  not  far  distant  when  we 
shall  feel  that  in  order  to  really  disable  England  we  must  possess 
ourselves  of  Egypt.     The  Vast  Ottoman  Empire,  which  is  rapidly 
crumbling  into  decay,  makes  it  our  imperative  duty  to  take 
prompt  measures  for  protecting  our  Eastern  commerce."     With 
a  single  bound  his  thought  traverses  the  space  which  intervenes 
between  him  and  the  land  of  the  Pharaohs.     On  the  13th  of 
September  he  writes  to  Talleyrand:  "Why  should  we  not  possess 
ourselves  of  the  island  of  Malta?    Admiral  Brucys  might  readily 
anchor  there  and  take  possession  of  it.     Four  hundred  knights 
and  a  regiment  of  five  hundred  men  constitute  the  entire  garrison 
of  the  city  of  La  Vallette.     The  people  there  are  much  inclined 
toward  us  and  much  out  of  conceit  with  their  knight'^,  who  have 
no  means  of  subsistence  and  are  dying  of  starvation.     I  had  all 
their  property  in  Italy  confiscated  on  purpose.     With  the  island 
of  St.  Pierre,  which  the  King  of  Sardinia  has  ceded  to  us,  Malta, 
Corfu,  etc.,  we  shall  be  masters  of  the  whole  Mediterranean.     If 
it  should  prove  necessary  for  us  to  give  up  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
when  the  time  comes  for  us  to  make  our  peace  with  England,  we 
must  take  possession  of  Egypt.     One  could  start  from  here  with 
25,000  men  escorted  by  eight  or  ten  ships  of  the  line  or  Venetian 
frigates.  .  .  .  Egypt  does  not  belong  to  the  Sultan.     I  should 
like  to  have  you  make  investigations  in  Paris  so  as  to  let  me 
know  what  the  consequences  of  our  Egyptian  expedition  would 
be  to  the  Porte." 

Talleyrand  eagerly  entered  into  the  projects  of  the  General,  his 
penetration  having  doubtless  recognized  the  future  master  under 

*  Napoleon   accorded   amnesty   to  the  Corsicans,   making  exception 
only  in  the  case  of  the  heads  of  those  families  who  had  ranged  themselves 
under  Paoli's  banner  against  him,  particularly  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Peraldi 
Bertholani,  and  others.       Pozzo  di   Borgo  remained  henceforth  his  foe 
And  implacable  adversary. 


^T.  28]         Napoleon's   Designs   on   Egypt  1 1  3 

this  exterior  of  brutal  superiority.  These  schemes  of  Napoleon's 
were  akin  to  conceptions  and  projects  of  his  own.  Before  the 
receipt  of  Napoleon's  letter,  he  had,  in  July,  1797,  read  a  paper 
before  the  members  of  the  National  Institute,  "8ur  les  avan- 
tages  k  rctirer  des  colonies  nouvelles  apres  les  r^'volutions,"  in 
which  he  directed  attention  to  Egypt  and  claimed  for  Choiseul 
the  honour  of  being  the  first  to  conceive  the  idea.* 

Furthermore,  Magallon,  the  French  consul  at  Cairo,  had  for  a 
year  reiterated  in  his  reports  the  advantages  to  be  gained  from 
an  Egyptian  expedition.  For  these  reasons  Bonaparte's  pro- 
posals met  with  approval  on  the  part  of  the  minister,  who  entered 
into  the  plan  himself  and  furthered  it,  laying  stress  upon  the 
importance  of  French  supremacy  on  the  Mediterranean  and 
especially  upon  the  Nile.  In  fact  he  once  even  claimed  to  the 
Prussian  envoy  that  he  had  himself  been  the  instigator  of  the 
enterprise. 

It  may  reasonably  be  questioned  whether  at  this  time  Napo- 
leon had  the  intention  of  assuming  himself  the  leadership  of  this 
expedition.  It  was  quite  out  of  keeping  with  his  ambitious  plans 
to  undertake  such  an  adventure  in  a  distant  land  with  25,000 
men,  setting  at  stake  upon  an  uncertain  issue  the  glory  which  he 
had  so  rapidly  and  completely  won,  giving  up  his  position  of 

*  But  the  idea  was  an  older  one.  Leibniz  had  urged  the  same  upon 
Louis  XIV.  in  order  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  French  from  the 
Rhine.  In  1738  d'Argenson,  the  future  French  minister,  again  brought 
up  the  suggestion  and  counselled  the  piercing  of  the  Isthmus  of  Suez. 
Since  that  time  the  French  government  had  taken  up  the  question  a 
number  of  times.  Thus  in  1780  the  explorer  Sonnini  came  upon  a 
French  officer  in  Cairo  who  had  been  sent  to  study  the  possibility  of  mak- 
ing a  conquest  of  Egypt  and  a  way  thence  to  the  Indies.  P'ive  years  later 
the  question  was  again  under  discussion,  for  Emperor  Joseph  II.  assigned 
Egypt  to  France  in  his  plan  for  the  division  of  Turkey.  In  1795  and  1796 
emissaries  of  the  Republic  scoured  the  valley  of  the  Nile.  It  is,  moreover, 
a  certainty  that  Bonaparte  concerned  himself  about  Egypt  long  before 
1797.  He  had  in  1792  made  the  acquaintance  of  \'olney,  who  had  trav- 
elled throughout  the  Orient  and  had  published  five  years  before  his 
"Voyage  en  Syrie  et  Egypte."  Volney  had  an  estate  near  Ajaccio.  In 
his  "Considerations  sur  la  guerre  actuelle  desTurcs"  (1788),  the  idea 
of  a  French  expedition  to  Egypt  is  the  subject  of  detailed  study. 


I  1 4  Egypt  [1797 

power  in  France  and  relieving  the  Directory  at  so  small  a  price  of 
the  anxiety  caused  by  his  ambitious  efforts.  He  did  indeed  later 
conduct  the  expedition,  but  only  because  compelled  by  circum- 
stances unforeseen  in  the  autumn  of  1797.  For  the  conquest  of 
Egypt  was  but  a  single  link  in  the  chain  of  projects  whose  final 
aim  was  disclosed  in  a  proclamation  to  the  fleet:  "Comrades, 
when  we  shall  have  accomplished  our  task  of  pacifying  the  conti- 
nent we  shall  unite  ourselves  once  more  with  you  to  conquer  the 
Uberty  of  the  seas.  .  .  .  Without  you  we  could  carry  the 
glory  of  the  French  name  but  to  a  small  corner  of  the  continent. 
United  with  you  we  shall  cross  the  seas,  and  the  remotest  regions 
shall  behold  the  national  glory."  On  the  day  following  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  Austria  he  indicated  the  present  moment, 
in  a  letter  to  Talleyrand,  as  particularly  favourable  to  combat 
with  Great  Britain:  "Let  us  concentrate  all  our  activity  upon 
the  upbuilding  of  the  navy,  and  let  us  destroy  England.  That 
accomplished,  Europe  is  at  our  feet!"  Even  before  this  time 
the  Directory  had  taken  into  consideration  a  landing  on  the  Brit- 
ish coast  and  made  preparations  accordingly.  Bonaparte 
favoured  the  idea.  When  on  the  2d  of  November  he  was  in- 
formed in  Milan  of  the  ratification  of  the  Austrian  treaty  he  was 
notified  at  the  same  time  of  his  appointment  as  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Army  of  England.  He  at  once  directed  fifteen  demi- 
brigades  of  the  Italian  army  to  march  to  the  seacoast,  and  ordered 
cannon  cast  of  the  calibre  of  those  used  by  the  English,  "in  order 
to  be  able,  in  the  enemy's  country,  to  avail  one's  self  of  English 
projectiles." 

But  another  matter  concerned  him  far  more  deeply  than 
these  military  designs.  He  had  long  ceased  to  be  the  mere 
military  servitor  of  the  Directory.  His  whole  b(nng  was  ex- 
pressive of  the  determination  to  conquer  for  himself,  if  possible, 
a  leading  position  and,  if  such  a  thing  could  be  accomplished, 
to  exercise  in  the  government  at  the  heart  of  France  the  same 
power  which  ho  had  up  to  this  time  enjoyed  in  foreign  lands. 

November  17th,  1797,  he  left  his  headquarters  in  Milan  in 
order  to  betake  himself  to  Rastatt,  where  he  as  first  French 
plenipotentiary  was  to  negotiate  with  the  ambassadors  of  the 


jEt.  28]  Napoleon   in    Paris  1 1  ^ 

Emperor  the  treaty  with  the  Empire.  He  remained  but  a 
short  time  in  this  little  town  in  Baden, — where  he  occupied  the 
same  apartments  put  at  the  disposal  of  Villars  during  a  previous 
congress, — only  until  Cobenzl  arrived  and  he  had  signed  with 
him  the  agreement  concerning  the  surrender  of  Mainz,  Decem- 
ber 1st,  1797.  Then  on  the  same  evening  he  began  his  journey 
toward  Paris,  whither  Barras  in  his  capacity  of  chief  of  the 
Directory  had  bidden  him  and  whither  he  was  driven  by  his 
own  desire  of  profiting  by  the  fame  he  had  acquired. 

He  was  received  by  the  Directory  with  every  outward  token 
of  amity.  Fetes  were  given  for  him  at  the  Luxembourg  and 
at  the  Louvre,  whose  walls  were  adorned  with  the  works  of  art 
brought  as  plunder  from  Italy,  while  theatrical  performances 
and  similar  festivities  were  organized  in  his  honour.  Even 
the  populace  appeared  to  have  forgotten  its  mistrust  of  the  man 
of  the  13th  Vendemiaire,  and  saw  in  him  only  the  war  hero; 
interest  and  curiosity  at  least,  if  not  sympathy,  were  every- 
where manifest.  In  the  theatres  the  public  boisterously  de- 
manded a  sight  of  the  General  upon  learning  that  he  was  present; 
it  was  scarcely  possible  for  him  to  elude  such  ovations.  He 
was  elected  by  the  National  Institute  to  a  fife-membership  in 
that  body  in  the  place  of  Camot,  and  from  that  time  he  appeared 
only  in  the  ordinary  garb  of  the  scholar  by  way  of  demonstrating 
his  "civism."  In  fact  he  affected  a  complete  simpficity  of 
manner  and  conduct  which  must  have  been  irksome  to  a  man  so 
eager  for  glory.  He  lived  in  his  wife's  unpretentious  house  in 
the  Rue  Chantereme,  which  had  been  rechristened  Rue  de  la 
Victoire  in  his  honour;  the  many  attentions  bestowed  upon  him 
he  met  with  studied  reserve  and  rarely  showed  himself  in  pubfic. 
To  his  old  comrade  Bourrienne,  who  had  become  his  confidential 
secretary,  he  said:  "At  Paris  nothing  is  long  remembered. 
If  I  remain  inactive  for  any  considerable  time,  I  am  lost.  One 
celebrity  crowds  out  another  in  this  Babylon.  They  need  only 
to  see  me  three  times  at  the  theatre  to  pay  no  further  attention 
to  me,  and  I  shall  appear  there  but  seldom."  Upon  the  ob- 
servation of  Bourrienne  that  he  must  nevertheless  feel  flattered 
to  see  the  people  throng  thus  about  him,  he  replied:   "Pshaw I 


I  1 6  Egypt  [1797 

They  would  crowd  around  me  just  as  eagerly  if  I  were  on  my 
way  to  the  scaffold." 

Of  all  the  official  festivities  the  chief  event  was  the  splendid 
fete  given  in  his  honour  by  the  Directory  on  the  10th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1797,  at  which  he  was  to  dehver  to  them  the  treaty  of 
Campo  Formio  ratified  by  the  Emperor  Francis.  All  the  dis- 
tinguished people  and  high  officials  in  Paris  were  assembled 
that  day  in  the  great  salon  of  the  Palais  de  Luxembourg,  which 
was  magnificently  decorated.  Minister  Talleyrand  delivered 
the  official  address  in  which  he  lauded  Napoleon's  old-fashioned 
preference  for  simplicity,  his  predilection  for  the  sciences,  his 
contempt  for  vain  splendour.  "  All  these  quaUties,"  said  he,  "are 
to  us  the  surest  guarantee  that  he  will  never  allow  himself  to 
be  led  away  by  ambition."  The  audience  awaited  with  intense 
interest  Napoleon's  reply,  which  was  as  follows:  "The  French 
people,  in  order  to  be  free,  had  to  fight  against  kings.  To  obtain 
a  Constitution  founded  upon  reason,  it  had  to  overcome  the 
prejudices  of  eighteen  centuries.  The  Constitution  of  the 
year  III  (1795)  and  you  yourselves  have  vanquished  all  these 
obstacles.  Religion,  feudalism,  and  monarchy  have  in  turn 
governed  Europe  during  twenty  centuries;  but  from  the  peace 
which  you  have  just  concluded  dates  the  era  of  representative 
governments.  Success  has  attended  your  efforts  to  organize 
this  great  nation  whose  vast  territory  is  circumscribed  by  the 
confines  which  nature  herself  has  imposed.  You  have  done 
even  more.  The  two  fairest  countries  in  Europe,*  once  so 
celebrated  for  the  arts,  the  sciences,  and  the  great  men  of  which 
they  were  the  cradle,  now  see  with  the  brightest  hopes  the  spirit 
of  liberty  rising  from  the  tombs  of  their  ancestors.  These  are 
two  pedestals  upon  which  destiny  will  rear  two  powerful  nations. 
I  have  the  honour  to  deliver  to  you  the  treaty  signed  at  Campo 
Formio  and  ratified  by  his  majesty  the  Emperor.  .  .  .  When 
the  happiness  of  the  French  people  shall  be  established  upon 
the  best  organic  laws,  all  Europe  will  become  free." 

The  meaning  of  these  words  was  far  from  clear.  The  last 
phrase   especially    was    enigmatic.     Its   solution    was    vaguely 

*  Italy  and  Greece. 


iEr.  28]  Napoleon's   Political   Ideas  117 

divined  by  a  few,  while  the  remainder  of  his  auditors  exhausted 
themselves  in  conjecture.  Then  with  this  vaunted  Constitu- 
tion of  the  year  III  France  was  not  yet  "estabUshed  upon  the 
best  organic  laws"?  Far  from  it,  according  to  Napoleon's 
innermost  convictions.  Shortly  before  he  had  written  con- 
fidentially to  Talleyrand  upon  this  subject;  the  letter,  dated 
September  19th,  reads:  "The  organization  of  the  French  nation 
is  then  in  reahty  nothing  more  than  roughly  outlined.  In 
spite  of  our  conceit,  our  thousand  and  one  pamphlets,  and  our 
verbose  and  endless  harangues,  we  are  very  ignorant  in  pohtical 
science.  We  have,  as  yet,  no  definite  conception  of  what  is 
meant  by  executive,  legislative,  and  judiciary  power.  Mon- 
tesquieu has  given  us  misleading  definitions;  not  that  this 
celebrated  man  was  not  abundantly  able  to  give  us  what  we 
need,  but  his  work,  as  he  himself  says,  is  only  a  kind  of  analysis 
of  that  which  had  existed  or  was  then  in  existence;  it  is  a  sum- 
mary of  notes  made  during  his  travels  or  in  his  reading.  He 
fixed  his  eye  upon  the  government  of  England  and  defined  in 
a  general  way  executive,  legislative,  and  judiciary  power.  Why, 
indeed,  should  one  regard  as  an  attribute  of  the  legislative 
power  the  right  to  make  war  or  conclude  peace,  or  the  right  to 
fix  the  quantity  and  the  nature  of  taxfes?  The  English  Con- 
stitution has  very  reasonably  entrusted  one  of  these  attributes 
to  the  House  of  Commons,  and  this  was  an  excellent  step,  be- 
cause the  English  Constitution  is  simply  a  charter  of  privileges, 
it  is  a  black  ceiling  but  bordered  with  gold.  As  the  House  of 
Commons  is  the  only  body  which  actually  represents  the  people, 
it  alone  should  have  the  right  to  determine  this  question  of 
taxation;  it  is  the  only  discoverable  bulwark  against  the  des- 
potism and  insolence  of  courtiers.  But  in  a  government  where 
every  authority  emanates  from  the  nation,  where  the  sovereign 
is  the  people,  why  class  among  the  attributes  of  the  legislative 
power  things  which  are  foreign  to  it?  The  governmental  power, 
using  the  term  in  the  broadest  sense,  should  be  considered  as 
the  true  representative  of  the  nation,  and  this  should  govern 
in  accordance  with  the  written  constitution  and  organic  laws. 
This  governmental  power  appears  to  me  to  be  subdivided  natu- 


1 1 8  Egypt  ti^o? 

rally  into  two  very  distinct  jurisdictions,  one  of  which  should 
supervise  without  acting,  while  that  which  we  now  call  the 
executive  power  should  be  obliged  to  submit  to  the  former  all 
important  measures;  this,  if  I  may  be  permitted  the  expression, 
would  be  the  legislation  of  the  executive.  The  first  of  these 
bodies  would  be  in  fact  the  great  council  of  the  nation ;  it  would 
have  all  that  part  of  the  administration  or  of  the  executive 
which  according  to  our  Constitution  is  entrusted  to  the  legisla- 
tive power.  The  governmental  power  would  thus  be  vested 
in  two  magistracies  appointed  by  the  people,  one  of  them,  con- 
sisting of  a  large  number  of  men,  to  which  no  one  would  be 
eligible  who  had  not  already  held  some  office  which  would  have 
given  experience  in  state  affairs.  The  legislative  power  would 
in  the  first  place  make  all  the  organic  laws,  and  alter  them,  but 
not  in  the  course  of  two  or  three  days,  as  is  the  present  practice; 
for,  once  an  organic  law  has  been  made  operative,  according  to 
my  idea,  it  could  not  be  changed  without  five  or  six  months  of 
discussion.  This  legislative  power,  without  rank  in  the  Republic, 
impassive,  without  eyes  and  without  ears  for  its  surroundings, 
would  be  free  from  ambition  and  we  should  no  longer  be  inun- 
dated with  a  thousand  laws  passed  for  the  occasion  which  annul 
themselves  by  their  very  absurdity  and  which  make  us,  with 
three  hundred  folio  volumes  of  legislative  enactments,  a  nation 
without  laws." 

These  conceptions,  which  Napoleon  calls  his  "Code  Complet 
de  Politique,"  are  of  the  greatest  possible  interest.  They  demon- 
strate not  only  his  dissatisfaction  with  existing  circumstances, 
but  it  is  noticeable  also  that  no  word  escapes  him  relative  to  the 
nature  of  the  real  executive  power;  that  was,  and  should  remain 
for  the  present,  his  own  secret.  The  letter,  as  has  been  said,  was 
directed  to  Talleyrand ,  who  was  to  show  it  in  confidence  to  Sieyes, 
the  great  theorist  and  constitution-maker.  Both  of  these  men 
were  as  little  in  favour  of  the  Constitution  of  that  time  as  was 
Bonaparte  himself.  The  last  named  was  then  twenty-eight  years 
of  age,  and  Article  134,  to  the  effect  that  JJin^ctors  nuist  have 
reached  the  age  of  forty,  was  to  him  particularly  obnoxious.* 

*  According   to   Uu;  tesiimony  of  Prince  John  of  T>i("ch(cnstein,  who 


/Et.  2s]   The   Fall   of  the   Papal   Government      119 

It  needed  only  a  fav()ural)l('oi)portunity  to  bring  aljout  the  over- 
throw of  this  obstacle  to  his  further  progress.  Should  such  an 
one  present  itself  during  the  winter  of  1797-98  Napoleon  was 
prepared  to  make  a  Coup  d'Etat  against  Directory  and  Constitu- 
tion. When  in  the  midst  of  the  festivities  of  the  lOth  of  Decem- 
ber a  curious  spectator  fell  from  the  roof  of  the  palace  to  the 
groimd,  the  sad  occurrence  was  regarded  as  an  omen  of  the  aj)- 
proaching  downfall  of  the  government. 

But  the  authorities  were  using  every  means  to  maintain  their 
friendly  relations  with  Bonaparte.  The  Directors  consulted  him 
upon  all  questions  of  foreign  policy  and  accepted  his  recommenda- 
tions with  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  readiness.  Toward  the  end 
of  December,  1797,  there  arose  in  the  Papal  States  a  revolt  of 
the  democratic  elements  of  the  populace  under  French  protection, 
and  this  insurrection  was  forcibly  suppressed  by  the  papal  troops. 
When  upon  this  occasion  General  Duphot  was  killed,  the  Direc- 
tory, acting  upon  the  counsel  of  Bonaparte,  took  advantage  of 
this  pretext  to  advance  upon  the  papal  government.  Berthier 
received  command  from  Napoleon  to  enter  Rome,  where  the 
rule  of  Pius  VI.  was  declared  at  an  end  and  a  republican  govern- 
ment proclaimed,  February  15th,  1798.  It  is  improbable  that 
it  was  the  intention  of  Bonaparte  that  these  measures  should  be 
carried  out  as  far  as  the  deposition  of  the  Pope.  The  inference 
is  that  here  the  feeling  in  the  Directory  was  too  strong  for  him  to 
resist. 

The  Batavian  Republic  was  at  this  time  ruled  by  federalists, 
and,  the  government  feeling  itself  incapable  of  meeting  the  hea\'y 
demands  for  money  and  ships  imposed  upon  it  by  the  alliance 
with  France,  the  French  envoy  openly  came  to  the  aid  of  the 
democratic  centralists,  who  rose  into  power  January  22d,  1798, 
by  means  of  a  Coup  d'Etat  similar  to  that  of  the  18th  Fructidor, 
and  placed  themselves  absolutely  at  the  disposition  of  the  Direc- 
tory. Joubert,  the  favourite  of  Napoleon,  received  the  command 
of  the  Dutch  troops. 

But  it  is  in  respect  to  relations  with  Switzerland  that  Napo- 

saw  him  in  Udine,  he  had,  to  be  sure,  even  then  the  appearance  of  a  man 
of  forty. 


I  20  Egypt  [1797 

leon's  influence  is  most  clearly  seen.  While  still  in  Italy  he  had 
released  the  ValtelUne  from  the  dominion  of  theGrisons, — "since, 
according  to  the  rights  of  nations  imder  the  new  Uberty,  no  people 
could  remain  subject  to  another," — and  this  territory  he  had 
incorporated  in  the  Cisalpine  Republic. 

The  treaty  with  Austria  had  delivered  into  his  hands  the 
Frickthal,  which  belonged  to  the  Canton  of  Aargau.  He  now 
conceived  a  desire  for  a  thoroughfare  through  Valais  which 
would  facilitate  communications  between  France  and  Lom- 
bardy.  This  purpose  could  be  achieved  if  Switzerland  could 
be  induced  to  accept  a  place  like  that  of  the  Batavian  and  the 
Cisalpine  in  the  circle  of  dependent  republics  with  which  France 
was  to  surround  herself  as  a  shield  against  the  rest  of  Europe. 
Accordingly  the  democratic  element  in  Switzerland  was  aroused 
and  supported  in  opposition  to  the  aristocratic  government  of 
the  patricians,  and  the  same  means  were  employed  which  had 
proved  so  efficacious  in  Holland  and  Venice,  in  Rome  and  Milan 
and  Genoa.  Upon  the  solicitation  of  the  democrats  of  the 
Canton  of  Vaud  for  assistance  from  the  French  against  the  rule  of 
Bern,  the  Directory  willingly  granted  their  request  and  charged 
its  diplomatic  agents  in  the  chief  cities  throughout  Switzerland 
to  fan  the  flame  of  the  insurgent  movement  to  their  utmost. 

Bonaparte  and  Rewbell  had  contrived  with  Ochs  of  Basel, 
the  leader  of  the  democratic  centralists,  a  regular  plan  of  revolu- 
tion. General  Brune  invaded  the  Bernese  territory  and  under 
the  guise  of  a  liberator  succeeded  in  separating  the  adversaries 
only  to  take  possession  of  Bern,  March  5th,  1798,  whence  he  deliv- 
ered to  the  Directory  the  "Bernese  treasure"  consisting  of  about 
25,000,000  francs  *  besides  an  immense  supply  of  provisions  and 
munitions  of  war.  A  burdensome  treaty  of  alUance  with  France 
was  then  imposed  upon  the  newly-established  "Helvetian  Re- 
public." Switzerland  had  become  a  French  dependency.  Of 
the  money  seized  3,000,000  francs  passed  into  Napoleon's  military 
chest  to  be  used  in  defraying  the  expenses  of  the  projected  under- 

*  According  to  Diiiidlikc^r  th(^  value  of  tliis  treasure  has  been  greatly 
exaggerated.  "It  actually  consisted  of  about  seven  millions  in  money 
and  twelve  millions  in  bonds."     (Short  Hist,  of  Switzerland,  217.) — B. 


^T.  28]        Napoleon   Looks  to   the  Orient  i  2 1 

taking  against  p]ngland,  and,  according  to  the  statements  of 
Madame  de  Stael,  it  was  commonly  believed  that  the  general 
had  advised  this  lucrative  enterprise  as  a  means  to  this  very 
end. 

But  however  great  the  condescension  whereby  the  Directors 
permitted  the  victorious  general  to  take  part  in  their  deliberations, 
he  was  nevertheless  without  any  secure  official  position  such  as 
this  influence  upon  proceedings  would  appear  to  denote.  Bour- 
rienne  affirms  that  he  demanded  admittance  to  the  Directory  in 
spite  of  the  Constitution,  but  was  unable  to  accomplish  his  pur- 
pose. It  is  not  impossible  that  there  was  ground  for  the  surmises 
of  the  observant  that  the  massing  of  great  bodies  of  troops  at  that 
time  was  ordered  less  with  a  view  to  the  enterprise  against 
England  than  to  the  establishment  of  a  dictatorship.  Disa- 
greeable scenes  took  place  in  the  Directory  over  this  question  of 
which  something  appears  to  have  reached  the  public,  for  the 
Prussian  envoy  reports  that  the  populace  of  Paris  were  already 
asking  one  another  what  the  general  was  doing  so  long  in  the 
capital  and  why  he  did  not  set  sail  for  England. 

Napoleon  had  thus  not  only  failed  of  securing  a  position  at 
the  head  of  the  government,  but  he  was  at  the  same  time  running 
great  danger  of  seeing  the  glory  of  his  former  triumphs  wane  in 
the  light  of  every-day  existence,  and  of  losing,  by  continued 
inaction,  the  popularity  which  he  had  acquired.  He  recognized 
that,  for  the  present  at  least,  there  was  no  hope  of  a  successful 
issue  to  a  Coup  d'Etat.  Hated  as  the  Directors  were  by  the 
people,  he  was  himself  far  from  being  beloved  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  be  able  to  rely  upon  his  popularity  in  a  struggle  against  them. 
His  chief  concern  must  be  to  "keep  his  glory  warm,"  to  use  his 
own  expression.  In  view  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  French  navy  a 
landing  in  England  seemed  to  him  too  hazardous  a  venture. 
Even  later,  in  1805,  he  again  eagerly  availed  himself  of  the  occa- 
sion furnished  by  the  coalition  to  lead  his  forces  elsewhere.  He 
much  preferred  a  return  to  his  former  plan  of  a  campaign  in  the 
Orient.  "I  will  not  remain  here,"  he  said  to  Bourrienne,  "there 
is  nothing  to  be  done.  I  see  that  if  I  stay  it  will  be  but  a  short 
time  before  I  am  done  for.     Everything  wastes  away  here  below. 


122  Egypt  [1798 

I  am  already  bereft  of  my  glory.  This  little  Europe  has  not 
enough  to  offer.  The  Orient  is  the  place  to  go.  All  great  repu- 
tations have  been  made  there.*  I  mean,  however,  to  make  a 
tour  of  inspection  of  the  northern  coast  in  order  to  convince 
myself  as  to  what  may  be  ventured.  If  I  see  reason  to  doubt  the 
success  of  a  landing  in  England,  as  I  fear  may  be  the  case,  the 
Army  of  England  will  become  the  Army  of  the  Orient  and  I  shall 
go  to  Egypt." 

On  February  8th,  1798,  the  proposed  journey  along  the  coast 
was  undertaken.  It  was  soon  completed.  Bonaparte  easily 
satisfied  himself  of  the  present  impracticability  of  the  enterprise, 
and  upon  his  return  tried  to  bring  the  Directory  to  the  same  con- 
clusion. 

In  two  memorials  of  February  23d  he  demonstrates  that  a 
landing  in  England  without  having  first  secured  the  mastery  of 
the  seas  would  be  a  most  difficult  and  daring  measm^e,  which,  if 
achievable,  could  only  be  accomplished  during  the  long  nights 
and  consequently  not  before  the  coming  autumn.  Meanwhile — 
as  he  explains  in  a  later  communication  bearing  date  of  April 
13th — the  expedition  on  the  Mediterranean  with  Egypt  as  its 
destination  might  be  undertaken  which  would  compel  the  English 
to  detach  a  part  of  their  Channel  fleet  to  send  to  India  and  the 
Red  Sea.  Meantime  the  forces  in  the  northern  ports  of  France 
could  be  increased  to  a  considerable  army,  so  that  a  landing  in 
November  or  December  with  40,000  men  might  be  possible. 

The  Directory,  with  a  feeling  of  relief,  at  once  decided  in 
favour  of  the  expedition  to  the  Levant,  and  on  the  12th  of  April 
sent  to  Napoleon  the  commission,  drawn  up  by  himself,  appoint- 
ing him  General-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Orient.  He  was 
authorized  and  commissioned  to  take  possession  of  Malta  and 
Egypt,  and  to  drive  the  English  from  their  possessions  as  far 
as  he  was  able  to  reach  them,  but  particularly  from  the  Red 
Sea,  and  he  was  to  cut  through  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  in  order 

*  While  still  in  Italy  ho  had  spoken  to  Botirrionnc  in  a  similar  way: 
"Eviropc  is  nothiiiK  hvit  a  molo-hill;  it  is  only  in  the  Orient  that  there  have 
been  f^reat  empires  and  mighty  revolutions,  there  where  600,000,000 
people  live." 


Mr.  28]  The  Egyptian  Expedition  123 

to  assure  to  the  French  the  possession  of  that  sea.  Until  his 
return  a  substitute  should  take  his  place  in  command  of  the 
army  destined  to  make  war  upon  England  directly,  for  it  was 
a  matter  of  course  that,  upon  the  termination  of  the  Egyptian 
expedition,  he  should  reassume  command  of  the  combined 
forces  directed  against  the  British.  At  Toulon  he  apostro- 
phized the  troops  of  the  expedition  in  these  words:  "You  are 
one  wing  of  the  Army  of  England!"  and  in  his  official  orders 
issued  at  the  end  of  April  he  styles  himself:  " General-in-chief 
of  the  Army  of  England." 

The  die,  then,  was  cast.  "I  do  not  know  what  would  have 
become  of  me,"  he  said  later  to  Madame  de  Remusat,  "if  I  had 
not  had  the  happy  idea  of  going  to  Egypt."  Two  of  the  greatest 
minds  of  his  age  have  tried  to  answer  this  question:  "Had  he 
remained  in  France,"  says  Madame  de  Stael,  "the  Directory 
would  have  launched  against  him  calumnies  without  number 
by  means  of  all  the  newspapers  under  their  control,  and  would 
have  dimmed  his  exploits  in  the  minds  of  the  idle.  Bonaparte 
would  have  been  reduced  to  powder  even  before  the  thunderbolt 
had  struck  him."  According  to  Beyle,  things  might  have 
resulted  even  worse:  "Napoleon  lent  himself  to  this  project, 
impelled  by  the  double  fear  of  being  forgotten  or  being  poisoned." 
This  is  doubtless  exaggeration,  but  in  any  case  the  Egyptian 
expedition  seemed  to  have  been  undertaken  because  the  Direc- 
tory and  Bonaparte  were  antagonistic  and  yet  could  not  attempt 
an  encounter  to  decide  the  question  of  supremacy.  The  Direc- 
tory sought  a  means  of  disencumbering  itself  of  a  dangerous 
rival,  while  Bonaparte  was  trying  to  avoid  the  loss  of  all  authority ; 
he  was  resolved  upon  increasing  it  by  the  acquisition  of  new 
glory,  and  to  renew  the  combat  with  the  Directory  when  a 
favourable  moment  should  present.  His  genius  at  once  per- 
ceived all  the  advantages  offered  him  by  the  new  combination, 
and,  with  characteristic  energy,  he  proceeded  to  execute  the 
mission  consigned  to  him. 

He  set  about  his  preparations  with  a  zeal  such  as  had  never 
before  been  seen  in  him  by  those  who  were  about  him,  and  his 
arrangements  were  made  upon  so  vast  a  scale  as  to  guarantee 


1 24  Egypt  [1798 

the  result  and  to  incur  no  risk  to  the  renown  of  the  general  in 
command.  This  was  no  longer  the  modest  expedition  which 
could  easily  be  undertaken  by  25,000  men  with  a  few  frigates. 
The  expedition  to  the  Orient  was  begun  with  an  army  of  40,000 
of  the  best  soldiers,  embarked  upon  one  of  the  greatest  fleets 
which  had  ever  been  equipped  by  France,  and  which  was  de- 
signed to  assure  to  the  Republic  the  supremacy  on  the  Medi- 
terranean. The  general  was  accompanied  by  a  staff  of  a 
hundred  and  twenty  scholars,  mechanicians,  and  engineers, 
among  whom  figured  Monge  and  Berthollet,  who  were  to  make 
scientific  investigations  in  that  distant  country,  to  prepare  the 
way  for  projected  colonization  and  to  open  the  necessary  water- 
ways. Talleyrand  was  to  follow  a  little  later  to  enter  upon 
direct  negotiations  with  the  Porte  and  convince  the  Sultan  that 
the  expedition  was  in  nowise  aimed  against  him,  but  solely 
against  the  Mamelukes,  who,  despising  his  suzerainty,  were 
governing  Egypt  hke  independent  princes.  A  library  was 
selected  to  be  carried  on  the  expedition,  and  among  these  books 
were  Ossian,  Tasso's  "Jerusalem  Delivered,"  Homer  and  Virgil, 
Rousseau's  "Nouvelle  H^loise"  and  Goethe's  "Werther."  It 
is  characteristic  and  interesting  to  note  that  the  Bible,  the 
Koran,  and  the  Vedas  were  grouped  with  the  works  of  Montes- 
quieu under  the  head  of  "Politics."  History  was  prominent 
in  the  collection.  Naturally  Plutarch's  "Lives"  were  there  as 
well  as  the  Anabasis,  Arrian's  "Alexander,"  and  Raynal's  "His- 
toire  philosophique  des  deux  Indes."  The  deep  and  lasting 
impression  made  on  Napoleon  by  this  work  has  already  been 
observed.  The  passage  referring  to  Egypt  had  doubtless  been 
of  particular  interest  to  him.  It  reads:  "At  sight  of  a  region 
situated  between  two  seas,  of  which  one  is  the  gate  of  the  Orient 
and  the  other  the  gate  of  the  Occident,  Alexander  formed  the 
project  of  establishing  the  seat  of  his  empire  in  Egypt  and  of 
making  it  the  centre  of  the  world's  commerce.  This  prince, 
the  most  enlightened  of  conquerors,  recognized  that,  if  there 
were  a  means  of  cementing  the  union  of  the  conquests  which 
he  had  already  made  and  those  which  he  proposed  to  himself, 
it  would  be  in  a  country  which  nature  seemed,  so  to  speak,  to 


Mr  28]     Example   of  Alexander   the   Great         125 

have  attached  to  the  point  of  junction  between  Africa  and  Asia 
to  bind  them  to  Europe." 

It  would  be  easy  to  prove  that  the  designs  of  the  great  Mace- 
donian now  engrossed  the  attention  of  Napoleon  with  special 
vigour  and  tempted  him  to  imitate,  to  surpass  his  predecessor. 
His  imagination  soared  aloft,  but  we  know  how  he  controlled 
it.  "I  always  have  two  strings  to  my  bow,"  was  a  customary 
phrase  with  him.  And  thus  in  the  midst  of  his  vast  concep- 
tions he  did  not  overlook  what  lay  at  hand  to  be  achieved.  To 
Bourrienne,  who  asked  him  how  long  he  expected  to  remain  in 
Egypt,  he  replied:  "A  few  months  or  six  years,  everj'thing 
depends  upon  the  outcome  of  events."  And  in  fact  as  matters 
then  stood  it  was  but  too  probable  that  within  "a  few  months" 
a  new  war  would  break  out  in  Europe  which  would  of  necessity 
recall  his  name  to  popular  remembrance.  For  the  progress 
made  by  the  spirit  of  revolution  in  Italy  and  the  republicaniza- 
tion  of  the  Papal  States  had  approached  near  enough  to  Tus- 
cany and  Naples  to  appear  threatening,  and  the  probability 
was  only  too  strong  that  Austria  would  extend  her  protection 
to  the  ruUng  princes  of  those  countries,  they  being  related  to 
the  House  of  Habsburg,  and  thus  at  the  same  time  defend  her 
own  interests. 

Moreover,  Russia  would  of  course  resent  the  interference  of 
France  in  the  Eastern  question.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to 
attribute  to  Bonaparte  the  introduction  of  this  policy.  France 
had  begun  her  system  of  revolutionizing  her  neighbours  long 
before  the  young  general  had  acquired  the  slightest  influence 
upon  affairs.*  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  now  secretly 
advocated  it  in  the  selfish  hope  that  the  difficulties  accruing  to 
the  Directory  through  war  with  a  new  coalition  would  bring 
that  body  into  discredit,  apparently  necessitate  his  own  return 

*  The  perspicacious  Mallet  du  Pan  wrote  to  ^'ienna  as  early  as  May 
25th,  1796:  "In  all  countries  which  they  do  not  care  to  retain  they  will 
BOW  the  seed  of  republicanism,  declare  themselves  allies  of  every  State 
which  will  imitate  the  example  set  by  France,  and  provoke  such  imita- 
tion in  every  possible  way;  they  flatter  themselves  by  the  use  of  such 
means  to  achieve  in  a  short  time  what  has  been,  ever  since  1792,  one  of 
the  first  and  most  important  aims  of  the  war." 


1 26  Egypt  tl798 

to  France,  and  elevate  his  power  and  authority  to  a  position 
whence  he  hoped  to  grasp  the  reins  of  government.  To  this 
end  France  must  be  beaten  in  Europe,  while  he  should  be  win- 
ning fresh  laurels  to  his  name  in  the  Orient;  such  was  the  aim 
of  his  unpatriotic  ambition.  This  was  the  occasion  also  for 
removing  all  the  best  soldiers  and  ablest  generals.  He  said  to 
his  brother  Joseph:  "I  start  for  the  Orient  with  every  means 
for  achieving  success;  if  my  country  needs  me,  if  the  number 
increases  of  those  who  think  as  do  Talleyrand,  Sieyes,  and 
Roederer,  if  war  breaks  out  and  is  not  auspicious  to  France, 
then  I  shall  return,  surer  than  now  of  public  opinion.  If,  on 
the  contrary,  the  war  is  favourable  to  the  Republic,  if  a  new 
warrior  hke  myself  should  arise  and  gather  about  him  the  hopes 
of  the  people,  well!  I  may  perhaps  still  render  greater  service 
to  the  world,  in  the  Orient,  than  he!" 

But  while  he  still  tarried  in  Paris  the  first  indications  of  new 
complications  on  the  Continent  became  apparent.  At  Rastatt 
the  Austrian  envoy  had  opposed  the  demand  of  the  Directory 
for  the  cession  of  the  entire  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  in  Vienna 
Bemadotte,  who  represented  France,  had  offended  the  court 
and  incited  the  populace  to  an  uprising  on  account  of  which 
he  was  obUged  to  leave  the  country.  The  situation  looked 
serious.  War  was  imminent.  Napoleon  hesitated  and  delayed 
his  departure.  If  report  is  to  be  believed,  his  thoughts  turned 
again  for  a  moment  to  a  Coup  d'Etat  and  dictatorship.  But  in 
spite  of  all  peace  was  preserved,  and  in  the  night  of  May  3d 
Napoleon  left  Paris  to  embark  at  Toulon,  urged  to  departure 
by  the  anxious  Directors,  who  preferred  to  feel  that  this  ambi- 
tious schemer  was  in  Africa. 

The  preparations  in  the  port  of  Toulon  had  been  prosecuted 
with  the  greatest  zeal.  The  actual  destination  of  the  expedition 
was  known  to  but  few.  It  is  true  there  had  been  nmch  talk  of 
Egypt  and  the  newspapers  had  commented  upon  it,  but  precisely 
for  this  reason  no  one  believed  in  the  genuineness  of  a  venture 
which  would  place  at  a  distance  the  best  general  in  the  French 
army  at  a  time  so  critical.  And  yet  such  was  really  the  case. 
On  the  19th  of  May,  1798,  the  fleet  weighed  anchor  with  a  part  of 


Mr.  2S]     The   French    Fleet   Evades   Nelson         1 27 

the  expeditionary  troops  on  board,  the  Gencral-in-chicf  being  on 
the  flag-ship  "Orient."  At  the  same  hour  the  divisions  of 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  Vaubois,  iand  Desaix  sailed  from  Genoa, 
Ajaccio,  and  Civita  Vecchia  to  join  the  squadron  from  Toulon,  and 
the  combined  forces  made  an  imposing  armament  of  fifteen  ships 
of  the  line,  as  many  frigates,  seven  corvettes,  and  over  thirty 
smaller  war-vessels  carrjang  all  together  two  thousand  guns  as 
protection  to  the  four  hundred  transports  conveying  the  ex- 
peditionary troops. 

Among  the  generals  of  division  who  took  part  in  this  campaign, 
in  addition  to  those  already  mentioned,  were  Kleber,  j\Ienou,  Rey- 
nier,  and  Dugua,  while  among  the  brigadier-generals  were  the 
bearers  of  those  names  which  were  later  to  be  made  so  glorious, 
Lannes,  Davout,  Murat,  Andreossy,  and  others;  at  that  time 
Marmont,  Junot,  Lefebvre  and  Bessieres  still  ornamented  the 
rank  of  colonel. 

The  chief  danger  to  the  expedition  lay  from  the  English, 
who  had,  it  is  true,  some  time  before  withdrawn  their  fleet  from 
the  Mediterranean  to  the  Channel  as  a  protection  to  their  own 
coast  against  the  landing  of  the  French,  but  since  that  time  the 
ships  at  Toulon  had  attracted  their  attention,  and  the  decision 
had  just  been  reached  to  send  a  squadron  under  Admiral  Nelson 
to  observe  them.  Napoleon  was  totally  unaware  of  this  proceed- 
ing. Fortunately  for  him,  Nelson  was  driven  by  a  storm  from 
his  ambush  a  few  days  before  the  departure  of  the  French  fleet, 
and  returned  to  his  hiding-place  only  after  they  had  made  their 
way  out  of  the  harbour  he  was  watching.  Doubtful  whither  they 
had  gone,  he  sought  them  in  Sicily  and  Naples,  while  they  had 
already  captured  the  first  important  halting-place  on  their  jour- 
ney,— Malta. 

A  year  previous  French  agents  had  bribed  certain  of  the 
Knights  of  the  Order  of  St.  John  which  had  been  in  possession  of 
the  island  since  the  time  of  Charles  V.  The  Grand-master,  Herr 
von  Hompesch,  was  an  incapable  and  short-sighted  man,  whose 
faculties  deserted  him  completely  on  this  occasion;  he  made  no 
attempt  at  resistance  to  Napoleon,  and  on  June  13th,  1798,  he 
yielded  to  him  the  strong  fortifications  of  La  Vallette  without  even 


128  Egypt  [i7fi8 

an  effort  to  hold  them  until  the  arrival  of  succour  from  the  Brit- 
ish. It  v/as  scarcely  an  honourable  capitulation — a  word 
which,  by  the  way,  Napoleon  avoided  using  in  the  articles  of 
rendition,  in  order,  as  he  sarcastically  observed,  not  to  employ  a 
term  which  would  sound  harshly  to  the  ears  of  an  Order  once  so 
celebrated  for  its  martial  valour.  The  property  of  the  Knights 
was  confiscated,  while  they  themselves,  provided  with  scanty 
pensions,  were  compelled  to  leave  the  island;  some  of  them 
joined  the  army  of  the  conqueror.  The  Order  itself  was  placed 
under  the  suzerainty  of  Naples  and  under  the  protectorate  of  the 
Czar  of  Russia.  In  accomplishing  its  annihilation  Bonaparte 
counted  doubtless  upon  thus  hastening  the  conflagration  with 
which  Europe  was  already  menaced. 

Leaving  at  Malta  a  suitable  garrison.  Napoleon  set  sail 
toward  the  East,  and  while  off  Candia  received  his  first  intimation 
of  the  fact  that  he  was  being  pursued  by  a  powerful  English 
squadron.  This  was  entirely  out  of  keeping  with  his  designs,  for 
not  only  the  Egyptian  expedition,  but  also  the  future  invasion 
of  England  was  based  upon  the  supposition  that  the  French  fleet 
was  to  remain  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean  at  least  until  the 
vanquishers  of  the  Mamelukes  should  be  brought  back  to  France, 
It  was  now  all-important  to  evade  the  pursuing  enemy  and  reach 
Alexandria  with  these  hundreds  of  transport  ships.  On  this 
occasion  Bonaparte  made  it  evident  that  if  in  his  boyhood  he 
had,  according  to  his  incUnation,  been  appointed  to  the  marine 
service,  he  would  have  furnished  France  with  a  most  efficient 
admiral.  By  sailing  close  to  the  southern  shore  of  Candia  he 
eluded  the  vigilance  of  the  pursuer  and  thus  escaped  the  threat- 
ening danger.  Nelson,  having  failed  to  come  upon  the  object  of 
his  quest  in  the  Gulf  of  Naples,  had  decided  to  direct  his  course 
to  Egypt.  Sailing  along  the  coast  of  Africa,  he,  in  his  zeal  to 
overtake  the  enemy,  outstripped  the  French  and  arrived  ahead 
of  them  in  Alexandria.  Finding  that  roadstead  empty  he  at 
once  hastened  away  again,  this  time  setting  his  helm  for  Syria. 
Immediately  after  his  departure  the  French  fleet  arrived  in 
Egypt,  July  1st,  and  had  time  to  land  the  expeditionary  troops. 

While  still  on  the  high  seas,  on  the  22d  of  June,  the  com- 


^T.  28]  The  Mamelukes  1 29 

mander-in-chicf  had  issued  a  proclamation  to  his  soldiers  pre- 
paring them  for  the  task  which  awaited  them.  "Soldiers,"  said 
he  to  them,  "you  arc  aljout  to  undertake  a  conquest  the  effects 
of  which  will  be  incalculable  upon  the  situation  and  commerce 
of  the  world.  You  will  deal  to  England  the  most  certain  and 
terrible  blow  while  awaiting  the  hour  in  which  you  may  inflict 
her  death-stroke.  We  shall  have  some  fatiguing  marches  to 
make,  we  shall  fight  a  number  of  battles,  we  shall  succeed  in  all 
our  enterprises;  fortune  is  with  us.  .  .  ."  He  admonished 
them  to  respect  the  religion  of  the  Mohammedans  and  their  muf- 
tis, adding:  "The  people  whom  we  are  about  to  encounter  treat 
woman  differently  from  what  we  do;  but,  in  any  country,  he 
who  violates  is  a  monster.  Pillage  enriches  but  a  few;  it  dis- 
honours us,  it  destroys  our  resources,  it  makes  hostile  to  us 
those  whom  it  is  to  our  interest  to  have  as  friends.  The  first  city 
to  which  we  come  was  built  by  Alexander.  We  shall  find  at 
every  step  reminders  of  great  deeds  worthy  to  excite  the  emula- 
tion of  the  French."  Many  of  his  soldiers  doubtless  understood 
him  better  when  in  Toulon  he  made  the  promise  of  enough 
money  to  each  of  them,  upon  the  return  of  the  expedition,  to 
buy  six  acres  of  land. 

Bonaparte,  having  taken  Alexandria  on  the  2d  of  July, 
likewise  addressed  himself  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  country. 
In  a  proclamation  rendered  into  the  Arabic  he  represented  him- 
self as  the  friend  of  the  Sultan  come  to  destroy  his  enemies  the 
Mamelukes  and  to  deliver  the  Egyptian  people  from  their  tyr- 
anny. He  proclaimed  the  equality  of  all  men  before  God,  the 
same  God  whom  he  recognized  in  the  Koran;  and  in  order  to 
awaken  more  completely  the  confidence  of  the  population  and 
counteract  the  precepts  of  the  Koran  which  forbade  submission  to 
any  nation  not  of  the  faithful,  he  declared  that  the  French  were 
true  Mussulmans,  and  adduced  in  evidence  the  fact  that  they  had 
vanquished  the  Pope  and  annihilated  the  Knights  of  Malta.  All 
this  was  hardly  likely  to  make  any  great  impression  upon  the  dull 
sensibilities  of  the  Fellaheen.  They  suljmitted  to  the  new  inva- 
sion as  to  any  other  domination.  The  actual  enemy  with  which 
Bonaparte  had  to  contend  was  the  cavalry  of  the  Mamelukes. 


130  Egypt  [1798 

Originally  in  the  twelfth  century  only  a  body-guard  of  the 
Caliph,  created  of  slaves  purchased  for  the  purpose,  the  Mame- 
lukes soon  possessed  themselves  of  the  mastery  of  Egypt,  which 
advantage  they  retained  until  overcome  in  the  sixteenth  century 
by  the  Ottomans,  when  Selim  I.  committed  the  administration  of 
affairs  of  the  country,  as  a  Turkish  province,  to  twenty-four  of 
their  chieftains.  Each  of  these  Beys  commanded  a  considerable 
body  of  horse,  and  as  the  Turkish  power  began  to  wane  the  posi- 
tion of  these  Beys  became  more  and  more  independent  until  the 
authority  of  the  Sultan  dwindled  to  a  mere  name.  At  the  time 
when  Bonaparte  took  up  arms  against  them  their  two  generals, 
Ibrahim  Bey  and  Murad  Bey,  commanded  over  8000  splendidly 
equipped  and  practised  horsemen,  who  were  dexterous  in  the  use 
of  sabre,  lance,  and  firearms,  but  of  other  troops  there  were  none. 
Infantry  and  artillery  were  entirely  lacking,  except  that  the 
small  flotilla  on  the  Nile  carried  a  few  cannon.  These  were  cir- 
cumstances, coupled  with  the  fourfold  superiority  in  numbers  of 
the  French,  to  leave  little  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  issue  of  the 
campaign  in  favour  of  the  invaders.  The  real  difficulties  arose 
from  other  causes. 

First  among  these  was  disheartening  disappointment.  Alex- 
andria fell  far  short  of  all  expectations.  Not  more  than  a 
twelfth  part  remained  of  the  metropolis  of  civilization  to  which 
the  Macedonian  hero  had  given  his  name,  the  rest  had  fallen  away 
into  ruin  and  dirt.  And  when,  on  July  7th,  Napoleon  broke 
camp  to  proceed  to  Cairo,  choosing  the  more  direct  way  across  the 
desert  instead  of  the  longer  and  easier  route  via  Rosetta  and 
along  the  Nile,  the  suffering  from  hunger,  thirst,  and  heat  was  so 
great  that  the  artfully  cherished  visions  of  an  Eastern  paradise 
suddenly  vanished.  The  soldiers  grumbled,  threatened  to  turn 
back,  and  reviled  the  scholars  to  whom  alone  they  imputed  the 
blame  of  the  deception  practised  upon  them.  In  the  F(>llah 
villages  there  was  no  trace  of  civilization;  grain  there  was  in 
abundance,  but  neither  mills  nor  ovens,  and  for  drink  there  was 
nothing  to  offer  but  slimy  cistern-water.  Many  of  the  soldiers 
perished  with  thirst,  while  terrible  homesickness  prevailed  in  the 
ranks  and  was  the  cause  of  frequent  suicide;  even  the  superior 


^T.  28]  First   Encounters  i  3 1 

officers  felt  the  demoralization.  At  length  the  Nile  was  reached 
at  Ramanieh,  but  there  the  enemy,  roving  about  in  detached 
bands,  began  to  harass  the  divisions,  so  that  progress  could  be 
made  only  by  forming  hollow  squares  and  marching  thus  with 
the  cavalry  in  the  centre.  At  Shebreket  they  came  upon  the 
bulk  of  the  army  of  Murad  Bey.  The  two  flotillas  on  the  Nile 
joined  battle;  Murad  made  two  ineffectual  attacks  and  then 
withdrew.* 

It  was  not  until  the  Pyramids  came  in  sight  on  July  19th, 
at  Om  Dinar,  three  miles  from  Cairo,  that  a  serious  engage- 
ment took  place.  With  toil  and  hardship,  marching  only  in 
the  early  morning  hours  from  two  to  nine,  the  French  reached 
Embabeh,  the  place  where  Murad  had  intrenched  himself,  and 
now,  on  the  21st  of  July,  offered  battle  with  sometliing  over 
5000  horsemen  and  a  troop  of  Fellaheen  against  the  French 
forces  numbering  five  times  as  many  as  his  command.  It  was 
scarcely  necessary  to  excite  the  fervour  of  the  Republican  troops 
by  pronouncing  those  celebrated  words:  "Soldiers,  from  the 
summit  of  these  Pyramids  forty  centuries  are  looking  douTi  upon 
you!" 

The  superiority  of  their  numbers  alone  made  a  victory  seem 
easy,  and  the  longing  to  escape  from  the  desert  increased  their 
ardour  for  battle.  The  issue  Avas  the  only  one  possible.  Bona- 
parte's five  divisions  formed  at  once  in  squares  six  men  deep, 
with  the  cannon  at  the  corners,  the  staff  and  baggage  in  the 
middle.  Murad  threw  himself  impetuously  upon  that  of  Desaix. 
Repulsed  here,  the  Mameluke  renewed    his   attack  upon  the 

*  One  example,  taken  from  many,  will  serve  to  show  the  extent  to 
which  the  deeds  of  the  Army  of  the  Orient  were  exaggerated  by  the  time 
they  reached  the  Directory  at  Paris  in  Napoleon's  reports.  Marmont, 
in  his  M^moires,  mentions  only  four  or  five  Mamelukes  at  Shebreket 
who  with  mad  impetuosity  rushed  upon  one  of  the  squares  and  were  cut 
down.  There  were  unquestionably  more  than  that,  but  in  a  letter  written 
by  Bonaparte  to  Menou,  who  had  remained  in  Alexandria,  the  number  had 
already  increased  to  fifty,  and  in  his  report  to  the  Directory,  dated  July  24th, 
1798,  it  had  become  nothing  less  than  a  "battle  at  Shebreket"  wh€>rein 
three  hundred  of  the  enemy  were  slain.  At  a  later  day  he  frankly  said 
that  a  statesman  nmst  understand  lying  to  perfection,  and  the  negotiator 
of  Udine  and  Passariano  was  a  statesman. 


132  Egypt  [1798 

divisions  of  Reynier  and  of  Dugua  (wherein  Napoleon  had  taken 
his  position),  with  the  same  lack  of  success.  Then  he  galloped 
away. 

His  camp  at  Embabeh  fell  after  a  short  resistance  into  the 
hands  of  the  conquerors,  who  derived  from  it  a  rich  harvest. 
Ibrahim,  who  had  been  posted  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Nile, 
at  Boulak,  with  a  portion  of  the  Mameluke  army,  abandoned 
his  position  and  withdrew  eastward  to  the  borders  of  the  S}Tian 
desert.  The  battle  of  the  Pyramids  delivered  Cairo  into  the 
hands  of  the  French.  On  the  22d  of  July,  Napoleon  took  up 
his  headquarters  in  Murad's  palace. 

Hitherto  the  complaints  of  the  troops  had  been  met  with 
the  promise  of  consolation  for  their  pains  in  the  booty  which 
Cairo  with  its  splendour  and  treasures  was  to  afford.  What 
they  found  in  this  city  of  300,000  inhabitants  proved  only 
another  disappointment.  Provisions  could  be  obtained  for 
money,  but  there  was  no  vestige  of  the  abundance  and  good 
cheer  which  had  been  counted  upon;  everything,  even  to  the 
deserted  Mameluke  quarter,  bespoke  only  poverty  and  squalor. 
Discontent  in  the  army  increased.  The  many  letters  written 
home  by  soldiers  and  officers  in  their  dejection,  which  were 
seized  and  published  by  the  English,  testify  to  the  spirit  of 
dissatisfaction  which  was  making  itself  felt.  Bonaparte  had 
all  he  could  do  with  punishing,  appeasing,  and  promising,  be- 
sides the  thousand  details  of  organization  and  administration, 
with  the  dispositions  to  be  taken  necessary  for  the  reduction 
of  the  enemy,  who  had  withdrawn  only  to  renew  the  charge 
with  fresh  forces.  And  what  added  greatly  to  his  cares  was 
the  entire  lack  of  tidings  from  Europe,  while  from  Alexandria 
came  news  of  crushing  disaster:  on  August  1st  the  English 
fleet  under  Nelson  had  reappeared  on  the  Egyptian  coast  and 
totally  overwhelmed  that  of  the  French  in  the  roadstead  of 
Aboukir. 

Bonaparte  in  leaving  the  squadron  under  Admiral  Brueys 
had  instructed  him  to  convey  the  fleet  into  the  old  harbour  of 
Alexandria  provided  it  were  of  sufficient  depth;  if  not,  he  was 
to  occupy  a  secure  position  in  the  roadstead  of  Aboukir^  or,  if 


^T.  28]  The   Battle   of  the   Nile  133 

this  should  prove  impossible,  he  was  to  leave  the  transports 
and  sail  for  Corfu.  Brueys  found  the  entrance  to  the  harbour 
impassable,  and  anchored  at  Aboukir  in  a  position  which  he 
deemed  strong  enough  to  withstand  attack  of  the  enemy.  In 
a  letter  to  Bonaparte  dated  July  20th  he  even  declared  it 
impregnable,  since  he  was  protected  on  one  side  by  the  coast 
defences  and  no  hostile  ship  could  take  up  its  position  between 
him  and  the  land.  The  error  was  a  fatal  one.  On  August  1st 
Nelson  appeared  with  his  squadron.  He  had  until  this  time 
been  seeking  eagerly  and  excitedly,  but  in  vain,  for  a  trace  of 
the  enemy,  and  now  rushed  without  delay  upon  the  French 
ships,  a  large  portion  of  the  crews  of  which  were  not  on  board. 
It  now  became  evident  that  Brueys'  position  was  quite  open  to 
attack  and  that  the  EngUsh  ships  of  the  line,  though  fewer  in 
number,  were  manoeuvred  with  such  skill  and  audacious  courage 
as  to  enable  them  in  spite  of  everything  to  push  between  their 
enemy  and  the  coast.  Caught  between  two  fires,  the  French 
vessels  succumbed  one  after  another  notwithstanding  all  the 
heroism  of  their  defenders.  Brueys  atoned  for  his  mistake  with 
his  life.  The  "Orient"  blew  up  with  him  and  all  his  crew;  the 
vahant  warriors  met  their  death  shouting,  "Vive  la  Repu- 
blique!"  It  was  such  a  victory  as  had  never  before  been  won 
on  the  sea.  Only  two  ships  of  the  line  and  two  frigates  were 
saved  by  the  rear-admiral,  Villeneuve,  in  the  flight.  Two  others 
had  been  previously  towed  into  the  harbour.  Everything  else 
was  destroyed  or  in  the  hands  of  the  enem}'. 

Bonaparte  received  the  tidings  on  his  return  from  a  march 
eastward  in  pursuit  of  Ibrahim,  while  he  at  the  same  time  entered 
upon  negotiations  with  !\Iurad,  though  the  latter  were  without 
result.  He  was  in  Marniont's  tent  when  the  news  was  brought 
to  him,  and  at  first  received  the  message  with  perfect  com- 
posure; he  even  began  then  and  there  to  estimate  its  significance. 
In  his  Memoires  Marmont  recortls  the  words  of  his  superior  on 
this  occasion.  "Here  we  are  now,"  said  he,  "cut  off  from  the 
mother  country.  .  .  .  We  have  got  to  be  sufficient  unto  our- 
selves. Egypt  was  once  a  powerful  kingdom.  .  .  .  What  a 
point  of  vantage  this  position  would  be  in  offensive  warfare 


134  -^gyP^  tl798 

against  the  English!  What  a  point  of  departure  for  the  con- 
quests which  the  possible  disintegration  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
may  bring  within  our  reach!  We  are  perhaps  destined  to  change 
the  face  of  the  Orient  and  to  inscribe  our  names  beside  those 
recalled  to  our  remembrance  with  the  greatest  radiancy  by 
ancient  and  mediaeval  history.  .  .  .  This  is  the  hour  when 
characters  of  a  superior  order  should  show  themselves." 

These  were  spirited  words  and  they  did  not  fail  of  their 
effect.  They  did  not,  however,  express  the  whole  of  the  im- 
pression produced  upon  the  commander  of  the  expedition  by  the 
information  just  received.  The  loss  of  the  fleet  had  been  more 
of  a  blow  to  him  than  he  had  allowed  himself  to  show.  His 
intention,  as  we  know,  had  been  to  conquer  Egypt,  and,  having 
secured  its  possession,  to  return  to  Prance  if  meanwhile  the 
fortunes  of  the  new  Continental  war  should  have  been  of  such 
a  character  as  to  enhance  the  value  of  his  sword  in  the  mind  of 
the  nation.  In  Bourrienne's  Memoires  we  read:  "According 
to  what  General  Bonaparte  said  to  me  before  receipt  of  the 
news  of  the  1st  of  August,  he  intended,  the  possession  of  Egypt 
once  assured,  to  start  again  for  Toulon  with  this  fleet,  which 
with  its  mission  accomplished  was  thenceforth  useless;  to  send 
thence  troops  and  provisions  of  every  kind  to  Egypt  and  to  unite 
the  fleet  with  all  the  forces  which  the  government  should  have 
collected  for  use  against  England,  ...  to  which  France  would 
then  be  superior.  .  .  .  The  loss  of  the  navy  shattered  all  these 
schemes."  *  Its  further  consequences  were  even  more  serious; 
it  even  put  in  jeopardy  the  position  of  the  French  in  Egypt. 

Napoleon  had  been  in  hopes  that  the  Sultan  might  be  de- 
ceived as  to  the  character  of  his  expedition,  or  at  least  that  he 

*  Bourrienne  was  at  that  time  as  little  as  Napoleon  in  a  position  to 
know  that  the  Directory  had  already  renounced  the  plan  of  making  the 
project(!d  invasion  in  the  following  autumn,  and  had  sent  the  ships  sta- 
tioned in  the  northern  ports  to  the  help  of  the  Irish,  who  had  revolted 
against  England  at  the  end  of  May,  1798.  This  enterprise  entailed  noth- 
ing hut  k)sses  to  the  French.  Dispersed  in  separate  expeditions,  some 
of  th(i  ships  w(!re  lost,  others  were  driven  out  of  their  course.  A  new 
concentration  of  the  maritime  forces  in  the  north  was  for  the  present 
entirely  out  of  the  question. 


Mt.  29]  Turkey   Declares  War  i  3  5 

could  be  prevented  from  interfering.  This  was  to  have  been 
Talleyrand's  task,  but  since  the  appearance  of  the  English  in 
the  Mediterranean  he  had  lost  courage  for  the  enterprise  and 
transferred  the  office  to  the  envoy  in  Constantinople.  The 
Sultan  wavered  for  a  long  time  between  friendship  with  the 
Republic  and  an  alliance  with  Russia,  which  was  offered  him 
by  the  Czar  Paul  I.,  whose  political  sphere  of  action  was  likewise 
disturbed  by  the  French  intervention  in  the  Orient  and  the 
seizure  of  Malta.  Just  at  this  critical  juncture  news  arrived  on 
the  Bosphorus  of  the  destruction  of  the  French  fleet  and  decided 
the  question  in  favour  of  the  Russian  alliance.  What  had  been 
counted  impossible  was  accomplished;  Turkey,  wishing  to 
defend  her  rights  of  suzerainty  against  the  invader  in  Egypt 
and  the  Ionian  Isles,  had  been  won  over  by  Russia.  On  Sep- 
tember 1st  the  Porte  declared  war  against  France. 

Bonaparte,  who  was  now  cut  off  from  all  tidings  of  events, 
did  not  at  once  learn  of  this  turn  of  affairs.  But  he  soon  sus- 
pected it.  Immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Egypt  he  had  made 
offers  of  friendship  to  Achmed  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier  and  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor of  Syria,  who  was  sumamed  Jezzar,  the 
Slaughterer,  on  account  of  his  cruelty;  to  him  Bonaparte  repre- 
sented the  object  of  his  mission  as  being  none  other  than  the 
protection  of  French  commercial  interests  against  the  Mame- 
lukes. No  reply  had  been  received  to  these  letters.  On  the 
other  hand  he  learned  in  the  early  part  of  October  that  the  Porte 
had  ordered  the  arrest  of  French  consuls  everywhere.  But  he 
still  had  no  certain  knowledge  of  the  attitude  of  Turkey,  and 
until  he  was  definitely  informed  he  could  not  think  of  leaving 
Egypt.  If  advices  should  prove  of  unfavourable  character, 
the  task  before  him  would  be  a  double  one;  he  should  have  to 
defend  his  recently  acquired  position  not  only  against  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Arab  population  and  the  forces  of  the  Mamelukes, 
but  also  against  the  rightful  lord  of  the  land — the  Sultan.  After 
the  defeat  of  his  fleet  at  Aboukir,  which  naturally  had  made  a 
bad  impression  at  home,  he  stood  in  need  of  fresh  triumphs  to 
efface  the  remembrance  of  that  disaster;  the  laurels  which  he 
had  won  in  the  battle  of  the  Pyramids,  even  when  the  loss  of  the 


136  Egypt  [1798 

enemy  had  been  multiplied  by  ten,  were  insufficient  to  maintain 
his  personal  renown.  And  yet  he  had  come  to  Egypt  only  to 
increase  his  fame  while  waiting  for  the  war  on  the  Continent  to 
open  to  him  a  new  field  of  action !  On  the  18th  of  September 
he  wrote  to  the  Directory:  "I  am  awaiting  news  from  Con- 
stantinople ;  I  cannot  be  at  home,  as  I  promised  you,  by  October, 
but  the  delay  will  be  only  for  a  few  months." 

During  this  time  of  anxious  waiting  Bonaparte  had  oppor- 
tunity to  convince  himself  that  the  Egyptian  people  submitted 
only  with  great  reluctance  to  foreign  rule  and  that  his  professed 
sympathy  with  Islam  was  of  little  avail.  In  October  the  in- 
habitants of  Cairo  revolted.  The  insurrection  was  occasioned 
by  the  rumour  that  the  Sultan  had  declared  war  against  France, 
that  Jezzar  was  advancing  from  Syria,  that  the  French  were 
going  to  be  compelled  to  withdraw,  but  were  resolved  first  to  set 
fire  to  the  city.  The  populace  assaulted  the  French  in  their 
houses  and  killed  a  number  of  them,  among  others  twenty-five 
sick  or  wounded  soldiers.  The  masses  armed  themselves  and 
organized  a  revolt.  Napoleon  at  first  attempted  to  pacify  the 
insurgents  by  the  use  of  gentle  means.  When  these  failed  he 
ordered  the  rebellious  quarter  surrounded  and  bombarded. 
The  uprising  was  soon  at  an  end.  To  insure  himself  against 
repetition  of  the  offence  he  ordered  the  immediate  decapitation 
of  a  number  of  prisoners.  "That  will  serve  as  a  lesson  to  them," 
he  wrote  to  his  generals.  He  had  supposed  that  he  could 
accomplish  his  ends  with  mild  measures,  but  with  these  people 
intimidation  alone  was  effective. 

The  time  of  quiet  following  these  terroristic  measures  was 
employed  in  the  development  of  the  organization  of  the  interior. 
The  scholars  who  had  accompanied  the  expedition,  with  certain 
officers  of  education,  such  as  Caffarelli  and  Andr^ossy,  founded 
an  "Institute,"  at  which  they  read  papers  on  the  subject  of 
cultivation  of  the  country.  These  papers  were  published  in  a 
periodical  entitled  "La  l)6cade  I^^gyptienne,"  while  political  and 
local  news  were  reported  in  "LeCouri'ier  d'Egypte."  The  first 
session  of  the  Institute  was  held  on  October  23d.  Bonaparte 
himself  on  that  occasion  proposed  a  series  of  questions  the  study 


^T.  29]  Scientific  Work  in   Egypt  137 

of  which  was  committed  to  different  sections  of  the  organiza- 
tion. The  sessions  were  held  every  five  days.  It  was  here  that 
the  materials  were  brought  together  for  the  imposing  scientific 
production  which  began  to  be  pubUshed  ten  years  later.  This 
work,  wherein  the  foundations  were  laid  for  the  scientific  study 
of  Egypt  in  all  its  aspects,  constitutes  a  title  to  imperishable 
honour  for  the  man  who  made  it  possible  by  his  energy  and  the 
interest  which  he  gave  to  it.  The  best  possible  feeUng  pre- 
vailed between  the  members  of  the  Institute  and  its  president. 
Upon  a  single  occasion,  as  is  reported  by  an  officer  of  the  expe- 
dition, Bonaparte  got  into  a  dispute  with  Berthollet  and  allowed 
his  anger  to  overmaster  him  upon  being  repeatedly  contra- 
dicted by  the  latter,  whereupon  the  great  chemist  observed: 
"You  are  in  the  wrong,  my  friend,  for  you  are  getting  uncivil." 
When  upon  this  Desgenettes,  the  chief  surgeon,  took  sides  with 
the  naturalist.  Napoleon  broke  forth:  "I  can  see  plainly  enough 
that  an  understanding  exists  between  you  all.  Chemistry  is 
the  kitchen  department  of  medicine,  which  is  itself  the  science 
of  murderers."  To  which  Desgenettes  coolly  repUed:  "And 
how  do  you  define  the  art  of  the  conqueror.  Citizen  General?" 

Since  he  could  look  for  no  further  suppUes  of  money  from 
home,  Bonaparte  had  recourse  to  the  wealth  of  the  rich  Arabs. 
One  is  reminded  of  the  art  of  financiering  as  practised  by  Mephis- 
topheles  in  "  Faust "  when  one  hears  that  the  French  commander 
was  continually  searching  for  hidden  treasure  and  in  the  interim 
ordered  the  manufacture  of  100,000  francs  in  paper  money. 
The  need  for  money  was  real,  for  a  new  campaign  was  about  to 
be  entered  upon. 

The  tidings  of  the  declaration  of  war  by  Turkey,  which  had 
been  the  cause  of  the  Cairo  revolt  in  October,  were  later  sub- 
stantiated, but  the  report  of  the  advance  of  Jezzar  proved  to 
have  been  premature.  In  December,  1798,  Bonaparte  went 
to  Suez  to  make  a  search  for  traces  of  the  old  canal,  and  to  in- 
vestigate into  the  actuahty  of  the  miracles  of  Moses;  there  he 
received  the  information  that  the  troops  of  Achmetl  Pasha  had 
made  an  incursion  into  Egypt  and  had  established  themselves 
in  the  frontier  fortress  of  El  Arish.     He  at  once  made  prepara- 


I  38  Egypt  [1799 

tions  for  taking  the  offensive  in  Syria.  The  opportunity  had 
now  come  for  winning  new  victories,  and  he  seized  it  with  ardour. 
His  own  tranquillity  of  mind  was  contributed  to  by  the  news 
brought  by  a  Frenchman  who  had  reached  Alexandria  on  a 
merchantman  from  Ragusa:  the  negotiations  at  Rastatt  were 
still  pending  and  only  Naples  was  at  war  with  France.  This 
was  exactly  in  accordance  with  Napoleon's  wishes :  to  be  assured 
that  the  great  Continental  war  had  not  yet  burst  into  flame 
and  yet  at  the  same  time  to  realize  the  probability  that,  kindled 
by  the  contest  with  Naples,  it  would  not  be  long  before  it  would 
break  out  generally.  It  was  his  intention  to  return  then  to 
France,  and  of  this  he  openly  informed  the  Directory  in  a  letter 
of  February  10th,  1799,  written  before  he  set  out  for  Syria. 

In  the  same  letter  he  made  known  the  plan  which  he  was 
following  in  penetrating  into  Syria :  he  meant  not  only  to  repulse 
the  invasion  and  by  means  of  fortifications  on  the  frontier  to 
prevent  any  co-operation  between  the  Syrian  army  and  a  second 
which  would  probably  land  on  the  Delta,  but,  in  addition,  once 
he  had  acquired  possession  of  Syria,  to  take  advantage  of  it  to 
exercise  some  pressure  upon  Turkey.  The  Syrian  expedition 
was  thus  designed  to  restore  the  political  ascendency  lost  through 
the  destruction  of  the  fleet.  Whether  his  designs  extended 
still  further  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  on  January  25th 
he  had  written  to  Tippo  Sahib,  Sultan  of  Mysore  and  sworn 
enemy  of  England,  inviting  him  to  enter  into  relations  with 
himself.  Toward  the  Shah  of  Persia  also  he  had  made  some 
advances  in  regard  to  the  necessary  halting-placos  on  a  march 
to  India.  Five  years  afterwards  lie  said  to  jMadamc  tic  Remusat: 
"In  Egypt  I  felt  myself  freed  from  the  shackles  of  a  restricting 
civiUzation;  I  dreamed  all  sorts  of  things,  and  I  saw  means  of 
executing  all  that  I  had  dreamed.  I  created  a  religion,  I  saw 
myself  on  the  way  to  Asia,  mounted  upon  an  elephant,  a  turban 
on  my  head,  and  in  my  hand  a  new  Koran  which  I  had  com- 
posed to  my  own  liking.  I  should  have  brought  together  in 
my  undertakings  the  experiences  of  the  two  worlds,  gathering 
to  my  own  profit  from  the  history  of  all  countries,  attacking 
the  power  of  England  in  India,  and  by  means  of  this  conquest 


^Et.  29]  The   Invasion   of  Palestine  139 

renewing  my  relations  with  ancient  Europe."  His  imagination 
followinji;  in  the  footprints  of  his  great  predecessors  was  evidently 
inexhaustible  in  its  projects.  But  in  a  historical  narration  it 
is  not  permissible  to  attach  too  great  weight  to  such  fantasies. 
For  even  when  indulging  in  these  dreams  calm  reason  was  ever 
at  hand  and  ready  to  assert  itself.  He  told  Bourrienne  in  con- 
fidence that  he  should  not  venture  upon  the  expedition  to  India 
unless  Egypt  were  first  made  secure  and  he  could  leave  15,000 
men  there  while  pursuing  his  march  with  30,000  more.  Since 
these  prerequisites  were  lacking  he  was  obUged  to  content  him- 
self with  the  Syrian  campaign.  "He  himself  felt  keenly," 
observed  his  confidant  in  his  M^moires,  "that  all  these  projects 
were  too  httle  in  accord  with  our  means,  the  weakness  of  the 
government,  and  the  distaste  already  evinced  by  the  army  to 
these  deserts." 

The  conquest  of  the  Holy  Land  was  undertaken  with  four 
divisions  (about  13,000  men),  under  Kleber,  Reynier,  Lannes, 
and  Bon.  On  February  20th  the  garrison  at  El  Arish  was  led 
to  capitulate,  being  granted  the  right  of  withdrawal  without 
molestation,  and  on  the  24th  the  advance-guard  reached  Pales- 
tine, where  the  troops  could  refresh  themselves,  having  been 
driven  nearly  to  desperation  by  thirst  and  heat  and  a  parching 
wind  which  kept  them  on  their  march  in  the  mitlst  of  a  cloud  of 
sand.  Gaza  soon  fell  into  their  hands,  no  determined  resist- 
ance being  shown  by  the  few  thousand  men  who  were  its  defend- 
ers, and  on  the  4th  of  March  the  fortified  city  of  Jaffa  was  invested 
by  the  French.  And  here  was  the  beginning  of  more  obstinate 
resistance.  The  French  officer  sent  to  negotiate  terms  with  the 
garrison  was  beheaded  by  order  of  the  Turkish  commander  of  the 
place,  and  the  ardour  for  battle  on  the  part  of  the  expeditionary 
troops  was  thereby  goaded  to  reckless  fury.  By  March  7th  their 
batteries,  consisting  only  of  light  field-pieces,  had  made  breaches 
in  the  walls,  and  the  fortress  was  at  once  stormed  and  taken. 
Hereupon  followed  a  general  massacre  in  the  streets  of  all  that 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors.  Of  the  garrison,  originally 
4000  men  strong,  1000  had  already  been  killed.  The  others 
retired,  fighting  their  way,  to  a  caravansary.     Upon  the  appear- 


1 40  Egypt  [1799 

ance  of  two  of  Bonaparte's  aides-de-camp,  the  besieged  Turks 
offered  from  this  refuge  to  surrender  on  condition  that  their 
lives  should  be  spared,  to  which  condition  the  officers  agreed 
without  waiting  to  obtain  further  orders,  to  the  extreme  chagrin 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  to  whom  the  great  number  of  prisoners 
was  the  cause  of  no  small  embarrassment.  To  send  them  to 
Egypt  was  impossible  on  account  of  the  necessary  escort;  to 
release  them  would  mean  only  to  strengthen  the  enemy;  to 
divide  and  maintain  them  offered  difficulties  no  less  considerable ; 
the  French  soldiers  grumbled  at  being  obhged  to  share  their 
bread  with  the  murderers  of  the  negotiator;  the  generals,  in  a 
council  of  war  held  to  decide  the  question,  voted  unanimously  to 
allow  that  law  of  war  to  take  its  course  which  forfeits  the  lives  of 
defenders  of  a  fortress  taken  by  assault.  Bonaparte  considered 
the  question  for  three  days  before  approving  the  decision  of  his 
officers.  Finally  the  prisoners  were  taken  to  the  beach  and 
massacred  in  a  body. 

History  has  condemned  this  horrible  act,  but  mihtary  writers 
have  declared  it  justifiable.*  But  certainly  this  can  apply  only 
in  so  far  as  concerns  the  garrison  of  Jaffa,  who  were  taken  in  the 
assault  with  arms  in  their  hands  after  having  rejected  every 
manner  of  capitulation.  These  were,  however,  according  to 
report,  not  the  only  ones  who  were  put  to  the  sword.  In  addi- 
tion 800  militiamen  from  the  garrison  of  El  Arish  were  murdered 
with  them.  To  these  the  promise  of  unmolested  withdrawal 
had  been  made,  but,  in  the  end,  not  kept,  for  fear  that  they 
should  go  to  strengthen  the  enemy.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  an 
abomination  such  as  no  argument  of  military  usage  can  excuse. f 

♦For  example,  Yorck,  in  his  recently  published  book  on  "Napoleon 
als  Feldherr  "  (I.  132),  says :  "  History  of  a  pedantic  order  has  been  shocked 
and  horrified  at  this  deed;  from  a  military  standpoint  the  question  wears 
a  very  difT(!rent  aspect.  The  welfare  of  his  own  army,  and  with  it  the 
possil>ility  of  winning  a  victory,  must  precede  all  other  considerations  in 
the  mind  of  the  commander.  If  the  proceeding  were  necessary  to  the 
safety  of  his  army,  not  only  was  the  act  in  this  case  justified,  but  its  repe- 
tition in  a  future  war  would  be  the  same,  and  any  convention  would  be 
powerless  to  make  any  change  in  the  matter." 

t  A  staff-officer  in  th(!  expeditionary  army  relates:  "Contrary  to  the 
terms  of  the  capitulation,  the  prisoners  from  El  Arish  had  been  dragged 


M. 


^T.  29]  The  Siege  of  Acre  141 

On  the  19th  of  March  Bonaparte  encamped  before  Acre. 
The  fortress  differed  apparently  but  little  from  those  of  the 
easily  conquered  El  Arish  and  Jaffa.  A  superficial  reconnois- 
sance  of  its  works  yielded  a  similar  impression,  and  since  the 
heavy  artillery  which  had  been  ordered  sent  on  from  Alexandria 
had  not  yet  arrived, — if,  indeed,  it  ever  should  succeed  in  escap- 
ing the  English  cruisers, — the  commander-in-chief  began  this 
siege  with  the  same  means  which  had  proved  sufficient  in  the 
former  cases.  But  at  Acre  the  result  was  to  be  a  different  one. 
The  works  were  much  better  adapted  to  effectual  resistance, 
being  provided  with  a  counterscarp  behind  the  outer  walls.  In 
addition,  the  English  rear-admiral,  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  was  in  the 
offing  with  several  ships  whence  he  furnished  the  fortress 
with  provisions  and  means  of  defence,  and  sent  to  Jezzar  a 
capable  officer  of  engineers  who  conducted  the  defence.  By  a 
strange  coincidence  that  officer  was  Picard  de  Phelippeaux,  a 
fellow  student  of  Bonaparte's  at  the  Paris  "Ecole  Militaire." 
These  two  men  who  had  sat  together  on  the  same  bench  at 
school  were  now  opposed  to  one  another  at  this  moment  so 
significant  in  the  world's  history,  the  Corsican  in  the  service  of 
France,  the  Frenchman  as  the  instrument  of  the  English. 

The  speedy  conquest  of  this  place  was  very  important  for 
Bonaparte,  for  war  had  now  really  broken  out  on  the  Continent. 
In  March  he  received  from  the  Directory  a  despatch  of  Novem- 
ber 4th,  1798,*  which  confirmed  the  report  that  the  Neapolitan 

along  in  the  train  of  the  army;  Bonaparte  feared  that  instead  of  going 
to  Bagdad  they  would  go  to  Jaffa  or  to  Acre,  where  they  would  have 
reinforced  the  enemy.  After  the  taking  of  Jaffa  these  militiamen  pro- 
tested and  became  unruly.  Bonaparte,  said  they,  had  no  further  occasion 
to  fear  their  going  to  Jaffa,  he  ought  to  let  them  depart  according  to 
agreement.  Still  he  could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  permit  this,  and  as 
he  had  resolved  upon  ridding  himself  of  the  prisoners  made  at  JafTa.  he 
secretly  ordered  those  from  El  Arish  included  with  the  others,  and  had 
them  all  massacred  together  on  the  10th  of  March."  (Jahrbiicher  fiir 
die  Deutsche  Armee  und  Marine,  XXXVI.  141.) 

This  account  would  agree  with  Bourrienne's  statement,  giving  the 
number  of  the  victims  at  about  4000, — 3000  men  of  the  Jaffa  garrison, 
with  the  800  militiamen. 

*  Since  the  battle  of  Aboukir,  and  in  consequence  of  the  constant 


142  Egypt  [1799 

forces  were  about  to  take  the  field  under  command  of  Austrian 
generals  (Mack  and  Sachsen),  which  was  at  the  same  time  an 
indication  of  the  renewal  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  Austria. 
Further,  that  an  Austrian  detachment  had  penetrated  the 
Grisons,  thus  violating  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland,  the  ally  of 
France.  To  meet  these  complications  the  Directory  had  ordered 
a  levy  of  200,000  men  and  given  to  General  Jourdan  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  and  to  Joubert  that  of  the  Army 
of  Italy,  where  presumably  the  decisive  blows  were  to  be  dealt. 
Bonaparte  himself  was  to  act  according  to  circumstances  and 
the  dictation  of  his  own  judgment.  The  Directory  not  being 
in  a  position  to  give  him  any  support,  it  would  refrain  also  from 
giving  him  any  commands  or  instructions.  The  despatch 
closed  with  the  words:  "Since  a  return  to  France  appears  to  be 
difficult  of  achievement  at  the  present  juncture,  three  alternatives 
seem  to  offer  among  which  you  can  choose:  to  remain  in  Egypt 
and  so  establish  yourself  as  to  be  safe  against  all  attacks  of  the 
Turks, — in  which  case,  as  you  are  aware,  the  fact  must  be  taken 
into  consideration  that  there  are  seasons  there  extremely  calami- 
tous to  Europeans,  especially  if  without  aid  from  the  mother 
country;  to  penetrate  into  India,  where,  on  your  arrival,  there 
is  no  question  but  that  you  would  find  men  ready  to  unite  with 
you  to  accomplish  the  overthrow  of  British  domination;  or, 
finally,  to  march  toward  Constantinople  against  the  enemy  which 
threatens  you."  This  letter  was  accompanied  by  newspapers 
dated  as  late  as  February,  which  the  consul  at  Genoa  had  given 
the  courier  to  take  with  him  and  which  told  of  war  actually 
Ijroken  out  between  France  and  Naples  and  Sardinia,  and  of  the 
advance  of  the  Russians  toward  Italy. 

Much  impressed  by  these  tidings,  and  disregarding  the  pro- 
cruising  about  of  English  ships,  intercourse  with  France  had  been  made 
extremely  difficult,  ("specially  when,  after  Turkey's  declaration  of  war, 
the  Barbary  States  also  assumed  a  hostile  attitude  and  communication 
between  Tripoli  and  Egypt  became  altogether  unsafe.  This  despatch 
]\\d  reached  Alexandria  in  safety  by  means  of  a  Genoese  transport-ship; 
nit  how  many  letters  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English  is  evidenced  by 
the  two  volumes  of  th(^  "Correspondence  of  the  French  Army  in  Egypt" 
which  appeared  in  London  in  1799. 


^T.  29]  A-ssaults  Fail  14^ 

tests  of  Kl^bcr,  Bonaparte,  toward  the  end  of  March,  1799, 
ordered  the  storming  of  Acre  with  all  possible  speed.  Only 
this  "heap  of  stones"  more  to  conquer,  and  then — covered 
with  the  glory  of  having  outshone  the  crusaders — away  to 
Europe,  alone,  where  the  Directory,  as  their  letter  shows,  are 
undertaking  a  war  with  very  Uttle  confidence  of  success.  These 
were  his  reflections.  Moreover,  when  leaving  Cairo  he  had  an- 
nounced to  Bourrienne  that  if  he  received  in  March  tidings  that 
France  was  at  war  against  the  coalition,  he  should  depart  at 
once.  These  tidings  had  reached  him,  and  immediately  he  told 
General  Dommartin  in  confidence  that  he  counted  upon  return- 
ing to  France  with  a  certain  number  of  generals  and  higher 
officers.  He  needed  then  only  to  acquire  a  httle  glory  before 
taking  his  departure. 

But  Acre  resisted  all  attempts.  The  assault  was  repulsed, 
and  the  result  heightened  the  self-confidence  of  the  besieged. 
Good  artillery  manned  by  English  gunners  inflicted  serious 
losses  upon  the  French;  Albanian  sharpshooters  threatened 
the  shghtest  indiscretion  with  certain  death ;  Caffarelli,  the  excel- 
lent general  of  engineers,  died  of  a  wound  received  in  the  trenches; 
the  besiegers  were  kept  constantly  on  the  alert  by  frequent 
sorties.  To  add  to  their  difficulties,  an  army  of  relief  organized 
in  Damascus  was  hastening  to  the  aid  of  the  besieged  and  had 
already  crossed  the  Jordan.  Kl^ber's  division,  which  was  sent 
out  against  it,  was  soon  surrounded  by  forces  twenty  times  as 
many  as  his,  and  in  spite  of  the  heroism  of  his  soldiers  they  were 
in  a  most  critical  situation.  Napoleon  had  to  go  to  their  assist- 
ance, and  on  the  IGth  of  April,  by  means  of  a  brilliant  feat  of 
arms,  he  was  successful  in  routing  the  enemy  at  the  foot  of 
Mount  Tabor.  Murat  then  drove  the  remainder  back  across  the 
Jordan. 

Meanwhile  the  work  of  the  besiegers  had  been  pushed  vigor- 
ously forward.  Mines  had  been  laid,  but  with  insignificant 
results.  The  assault  had  been  again  and  again  renewed,  but 
all  in  vain.  Finally  the  point  of  attack  was  changed  with  no 
better  success  than  before.  At  command  of  PhelippeaiLX  a 
second  "enceinte"  was  constructed  within  the  fortress  and  the 


144  ^gyP^  tl799 

streets  barricaded.  An  assault  on  May  8th,  1799,  undertaken  with 
unparalleled  gallantry,  broke  upon  this  accumulation  of  defences, 
and  only  a  few  hundred  of  the  most  foolhardy  grenadiers  reached 
the  interior  of  the  city,  where  they  were  obliged  in  the  end  to 
give  themselves  up  to  the  English.  It  was  not  long  before 
pestilence  began  to  spread  in  the  French  camp,  ammunition 
was  growing  scarce,  and,  as  if  to  take  from  Napoleon  his  last 
ray  of  hope  of  success,  a  Turkish  squadron  landed  reinforcements 
for  the  besieged.  When,  on  the  16th  of  May,  there  followed 
the  last  decisive  attack  upon  the  nearly  demolished  city,  it 
miscarried,  as  had  the  others.  To  tarry  further  was  now  useless, 
indeed  ruinous,  especially  to  the  personal  standing  of  Bonaparte 
with  his  troops,  whom  he  sacrificed  without  number.  Two  days, 
May  7th  and  8th,  had  alone  cost  3000  men  and  two  generals. 
The  army  began  to  murmur  and  to  contrast  their  unfeeling 
commander-in-chief  with  the  humane  Kleber,  and  there  were 
individuals  who  even  wanted  the  chief  command  transferred 
to  the  latter.  Napoleon  determined  upon  retreat  to  Egypt.  The 
more  improbable  the  conquest  of  Acre  became,  the  more  he  had 
expatiated  upon  his  far-reaching  designs  in  case  the  siege  were 
successful.  Where  his  deeds  no  longti  yielded  the  coveted 
glory,  he  had  recourse  to  his  imposing  dreams.  With  the 
weapons  plundered  from  the  fortress  at  Acre  he  should  arm  the 
discontented  tribes  of  Syria,  march  upon  Damascus  and  Aleppo, 
proclaim  the  end  of  the  tyranny  of  the  pashas,  and,  with  the 
hordes  which  should  come  to  swell  the  ranks  of  his  army,  move 
upon  Constantinople.  "Then,"  said  he  to  Bourrienne,  "the 
Turkish  Empire  falls  before  me;  I  establish  in  the  Orient  a  new 
and  great  empire  which  will  assure  my  place  with  posterity,  and 
perhaps  I  shall  return  to  Paris  by  way  of  Adrianople  or  Vienna 
after  having  crushed  the  House  of  Austria." 

Here  were  again  the  visions  of  that  imagination  of  which  he 
had  said  in  the  before-mentioned  conversation  with  Madame 
de  R^musat  that  it  had  "died  confronting  Acre."  That  may 
have  been,  but  in  any  case  we  know  from  his  own  letters  written 
from  Syria  to  those  who  had  nnnained  in  Egypt  that  his  efforts 
were  to  be  directed  toward  a  return  to  Cairo  whether  the  fortress 


^T.  29]  The   Retreat  145 

yielded  or  not.  For  he  was  convinced  that  a  TurkLsh  army, 
which  had  already  been  seen  at  Rhodes,  was  designed  to  land 
at  the  Delta  of  the  Nile,  and  it  was  clear  to  him  that  these 
forces  must  be  conquered  if  everything  were  not  to  be  lost.  The 
unyielding  claim  of  this  immediate  necessity  put  to  flight  all 
further  dreams  of  advance  toward  Constantinople  or  India,  or 
the  foundation  of  an  Oriental  kingdom.  And  an  empire  might 
not  impossibly  be  founded  elsewhere  than  in  Asia. 

On  May  20th  the  siege  was  raised  and  the  retreat  begun. 
According  to  descriptions  of  contemporaries  the  latter  was 
horrible  in  the  extreme.  The  march  from  Acre  to  Jaffa  is  por- 
trayed in  these  words:  "A  consuming  thirst,  total  lack  of  water, 
excessive  heat,*  a  fatiguing  march  through  scorching  dunes, 
demoralized  the  men  and  caused  all  generous  feeling  to  give 
place  to  the  most  cruel  selfishness,  the  most  distressing  indiffer- 
ence. I  have  seen  officers  with  amputated  limbs  thrown  from 
the  litters  upon  which  they  were  to  have  been  transported 
according  to  orders,  even  in  cases  where  the  wounded  man  had 
paid  the  bearers  for  their  labour.  I  have  seen  abandoned  to 
their  fate  those  who  had  suffered  amputation,  the  wounded 
together  ^^dth  those  who  were  attacked  by  the  plague  or  only 
suspected  of  being  so.  The  march  was  illumined  by  torches 
kindled  to  set  fire  to  small  cities,  towns,  villages,  hamlets,  and 
the  rich  harvests  with  which  the  land  was  covered.  The  whole 
country  was  in  flames.  We  were  surrounded  only  by  plunderers, 
incendiaries,  and  the  dying.  By  the  side  of  the  road  where  they 
had  been  thrown  lay  men  half  dead,  calling  out  with  feeble 
voice,  'I  am  not  sick  with  the  plague,  I  am  only  wounded,'  and 
to  convince  the  passers-by  many  of  these  poor  wretches  could 
be  seen  reopening  their  wounds  or  inflicting  new  ones  upon 
themselves.  No  one  believed  in  them.  .  .  .  The  sun  in  all  its 
splendour  under  this  clear  sky  was  obscured  by  the  smoke  from 
our  incessant  conflagrations.  We  had  at  our  right  the  sea  and 
behind  us  the  desert  which  we  had  created,  before  us  the  priva- 

*  In  the  desert,  between  Syria  and  the  Nile,  the  thermometer  regis- 
tered 34°  Reaumur  (108°  Fahr.)  when  exposed  to  the  air,  and  42°  Reau- 
mur (125°  Fahr.)  when  in  contact  with  the  ground. 


14^  Egypt  [1799 

tions  and  sufferings  which  awaited  us;  such,  in  truth,  was  our 
situation."*  Besides  there  were  hovering  all  about  them  swarms 
of  Nabulusians,  one  of  whom  on  one  occasion  shot  at  Napoleon, 
who  had  fallen  asleep  upon  his  horse  while  on  the  march. 

On  the  24th  of  May  they  reached  Jaffa.  Here  yet  lay  those 
wounded  during  the  attack  on  the  city.  The  plague  had  asserted 
itself  here  as  in  the  ranks  of  the  army.  Napoleon  himself 
hastened  through  the  wards  of  the  hospital,  calling  out  to  the 
sick:  "The  fortifications  are  destroyed.  Fortune  was  against 
me  at  Acre.  I  have  got  to  return  to  Egypt  to  keep  it  from 
enemies  who  are  about  to  descend  upon  it.  The  Turks  will  be 
here  in  a  few  hours;  let  all  who  feel  able  to  get  up  come  with 
us;  they  will  be  transported  on  litters  and  horses."  And  how 
about  the  others?  There  were  about  sixty  stricken  with  the 
plague  who  were  obliged  to  remain.  Fable  has  exaggerated 
this  visit  to  the  hospital  both  in  art  and  writing,  while  ill-disposed 
criticism  has  set  forth  as  a  crime  his  suggestion  that  those  who 
must  remain  should  be  protected  from  the  fury  of  the  pursuing 
foe  by  administration  of  a  narcotic  which  should  bring  about 
painless  death.  He  never  denied  having  taken  this  view  of  the 
situation,  and  at  St.  Helena  he  declared  himself  to  his  physician 
to  be  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  measure  suggested  would  have 
been  the  wisest,  and  that  under  similar  circumstances  he  should 
have  pursued  the  same  course  toward  his  own  son. 

Through  Ascalon  and  Gaza  and  then  for  nine  long  days 
through  the  burning  sands  of  the  desert,  the  expeditionary 
troops,  wofuUy  reduced  in  number,  dragged  their  weary  way; 
a  procession  smaller  in  extent  but  otherwise  closely  resembling 
that  awful  retreat  from  Russia's  bitter  cold  and  ice  which  thir- 
teen years  later  prefaced  the  end  of  the  "Fortune"  of  the  P]m- 
peror  of  the  French.  Five  thousand  men  had  been  sacrificed 
without  making  the  shghtest  impression  upon  the  Porte.  And 
to  disperse  a  Turkish  army  there  was  no  need  for  travelling  that 
long  road  of  suffering  to  Mount  Tabor.  Least  of  all  had  any- 
thing been  accomplished  toward  the  satiation  of  the  ambition 
of  the  commander.  His  chief  concern  now  was  that  there  should 
*  Jung:   "  Bonaparte  et  son  Temps,"  III.  290. — B. 


^T.  29]  Deceptive   Bulletins  147 

be  no  avowal  of  the  truth.  While  still  before  Acre,  on  the 
10th  of  May,  he  had  announced  to  the  Directory  that  his  object 
had  been  attained,  the  season  was  growing  unfavourable,  and 
Egypt  demanded  his  presence;  he  should  return  through  the 
desert  after  having  demolished  the  fortress.  In  another  report, 
of  May  27th,  his  statement  was  that  he  might  have  occupied 
the  city,  but  had  abstained  from  doing  so  on  account  of  the 
plague  which,  his  spies,  prisoners,  and  deserters  all  concurred  in 
testifying,  was  raging  there  most  frightfully.  (What  a  pity 
that  his  spies  had  been  so  late  in  making  this  discovery!)  In 
a  war  bulletin  of  the  16th  of  May  he  announced  to  the  Divan 
of  Cairo,  an  organization  of  his  own  creation,  that  he  was  bring- 
ing with  him  a  vast  number  of  prisoners  and  flags,  that  he  had 
razed  to  the  ground  the  palace  of  Jczzar,  likewise  the  ramparts 
of  Acre,  and  so  bombarded  the  city  as  to  leave  no  stone  upon 
another;  the  inhabitants  had  all  fled  by  way  of  the  sea;  Jezzar, 
who  was  wounded,  had  retired  with  his  followers  into  one  of 
the  forts  on  the  seacoast.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  reassure 
his  owTi  soldiers  with  the  confidently  affirmed  falsehood  that 
they  might  have  hoped  in  a  few  days  to  overpower  the  Pasha 
of  Syria  himself  in  his  palace,  but  that  at  this  season,  with  the 
possibiUty  of  a  landing  of  the  Turks  in  Egypt,  the  capture  of 
Acre  would  not  counterbalance  the  loss  of  time  spent  in  the 
effort.  When  his  secretary  ventured  to  protest  against  this 
distortion  of  the  actual  circumstances.  Napoleon  silenced  him 
with  the  observation  that  he  was  a  simpleton  who  tormented 
himself  about  trifles  and  had  no  comprehension  of  matters  of 
this  kind. 

Toward  the  middle  of  June,  the  Syrian  army,  reduced  it  is 
true  to  only  8000  men,  made  its  triumphal  entry  into  the  capital 
of  Egypt.  A  short  time  afterward  Bonaparte  received  word 
from  Marmont  in  Alexandria  that  100  Turkish  ships  had  ap- 
peared on  the  11th  of  July  in  the  roadstead  of  Aboukir  under 
escort  of  Sir  Sidney  Smith  and  had  landed  18,000  men.*     The 

*  The  number  fluctuates  between  8000  and  18,000  according  as  the 
statement  be  made  by  the  EngUsh  or  by  the  French.  The  former  is 
certainly  too  low  an  estimate,  the  latter  too  high  in  comparison  with  the 


148  Egypt  [1799 

same  message  had  evidently  reached  Ibrahim  and  Murad,  whom 
Desaix  had  until  now  kept  at  a  respectful  distance ;  for  the  former 
now  again  appeared  on  the  Syrian  frontier,  while  the  latter 
made  efforts  to  reach  the  North  with  some  hundreds  of  Mame- 
lukes, both  with  the  object  of  co-operating  with  the  Turkish 
forces  just  landed.  The  latter  had  intrenched  themselves  tem- 
porarily upon  the  peninsula  of  Aboukir,  Alexandria  being 
fortified  by  the  French. 

Bonaparte  determined  upon  attacking  them  in  this  place  and 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  Murad  was  speedily  driven 
toward  the  South,  while  a  close  watch  was  kept  upon  Ibrahim. 
To  facihtate  the  concentration  of  the  French  forces,  Desaix  was 
ordered  to  evacuate  Upper  Egypt,  while  with  all  other  disposable 
troops — numbering  about  6000  men,  besides  a  reserve  of  2000 
entrusted  to  Kleber — the  commander-in-chief  advanced  against 
the  enemy.  It  was  a  hastily  conceived  plan  brilliantly  exe- 
cuted on  the  plain  of  Aboukir,  July  25th,  1799.  The  plan  of 
action  in  this  battle  was  characteristically  Napoleonic — to  unite 
all  forces  before  the  onslaught,  make  use  of  them  all  in  the  en- 
gagement, and  seek  to  annihilate  his  foe ;  its  execution  was  made 
much  easier  through  the  defective  order  of  battle  adopted  by 
the  Turks.  The  success  was  complete.  The  left  wing  of  the 
enemy  having  been  surrounded  and  driven  into  the  sea,  the  right 
was  made  to  undergo  the  same  fate.  Lannes  then  succeeded  in 
gaining  possession  of  a  commanding  redoubt  which  Murat  and 
his  cavalry,  with  mad  impetuosity,  had  ridden  around  and  which 
constituted  the  strongest  point  of  the  Turkish  centre.  That 
also  was  now  forced,  and  only  a  few  remnants  of  the  Turkish 
forces  escaped  to  the  fort  on  the  apex  of  the  little  peninsula. 
These  were  reduced  by  starvation  and  forced  to  capitulate  a 
week  later.  This  time  Napoleon  confined  himself  strictly  to  the 
truth  in  writing  to  Cairo:  "The  staff  will  have  acquainted  you 
with  the  outcome  of  the  battle  of  Aboukir;  it  is  one  of  the  finest 
I  have  ever  witnessed.  Of  the  army  landed  by  the  enemy  not  a 
man  has  escaped." 

number  of  transport-ships.  More  than  15,000  men  were  scarcely  to  be 
conveyed  on  100  transport-vessels. 


^T.  29]  French   Losses  in   Europe  149 

In  addition  to  this  triumph  but  one  thing  more  was  needed 
to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  his  self-seeking  ambition:  to  be 
assured  that  he  had  been  correct  in  the  second  assumption  upon 
which  he  had  based  his  departure  to  Egypt — that  the  war  broken 
out  meanwhile  in  Europe  should  result  disastrously  to  France, 
thus  not  only  increasing  his  own  personal  importance,  but  bringing 
the  government  at  Paris  into  discredit  so  that  a  determined 
soldier  who  knew  how  to  conquer  at  this  time  might  with  the 
same  blow  easily  acquire  the  power  of  the  State.  And  the  cer- 
tainty of  this  condition  of  affairs  Napoleon  obtained  for  himself. 

Since  the  message  which  had  overtaken  him  while  before 
Acre  no  other  had  reached  him.  He  could  not  know  that  at  the 
end  of  May,  1799,  the  French  admiral  Bruix  had  received  orders 
to  unite  his  squadron  with  the  Spanish  fleet  to  defeat  the  Eng- 
lish on  the  Mediterranean  and  bring  home  the  expeditionary 
army  from  Egj'pt — an  enterprise  which  fell  through  on  account 
of  the  refusal  of  the  Spanish  commander  to  co-operate.  He 
failed  also  of  receiving  a  letter  sent  to  him  on  May  26th  by  the 
Directory  notifying  him  of  Bruix's  mission  and  recalling  him  to 
Europe.*  But  he  heard  nevertheless  what  he  needed  to  know. 
It  is  almost  a  certainty  that  he  received  occasional  tidings  from 
his  brothers  by  way  of  Tunis  through  the  consuls  of  Genoa  and 
Ancona,  who  were  devoted  to  his  interests.  And  here  again 
chance  came  to  his  aid.     Sir  Sidney  Smith,  who  now  lay  at 

*  A  passage  from  this  letter  signed  by  three  of  the  Directors  runs 
thus:  "The  extraordinary  efforts  just  put  forth  by  Austria  and  Russia, 
the  serious  and  ahnost  alarming  turn  taken  by  the  war,  necessitates  to 
the  Republic  the  concentration  of  all  its  forces.  The  Director}'  has 
accordingly  just  given  command  to  Admiral  Bruix  to  employ  all  means 
in  his  power  to  make  himself  master  of  the  Mediterranean  and  to  bear 
toward  Egypt  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  back  from  thence  the  army 
under  your  connnand.  He  has  orders  to  arrange  with  you  as  to  the  method 
to  be  employed  in  effecting  its  embarkation  and  transport.  It  is  left 
to  your  discretion,  Citizen  General,  to  decide  whether  you  can  with  safety 
leave  in  Egypt  a  part  of  your  forces,  and  you  are  authorized  by  the  Direc- 
tor}' in  this  case  to  entrust  the  command  to  whomsoever  you  may  judge 
fit.  The  Directory  would  take  pleasure  in  seeing  you  at  the  head  of  the 
republican  armies  which  you  have  up  to  the  present  time  commanded 
with  so  much  glorj-." 


150  Egypt  [1799 

anchor  before  Alexandria  and  was  entering  into  negotiations 
with  Bonaparte  in  regard  to  the  release  of  prisoners,  took  pleasure 
in  communicating  to  him  the  late  defeats  suffered  by  the  French 
in  Italy,  where  indeed  Scherer  had  been  overcome  in  April  and 
the  Cisalpine  Republic  dissolved.  As  testimony  to  the  truth  of 
his  assertions  he  sent  to  Bonaparte  a  package  of  the  most  recent 
newspapers,  announcing  in  addition  that  he  was  under  orders  to 
prevent  the  return  of  the  expeditionary  army  desired  by  the 
Directory.  Nothing  more  was  needed  to  determine  Napoleon's 
immediate  execution  of  the  plan  long  before  resolved  upon.  In 
the  words  with  which  he  announced  his  decision  to  Marmont  may 
be  found  the  entire  plan  by  which  his  actions  were  to  be  directed 
during  the  ensuing  months:  "I  have  determined  upon  taking 
my  departure  for  France,  and  I  count  upon  taking  you  with  me. 
The  state  of  affairs  in  Europe  forces  me  to  this  momentous  step; 
reverses  have  overwhelmed  our  armies,  and  Heaven  knows  to 
what  point  the  enemy  may  have  already  advanced.  Italy  is 
lost,  and  the  reward  of  so  many  efforts,  of  so  much  bloodshed, 
escapes  us.  And  what,  in  truth,  is  the  use  of  these  incapables  put 
at  the  head  of  affairs?  There  is  nothing  but  ignorance,  stupidity, 
or  corruption  amongst  them.  It  is  I,  I  alone,  who  have  borne 
the  burden  and  by  means  of  constant  victory  given  strength  to 
this  government,  which  without  me  would  never  have  been  able 
to  lift  its  head  and  support  itself.  As  soon  as  I  was  gone  every- 
thing had  to  collapse.  Do  not  let  us  wait  until  the  destruction 
be  complete.  .  .  .  The  news  of  my  arrival  and  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Turkish  army  at  Aboukir  will  be  heard  in  France 
ahiiost  at  the  same  moment.  My  presence,  in  raising  their 
spirits,  will  restore  to  the  army  the  confidence  which  it  lacks, 
and  to  good  citizens  the  hope  of  a  brighter  future." 

His  intentions  were  confided  to  but  a  few  trusted  men  and 
concealed  from  most  of  the  generals.  Witli  tlie  utmost  secrecy 
also  were  the  two  frigates  at  anchor  in  the  harbour  of  Alexandria 
fitted  out  for  the  voyage.  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  to  whom  it  was 
apparently  incoiicoiva])le  that  the  cominatidor-in-chief  should 
return  to  France  without  this  army,  had  left  the  roadstead  for  a 
short  time  to  renew  his  supply  of  water  at  Cyprus.    Hardly  had  he 


i 


.Et.  30]        Napoleon's   Decision   to   Return  151 

taken  his  departure  before  Na|)()le()n  profited  by  this  new  favour 
of  fortune  and  made  his  way  out  to  sea  during  the  night  of  August 
21st,  accompanied  by  only  a  few  devoted  adherents,  Lannes, 
Marmont,  Murat,  Monge,  Berthollet,  and  a  few  hundred  soldiers  of 
the  guard.  To  the  gallant  Kleber,  whose  inconsiderate  frankness 
had  made  him  obnoxious  to  Napoleon,  was  left,  by  written  order, 
the  command  of  the  army  remaining  in  Egypt. 

The  fact  does  not  appear  to  have  been  taken  into  considera- 
tion by  Napoleon  that  honour  required  his  continuance  with  the 
troops  which  had  been  entrusted  to  his  leading  and  which  had 
courageously  shed  their  blood  in  the  furtherance  of  his  own 
ambitious  designs.  And  yet  it  is  scarcely  admissible  to  accuse 
him  of  abandonment  of  the  army,  nor — as  has  even  been  done — 
of  desertion.  His  position  toward  the  Directory  was  without 
question  exceptional.  At  the  time  of  his  departure  for  Egypt  it 
was  miderstood  that  he  w^as  to  return  during  the  autumn  of 
1798  to  resume  command  of  the  Army  of  England.  This  was 
not  to  be  the  case  with  the  entire  expeditionary  corps,  since  it 
was  the  plan  also  to  found  a  colony  and  to  organize  plantations 
which  would  require  perpetual  protection.  The  letter  of  No- 
vember 4th,  1798,  from  the  National  authorities  at  Paris,  re- 
ceived while  besieging  Acre  and  which  has  been  before  cited,  left 
him  entire  freedom  in  his  decisions.  He  himself  had  repeatedly 
and  openly  announced  his  approaching  return  to  France,  which 
he  would  certainly  not  have  done  had  it  been  directly  contra- 
dictory to  instructions.  But  it  is  equally  certain  that  in  taking 
this  step  he  was  acting  only  out  of  regard  for  his  personal  ambi- 
tion and  interests.  For  neither  of  these  was  anything  further  to 
be  acquired  in  Egypt  and  everything  to  be  lost.  The  situation 
of  the  expeditionary  army  must  inevitably  grow  more  and  more 
critical,  and  in  announcing  that  he  left  it  just  after  a  victory  in 
the  field  which  would  long  protect  it  from  molestation  his  state- 
ments did  not  wholly  coincide  with  the  truth.  He  kept  silence 
upon  one  point  which  he  afterwards  divulged  at  St.  Helena: 
that  he  was  already  convinced  from  the  moment  of  the  loss  of 
the  fleet  at  Aboukir  that  expedition  could  end  only  in  catastrophe, 
since  any  army  which  cannot  be    recruited    must    eventually 


152  Egypt  [1799 

capitulate.  He  also  prudently  refrained  from  communicating 
what  was  revealed  by  the  honest  Kl^ber  in  a  letter  to  Talleyrand : 
that  the  army,  already  reduced  by  one  half,  was  suffering  for 
the  want  of  munitions  and  clothing;  that  the  population  of 
Egypt,  roused  by  the  Sultan  against  the  Christians,  was  ready  at 
any  moment  to  rise  in  revolt;  that  an  advance  of  new  Turkish 
forces  was  threatening,  and  that  Alexandria  was  almost  defence- 
less, since  the  heavy  artillery  had  been  lost  in  the  Syrian  campaign 
and  the  remainder  of  the  equipment  used  in  fitting  out  Napo- 
leon's two  frigates;  finally,  that  the  distress  of  the  situation  was 
aggravated  by  a  grievous  lack  of  money,  since  the  arrears  of  pay 
to  the  troops  now  amounted  to  4,000,000  francs,  and  Napoleon 
had  left  nothing  but  debts  with  not  a  single  sou  in  the  treasury. 
Much  has  been  said  of  the  courage  shown  by  Napoleon  in 
exposing  himself  to  the  dangers  of  a  voyage  upon  the  Mediterra- 
nean, infested  as  it  was  by  ships  of  the  enemy.  But  it  may  be 
questioned  whether  it  would  not  have  required  greater  courage 
to  remain  under  such  desperate  circumstances.  And  in  this 
courage  Napoleon  would  not  have  been  found  wanting  if  his 
ambitious  schemes  had  not  impelled  him  to  make  this  effort 
toward  the  acquisition  of  supreme  power  in  France.  Of  these 
schemes  the  distinguishing  features  had  long  been  determined 
upon,  nor  was  there  any  lack  of  devoted  adherents,  so  that  even 
before  the  expedition  to  the  Orient  they  had  been  on  the  point 
of  realization  by  means  of  a  Coup  d'Etat.  The  Army  of  the 
Orient  was  composed  almost  exclusively  of  fervent  republicans. 
He  felt  not  the  least  pang  in  separating  himself  from  it ;  it  suited 
him  perhaps  better  to  know  that  it  would  be  far  from  France  at 
the  moment  when  his  designs  were  to  be  executed.  During  the 
camj)aign  in  Italy  Napoleon  had  already  obeyed  only  his  own 
impulses,  regarded  himself  as  sovereign  in  conquered  countries, 
and  negotiated  and  concluded  the  treaties  of  Leoben  and  Campo 
Formio  by  which  France  had  been  bound.  Here  in  Egypt, 
where  even  more  than  before  he  acted  as  his  own  master,  his 
spirit  of  domination  had  found  new  sustenance  and  his  yearning 
desire  to  become  the  head  of  an  independent  government  had 
struck  deeper  root  than  ever  into   his   character.     He   could 


iEr.  30]  Napoleon's   Desire   to   Rule  153 

scarcely  think  of  himself  any  longer  as  without  a  crown.  Only 
it  seemed  to  him  manifestly  easier  to  pluck  it  from  the  witliered 
liberty-tree  of  the  Revolution  than  to  disinter  it  from  the  endless 
sands  of  the  desert. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  COUP  D'ETAT  AND  THE  CONSULATE 

At  that  time,  when  everything  depended  upon  wind  and 
weather  alone,  a  voyage  to  or  from  Egypt  was  a  question  of 
the  season.  From  the  beginning  of  spring  until  autumn  it  was 
an  easy  matter,  driven  by  the  constant  northwest  wind,  to 
reach  Alexandria  from  Toulon,  but  just  so  much  the  more 
difficult  to  make  the  trip  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  was, 
therefore,  no  favourable  season  for  a  journey  to  France  when 
the  two  frigates,  "Muiron"  and  "Carrere",  with  Bonaparte 
upon  the  former,  left  the  Egyptian  harbour.  Only  for  the 
sake  of  eluding  the  vigilant  watch  of  Sir  Sidney  Smith  had 
they  put  to  sea  in  August.  The  contrary  wind  compelled  the 
two  ships  to  give  up  the  direct  course  to  Toulon  and  to  sail 
along  the  north  coast  of  Africa.  Their  progress  was  scarcely 
to  be  designated  as  such.  A  number  of  times  they  were  driven 
back  ten  miles  during  the  day  and  only  regained  their  former 
position  by  night  when  the  breezes  blew  from  the  shore.  Not 
less  than  three  weeks  were  thus  consumed  by  the  impatient 
travellers  before  they  arrived  off  the  Carthaginian  headlands, 
in  constant  anxiety  of  being  attacked  from  the  rear  by  the 
enemy.  But  the  real  danger  began  only  when  the  wind  at 
last  turned  to  the  advantage  of  the  homeward  bound.  The 
narrow  passage  between  Sicily  and  Tunis  had  to  be  passed,  and 
this  was  guarded  by  an  English  cruiser  belonging  to  Nelson's 
fleet,  which  was  at  anchor  off  Syracuse.  Should  the  frigates 
be  discovered  by  this  vessel,  it  would  be  a  very  short  time 
before  the  dreaded  admiral  would  be  in  pursuit.  Fortunately 
they  succeeded  in  passing  the  scout  at  night  with  lights  ex- 
tinguished, and  now  directed  their  course  toward  the  north 
along  the  west  coast  of  Sardinia  as  far  as  Corsica,  which  they 

154 


^T.  30]  Changes  In   Paris  15^ 

reached  in  the  beginning  of  October.  And  here  they  were 
again  detained  for  several  days  by  a  return  of  the  northwest 
wind  to  the  vexation  of  Napoleon,  who  was  overrun  in  Ajaccio 
by  cousins  and  godparents  and  every  one  who  could  claim 
relationship  of  any  kind.  He  was  totally  unmoved  by  every- 
thing except  the  meeting  with  his  old  nurse,  who  hailed  him 
eagerly  as  "caro  figlio."  He  showed  to  his  companions,  not 
without  a  certain  pride,  the  former  estates  of  the  Bonapartes, 
and  hunted  with  them  in  the  adjoining  thickets.  This  was  the 
last  time  that  he  ever  saw  his  native  island. 

As  if  his  programme  were  to  be  literally  carried  out,  he 
learned  in  Ajaccio  that  the  French  armies  had  suffered  new 
reverses,  that  on  June  19th  a  battle  had  been  lost  on  the  Trebbia, 
and  on  August  15th  another  at  Novi,  and  that  Joubert  had  been 
killed.  But  something  else  which  he  learned  was  of  still  greater 
importance  to  him:  that  the  Directory  had  succumbed  after 
a  struggle  with  the  legislative  bodies  in  June  (the  30th  Prairial), 
and  had  been  compelled  to  admit  new  members,  among  them 
Sieyes.  It  is  well  knowm  that  Napoleon's  confidence  in  the 
abbe  was  great,  and  these  tidings  consequently  could  not  but 
be  reassiuing  to  him.  They  induced  him  to  change  his  plan 
for  the  rest  of  the  voyage.  It  had  been  his  intention  to  hasten 
at  once  to  the  theatre  of  war  in  Italy,  there  to  assume  the  su- 
preme command,  and  having  by  new  victories  ingratiated  him- 
self with  the  people  of  France,  as  their  deliverer  in  the  hour  of 
need,  to  present  himself  before  the  Directory  with  all  the  weight 
of  his  renown.  This  plan  being  now  abandoned,  he  put  forth 
all  efforts  to  reach  the  capital.  The  circuitous  route  by  way 
of  the  battle-field  seemed  now  only  a  loss  of  time. 

But  first  of  all  it  was  indispensable  to  reach  the  shores  of 
France,  and  this  was  to  be  more  difficult  than  had  been  fore- 
seen, now  that,  after  having  passed  through  so  many  dangers, 
they  were  so  near  the  goal.  A  favourable  wind  had  at  last 
carried  them  away  from  Corsica,  and  on  the  8th  of  October 
tlicy  were  already  in  sight  of  the  islands  of  Hyeres  and  sailing 
toward  Toulon,  when  suddenly  at  sundowm  an  English  squad- 
ron was  made  out  bearing  directly  upon  their  course.     The 


156  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

critical  moment  was  at  hand,  for  the  Englishmen  had  also 
observed  the  frigates  and  began  to  give  chase.  The  French 
admiral  attempted  to  turn  back  toward  Corsica,  but  Napoleon 
gave  orders  to  veer  again  to  the  north  and  continue  in  their 
course.  He  was  resolved  in  case  of  necessity  to  throw  himself 
into  a  small  boat  carried  by  the  ship,  and  to  attempt  an  escape 
to  land  alone.  And  once  again  was  his  courage  rewarded  by 
success.  The  English  were  misled  in  the  distance  by  the  ap- 
parent direction  of  the  sails,  and  fancied  them  to  be  steering 
in  a  northwesterly  direction.  Under  this  mistaken  impression 
they  pressed  rapidly  forward.  Nightfall  prevented  them  from 
discovering  their  error  until  too  late.  The  frigates  escaped 
thus  narrowly,  and  the  following  morning,  October  9th,  found 
them  safely  at  anchor  in  the  harbour  of  Fr^jus. 

The  tidings  of  Bonaparte's  return  was  spread  in  a  moment 
throughout  the  town.  At  once  the  sea  was  covered  with  craft 
which,  regardless  of  the  danger  of  pestilence,  escorted  the  hon- 
oured general  to  land.  Here,  as  in  Ajaccio,  the  question  of 
quarantine  was  entirely  set  aside,  affording  no  small  gain  in 
time  to  Napoleon,  and  what  must  have  seemed  to  him  of  still 
greater  consequence  was  the  inference  to  be  drawn  from  this 
enthusiastic  reception  that  the  public  mind  had  become  most 
favourably  disposed  toward  himself.  It  is  even  related  by 
Marmont  that  he  was  publicly  greeted  by  a  club-orator  with 
the  words:  "Only  go  and  beat  the  enemy.  General,  and  drive 
him  away,  and  then  we  will  make  you  king  if  you  so  desire!" 

After  a  few  hours  of  repose  he  pursued  his  journey  without 
stop  as  far  as  Aix,  whence  he  sent  on  a  messenger  to  the  Direc- 
tory to  announce  his  arrival.  Every  word  of  his  letter  was 
carefully  weighed.  It  opened  with  the  statement  that  the 
General  had  received  the  communication  sent  by  the  govern- 
ment on  November  4th  of  the  previous  year,  and  had  concluded 
from  it  that  war  was  about  to  break  out  on  the  Continent. 
That  if  he  had  not  at  once  put  himself  at  their  disposal  the 
incursion  of  the  Turks  was  to  blame,  since  they  had  first  to  be 
overcome  before  he  might  think  of  return.  He  should  have 
ventured  to  make  the  voyage  home  whatever  the  circumstances 


Mr.  30]  Napoleon's  Welcome  i  ^j 

even  had  it  been  possible  only  "  in  a  small  boat  and  WTapped  in 
a  mantle."  He,  of  course,  asserted  in  the  letter  that  he  had 
left  Egypt  perfectly  organized,  nor  did  he  fail  to  take  precau- 
tions that  the  arrival  of  the  courier  should  precede  his  own 
but  by  a  very  short  interval. 

He  travelled  rapidly  after  leaving  Aix.  The  journey  was 
a  veritable  triumphal  procession.  His  companions  can  hardly 
find  words  to  describe  the  enthusiastic  reception  accorded  along 
the  entire  route  between  Lyons  and  Paris.  The  cities  vied 
with  each  other  in  tokens  of  homage  to  the  man  in  whom  they 
saw  not  so  much  the  conqueror  of  the  foreign  enemy  as  the 
deliverer  in  time  of  need  from  intestinal  dissension,  the  saviour 
from  the  dilemma  of  having  to  choose  between  anarchy  and  the 
Bourbons,  the  man  who  was  to  raise  the  country  from  the  state 
of  utter  despondency  into  which  it  had  fallen.  And  this  feeling 
was  not  confined  to  the  provincial  towns.  At  the  capital  also 
the  same  effect  was  produced  by  the  tidings  of  his  return,  in 
the  possibility  of  which  faith  had  ceased  to  exist.  When  it 
liccame  know-n  the  news  was  greeted  with  a  wild  outbreak  of 
joy.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution  never  had  the 
hopes  of  every  one  been  so  fastened  upon  a  single  name  as  now 
when  the  end  of  political  upheaval  was  so  ardently  desired. 
And  yet  this  was  the  same  people  who  a  year  and  a  half  before 
had  with  no  very  great  regret  seen  this  same  man  sail  away 
to  take  part  in  a  dangerous  adventure!  What  was  it  w'hich 
had  brought  about  this  rapid  and  complete  change  in  the  popu- 
lar feeling  and  realized  the  hopes  of  Napoleon  based  upon  it? 
The  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be  found  in  the  events  which 
had  taken  place  in  France  during  his  absence.  These  must  be 
more  carefully  considered. 

After  the  Coup  d'Etat  of  the  18th  Fructidor  the  Directory 
had  sought  to  protect  itself  against  a  recurrence  of  the  danger 
of  being  driven  from  power  by  the  conservative  elements  of 
the  populace,  and  had  for  this  purpose  resorted  to  the  same 
means  b}'  which  the  rule  of  the  Radical  minority  over  France 
had  once  before  been  made  possible.  It  had  established  a 
tjTannical  dictatorship  which  stopped  the  mouth  of  the  oppos- 


15B  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

ing  press,  proscribed  nobility  and  clergy,  and  compelled  more 
than  100,000  men  of  means  to  emigrate,  while  rendering 
almost  valueless  by  means  of  forced  loans  the  possessions  of 
those  who  remained;  it  had  scaled  down  the  public  debt  one 
third,  deported  to  the  colonies  political  opponents,  and  called 
forth  into  prominence  those  elements  which  had  been  fright- 
ened away  by  the  events  of  the  9th  Thermidor:  and  this  des- 
potic rule  was  expected  to  insure  to  the  Directors  the  contin- 
uance of  their  power.  In  order  that  they  and  their  creatures 
might  remain  in  supremacy  these  men,  Barras,  Rewbell,  and 
Larevelliere-Lepeaux  crushed  millions  of  people  into  timid 
subjection;  in  order  to  assure  great  revenues  to  themselves 
and  their  followers  they  ruined  property  throughout  the 
country. 

But  soon  the  Directory  had  to  recognize  that  the  Radicals, 
its  allies  of  the  18th  Fructidor,  might  become  quite  as  dangerous 
opponents  as  the  Conservatives  and  the  Monarchists.  The 
more  quiet  and  peaceable  elements  of  the  population  had  indeed 
been  conquered,  but  the  sympathizers  with  the  system  of  ter- 
rorization  pushed  themselves  only  so  much  the  more  boldly 
into  the  foreground. 

Although  forbidden  by  law,  numerous  Jacobin  clubs  were 
organized  and  confederated  with  one  another,  and  these  by 
resort  to  the  old  methods  of  intimidation  were  successful  in  con- 
trolling the  elections  in  the  spring  of  1798,  at  which  a  third  of 
the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  was  to  be  chosen.  The  vanquished 
Conservatives  stayed  away  from  the  polls,  and  the  adherents  of 
the  Directory,  who  had  separated  themselves  from  the  Jacobins, 
were  left  in  a  minority  with  their  candidates.  The  rule  of  the 
Directory  was  consequently  as  seriously  endangered  now  through 
the  preponderance  of  infuriated  menil)ers  in  the  legislature  as  it 
had  been  a  year  Iw^fore  through  tliat  of  the  Conservatives.  But 
the  Directors  knew  a  remedy  wliich  might  ])erhaps  be  of  avail; 
it  had  proved  efficacious  in  the  preceding  sununer  and  should 
again  be  made  useful:  this  was  the  violation  of  the  Constitution 
on  the  part  of  the  government.  Instead  of  annulling  the  elections 
and  apjjointing  new  ones,  on  the  ground  that  these  were  illegal 


iET.  30]         The   Plight  of  the   Directory  159 

since  intimidation  had  been  practised  upon  the  voters,  the  Direc- 
tory induced  the  Five  Hundred  to  confirm  the  elections  of  the 
members  of  the  minority  devoted  to  the  existing  government,  and 
to  exclude  sixty  Radical  deputies  (May  11th,  1798;  22d  Flor^al). 
All  that  had  been  gained  by  this  measure  was  that  the  govern- 
ment ceased  from  this  moment  to  be  sustained  by  either  of  the 
two  great  parties.  The  Conservatives  detested  it  and  had  been 
its  sworn  enemies  ever  since  the  18th  Fructidor;  since  the  22d 
Flor^al  the  Jacobins  had  become  equally  antagonistic.  Its  exist- 
ence was  assured  only  so  long  as  the  army  yielded  obedience  to 
its  commands.  But  party  division  began  to  affect  the  generals; 
Moreau,  for  example,  was  a  Conservative,  while  Jourdan  was  a 
Jacobin;  among  officers  and  privates  alike  the  antipathy  to  this 
government  of  lawyers  was  becoming  pronounced,  so  that  the 
situation  of  the  administration  was  liable  to  become  precarious  if 
war  did  not  soon  break  out  on  the  Continent  to  give  another  direc- 
tion to  the  attention  of  these  various  dissatisfied  elements. 

And  measures  had  been  taken  which  would  prevent  the  possi- 
biUty  of  its  being  longer  delayed.  The  peace-party  had  been 
overcome  on  the  18th  Fructidor,  just  as  it  had  been  before  on  the 
13th  Vendemiaire.  The  abrupt  discontinuance  of  negotiations 
with  England  which  followed,  the  arrogant  demands  of  the 
envoys  at  Rastatt,  the  defiant  attitude  of  Bemadotte  in  Vienna, 
the  revolts  against  the  legitimate  powers  in  Italy  and  Switzer- 
land, the  instigation  of  republican  propaganda  in  Southern  Ger- 
many, and  the  encroachments  in  the  Orient, — all  these  could  not 
but  lead  to  a  new  and  tremendous  conflagration  in  Europe  which 
would  give  employment  to  all  the  forces  of  France  and  would 
prolong  the  rule  of  those  in  power. 

And  first  of  all  there  arose  in  Russia  an  inexorable  enemy. 
For  the  unconcealed  support  given  by  the  Republic  to  the  Poles, 
the  occupation  of  the  Ionian  Isles,  the  secret  alliance  with  the 
turbulent  elements  on  the  Balkan  peninsula,  the  expedition  to 
the  Levant  and  particularly  the  seizure  of  Malta,  whose  Order 
of  Knights  had  but  recently  put  themselves  under  the  protec- 
torate of  the  Czar,  combined  to  make  Paul  I.  an  adversary  of 
France  and  the  champion  of  hereditary  monarchy  threatened 


i6o  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

and  combated  by  the  Republic  and  its  agents.  He  concluded 
treaties  of  alliance  with  England  and  Turkey,  whose  hostility 
also  had  been  incurred  by  the  encroachments  of  the  French,  and 
urged  immediate  attack.  England  on  her  part  induced  the 
King  of  Naples  as  early  as  November,  1798,  to  open  hostiUties 
against  the  French  who  were  in  possession  of  the  States  of  the 
Church — a  premature  and  hazardous  attempt  which  failed 
miserably — with  the  result  that  the  French  forces  under  General 
Macdonald  penetrated  as  far  as  Naples,  compelled  the  flight  of 
the  king  into  Sicily,  and  founded  the  "  Parthenopean  Repubhc." 
This  was  one  more  step  toward  the  complete  ascendency  of 
France  in  Italy,  and  the  blow  was  nowhere  more  keenly  felt  than 
in  Vienna,  whose  court  was  linked  by  kindred  with  that  of  Naples 
and  had  made  the  loan  of  one  of  its  generals  (Mack)  to  command 
the  Neapolitan  army.  From  the  time  of  the  departure  of  the 
French  ambassador,  Bemadotte,  from  Vienna  all  relations  be- 
tween Austria  and  France  had  been  broken  off,  nor  were  the 
conferences  held  at  Selz  between  Cobenzl  and  Frangois  de  Neuf- 
chateau,  the  former  Director,  able  to  bring  about  their  renewal. 
The  outbreak  of  hostilities  was  no  longer  anything  but  a  ques- 
tion of  weeks,  when  Austria  also  made  an  agreement  with  Russia 
and  a  corps  of  Russian  auxiliary  troops  marched  into  Galicia. 
And  when  the  French  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  these  northern 
troops,  stating  that  non-comphance  with  this  requisition  would  be 
regarded  as  cause  for  war,  the  last  hope  of  maintenance  of  peace 
was  at  an  end.  The  Russians  continued  to  advance,  and  Thugut 
paid  not  the  sUghtest  attention  to  the  menaces  of  France.  Early 
in  March  the  French  crossed  the  Rhine,  the  Austrians  under  Arch- 
duke Charles  passed  to  the  other  side  of  the  Lech,  and  on  March 
12th.  1799,  France  declared  war  against  the  power  on  the  Danube, 
hostilities  being  at  once  begun.  To  add  to  the  gloom  of  the 
situation  the  congress  at  Rastatt  came  to  a  tragic  end:  on 
March  28th  the  French  envoys  in  taking  their  departure  from 
the  town  were  attacked  by  Austrian  hussars  and  massacred 
with  the  exception  of  one  man.  It  may  have  been  through  a 
misunderstanding  of  orders  or  it  may  have  been  due  to  some 
other  motive  as  yet  unexplained. 


Bt.  30]       Weakness  of  the   French  Army  1 6 1 

It  would  be  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  Directory  which 
had  by  its  policy  provoked  this  war  would  have  been  fully 
armed  so  as  to  be  perfectly  prepared  to  meet  the  danger.  But 
it  now  became  evident  how  disastrous  was  the  reaction  upon 
public  affairs  of  the  system  of  personal  government.  Under 
this  WTetched  administration  the  finances  had  at  length  reached 
a  condition  of  total  disorder,  and  the  contributions  levied  in 
neighbouring  countries  did  not  suffice  to  make  up  the  deficit. 
The  army,  upon  whose  ranks  the  government  depended  at  all 
times  as  a  last  resort,  stood  in  need  of  the  energetic  and  watchful 
care  of  the  banished  Carnot,  and  its  best  commander  tarried 
far  away  in  the  East.  It  is  true  that  m  September,  1798,  the 
institution  of  conscription  had  been  estabUshed,  and  according 
to  the  law  all  Frenchmen  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  twenty- 
five  years  were  to  serve  in  the  army  divided  into  five  classes, 
but  this  law  had  been  but  imperfectly  carried  out.  In  Italy 
not  more  than  50,000  men  could  be  opposed  to  the  Austrians, 
and  in  Southern  Germany  not  more  than  40,000.  The  troops 
were  ill-armed,  and  the  commissariat  in  the  hands  of  speculators 
who  were  in  no  wise  more  conscientious  than  the  government. 
Besides  these  drawbacks  a  difference  of  opinion  prevailed  in  the 
Directory  as  to  what  generals  should  be  put  in  command.  Among 
these,  certain  ones,  Uke  Joubert,had  quarrelled  with  the  govern- 
ment commissioners  who  accompanied  the  armies;  others,  such 
as  Moreau,  were  too  conservative ;  the  outcome  of  it  was  that  to 
the  old  and  incompetent  Sch^rer  had  eventually  to  be  assigned 
the  important  supreme  command  in  Italy. 

The  adversary  came  into  the  field  far  better  equipped. 
Austria  unassisted  had  the  advantage  in  point  of  nimibers  upon 
the  three  fields  of  operation,  Suabia,  Switzerland,  and  upper 
Italy;  she  had  in  Archduke  Charles  an  able  leader,  and  in  the 
Russians  under  the  valiant  Suvaroff  a  powerful  support  and 
helper.  And  the  result  was  inevitable.  Jourdan,  who  had 
advanced  to  the  Danube,  was  defeated  at  Osterach  and  Stockach 
by  the  Archduke  before  the  end  of  March,  1799,  and  forced  back 
to  the  Rhine;  Massena,  who  had  begun  by  victoriously  pushing 
his  way  eastward  from  Switzerland,  was  checked  at  Feldkirch, 


1 62  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

while  Schercr  was  met  by  the  Austrians  under  Kray  at  Mag- 
nano  in  the  Cisalpine  Republic  and  thrown  back  behind  the 
Adda. 

And  what  Scherer  had  been  unable  to  accomplish  against  the 
Austrians  alone,  his  successor,  Moreau,  was  still  less  able  to  do 
against  the  united  Austro-Russian  armies  under  Suvaroff.  At 
Cassano  on  the  Adda  he  underwent  a  decisive  defeat,  on  April 
27th,  1799,  which  opened  to  the  northern  conqueror  the  gates  of 
Milan  and  Turin  and  caused  the  Cisalpine  Republic  to  vanish. 
Austria  again  entered  into  possession  of  Lombardy,  supported 
by  a  flood  of  conservative  feeling  among  the  population  which 
everywhere  drove  the  Democrats  from  their  positions.  The  for- 
tresses alone  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  Through  a 
victory  of  the  Archduke  over  Massena  at  Zurich  on  June  4th  a 
third  of  Switzerland  soon  after  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Austrians. 
These  occurrences  compelled  Macdonald  to  evacuate  Naples  and 
march  toward  the  north,  and  with  his  departure  the  Parthenopean 
Republic  was  at  the  same  time  brought  to  an  end.  The  only 
hope  of  recovering  what  had  been  lost  now  lay  in  Macdonald's 
effecting  a  junction  of  forces  with  those  which  Moreau  had  been 
able  to  withdraw  to  the  Genoese  Riviera  and,  with  these  rein- 
forcements, winning  a  victory.  But  this  attempt  also  was 
doomed  to  failure.  Even  before  the  projected  union  could  take 
place  Macdonald's  army  was  attacked  by  the  Russians  in  a 
furious  onslaught  and  defeated  in  the  three  days'  battle  on  the 
Trebbia,  June  17tli-19th.  The  loss  of  the  French  was  severe, 
and  they  were  compelled  to  retreat  beyond  the  Apennines.  This 
disaster  was  followed  in  a  few  weeks  by  the  capitulation  of  Man- 
tua, for  the  sake  of  which  so  much  blood  had  flowed  two  years 
before. 

A  natural  consequence  of  these  losses  in  the  field  was  a 
diminution  of  respect  for  the  Directory  throughout  France.  The 
war  had,  it  is  true,  two  years  before  secured  in  its  position  of 
power  a  most  unpopular  government.  But  then  there  had  been 
a  series  of  victories  won  by  a  general  who  had  adopted  as  his 
own  the  government's  policy  of  expansion  and  conquest,  while 
now  the  reputation  of  the  army  was  being  constantly  dimin- 


,Et.  30]  Changes   in    the    Directory  163 

ished  by  a  succession  of  defeats,  under  commanders,  moreover, 
in  no  political  sympathy  with  the  leaders  of  the  government. 
It  is  consequently  not  surprising  that  the  elections  in  the 
spring  of  1799  shoidd  bring  to  the  Directory  new  discomfiture 
such  as  they  were  not  able  to  recover  from  as  heretofore  by 
the  use  of  force.  It  was  also  a  sign  of  the  general  mistrust 
that  when,  in  accordance  with  the  law,  one  of  the  Directors 
had  to  retire,  the  man  chosen  to  take  his  place  was  one  w^ell 
known  to  have  shown  opposition  as  a  member  of  the  Convention 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  year  III,  and  to  be  ambitious  of 
providing  France  with  a  better  one;  this  was  the  abbe  Sieves, 
the  same  man  to  whom  Napoleon  had  confided,  through  Talley- 
rand, his  ideas  upon  the  framing  of  a  constitution.  Barras, 
who  was  entirely  without  principles,  at  once  attached  himself 
to  the  popular  abbe,  with  the  result  that  there  arose,  as  in  1797, 
a  minority  in  the  Directory  (Sieyes  and  Barras  against  Treilhard, 
LareveUiere,  and  Merlin),  corresponding  with  a  majority  in  the 
Chambers  opposed  to  the  existing  government ;  hence  came  new 
contentions.  In  face  of  the  defeats  abroad  the  majority  in  the 
Directory  could  no  longer  think  of  attempting  a  Coup  d'fitat  as 
on  a  former  occasion;  they  were  obliged  to  confront  their 
adverearies  in  the  legislature,  who,  attacking  them  upon  their 
weak  point,  the  financial  disorder,  succeeded  in  overthrowing 
the  detested  three.  On  June  18th,  1799  (30th  Prairial),  they 
retired,  their  places  being  filled  by  two  pronounced  Radicals 
(Gohier  and  Moulins),  and  a  partisan  of  iSicyes  (Roger-Ducos). 
Thus  the  party  of  the  latter  obtained  a  majority  in  the  Direc- 
tory.* 

This  overthrow  of  the  government  had  been  the  work  of  a 
coalition  between  the  two  great  parties  making  up  the  Five 
Hundred,  the  Radicals,  all  branches  of  which  were  classed 
together  under  the  denomination  of  Jacobins,  and  the  Moderate 
Republicans  under  the  leadership  of  Boula}'  de  la  Meurthe,  to 
which  party  belonged  Napoleon's  brothers,  Lucien  and  Joseph. 
This  alliance  was,  however,  at  once  dissolved  upon  the  accom- 

*  The  Constitution  required  for  the  vaHdation  of  an  act  of  the  gov- 
irnment  the  signatures  of  at  least  three  of  the  members  of  the  Directory. 


164  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

plishment  of  its  object.  The  Moderates  being  now  in  power, 
since  they  were  in  the  majority  in  the  Directory  (with  Sieyes, 
Ducos,  and  Barras),  the  Jacobins  joined  themselves  to  the 
opposition.  At  first  they  were  so  upheld  by  the  neutral  mem- 
bers that  they  succeeded  in  enacting  a  forced  loan  to  be  levied 
upon  the  wealthy,  and  a  law  against  the  nobility  who  were  to 
serve  as  hostages  in  the  Royalist  departments  of  France.  Elated 
by  these  successes,  they,  contrary  to  law,  reopened  their  club  in 
Paris,  they  proposed  a  succession  of  radical  measures  to  the 
effect  that  children  should  be  brought  up  in  common,  that  public 
workshops  should  be  opened  for  the  benefit  of  the  poor,  that  the 
people  should  have  the  right  to  form  federations,  and  demanded 
further  the  re-establishment  of  the  old  Convention  and  public 
declaration  that  the  country  was  in  danger,  in  order  to  introduce 
by  this  means  a  government  similar  to  that  of  1793;  but  here 
their  allies  abandoned  them  and  they  found  themselves  in  the 
minority.  Sieyes  could  now  venture  to  close  their  club  and  to 
organize  a  system  of  strict  surveillance,  which  he  entrusted  to 
a  former  member  of  the  Convention,  Fouche,  with  the  title  of 
Minister  of  Police. 

To  Sieyes  the  essential  thing  now  was  to  secure  in  the  army 
a  support  upon  which  he  could  rely,  and  his  first  care  had  to  be 
to  establish  his  influence  by  means  of  decisive  successes  gained 
at  the  theatre  of  war.  Accordingly  the  equipment  of  troops 
was  vigorously  advanced  during  July,  and  the  young  General 
Joubert  put  in  the  place  of  Moreau  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
Italy.  Should  he  be  victorious  in  his  encounter  with  the  enemy, 
it  was  more  than  possible  that  he  could  be  made  by  the  Director 
a  very  useful  instrument  for  effecting  a  change  in  affairs  of  the 
interior.  But  Sieyes  was  destined  to  be  no  more  fortunate  than 
his  predecessors.  The  reinforcements  which  Joubert  took  with 
him  to  the  Genoese  Riviera  were  insufficient  to  support  him  in 
withstanding  the  allied  Austrians  and  Russians.  He  also  was 
defeated  by  Suvaroff.  In  the  l)loody  battle  of  Novi,  on  the 
Bormida  (August  ir)th,  1799),  the  Republic  lost  12,000  men, 
Joulx'rt  his  life,  and  Sieyes  his  ])r('stige. 

One  person  only  profited  thereby.      It  was  the  man  whose 


/Et.  30]        Basis  of  Napoleon's   Popularity  165 

name,  as  he  had  foreseen,  would  be  recalled  by  every  one  upon 
the  discomfiture  of  the  French  armies.  "Where,"  the  people 
began  to  ask,  "was  the  victor  of  former  days?  Why  was  he 
not  at  hand?  Where  were  the  thousands  he  led  away?  Was 
it  really  better  for  the  interests  of  the  country  that  its  sons 
should  shed  their  blood  far  away  upon  the  sands  of  the  desert, 
while  at  home  upon  the  scenes  of  former  triumphs  the  fame  of 
the  nation  was  suffering  disgrace?"  The  unseated  govern- 
ment was  accused  of  having  "deported"  the  general,  the  radical 
opposition  even  demanded  that  the  former  Directors  be  brought 
to  judgment  upon  this  charge  and  inveighed  against  those  now 
in  power  for  abandoning  to  their  fate  the  members  of  the  ex- 
pedition.* Talleyrand  was  forced  to  resign  his  position  as 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  tried  to  justify  himself  by 
asserting  that  it  was  not  he  but  his  predecessor  who  had  pro- 
posed the  expedition  to  Egypt.  Formerly,  in  1798,  when  public 
opinion  still  connected  Napoleon  with  the  detested  Directory, 
he  could  acquire  but  little  popularity  despite  his  victories;  but 
now  that  he  was  considered  to  be  in  opposition  to  the  govern- 
ment and  to  be  as  it  were  the  victim  of  its  self-seeking  policy, 
he  became  the  favourite  of  the  people  and  the  ideal  of  millions 
belonging  to  no  party  who  desired  quiet  and  order  and  a  vigorous 
government  which  should  put  an  end  to  the  perpetual  changes 
in  the  organic  laws  of  France  and  to  the  horrible  confusion  of 
the  administration,  that  the  land  might  have  peace  and  the 
citizens  enjoy  the  wholesome  fruits  of  the  Revolution.  To 
them  Napoleon  was  not  merely  the  tried  conqueror  who  could 
defeat  the  enemy,  but  still  more  the  man  of  energetic  purpose 
who  could  suppress  anarchy.  This  was  the  reason  why  his 
return  was  greeted  everywhere  by  such  boundless  enthusiasm 
and  why  his  popularity  did  not  abate  when  it  became  known 
that  in  the  last  days  of  September  the  Russians  and  Austrians 
had  been  defeated  in  Switzerland  by  Massena,  that  the  English 
had  suffered  in  like  manner  at  the  hands  of  Brune  in  Holland 

*  Lucien  and  Josephine  did  all  in  their  power  to  foster  the  idea  that 
the  Directory  had  sent  Napoleon  upon  the  expedition  in  order  to  rid  itself 
of  him. 


1 66  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

early  in  October,  that  the  CoaUtion  had  been  ruptured,  and 
danger  to  France  from  every  foreign  foe  had  vanished.  Napo- 
leon had  no  longer  any  need  for  fresh  triumphs  on  the  field  to 
prepare  the  way  for  him,  the  cherished  favourite  of  the  people, 
before  proceeding  to  extreme  measures.  He  had  not  been 
mistaken  when  he  had  before  his  departure  expressed  to  liis 
])rother  the  conviction  that  he  should  be  "surer  of  pubhc  opinion" 
upon  his  return.*  This  had  been  lacking  to  him  a  year  and  a 
half  earlier  when  a  Coup  d'Etat  had  been  under  consideration; 
now  that  this  had  been  secured  nothing  should  prevent  him 
from  putting  his  ambitious  schemes  into  execution. 

When,  in  1803,  Napoleon  was  telling  Madame  de  R^musat 
of  his  past  hfe  and  came  to  the  time  following  the  Egyptian 
expedition,  he  said:  "The  Directory  trembled  at  my  return; 
I  kept  a  careful  watch  upon  myself;  it  was  one  of  the  periods 
in  my  life  when  I  acted  most  skilfully.  I  saw  the  abbe  Sieyes 
and  promised  to  put  into  execution  his  wordy  constitution; 
I  received  the  leaders  of  the  Jacobins  and  the  agents  of  the 
Bourbons;  I  refused  advice  to  no  one,  but  I  gave  only  such  as 
was  to  the  interest  of  my  plans.  I  concealed  myself  from  the 
people  because  I  knew  that  when  the  time  came  curiosity  to 
see  me  would  throw  them  at  my  feet.  Every  one  fell  into  my 
snare,  and  when  I  became  the  head  of  the  State,  there  was  not 
a  party  in  all  France  which  had  not  some  hope  based  upon  my 
buccess." 

Bonaparte  did  in  fact  act  the  part  of  an  impartial  man,  but  he 
nevertheless  followed  in  reality  a  well-defined  plan  in  his  compU- 
cated  system  of  dissinuilation  and  intrigue.  His  object  was 
power,  that  point  was  settled.  Only  the  means  by  which  to 
acquire  it  could  need  consideration.  The  readiest  way  would 
have  been  to  get  himself  elected  Director.  But  when  for  the 
sake  of  appearances  he  sounded  the  presiding  Director  Gohier,  a 
zealous  and  honest  Jacobin  with  that  political  narrow-minded- 
ness which  at  one  time  constituted  the  strength  of  his  i)arty,  the 
latter  referred  him  to  the  Constitution  which  excluded  men  under 
forty  years  of  age  from  the  Directory.    This  provision  was  but  too 

*  See  page  126. 


iEr.  30]        The   Plan   of  the   Coup   d'Etat  167 

well  known  to  Napoleon.  Once  before  it  had  presented  itself  as 
an  obstacle  in  his  way,  and  the  thought  had  long  been  maturing 
in  his  mind  of  overthrowing  this  embarrassing  Constitution. 
Nothing  was  more  natural  than  that  he  should  now  join  with 
those  who  were  likewise  planning  to  make  an  end  of  it.  Sieyds 
was  foremost  amongst  these.  Since  his  outline  of  a  constitution 
had  been  decUned  in  1795,  the  abb6  had  ostentatiously  kept 
aloof  from  the  government.  Not  until  1799  did  he  take  a  lead- 
ing position,  for  he  beUeved  the  time  now  come  for  him  to  put 
an  end,  by  means  of  his  Constitution,  to  the  general  discontent 
with  existing  conditions  and  to  prove  himself  thus  the  saviour  of 
his  country.  And  the  encroachments  of  the  Jacobins  seemed 
about  to  hasten  the  realization  of  his  plans.  Sieyes  found  secret 
support  in  the  moderate  RepubUcans  in  both  Chambers  who 
styled  themselves  "Reformists";  among  these  belonged  Lucien 
Bonaparte.  An  agreement  was  reached  upon  the  following 
points:  In  order  to  strengthen  the  executive  power  the  five 
Directors  should  be  replaced  by  three  Consuls  elected  for  a 
term  of  ten  years;  beside  these  there  should  be  a  Senate  with 
life-membership  and  a  Chamber  of  Deputies  eleete.l  by  uni\ersal 
suffrage.  In  order  to  have  this  Constitution  adopted  the  Council 
of  Ancients,  a  majority  of  whom  had  been  won  over,  was  to  decree 
the  transfer  of  the  two  legislative  bodies  to  a  place  outside  the 
capital  so  that  the  Jacobin  opposition  in  the  Council  of  Five 
Hundred  should  be  separated  fi'om  their  following  in  the  suburbs. 
Articles  102-104  of  the  Constitution  of  the  year  III.  conferred 
upon  the  first  Council  the  power  to  take  this  measure.  Once 
assembled  outside  of  Paris  the  Ancients  would  recommend  Sieyes' 
proposition  to  the  Five  Hundred,  win  over  to  it  the  neutral 
element  among  them,  and  finally  cause  the  new  Constitution  to 
be  sanctioned  by  a  plebiscite.  Every  step  in  this  plan  was  clear 
but  one.  Would  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  consent  without 
opposition  to  the  decree  of  the  Ancients  and  leave  Paris  ?  Its 
refusal  to  comply  might  be  a  dangerous  matter,  the  more  so 
since  Generals  Jourdan,  Augereau,  and  Bernadotte  were  all 
numbered  among  the  Radical  deputies.  A  soldier  of  reno^\Ti 
was  needed  to  whom  the  execution  of  this  measure  could  be  en- 


1 68  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

trusted.  Sieyes  had  undoubtedly  counted  at  first  upon  Joubert, 
and  after  his  death  upon  Moreau,  who  seemed  to  him  the  right 
instnmient  since  he  was  devoid  of  all  political  ambition,  his 
aspirations  being  entirely  military;  he  summoned  the  General 
to  Paris.  But  at  the  same  time  with  Moreau,  Bonaparte  entered 
the  capital,  the  former  in  perfect  silence,  the  latter  surrounded 
by  the  acclamations  of  millions;  the  one  defeated,  the  other  as 
conqueror;  and  Sieyes  could  not  hesitate  as  to  which  of  these 
soldiers  he  should  confide  the  execution  of  his  project.  He 
had  to  choose  Napoleon  even  at  the  risk  of  being  overshadowed 
by  him. 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival  Napoleon  was  made  acquainted 
through  Lucien  with  the  contemplated  reform,  and  expressed 
himself  as  in  sympathy  with  it.  He  himself  stood  in  need  of  a 
new  Constitution  in  order  to  come  into  power,  and  Sieyes  was  in 
want  of  a  general  esteemed  by  the  army  to  establish  his  Consti- 
tution. This  was  the  pivot  about  which  the  destinies  of  France 
at  that  time  revolved,  lalleyrand,  who  was  desirous  of  regain- 
ing favour  with  Napoleon,  assumed  the  task  of  bringing  the  two 
men  into  relations,  and  on  November  1st  they  met  secretly  at 
the  house  of  Lucien.  Bonaparte  was  not  in  favour  of  submitting 
the  new  Constitution  to  the  Chambers  at  once  in  the  form  given 
it  by  Sieyes,  but  expressed  a  desire  to  entrust  it  first  to  a  com- 
njission  of  Deputies  for  examination  and  meanwhile  to  have  all 
energies  bent  upon  obtaining  the  establishment  of  a  provisional 
government  to  be  composed  of  Sieyes,  Roger-Ducos,  and  himself. 
Sieyes  was  obliged  to  consent  whether  or  no.  He  recognized 
that  his  role  of  saving  genius  was  at  an  end  from  the  moment 
that  his  Constitution  should  have  to  undergo  examination  by  a 
committee,  and  it  was  no  less  clear  to  him  that  in  a  provisional 
government  with  Bonaparte  as  colleague  he  could  have  no  hope 
of  obtaining  the  foremost  place.  But  it  was  too  late  to  with- 
draw.* 

*  Aftor  a  dinner  at  which  SieySs  met  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  the  Dep- 
uty Cabanis,  who  was  in  the  secret,  he  saicl  to  them:  "I  am  going  to  join 
forces  with  (Jeneral  Bonaparte  because  o*"  all  our  military  men  he  is  the 
most  of  a  civilian;  nevertheless  I  am  aware  of  what  is  before  me:  success 
attained,  the  General  will  do  like  this  to  his  two  colleagues,"  whereupon 


Mt.  30]       Generals   of  the   Army   Sounded  1 69 

Sieyes  and  Bonaparte  met  again  on  November  6th,  after  a 
banquet  given  by  the  Chambers  in  honour  of  Moreau  and  Bona- 
parte at  which  the  latter  proposed  the  toast,  "The  unity  of  all 
Frenchmen,"  and  at  this  time  the  Hnal  arrangements  were  dis- 
cussed. The  abb6  had  brought  with  him  a  draft  which  he  had 
already  made  of  the  decrees  to  be  issued  by  the  Ancients.  The 
first  convoked  the  Chambers  at  St.  Cloud,  the  second  appointed 
Napoleon  to  supreme  command  of  all  troops,  and  a  third  pro- 
posed him  with  Roger-Ducos  and  Sieyes  as  provisional  Consuls. 
Each  Chamber  was  to  appoint  a  special  committee  to  pass  upon 
the  Constitution  and  adjourn  for  three  months.  The  action 
was  to  be  taken  on  the  18th  Brumaire  (November  9th). 

During  the  ensuing  days  Napoleon  sounded  the  generals 
and  officers.  Several  regiments  of  the  Paris  garrison  had  for- 
merly served  under  him  in  the  ItaUan  army,  the  officers'  positions 
in  the  National  Guard  had  been  for  the  most  part  of  his  be- 
stowal while  General  of  the  Army  of  the  Interior  after  the  13th 
Vend^miaire;  inclination  and  discipline  would  assure  to  him 
the  fidelity  of  the  troops  who  idolized  the  "little  corporal."  Of 
the  generals  only  Jourdan  and  Augereau  held  themselves  at  a 
distance;  Bemadotte,  who,  as  he  wrote  to  Lucien  in  1804,  might 
easily  have  roused  the  suburbs  to  opposition,  yielded  to  the 
solicitations  of  Joseph,  whose  brother-in-law  he  had  recently 
become;  Moreau  simply  obeyed  the  man  in  supreme  command. 
Possibly  he  took  this  course  because  he  hoped,  as  has  been 
affirmed,  that,  the  illustrious  general  having  once  been  made 
the  head  of  the  government,  he  should  no  longer  have  him  as  a 
rival  at  the  head  of  the  army;  or  it  may  have  been,  as  he  himself 
assured  Napoleon  at  a  later  date,  because  he  firmly  believed 
that  this  audacious  adventurer  would  be  overthrown  six  weeks 
after  the  event.* 

he  stepped  suddenly  between  Joseph  and  Cabanis  and  threw  them  by  a 
powerful  swing  of  his  arms  into  the  chimney-comer  and  stood  alone  in 
the  middle  of  the  room.  Napoleon,  to  whom  Joseph  related  the  scene, 
was  much  amused  and  laughingly  exclaimed:  "Long  live  the  wittv!  This 
augurs  well." 

*  See  the  letter  of   General  Willot  of  October  30th,  1S09,  in  Boulay 
de  la  Meurthe's  "Les  demi^res  ann^es  du  Due  d'Enghien,"  p.  293. 


\jo  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

Meanwhile  Sieyes  and  his  confidants  were  taking  the  last 
steps  to  make  sure  of  the  Council  of  the  Ancients.  A  threat- 
ening outbreak  of  the  Jacobins  was  used  as  a  bugbear  to  win  over 
those  who  wavered.  Those  deputies  who  could  not  be  counted 
upon  were,  through  the  connivance  of  the  hall-inspectors,  kept 
away  from  the  decisive  session,  some  being  summoned  at  a  later 
hour  and  some  not  at  all. 

On  November  9th  (18th  Brumaire),  at  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  the  Ancients  assembled.  Regnier,  who  had  been  taken 
into  confidence,  at  once  took  the  floor  to  make  the  following 
motion:  "The  Council  of  the  Ancients,  in  accordance  with 
Articles  102,  103,  and  104,  decrees:  1st.  That  the  Legislature  be 
transferred  to  the  commune  of  St.  Cloud,  where  both  Councils 
will  hold  session  in  the  two  wings  of  the  palace.  2d.  That  they 
will  there  assemble  to-morrow,  the  19th  Brumaire  (November 
10th),  at  noon.  All  continuation  of  functions  or  deliberation 
is  prohibited  elsewhere  and  until  that  time.  3d.  That  General 
Bonaparte  be  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  present  decree. 
He  will  take  all  the  necessary  measures  to  protect  the  National 
Republic.  The  general  in  command  of  the  seventeenth  division, 
the  guard  of  the  Legislative  Body,  the  National  Guards  and  the 
regular  troops  in  Paris,  in  the  constitutional  arrondissement, 
and  in  the  whole  seventeenth  division  are  put  directly  under  his 
orders  and  are  bound  to  recognize  him  as  commander.  Every 
citizen  will  be  required  to  render  him  assistance  upon  demand. 
4th.  That  General  Bonaparte  be  summoned  to  appear  before 
the  Council  of  the  Ancients  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  present  decree 
and  to  take  the  oath.  5th.  That  this  decree  shall  be  at  once 
communicated  to  the  Council  of  the  Five  Hundred  and  to  the 
Directory.  That  it  shall  be  printed  and  promulgated  through- 
out the  length  and  breadth  of  the  Repiiblic  by  means  of  special 
messengers.*     The  motion  was  carried  unanimously  and  a  mani- 


*  The  Articles  of  the  Constitution  of  170.5  upon  which  the  Ancienta 
r(;lied  for  their  authority  in  this  matter  were  the  following:  "Article  102. 
The  Council  of  the  Ancients  may  change  the  place  of  meeting  of  the 
Legislative  Body.      It  shall,  in    such  case,  indicate    another    place  and 


iEr.  30]  Napoleon   to   the  Ancients  171 

festo  to  the  nation  was  decided  upon  in  like  manner,  announcing 
that  the  Council  of  the  Ancients  had  decreed  these  measures  in 
order  to  control  the  factions  which  wanted  to  tyrannize  over  the 
National  Representatives  and  for  the  sake  of  securing  peace 
within  the  country. 

While  the  Council  of  Ancients  was  thus  engaged  Bonaparte, 
surrounded  by  officers  and  generals,  was  awaiting  at  home  his 
nomination.  As  soon  as  it  had  been  delivered  to  him  he  mounted 
his  horse  and  proceeded  with  a  numerous  retinue  to  the  Tuileries, 
where  he  entered  the  hall  in  which  sat  the  Council  of  the  Ancients 
in  order  to  take  the  required  oath.  Here  he  made  a  short 
address  in  his  accustomed  tone  of  command  and  closing  with 
the  following  words:  "Your  wisdom  has  passed  this  decree; 
our  arms  will  find  a  way  to  execute  it.  We  are  desirous  of  a 
Republic  founded  upon  true  civil  liberty,  upon  representation 
of  the  people.  And  we  shall  have  it,  I  swear  it;  I  swear  it  in 
my  own  name  and  in  that  of  my  companions  in  arms."  Of 
maintenance  of  the  Constitution  he  said  not  a  word;  on  the 
contrary,  every  syllable  intimated  a  change  in  pubhc  affairs. 
The  members  of  the  Council  were  none  the  less  warm  in  their 
applause  of  the  General,  and  the  session  was  brought  to  a  close 
not  to  be  reopened  before  the  following  day  at  St.  Cloud.  When 
shortly  afterwards  the  Council  of  the  Five  Hundred  assembled  it 
was  met  with  the  announcement  of  the  decree  of  the  First  Cham- 
ber, and  Lucien  Bonaparte,  who  had  been  elevated  to  the  presi- 
dency as  a  token  of  honour  to  his  brother,  at  once  adjourned 

time  at  which  the  two  Councils  must  assemble.  The  decree  of  the  Council 
of  the  Ancients  in  this  matter  shall  be  irrevocable. 

"  Article  103.  Upon  the  day  that  this  decree  is  issued  neither  of  the 
Councils  may  deliberate  within  the  communes  in  which  its  sessions  have 
until  that  time  been  held.  Members  who  shall  there  continue  their  func- 
tions will  be  guilty  of  assault  upon  the  safety  of  the  Republic. 

"Article  104.  Members  of  the  Executive  Directory  who  shall  delay  or 
refuse  to  seal,  promulgate,  and  send  out  the  decree  for  the  transfer  of  the 
Legislative  Body,  will  be  guilty  of  the  same  misdemeanor." 

Of  the  right  of  entrusting  to  a  general  the  execution  or  the  protection 
of  the  decree  there  was  no  word  in  the  Articles.  This  was  the  first  un- 
lawful act,  and  this  the  managers  of  the  Coup  d'Etat  cleverly  shifted  on  to 
the  shoulders  of  the  representatives  of  the  people. 


172  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

the   session.     The    activity   of   the    Legislature  had  been   sus- 
pended. 

Upon  leaving  the  hall  of  the  Ancients,  Napoleon  betook  him- 
self to  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries,  where  he  passed  in  review  the 
troops  drawn  vip  there.  He  next  issued  a  proclamation  to  the 
National  Guard  and  another  to  the  regular  troops.  In  each  he 
arraigned  the  government  which  had  until  now  been  in  power. 
"For  two  years,"  said  he  to  his  soldiers,  "the  Republic  has  been 
badly  governed.  You  have  been  in  hopes  that  my  return  would 
put  an  end  to  so  many  evils;  you  have  celebrated  it  with  such 
a  unanimity  as  to  impose  upon  me  obligations  which  I  am  about 
to  fulfil.  .  .  .  Liberty,  victory,  and  peace  will  restore  to  the 
French  Republic  the  rank  which  she  formerly  held  in  Europe 
and  which  incapability  or  treachery  alone  could  have  caused 
her  to  lose.  Long  life  to  the  Republic!"  Execution  followed 
close  upon  the  heels  of  accusation.  As  had  been  arranged, 
Sieyes  and  Ducos  presented  their  resignations  as  members  of  the 
Directory.  It  needed  but  to  persuade  Barras  to  do  likewise  to 
stop  the  wheels  of  government  altogether,  since  the  vaUdation 
of  every  act  required  the  signatures  of  at  least  three  Directors. 
Up  to  this  day  Napoleon  had  kept  his  former  friend  and  patron 
in  ignorance  as  to  his  real  designs,  and  had  made  use  of  him  to 
hold  Sieyes  to  a  certain  extent  in  check.  The  time  had  now 
come  to  lay  aside  precaution,  and  he  sent  to  him  two  of  his  con- 
fidants, Talleyrand  and  Bruix  to  demand  the  resignation  of  his 
ofRce.  Barras  announced  his  willingness  to  accede  to  this 
requisition;  he  was  led  to  this  decision  by  the  power  at  the  dis- 
posal of  Bonaparte  and  by  the  universal  contempt  in  which  he 
was  himself  held ;  his  only  request  to  the  all-powerful  man  of  the 
day,  made  through  his  secretary  Bottot,  was  for  a  safe-conduct 
beyond  the  city.  Bonaparte  made  use  of  this  occasion  to  ex- 
press himself  before  a  number  of  witnesses  concerning  the  policy 
of  the  Directory.  To  Barras's  frightened  messenger  he  ex- 
claimed: "What  have  you  done  with  that  France  which  I  left 
you  so  glorious?  I  left  peace  and  find  war!  I  left  you  victory, 
I  find  only  defeat!  I  left  you  the  millions  of  Italy,  I  find  every- 
where poverty  and  laws  that  plunder!  .  .  .  What  have  you 


iEx.  30]  The   End  of  the   Directory  173 

done  with  tlic  hundred  thousand  Frenchmen  whom  I  knew,  my 
companions  in  glory?  They  are  dead!  This  state  of  things 
cannot  last;  before  three  years  had  passed  it  would  lead  us  to 
despotism.  We  want  a  Republic  founded  on  the  basis  of 
equality,  of  morality,  of  civil  liberty,  and  of  political  toleration." 
These  at  least  were  the  words  in  which  the  "Moniteur"  repro- 
duced the  speech  two  days  afterwards. 

With  the  retirement  of  Barras,  Moulins  and  Gohier  became 
powerless.  The  latter  had  been  invited  by  Josephine  to  break' 
fast  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  this  eventful  day.  Was  it 
Bonaparte's  intention  to  make  sure  of  this  man?  Did  he  hope 
in  spite  of  everything  to  win  him  to  the  support  of  the  movement 
in  hand?  Gohier  did  not  come.  Only  during  the  course  of  the 
forenoon  did  he  learn  of  what  had  occurred,  and  hastened  with 
Moulins  to  Napoleon  to  expostulate  with  him.  His  remon- 
strances were  of  course  without  avail.  The  two  Directors 
returned  with  their  mission  unaccomplished  to  the  Palace  of 
the  Luxembourg,  where  the  Executive  of  the  government  had 
hitherto  held  its  sessions.  JMoreau  received  instructions  to  detain 
them  there. 

The  Directory  had  ceased  to  exist.  All  that  was  needed 
further  was  to  get  the  two  Comicils  at  St.  Cloud  to  ratify  the 
political  change,  to  accept  the  provisional  government,  and  to 
appoint  the  committees  w^hich  were  to  pass  upon  the  proposed 
Constitution.  Sieyes  had  advised  that  on  the  following  day 
some  twenty  or  thirty  of  the  most  pronounced  Radicals,  espe- 
cially Jourdan  and  Augereau,  should  be  prevented  from  attending 
the  session  of  the  Five  Hundred.  This,  however,  Bonaparte 
declined  to  do ;  it  should  not  be  said  of  him  that  he  stood  in  fear 
of  these  two  men.  "On  the  whole,"  said  he  exultingly  to 
Bourrienne  that  evening,  "things  have  not  gone  badly  to-day. 
Good-night;  to-morrow  we  shall  see  what  comes  next."  He 
did  not,  however,  fail  to  take  the  precaution  to  load  his  pistols 
before  going  to  bed. 

On  the  morrow,  the  10th  of  November  (19th  Brumaire), 
the  deputies  of  both  Chambers  assembled  at  noon,  the  appointed 
hour,  in  St,  Cloud.     To  the  .Ancients  had  been  assigned  a  hall 


174  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

in  the  second  story  of  the  palace,  while  the  Five  Hundred  were 
to  sit  in  the  Orangery  on  the  ground-floor.  Before  the  opening 
of  the  session  the  deputies  met  in  the  park  and  eagerly  discussed 
the  event  of  the  day.  The  Jacobin  members  of  the  Five  Hundred 
and  such  of  the  Ancients  as  had  been  excluded  on  the  previous 
day  demanded  explanations;  others  began  to  comprehend  that 
assent  to  this  momentous  decree  had  been  drawn  from  them 
under  false  pretences  and  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  Coup 
d'Etat;  they  had  intended  at  the  utmost  to  aid  in  effecting  a 
change  in  the  Executive  and  not  at  all  in  overthrowing  the  Con- 
stitution; their  indignation  waxed  hot  at  sight  of  the  troops 
which  filled  the  courtyard.  Thus  began  the  sessions  of  the  two 
Chambers.  Napoleon  had  taken  his  place  with  his  generals  in 
the  hall  of  the  inspectors  of  the  legislative  body.  Here  he  was 
kept  informed,  as  he  had  arranged,  of  the  progress  of  affairs  in 
both  of  the  assemblies.  The  reports  were  hardly  of  a  nature  to 
give  him  satisfaction. 

In  the  Council  of  the  Ancients  continual  excitement  pre- 
vailed, and  the  feeling  grew  still  more  intense  when  it  became 
known  there  that  three  of  the  Directors  had  abdicated  and  that 
the  remaining  two  were  forcibly  detained.  In  the  Council  of 
the  Five  Hundred  one  of  the  initiated  had  taken  the  floor,  but  he 
was  interrupted  by  cries  from  the  Radicals  of  ''No  dictator- 
ship! Down  with  dictators!"  They  further  proposed  and 
carried  a  motion  that  every  member  should  at  the  roll-call 
renew  his  oath  to  support  the  existing  Constitution.  Upon 
receipt  of  this  news  Napoleon  could  contain  himself  no  longer. 
Should  he  allow  this  hostile  feeling  to  grow,  and  perhaps  even 
finally  to  spread  among  the  troops,  all  would  be  lost,  "This 
must  be  put  a  stop  to,"  said  he,  suddenly  jumping  up,  to  officers 
of  his  retinue,  and  going  at  once  to  the  hall  where  the  Ancients 
were  in  session.  He  was  no  orator,  and  his  words  on  this  occa- 
sion seemed  altogether  incoherent  and  abrupt.  They  were 
standing  on  the  crater  of  a  volcano,  he  told  them.  He  and 
his  companions  in  arms  had  gladly  obeyed  the  summons  of  the 
Council,  and  now  he  was  calumniated  with  the  charge  of  playing 
the  part  of  a  Cjosar  or  a  Cromwell.     Had  he  wished  to  destroy 


^T.  30]        Napoleon   Before   the   Ancients  175 

the  liberty  of  the  country  ho  niiglit  have  availed  himself  of  fre- 
quent opportunities  which  had  presented.  He  then  spoke  in  a 
general  way  of  the  dangers  threatening  the  Republic;  "liberty 
and  equality  must  be  preserved,"  said  he.  "And  how  about  the 
Constitution?"  called  a  voice.  This  was  striking  Xapoleon  in 
the  most  sensitive  spot,  and  he  broke  forth:  "The  Constitution? 
you  yourselves  rendered  it  of  no  account.  You  violated  it  on 
the  18th  Fructidor.  you  violated  it  on  the  22d  Floreal  and  on 
the  30th  Prairial.  It  is  appealed  to  by  all  parties,  and  all  parties 
have  sinned  against  it.  It  cannot  afford  safety  to  us,  for  no  one 
respects  it  any  more.  Let  us  find  the  means  of  assuring  to 
every  one  the  liberty  to  which  he  is  entitled  and  which  could 
not  be  guaranteed  to  him  by  the  Constitution  of  the  Directory." 

Some  members  having  demanded  enlightenment  concerning 
the  threatening  dangers  of  which  he  had  spoken,  he  was  unal^le  to 
get  out  of  the  difficulty  without  recourse  to  falsehood.  He 
declared  that  two  of  the  Directors,  Barras  and  Moulins,  had 
proposed  to  him  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a  party  pur- 
posing to  overthrow  all  men  of  liberal  ideas.  This  was  palpably 
nothing  but  an  invention  which  irritated  his  adherents  and  put 
his  opponents  out  of  patience  to  such  an  extent  that  the  presi- 
dent, Lemercier,  was  forced  to  call  upon  him  to  reveal  the  details 
of  the  plot.  But  Napoleon,  having  no  exact  information  to 
impart,  could  only  reiterate  what  he  had  said  before;  he  declared 
the  Constitution  ineffectual,  and  finally  turned  in  his  helpless- 
ness and  agitation  to  the  soldiers  who  were  stationed  outside 
and  who  were  totally  unable  to  hear  him ;  he  apostrophized  them 
in  flattering  words  and  expressed  to  them  his  confidence  that 
they  would  protect  him  in  case  any  speaker  should  attempt  to 
raise  the  cry  of  "outlaw"  against  him,  "for,"  said  he,  "1  am 
accompanied  by  the  god  of  war  and  the  god  of  fortune ! "  With 
these  words  he  lost  all  command  over  what  he  was  saying. 
Bourrienne,  who  with  Berthier  was  standing  at  his  side,  whis- 
pered in  his  ear:  "General,  you  no  longer  know  what  you  are 
saying,"  and  induced  him  to  withdraw.  The  session  was  then 
brought  to  a  close. 

But  the  most  difficult  task  was  yet  before  him.     Napoleon 


176  Coup   d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

went  down-stairs  and  presented  himself  at  the  session  of  the 
Five  Hundred,  where  its  members  had  meanwhile  one  by  one 
taken  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  and  were,  for  their  part, 
awaiting  a  disclosure  from  the  Upper  Chamber  as  to  the  motive 
for  the  transfer  of  the  Legislative  Body.  This  communication 
was  not  forthcoming,  which  fact  in  nowise  tended  to  increase  their 
calmness  of  mind.  Instead  of  the  expected  message  there 
arrived  a  letter  from  Barras  presenting  his  resignation  and  saying 
that  he  retired  before  the  man  made  so  glorious  alike  by  his  per- 
sonal renown  and  by  the  marks  of  confidence  given  him  by  the 
National  Representatives.  The  Jacobin  deputies  hereupon 
demanded  to  know  what  circumstances  could  have  determined 
the  Director  to  resign  his  office.  Suddenly,  just  at  this  juncture, 
appeared  Bonaparte  in  the  hall,  unannounced  and  followed  by 
four  grenadiers.  This  was  an  act  of  flagrant  dirsregard  of  all 
conventionalities.  There  arose  at  once  a  frightful  uproar  of 
indignation  against  him.  "Armed  men  in  the  hall!"  cried  the 
Jacobins,  and  a  number  of  Radicals  rushed  in  uncontrollable 
excitement  upon  the  intruder.  Hands  were  laid  upon  him 
and  he  was  pushed  toward  the  door.  In  the  tumult  he  for  a 
moment  lost  consciousness.  He  sank  into  the  arms  of  the  grena- 
diers and  was  carried  by  them  into  the  open  air.  But  from 
within  there  followed  him  furious  clamours  of  "Hors  la  loi!" 
"Outlaw  him!" — a  cry  which  but  a  few  years  before  had  meant 
certain  death. 

And  who  knows  what  would  have  occurred  if  the  Jacobins 
had  quietly  listened  to  Napoleon?  A  careful  observer,  Brink- 
mann  the  Swede,  at  that  time  resident  in  Paris,  expresses  in  his 
recently  published  letters  only  the  general  verdict  when  he  says: 
"  Evidently  they  ought  either  to  have  slain  the  general  on  the  spot, 
or  to  have  listened  to  him  quietly,  keeping  always  themselves 
within  the  limits  of  the  Constitution  and  of  prudence  ...  in 
order  to  lay  all  the  blame  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  aggressor." 
Certainly  the  behaviour  of  the  Jacobins  was  of  a  kind  to  put 
them  at  a  disadvantage  if  the  circumstances  were  cleverly  made 
use  of.  To  no  one  was  their  mistake  more  promptly  evident 
than  to  Lucien  Bonaparte,  the  president  of  the  Council,  against 


^T.  30]  Lucien   Saves  the   Day  177 

whom  their  attack  was  now  directed;  the  most  excited  demanded 
that  he  should  put  to  vote  the  proscription  of  his  brother;  others 
demanded  that  Napoleon  be  declared  not  in  command  of  the 
troops  since  the  Council  of  the  Ancients  had  been  in  nowise 
authorized  to  appoint  him  to  that  post.  The  desk  in  the 
middle  of  the  hall  was  surrounded  by  members  clamouring  to 
be  heard. 

In  the  midst  of  the  uproar  Lucien  resigned  the  chair  to  the 
vice-president  in  order  to  speak  from  the  tribune  in  his  brother's 
favour.  His  voice,  however,  Avas  unable  to  make  itself  heard 
above  the  din,  and  he  sent  a  deputy  who  was  in  sympathy  with 
the  plot  to  Napoleon  with  the  message  that  he  was  compelled  to 
relinquish  his  seat  and  required  miUtary  protection.  At  the 
same  time  he  took  off  his  toga.  Just  as  he  was  being  forced  by 
his  colleagues  to  resume  his  seat  appeared  the  soldiers  sent  to  his 
assistance  by  Napoleon,  and  by  them  he  was  escorted  out  of  the 
room.     A  number  of  deputies  followed  him. 

Outside  in  the  courtyard  Napoleon  waited  with  his  officers 
at  the  head  of  a  battalion  of  the  Garde  du  Corps  Legislatif. 
Near  him  stood  certain  confidential  friends.  Siey^s,  Ducos, 
and  TallejTand  sat  in  a  carriage  at  the  gate  ready  to  save 
themselves  by  flight  if  affairs  should  assume  an  unfavourable 
aspect.  Intense  excitement  could  be  recognized  in  every  face. 
Before  the  Councils  the  cause  of  the  Coup  d'Etat  seemed  as 
good  as  lost.  The  question  now  was  in  regard  to  the  troops. 
The  outcome  of  the  day  depended  upon  their  attitude.  Lucien 
at  once  recognized  this  fact,  and  mounting  a  horse  he  addressed 
the  battahon  in  a  few  words  in  which  he  exaggerated  the 
tumult  provoked  by  the  Jacobin  minority  to  the  extent  of 
making  it  an  attack  upon  Napoleon's  Hfe.  "Frenchmen," 
he  cried,  "the  President  of  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred 
declares  to  you  that  the  immense  majority  (.f  this  Council  is 
at  the  present  moment  held  in  terror  by  certain  Representa- 
tives armed  with  daggers  who  beset  the  tribune  threatening  their 
colleagues  with  death  and  proposing  to  them  the  most  frightful 
resolutions.  I  declare  to  you  that  these  audacious  brigands, 
inspired  no  doubt  by  the  evil  spirit  of  the  English  government, 


178  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

have  put  themselves  in  the  position  of  rebels  toward  the  Council 
of  the  Ancients  in  demanding  the  outlawry  of  the  general  charged 
with  the  execution  of  this  decree  of  the  Council,  as  if  we  still 
belonged  in  those  awful  times  of  their  reign,  when  that  word 
*hors  la  loi'  was  enough  to  cause  the  fall  of  any  head  however 
dear  to  our  country.  ...  To  you  warriors  I  entrust  the  duty  of 
dehvering  this  majority  of  the  Representatives  of  the  People, 
so  that,  protected  by  bayonets  against  stilettos,  we  may  delib- 
erate in  peace  upon  the  interests  of  the  Republic.  .  .  .  You  will 
recognize  as  Deputies  of  France  only  those  who  present  them- 
selves with  their  president  in  your  midst.  As  for  those  who  will 
persist  in  remaining  in  the  Orangery  in  order  to  vote  proscrip- 
tions, let  them  be  put  out  by  force!"  "And  if  any  one  offers 
resistance,"  added  Napoleon,  "kill,  kill!  Yes!  follow  me, 
follow  me.  I  am  the  god  of  the  day!"  And  he  would  have 
continued  in  this  strain  if  Lucien  had  not  whispered  to  him  for 
heaven's  sake  to  keep  still.  "Vive  Bonaparte!"  shouted  the 
soldiers,  but  they  made  no  attempt  to  move.  And  it  was 
indeed  no  hght  matter  to  direct  the  bayonet  against  the  Na- 
tional Representatives.  But  Lucien,  recognizing  this  fatal 
hesitation,  seized  a  dagger  and  pointed  it  against  his  brother's 
breast,  swearing  to  strike  him  dowii  with  it  should  he  ever 
attempt  to  violate  the  Uberties  of  the  French.  At  this  the  grena- 
diers ceased  to  waver.  At  a  sign  from  Napoleon  one  division 
with  drums  beating  allowed  itself  to  be  led  by  Murat  into  the 
hall.  Upon  the  failure  of  the  deputies  to  comply  with  his  order 
to  disperse,  the  soldiers  advanced,  and  the  legislators  were  forced 
to  take  flight  through  the  windows. 

Nothing  could  more  clearly  show  the  deep  gulf  which  sepa- 
rated the  army  from  the  nation  than  this  painful  scene.  Con- 
stant absence  from  home  had  made  the  militia  strangers  to  the 
people,  and  whoever  commanded  the  soldiery  could  domineer 
recklessly  over  the  nation.  It  is  true  that  the  Bonapartes  had 
been  obliged  to  resort  to  calumny  and  invention  in  order  to  set 
this  force  in  motion  against  the  constituted  authorities;  the 
allusions  to  English  influence  in  Lucien's  speech  were  totally 
without  foundation;    in  fact  the    "daggers"  of    the    deputies 


iET.  30]         The   Provisional   Government  179 

had  been  seen  by  no  one,  personal  danger  to  the  President  of 
the  Chamber  did  not  exist,  and  the  dagger  brandished  against 
Napoleon  was  an  unparalleled  piece  of  buffoonery;  but  the 
fact  that  such  means  could  be  successful  and  sufficient  to  decide 
the  fate  of  a  great  nation  showed  to  what  an  extent  disintegra- 
tion had  taken  place.  And  what  of  the  people  itself?  On 
the  18th  and  19th  Brumaire  the  Parisians  quietly  occupied 
themselves  with  their  private  affairs,  totally  indifferent  to  events 
which  a  few  years  before  had  thrilled  every  fibre.  That  for 
which  hundreds  of  thousands  had  then  risked  their  lives  in 
fanatic  devotion  to  hberty  now  seemed  scarcely  able  to  awaken 
curiosity. 

The  Coup  d'Etat  once  accomplished  everything  else  was  very 
soon  reduced  to  order.  Lucien  could  now  describe  to  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  Ancients  the  occmrences  in  the  lower  house  with  the 
same  degree  of  partiality  as  had  marked  the  account  which  he 
had  given  to  the  troops.  He  summoned  the  Ancients  to  pass  a 
resolution  "that  the  fasces  of  the  Consuls,  those  glorious  symbols 
of  republican  hberty  of  ancient  times,  be  raised  to  disarm  our 
calumniators  and  to  give  reassurance  to  the  French  people, 
whose  universal  approbation  will  not  withhold  its  sanction  to 
our  labours."  And  the  Council  at  once  agreed  upon  adjourn- 
ment of  both  Chambers,  upon  the  nomination  of  a  provisional 
government  of  three  Consuls,  and  upon  the  election  of  a  com- 
mission for  consideration  of  the  new  Constitution.  And  similar 
action  was  taken  during  the  same  night  by  such  members  of  the 
Five  Hundred  as  could,  with  no  small  difficulty,  be  assembled. 
The  number  of  those  present  seems  to  have  been  from  fifty  to  one 
hundred  and  twenty.*  Lucien  presided  at  this  gathering,  just 
as  he  had  occupied  the  chair  at  the  session  of  the  whole  number, 
in  order  that  appearances  of  legality  at  least  might  be  preserved. 
The  proposed  amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  submitted, 
whereupon  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  made  a  long  speech  in  justifica- 
tion of  them,  during  the  course  of  which  he  denounced  the  Con- 

*  The  last  number  is  given  by  Brinkmann  from  the  statements  of  im- 
partial eye-witnesses.  Bourrienne,  on  the  other  hand,  speaks  of  only 
thirty  deputies. 


i8o  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

stitution  of  the  year  III  and  the  poUcy  of  the  late  Directory. 
This  "Rump  Pariiament"  then  passed  the  following  definitive 
resolutions  formulated  in  sixteen  articles:  "The  Directory  has 
ceased  to  exist.  A  committee  consisting  of  three  Consuls, 
Sieyes,  Ducos,  and  Bonaparte,  is  to  constitute  a  provisional  gov- 
ernment. They  are  clothed  with  all  directorial  power  and 
authorized  to  re-establish  order  in  public  affairs,  to  secure  domes- 
tic tranquillity,  and  to  establish  an  honourable  and  lasting  peace 
with  foreign  nations.  The  Legislative  Body  will  adjourn  until  Feb- 
ruary 20th,  1800,  after  having  declared  sixty-two  deputies,  desig- 
nated by  name,  to  have  forfeited  their  seats,  and  after  having 
elected  a  commission  of  twenty-five  members  who,  in  conjunction 
with  a  similar  one  appointed  by  the  Ancients  and  the  three  Con- 
suls, shall  act  upon  the  urgent  business  of  police  and  financial 
legislation,  formulate  a  new  representative  constitution  and  a 
new  civil  code."  The  commission  was  hereupon  elected  and 
the  decree  transmitted  to  the  Ancients  and  ratified  by  them. 
Finally,  the  three  Consuls  took  an  oath  of  inviolable  fidelity  to 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  to  the  French  Republic,  to  liberty, 
equaUty,  and  the  representative  system  of  government.  It  was 
long  after  midnight  before  the  assemblage  broke  up.  The  Coup 
d'Etat  had  been  accomplished. 

How  correct  Napoleon  had  been  in  his  calculations  when  he 
risked  everything  on  the  19th  Brumaire  was  shown  at  once  in  the 
events  of  the  ensuing  days.  France  approved  the  Coup  d'Etat. 
The  fact  was  not  to  be  denied.  "Every  previous  revolution," 
wrote  the  Prussian  ambassador,  Sandoz-Rollin,  to  the  govern- 
ment at  home  under  date  of  November  13th — "every  previous 
revolution  had  inspired  much  distrust  and  fear.  This  one,  on 
the  contrary,  as  I  myself  can  testify,  has  cheered  the  spirits  of 
every  one  and  awakened  the  liveliest  hopes."  And  the  causes  of 
this  phenomenon  are  given  us  by  Brinkmann  in  a  remarkable 
letter  of  November  18th:  "Never,  perhaps,  did  a  legitimate 
monarch  find  a  people  more  devoted  to  his  will  than  did  liona- 
parte,  and  it  would  be  unpardonable  should  this  clever  general 
fail  to  profit  by  this  fact  to  establish  a  better  government  upon 
a  more  stable  basis.     It  is  literally  true  that  France  will  accom- 


iET.  30]  Popular  Approval  i  8 1 

plish  the  impossible  in  order  to  contribute  to  this  result,  for  the 
people,  with  the  exception  of  the  contemptible  horde  of  anar- 
chists, is  so  tired,  so  disgusted  with  revolutionary  horrors  and 
follies,  that  all  are  inwardly  convinced  that  they  cannot  but  gain 
by  any  change.  All  classes  of  society  jeer  at  the  heroics  of  the 
demagogues,  and  everywhere  the  demand  is  rather  for  their 
expulsion  than  for  the  realization  of  their  ideal  dreams.  Even 
Royalists  of  every  shade  are  sincerely  devoted  to  Bonaparte,  for 
they  suppose  it  to  be  his  intention  to  bring  back  little  by  little 
the  old  order  of  things.  Those  unattached  to  any  party  adhere 
to  him  as  the  man  best  fitted  to  procure  peace  to  France,  and 
the  most  enlightened  Republicans,  while  trembling  at  the  danger 
of  destruction  to  their  system,  are  better  satisfied  that  it  should 
be  one  man  of  talent  rather  than  a  club  of  obscure  conspirators 
who  should  gain  exclusive  control  of  public  affairs." 

Even  when  it  became  knowTi  that  the  accusation  made  against 
Moulins  and  Barras  was  a  mere  slander,  that  the  alleged  con- 
spiracy and  the  daggers  of  the  deputies  were  all  fabrications,  the 
hatred  felt  toward  the  Jacobins  and  the  yearning  for  a  return  to 
conditions  of  social  order  were  so  great  that,  in  spite  of  all,  in  the 
end  achieved  it  was  forgotten  that  the  means  employed  had 
been  anything  but  moral. 

It  is  surprising  to  observe  in  contemporaneous  accounts  of 
the  Coup  d'Etat  how  Bonaparte  is  nearly  always  the  only  actor 
named,  while  Sieyes  and  Ducos,  if  mentioned  at  all,  are  spoken 
of  only  incidentally.  And  yet  all  three  were  formally  invested 
with  equal  executive  power  and  at  first  shared  equally  in  the 
labour  of  government,  strictly  maintaining  their  equality.  But 
at  the  end  of  a  very  short  time  Bonaparte  alone  was  in  full  pos- 
session of  the  executive  power.  For  this  there  were  sundry 
causes.  In  the  first  place  the  people  regarded  him  alone  as 
their  deliverer,  while  Sieyes  and  Ducos,  in  disfavour  as  former 
Directors,  interested  nobody,  and,  justly  appreciating  this  fact, 
voluntarily  kept  themselves  in  the  background.  Moreover, 
there  was  among  the  three  really  only  one  who  had  had  practical 
experience  in  affairs  of  state;  that  one  was  Napoleon,  who, 
having  governed  Italy  in   1797,  and  organized  the  affairs  of 


1 82  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

Egypt  in  1798,  was  acquainted  with  all  the  detail  of  administra- 
tion. Finally,  he  alone  had  the  unswerving  desire  for  work  and 
marvellous  capacity  for  it  which  was  needed  to  bring  security 
and  order  out  of  the  appalling  confusion  into  which  affairs  had 
sunk.  Ducos,  appreciating  his  unfitness,  soon  withdrew  alto- 
gether, and  Sieyes,  perceiving  that  his  cherished  plan  of  playing 
poUtical  saviour  had  stranded,  contented  himself  with  elaborat- 
ing his  Constitution  in  interminable  discussions  with  both  com- 
mittees, while  abandoning  to  his  zealous  colleague  the  arduous 
labours  of  the  ruler. 

Napoleon  was  thus  left  free  to  act  as  he  saw  fit.  He  chose  his 
own  ministers.  Gaudin,  who  had  acquired  much  experience  in 
the  administration  of  public  revenues  under  the  monarchy,  and 
who  had  refused  to  accept  a  portfoHo  under  Sieyes,  now  wilHngly 
assumed  the  burdensome  duties  of  Minister  of  Finance.  Talley- 
rand, formerly  Bishop  of  Autun,  whose  sordid  avarice  and  irregu- 
lar manner  of  life  were  a  reproach,  but  whose  penetration  in 
statecraft  was  unequalled,  was  again  made  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  As  a  token  of  respect  to  the  National  Institute,  Laplace, 
the  great  mathematician,  was  appointed  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
a  position  he  however  soon  yielded  to  Lucien  Bonaparte  on 
account  of  entire  lack  of  capacity  in  the  management  of  affairs. 
Berthier,  the  skilful  manager  of  military  operations  in  Napo- 
leon's campaigns,  became  Minister  of  War,  but  later  gave  place 
to  Carnot.  Fouche  retained  command  of  the  department  of 
police,  Cambaceres  was  given  the  portfolio  of  justice,  and  Forfait 
received  that  of  the  Navy. 

The  Ministry  having  been  constituted,  attention  was  turned 
to  the  regulation  of  the  desperate  financial  situation.  Such 
was  the  confidence  inspired  by  the  new  government  that  the  five 
per  cents  rose  from  7  to  12  after  the  Coup  d'Etat,  and  to  17 
within  a  few  weeks.  When  thereupon  Napoleon  did  away  with 
the  pernicious  compulsory  loans,  capitalists  became  somewhat 
more  confident.  By  way  of  compensation  taxes  on  real  estate 
were  raised,  and  in  order  to  secure  the  revenue  thus  levied,  a 
project  which  had  already  previously  been  under  discussion  was 
made  law  reorganizing  the  collection  of  direct  taxes.     In  every 


^r.  30]  Sieyes'   New   Constitution  183 

department  the  Receivers  General  had  to  furnish  security  by 
means  of  which  contributions  of  money  the  most  crying  needs 
could  at  least  be  met.  That  capital  might  be  still  further  re- 
assured more  than  fifty  Jacobin  deputies,  among  them  General 
Jourdan,  were  sentenced  to  deportation  or  imprisonment,  but 
this  sentence  was  afterwards  commuted  to  police  surveillance. 
These  measures  did  not,  it  is  true,  themselves  remedy  the  desper- 
ate financial  straits  of  the  State,  but  they  furnished  the  conditions 
essential  to  the  bringing  about  improvement.  Everything 
depended  upon  whether  Napoleon  were  confirmed  legally  in  his 
ascendency  in  the  government.  He  began  seriously  to  concern 
himself  in  regard  to  the  new  Constitution. 

Sieyes  had  sought  to  make  his  draft  of  a  Constitution  accepta- 
ble to  both  committees  appointed  by  the  former  Chambers.  It 
was  based  on  the  principle  that  the  different  branches  of  the  gov- 
ernment should  counterbalance  one  another.  The  people  was 
declared  sovereign  and  universal  suffrage  guaranteed.  But  the 
people  were  not  to  elect  their  representatives  directly,  merely  to 
cast  their  votes  for  candidates  from  among  whom  the  legislators 
were  to  be  appointed  by  the  supreme  power  of  the  State.  The 
five  milhon  adults  comprising  the  voters  of  all  France  were  to 
elect  from  their  number  one  tenth,  500,000  men,  who  were  to  be 
called  Notables  of  the  Communes,  eligible  for  communal  offices; 
these  were  to  elect  from  among  their  number  50,000  Notables  of 
the  Department,  eligible  for  departmental  offices;  ffiially,  these 
last  were  to  elect  one  tenth  of  their  number  for  Notables  of 
France,  candidates  for  the  legislative  body,  and  for  central  admin- 
istration offices  up  to  that  of  Minister.  All  such  as  had  during 
the  last  ten  years  held  high  office  or  been  representatives  were  to 
be  included  in  the  Ust  of  Notables  of  France,  and  all  lists  were 
to  be  vaUd  for  ten  years.  From  the  Notables  of  France  were  to 
be  chosen  the  members  of  two  legislative  bodies,  one  of  which 
should  discuss  but  not  vote  upon  bills  originating  in  their  own 
assembly  or  proposed  by  the  government,  while  the  other  was  to 
vote  without  discussion.  At  the  head  of  the  State  there  was  to 
be  a  president  styled  the  Grand  Elector.  He  was  to  enjoy  an 
ample  income,  represent  the   Republic,  sign  laws  and  treaties 


184  Coup  d'Etat  and   Consulate  [1799 

and  appoint  or  dismiss  the  two  chief  magistrates,  the  Consuls, 
but  this  was  to  be  the  Umit  of  his  functions.  Of  the  Consuls,  one 
was  to  have  charge  of  the  war  department  (army  and  foreign 
affairs),  the  other  of  the  peace  department  (Ministry  of  the 
Interior).  Each  was  to  appoint  his  subordinates.  As  an  out- 
ward check  upon  the  government  and  as  a  guardian  of  the 
Constitution  there  was  to  be  an  independent  body,  the  Constitu- 
tional Jury,  to  consist  of  eighty  members  appointed  for  life. 
They  were  to  choose  their  own  successors,  appoint  the  Grand 
Elector  and  the  members  of  the  two  legislative  houses,  and  annul 
unconstitutional  laws.  In  case  the  Grand  Elector  or  any  other 
high  official  abused  his  authority  this  Jury  was  empowered  to 
appoint  him  a  member  of  their  own  body,  thus  depriving  him  of 
his  former  office,  since,  as  member  of  the  Jury  it  was  impossible 
for  him  to  hold  any  other  official  position. 

Such  were  the  principal  features  of  the  Constitution  which 
Sieyes  had  elaborated  with  so  much  subtlety.  The  sovereign 
people  was  rendered  powerless  by  the  Jury,  the  first  Chamber  by 
the  second,  the  power  of  the  Consuls  was  neutralized  through 
the  Grand  Elector,  and  that  of  the  Grand  Elector  in  his  turn 
through  the  Jury.  This  system,  however  perfect  theoretically, 
was  altogether  impractical.  So  insecure  a  mechanism  could 
least  of  all  find  approval  with  a  man  Uke  Bonaparte,  whose 
dreams  of  rule  were  on  the  threshold  of  realization.  He  ridiculed 
the  contrivance,  characterized  it  to  Joseph  as  far  too  "metaphysi- 
cal," and  compelled  the  commission,  zealously  desirous  of  being 
serviceable  to  so  powerful  a  man,  to  undertake  radical  changes 
therein.  The  useless  Grand  Elector, "  this  shadow  of  a  'roi  fain^ 
ant,'  this  fatted  swine,"  as  Napoleon  designated  him,  was  at  once 
eliminated.  He  was  replaced  by  a  First  Consul  as  head  of  the 
government,  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  law,  to  be  elected 
by  the  Senate  for  a  term  of  ten  years.  He  was  to  appoint  and 
dismiss  ministers,  ambassadors,  councillors  of  State,  administra- 
tive officials  (prefects,  sub-prefects,  and  mayors),  all  officers 
whether  of  the  army  or  navy,  and  all  judges  excepting  members 
of  the  "cour  dc  cassation"  (higliest  court  of  appeals),  and  the 
"  jugcs  de  paix."  His  will  should  be  law  when  pronmlgated  in  the 


^T.  30]    The   Departments  of  Government        185 

form  of  a  decree.  He  was  to  direct  in  matters  of  diplomacy, 
and  was  to  be  Commander-in-chief  of  all  military  forces.  He 
was  to  sign  treaties  and  laws  upon  their  adoption  by  the  legisla- 
tive body.  He  was  to  appoint  the  members  of  a  Council  of  State 
which  constituted  a  part  of  the  executive  and  which  was  to  assist 
the  government  with  its  advice.  At  the  side  of  the  First  Consul 
there  were  to  be  two  colleagues  whose  powers  were,  however, 
much  less  extensive,  since  they  could  assist  only  with  counsel 
and  could  exercise  no  influence  in  the  appointment  of  State 
officials.  It  would  almost  seem  as  if  they  had  been  created  to 
veil  the  omnipotence  of  the  First  Consul. 

In  the  face  of  a  governing  power  thus  constituted  an  efficient 
legislative  body  was  scarcely  possible.  Bonaparte  therefore 
readily  agreed  to  the  manner  of  election  by  means  of  the  before- 
mentioned  hsts  of  candidates.  The  legislative  power  was  to  be 
exercised  by  three  bodies.  Sieyes'  Constitutional  Jury  was  trans- 
formed into  a  Senate  with  life-membership  (Senat  conserva- 
teur),  whose  80  members  were  to  be  chosen  from  the  Notables 
of  France.  From  the  same  list  of  candidates  the  Senate  was  to 
choose  the  Corps  legislatif,  with  300  members,  and  the  Tribunate, 
with  100.  No  one  of  these  bodies  possessed  the  right  of  initiating 
legislative  measures.  The  executive  laid  bills  before  the  Tri- 
bunate ;  the  latter  debated  questions  thus  brought  before  it,  but 
could  vote  only  as  to  whether  certain  of  its  members  designated 
for  that  purpose  should  speak  for  or  against  the  measure  before 
the  Corps  legislatif.  The  members  of  this  last  body,  on  the  other 
hand,  did  not  debate  the  question,  but  voted  at  once  after  hearing 
the  Tribunes.  In  a  letter  to  Talleyrand  already  quoted  Napoleon 
had  spoken  of  a  legislature  "impassive,  without  eyes  and  without 
ears  for  its  surroundings."  Such  an  one  had  now  been  found. 
In  the  same  letter  the  Council  of  State  was  also  designated  as  one 
of  the  two  branches  of  the  executive.  Now  for  the  first  time 
could  it  be  seen  who  was  to  constitute  the  other  branch.  It 
became  suddenly  apparent  that  the  real  authority  was  to  rest  in 
his  hands  and  his  alone.* 

Other  provisions  of  the  Constitution  concerned  the  judicial 

*  See  page  118. 


1 86  Coup  d'Etat  and  Consulate  [1799 

and  financial  regulations,  especially  the  court  of  appeals  ("cour 
de  cassation  "),  whose  members  were  to  be  elected  by  the  Senate, 
as  were  also  those  of  the  exchequer  ("cour  des  comptes  ").  The 
yearly  salaries  of  the  dignitaries  were  then  fixed.  That  of  the 
First  Consul  was  to  be  500,000  francs,  while  his  colleagues  were 
to  receive  150,000.  All  three  were  to  have  residences  in  the 
Tuileries.  Senators  were  to  receive  25,000  francs,  the  Tribunes 
15,000,  and  members  of  the  Corps  legislatif  10,000. 

To  this  modified  form  of  the  proposed  Constitution  the  fifty 
members  of  the  Commission  had  on  the  whole  given  their  approval 
with  but  little  opposition.  It  remained  only  to  elect  the  three 
chief  magistrates  whose  names  were  to  appear  in  the  Constitution 
of  the  year  VIII.  All  naturally  were  agreed  upon  Napoleon  for 
First  Consul.  Sieyes  having  declined  to  serve  in  the  capacity 
of  one  of  the  other  Consuls,  the  choice  fell  upon  Cambaceres  and 
Lebrun.  The  former,  who  had  befriended  and  patronized 
Napoleon  in  Paris  in  the  days  before  the  13th  Vendemiaire,  was 
an  eminent  jurist,  though  decidedly  inchned  toward  a  life  of  ease. 
The  latter  was  a  financier  of  like  ability  who  contributed  to  the 
new  regime  the  benefit  of  his  wide  experience  acquired  under 
the  monarchy.  To  Sieyes  was  accorded  the  sinecure  of  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Senate  with  a  handsome  income  besides  a  great  estate 
in  the  vicinity  of  Paris,  a  price  gladly  paid  by  Napoleon  to  relieve 
himself  of  the  abbe.     Ducos  was  made  a  Senator. 

With  these  appointments  the  Committee  of  Fifty  completed 
its  task  in  a  night  session  of  December  12th.  Nothing  was  now 
lacking  but  its  sanction  by  the  sovereign,  that  is  to  say  by  the 
people  of  France,  as  was  clearly  expressed  in  the  Constitution. 
Upon  this  absolute  reliance  could  be  placed.  The  more  the 
new  statute  differed  from  those  which  had  during  the  last  ten 
years  led  to  the  overthrow  of  order  at  home  and  to  a  state  of  war 
abroad,  the  more  favourably  would  it  be  received.  Napoleon 
might  safely  venture,  without  waiting  for  the  vote  of  the  people,  to 
fill  the  i)laces  created  for  the  representatives  of  the  nation.  Sieyes 
and  Ducos  in  company  with  Cambaceres  and  Lebrun  chose  thirty- 
one  Senators  according  to  their  discretion,  or  rather  that  of 
Bonaparte,  and  these  thirty-one  selected  colleagues  sufficient 


iEr.  30]     "The  Revolution  is  at  an   End"         187 

to  bring  their  number  up  to  sixty,  wliich  was  for  the  present  to  be 
its  hmit.  Their  ranks  being  filled,  the  Senate  proceeded  at  once 
to  the  appointment  of  the  Tribunes  and  the  members  of  the 
Corps  l^gislatif,  while  Napoleon  appointed  the  members  of  the 
new  Council  of  State,  which  held  its  first  session  on  December 
25th.  A  new  government  having  many  positions  to  bestow 
always  finds  many  adherents  among  the  ambitious,  the  enter- 
prising, and  the  covetous — a  power  w^hich  Napoleon  well  under- 
stood making  use  of  to  establish  his  rule.  And  from  this  time 
forth  he  was  master  of  France. 

The  manifesto  of  December  15th,  1799,  in  which  the  Consular 
Constitution  was  presented  to  the  people  of  France  for  its  ratifi- 
cation, closed  with  these  words:  "Citizens,  the  Revolution  is 
estabUshed  upon  the  principles  wliich  were  its  origin.  It  is  at  an 
end." 

That  was  the  question. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

WAR    AND    PEACE 

No,  the  Revolution  was  not  at  an  end.  Napoleon  might  ac- 
quire an  unlimited  dictatorial  power  over  France,  he  might  render 
the  representatives  of  the  nation  a  blind,  impassive  instrument  of 
his  will,  he  might  finally  destroy  the  Republic  and  set  up  in  its 
stead  his  own  absolute  sovereignty,  still  the  Revolution  had 
not  reached  its  end.  It  had  but  undergone  a  change  of  form,  a 
metamorphosis  such  as  would  be  described  chemically  as  an  allo- 
tropic  state  of  the  Revolution  resulting  from  the  decomposi- 
tion of  the  Directory.  For  two  of  its  most  essential  principles 
were  retained  by  the  Consulate:  that  of  equality  at  home  and 
that  of  extension  in  all  directions  abroad. 

Civil  and  social  inequality,  the  barriers  separating  classes  and 
circles,  had  been  set  aside  by  the  Revolution,  and  these  were  not 
restored  by  the  Consulate.  "Liberty"  had  been  far  too  often 
misused  by  the  people  in  the  ten  years  of  their  supremacy  to  be 
valued  highly  now;  "Fraternity"  had  become  a  hated  word 
owing  to  the  many  deeds  of  violence  committed  in  its  name; 
"Equality"  alone  was  still  held  in  respect,  and  Napoleon  was 
correct  in  his  repeated  assertions  that  the  French  cared  far  less 
for  pohtical  liberty  than  for  equality,  a  point  which  the  Bour- 
bons were  too  blind  to  recognize.*  It  was,  to  be  sure,  only  the 
equality  of  all  under  one  superior,  but  at  least  it  was  but  one. 
This  man  had  himself  learned  its  value  at  the  time  when,  through 

*  In  1804,  shortly  before  he  became  Emperor,  he  remarked  to  Mme. 
de  R^musat:  "One  must  needs  have  regard  for  people's  vanity;  the  plain- 
ness of  the  Republic  bored  you  people.  What  began  the  revolution? 
Vanity.  What  will  put  a  stop  to  it?  Vanity.  Liberty  is  a  pretext. 
Equality  is  the  hobljy.  The  people  are  pleased  to  have  a  man  who  has 
risen  from  the  ranks  for  king." 

i88 


iEx.  30]  The   Spirit  of  Conquest  189 

it,  the  way  was  opened  before  him,  a  young  heutenant  without 
a  future,  for  the  possible  reahzation  of  his  vast  designs;  and 
again  when,  through  it,  he,  a  man  of  ordinary  family,  obtained 
the  hand  of  a  lady  belonging  to  the  nobihty ;  finally,  when  it  had 
enabled  him  with  no  other  claim  than  that  of  merit  to  become 
the  ruler  over  a  great  nation. 

The  second  revolutionary  principle  retained  by  the  Consulate 
was  that  of  conquest.  Many  historians  have  represented  the 
striving  for  universal  dominion  as  due  entirely  to  Napoleonic 
ambition.  Whether  seeing  therein  a  new  and  glorious  proof  of 
the  grandeiu"  of  his  genius,  or  condemning  him  for  his  criminal 
and  insatiable  greed,  wTiters  have  concurred  in  imputing  this 
tendency  to  him  personally  and  in  placing  the  responsibility  for 
it  upon  his  shoulders  alone.  But  this  view  of  the  situation  is 
hardly  to  be  accepted,  for  ever  since  the  year  1792  the  revolu- 
tionary holders  of  power  in  France  had  pursued  this  course 
toward  universal  dominion.  It  was  indeed  at  first  intended 
that  this  should  be  the  universal  dominion  of  revolutionary  ideas 
only,  of  the  rights  of  man  which  they  styled  "universal."  But 
when  these  ideas  met  with  material  resistance  put  forth  by 
the  old  States,  the  opposition  was  overcome  by  armies  consisting 
of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  enthusiasts  for  these  principles 
which  pressed  forward  deep  into  foreign  territory,  calling  the  peo- 
ple to  hberty  and  to  resistance  against  hereditary  rule.  As  Mo- 
hammed propagated  his  rehgion  with  the  aid  of  the  sword,  and 
as  the  religious  parties  of  the  sixteenth  century  took  up  arms 
for  their  faith,  so  now  did  the  believers  in  the  new  political  dogma 
rush  upon  the  neighbouring  countries  to  convert  while  conquer- 
ing. And  when  the  question  arose  whether  acquisitions  made  in 
war  were  to  be  retained  m  time  of  peace,  it  was  decided  by  no 
ideal  considerations,  but  by  material  need:  the  only  hope  of  re- 
lieving the  financial  distress  in  France  was  by  drawing  upon  the 
resources  of  these  neighbours  either  by  means  of  downright  an- 
nexation or  by  creating  a  fringe  of  dependent  republics  on  the 
borders  of  France  and  transferring  to  them  a  portion  of  the 
State's  burden.  It  has  already  been  seen  how  this  motive  of 
self-preservation  determined  the  revolutionary  government  in 


190  War  and  Peace  [1799 

1795  to  incorporate  Belgium.*  Some  one  at  that  time  having 
offered  a  prize  for  the  best  answer  to  the  question  whether  it 
would  be  advantageous  or  prejudicial  to  France  to  extend  her 
borders  as  far  as  the  Rhine,  he  was  officially  denounced  in  the 
"Moniteur"  as  suspected  of  high  treason.  Thus  had  the  Revolu- 
tionary theory  of  the  liberation  of  nations  become  in  practice 
the  conquest  of  nations.  Conquests  were  no  longer  made  in 
order  to  give  hberty:  liberty  was  now  declared  only  in  order  to 
faciUtate  conquest.  "When  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  pro- 
poses peace,"  wrote  Mallet  du  Pan  in  October,  1795,  "this  word 
must  be  understood  to  mean  submission.  Its  invariable  inten- 
tion is  to  compel  every  State  laying  down  its  arms  before  France 
to  become  her  ally,  that  is  to  say,  her  tributary  and  her  imitator. 
Such  princes  of  secondary  rank  who  hope  to  escape  this  fate  by 
means  of  treaties  or  capitulations  strangely  misapprehend  the 
character  of  this  Revolution."  As  will  be  seen,  this  system  is 
identical  with  that  pursued  by  Napoleon  up  to  the  year  1812.t 

The  greatest  antagonist  to  the  extension  of  the  boundaries  of 
France  was  now,  as  it  had  been  in  the  time  of  Louis  XIV.,  Eng- 
land. Should  France  stick  to  that  poUcy  to  which  she  had  been 
forced  by  the  ideal  purpose  of  the  Revolution  and  to  which  she 
had  been  obUged  to  hold  on  account  of  material  need,  the  con- 
sequence would  be  that  Great  Britain  must  also  keep  to  her  system 
of  opposition  by  means  of  her  ships  upon  the  ocean  and  through 
her  allies  upon  the  Continent.  For  this  reason,  if  reports  of  that 
time  are  to  be  believed,  there  was  in  France,  as  early  as  the 
summer  of  1796,  a  clearly  defined  intention  not  only  to  land  an 
army  in  the  British  Islands,  but  also  to  annihilate  that  country 
by  closing  to  her  commerce  the  ports  of  all  Europe;  Napoleon's 

*  See  page  75. 

tin  August,  1801,  the  Prussian  Envoy,  Lucchesini  wrote  to  Berlin: 
"Whatever  advantages  may  accrue  to  the  French  government  from  ex- 
changing the  anarchy  of  the  Directory  for  the  Consuhir  authority,  there 
will  be  no  change  in  foreign  policy.  The  same  ambitious  plans  and  the 
same  arbitrary  coimoctions  will  prevail,  and  if  General  Bonaparte  is  as 
well  qualified  for  administration  as  he  is  to  deal  with  enemies  without 
and  within,  he  is  still  too  much  of  a  conqueror  to  give  France  and,  through 
her,  Europe  lasting  peace." 


i 


Mt.30]         Napoleon's    Policy   Prefigured  191 

"Continental  System"  was  therefore  also  prefigured  at  this  time. 
Even  Bonaparte's  Eastern  plans  had  been  evolved  before  his 
time  by  the  rulers  at  Paris.  At  the  same  time  that  the 
descent  upon  England  was  planned,  long  before  Bonaparte 
had  turned  his  mind  upon  imitating  Alexander  the  Great,  the 
Directory  was  concerning  itself  about  the  source  of  Britain's 
wealth,  India.  Mallet  du  Pan  wTites  in  a  report  dated  July  3d, 
1796:  "The  incendiary  activity  of  the  Directory  no  longer  knows 
any  bounds.  It  is  rousing  Persia  to  rebellion,  working  up  Con- 
stantinople, and  peopling  Hindostan  with  its  emissaries."  In  a 
similar  way  the  policy  towards  Germany  afterward  pursued  by 
Napoleon  may  be  found  mapped  out  in  all  its  details  during  the 
last  ten  years  of  the  century.  The  idea  of  the  secularization  of 
the  German  ecclesiastical  principaUties  originated  with  the  Girond- 
ists, and  in  1795  Sieyes  was  the  author  of  a  memorial  containing 
a  scheme  for  the  indemnification  and  aggrandizement  of  the 
secular  principalities  at  the  expense  of  the  ecclesiastical,  a  plan 
which,  with  slight  alteration,  was  actually  put  into  practice  in 
1803.  The  suggestion  of  the  confederation  of  Rhenish  princes 
under  French  protection  which  in  1806  became  a  reality  will  also 
be  found  to  have  had  its  origin  in  the  diplomacy  of  the  Directory 
of  1798,  as  was  Hkewise  the  case  with  the  design  of  driving  back 
Prussia  and  Austria  as  far  toward  the  East  as  possible  in  order 
to  bring  under  French  control  the  mouths  of  the  Weser  and  Elbe 
and  cut  them  off  from  English  commerce.  In  a  report  to  the 
Directory  sent  by  Sieyes  from  Berhn  in  July,  1798,  he  says  plainly 
that  the  German  coast  of  the  North  Sea  is  "for  France  the  most 
important  portion  of  the  earth's  surface  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
by  means  of  it  the  Directory  may  at  its  will  close  to  English 
commerce  all  the  markets  and  all  the  ports  of  the  Continent  from 
Gibraltar  as  far  as  Holstein  or  even  to  the  North  Cape." 

It  is  evident  that  the  Revolution  had  determined  upon  ex- 
tending its  influence  and  power  to  the  furthest  confines  of  the 
Continent.  This  intention  was,  to  be  sure,  without  system 
or  method, — just  as  in  the  legislation  of  the  interior  one  law 
was  heaped  upon  another  without  regard  to  order  or  relation, — 
and  it  needed  a  man  of  extraordinary  perspicacity  and  practical 


192  War  and  Peace  [1799 

insight  to  apply  both  system  and  method  to  this  vague  purpose. 
And  here  begins  Bonaparte's  direct  participation  in  the  policy 
of  the  Revolution.  Up  to  this  time  he  had  been  merely  its  dis- 
ciple and  advocate,  as  far  as  its  interests  coincided  with  his  own, 
and  except  for  the  latter  he  recognized  none.  Neither  his  inter- 
ests nor  his  ambition  knew  any  bounds.  Once  master  of  France 
he  would  satisfy  them  by  letting  things  take  their  course,  and 
before  him  would  open  up  the  prospect  of  a  universal  empire 
such  as  perhaps  no  power  on  the  globe  had  ever  founded.  He 
was  like  a  swimmer  whose  destination  is  the  river's  mouth:  he 
needs  but  to  throw  himself  into  the  current  to  reach  it.  Even  at 
the  time  when  with  Robespierre  the  younger  he  was  considering 
the  plan  of  offensive  warfare  against  Italy  he  had  begun  to  de- 
velop a  policy  of  his  own  founded  upon  that  of  revolutionary 
conquest,  and  this  had  matured  so  that  it  could  not  now  be  aban- 
doned without  danger  to  himself  and  to  the  power  which  he  had 
acquired. 

History  shows  us  monarchs  whose  lives  are  tragedies.  But 
there  are  also  nations  whose  story  is  a  tragedy,  where  for  cen- 
turies the  people  suffer  and  pine  as  the  result  of  a  single  great 
crime,  and  the  anguish  is  not  lessened  by  the  fact  that  it  is  shared 
by  miUions.  France  gives  us  an  example  of  such  a  natioii. 
Nothing  can  be  more  affecting  than  the  fate  of  this  people,  so 
full  of  enthusiasm  for  the  real  good  of  humanity,  overtaken  in 
the  course  of  a  few  years  by  all  that  was  glaringly  contradictory 
to  humane  feeling;  yearning  for  peace,  and  condemned  to  long 
decades  of  warfare  involving  untold  sacrifice.  Immediately  upon 
the  overthrow  of  Robespierre's  Reign  of  Terror  the  people  had 
begun  to  clamour  for  peace  with  the  rest  of  the  world;  this  cry 
was  repeated  when  the  Convention  was  succeeded  by  the  Direc- 
tory; and  again  when  Sicyes  took  his  place  in  the  government 
the  same  hope  centred  in  his  name.  Now  that  Bonaparte  had 
siezed  the  rudder,  the  nation,  so  often  disappointed,  turned 
its  gaze  once  more  in  hope  upon  him.  Was  it  to  be  again  in 
vain? 

It  has  been  asserted  that  by  accepting  certain  restrictions 
Napoleon  might  have  concluded  peace  at  once  in  1800.     This  is,, 


1 


JEt.so]      Difficulties  in   the  Way  of  Peace        193 

however,  improbable.  For  since  the  Director}'  liad  become  accus- 
tomed to  making  the  "hberated"  countries  bear  a  portion  of  the 
state  burdens  and  to  having  the  contributions  levied  in  hostile 
territory  figure  as  a  permanent  item  in  the  budget,  it  had  in- 
dolently avoided  the  arduous  and  tedious  labour  of  remedying  the 
disorder  in  the  finances.  Napoleon's  energy  had  brought  about 
an  amelioration,  but  in  the  few  months  of  his  rule  notliing  more 
could  be  done  than  merely  to  lay  the  foundation  for  his  reforms. 
Capital  was  still  withheld,  the  rate  of  interest  was  still  very  high, 
the  revenue  collected  was  still  not  much  exceeding  that  of  pre- 
ceding years,  and  many  arbitrary  measures  had  to  be  resorted  to 
in  order  to  procure  funds.  Consequently,  if  the  State  was  to 
continue  in  existence,  it  was  unavoidable  to  draw  for  the  present 
upon  the  alHes  for  contributions  together  with  the  money  ex- 
torted from  conquered  foes.  To  conclude  peace  at  this  time 
would  have  meant  nothing  less  than  the  rehnquishment  of 
wealthy  Holland,  Switzerland,  the  conquered  German  territory 
beyond  the  Rhine,  the  Riviera,  Malta,  Egypt,  and  above  all,  the 
possibility  of  levying  contributions ;  it  would  have  meant  to  draw 
back  within  the  narrow  confines  of  a  land  whose  resources  were 
to  a  great  extent  exhausted  or  at  least  still  inaccessible,  where 
the  disbanded  army  would  only  increase  the  starving  populatior, 
and  where  the  contrast  between  the  misery  of  the  poor  and  the 
wealth  of  unscrupulous  upstarts  who  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  financial  embarrassment  to  enrich  themselves  would  have 
probably  led  to  social  revolution  and  civil  war.  Moreover,  not  all 
Frenchmen  demanding  peace  meant  thereby  peace  at  any  price 
or  based  upon  the  reverses  of  the  preceding  year,  but  upon  terms 
dictated  by  new  and  glorious  victories  promised  by  the  mere 
name  of  Bonaparte.  One  of  the  missions  undertaken  by  the 
consuls  on  the  19th  Brumaire  was  that  of  concluding  an 
honourable  peace.  Barante  says  in  his  "Souvenirs":  "There 
prevailed  everywhere  a  desire  for  improvement  and  for  national 
glory."  Added  to  this  there  was  in  the  army  especially  a  crav- 
ing for  war  and  victory  by  means  of  which  its  reputation 
might  be  retrieved.  It  was  in  response  to  this  desire  that 
Bonaparte,  on  the  first  day  of   the  Coup  d'Etat,  had  spoken 


194  War  and  Peace  [1799 

to  the  soldiers  not  only  of  liberty  and  of  peace,  but  also  of 
victory.* 

Finally,  and  this  was  the  essential  point,  the  First  Consul 
himself  stood  in  need  of  war  in  order  to  strengthen  and  maintain 
the  power  which  he  had  so  boldly  assumed,  according  to  the  time- 
honoured  method  of  securing  obedience  from  the  parties  at  home 
by  employing  abroad  the  forces  of  the  State;  he  stood  in  need 
of  war  in  order  to  acquire  new  personal  glory  and  fame,  and  to 
silence  the  whispers  about  disaster  at  Acre  and  the  whole  futile 
expedition  to  the  Orient ;  he  stood  in  need  of  war,  moreover,  to 
satisfy  his  measureless  ambition,  which  aimed  at  the  acquisition 
of  supremacy  over  all  Europe  in  the  same  way  that  he  had  ac- 
quired it  over  France. 

It  was  therefore  only  a  matter  of  form  when,  on  the  25th 
of  December,  1799,  he  addressed  letters  to  the  King  of  England 
and  to  the  Emperor  Francis  in  which,  without  making  any 
definite  propositions,  he  simply  expressed  his  desire  for  peace. 
Such  advances  of  course  could  not  be  considered.  England  was 
holding  Malta  and  Egypt  in  a  state  of  blockade,  and  the  fall  of 
these  two  French  positions  was  only  a  question  of  weeks;  both 
of  these  acquisitions  were  of  far  too  great  importance  to  British 
interests  for  Pitt  to  give  them  up.  He  declined  to  enter  into 
any  negotiations  for  peace.  Austria  had  indeed  quarrelled  with 
Russia.  After  the  victories  of  the  allied  forces  in  Italy  Thugut 
was  not  to  be  satisfied  with  regaining  the  former  Austrian  terri- 
tory of  Lombardy,  but  wanted  also  the  three  Legations  and  Pied- 
mont, a  purpose  which  was  suspected  by  his  Russian  neighbour 
and  to  which  Suvaroff  opposed  resistance  upon  his  own  au- 
thority. Thugut  succeeded  in  procuring  from  the  Court  of  St. 
Petersburg  an  order  for  this  capable  general  to  take  command  in 
Switzerland,  while  Archduke  Charles,  then  stationed  there,  was 
forced  against  his  own  better  judgment  to  pass  over  into  South- 
ern Germany.  During  the  marches  entailed  by  these  changes 
of  location  Mass6na  su(;ceeded  in  defeating  a  corps  of  Russians 
at  Zurich  and  by  means  of  this  victory  in  regaining  posses- 
sion of  the  whole  of  Switzerland.     Suvaroff  returned  to  Russia, 

*  See  page  172. 


iET.  30]  Austria's   Conditions  19^ 

Austria  was  now  absolute  mistress  of  the  situation  in  Upper  Italy 
with  the  exception  of  Genoa,  where  the  remnants  of  the  French 
armies  were  collected,  and  this  supremacy  she  hoped  to  maintain. 
Hence  when  Napoleon's  letter  reached  Vienna  Thugut  also  was 
unready  to  accede  to  its  vague  propositions  of  peace.  He  de- 
manded first  of  all  assurance  upon  the  question  as  to  "whether 
the  First  Consul  would  return  to  the  actual  causes  of  the  war  so 
as  to  prevent  for  all  time  their  recurrence;  whether  he  would 
abandon  the  very  source  of  that  mistaken  poUcy,  fatal  to  France 
herself  and  threatening  the  existence  of  the  other  powers;  whether 
there  existed  any  difference  between  the  overtures  of  the  new 
government  and  those  of  its  predecessors;  and,  finally,  whether 
General  Bonaparte  would  bring  the  French  public  to  recognize 
the  general  principles  of  international  law  which  alone  can  bind 
nations  together  and  teach  them  reciprocal  respect  for  peace  and 
independence."  On  February  28th  Talleyrand  answered  by 
proposing  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio, 
that  monument  of  French  offensive  poUcy.  Thugut  knew  then 
what  might  be  counted  upon. 

How  little  Napoleon  meant  by  his  offers  of  peace  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  on  the  very  day  on  which  those  letters  were  dated 
he  addressed  the  French  soldiers  in  these  w'ords:  "You  are  the 
same  men  who  conquered  Holland,  the  Rhine  and  Italy,  and  dic- 
tated terms  of  peace  under  the  walls  of  astonished  Vienna.  Sol- 
diers !  it  is  no  longer  your  frontiers  which  you  are  called  upon  to 
defend;  you  are  now  to  invade  the  territoiy  of  the  enemy."  To 
the  army  of  Italy,  posted  on  the  Riviera  and  which  had  just  been 
placed  under  the  command  of  Mass^na,  he  addressed  a  procla- 
mation in  which  the  star\dng  soldiers  were  consoled  ^\^th  the 
prospect  of  victories  soon  to  follow,  exactly  as  he  had  done  in 
1796.*     In  short,  war  was  from  the  very  first  a  foregone  conclu- 

*  In  this  second  manifesto  Bonaparte  displayed  in  its  full  perfection 
his  incomparable  skill  in  dealing  with  the  common  soldier.  A  demi- 
brigade  had  given  evidence  of  discouragement:  "Are  they  then  all  dead," 
he  exclaimed,  "those  brave  hearts  of  Castiglione,  of  Rivoli,  and  of  Neu- 
markt?  They  would  have  died  rather  than  desert  their  flags,  and  they 
would  have  recalled  their  younger  comrades  to  honour  and  duty.  Sol- 
diers I   you  say  that  your  rations  are  not  issued  to  you  with  regularity. 


196  War  and  Peace  [I800 

sion  with  Bonaparte,  and  his  only  object  in  writing  to  the  two 
sovereigns  was  to  make  the  French  people  believe  that  it  was  he 
who  desired  peace,  and  the  enemy  who  was  forcing  war  upon  him.* 

But  in  order  to  make  headway  against  the  foreign  enemy, 
those  at  home  must  first  be  overcome.  La  Vendee  was  still  in 
revolt,  but  just  at  this  time  the  favourable  outcome  of  the  cam- 
paign in  Holland  set  at  Hberty  a  magnificent  army  of  30,000  men, 
which  Napoleon  further  reinforced  in  order  to  give  weight  to  a 
manifesto  calling  upon  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms, 
offering  full  amnesty  to  those  who  obeyed,  but  threatening  with 
annihilation  all  who  continued  in  resistance  to  the  law.  The 
inhabitants  of  Vendee  were  taken  entirely  by  surprise  in  this 
proceeding,  coming  from  a  man  of  whom  they  had  scarcely  any 
knowledge  except  as  the  conqueror  of  Toulon  and  the  confidant 
of  Robespierre.  They  were  still  further  amazed  when  they  saw 
this  man  compelling  respect  to  the  Catholic  religion  and  setting 
the  priests  at  liberty.  The  success  of  the  manifesto  was  com- 
plete. Among  all  the  bands  in  La  Vendee,  only  three  ventured 
to  resist  and  they  were  forced  to  capitulate.  By  February, 
1800,  the  province  had  been  quieted  and  the  Army  of  the  West 
was  appointed  a  new  destination. 

As  for  the  rest  of  the  French  forces,  the  120,000  men  com- 
manded by  Moreau  in  Switzerland  were  equal  in  number  to  the 
Austrians  in  Suabia  under  command  of  the  brave  but  otherwise 
incapable  Kray,  Archduke  Charles  having  retired  from  the  chief 
command,  sick  and  wounded  by  Thugut's  arbitrary  proceedings. 

What  would  you  have  done  if  you  had  found  yourselves,  like  the  4th  and 
22d  Hght  infantry  and  the  18th  and  the  32d  of  the  line,  in  the  midst  of  the 
desert,  without  bread  or  water,  with  horse  or  mule  meat  as  your  only 
food?  'Victory  will  give  us  bread,'  said  they;  but  you^ — you  desert  your 
standards!  "  etc. 

*  There  is  in  existence  a  communication  from  Talleyrand  to  the  First 
Consul  of  precisely  this  time  (the  first  weeks  of  the  jear  1800),  in  which 
he  says:  "It  is  always  assuming  a  good  position  at  the  beginning  of  a 
campaign  to  manifest  a  warm  desire  for  peace  and  to  make  every  attempt 
toward  its  re-establishement.  If  the  result  of  the  campaign  is  favourable, 
one  has  acquired  the  right  to  show  severity;  if  disastrous,  one  need  not 
bear  the  reprf)ach  of  having  brought  it  on."  (Bailleu,  "  Preussen  und 
Frankreich,  179&-1807,"  I.  522.) 


/ivr.  30]       Why   Napoleon   Took   the   Field  197 

In  Italy,  however,  Massena  had  but  30,000  men  with  which  to 
oppose  the  80,000  Austrians  under  Melas,  a  general  who  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  the  year  before  at  Novi  by  deciding  the  battle 
in  favour  of  the  Austrians;  he  was  old,  feeble,  conscientious,  but 
very  deUberate.  In  order  to  counterbalance  the  enemy's  superior- 
ity of  numbers  the  First  Consul  gave  secret'  orders  in  January, 
1800,  to  Berthier,  the  Minister  of  War,  to  assemble  a  reserve  army 
of  50,000-60,000  men,  using  as  a  nucleus  the  above-mentioned 
Army  of  the  West.  His  plan  for  the  ensuing  campaign  was  mas- 
terly: Moreau  was  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  to  cross  the 
Rhine  at  Schaffhausen,  engage  Kray  in  Germany,  and  force  the 
Austrians  back,  while  ^lass^na  was  to  hold  Melas  before  Genoa, 
retreating  to  that  city  fighting  every  inch  of  the  ground.  Bona- 
parte himself  meanwhile  designed  to  cross  the  Swiss  Alps  with 
the  reserve  army,  penetrate  into  Lombardy  and  there  cut  off 
communication  between  Vienna  and  the  Austrian  army,  which 
he  hoped  to  surprise;  the  decisive  blow  would  then  be  struck 
or  the  Austrians  forced  to  capitulate.  In  pursuing  this  course 
he  was,  without  the  least  doubt,  carrying  out  hidden  ends  in 
addition  to  his  acknowledged  aim,  which  was  to  inflict  defeats 
upon  the  enemy  and  obtain  advantageous  terms  of  peace.  He 
was  unwiUing  that  France  should  owe  that  peace  to  Moreau, 
who,  by  a  reinforcement  of  his  army,  would  have  been  enabled, 
undoubtedly,  to  prevail  over  Austria.  Nor  was  he  perhaps 
willing  that  this  honour  should  fall  to  Mass^na.  Peace  must  be 
the  gift  of  Bonaparte  himself  alone.  This  is  the  reason  why  the 
head  of  the  government  determined,  to  the  great  surprise  of 
every  one,  to  take  the  field ;  this  was  doubtless  his  motive  in  being 
so  conciliatory  toward  the  insurgents  of  Vendue,  in  order  to  have 
done  with  them  and  be  able  to  take  to  his  own  use  the  troops  of 
which  he  stood  in  need ;  it  was  for  the  same  reason  again  that 
Moreau  was  instructed  to  send  into  Upper  Italy  by  way  of  Switzer- 
land one  of  the  corps  of  his  army  for  his  reinforcement  at  the 
risk  of  reducing  the  Army  of  Germany  to  a  number  inferior  to 
that  of  the  enemy.* 

*  Before  deciding  upon  this  course,  Napoleon  had  planned  to  allow 
things  to  take  their  own  course  in  Italy,  to  unite  the  reserve  army  with 


198  War  and   Peace  [I800 

Of  all  these  designs  and  preparations  no  inkling  had  reached 
Vienna.  There  the  Austrians  had  elaborated  their  own  plan: 
Melas  was  as  promptly  as  possible  to  clear  the  Riviera  of  the 
French  and  then  to  direct  a  detached  corps  into  Switzerland 
from  the  south,  while  Kray  should  attack  Moreau's  position 
from  the  north.  The  order  to  carry  out  this  plan  was  communi- 
cated to  Melas  on  the  24th  of  February,  and  its  execution  might 
have  been  begun  in  the  early  part  of  March,  before  Napoleon  had 
come  to  any  agreement  with  Moreau  in  regard  to  the  detail  of 
the  campaign.  It  would  then  have  been  possible  to  shut  Mas- 
sena  up  in  Genoa  by  the  end  of  the  month  before  his  reinforce- 
ments could  reach  him,  and  compel  him  to  surrender  at  latest  in 
the  beginning  of  May;  this  accomplished,  it  would  have  been  pos- 
sible to  turn  northward  with  a  considerable  force  where  he 
might  perhaps  have  encountered  Napoleon's  reserve  army  while 
still  on  the  march.  As  it  was,  however,  Melas,  after  long  delay, 
did  not  begin  the  contest  until  the  beginning  of  April,  and  did  not 
succeed  until  the  21st  in  driving  Massena  into  Genoa,  and  then  he 
wasted  precious  time  in  pursuing  a  French  corps  sent  to  the 
relief  of  Massena.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  middle  of  May  found 
Melas  with  30,000  men  just  across  the  French  frontier  on  the 
Var,  while  his  subordinate  Ott  was  still  besieging  Genoa  with 
24,000  men.  and  to  the  north  17,000  men  in  sundry  detachments 
were  scattered  among  the  valleys  of  the  Alpine  foot-hills.  No 
situation  of  affairs  could  have  been  more  favourable  to  Napoleon. 
And  he  stood  in  need  of  such  conditions  for  his  audacious  under- 
taking. 

The  equipment  of  the  new  French  army  had  been  excessively 
delayed  by  the  lack  of  the  commonest  necessities  arising  from 
the  mismanagement  of  the  previous  year.  Moreau  did  not  for 
a  long  time  make  his  attack.     Time  was  pressing,  for  Mass6na 

that  under  Moroau,  and,  assuming  command  himself,  with  these  superior 
forces  to  surround  Kray's  loft  wing,  cut  it  off  from  comnmnication  and 
march  at  once  upon  Vienna — a  mancKUvn^  which  he  was  five  years  later, 
in  1805,  to  execute  with  brilliancy.  That  he  renounced  this  plan  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  Moreau  with  his  excessive  military  ambition  would  not 
serve  in  a  subordinate  capacity  and  that,  at  that  time,  Bonaparte  still 
had  reasons  for  using  tact  in  dealing  with  him. 


.Et.  30]  Crossing  the  Alps  199 

could  hold  the  enemy  in  check  for  but  a  few  weeks.     Accordingly 
Bonaparte  determined  to  venture,  without  waiting  for  Moreau 
to  take  the  offensive,  upon  taking  up  his  march  through  Lausanne 
and  over  the  Great  Saint-Bernard  to  the  Dora  Baltea  with  but 
32,000  men.     Moreau  was  to  send  one  corps  as  soon  as  practicable 
across  the  Saint-Gothard  to  the  aid  of  Bonaparte.     On  the  14th 
of  May  the  first  columns  climbed  the  pass,  drawing  behind  them 
the  cannon  in  troughs  or  cases  matle  of  hollowed  logs,  under  the 
difficulties  entailed  by  such  a  manoeuvre,  but  with  favourable 
weather  and  without  serious  accident.     On  the  22d  of  May  the 
last  detachment  had  crossed  the  heights.     The  irruption  of  an 
entire  army  at  this  point  had  been  least  of  all  expected  by  the 
Austrians,  and  their  defences  were  insignificant.     The  impreg- 
nable Fort  Bard  alone  made  difficulties.     "There  the  Consul  took 
many  a  pinch  of  snuff,"  relates  one  of  his  grenadiers  who  later 
became  Captain  Coignet;  "he  had  much  to  do  with  all  his  great 
genius."     But  eventually  this  obstacle  also  was  overcome.     The 
infantry  and  cavalry  passed  beyond  the  fort  by  means  of  a  cir- 
cuitous route,  while  the  cannon  with  wheels  wrapped  in  straw 
were  conveyed  past,  under  cover  of  the  night,  by  the  direct  road, 
which  had  been  spread  with  manure.     During  the  last  days  of 
May  a  small  band  of  the  enemy  was  put  to  flight,  Ivrea  taken, 
and  Napoleon's  advance  upon  Milan  begun.     His  entry  into  that 
city  was  made  on  the  2d  of  June.     The  venture  had  succeeded. 
M6las  had  been  advised  too  late  of  the  invasion  of  the  French; 
he  now  sought  to  collect  all  available  forces  at  Turin  in  order  to 
maintain  communication  with  Austria  while  conducting  his  re- 
treat through  Alessandria,  Piacenza,  and  Mantua.     But  in  this 
design  also  he  was  to  fail.     He  got  no  farther  than  Alessandria, 
in  the  vicinity  of  which  the  decisive  blow  was  struck. 

In  the  first  two  weeks  of  May  Moreau  had  defeated  the  Aus- 
trians at  Stockach,  Engen,  and  Moeskirch,  driving  them  back  as 
far  as  Uhn,  and  he  w'as  thence  in  a  position  to  send  to  Napoleon 
the  desired  auxiliaiy  corps.  These  reinforcements  reached  the 
army  of  reserves  during  the  first  days  of  Jime,  bringing  the  aggre- 
gate number  to  ten  divisions  (about  60,000  men).  Always  bear- 
ing in  mind  his  purpose  of  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy, 


200  War  and  Peace  [isoo 

Napoleon  now  advanced  with  five  of  these  divisions,  making  his 
way  across  the  Po  between  Pa  via  and  Piacenza,  and,  after  a  suc- 
cessful encounter  with  Ott,  who  had  finally  taken  Genoa,  arrived 
June  12th  at  Tortona,  a  httle  town  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Mon- 
tebello.  These  troops  were  commanded  by  Lannes,  Victor,  and 
Desaix,  who  had  just  arrived  from  Egypt.  Three  other  divisions 
were  sent  by  the  Consul  to  the  Ticino  and  toward  Piedmont  to 
prevent  the  escape  of  Melas  toward  the  north;  two  more  were 
set  to  guard  the  Adda  and  the  left  bank  of  the  Po.  Having 
encountered  no  serious  resistance  on  the  march  from  Piacenza 
to  Tortona  and  beyond,  Napoleon  was  uncertain  what  direction 
Melas  would  take,  knowing  him  to  be  then  in  Alessandria.  He 
did  not  credit  his  antagonist  with  capacity  for  the  bold  resolu- 
tion of  facing  the  French  army  and  cutting  his  way  through. 
Pride  had  led  him  to  esteem  hghtly  the  souls  as  well  as  the  minds 
of  his  adversaries. 

The  Scrivia  and  Bormida  rivers  run  parallel  to  each  other 
northward  to  the  Po;  on  the  one  lies  Tortona,  on  the  other,  a 
few  miles  west,  the  fortress  of  Alessandria.  The  two  towns  are 
connected  by  the  highway  running  from  Turin  by  way  of  Asti 
to  Piacenza  and  the  east;  between  Tortona  and  Alessandria,  but 
nearer  to  the  latter,  is  situated  the  village  of  Marengo.  A  road 
running  south  from  Tortona  is  joined  at  Novi  by  one  running 
southeast  from  Alessandria;  they  form,  united,  the  way  to  Genoa. 
The  two  corps  under  Lannes  and  Victor  had  advanced  as  far  as 
Marengo,  when  Bonaparte,  failing  to  encounter  the  Austrians 
in  the  open  country,  finally  concluded  that  the  enemy  must  have 
turned  toward  Novi  in  order  to  avoid  him  and  secure  a  strong 
position  near  Genoa,  where  he  could  avail  himself  of  the  resources 
of  the  English  fleet.  In  order  to  get  light  upon  this  question 
Bonaparte  sent  Desaix  on  June  13th  with  a  division  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Novi.  He  himself  remained  with  another  division  and 
the  Consular  Guard  in  the  vicinity  of  Tortona.*  The  army  was 
thus  cut  up  into  three  detached  parts.  Should  Melas  now  attack 
with  his  30,000  well-concentrated  men,  the  issue  might  readily 

*  TheOiiard  luiinborod  at  that  tiiuo  1200  men,  every  one  of  whom  must 
have  been  through  four  campaigns. 


/Et.  30]  Marengo  201 

prove  fatal  to  the  French.  And  the  following  morning  was  to 
display  the  danger  in  this  disposition.  During  the  forenoon  of 
that  day,  June  the  14th,  the  Austrian  general  crossed  the  Bormida 
and  pressed  forward  in  the  direction  of  Tortona.  At  Marengo  he 
came  upon  Lannes  and  ^^ictor,  drove  them  back  and  out  of  the 
village,  and  after  a  struggle  of  six  hours'  duration  compelled  them 
by  his  superiority  of  numbers  to  give  way.  Napoleon  now  real- 
ized that  the  decisive  battle  was  to  be  fought  out  on  this  occasion 
and  that  he  had  made  an  egregious  blunder.  He  at  once  de- 
spatched an  ordnance  officer  to  Desaix  commanding  his  return, 
and  himself  hastened  to  the  field  with  his  Guards  and  reserve 
division,  where  he  succeeded  in  the  early  afternoon  hours  in  stem- 
ming the  tide  of  battle.  But  the  conflict  had  not  raged  long 
before  the  French  again  began  to  give  way  and  the  retreat  threat- 
ened to  become  a  stampede.  Napoleon  sat  by  the  roadside  in 
nervous  excitement,  beating  up  with  his  riding-whip  the  dust 
through  which  his  defeated  troops  fled  past  him.  In  vain  he 
called  to  the  soldiers  to  stand  and  hold  out  since  the  reserves 
were  coming.  It  was  but  an  empty  promise.  About  7000  men 
were  already  killed  or  wounded,  and  Desaix,  the  only  remaining 
hope,  was  still  beyond  reach.  There  could  be  no  question  but 
that  the  battle  had  been  won  by  the  Austrians.  Rejoicing  in 
their  victory,  with  shouldered  arms,  they  marched,  formed  in 
an  immense  column,  behind  the  fleeing  French  on  the  road  that 
their  valour  had  opened  to  them.  Melas  himself,  slightly  wounded, 
had  already  yielded  the  command  to  a  subordinate  and  had 
ridden  back  to  Alessandria.  All  at  once  appears  Desaix  with 
his  division  of  fresh  men,  and  these  dash  impetuously  upon  the 
dismayed  Austrians;  Napoleon  makes  one  more  attempt  to  im- 
pose a  check  upon  the  retreat,  and  is  rewarded  with  success. 
Kellermann  the  younger,  cheered  by  the  sight  of  approaching 
help,  turned  about  with  his  dragoons  and  made  a  furious  charge 
upon  the  pursuing  foe,  who  wavered,  fell  back,  and  finally  took 
to  flight  in  their  turn.  The  pursuers  became  the  pursued.  The 
battle  lost  to  the  French  at  five  o'clock  was  retrieved  by  seven. 
It  had  been  lost  by  Bonaparte,  as  must  be  conceded  by  any  im- 
partial judge;  the  victory  was  due  to  the  gallant  Desaix.    Hear- 


202  War  and  Peace  [isoo 

ing  the  roar  of  cannon,  he  had  halted  to  await  new  orders.  It 
was  due  to  this  that  he  was  overtaken  by  Napoleon's  messenger 
and  was  able  to  reach  the  scene  of  battle  before  it  was  too  late. 
But  at  the  opening  of  the  assault  which  was  to  save  the  day 
Desaix  was  cut  down  by  a  shot  from  the  enemy,  and  the  victor's 
laurel  wreathed  a  brow  cold  in  death. 

Napoleon  was  for  a  long  time  unable  to  reconcile  himself  to 
the  thought  that  he  had  been  surprised  on  this  occasion  and  that 
the  battle  had  been  won  without  his  assistance.  He  repeatedly 
attempted  by  means  of  official  reports  on  the  battle  to  exalt  the 
purely  fictitious  deeds  of  the  commander-in-chief  above  the  real 
services  of  Desaix  and  Kellermann.  Even  as  late  as  1805  he 
tried,  through  Berthier,  to  establish  these  claims,  and  he  had 
almost  convinced  the  nation  of  their  validity  until  the  concur- 
rent testimony  of  eye-witnesses  proved  his  assertions  to  be  false. 

But  even  if  the  victory  gained  at  Marengo  on  June  14th, 
1800,  were  not  of  his  achieving,  it  was  nevertheless  he  who  had 
directed  the  whole  campaign  which  had  brought  the  foe  into 
such  precarious  circumstances,  and  he  justly  reaped  the  benefit 
of  its  results.  This  battle  was,  according  to  the  expression  of 
one  of  the  deepest  thinkers  of  that  time,  "the  baptism  of  Napo- 
leon's personal  power."  The  Austrians  had  lost  more  than 
9000  men ;  a  renewal  of  attack  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  Melas 
asked  for  an  armistice  and  the  right  of  withdrawal  without 
molestation,  and  on  June  15th  a  convention  was  signed  grant- 
ing both  requests  upon  condition  that  he  retire  with  his  troops 
beyond  the  Mincio  and  surrender  to  Napoleon  all  the  country 
west  of  that  river.  The  fruit  of  all  the  victories  gained  in  1799 
had  been  lost  in  a  single  day.  The  Cisalpine  and  Ligurian 
Republics  were  again  set  up,  and  in  Tuscany  and  Ancona  alone 
were  Austrian  garrisons  for  the  time  being  permitted. 

After  the  battle  Napoleon  left  Massena  in  command  of  the 
army  and  went  to  Milan  for  the  purpose  of  reaping  pecuniary 
advantage  first  of  all  from  the  result  of  the  war.  The  Cis- 
alpine Republic  was  compelled  to  furnish  two  million  francs  a 
month  and  Piedmont  a  million  and  a  half;  })ublic  domains  and 
property  of  the  Church  were  confiscated  and  sold;  the  support 


JEt.  30]  The  Results  of  the  Victory  203 

of  the  army  was  as  a  matter  of  course  imposed  upon  the  country. 
Moreau,  who  had  meanwhile  advanced  further  iiilo  Germany 
and  occupied  Munich,  was  ordered  to  levy  contributions  also, 
and  Southern  Germany  was  in  like  manner  compeUed  to  main- 
tain the  hostile  army  and  pay  in  addition  40,000,000  francs. 
The  financial  object  of  the  campaign  had  thus  been  attained, 
but  the  advantages  which  Napoleon  himself  derived  were  of 
no  small  importance.  His  position  in  France  was  now  firmly 
established.  That  such  had  not  previously  been  the  case  is 
proved  by  letters  and  comments  written  at  the  time.  WHiat 
was  to  be  the  consequence  if  he  lost  his  Hfe  in  Italy  or  even  in 
case  he  were  defeated  was  a  question  secretly  discussed  in 
Talleyrand's  house  by  Sieyes,  Camot,  Lafayette,  Fouch^,  and 
others.  The  question  became  a  burning  one  when  the  report, 
though  entirely  unfounded,  was  circulated  in  Paris  that  he  had 
suffered  a  defeat.  They  were  still  wavering  between  Camot 
and  Lafayette  in  their  choice  for  the  next  First  Consul,  when 
tidings  of  the  victory  at  Marengo  arrived  and  interrupted  the 
consultation.  Bonaparte  was  aware  of  what  was  taking  place 
during  his  absence,  and  this  fact  unquestionably  had  no  Uttle 
influence  in  determining  him  to  leave  the  theatre  of  war  as  early 
as  June.  Early  in  July  he  was  again  in  Paris  with  the  fixed 
intention  not  to  leave  the  capital  again  for  a  long  time,  but 
rather  to  take  advantage  of  the  success  at  Marengo  to  bring 
about  a  speedy  conclusion  of  peace.  This  he  was  determined 
to  accompUsh  at  whatever  cost,  for  thus  alone  could  he  claim 
success  and  the  glory  of  having  secured  for  the  nation  the  peace 
so  ardently  desired. 

He  had  addressed  while  at  Milan  a  second  letter  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  proposing  a  conclusion  of  peace  and  again 
offering  to  treat  upon  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio. 
But  in  Vienna  they  had  not  yet  reached  the  point  of  having 
to  accept  such  unfavourable  propositions.  Moreover,  Austria 
had  shortly  before  bound  herself,  in  return  for  considerable  sub- 
sidies from  the  British  government,  not  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace  with  France  before  the  following  Februar}',  but  she  was 
not  without  hopes  that  Bonaparte  would  depart  from   these 


204  War  and  Peace  [isoo 

conditions  and  make  proposals  to  which  England  also  could  be 
brought  to  accede.  It  was  with  these  considerations  in  mind 
that  the  Emperor's  reply  to  the  First  Consul  was  composed. 
General  Count  Joseph  de  St.  Julien,  who  had  just  come  from 
Italy,  had  been  the  bearer  of  Bonaparte's  letter  to  the  Emperor, 
and  he  was  now  entrusted  with  the  delivery  of  the  reply.  Not 
finding  the  Consul  in  Milan  the  Count  followed  him  to  Paris. 
Here  the  messenger  was  made  by  Napoleon  the  object  of  a 
special  intrigue.  Talleyrand  was  appointed  to  persuade  the 
Count  that  he  was  entrusted  by  the  Emperor  with  full  powers 
to  negotiate  for  peace,  and  that  failure  to  make  use  of  these 
powers  would  lead  to  immediate  renewal  of  war.  St.  Julien 
was  completely  taken  in,  and  within  a  week  the  vain  and  stupid 
envoy  was  led  to  sign  preliminaries  which,  entirely  contrary 
to  the  spirit  of  the  Emperor's  letter,  accepted  as  a  basis  the 
stipulations  of  Campo  Formio  and  not  only  totally  ignored 
all  claims  on  the  part  of  England,  but  even  closed  to  her  all 
Austrian  ports. 

Had  Napoleon  really  supposed  that  his  purpose  could  be 
accomphshed  at  so  sUght  a  cost?  Whatever  may  have  been 
his  hopes,  this  end  was  not  to  be  reached  for  the  present,  though 
when  once  attained  it  was  but  so  much  the  more  assured.  The 
Austrian  court  declined  to  ratify  the  preliminaries  and  put 
forth  all  its  powers  toward  the  equipment  of  troops  for  the 
continuance  of  the  war.  New  troops  were  levied,  and  Kray, 
who  had  proved  himself  incompetent,  was  replaced  by  Arch- 
duke John,  an  extremely  young  man,  who  relates  in  his  Me- 
moirs that  he  had  but  recently  learned  to  saddle  a  horse.  His 
instructions  were  to  follow  implicitly  the  directions  of  Lauer, 
his  chief  of  staff,  and  thus  he  had  to  assume  the  responsibility 
for  all  that  officer's  monstrous  blunders.  In  Italy  Melas  gave 
place  to  Bellegarde,  a  general  far  less  competent  than  himself. 
These  changes  had  so  little  improved  the  condition  of  the  Aus- 
trian armies  that  toward  the  end  of  September  Emperor  Francis 
was  obliged  to  ask  for  an  extension  of  the  truce  concluded  with 
Moreau  in  July.  According  to  instructions  Moreau  granted 
this  request  on  condition  of  Austria's  surrender  of  three  of  her 


Mt.  31]  Futile   Negotiations  205 

most  important  fortresses  (Philipsburg,  Ulm,  and  Ingolstadt), 
and  the  withdrawal  of  her  troops  beyond  the  Inn.  Napoleon 
had  been  beyond  measure  exasperated  at  the  refusal  of  the 
Austrians  to  accept  his  preUminaries,  and  it  was  with  the  utmost 
difficulty  that  Talleyrand  was  able  to  calm  him.  Only  the 
strong  personal  interest  which  he  now  had  in  a  speedy  conclu- 
sion of  peace  led  him  to  consent  to  the  presence  of  an  Austrian 
diplomat  at  Paris  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  new  conditions 
of  peace.  Cobenzl,  who  had  shown  much  skill  in  the  negotia- 
tions at  Passariano  in  1797,  was  sent  as  the  ambassador  to 
France,  but  here  he  was  most  unfortunate  in  his  efforts.  Hith- 
erto his  talent  had  been  able  to  adjust  itself  to  circumstances, 
but  the  sudden  revolution  of  conditions  brought  about  by  the 
fortunes  of  war  was  more  than  he  could  grasp ;  he  persisted  in 
demands  which  no  longer  corresponded  with  the  actual  relations 
of  the  powers,  and  renounced  them  only  when  Napoleon  had 
already  resolved  upon  a  continuance  of  the  war.  The  great 
contrast  between  revolutionary  and  conservative  diplomacy 
was  here  again  exempUfied :  Cobenzl,  who  was  bound  by  Austria's 
agreement  with  Great  Britain,  demanded  that  an  English  diplo- 
mat should  take  part  in  the  negotiation;  Bonaparte,  on  the 
contrary,  insisted  upon  a  separate  agreement  with  Austria  so 
as  to  isolate  England  from  her  alhes  and  close  to  her  the  Con- 
tinental ports,  so  that  he  might  meet  her  alone  in  combat. 
Cobenzl  was  not  altogether  disincUned  to  consent  to  such  an 
arrangement  provided  that  France  pay  a  sufficiently  high  price, 
more  especially  in  Italy.  Ancient  Austria  and  new  France  had 
met  face  to  face;  each  was  pursuing  a  policy  of  conquest,  and 
neither  could  be  successful  without  excluding  the  other.  A 
solution  of  the  problem  seemed  possible  only  in  the  total  subju- 
gation of  one  of  the  parties.  Napoleon,  who  was  perfectly  in- 
formed as  to  the  situation  of  the  Austrian  forces,  resolved  upon 
bringing  about  the  crisis,  and  at  the  end  of  November,  1800,  he 
declared  the  armistice  at  an  end.  Although  Cobenzl  still  carried 
on  negotiations  with  Joseph  Bonaparte  at  Lun^ville  on  the 
French  frontier,  the  questions  at  issue  were  decided  elsewhere. 
When  hostiUties  were  resumed  the  French  were  posted  on 


2o6  War  and   Peace  [isoo 

the  Isar,  while  the  Austrians  occupied  an  advantageous  position 
on  the  further  side  of  the  broad  Inn.  Had  they  understood 
making  use  of  their  advantage  they  might  at  least  have  kept 
their  opponents  occupied  longer  than  would  have  been  agreeable 
to  the  chief  ruler  on  the  Seine.  On  the  1st  of  December,  just  as 
Moreau  was  making  preparations  for  the  difficult  task  of  effect- 
ing a  crossing  of  the  stream  behind  which  the  enemy  lay  en- 
sconced, his  left  wing  was  suddenly  attacked  and  thrown  back 
while  on  the  march  toward  the  Inn,  It  seemed  beyond  belief 
that  the  enemy  should  have  abandoned  their  strong  position, 
and  yet  such  was  the  case.  Moreau  at  once  profited  by  the 
advantage  so  unexpectedly  offered  him,  united  the  centre  with 
the  left  wing  at  Hohenlinden,  and  now  in  his  turn  awaited  the 
enemy  while  occupying  a  strong  position.  The  onslaught  of 
the  Austrians  was  sustained  by  Moreau  in  front,  while  two  of 
his  divisions  under  command  of  Richepanse  circumvented 
them  and  attacked  them  from  the  rear.  Taken  by  surprise, 
the  Austrians  sought  safety  in  flight,  the  Archduke  barely 
escaping  capture.  The  battle  of  Hohenfinden  (December  3d, 
1800)  had  been  won  by  the  French,  the  way  to  Vienna  lay  open 
before  them.  On  the  25th  of  December  Moreau  signed  an 
armistice  at  Steyer  which  was  to  lead  to  definite  peace.  On 
the  26th  General  Brune,  who  had  succeeded  Mass^na  in  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  Italy,  advanced  from  the  south  across 
the  Mincio  and  a  few  days  later  across  the  Adige.  Austria, 
with  her  policy  of  conquest  and  extension,  had  been  vanquished. 
At  Luneville  the  success  attending  the  French  arms  had 
speedily  made  itself  felt.  Cobenzl  had  at  last  agreed  to  treat 
separately,  he  was  even  ready  to  sign  for  the  German  Empire 
as  well,  and  was  desirous  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
France  in  regard  to  a  partition  of  Italy  between  France  and 
Austria  in  accordance  with  a  proposal  of  Joseph  Bonaparte; 
but  the  events  on  the  field  put  an  end  to  all  these  agreements. 
Austria's  diplomacy,  like  her  army,  was  driven  back  relent- 
lessly from  one  position  to  another:  in  November  Cobenzl  had 
still  clung  to  the  Oglio  as  the  boundary  of  Austrian  territory  in 
Italy,  by  December  he  had  already  receded  to  the  Mincio,  and 


-Et.  31]  The  Peace  of  Luneville  207 

in  January  he  could  make  claims  only  as  far  as  to  the  Adigc. 
When  finally  the  definitive  treaty  of  peace  was  signed,  Febru- 
ary 9th,  1801,  it  contained  stipulations  which  not  only  de- 
stroyed Austria's  plans  of  conquest,  but  were  even  detrimental 
to  her  position  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers,  while  to  France  the 
result  of  the  treaty  was  to  be  the  confirmation  of  her  revolu- 
tionary system  of  territorial  expansion.  The  stipulations  of 
the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio  were  therein  estabUshed  and  in 
certain  respects  made  still  more  severe.  In  Italy  the  Grand- 
duke  of  Tuscany,  whose  house  was  allied  to  that  of  Habsburg, 
was  deprived  of  his  estates.  Compensation  was  to  be  made 
him  in  German  territory,  just  as  the  Breisgau  had  been  assigned 
to  the  Duke  of  Modena  by  the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio.  Aus- 
tria's last  foothold  in  Central  Italy  was  thus  taken  from  her, 
and  the  entire  peninsula  surrendered  to  French  influence. 
Moreover,  that  influence  was  now  beginning  to  make  itself 
felt  in  Germany  also.  As  had  been  agreed  upon  in  Rastatt, 
the  Rhine  throughout  its  course  was  to  form  the  boundary  line 
of  France,  and  all  temporal  princes  losing  territory  on  the  left 
bank  were  to  receive  indemnification  in  ecclesiastical  domains 
on  the  right  of  the  stream.  The  old  scheme  of  secularization 
had  thus  been  resumed,  and  Austria,  whose  power  in  Germany 
rested  mainly  on  the  ecclesiastical  princes,  had  been  constrained 
to  sanction  it.  Napoleon  had  in  the  treaty  secured  to  himself 
the  right  of  superintending  its  execution,  and  French  inter- 
vention in  Germany  was  thus  conceded  by  the  head  of  the 
Empire.  Provision  for  compensation  to  Austria  by  means  of 
Bavarian  territory  as  far  as  the  Inn  had  been  made  in  the  treaty 
of  Campo  Formio,  but  of  this  there  was  now  no  further  thought. 
Austria,  thus  defeated  in  Italy  and  threatened  in  Germany, 
must  perforce  reUnquish  all  hope  of  conquest  such  as  had  ani- 
mated Joseph  II.  Thugut,  the  representative  of  Austria's 
policy  of  extension,  was  deprived  of  his  office  upon  the  demand 
of  Napoleon.  On  the  6th  of  March  the  Reichstag  ratified  the 
treaty  for  the  Empire. 

This  peace  of  Luneville  was  not,  however,  due  exclusively 
to  success  in  arms.     It  was  at  the  same  time  the  result  of  clever 


2o8  War  and  Peace  [isoi 

diplomatic  action.  While  the  armies  were  yet  in  the  field 
Napoleon  had  contrived  to  widen  the  breach  existing  in  the 
coalition,  and  had  succeeded  not  only  in  wholly  separating 
Russia  from  Austria,  but  even  in  winning  the  good-will  of  the 
Czar  for  France.  Prior  to  the  last  campaign  Napoleon  had 
offered  to  release  about  7000  Russians  captured  in  the  last 
battles  at  Zurich  and  in  Holland,  and  these  he  now  fitted  out 
with  new  clothing  and  equipments,  and  in  addition  offered 
the  Czar  the  possession  of  the  island  of  Malta.  Paul,  who 
regarded  the  mighty  general  as  the  subduer  of  the  detested 
Revolution,  was  delighted  and  now  became  as  much  prejudiced 
in  favour  of  Napoleon  as  he  had  been  shortly  before  against  the 
Directory.*  The  Consul  had  weighed  carefully  the  conse- 
quences of  this  step.  Malta  could  no  longer  be  provided  with 
supplies,  and  consequently  could  be  held  but  a  little  while 
longer  against  the  English  besiegers.  If  the  fortress  capitulated, 
his  offer  of  it  to  the  Czar  would  be  throwing  the  apple  of  dis- 
cord between  the  two  alHes.  And  this  was  precisely  the  out- 
come. When,  on  the  5th  of  September,  1800,  the  French 
garrison  at  Lavallette  surrendered  and  the  Enghsh  took  pos- 
session of  the  island  without  regard  for  the  rights  of  the  Grand 
Master,  the  Czar  abandoned  his  allies  and  seized  upon  all  British 
ships  lying  in  Russian  harbours.  He  even  proceeded  to  join 
with  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Prussia  in  a  "  league  of  armed  neu- 
trality "  against  England's  arbitrary  proceedings  on  the  seas. 
Napoleon's  policy  was  never  so  successful  as  when  dealing  with 
a  state  represented  by  an  absolute  sovereign;  some  years  later 
he  played  the  same  game  with  Alexander  I.,  and  with  hke  suc- 
cess as  rewarded  his  present  transactions  with  the  father  of 
that  monarch. 

The  annihilation  of  EngUsh  maritime  supremacy  was  the 
object  upon   which  were  now  concentrated  all  the  efforts  of 

*  Without  further  confirmation  it  must  still  remain  questionable 
whether  Napoleon  actually  wrote  to  Paul  I.,  Jis  has  recently  been  asserted 
by  Lalanne  ("  Les  derniers  jours  du  Consulat, "  p.  4  f .),  promising  the  res- 
toration of  the  Bourbons  and  demanding  only  an  Italian  principality 
for  himself. 


Mt.  31]         Isolating   England   and   Austria  209 

French  policy.  From  this  time  approaches  were  of  necessity 
made  toward  the  United  States  of  America,  with  which  ever 
since  the  Directory  France  had  for  mercantile  reasons  been 
upon  a  footing  bordering  upon  warfare.  To  this  state  of  affairs 
the  First  Consul  put  an  end.  Upon  receipt  of  the  tidings  of 
the  death  of  General  Washington  in  December,  1799,  he 
showed  respect  by  ordering  the  French  army  to  assume  the 
badge  of  mourning,  and  a  short  time  afterwards,  September 
30th,  1800,  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Morfontaine  recognizing  the 
absolute  independence  of  the  neutral  flag. 

In  the  same  way  in  which  he  sought  to  win  allies  to  his  cause 
against  England  by  land  and  by  sea  he  w^as  endeavouring  to 
gain  confederates  on  the  Continent  against  Austria.  Inrnie- 
diately  after  the  Coup  d'Etat  Napoleon  had  sent  to  Berlin  his 
aide-de-camp  Duroc,  in  whom  he  had  absolute  confidence.  His 
mission  was  to  induce  the  Prussian  cabinet  to  assume  armed 
intervention  in  order  to  compel  Austria  to  accept  the  conditions 
imposed  upon  her  by  France,  and  in  particular  the  cession  of 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Frederick  William  III.,  who  had 
been  King  of  Prussia  since  1797,  while  unwilling  to  accept  exactly 
this  role,  consented  at  least  to  remain  neutral  and  came  to  an 
agreement  with  Napoleon  whereby  he  was  to  assist  in  bringing 
about  relations  between  France  and  Russia  and  to  consent  to 
French  acquisition  of  the  Rhine  boundarj^  receiving  in  return 
the  promise  from  France  that  Austria  should  by  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  of  peace  make  no  accessions  of  territory  in  Germany, 
that  is  to  say,  that  she  should  not  obtain  an  inch  of  Bavarian 
soil.  Jealousy  w^as  accordingly  the  force  which  moved  both  of 
these  nations  to  take  sides  with  Napoleon :  jealousy  on  Russia's 
part  concerning  accessions  to  Austria  in  Italy,  jealousy  on  the 
part  of  Prussia  of  Austria's  making  gains  in  Germany.  Their 
consent  to  the  results  obtained  by  the  Revolutionary  poUcy  of 
conquest  strengthened  the  power  of  the  First  Consul  and  enabled 
him  to  compel  Austria  to  greater  sacrifices  than  he  could  have 
demanded  without  this  support.  French  supremacy  on  the 
Continent  had  received  confirmation  at  the  hands  of  the  Great 
Powers  themselves. 


2IO  War  and   Peace  [isoi 

Napoleon  at  once  profited  by  these  successes  to  establish 
definitely  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  country  over  which  he 
ruled.  His  attention  was  turned  first  of  all  to  Italy,  where  the 
Cisalpine  and  Ligurian  Republics  were  again  recognized  and 
guaranteed.  The  former  had  been  very  considerably  increased 
by  the  annexation  of  Modena  and  the  Legations;  in  both,  French 
statesmen  stood  at  the  head  of  the  government;  both  remained 
mere  dependencies  of  France,  and  the  will  of  the  First  Consul 
was  supreme  there  as  in  France.  Between  these  two  countries 
lay  Piedmont,  whose  destiny  or  that  of  its  king  had  not  yet  been 
decided,  with  the  exception  of  vSavoy,  which  had  been  incor- 
porated into  France;  but  of  its  eventual  fate  no  one  felt  the 
least  doubt.  Napoleon  took  advantage  of  the  acquisition  of 
Tuscany  to  place  Spain  under  obligations  to  himself  and  thus 
gain  a  directing  hand  in  the  management  of  her  policy.  After 
the  battle  of  Marengo  he  had  succeeded  in  driving  out  of  office 
in  Madrid  a  ministry  hostile  to  France.  Affairs  were  then  placed 
in  the  hands  of  Godoy,  the  paramour  of  the  queen,  who  had 
received  the  title  of  "Prince  of  the  Peace."  This  man  was 
ambitious  of  power  and  friendly  to  the  interests  of  France. 
Napoleon's  object  was  attained  October  1st,  1800,  through  the 
treaty  of  San  Ildefonso,  by  which  Tuscany,  under  the  name  of 
Ejngdom  of  Etruria,  was  promised  to  the  queen's  daughter, 
who  had  married  the  Bourbon  Prince  of  Parma.  The  trans- 
action was  completed  by  the  signature  of  the  Peace  of  Lune- 
ville,  and  on  the  21st  of  March,  1801,  Spain  declared  herself 
ready  not  only  to  cede  to  France  Parma  and  its  dependency 
Elba,  and  to  give  up  Louisiana,  but,  what  was  to  Napoleon  of 
greater  importance,  to  constrain  Portugal  to  sever  its  alliance 
with  Groat  Britain  and  to  close  its  ports  to  all  English  ships. 
A  Spanish  army  reinforced  by  a  French  auxiliary  corps  was 
despatched  across  the  Portuguese  frontier,  and  on  the  6th  of 
June,  1801,  John  VL  was  forced  to  sign  the  treaty  of  Badajoz, 
which  closed  all  Portuguese  harbours  to  the  English,  and  by  a 
special  convention,  September  29th,  he  was  bound  to  pay  France 
twenty  million  francs. 

In  Italy  there  yet  remained  Rome  and  Naples  to  be  dealt 


jEt.  31]  Naples  and   the   Papal   States  2  i  i 

with.  In  the  time  of  the  Directory  these  two  states  had  each 
been  made  a  repubUc.  Were  these  to  be  re-estabhshcd?  Napo- 
leon followed,  it  is  tnie,  the  course  of  development  which  France 
was  undergoing,  but  always  with  the  stamp  of  his  own  indi- 
viduality and  according  to  his  own  judgment.  He  was  far  too 
practical  to  act  simply  according  to  the  theories  of  the  "Idea- 
logues,"  whom  he  openly  ridiculed.  It  is  clear,  moreover,  that 
as  an  autocratic  ruler  the  preservation  of  the  repubUcan  form 
of  government  was  of  no  great  moment  to  him.  And  he  ac- 
complished his  purpose  without  setting  up  the  republics  again. 
During  the  recent  war  Russia  had  made  special  intercession  for 
Naples,  and,  out  of  regard  for  his  newly  won  friend,  the  First 
Consul  was  obliged  to  be  lenient  with  the  royal  liouse  of  the  Two 
SiciUes.  On  March  18th,  1801,  he  concluded  with  Ferdinand  IV. 
the  Peace  of  Florence,  wherein  the  king  agreed  to  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  Papal  States,  which  had  been  occupied  by  Neapolitan 
troops  during  the  war,  ceded  to  France  his  rights  to  the  island 
of  Elba  and  the  principality  of  Piombino,  besides  binding  him- 
self to  what  we  recognize  as  the  two  essential  points  of  the 
policy  of  conquest  pursued  by  the  Consul:  to  close  his  ports 
to  English  ships,  and  to  maintain  at  his  own  expense  a  corps 
of  French  soldiers  in  and  about  Taranto. 

Nor  did  the  States  of  the  Church  vacated  by  the  Neapolitans 
come  again  under  the  administration  of  French  functionaries. 
It  was  in  this  that  Napoleon  differed  most  essentially  from  his 
predecessors  in  authority.  He  was  by  no  means  religiously  in- 
clined and  far  removed  from  holding  any  positive  reUef.  Among 
the  writings  of  his  youth  figures  one,  composed  no  doubt  in 
imitation  of  Voltaire,  entitled  "Un  Parallele  entre  Apollonius  de 
Tyane  et  Jesus-Christ,"  in  which  the  result  of  the  comparison  is 
in  favour  of  the  Greek  philosopher.*     But  this  in  no  wise  pre- 

*  When  in  1802  Lucien  reminded  him  of  this  dissertation  Napoleon 
ordered  him  not  to  speak  of  it  inasmuch  as,  in  case  it  were  known  of,  his 
whole  work  of  religious  pacification  might  be  thereby  compromised.  This 
was  not  among  the  writings  of  his  youth  which  Napoleon  himself  con- 
signed to  tlie  flames.  This  had  been  borrowed  by  Fr6ron  and  never 
returned.     (Lucien,  M^moires,  II.  114.) 


212  War  and  Peace  [isoi 

vented  his  recognizing  to  the  full  the  political  significance  of  the 
Papacy.  It  has  been  seen  how  in  1797  he  allowed  the  States 
of  the  Church  to  exist  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  Directory. 
He  was  actuated  to  this  poUcy  by  the  fact  that  during  the  pre- 
vious year  by  far  the  greater  proportion  of  the  French  people 
had  already  openly  professed  faith  again  in  the  Catholic  religion. 
"The  people  of  France  have  become  Roman  Cathohc  again," 
wrote  General  Clarke  to  Napoleon  in  December,  1796,  "  and  we 
have  perhaps  reached  the  point  of  needing  the  Pope  himself  to 
compel  the  support  of  the  Revolution  by  the  priests  and  through 
them  by  the  country  districts,  which  they  have  succeeded  in 
getting  again  under  their  control.  .  .  .  Would  not  the  attempt 
to  overthrow  him  just  at  this  time  be  incurring  the  danger  of 
cutting  off  forever  from  our  government  a  multitude  of  French- 
men who  are  devoted  to  the  Pope  and  whom  we  might  retain?  " 
Napoleon  was  so  entirely  convinced  of  the  justice  of  these 
observations  that  even  at  that  time  after  the  peace  of  February, 
1797,  he  tried  to  induce  the  Pope  to  exhort  the  priests  to  obedi- 
ence to  the  laws  of  the  State.  These  plans  were  interrupted  by 
the  events  of  the  18th  Fructidor.  The  reason  for  his  present 
attitude  toward  Rome  in  1800  was  likewise  to  be  found  in  the 
situation  of  affairs  in  the  interior  of  France.  Everywhere,  in 
Paris  as  well  as  in  the  provinces,  crowds  flocked  to  the  churches 
presided  over  by  priests  who  had  refused  to  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  laws  of  the  State,  while  those  of  the  State  Church 
priesthood  remained  empty.  The  significance  of  this  Napoleon 
rightly  appreciated.  A  great  part  of  the  general  hatred  toward 
the  Directory  arose  from  the  antipathy  they  had  shown  toward 
satisfying  the  rehgious  wants  of  the  people.  He  was  determined 
to  be  the  object  of  no  such  hatred.  Moreover,  he  needed  to  come 
to  an  understanding  with  Rome  in  order  to  bring  about  a  definite 
pacification  of  La  Vend6e.  He  resolved  upon  making  a  compact 
with  the  Pope.  To  Pius  VII.,  who  had  been  elected  in  Venice, 
March  13tii,  1800,  he  made  the  j^roposition,  soon  after  the  battle 
of  Marengo,  of  assuring  the  continued  existence  of  the  States  of 
the  Church, — divested,  indeed,  of  the  Legations, — on  condition 
that  the  Holy  Father  would  lend  his  aid  to  the  establishment  of 


/Et.  31]  The   Concordat  213 

an  acceptable  peace  between  Church  and  State  m  France.  Pius 
VII.  accepted  these  terms  with  alacrity  and  sent  his  Secretary 
of  State,  Cardinal  Consalvi,  to  Paris,  where,  on  the  15th  of  July, 
1801,  a  concordat  was  signed.  This  abolished  the  religious  laws 
of  1790  (new  divisions  of  dioceses,  election  of  bishops  and  priests 
by  parishes,  abolition  of  celibacy),  and  recognized  the  Pope  as 
head  of  the  Church;  and  accorded  him  the  right  to  confirm  the 
bishops  nominated  by  the  First  Consul;  on  the  other  hand  the 
alienation  of  the  Church  property  was  accepted  by  the  See  of 
Rome,  the  old  maxim  of  the  GaUican  Church  was  acknowledged 
that  the  Church  exists  in  the  State,  and  not  the  State  within 
the  Church,  and  the  agreement  made  that  dignitaries  of  the 
Church  should  receive  their  remuneration,  like  officials  of  the 
State,  at  the  hands  of  the  government. 

In  restoring  the  States  of  the  Church  to  Pius  VII.  Napoleon 
made  no  sacrifice,  but  rather  secured  through  this  means  a  marked 
advantage  to  himself.  All-powerful  as  he  now  was  in  Italy,  the 
Pope,  as  a  secular  prince,  would  of  necessity  assume  a  position 
of  dependence  toward  him,  and  he  thus  attained  a  result  which 
Kaunitz,  Joseph  II.,  and  Thugut,  with  their  schemes  of  conquest 
in  the  Apennine  peninsula,  had  striven  for  in  vain.  Referring 
on  one  occasion  at  St.  Helena  to  his  attitude  toward  Rome  at 
this  time,  he  expressed  himself  in  these  remarkable  words:  "Ca- 
tholicism preserved  the  Pope  for  me,  and  with  my  influence  and 
our  armies  in  Italy  I  did  not  despair  of  acquiring  sooner  or  later, 
by  one  means  or  another,  the  control  of  this  Pope,  and  then  how 
vast  would  be  my  influence!  What  a  lever  I  should  have  with 
which  to  move  the  rest  of  the  world ! " 

Thus  had  Napoleon  estabUshed  his  sway  in  western  Europe 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  Lun^ville.  Holland,  Portugal, 
and  Italy  furnished  their  quota  toward  reimbursement  of  the 
French  treasury;  everywhere,  extending  far  into  German  territory, 
French  troops  were  sustained  at  the  expense  of  neighbouring  and 
dependent  countries ;  from  Holland  to  Sicily  the  ports  were  closed 
to  ships  and  products  of  the  powerful  enemy  across  the  Channel. 
In  the  Channel  itself  the  First  Consul  collected  a  flotilla  in  order 
to  keep  the  EngUsh  in  ceaseless  fear  of  a  descent  of  the  French 


214  War  and  Peace  [isoi 

army.  And  in  fact  there  came  a  moment  in  which  the  crushing 
of  this  antagonist  also  seemed  no  distant  possibiUty.  The  allied 
powers,  Denmark, Sweden,  and  Russia,  took  up  arms  against  Eng- 
land, and  the  Czar  Paul  I.  was  so  far  carried  away  by  his  visionary 
ardour  as  to  project  an  expedition  which  was  to  march  by  way 
of  Khiva  and  Herat  to  India,  there  to  strike  the  common  enemy 
a  death-blow.  Napoleon's  visions  of  universal  supremacy 
took  on  more  definite  shape  than  ever  before.  Was  not  the 
French  army  yet  in  Egypt,  whence  it  might  with  profit  aid  and 
support  this  Russian  expedition  against  the  Punjab? 

But  this  dream  was  destined  to  last  only  for  a  moment. 

During  the  night  of  March  23d,  1801,  the  Czar  fell  a  victim 
to  a  palace  revolution.  His  despotic  arrogance  had  degenerated 
into  insupportable  cruelty  toward  those  nearest  to  him.  His 
son,  Alexander  I.,  succeeded  him  on  the  throne  of  Russia.  It  is 
said  that  upon  the  arrival  of  this  news,  which  reached  Paris  on 
the  17th  of  April,  Napoleon  was  thrown  into  a  state  of  genuine 
despair.  His  magnificent  schemes  were  all  overthrown  for  the 
present,  for  it  soon  became  known  that  Alexander  had  released 
all  the  English  ships  which  had  been  seized  in  Russian  ports  and 
that  he  renounced  all  claim  to  the  office  of  Grand  Master  of  the 
Knights  of  St.  John,  that  is  to  say,  to  possession  of  the  island  of 
Malta.  Thus  by  a  single  blow  Napoleon  saw  deferred  into  the 
remote  future  the  fulfilment  of  those  aims  which  had  seemed  so 
near  through  the  friendship  of  one  who  was,  it  is  true,  partially 
demented,  and  was  forced  to  content  himself  for  the  time  being 
with  advantages  less  brilliant  than  those  upon  which  he  had 
counted. 

It  so  happened  that,  even  before  the  unlooked-for  death  of 
the  Czar,  Pitt  had,  for  reasons  connected  with  the  domestic 
pohtics  of  the  kingdom,  retired,  March  14th,  1801,  from  the 
leadership  of  the  British  government.  The  peace-loving  Adding- 
ton  succeeded  him  as  prime  minister  and  at  once  made  overtures 
to  Napoleon.  Were  these  to  be  rejected?  The  French  people  were 
clamouring  daily  more  loudly  foi-  peace,  and  their  demand  was  no 
longer  to  be  overlooked.  The  pubHc  was  aware  of  England's 
proposition,  and   the  First  Consul  could  no  long(M-  justify  his 


^T.  32]  Manoeuvres   toward  a   Peace  2 1  5 

policy  of  war,  as  he  had  done  in  the  preceding  year,  by  alleging 
Great  Britain's  unwillingness  to  treat.  He  accordingly  accepted 
England's  proposal,  although  solely  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the 
utmost  advantage  of  his  opponent's  disincUnation  for  war.  In 
the  course  of  her  long  contest  on  the  seas  England  had  made  a 
number  of  valuable  acquisitions.  The  Antilles,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Guadeloupe,  and  the  factories  at  PondichoiTy  and  Chander- 
nagore  in  India  had  been  taken  by  her  from  the  French,  while 
Holland  had  been  compelled  to  give  up  Ceylon  and  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  and  Spain  had  yielded  Trinidad  to  her  superior 
forces.  In  the  Mediterranean  Malta  and  Minorca  had  already 
fallen  into  her  hands,  and  apparently  the  time  was  not  far  distant 
when  Egypt  also  must  be  reckoned  among  the  conquests  of  Great 
Britain.  Relying  upon  the  friendship  of  the  "neutral"  powers, 
Napoleon  thought  himself  strong  enough  to  compel  England  to 
give  up  all  of  these  acquisitions.  But  a  sudden  end  was  put  to 
all  such  aspirations  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  by  the  arrival  of 
tidings  of  the  death  of  the  Czar,  followed  shortly  by  word  from 
Egypt  that  General  Menou,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  army  in  Egypt  upon  the  assassination  of  Kleber,  had  been 
defeated  before  Alexandria  and  driven  back  into  the  city.  Upon 
learning  of  this  the  English  showed  themselves  again  less  dis- 
posed to  obtain  peace  at  a  sacrifice.  Negotiations  were  broken 
off  and  each  party  strove  to  get  the  advantage  of  the  other  by 
means  of  military  or  diplomatic  successes.  England  prosecuted 
every  possible  means  for  bringing  about  a  reconciliation  with 
the  new  Czar,  and  sent  a  corps  of  troops  to  Egypt  which  was 
there  to  join  forces  with  the  Turks  in  order  to  compel  the  French 
to  capitulate.  Napoleon  on  his  part  urged  upon  Spain  the  con- 
quest of  Portugal  with  a  view  to  acquiring  thus  a  territory  which 
might  be  given  to  England  as  compensation  for  terms  of  peace 
of  the  most  favourable  character,  just  as  he  had  delivered  Venice 
to  Austria  in  1797.  He  further  sought  to  secure  to  France  the 
good-will  of  Alexander  I.  by  sending  to  St.  Petersburg  his  aide- 
de-camp  Duroc,  a  man  in  whom  he  felt  unlimited  confidence. 

In  the  midst  of  these  conflicting  interests    it  was  England 
which  was  successful.     In  Egypt  Cairo  was  surrendered  in  June, 


2i6  War  and  Peace  [isoi 

and  with  its  fall  the  capitulation  of  Alexandria  was  assured. 
On  the  Peninsula,  too,  the  hopes  of  France  were  blasted,  for 
there  Spain  concluded  with  Portugal  the  separate  peace  aheady 
mentioned  guaranteeing  independence  to  the  latter  country. 
It  was  now  Napoleon  who  made  the  proposal  to  resume  nego- 
tiations. To  this  England  was  not  ill-disposed,  for  Nelson,  who 
had  but  a  short  time  before  compelled  Denmark  to  retire  from 
the  league  of  neutral  powers,  had  been  repulsed  in  an  attack 
on  the  French  Channel  fleet.  Concessions  were  made  upon 
both  sides,  and  op.  the  1st  of  October,  1801,  preliminaries  were 
signed  at  London  according  to  the  terms  of  which  England 
was  to  retain  of  aU  her  recent  conquests  only  Trinidad,  which 
had  been  taken  from  Spain,  and  Ceylon,  which  had  belonged 
to  Holland;  the  islands  and  ports  of  the  Mediterranean  were 
to  be  evacuated  by  her,  and  Malta  was  to  be  restored  to  the 
Knights  of  the  Order  of  St.  John.  The  French,  on  the  other 
hand,  pledged  themselves  to  restore  Egypt  to  Turkey,  to  guar- 
antee the  integrity  of  Portugal,  and  to  withdraw  their  troops 
from  the  kingdom  of  Naples. 

England  might  perhaps  have  obtained  more  favourable 
terms  had  the  signing  of  the  treaty  been  delayed,  for  but  a  short 
time  after  this  event  the  tidings  reached  Europe  that  Menou 
had  been  obhged  to  surrender  Alexandria  to  the  combined 
forces  of  England  and  Turkey.  This  capitulation  put  an  end 
to  French  occupation  of  Egypt  and  to  one  of  the  most  glorious 
of  Napoleon's  dreams.  For  he  never  returned  to  a  scheme  of 
which  he  had  made  so  unequivocal  a  failure.  He  was  now 
definitively  thrown  back  upon  the  Continent  of  Europe  for  the 
working  out  of  his  plans.  It  was,  however,  a  triumph  of  no 
mean  order,  when  England,  which  for  a  century  had  contested 
with  her  whole  might  every  encroachment  made  by  France  upon 
the  Continent  as  a  direct  detriment  to  her  interests,  was  com- 
pelled to  acquiesce  at  a  time  when  Napoleon  had  far  surpassed 
Louis  XIV.  in  his  most  ambitious  designs. 

France  and  Russia,  October  8th,  1801,  signed  a  treaty  of 
peace  which  contained  the  important  stipulation  that  the  two 
States  bound  themselves  not  to  tolerate  secret  agitations  of 


^T.  32]  The  Peace  of  Amiens  2 1 7 

the  (Emigres  against  their  country.  In  this  manner  Napoleon 
renounced  for  the  time  being  all  support  of  the  Poles,  and  the 
Czar  that  of  the  Bourbons  (article  3).  Three  days  later,  in  a 
secret  compact  which  determined  for  Europe  its  immediate 
future  and  so  was  of  equal  importance  with  the  treaty  with 
England,  these  two  powers  engaged  to  regulate  in  common  the 
compensations  to  be  made  to  the  German  princes,  and  in  the 
same  way  to  decide  the  Italian  question  together  so  far  as  it 
was  not  already  determined  through  the  treaties  of  peace  with 
Rome,  Austria,  and  Naples.  At  the  same  time — October  9th, 
1801 — an  agreement  was  signed  between  France  and  Turkey 
according  to  which  all  previous  compacts  between  the  two 
countries  were  made  valid.  Finally,  a  treaty  full  of  promise 
to  the  Elector  had  been  signed  with  Bavaria  a  short  time 
before,  and  with  it  the  last  armed  foe  had  been  appeased. 

The  cry  of  Peace !  rang  out  through  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  land.  All  the  nations  rejoiced  to  see  the  end  of  a  struggle 
which  had  become  unendurable.  To  his  fame  as  a  hero  of  war 
Napoleon  had  added  that  of  cstablisher  of  peace,  and  to  him 
was  accorded  both  at  home  and  abroad  an  esteem  without 
parallel — in  France,  where  the  people  saw  the  hopes  fulfilled 
which  they  had  founded  on  him  on  his  return,  and  in  other 
countries,  where  the  governments  of  the  old  States  welcomed 
him  as  the  subduer  of  the  Revolution  and  cherished  the  firm 
expectation  that,  content  wath  what  had  been  acquired,  he 
would  by  his  power  insure  tranquillity  to  Europe.  "This  is 
no  ordinary  peace,"  said  the  English  prime  minister,  Addington, 
"it  is  the  actual  reconciliation  of  the  two  foremost  nations  of 
the  world."  And  Fox,  having  met  Napoleon  in  Paris,  returned 
to  London  full  of  enthusiasm  for  the  great  man.  But  even  at 
that  time  there  were  far-seeing  statesmen  who  felt  less  confident 
of  this  desirable  outcome.  When  on  the  27th  of  March,  1802, 
the  Treaty  of  Amiens  confirmed  the  terms  of  the  preliminaries 
signed  between  France  and  England  in  the  preceding  October, 
the  acclamations  of  joy  with  which  the  news  was  received  were 
disturbed  by  the  warning  voices  of  the  members  of  the  opposi- 
tion in  Parliament  with  the   reminder   that  "We    have  sane- 


2 1  8  War  and   Peace  [1802 

tioned  the  possession  of  Italy  by  France  and  at  the  same  time 
her  supremacy  over  the  Continent."  Indeed,  Napoleon  him- 
self but  half  concealed  his  ambitious  designs.  But  a  few  weeks 
after  the  battle  of  Marengo  he  said  to  the  Prussian  envoy  at 
Paris:  "I  desire  peace  for  the  sake  of  establishing  securely  the 
existing  government  of  France  as  well  as  for  the  sake  of  saving 
the  world  from  chaos."  And  these  words  were  no  empty  figure 
of  speech.  Their  true  meaning  is  to  be  gathered  from  a  semi- 
official pamphlet  published  in  1801  and  entitled  "De  I'Etat 
de  la  France  a  la  fin  de  I'an  VIII."  Hauterive  was  its  author, 
one  of  the  most  excellent  of  the  officials  in  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Talleyrand's  right-hand  man.  The  follow- 
ing principles  were  therein  advocated :  At  the  time  of  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  Revolution  the  political  system  of  Europe  had 
long  since  been  impaired  and  was  no  longer  worthy  of  being 
maintained;  the  war  between  France  and  the  other  powers 
was  nothing  but  a  consequence  of  this  condition.  France, 
victorious  in  this  contest,  had  undertaken  to  establish  in  the 
place  of  the  discarded  system  of  the  balance  of  power  a  new 
system  of  federation,  and  this  purpose  had  been  already  partially 
accomplished.  By  reason  of  her  military  and  financial  resources 
as  well  as  on  account  of  her  principles  of  government  France 
was  destined  to  become  security  for  peace  and  prosperity,  to 
be  the  director  of  this  new  European  confederacy,  and  it  was 
to  the  interest  of  all  the  other  powers  to  yield  themselves  with 
full  confidence  to  her  guidance. 

Such,  in  plain  terms,  was  the  political  programme  of  the  new 
France.  At  bottom  it  did  not  differ  from  that  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary government,  its  predecessor.  But  if  it  had  been  the 
design  of  the  Convention  to  create  a  federation  of  republics  in 
Europe  und(?r  French  leadership,  Napoleon's  object  was  far  less 
concerned  with  the  giving  of  freedom  to  the  nations  than  with 
securing  the  submission  of  their  rulers  to  the  hegemony  of  the 
State  governed  by  himself.  In  his  criticism  of  Hauterive's 
pamphlet,  Gentz,  the  famous  publicist  and  a  man  of  genius, 
showed  his  discrimination  by  calling  certain  facts  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  statesmen  of  the  old  system  in  1801  in  the  following 


JEt.  32]  The   Question   of  the   Future  2  1  9 

words:  "\\nieii  it  is  said  that  France  has  extended  her  Ijouiida- 
ries  in  all  directions  through  her  conquests,  that  her  old  in- 
violable territory  has  been  surrounded  by  new  defences,  and 
that  her  influence  upon  all  neighbouring  countries  has  been 
increased  to  forniida]:)le  proportions,  the  truth  has  been  but 
partially  stated.  The  actual  fact  is  this:  France  in  her  present 
condition  recognizes  no  boundaries  whatsoever;  all  neigh- 
bouring States  are  now  in  fact,  even  if  not  nominally,  her  de- 
pendencies and  property,  or  may  become  such  upon  the  first 
convenient  occasion  whenever  it  may  seem  desirable  to  the 
men  placed  at  the  head  of  the  government."  No,  the  peace  now 
prevailing  over  Europe  was  not  a  reconcihation  of  the  peoples 
such  as  short-sighted  ministers  had  been  deluded  into  calling 
it,  this  was  but  a  halting-place  on  the  road  to  universal  domin- 
ion along  which  Napoleon  unremittingly  advanced,  impelled  by 
revolutionary  tradition  as  well  as  by  personal  ambition. 

But  in  case  he  had  determined  to  abide  by  revolutionary 
policy  in  relation  to  other  countries,  the  question  arises,  the 
most  important  perhaps  of  any  to  the  historian  of  those  timesi 
to  what  extent  might  and  must  this  policy  affect  the  govern- 
mental and  social  conditions  of  these  other  countries  and  nations 
of  Europe  whose  organization  differed  so  materially  from  that  of 
the  new  France?  The  revolutionary  armies  had  carried  but  little 
into  foreign  countries  during  the  last  few  years  of  the  eighteenth 
century  beyond  riot  and  disorder,  for  in  France  itself  nothing 
else  existed.  Were  the  armies  of  Napoleon  to  introduce  nothing 
better  wherever  they  should  penetrate?  That  depended  upon 
whether  he  were  really  successful  in  restoring  lasting  conditions 
of  order  in  the  interior,  in  selecting  from  the  chaos  of  revolution- 
ary legislation  such  laws  as  were  salutary,  thus  fulfilling  the 
second  great  hope  which  the  nation  had  builded  upon  him  at 
the  time  of  his  return.  This  task  he  took  upon  himself,  and  he 
accomphshed  it,  not  for  the  sake  of  making  the  French  people 
happy, — he  never  loved  them  enough  for  that,* — but  in  order 

♦See  a  most  interesting  scene  in  the  "M^moires  de  Mme.  de  R^musat," 
I.  246,  and  the  observation  of  Mme.  de  Stael  (Considerations,  II.  199).' 
"  He  despised  the  nation  whose  approbation  he  coveted." 


\ 


±20  War  and  Peace  [isol 

to  create  a  secure  foundation  for  the  structure  of  his  world-empire. 
For  this  purpose,  and  for  this  purpose  only,  should  France  herself 
become  strong,  powerful,  and  rich,  for  under  these  circumstances 
alone  would  she  be  equal  to  making  the  sacrifices  demanded  by 
his  ambition.  Neither  he  nor  France  could  indeed  foresee  at 
the  beginning  of  the  revolutionary  monarchy  that  these  sacrifices 
made  for  the  sake  of  an  experiment  which  shaped  the  history 
of  the  world  would  in  the  end  cost  the  fives  of  a  miUion  men  and  yet 
fail  of  attaining  the  object  sought.  It  must  be  confessed  that 
his  predecessors  in  power,  the  Convention  and  the  Directory,  had 
sent  almost  as  great  a  number  of  Frenchmen  to  their  death 
without  even  procuring  in  compensation  order  and  prosperity 
to  the  country.    This  at  least  Napoleon  wholly  accompfished. 


GHAPTER  IX 

THE  NEW  FRANCE  AND  HER  SOVEREIGN 

The  great  work  of  reorganizing  France  was  carried  through 
by  Napoleon  with  the  aid  of  a  large  number  of  talented  and  ex- 
perienced assistants,  some  of  whom,  as  members  of  the  Council 
of  State,  discussed  the  new  measures  and  formulated  them  into 
decrees  and  laws,  while  others  in  the  capacity  of  ministers  and 
director-generals  carried  them  into  effect  with  precision  after 
they  had  been  passed  by  the  Chambers.  The  Council  of  State, 
which  has  continued  to  exist  in  France  up  to  the  present  day, 
furnished  the  First  Consul  with  an  exact  portrayal  of  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  within  the  country;  it  put  at  his  disposal  the  wealth 
of  experience  acquired  by  gifted  men  not  only  during  the  event- 
ful ten  years  of  the  Revolution,  but  also,  before  that  time,  in  the 
employ  of  the  royal  government;  it  enabled  him  to  make  use  of 
the  practical  intelhgence  of  men  w^hose  fitness  for  service  of  the 
State  had  been  developed  in  the  free  atmosphere  of  the  Revolu- 
tion as  fully  as  the  mihtary  genius  of  Hoche  and  of  Bonaparte. 
It  is  to  these  first  Councillors  of  State,  such  men  as  Boulay  de  la 
Meurthe,  Roederer,  Chaptal.  Berlier,  Duchatel.  Defermon,  Du- 
fresne,  Fourcroy,  Cretet,  Barb^-Marbois,  Regnault  de  Saint- Jean- 
d'Ang^ly.to  whom  honour  is  due  for  having  accomplished  the  final 
regulation  of  French  finances,  the  reform  in  internal  administra- 
tion, the  codification  of  the  laws,  the  establishment  of  perma- 
nent institutions  for  worship  and  education, — in  short,  for  having 
brought  together  all  the  valuable  material  from  which  arose  under 
the  eye  of  the  most  skilful  of  architects  the  commodious  edifice 
of  modern  France.  In  their  pohtical  past  these  collaborators  of 
Napoleon's  differed  widely  from  one  another.  The  Royalists 
were  represented  among  them  by  Dufresne,  the  Girondists  by 
Defermon,  Radical  members  of  the  Convention  by  Fourcroy 

X2I 


222    The   New   France  and   Her  Sovereign     [isoo 

and  Berlier,  Moderates  of  the  time  of  the  Directory  by  Regnaud 
and  Roederer,  and  exiles  of  the  18th  Fructidor  by  Portahs  and 
Barbe-Marbois. 

Napoleon  had  purposely  chosen  his  men  from  different  parties 
so  that  his  reforms  might  not  appear  to  be  the  work  of  any  par- 
ticular faction.  They  were  divided  into  Commissions  of  Finance, 
Justice,  War,  the  Na\^,  and  the  Interior.  The  First  Consul  pre- 
sided at  their  deliberations,  and  such  was  the  capacity  of  his  intel- 
lect that  he  could  enter  into  all  the  detail  of  affairs  without  be- 
coming confused  and  was,  on  the  contrary,  ready  at  any  moment 
to  judge  of  the  matter  under  discussion  in  its  entirety  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  sovereign. 

The  second  task  of  the  public  administration,  the  execution 
of  the  laws  and  decrees  passed  by  the  Council  of  State,  was  in- 
cumbent upon  the  ministers,  and  their  measures  were  likewise 
as  much  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  Bonaparte  as  were 
the  dehberations  and  resolutions  of  the  Council  of  State.  The 
names  of  the  men  to  whom  he  entrusted  the  seven  existing  port- 
folios when  taking  up  the  reins  of  government  have  already  been 
given,  and  here  also  the  men  were  selected  with  a  like  regard 
to  diversity  of  political  faith.  He  said  one  day  to  his  brother 
Joseph:  "Where  is  the  revolutionary  who  will  lack  confidence  in 
a  state  of  affairs  in  which  Fouche  is  Minister  of  Pohce?  and  where 
is  the  nobleman,  if  he  has  remained  a  Frenchman,  who  will  not 
hope  to  find  his  wants  provided  for  in  a  country  where  a  Ferigord, 
a  former  bishop  of  Autun,  is  in  power?  I  am  protected  on  the 
left  by  one  and  on  the  right  by  the  other.  I  mean  that  my  gov- 
ernment shall  unite  all  Frenchmen  It  is  a  broad  road  in  which 
all  may  find  room."  To  certain  of  the  ministries  Napoleon  asso- 
ciated "directions  generales,"  an  institution  still  cxi.stent  in  the 
administrative  organization  of  France.  These  "directions"  in- 
cluded bridges  and  roads,  public  instruction,  worship,  the  treas- 
ury, customs,  registration  fees,  domains,  the  liquidation  of  the 
public  debt,  and  sundry  others  from  among  which  independent 
ministries  were  soon  created. 

Official  communication  between  the  First  Consul  and  his 
ministers  was  made  through  the  Secretary  of  State.     This  im- 


^T.  30]  Internal   Administration  223 

portant  office  had  been  filled  ever  since  1799  by  the  faithful  and 
capable  Maret,  who  continued  to  execute  his  functions  in  that 
position  almost  up  to  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  rule.  He  was 
without  an  equal  in  his  ability  for  giving  immediate  form  and 
expression  to  the  thoughts  hurriedly  let  fall  by  his  master  and 
for  following  intelligently  his  hasty  dictation.  Maret  was  in 
reaUty  a  Cabinet  Minister  kept  at  the  level  of  a  clerk  by  the  con- 
summate superiority  of  Napoleon.  It  is  from  the  office  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  there  issued  those  innumerable  letters 
addressed  to  all  sorts  of  officials  and  persons  which  make  up  to- 
day the  many  quarto  volumes  of  Napoleon's  correspondence  and 
bear  \\dtness  to  the  indefatigable  acti\aty  of  master  and  servants. 
The  laws  and  ordinances  with  the  execution  of  which  the 
ministers  were  charged  were  transmitted  by  them  to  newly  cre- 
ated subordinate  officials,  by  whom  they  were  introduced  into 
the  "departments."  On  February  17th,  1800,  the  law  was  pro- 
mulgated which  forms  to-day  the  basis  of  French  administrative 
apparatus.  According  to  its  provisions  in  every  "  department  " 
the  chief  administrative  officer  is  a  prefect,  in  every  "Ar- 
rondissement "  a  sub-prefect,  in  every  "Commune"  a  mayor, 
— all  three  classes  being  appointed  by  the  Chief  Magis- 
trate and  subordinated  to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  During 
the  Revolution  the  government  of  the  provinces  had  rested  in 
the  hands  of  elective  councils,  a  system  which  had  led  not  only 
to  partiaUty  and  to  irregularities  of  many  kinds,  but  even  to 
do\\'nright  disobedience  to  the  central  authority,  with  the  result 
that  the  Constitution  of  1795  establishing  the  Directory  totally 
abolished  the  autonomous  municipalities.  Napoleon  now  re- 
estabUshed  these  communal  authorities;  the  officers,  however, 
were  not  to  be  elective.  The  chief  official  of  the  commune  was  to 
be  the  mayor,  aj^pointed  and  paid  by  tlie  State,  while  the  members 
of  the  municipal  council  assisting  him,  who  were  advisers  merely 
without  votes,  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  prefect  from  the  list 
of  notables.  In  like  manner  the  sub-prefect  had  his  district  council 
and  the  prefect  his  general  council,  both  appointed  by  the  First 
Consul  to  regulate  the  direct  taxes  to  be  levied  in  the  depart- 
ment, to  make  appropriations,  and  to   bring  to  the  attention  of 


224    The  New  France  and   Her  Sovereign    [I800 

the  government  the  needs  and  interests  of  their  jurisdictions. 
It  was  a  system  of  rigid  centrahzation  which  gave  to  the  man 
placed  at  the  head  of  government  boundless  influence  upon  the 
smallest  details  of  the  communal  administration.  It  was,  as 
Napoleon  himself  said,  a  hierarchy  of  "First  Consuls  in  minia- 
ture," a  bureaucracy  resembling  that  established  under  Richelieu 
and  Louis  XIV.,  but  with  this  distinctive  difference,  that  its 
mechanism  was  not  hampered  and  impeded  either  by  the  privi- 
leges and  local  tariffs  of  the  provinces,  nor  by  reason  of  the  ex- 
ceptional conditions  of  privileged  classes  and  corporations;  more- 
over, it  did  not  govern  a  people  filled  with  theoretical  aspirations 
toward  liberty,  but  one  which  had  through  practical  experience 
grown  heartily  tired  of  it  and  who  longed  more  than  anything 
for  the  opportunity  to  live  in  tranquillity. 

Early  in  March,  1800,  the  first  prefects  were  appointed, 
being  selected,  just  as  the  ministers  and  Councillors  of  State  had 
been,  with  care  to  avoid  maldng  one  poUtical  party  more  promi- 
nent than  another;  the  royalist  Count  La  Rochefoucauld  figures 
beside  the  arch-Jacobin  De  Bry  and  the  Girondist  Doulcet  de 
Pontecoulant.  There  was  no  lack  of  work  for  all.  During 
the  year  1800  there  were  still  no  taxes  collected  and  the  amount 
of  revenue  due  from  the  departments  was  scarcely  known. 
The  State  was  indebted  to  the  lowest  of  its  servants  for  half  a 
year's  salary;  some  among  them  even  died  of  starvation.  In 
the  open  country  the  most  appalUng  insecurity  prevailed.  The 
highroads,  fallen  into  disrepair,  were  the  lurking-place  of  numer- 
ous bands  of  robbers,  who  pursued  their  calling  up  to  the  very 
outskirts  of  Paris,  and  whose  misdeeds  form  the  chief  subject 
of  report  on  the  part  of  the  officials.  In  a  single  department, 
that  of  Vaucluse,  not  less  than  ninety  cases  of  highway 
robbery  and  murder  were  committed  within  the  year  1801. 
Many  communities  were  driven  by  terror  into  making  common 
cause  with  the  brigands  and  affording  them  refuge.  In  the 
cities  the  state  of  affairs  was  not  in  the  slightest  degree  better 
than  in  the  country.  Speaking  of  what  was  to  be  seen  in  Toulon, 
a  Councillor  of  State  writes:  "No  poUce  in  the  city, no  street- 
lamps,  every  night  stores  broken  into  and  robbed,  no  pave- 


^T.  30]        The  Restoration  of  Prosperity  225 

ments,  no  cleanliness,  no  safety,  no  town  taxes,  no  bread  at 
the  hospitals."  Only  with  the  greatest  difficulty  could  the 
new  government  fulfil  its  most  important  duty,  of  protecting 
the  Ufe  and  property  of  citizens.  Special  tribunals  were  estab- 
lished in  February,  1801,  and  these  with  the  aid  of  the  "gen- 
darmerie," now  reorganized  by  Napoleon,  soon  purged  the 
land  of  the  bands  of  criminals  which  had  infested  it.  This 
police  force  had  already  undergone  a  reform  in  the  time  of  the 
Directory,  but  its  effectiveness  was  vastly  increased  and  its 
zeal  for  duty  greatly  stimulated  by  being  put  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  general  of  merit  and  experience.  By  1802  cases  of 
murder  or  highway  robbery  had  already  become  rare.  A  law 
of  February  17th,  1800,  provided  for  the  security  of  towns  by 
instituting  a  commission  of  police  in  every  commune  of  more 
than  5000  inhabitants  and  poUce  "directions"  in  all  such  as 
included  more  than  100,000  souls.  By  a  decree  of  July  1st, 
1800,  a  prefect  of  police  was  established  in  Paris  who  had  charge 
of  both  the  political  detectives  and  the  city  poUce  force. 

Measures  having  thus  been  taken  to  insure  protection  to 
the  Ufe  and  property  of  citizens,  the  next  step  to  be  considered 
must  be  toward  promoting  or  rather  laying  the  foundations 
of  general  prosperity,  for  there  was  none  at  the  time.  The 
arbitrary  financial  legislation  of  the  revolutionary  governments, 
incessant  war,  which  had  put  an  end  to  all  export  trade,  and 
the  unstable  paper-money  system  had  combined  to  ruin  in- 
dustry and  traffic.  The  manufacturer  in  Paris  who  had  for- 
merly employed  from  sixty  to  eighty  workmen  now  contented 
himself  with  ten.  The  lace-making  industry,  once  so  flourishing 
in  the  North,  the  linen  industry  in  Brittany,  and  the  celebrated 
paper  manufactory  in  the  department  of  Charente  were  all 
practically  annihilated,  and  the  number  of  silk-manufacturing 
concerns  at  Lyons  had  diminished  by  one  half.  In  Marseilles 
the  amount  of  sales  per  month  no  longer  equalled  what  it  had 
been  per  week  before  the  Revolution  began.  The  harbours, 
more  especially  those  on  the  ocean,  had  become  choked  with 
sand,  their  defences  had  fallen  to  ruin,  the  inhabitants  were 
starving.     Such  business  as  continued  to  be  carried  on  at  all 


2  26    The  New  France  and   Her  Sovereign    [isoo 

was  done  at  the  Stock  Exchange,  where  the  vast  and  constantly 
fluctuating  difference  between  real  and  fictitious  values  was  a 
temptation  to  gambling  or  to  speculation  in  army  suppUes, 
whereby  the  contractors  and  the  officers  whom  they  had  bribed 
were  enriched  at  the  expense  of  the  soldiers  who  were  being 
driven  to  want  and  death  by  the  unscrupulous  conduct  of  the 
government.  Only  a  complete  reform  of  the  admiiiistration 
of  finances  could  secure  respect  for  the  government,  money 
for  its  treasury  and  national  credit,  all  of  which  were  essential 
to  any  scheme  for  improving  in  a  radical  way  the  position  of 
the  substantial  people  of  the  country. 

It  is  an  exceedingly  interesting  historical  study  to  see  how 
France,  almost  overwhelmed  during  the  rule  of  the  Convention 
and  Directory  by  a  sea  of  worthless  paper  money,  worked  its 
way  out  in  spite  of  everything  and  returned  to  normal  economic 
conditions  and  a  regulated  standard  of  values.  In  order 
to  re-establish  the  national  credit,  which  had  been  exhausted 
through  the  innumerable  debts  contracted  by  the  royal  govern- 
ment, the  revolutionary  authorities  declared  the  estates  of  the 
clergy  and  of  the  nobles  who  had  emigrated  to  be  the  property 
of  the  nation,  and  issued  notes  or  "assignats"  based  on  these 
lands  as  currency.  But  in  consequence  of  the  general  feeling 
of  uncertainty  the  value  of  real  estate  decreased  and  the  prop- 
erty became  for  the  most  part  unsalable;  the  war,  which  in  the 
intoxication  of  untried  liberty  had  been  declared  against  all 
Europe,  consumed  immense  sums,  and  eventually  the  assignats, 
of  which  more  and  more  were  continually  being  issued,  became 
worthless.  In  1795  a  louis  d'or  rose  in  value  from  24  francs  to 
1800,  and  in  February,  1796,  to  8137  francs  in  assignats,  so  that 
a  livre  in  gold  was  worth  almost  340  hvres  in  paper.  The 
Directory  had  recourse  to  arbitrary  enactments.  The  24 
billions  of  assignats  in  circulation  wore  called  in  towards  the  end 
of  March,  1796,  and  the  holders  received  in  exchange  but  one 
thirtieth  of  their  face  value  in  so-called  "mandats  tcrritoriaux." 
These,  however,  were  in  turn  nothing  more  than  orders  upon 
the  national  lands  and,  in  spite  of  their  enforced  circulation, 
they  fell  at  the  end  of  a  few  weeks  to  one  twentieth  of  their 


JEt.so]  The   Public   Debt  227 

nominal  value,  and  in  the  following  year  to  one  hundredth. 
When  finally  the  government  was  compelled  to  repeal  the  act 
forcing  the  people  to  accept  them  as  currency,  they  disappeared 
entirely  from  circulation.  They  had  only  served  to  enable 
certain  speculators  to  purchase  from  the  Directory  during  the 
course  of  a  year  the  larger  part  of  the  government  lands,  so  that 
the  State  lost  in  this  way  most  of  its  domains,  having  received 
in  return  in  ready  money  scarcely  one  hundredth  part  of  their 
value,  which  amounted  to  several  bilUons.  Sordid  usurers, 
unscrupulous  speculators,  and  a  vast  number  of  small  con- 
tractors— estimated  to  number  not  less  than  1.200,000 — had 
thus  acquired  the  estates  of  monasteries  and  of  ancient  families 
of  rank,  a  change  of  ownership  so  rapid  and  so  complete  as  to 
be  unequalled  cither  before  that  time  or  even  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  in  spite  of  its  rapid  economic  and  social  changes. 

The  original  intention  had  been  to  pay  the  public  debt  of 
France  with  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  State  property,  but  this, 
under  existing  circumstances,  could  no  longer  be  thought  of. 
In  1793  the  Convention  had  already  been  obliged  to  decree  that 
the  outstanding  public  debt  should  be  entered  in  the  "Great 
Book  of  the  public  debt"  as  a  consolidated  fund  irredeemable 
beyond  the  payment  of  5%  annual  interest.  In  1797  the 
annual  interest  had  risen  to  over  250  million  francs,  of  which, 
however,  only  one  fourth  was  paid  in  cash,  the  remainder  being 
in  bonds  upon  the  national  estates,  whicli  had  been  added  to 
by  the  confiscation  of  the  Belgian  monasteries.  But  the  burden 
remained  nevertheless  far  too  heavy,  and  the  Directory  sought 
relief  by  retaining  only  one  third  of  the  national  debt  in  the 
"Great  Book,"  the  other  two  thirds  being  paid  to  the  creditors 
in  land  bonds.  But  since  these  bonds  fell  with  the  credit  of  the 
government  to  ^%  of  their  face  value  before  the  end  of  the  year 
1798,  the  reduction  of  the  debt  had  been  in  fact  simple  bank- 
ruptcy whereby  the  creditors  of  France  were  robbed  of  two 
thirds  of  their  claims.  But  even  the  remaining  so-called  "con- 
solidated "'  thinl  was  not  paid  in  specie,  but  again  in  bonds. 
Under  such  conditions  no  further  confidence  in  the  govern- 
ment could  exist  among  the  solid  men  of  the  busmess  world. 


228    The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign     [isoo 

The  people  replied  by  a  refusal  to  pay  taxes.  The  Directory 
resorted  to  forced  loans.  In  1800  the  arrears  had  reached  the 
sum  of  1100  millions. 

To  reduce  to  order  such  a  state  of  affairs  required  an  iron 
determination.*  But  in  the  course  of  this  single  year  a 
remedy  was  found  for  the  most  serious  of  these  abuses,  and 
provisions  were  made  which  prevented  the  possibility  of  a 
return  to  such  conditions.  On  November  24th,  1799,  "direc- 
tions (boards  of  managers)  of  direct  taxes"  were  established  in 
every  "  department "  such  as  are  still  in  operation  at  the  present 
time.  Further,  the  assessment  of  taxes,  which  had  hitherto 
varied  from  year  to  year,  was  now  regulated  upon  fixed  prin- 
ciples. "There  is  no  real  security  of  possession,"  said  Napo- 
leon, "except  in  a  country  where  the  rate  of  taxation  does  not 
vary  every  year."  An  exact  survey  of  all  real  estate  in  France 
was  another  matter  to  which  he  turned  his  attention.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1801.  were  appointed  a  "direction  g^n^rale"  of  the  cus- 
toms and  of  the  registration  of  landed  property;  the  reorganized 
bureau  of  forestry  in  a  single  year  almost  doubled  the  revenue 
obtained  during  the  preceding  twelve  months.  The  revenues 
and  income  from  public  property  being  at  length  regulated 
and  entrusted  to  the  management  of  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
the  department  of  expenses  and  of  the  national  debt  under- 
went a  similar  reform  and  was  committed  in  1801  to  the  care 
of  a  special  "treasury  department,"  at  the  head  of  which  was 

♦Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  first  steps  taken  by 
Gaudin.  the  new  Minister  of  Finance  To  enable  the  State  to  continue 
its  existence  during  the  first  year  of  his  administration  he  was  obliged  to 
make  use  of  the  old  system  of  expensive  loans  and  extortion  of  funds 
from  adjacent  countries  Seventy  millions  were  practically  repudiated, 
as  he  simply  forbade  the  payment  of  the  orders  on  the  revenue  which  the 
Directory  had  issued  to  contractors,  except  within  a  given  time  and  at 
their  value  in  specie  or  short-time  bills  It  was  important  above  all  to 
regulate  and  assure  the  position  of  the  landholders  With  this  end  in 
view  the  Constitution  of  the  year  VIII  had  solemnly  guaranteed  to 
holders  of  national  estates,  no  matter  how  obtained,  the  ownership  of 
those  lands  (articles  93,  91),  Other  measures  to  be  taken  belonged  to 
the  province  of  financial  policy. 


iET.  30]  The  Bank  of  France  229 

placed  the  Councillor  of  State  Barb^-Marbois.*  To  this  de- 
partment was  submitted  the  control  of  the  sinking  fund  (caisse 
d'amortissement),  which  had  been  since  July,  1801,  under  the 
management  of  MoUien,  a  most  capable  man.  It  was  this 
institution  doubtless  which  did  more  than  anything  else  toward 
raising  the  national  credit.  The  Consulate  had  inherited  from 
the  Directory  a  residue  of  unsold  national  domains  worth  400 
millions.  Instead  of  squandering  these  resources  as  his  prede- 
cessors in  power  had  done,  Napoleon  sought  to  make  them  more 
profitable.  He  assigned  90  millions  to  the  sinking  fund  to 
be  gradually  disposed  of,  the  proceeds  being  used  to  redeem 
state  bonds  so  that  they  should  continue  to  circulate  at  50, 
to  which  point  they  had  risen  after  the  treaty  of  Lun^ville. 
Napoleon  could  then  issue  new  bonds  at  this  rate  of  exchange 
and  thus  discharge  floating  debts  and  arrears  of  interest  from 
former  years.  A  further  120  milUons  of  this  national  property 
were  dedicated  with  their  proceeds  to  the  administration  of 
Public  Instruction,  while  40  millions  were  to  go  to  the  support 
of  disabled  soldiers,  thus  relieving  the  budget.  The  victorious 
outcome  of  the  war  made  it  possible  to  leave  the  greater  part 
of  the  army  to  subsist  on  foreign  territory,  which  also  aided 
to  hghten  the  burden  which  the  state  had  to  bear. 

In  order  to  promote  industry  and  trade  the  Bank  of  France 
was  established  on  the  18th  of  January,  1800,  with  a  capital 
of  30  miUions,  the  state  holding  shares  for  5  millions  which  had 
been  taken  from  the  security  furnished  by  the  Treasury  officials. 
The  Bank  was  given  the  privilege  of  issuing  notes  up  to  a  certain 
amount;  in  return  it  bound  itself  to  put  its  capital  at  the  dis- 
position of  the  Treasury.  Ordinances  were  passed  also  regu- 
lating the  affairs  of  the  stock  exchange,  re-establishing  the 
chambers  of  commerce  suppressed  by  the  Revolution,  pro\'iding 
for  frequent  national  expositions,  etc.  With  confidence  and 
good-will  on  the  part  of  the  people  it  would  now  be  possible  to 

*  This  division  of  the  administration  of  finances  between  two  ministers 
was  maintained  until  1815.  Napoleon  attempted  to  justify  this  course 
by  saying  that  a  single  minister  offered  him  no  such  security.  WTiere  there 
were  two,  each  acted  as  a  constant  check  upon  the  other. 


230    The  New  France  and   Her  Sovereign    [I800 

restore  equilibrium  to  the  finances  and,  tliis  accomplished,  the 
lost  credit  of  France  would  soon  be  recovered.  The  govern- 
ment having  done  all  in  its  power  to  bring  tliis  about,  the  people 
no  longer  hesitated  to  do  their  share.  Taxes  were  promptly  paid 
in,  and  the  financial  undertakings  of  the  government  again  met 
with  the  support  of  the  substantial  business  men.  Progress  in 
this  direction  was  marked  after  the  signing  of  the  peace  of 
Amiens,  which  seemed  to  mean  the  dawn  of  a  new  era  of  uni- 
versal peace. 

But  this  entire  organism  would  have  been  without  lasting 
value  if  the  rights  and  duties  of  individuals  toward  one  another 
had  not  at  the  same  time  been  definitely  determined  and  made 
known  to  every  one.  The  demand  was  imperative  for  a  code 
clearly  and  precisely  setting  forth  the  law  of  the  land,  wliich  the 
Revolution  had  completely  changed.  Up  to  1789  there  had 
been  no  uniformity  of  law  in  France.  The  North  was  governed 
principally  by  the  customary  law  (coutmnes)  formulated  in 
the  sixteenth  century,  while  in  the  South  the  Roman  law 
(droit  ecrit)  prevailed;  in  addition  there  were  numerous  local 
laws.  Even  before  the  Revolution  the  Chancellor  Maupeou 
had  pointed  out  the  necessity  for  a  reform  of  the  judicial  system 
and  a  codification  and  simplification  of  these  manifold  forms 
of  law.  But  the  Revolution,  which  followed  with  its  ruling 
principle  of  "Equal  rights  for  all,"  made  an  end  of  the  diversity 
in  French  jurisprudence.  A  new  national  civil  code  was  prom- 
ised in  the  Constitution  of  1791;  in  that  of  1793  the  promise 
was  renewed  and  extended  to  include  a  code  of  criminal  law 
to  be  likewise  national,  but  in  1799  neither  promise  had  yet 
been  fulfilled,  and  in  the  night  session  of  November  10th,  in 
which  Napoleon  was  invested  with  the  supreme  power,  the  two 
commissions  were  again  instructed  to  formulate  a  code.  And 
now  at  last  through  the  strong  will  of  a  single  man  was  accom- 
plished what  had  been  fruitlessly  attcmpt(^(l  by  the  many.  On 
the  12th  of  August,  1800,  Napoleon  appointed  a  committee 
consisting  of  three  eminent  jurists,  Tronchet,  Bigot  de  Preame- 
neu,  and  Portalis  (of  the  Council  of  the  Ancients),  with  Male- 
ville  as  secretary,  to  draw  up  a  civil  code.     These  men  appor- 


iEx.  32]  The   Civil   Code  231 

tioned  the  work  among  themselves  and,  taking  as  a  basis  a 
sclieme  which  Cambac6res  had  at  one  time  laid  before  the  Con- 
vention, by  the  end  of  four  months  had  finished  the  task.  The 
proposed  code  was  then  deliberated  upon  in  the  Council  of  State, 
where  it  was  revised  by  the  jurists  Boulay  de  la  Muerthe,  Berlier, 
Abrial,  and  the  Consuls  Cambaceres  and  Lebrun  (former  secre- 
tary to  the  Chancellor  Maupeou),  Napoleon  himself  frequently 
taking  part  in  the  discussion  and  settUng  disputed  points. 
Those  who  were  present  bear  witness  to  his  penetrating  observa- 
tions and  clear  ideas,  though  these  at  times  betrayed  a  point 
of  view  quite  foreign  to  the  jurist.  The  laws  restricting  the 
grounds  for  divorce  and  placing  parents  under  obligation  to 
support  their  children  are  with  sundry  others  said  to  have  been 
due  to  him. 

Before  the  end  of  the  year  1801  the  Code  had  already  been 
presented  in  three  parts  to  the  Council  of  State  for  discussion. 
The  ordinances  of  the  Chancellor  d'Aguesseau  enacted  between 
1737  and  1750  were  found  to  contain  many  things  of  value 
which  were  incorporated  among  the  new  laws;  the  ancient 
"Coutumes"  and  the  Roman  law  were  also  drawn  upon  so  far 
as  they  did  not  confhct  with  the  Revolutionary  principle  of 
EquaUty,  for  this  spirit  was  dominant  throughout  the  whole 
of  this  monumental  work.  The  Revolution  had  abohshed 
hereditary  nobility,  the  civil  code  did  not  re-establish  it;  in 
the  laws  concerning  inheritance  it  had  set  up  as  a  principle  that 
children  of  different  age  and  sex  should  enjoy  equal  rights,  and 
this  also  was  approved  by  the  civil  code;  the  Revolution  had 
granted,  though  not  without  hesitation,  all  rights  of  citizenship 
to  the  Jews,  and  these  were  confirmed  without  reserve  by  the 
civil  code;  it  had  introduced  for  all  classes  and  for  all  religions 
registration  of  civil  status  [births,  marriages,  etc.],  and  civil 
marriage,  both  of  which  innovations  were  retained  by  the  civil 
code;  it  had  declared  the  marriage  relation  capable  of  dissolu- 
tion, and  the  civil  code  abode  by  this  decision.  But  whereas  the 
National  Assembly  and  the  Convention  had  elaborated  only  certain 
portions  of  the  laws  governing  individuals,  the  Consulate  carried 
the  work  much  farther  and  formulated  a  system  of  laws  em- 


232    The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign    [isoi 

bracing  the  whole  civil  life  of  the  people.  The  merit  for  this 
belongs  indisputably  to  the  First  Consul  of  France,  and  the 
book  in  which  the  laws  of  the  land  are  inscribed  is  accordingly 
rightfully  named  the  "Code  Napoleon."  The  three  parts  of 
the  civil  code,  adopted  in  turn  by  the  Council  of  State,  were,  on 
the  21st  of  March,  1804,  incorporated  together  into  a  single 
body  of  laws. 

The  codification  of  criminal  law,  of  laws  of  procedure  and 
of  commerce  was  likewise  undertaken,  and  the  value  of  the  result 
of  these  labours,  so  extensive  that  their  branches  cannot  even  be 
enumerated  here,  is  proven  by  the  wide  circle  into  which  they 
have  been  adopted.*  For  these  books  of  the  law  were  not  to 
benefit  France  alone:  wherever  the  power  of  Napoleon  extended 
the  new  laws  were  carried  with  it,  and  when,  later,  a  time  came 
when  the  French  people  were  driven  back  within  their  former 
boundaries,  their  laws  remained  a  testimony  to  the  former  great- 
ness of  their  country.  Up  to  the  present  day  the  "Code  Napo- 
leon" is  still  in  force  in  Rhenish  Prussia,  Rhenish  Bavaria,  Rhenish 
Hesse,  and,  with  slight  modifications,  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Ba- 
den, in  Holland,  Belgium,  Italy,  etc.  It  is  only  within  a  very 
few  years  that  the  French  method  of  procedure  in  criminal 
cases,  public  and  oral  with  the  assistance  of  a  jury,  has  ceased  to 
prevail  in  the  Prussian  provinces  on  the  Rhine.  To  this  day  the 
"Code  de  Commerce  "  is  in  force  in  Belgium  and  Italy,  in  Greece 
and  the  principahties  on  the  Danube,  and  has  served  as  a  model 
in  almost  every  land  where  laws  of  commerce  have  been  framed. 
With  these  codes  of  law  the  principles  of  equality  upon  which 
they  were  based  were  also  carried  into  foreign  countries,  where 
they  exerted  a  civilizing  and  refining  influence  which  was  within 
a  short  time  to  change  the  face  of  the  world  in  s])ite  of  all  reaction 
against  them.  Who  would  deny  the  greatness  of  the  man  whose 
powerful  hand  brought  into  being  and  controlled  such  a  lever! 

*  The  (U'lilx'ijdions  concerning  the  "Code  pc^nal"  and  the  "Code  d'in- 
struction  cniiiinelle"  were  begun  in  March,  ISOl,  and  bronglit  to  com- 
pletion in  1810.  The  "Code  de  procedure  civih;"  was  drafted  in  1802, 
.submitted  to  the  "Corps  legislatil"  in  180(), "  and  put  into  operation  in 
1807.  The  "Code  de  Cbmmerce"  was  elaborated  between  1801  and  1807, 
and  was  put  in  force  in  1808. 


Mr.  32]  Education 


^32 


The  rights  and  welfare  of  the  existing  generation  provided 
for,  Napoleon  turned  his  attention  to  the  education  and  training 
of  the  next.     In  the  matter  of  pubhc  histruction,  just  as  had 
been  the  case  in  all  other  branches  of  the  administration,  the 
Revolution,  in  seeking  to  better    the    condition  of  things,  had 
abolished  what  was  useless  and  had  laid  down  excellent  principles 
without  having  been  able  to  establish  much  that  was  solid  or 
durable.     Its  axiom  of  Equality  had  already  been  applied  to  the 
question  of  public  instruction  in  the  Constitution  of  the  year  1791, 
in  which  the  provision  is  made  that  "A  system  of  public  instruc- 
tion shall  be  created  and  organized  which  shall  be  open  to  all 
citizens  and  shall  be  gratuitous  in  respect  to  those  branches 
which  are  indispensable  to  all  men."     But  in  spite  of  excellent 
recommendations  submitted  by  Talleyrand  and  Condorcet,  much 
time  elapsed  before  a  general  statute  was  passed.     Not  until 
October,  1795,  was  there  a  law  providing  for  primary  schools 
in    each    commune,  central    schools    in    the    departments,  and 
special  schools  preparing  for  ten  different  professions.     But  even 
in  1800  the  primary  schools  were  but  rare,  there  was  a  scarcity 
of  both  scholars  and  teachers,  and  the  Comicillor  of  State  when 
making  report  of  these  conditions  proposed  outright    that    the 
parish  priest  should  be  charged  with  the  giving  of  instruction 
where  such  schools  existed.     At  the  central  schools,  where  there 
were  neither  examinations  nor  diplomas,  owing  to  the  tempes- 
tuous spirit  of  the  times,  the  mathematical  and  technical  courses 
alone  found  a  meagre  following,  the  others  remained  entirely 
unattended.     The  same  was  true  of  the  professional  schools. 
The  important  creations  of  the  Convention  dating  from   1794 
could  not  gain  Ufe  and  vigour  in  these  agitated  times.    The  "  Poly- 
technic School"  counted  but  few  pupils;  the  "Normal  School," 
for  the  training  of  teachers,  existed  for  less  than  a  year;  the 
"Medical  School"  amounted  to  Uttle  more  than  the  faculty  of 
former  times  and  was  still  awaiting  reorganization;  the  "Con- 
servatoire des  arts  et  metiers,"  an  institution  due  to  suggestion 
by  the  philosopher  Descartes  in  the  seventeenth  century,  which 
was  intended  for  the  instruction  of  working  men  by  means  of 
observation,  remained  totally  neglected  up  to  the  last  days  of  the 


234    The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign    [I801 

Directory.  And  here  again  the  task  remained  to  the  Consulate 
of  elaborating  the  plans  as  well  as  of  building  up  the  institution. 

The  month  of  December,  1799,  already  witnessed  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  special  sub-department  for  Arts  and  Sciences  in 
the  Department  of  the  Interior,  and  this  developed  two  years 
later  into  the  "Direction  generale  de  I'Instruction  publique." 
May  1st,  1802,  a  new  statute  concerning  pubhc  instruction  was 
promulgated:  primary  schools  were  to  be  established  in  every 
country  parish  under  supervision  of  the  sub-prefect,  the  teachers 
to  be  appointed  by  the  mayor;  in  the  capitals  of  the  depart- 
ments there  were  to  be  secondary  schools  under  supervision  of 
the  prefect,  permission  being  at  the  same  time  granted  to  private 
persons  to  open  and  maintain  schools  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  government;  further,  there  were  to  be  32  "Lycees  "  with 
classical  and  scientific  instruction  to  which  the  better  scholars 
of  the  secondary  schools  should  be  promoted  and  from  which 
one  fifth  of  the  students  upon  completion  of  the  course  should 
be  admitted  into  the  upper  schools  for  special  instruction.*  In- 
spectors were  appointed  to  supervise  the  entire  system  of  public 
instruction,  and  in  order  to  put  the  new  system  at  once  into 
active  operation  the  government  granted  no  less  than  6400 
free  scholarships,  of  which  2400  were  awarded  to  the  sons  of 
meritorious  government  officials  and  military  men.  Success 
crowned  the  work.  Within  two  to  three  years  later  4500  elemen- 
tary schools  were  in  operation  with  more  than  750  secondary 
schools,  counting  50,000  pupils,  and  45  Lycees.f 

In  issuing  these  decrees  Napoleon's  object  had  not  been  so 
much  the  disinterested  advancement  of  knowledge  as  to  train 
up  for  himself  passably  educated  and  completely  docile  subjects 

*  Of  Ihese  special  or  professional  schools  the  statute  of  May  1st,  1802, 
recognized  nine:  1.  Law;  2.  Medicine;  3  Physical  and  Natural  Sciences; 
4.  Mechanical  and  Chemical  Technology;  5.  Pure  Mathematics;  G.  Geog- 
raphy, History,  and  Political  Economy;  7.  Graphic  Arts;  8.  Astronomy: 
0.   Music  and  Composition. 

t  The  first  Consul  did  not  prohil)it,  as  did  the  Revolutionary  gov- 
ernments, the  clerical  schools.  The  clergy  established  elementary  and 
secondary  schools,  and  the  girls'  schools  were  generally  conducted  by 
Sisters. 


^T.  32]  The   Legion   of  Honour  235 

whose  education  need  not  be  carried  to  a  point  whence  they 
might  presume  to  make  unreserved  criticism  of  his  adminis- 
tration of  the  government.  When  in  1802  Fourcroy,  the  Direc- 
tor-General of  PubUc  Instruction,  submitted  to  liim  an  elaborate 
plan  of  education,  Napoleon  rejected  it  as  being  fai*  too  compre- 
hensive with  the  observation:  "A  httle  Latin  and  mathematics 
is  all  that  is  needed."  And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  never 
found  wanting  in  respect  toward  scholarship  or  its  representa- 
tives. He  took  delight  in  associating  with  great  artists  as  well 
as  with  learned  men,  and  never  ceased  to  confer  honours  and  dig- 
nities upon  those  who  had  won  his  esteem  by  their  talents  or 
scientific  attainments.  As  early  as  1800  of  the  sixty  senators 
seventeen  were  members  of  the  Institute,  and  when  on  Alay  19th, 
1802,  the  Legion  of  Honour  was  established  for  the  purpose  of 
recognizing  service  to  the  State  whether  military  or  civil,  it  was 
the  naturalist  Lacepede  who  was  appointed  by  Napoleon  "High 
Chancellor"  of  the  new  order.* 

It  ill  accorded  with  this  system  of  combining  and  centralizing 
all  the  forces  of  the  State  that  one  portion  of  the  nation  should 
be  still  debarred  by  law  from  returning  to  their  native  land. 
Those  who  were  thus  excluded  were  partly  those  emigres  who 
had  left  France  of  their  o^ti  free-will  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Revolution,  and  partly  those  who  had  fled  a  little  later  because 
of  the  terrorist  measures  and  threats  of  the  Radicals  in  power. 
Even  under  the  Directory  the  law  had  been  re-enacted  which 
made  return  punishable  with  death.  That  no  possible  doubt 
might  remain  as  to  the  strength  and  security  of  his  new  govern- 

*  According  to  the  statute  of  1802  the  members  of  the  Legion  were 
compelled  among  other  things  to  swear  on  their  honour  to  combat  every 
attempt  to  restore  the  feudal  regime  with  its  attributes  and  titles.  The 
decoration  of  the  order  was  exceedingly  distasteful  to  the  pronounced 
Repulilicans,  some  of  whom  made  complaint  to  Napoleon.  "I  challenge 
you,"  he  replied,  "to  show  me  a  Republic,  whether  ancient  or  modem, 
in  which  such  marks  of  distinction  have  not  had  their  place.  They  are 
indeed  gewgaws  (hochets),  but  it  is  with  gewgaws  that  men  are  led."  It 
was  at  this  same  period  that  he  said  to  Madame  de  Renmsat:  "The  fact 
is  that  it  is  very  convenient  to  govern  the  French  people  by  appealing  to 
their  vanity." 


236    The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign    [I801 

ment  Napoleon  repealed  this  law  of  proscription.  The  only 
difficulty  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  property  of  the  emigres  had 
in  the  meanwhile  been  confiscated  and  sold  by  the  State,  and 
the  purchasers  saw  cause  for  alarm  concerning  their  possessions 
in  the  return  of  the  former  owners.  The  new  Constitution,  as 
has  been  already  stated,  not  only  guaranteed  the  ownership  of 
these  estates  to  their  purchasers,  but  for  this  very  reason  for- 
bade the  return  of  the  emigres.  But  in  spite  of  all  the  First 
Consul  advanced  step  by  step  to  the  reaUzation  of  his  design. 
In  March,  1800,  an  edict  appeared,  in  the  first  place,  closing  the 
list  of  Emigres  and  empowering  the  government  to  strike  from  it 
the  names  of  those  who  would  request  it  and  renounce  all  claim 
upon  their  former  possessions.  This  was  followed  by  making 
vast  numbers  of  erasures  from  the  list, — Constitutionalists  of  1789, 
thousands  of  banished  priests,  etc.  Finally,  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  foreign  powers  in  April,  1802,  a  general  amnesty 
was  granted,  always  with  the  underetanding,  however,  that 
present  owners  of  national  domains  would  be  protected  in  their 
rights.  Scarcely  had  this  law  been  promulgated  when  the  ban- 
ished families  began  to  flock  back  to  France.  Not  less  than 
forty  thousand  of  them  returned  at  this  time.  Thanks  to  this 
measure  and  to  the  Concordat,  which  put  an  end  to  schism  within 
the  country,  the  reorganization  of  France  was  practically  com- 
pleted. 

But  this  task  had  not  been  accomplished  without  consid- 
erable resistance.  The  autocratic  character  of  Napoleon's 
government  became  daily  more  pronounced  and  stirred  up  ad- 
versaries both  within  the  Chambers  and  without.  These 
showed  themselves  first  among  the  Liberal  Constitutionalists, 
who,  under  the  leadership  of  Benjamin  Constant,  the  intimate 
friend  of  Madame  de  Stael,  arrayed  themselves,  in  society  as 
well  as  in  the  Tribunate,  in  opposition  to  the  tendency  toward 
absolutism  shown  by  the  First  Consul.  But  since,  while  oppos- 
ing this,  they  at  the  same  time  attacked  his  beneficial  and  neces- 
sary constructive  work,  such  as  the  financial  and  judicial  laws, 
their  opposition  only  served  to  confirm  him  in  the  course  which 
he  was  pursuing.    The  implacable  Jacobins  and  Terrorists  took 


-^^T. 32]  An  Attempt  at  Assassination  237 

the  same  position,  and  in  tlioir  secret  meetings,  as  Fouch6 
learned  through  his  agents,  did  not  shrink  even  from  the  idea 
of  assassinating  Bonaparte.  This  plot,  according  to  the  testi- 
mony of  the  Prussian  ambassador,  failed  only  because  of  lack 
of  funds  with  which  to  stir  up  the  populace.  And  finally  the 
opposition  was  augmented  by  the  stiff  Royalists,  who  had  re- 
mained loyal  through  everything  to  Louis  XVIII.  and  hated 
Napoleon  because  they  saw  in  him  the  principal  obstacle  to 
the  realization  of  their  hopes.  They  were  led  by  the  inde- 
fatigable Georges  Cadoudal,  a  leader  of  the  Vendeans  who  lived 
abroad;  they  were  encouraged  in  their  resistance  by  subsidies 
from  England.  Their  representatives  in  Paris  were  young  Hyde 
de  Neu'^dUe  and  Andigne.  Hardly  two  months  after  the  Coup 
d'Etat  Bonaparte  had  said  to  them:  "There  is  no  further  hope 
for  the  Bourbons.  Range  yourselves  under  my  banner,"  he 
added,  hoping  to  persuade  them;  "my  government  is  to  be  the 
government  of  youth  and  of  talent.  Would  you  blush  to  wear 
the  uniform  worn  by  Bonaparte?"  But  these  allurements  were 
all  in  vain.  Among  the  Royalists  there  were  men  who  did 
not  hesitate  at  the  most  extreme  measures,  and  they  proceeded 
to  carry  into  execution  what  had  been  only  planned  by  the 
Jacobins.  On  the  evening  of  December  24th,  1800,  as  the  First 
Consul  was  being  driven  to  the  opera,  he  narrowly  escaped 
being  killed  by  the  explosion  of  an  infernal  machine,  consisting 
of  a  barrel  filled  with  gunpowder,  bullets,  and  fireworks,  which 
was  set  off  in  the  little  rue  St.  Nicaise  and  which  killed  several 
passers-by,  but  left  him  uninjured.  This  crime  was  at  first 
supposed  to  be  the  work  of  the  Radicals,  and,  with  the  assent 
of  the  Senate  and  of  the  Council  of  State,  Napoleon  ordered 
one  hundred  and  thirty  of  them  sentenced  to  deportation,  one 
of  the  most  distressing  penalties.  The  real  perpetrators  of 
the  deed  were  not  discovered  until  later  when  most  of  them  had 
already  made  good  their  escape,  and  only  two  could  be  brought 
to  execution.  The  Terrorists  were  none  the  less  carried  off  to 
the  colonies,  for,  as  Fouch6  observed:  "It  was  not  only  a  ques- 
tion of  punishment  for  the  past,  but  above  all  of  insuring  social 
order."     A  certain  number  of  Radicals  were  deported  without 


238    The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign    [isoi 

trial,  among  others  three  generals  who  made  no  attempt  to  con- 
ceal their  Republican  sentiments  and  who  were  said  to  have 
tried  to  stir  up  the  army  against  the  First  Consul. 

Napoleon  had  thus  become  an  arbitrary  ruler.  His  ar- 
bitrary acts  had  already  begun  when  in  January,  1800,  he  sup- 
pressed no  less  than  sixty  out  of  the  seventy-three  political  news- 
papers published  at  that  time  and  forbade  the  establishment 
of  any  new  ones.*  It  was  an  arbitrary  act,  again,  by  which  he 
defended  himself  against  the  opposition  in  the  Tribunate  in 
1802.  When  that  body  rejected  certain  provisions  of  the 
"Code  civile,"  in  the  elaboration  of  which  Napoleon  had  himself 
participated,  his  first  impulse  had  been  to  attempt  a  "Coup 
d'Etat "  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  government  had  not  the  right 
to  dissolve  the  Chambers;  Cambaceres,  however,  succeeded  in 
persuading  him  to  resort  to  a  less  direct  way  of  accomphshing 
his  ends  and  to  save  appearances  by  means  of  a  seemingly  con- 
stitutional expedient.  Article  38  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
year  VIII  provided  that,  beginning  with  the  year  1802,  one 
fifth  of  the  membership  of  the  Tribunate  and  the  Corps  Legis- 
latif  should  be  annually  renewed.  The  time  appointed  for  this 
renewal  had  now  come.  Since  the  Constitution  did  not  defi- 
nitely prescribe  the  manner  in  which  this  should  be  accom- 
plished, it  was  decided  not  to  follow  the  logical  and  ordinary 
method  of  deciding  by  lot  what  members  should  yield  their 

*  This  decree  was  but  a  poor  return  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  to  those 
newspapers  which  four  years  before  had  received  his  instructions,  as  he 
took  his  departure  for  the  campaign  in  Italy — "to  write  about  him  and 
about  nothing  but  him," — and  which  had  as  a  matter  of  fact  contributed 
in  no  small  degree  to  his  glory.  This  was  however  only  the  first  step  towards 
the  actual  re-establishment  of  the  censorship  which  took  place  three  years 
later.  A  decree  of  September,  1803,  runs  thus:  "In  order  to  secure 
liberty  of  the  press  (!)  no  bookseller  shall  henceforth  offer  for  sale  any 
work  without  its  having  first  been  submitted  to  a  Commission  of  Revision, 
who  will  return  it  if  it  be  found  to  contain  no  ground  for  censure."  A 
similar  regulation  applied  to  new  theatrical  representations.  The  First 
Consul  was  encovnaged  in  the  adoption  of  these  measures  toward  the 
newspapers  by  the  attitude  of  the  public,  which,  intent  upon  securing 
internal  peace,  was  not  exactly  averse  to  seeing  a  rigorous  course  pursued 
in  regard  to  a  disputatious  and  frequently  corrupt  press. 


I 


^T.  32]  Consul   for   Life  239 

positions,  but  to  prevail  upon  the  Senate  to  designate  not  only 
who  should  constitute  the  incoming  fifth,  but  also  who  should 
step  out-  The  Senate,  threatened  with  the  dreaded  wrath  of 
Napoleon,  obeyed,  and  Tribunate  and  Corps  L^gislatif  were 
purged  in  January,  1S02,  of  the  obnoxious  element,  consisting 
of  such  men  as  Benjamin  Constant,  Chdnier,  Chazal,  and  Daunou. 
Their  places  were  filled  by  entirely  docile  persons  who  voted 
without  protest  in  favour  of  all  the  bills  which  had  been  so 
fiercely  contested  by  their  predecessors;  nor  did  they  offer  any 
opposition  to  other  bills  which  had  not  before  been  submitted 
for  consideration,  such  as  the  enactments  in  regard  to  the  ^mi- 
gr^s,  the  Concordat,  and  the  Legion  of  Honour.  The  brothers 
of  the  First  Consul  attempted  on  one  occasion  to  convince  him 
that  opposition  was  a  necessity  and  cited  England  in  support  of 
their  argument,  whereat  he  replied:  "For  my  part  I  have  never 
yet  seen  the  advantages  of  opposition  of  any  kind.  Whatever 
its  nature,  it  serves  only  to  lessen  respect  for  the  authority  in 
power  in  the  minds  of  the  people.  Let  some  one  else  come  and 
govern  in  my  place,  and  if  he  does  not  attempt  as  I  do  to  put  a 
stop  to  idle  talk,  he  will  see  what  happens  to  him.  I  tell  you  ab- 
solute unity  of  power  is  indispensable  to  good  government." 

But  Napoleon  had  still  greater  demands  to  make  from  the 
new  Chambers.  The  power  which  he  wielded  was  far  from 
extensive  enough  to  satisfy  him.  It  ill  accorded  with  his  vast 
designs  that  he  should,  in  conformity  to  the  constitution,  hold 
authority  for  only  ten  years.  And  therefore  he  hated  the  Con- 
stitution of  1799  just  as  he  had  for  a  similar  reason  hated  that 
of  1795.  He  yearned  to  rule  over  France  and  rule  as  other 
sovereigns  ruled  over  their  dominions,  not  bound  and  humiUated 
by  a  petty  paragraph  which  confined  his  haughty  ambition 
within  a  period  which  could  be  calculated  to  a  minute.  But 
the  more  passionately  he  fostered  this  design  the  more  carefully 
he  concealed  his  purpose,  until  toward  the  end  of  March,  1802, 
definitive  peace  with  England  had  been  concluded,  when,  sus- 
tained by  his  popularity,  now  greater  than  ever,  he  could  with 
safety  allow  something  of  it  to  be  divined.  But  the  majority 
of  the  Senate  showed  how  little  they  comprehended  the  situa- 


240    The   New   France   and   Her   Sovereign    [I802 

tion  by  their  proposal,  in  recognition  of  the  great  services  ren- 
dered by  the  head  of  the  government  to  the  State/ to  continue 
his  term  as  First  Consul  for  another  ten  years.  Napoleon  was 
exasperated.  He  was  on  the  point  of  flying  into  a  passion  and 
declining  their  proffer,  when  Cambaceres — or  Lucien  according 
to  other  authorities — again  had  an  expedient  to  suggest:  an 
appeal  to  the  nation.  He  therefore  replied  to  the  Senators 
that  he  could  not  accept  this  offer  without  again  consulting  the 
people  which  had  in  former  times  clothed  him  with  the  supreme 
power.  The  question,  however,  as  put  by  him  to  popular  vote 
differed  widely  from  the  vote  of  the  Senate,  for  it  was  formulated 
in  these  words:  "Shall  Napoleon  Bonaparte  be  made  Consul 
for  life,  and  shall  he  be  given  the  right  to  appoint  his  successor?  " 
And  again  his  calculations  proved  correct.  Three  and  a 
half  millions  of  "ayes"  against  a  few  thousand  "noes,"  such 
was  the  nation's  response.  Then  the  Senate  recognized  the 
course  which  it  was  called  upon  to  pursue.  It  hastened  to 
convey  the  thanks  of  the  nation  to  the  object  of  its  choice,  and 
two  days  later,  by  the  Senatus  consultum  of  August  4th,  1802, 
it  very  considerably  increased  the  power  in  the  hands  of  the 
First  Consul.  Henceforward  he  had  exclusive  right  to  pardon 
malefactors,  to  ratify  treaties  with  foreign  powers,  and  to  ap- 
point senators.  The  significance  of  this  last  prerogative  will  be 
perceived  when  the  importance  which  the  Senate  itself  had 
acquired  is  taken  into  consideration.  It  could,  by  means  of 
special  decrees  (Senatus  consulta),  interpret,  amend,  or  totally 
suspend  the  Constitution,  suspend  the  court  of  assizes  within 
certain  departments,  dissolve  both  Chambers,  and  reverse  the 
judgments  of  the  courts  when  they  were  held  to  endanger  the 
safety  of  the  State, — all  of  these  at  a  nod  from  the  man  who 
now  governed  France  as  absolute  master.  A  monarchy  had  been 
established,  not  indeed  such  as  Napoleon  desired  it  to  be,  that 
is  to  say,  under  the  form  of  a  hereditary  power,  but  nevertheless 
established,  and  for  the  time  being  he  was  obliged  to  content 
himself  with  this  result.*     "I  am  henceforth,"  said  Napoleon, 

*  The  French  did  not  apparently  hesitate    to  accept  even  the  name 
with  the  new  arrangement,  for  it  was  as  a  Republican  Monarchy  that  the 


I 


Mr.  32]       Source   of  Napoleon's   Strength  241 

"upon  the  same  level  witli  other  sovereigns,  for,  when  all  is  said 
and  done,  they  hold  their  power  only  for  hfe.  It  is  not  right 
that  the  authority  of  a  man  who  directs  the  policy  of  all  Europe 
should  be  precarious,  or  even  seem  so."  When,  two  years  later, 
he  places  the  Imperial  crown  France  upon  his  head,  it  is  only 
the  outward  sign  of  a  power  now  already  in  his  hands. 

That  which  made  possible  this  decisive  step  toward  his  abso- 
lute sovereignty  was  the  same  element  which  had  been  Bona- 
parte's secret  ally  on  the  18th  Brumaire — non-partisan  pubUc 
opmion.  All  its  sympathies  were  with  the  man  who  had  put 
an  end  to  anarchy,  who  had  established  order  and  prosperity 
and  made  peace  with  all  the  world.  And  it  was  above  all  to 
this  last  consideration  that  his  popularity  was  due.* 

But  little  did  the  French  know  the  man  to  whose  unlimited 
power  they  were  committing  the  destiny  of  their  country!  He 
was  no  man  of  peace.  He  did  indeed  at  the  cost  of  indefatigable 
labour  and  unparalleled  energy  restore  to  France  her  lost  vigour 
and  power,  but  this  was  done  with  no  thought  of  peace,  but  solely 
as  preparation  for  a  conflict  in  which  the  victor's  reward  was 
to  be  a  dominion  extending  far  beyond  the  borders  of  France. 

new  system  was  designated  early  in  the  year  1803  by  the  "Journal  de 
Paris,"  the  official  organ  of  the  government. 

*  Article  II  of  the  Senatus  consultum  of  August  4th,  1802,  is  expressed  in 
these  words:  "A  statue  of  Peace  bearing  in  one  hand  the  laurels  of  victory 
and  in  the  other  the  decree  of  the  Senate  shall  bear  witness  to  posterity 
of  the  gratitude  of  the  Nation." 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  LAST  YEARS  OF  THE  CONSULATE.      THE  EMPEROR 

The  general  peace  of  1802  brought  France  prosperity  and 
respect.  Innumerable  foreigners  journeyed  to  Paris  to  visit  the 
places  immortalized  by  the  Revolution  and  to  see  the  great  man 
who  had  calmed  the  tempestuous  waters.  The  centre  of  the 
world  appeared  to  be  removed  to  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  where 
a  well-regulated  manner  of  Hfe  with  its  work  and  its  social  enjoy- 
ment had  become  the  rule.  These  were  no  longer  the  days  of 
mad  intoxication  such  as  those  early  in  the  reign  of  the  Direc- 
tory, when  every  one  rejoiced  to  have  escaped  the  horrors  through 
which  he  had  passed  and  yet  awaited  the  morrow  with  un- 
certainty and  dread.  Excitement  had  given  way  to  moderate 
and  peaceful  enjoyment;  instead  of  bold  speculation  for  disrepu- 
table gains,  there  were  steady  activity  and  honest  earnings. 
Greater  security  than  ever  before  was  felt  under  the  new  gov- 
ernment by  the  moderate  law-abiding  citizen,  the  same  element 
which  Napoleon  had  on  the  13th  Vendemiaire  so  mercilessly 
mown  down  with  grape-shot  that,  according  to  his  statements, 
gloomy  visions  of  the  scene  still  continually  haunted  his  dreams. 
The  unjust  deportation  of  Jacobin  deputies  also  carried  convic- 
tion— as  it  had  been  intended  to  do — that  the  man  who  had 
been  in  control  since  the  18th  Brumaire  had  no  longer  any- 
thing in  common  with  the  general  commanding  the  forces  of  the 
Convention  in  1795.  Adherents  to  the  royal  cause  had  returned 
home  in  great  numbers  and  had  to  some  extent  again  come  into 
possession  of  their  property.  The  so-called  "  nouveaux  riches," 
who  had  become  owners  of  extensive  tracts  of  state  property 
through  speculation  and  stock-jobbing,  gradually  came  to  feel 
secure  in  their  possessions  as  Napoleon  was  seen  to  depart  more 
ftnd  more  widely  from  the  role  played  by  Monk.    To  one  ele- 

242 


JEt.  33]  Reaction  243 

ment,  accordingly,  personal  power  in  Napoleon's  hands  seemed 
desirable  as  security  against  further  Revolutionary  excesses, 
while  to  another  it  seemed  equally  so  as  a  guarantee  against  the 
return  of  the  Bourbons,  the  aim  of  all  being  to  make  it  possible 
for  labour  and  enjoyment  to  continue  undisturbed. 

In  the  face  of  such  material  forces  and  interests  what  mat- 
tered it  that  a  certain  number  of  miyielding  republicans  be- 
moaned the  loss  of  their  unrestrained  political  liberty,  or  that 
the  haughty  nobility  of  the  faubourg  Saint-Germain  should 
prefer  to  become  subjects  of  a  legitimate  sovereign  rather  than 
of  an  ill-bred  upstart?  The  great  body  of  the  people  had  wearied 
of  poUtical  questions  and  gladly  submitted  to  the  tyranny  of  the 
new  government  which  had  re-established  order  and  vouched 
for  its  continuance.  The  period  of  the  Consulate  is  characterized 
by  the  absolute  confidence  placed  in  the  man  who  had  van- 
quished the  foes  of  France  both  without  and  within  her  borders. 
Unlimited  power  in  the  hands  of  one  individual  was  now  as 
much  in  popular  favour  as  the  "  Liberty,  Equahty,  and  Frater- 
nity "  of  all  had  been  a  short  time  before.  In  reliance  upon  this 
feeling  the  new  monarch  of  France  might  safely  venture  very 
far.  It  was  only  that  he  finally  ventured  too  far  that  brought 
him  to  ruin  before  his  death.  To  any  one  who  had  left  Paris  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Consular  period  and  who,  Uke  the  Comicillor  of 
State  Miot  de  Melito,  returned  thither  at  the  end  of  a  few  years, 
the  changes  which  had  meanwhile  taken  place  were  astounding. 
The  last  traces  of  Revolutionary  times  had  every^vhere  disap- 
peared. In  the  place  of  the  half-military,  half-civil  costume 
which  facliion  had  imposed  toward  the  end  of  the  century,  the 
mode  of  dress  prevailing  during  the  "ancien  regime",  had  been 
resumed ;  instead  of  the  sabre  was  worn  the  sword  of  ceremony, 
and  boots  had  given  way  to  stockings  with  buckled  shoes.  The 
returned  aristocrats  alone  retained  the  garb  of  equality,  the  dress 
coat  and  trousers,  as  evidence  of  their  impoverishment.  Men  no 
longer  addressed  one  another  as  "Citoyen,"  but  as  "Monsieur," 
and  m  1803  the  official  almanac  even  expUcitly  enjoined  the  use 
of  the  title  "Madame"  in  place  of  "Citoyenne."  Although  the 
Revolutionary  calendar  was  still  in  use,  the  Decadi  had  already 


244        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I802 

been  replaced  by  the  Sunday  of  old,  and  no  one — least  of  all  the 
First  Consul — failed  of  attending  mass  on  that  day.  The  names 
of  the  streets  had  again  been  changed  to  those  which  they  had 
bome  before  the  days  of  the  Republic,  the  "Palais  EgaUte  "  had 
again  become  the  "Palais  Royal,"  the  "Place  de  la  Revolution" 
was  again  known  as  "Place  Louis  XV."  In  fashionable  litera- 
ture the  names  of  the  foremost  representatives  of  enUghtened 
France,  Voltaire  and  Rousseau,  were  repudiated  because  they 
were  regarded  as  having  been  through  their  writings  originators 
of  the  Revolutionary  movement. 

But  it  was  in  what  immediately  surrounded  Napoleon  that  the 
change  was  most  striking.  The  Tuileries,  which  he  had  occupied 
since  January,  1800,  as  the  residence  of  the  chief  magistrate, 
had  been  transformed  into  the  palace  of  a  sovereign.  There  a 
rigid  etiquette  was  enforced  and  everything  was  regulated  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  a  court.  Woman,  to  whom  the  democracy 
had  conceded  no  political  rights,  was  now  given  her  place :  Jose- 
phine had  her  days  for  giving  audience  just  as  her  husband  did. 
Everything,  with  the  exception  of  the  words  "Consul  "  and  "Re- 
public," was  monarchical  and  centred  in  a  single  dominating  per- 
sonality. 

In  this  court,  where  the  usages  of  the  old  monarchy  had  been 
restored  by  command,  and  where  aristocrats  schooled  in  the 
ways  of  the  world  were  preferably  installed  as  officials  of  the 
palace,  there  was  indeed  much  to  recall  the  sudden  elevation 
of  its  sovereign.  People  were  to  be  seen  there  who,  according 
to  Talleyrand's  sarcastic  comment,  did  not  understand  walking 
on  waxed  floors;  officers  with  awkward  wives  of  obscure  origin 
and  lacking  in  every  grace;  generals,  better  drilled  than  bred, 
obeying  with  awe  and  servility  capricious  behests  resulting  from 
a  mixture  of  calculation  and  nervousness  in  a  man  who  made  it 
a  principle  to  stimulate  zeal  by  means  of  fear. 

Napoleon  was  tolerant  of  no  contradiction  in  his  despotism, 
as  indeed  he  refused  to  feel  himself  restricted  in  any  respect 
even  by  such  rules  of  conduct  as  all  the  world  was  agreed  in 
accepting.  "I  am  no  ordinary  man,"  said  he,  "and  laws  of  pro- 
priety and  morals  are  not  aj)plicable  to  me."     It  is  said  that  he 


Mr.  33]  Napoleon's   Inner  Nature  245 

even  carried  to  such  an  extent  his  disregard  of  what  was  sacred 
to  others  that  he  was  by  his  own  wife  taxed  with  incestuoas  re- 
lations with  his  sisters.  In  his  nature  he  still  remained  gloomy 
and  morose  as  he  had  been  in  earlier  years.  His  successes  had 
not  made  a  happy  man  of  the  dreamer.  There  was  at  this  time 
a  tinge  of  sadness  in  his  character  which  in  later  years  developed 
into  a  surly  ill-humour.  "I  am  not  fitted  for  taking  pleasure," 
he  was  accustomed  to  say,  and  from  what  is  known  of  his 
modes  of  diversion  the  truth  of  these  words  is  fully  corroborated. 
Madame  de  Remusat,  who  had  since  1802  filled  the  office  of  lady 
in  waiting  to  Josephine,  writes  thus  of  him:  "I  have  seen  him 
go  into  transports  at  the  murmur  of  the  wind,  and  talk  with  en- 
thusiasm of  the  roaring  of  the  sea;  tempted  at  times  to  think 
nocturnal  apparitions  not  altogether  beyond  credence,  he  was  in 
fact  inclined  toward  entertaining  certain  superstitions.  When 
he  left  his  council-chamber  to  pass  the  evening  in  the  drawing- 
room  of  Madame  Bonaparte,  he  would  take  the  notion  sometimes 
to  have  the  candles  veiled  with  white  gauze  and,  having  enjoined 
profound  silence,  would  amuse  himself  with  relating  or  listening 
to  stories  of  ghosts  and  apparitions;  at  another  time  he  would 
listen  to  slow,  sweet  music  executed  by  Italian  singers  to  the 
sole  accompaniment  of  a  small  number  of  instruments  softly 
played.  He  would  then  be  seen  to  sink  into  a  re  very  which  was 
respected  by  all,  no  one  daring  to  make  a  motion  nor  to  stir  from 
his  place.  Upon  coming  out  of  this  state,  which  appeared  to 
serve  as  a  sort  of  relaxation  to  him,  he  was  usually  more  serene 
and  affable." 

Ever  since  the  attempt  had  been  made  upon  his  life  Bona- 
parte shut  himself  off  more  and  more  thoroughly  from  the  out- 
side world.  It  was  only  during  the  review  of  troops  in  the 
court  of  the  Tuileries  that  it  was  possible  to  approach  him 
and  present  petitions.  "Wlienever  he  rode  out  through  the  city 
he  was  always  escorted  by  a  large  force  of  mounted  guards,  and 
his  regular  visit  to  the  theatre  called  forth  a  special  detail  of 
police  for  whose  accommodation  even  the  first  set  of  side-scenes 
opposite  the  Consular  box  were  pressed  into  service.  Out  at 
Malmaison   the  walks    throughout   the    park  were  constantly 


246        The   Last  Years  of  the   Consulate        [I802 

patrolled  by  a  competent  force  of  men,  and  at  no  time  did  the 
First  Consul  return  to  Paris  until  after  the  police  had  searched 
the  streets  through  which  he  had  to  pass.  He  was  filled  with  a 
profound  mistrust  of  every  one.  At  times  even  his  ministers 
were  denied  access  to  him;  under  such  circumstances  some  young 
aide-de-camp  was  made  the  bearer  of  his  commands  to  them. 
Since  every  action  of  his  own  was  the  outcome  of  calculation,  he 
was  always  trying  to  scent  out  motives  and  designs  in  the  con- 
duct of  others.  Nothing  seemed  to  him  so  trustworthy  as  the 
maxim  of  Macchiavelli,  that  in  dealing  with  friends  one  must 
always  bear  in  mind  that  they  may  become  enemies.  Entirely 
devoid  of  magnanimity  himself,  he  ascribed  nobility  of  purpose 
to  no  one.  When,  upon  one  occasion,  a  lost  watch  was  returned 
to  Bourrienne  his  secretary,  Napoleon  was  so  impressed  by  this 
act  of  integrity  that  he  freed  the  finder  from  military  duty  and 
interested  himself  in  the  welfare  of  his  family.  In  regard  to 
veracity  his  ideas  did  not  differ  from  those  which  he  held  con- 
cerning honesty.  It  was  not  always  advantageous,  he  thought, 
to  tell  the  truth.  He  used  to  relate  with  pleasure  his  uncle's 
prediction  "  that  he  would  some  day  govern  the  world  because  he 
was  in  the  habit  of  lying  on  all  occasions."  With  his  estimate 
of  mankind  it  is  therefore  not  strange  that  he  did  not  rely  solely 
upon  the  faithfulness  of  the  official  police,  but  established  in  addi- 
tion, particularly  after  Fouche  was  deprived  of  his  office  of  Minis- 
ter of  Police  in  1802,  a  number  of  secret  police  agencies  under  the 
direction  of  his  most  devoted  generals:  Duroc,  Savary,  Davout, 
Moncey,  Junot,  and  others,  who  were  expected  to  keep  watch 
upon  each  other. 

It  was  Josephine,  the  aristocrat  by  birth,  who  formed  the 
link  connecting  the  nobility  of  France  with  the  court  of  the 
First  Consul.  Through  her  and  her  former  relations  witli 
people  of  rank  many  a  family  of  ancient  name  now  became  recon- 
ciled with  the  existing  order  of  things  and  allied  their  interests 
with  those  of  the  new  regime.  On  the  other  hand  the  brothers 
of  the  Consul,  J()soi)h  and  Lucicn,  were  distinguished  by  certain 
republican  tendencies  which  were,  however,  not  deep-rooted 
enough   to   prevent  their   being  eventually  overcome   by  the 


S.i\  33]  Napoleon's   Family  247 

resolute  determination  of  the  new  Caesar.  Such  at  least  was  the 
case  with  Joseph.  Lucien,  who  as  ambassador  to  the  court  of 
Madrid  had  acquired  a  large  fortune,  had  a  falUng-out  with 
Napoleon  because  he  persisted  in  contracting  a  marriage  with 
the  daughter  of  a  tradesman  instead  of  with  the  widowed  Queen 
of  Etruria,  and  refused  to  procure  a  divorce  in  spite  of  his  broth- 
er's protests,  a  course  which  eventually  brought  about  his  ban- 
ishment from  France.  At  a  later  date  he  was  pleased  to  make 
a  display  of  his  democratic  principles,  although  there  is  little 
room  for  doubt  that  in  1801  he  indulged  the  hope  of  being  made 
a  king. 

The  third  brother,  Louis,  through  Josephine's  influence 
had  been  brought  January  3d,  1802,  to  marry  her  daughter,  the 
beautiful  Hortense  Bcauharnais.  The  union,  unwiUingly  en- 
tered upon  by  both  parties,  was  no  happy  one  and  brought  to 
a  culmination  the  hostility  existing  between  the  two  families, 
Bonaparte  and  Beauhamais,  The  cause  of  this  discord  lay 
in  Josephine's  steriUty,  which  gave  to  Napoleon's  stepchildren 
an  importance  resented  by  the  Bonapartes  and  which  was  a 
hindrance  in  the  path  of  their  ambition.  The  fact  has  been 
established  that  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  Consul,  par- 
ticularly Lucien,  began  even  at  this  time  to  talk  of  a  divorce, 
and  that  Josephine,  in  her  fear  of  being  abandoned,  even  es- 
poused the  cause  of  the  Bourbons.*  Jerome,  Napoleon's 
youngest  brother,  was  leading  at  this  time  rather  a  frivolous 
life  in  the  United  States,  where  he  married  the  beautiful  EUza- 
beth  Patterson  of  Baltimore,  whom  he,  at  the  command  of  his 
superior,  subsequently  abandoned  in  Europe.  He  had  been 
appointed  by  his  brother  to  a  position  of  importance  in  the 
navy,  but  he  was  to  momit  still  higher.  Of  the  sisters  of  the 
all-powerful  Consul  the  eldest,  EUsa,  had  been  married  in  1797 
to  Pascal  Bacciochi,  an  Italian  nobleman  and  an  officer  in  the 
French  army,  to  whom  in  1803  was  given  the  command  of  Fort 

*  See  Jung,  " Lucien  Bonaparte  et  ses  M^moires,"  II.  67,  the  letter 
written  by  Lucien  from  Madrid  under  date  of  April  4th,  1801,  to  Napoleon 
in  which  he  alludes  to  the  Infanta  Isabella,  whom  the  Queen  of  Spain  was 
desirous  of  marrying  "  to  the  future  lord  of  the  world-monarchy." 


248        The   Last  Years   of  the   Consulate        [I802 

Saint- Jean  in  Marseilles.  She  was  a  woman  of  fine  intellectual 
ability,  and  with  the  aid  of  her  brother  Lucien  assembled  about 
her  in  Paris  a  circle  of  distinguished  men  of  letters,  among  whom 
were  Fontanes  and  Chateaubriand,  whom  she  recommended 
to  the  notice  of  Napoleon  and  for  whom  she  obtained  his  favour. 
The  beautiful  but  frivolous  Pauline  had  married  General  Leclerc, 
who  with  thousands  of  his  fellow  countrymen  died,  stricken  with 
yellow  fever,  in  San  Domingo.  Wlien,  in  1803,  she  returned  to 
France,  her  hand  was  at  once  asked  in  marriage  by  the  Prince 
Borghese.  The  ambitious  Caroline,  married  in  1800  to  Murat, 
the  cavalry  general,  to  whom  she  was  intellectually  far  supe- 
rior, was  one  of  the  most  ardent  of  those  who  were  intrigu- 
ing against  the  Beauharnais  family.  Napoleon's  mother, 
Laetitia  Bonaparte,  now  lived  in  her  own  palace  at  the  Capital, 
basking  in  the  splendour  of  her  son,  not,  however,  as  an  experi- 
enced woman,  relying  so  implicitly  upon  her  good  fortune  as 
to  fail  to  improve  such  a  favourable  opportunity  for  the  acqui- 
sition of  considerable  funds  against  a  possible  evil  day.  She 
had  remained  precisely  the  same  woman  as  in  former  years, 
even  to  retaining  her  Corsican  dialect,  a  point  which  Napoleon 
keenly  resented,  since  it  was  his  will  that  nothing  should  act 
as  a  reminder  of  his  foreign  origin.*  A  kinsman  who  proved 
more  useful  was  found  in  his  uncle  Fesch,  the  former  abbe  and 
more  recently  War  Commissary  to  the  Army  of  Italy.  After 
having  made  his  peace  with  the  Church,  an  ecclesiastical  mem- 
ber of  the  family  was  of  no  little  value  to  the  Consul.  Fesch 
must  needs  resume  the  discarded  cassock,  and  soon  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Concordat  he  was  appointed  Archbishop  of 
Lyons  and  Cardinal. 

Such  was  the  court  of  the  man  who,  to  use  his  own  words, 
directed  the  political  course  of  Europe.  Nor  was  this  state- 
ment an  exaggeration.  Direct  it  he  did  in  reality,  ready  to 
crush  out  by  force  of  arms  any  sign  of  resistance  wherever  it 
appeared.     He  had  concluded  tlie  general  treaty  of  peace  be- 

*  His  alien  hirth  was  a  source  of  real  mortification  to  him.  "To  put 
it  in  plain  terms,"  said  he  to  liis  brothers,  "I  am  very  sorry  to  have  been 
born  a  Corsican."      (Jung,  "  Lucien  Bonaparte,"  etc.) 


Mr.  33]     The  Outlook  for  Permanent  Peace        249 

cause  this  step  was  necessary  to  the  furtherance  of  his  own 
interests;  to  maintain  it  was  in  keeping  neither  with  the  revo- 
lutionary system  which  he  had  made  his  own  nor  with  his  own 
inchnations.  There  has  been  handed  down  from  a  reUable 
source  the  report  of  a  conversation  which  he  held  with  a  Coun- 
cillor of  State  shortly  before  he  was  invested  with  the  Consular 
power  for  life.  The  Councillor  having  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  Europe  was  above  all  necessary 
to  the  welfare  of  France,  the  Consul  rephed  by  asking  whether 
he  did  not,  then,  believe  in  the  enmity  of  the  Powers  who  had 
signed  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  Comicillor  was  obliged  to  ac- 
knowledge that  England,  Austria,  and  the  others  would  doubtless 
remain  hostile  to  France  in  the  future  as  they  had  been  in  the 
past.  "Well,  then,"  said  Napoleon,  "what  are  the  conse- 
quences? If  these  Powers  are  continually  going  to  cherish 
war  in  their  hearts  so  that  it  must  break  out  some  day,  then  the 
sooner  it  comes  to  that  the  better,  for  every  day  helps  to  dissi- 
pate in  them  the  recollection  of  their  last  defeats,  while  it  tends 
to  diminish  at  home  the  prestige  of  our  last  victories.  All  the 
advantage  in  delay  is  accordingly  on  their  side.*  Bear  in  mind 
that  a  First  Consul  is  not  like  one  of  these  kings  by  the  grace 
of  God  who  look  upon  their  State  as  a  heritage.  Ancient  usages 
are  to  them  an  advantage  and  a  support,  while  to  us,  on  the  con- 
trary, they  are  a  hindrance.  The  French  government  of  to-day 
bears  no  resemblance  to  anything  which  surrounds  it.  Hated 
by  its  neighbours,  compelled  to  hold  in  restraint  within  its  do- 
main sundry  classes  of  evil-disposed  persons,  in  order  to  preserve 
an  imposing  appearance  in  the  face  of  so  many  enemies  it  stands 
in  need  of  brilliant  deeds  and  consequently  of  war.  France 
must  be  first  or  utterly  fail.     I  will  tolerate  peace  if  our  neigh- 

*  How  correct  were  these  obsers'ations  may  be  seen  by  the  recently 
published  despatch  sent  by  the  English  ambassador  Whitworth  on  the 
1st  of  December,  1802.  "Every  added  year  of  peace,"  so  it  runs,  "while 
enfeebling  the  Consular  government,  will  give  strength  and  courage  to 
those  whose  aim  and  interest  it  is  to  overthrow  it  As  a  matter  of  fact 
in  maintaining  peace  we  are  keeping  up  a  state  of  war  against  this  govern- 
ment which  is  more  decisive  and  more  deleterious  in  itself  than  open 
hostilities," 


250        The  Last  Years  of  the   Consulate        [I802 

hours  know  how  to  keep  it,  but  if  they  compel  me  to  take  up 
arms  again  before  they  become  unserviceable  through  neglect 
or  long  disuse  I  shall  regard  it  as  to  our  advantage,  .  .  .  There 
is  always  a  spirit  of  hostility  existing  between  ancient  mon- 
archies and  a  newly-formed  republic.  .  .  .  Situated  as  we  are, 
I  regard  every  peace  as  a  brief  truce  and  the  ten  years  of  my 
consulship  as  destined  to  be  an  uninterrupted  warfare."  * 

To  any  one  reading  with  attention  these  utterances  spoken 
during  the  summer  of  1802 — ^whether  the  words  are  exactly 
quoted  or  no — it  will  be  clear  that  Napoleon  was  determined 
upon  carrying  out  by  force  of  arms  the  programme  for  the 
hegemony  of  France  formulated  by  Hauterive  in  1801.  But 
was  this  after  all  the  ultimate  aim  to  which  he  aspired?  Was 
it  really  his  only  concern,  as  he  asseverated,  to  procure  this 
hegemony  for  the  French  government,  or  did  he  have  a  purpose 
deeper  than  might  be  disclosed  to  a  member  of  the  French 
Council  of  State?  Perhaps  he  had  already  at  this  time  con- 
ceived in  secret  the  idea  which  he  imparted  two  years  later  to 
a  circle  of  intimate  friends:  "Europe  cannot  be  at  rest  except 
under  the  rule  of  a  single  head  who  will  have  kings  for  his  offi- 
cers, who  will  distribute  his  kingdoms  to  lieutenants,  making  of 
one  King  of  Italy,  of  a  second  King  of  Bavaria,  of  a  third  Land- 
amman  of  Switzerland,  of  a  fourth  Stadholder  of  Holland, 
each  having  his  position  in  the  Imperial  household  with  title  of 
Chief  Cup-bearer,  Grand  Master  of  the  Pantry,  Grand  Master 
of  the  Horse,  Grand  Master  of  the  Hounds,  etc.  It  may  be 
objected  that  this  plan  is  nothing  but  an  imitation  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  German  Empire,  and  that  there  is  nothing  novel 
in  the  idea;  but  there  is  nothing  in  existence  which  is  absolutely 
new,  pohtical  institutions  only  revolve  in  a  circle,  and  it  is  often 
necessary  to  return  to  what  has  been  already  tried."  It  is 
plain  that  he  was  no  true  Frenchman  at  heart,  fond  as  he  was 
of  representing  himself  as  such,  especially  during  the  years  of 
the  Consulate.  Had  he  been  what  he  pretended  he  would  have 
been   content  with  securing  for   France   the   leading  position 

*  Miot  de  M61ito,  M6moires,  II.  226. 


^T.  32]  Changes  in  the  Vassal   States  25 1 

among  the  Powers.  But  that  was  precisely  wherein  he  failed 
the  nation  which  had  put  its  trust  in  him.  Possessing  no  spark 
of  French  patriotism  or  of  ambition  for  France,  from  the  time 
when  he  had  been  forced  to  give  up  his  httle  native  country  he 
had  recognized  no  national  limits  to  his  ambition,  gigantic  in 
truth,  since  it  embraced  the  whole  world,  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  infinitesimally  small,  since  it  was  to  serve  only  to  satisfy 
the  inordinate  passion  for  glory  on  the  part  of  a  single  indi- 
vidual.* To  any  one  so  resolved  upon  war  there  can  be  no 
difficulty  in  bringing  it  about  without  appearing  a  direct  ag- 
gressor. And  indeed  Napoleon's  conquests  hi  time  of  peace 
were  most  efficacious  in  preparing  the  way  for  war,  and  finally 
even  brought  about  the  outbreak. 

In  the  later  months  of  the  year  1801,  when  the  preUminaries 
concluded  with  England  and  the  treaty  with  Russia  had  estab- 
fished  universal  peace,  Bonaparte  had  already  begun  with  inde- 
fatigable activity  to  take  advantage  of  the  need  felt  by  all  the 
nations  of  Europe  for  a  time  of  recuperation,  and  to  make  the 
acquisitions  necessary  to  his  system.  For,  as  a  result  of  the 
recent  strife,  the  temporary  exhaustion  felt  by  the  Powers  had 
made  possible  the  turning  of  the  balance  of  power  in  favour  of  the 
conqueror.  It  behooved  him  above  all  to  bring  those  countries 
lying  within  the  sphere  of  French  authority  more  directly  under 
his  control  by  means  of  their  internal  organization ;  for,  being  for 
the  most  part  furnished  with  strictly  repubUcan  constitutions 
modelled  upon  that  of  France  in  the  time  of  the  Directory,  they, 
with  their  continual  changes  of  party  government,  were  not 
always  to  be  rehed  upon.     It  was  therefore  essential  to  modify 

*  According  to  Lucien,  to  conquer  Europe  for  his  own  sake  and  not  for 
that  of  France  had  already  been  determined  upon  by  Napoleon  in  1802. 
Referring  to  that  year,  Lucien  says  in  his  M^moires  (Edition  Jung,  II. 
165);  "I  am  not  one  of  those  who  have  believed  and  who  persist 
in  belie\nng  that  my  brother  Napoleon  made  war  contrary  to  his  choice 
at  any  time  in  his  career.  I  was  too  well  acquainted  with  what  he  thought 
at  bottom,  particularly  at  the  time  of  which  I  speak.  And,  to  be  quite 
candid,  his  designs,  which  were  far  more  ambitious  than  patriotic  and 
which  made  war  a  personal  necessity  to  him  at  that  time,  were  revealed 
to  me  almost  without  attempt  at  disguise." 


252        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I801 

these  constitutions  to  correspond  with  the  new  one  which  France 
had  adopted  in  1799. 

This  was  at  once  put  into  operation  in  Holland.  With  the 
concurrence  of  the  ambassador  of  the  Batavian  Repubhc  a  new 
constitution  was  elaborated  in  Paris  according  to  which  the  five 
Directors  were  superseded  by  a  President  bearing  the  ancient 
title  of  Grand  Pensionary,  while  the  two  Chambers  gave  place  to 
a  legislative  body  of  deputies  with  limited  powers.  This  new 
constitution  was  forced  upon  the  Dutch  people  by  its  own  Direc- 
tory, which  had  been  bribed  by  France  and  which  was  most 
forcibly  supported  by  French  troops  (October  17th,  1801).  At 
the  plebiscite  which  was  then  held  50,000  of  the  people  voted 
against  the  change;  the  remainder  held  their  peace.  This  silence 
was  construed  by  Napoleon  to  mean  acquiescence,  and  the  new 
constitution  was  announced  the  free  act  of  the  Batavian  people. 
This  was  done  as  a  matter  of  form  in  order  to  satisfy  the  demands 
of  Article  11  in  the  Treaty  of  Luneville,  which  read:  "The  con- 
tracting parties  mutually  guarantee  the  independence  of  the  said 
Republics  (Batavia,  Helvetia,  Cisalpine,  Liguria),  their  inhab- 
itants being  vested  with  the  power  to  adopt  whatever  form  of 
government  shall  to  them  seem  good." 

In  the  Cisalpine  Republic  matters  stood  exactly  as  they  had 
in  Holland.  Here  also  was  still  in  force  a  republican  constitu- 
tion similar  to  that  of  France  under  the  Directory,  and  here  also 
the  power  was  made  to  pass  entirely  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
Councils  into  those  of  a  single  executive  body,  which  was  far 
easier  to  direct  from  Paris  than  had  been  the  fluctuating  mass 
of  parties  in  the  Chambers.  In  September,  1801,  Napoleon  had 
already  conferred  with  certain  men  in  Lombardy  who  were  in  his 
confidence;  the  next  step  was  to  arrange  for  the  elaboration  of 
a  constitution  according  to  his  directions,  which  duty  he  assigned 
to  Maret.  The  result  of  these  labours  was  sent  to  Milan  in  order 
that  it  might  there  be  secretly  deliberated  upon.  According  to  it 
a  single  President  was  in  this  case  also  to  be  put  at  the  head  of 
the  government.  The  authorities  in  Milan  consented  to  every- 
thing, asking  only  that  Napoleon  would  do  them  the  favour  to 
appoint  the  proper  persons  to  the  offices  of  State.     And  again 


m: 


Mr.  33]  The  Italian   Republic  253 

the  First  Consul  tried  to  conform  with  the  provisions  of  the  before- 
mentioned  Article  in  the  Treaty  of  Lun<§ville  by  inviting  to 
Lyons  the  most  prominent  representatives  of  the  three  classes 
into  which  the  people  were  divided  according  to  the  constitu- 
tion— the  landowners,  the  scholars,  and  the  tradespeople  (pos- 
sidenti,  dotti,  commercianti).  At  this  place  and  with  the  con- 
currence of  these  deputies  men  were  assigned  to  the  principal 
offices  with  the  exception  of  a  single  one,  that  of  the  Presidency- 
This  Napoleon  was  reserving  for  himself.  Talleyrand  had  been 
charged  with  the  arrangements  for  bringing  this  about.  The 
wily  minister  made  use  of  the  occasion  of  a  review  of  the  returned 
Egyptian  troops,  which  attracted  most  of  the  strangers  outside 
the  city,  to  assemble  the  few  deputies  who  had  remained, — pos- 
sibly a  third  of  the  whole  number, — when  a  trial  vote  was  cast. 
The  choice  fell  upon  Melzi  d'Eril,  whereupon  Talleyrand  gave  the 
Italians  to  understand  that  a  far  better  selection  might  be  made. 
They  grasped  his  meaning  and  resolved  upon  offering  the  Presi- 
dency to  Napoleon,  while  Melzi  should  be  vice-president.  On 
the  26th  of  January,  1802,  the  First  Consul  declared  himself  ready 
to  accept  this  position.  His  first  official  act  was  to  change  the 
name  "Cisalpine  Repubhc  "  to  the  "  Italian  Republic  " — a  clever 
stroke,  for  already  many  hearts  had  been  fired  wdth  enthusiasm 
by  the  words  of  Alfieri:  "Itaha  virtuosa,  magnanima,  libera  et 
una."  The  name  was  taken  to  signify  a  complete  programme  of 
national  unity  and  independence.  And  who  was  better  fitted  to 
make  this  dream  a  reality  than  the  victor  of  Marengo? 

But  this  was  after  all  nothing  but  a  decoy.  Napoleon's  real 
designs  were  most  clearly  shown  by  the  fate  which  overtook 
Piedmont.  Tliis  country  lay  at  the  portals  of  France  and  formed 
a  sort  of  bridge  leading  to  the  Republic  of  Lombardy.  The 
French  had  occupied  it  ever  shice  their  last  victory  over  the  Aus- 
trians,  and  had  not  evacuated  it  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Luneville.  During  the  Ufetime  of  Paul  I.  of  Russia,  who  had 
drawn  his  sword  among  other  things  in  defence  of  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Kng  of  Sardina,  Napoleon  contented  himself  with 
simple  occupation  of  the  territory  in  order  to  avoid  giving  offence 
to  his  new-found  friend.     Hardly  had  the  Czar  breathed  his  last, 


254       The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I8O2 

however,  before  Gen.  Jourdan — the  Jacobin  of  the  18th  Bru- 
maire  and  now  the  docile  tool  of  the  new  monarch — was  forth- 
with commissioned  to  proclaim  to  the  Piedmontese  that  their 
country  was  to  form  a  French  mihtary  division  and  to  be  por- 
tioned off  into  six  prefectures.  This  was  exactly  the  procedure 
of  the  Convention  in  former  days  when  it  set  about  the  annexa- 
tion of  German  possessions  along  the  Rhine.  For  the  formal 
incorporation  of  Piedmont  the  First  Consul  waited  until  the 
definitive  peace  with  England  should  be  concluded.  During  the 
negotiations  leading  to  that  end  his  plenipotentiaries  received 
the  strictest  injunctions  to  tolerate  no  interference  of  any  kind 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  in  Continental  questions,  and  actu- 
ally so  absolute  was  England's  need  of  a  time  of  respite  how- 
ever short  that  this  sacrifice  was  made  to  it;  the  Treaty  of 
Amiens  contained  no  word  in  behalf  of  Victor  Amadeus,  King 
of  Sardinia.  As  soon  as  all  had  been  made  safe  in  that  quarter 
Napoleon  proceeded  without  delay  to  take  formal  possession  of 
the  coveted  territory.  On  September  4th  a  Senatus  consultum 
dated  at  Paris  declared  Piedmont  a  French  province  with  six 
departments,  of  which  one  was  to  bear  the  glorious  name  of 
Marengo. 

At  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  greatest  consternation  prevailed 
at  this  rapid  extension  of  French  authority  in  Italy.  Count 
Ludwig  Cobenzl,  the  successor  of  Thugut  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  writes  at  this  time  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  at  Paris: 
"How  may  any  portions  of  Italy,  not  now  belonging  to  France, 
hope  to  escape  her  domination?  More  rapid  and  devastating  in 
times  of  peace  than  in  war,  where  are  the  ravages  of  this  torrent 
to  cease?  "  *  It  was  to  be  a  long  while  before  the  course  of  "this 
torrent "  would  be  arrested.  To  the  south  of  Piedmont  was  the 
Ligurian  Repubhc,  territory  of  the  old  ducal  city  of  Genoa.  The 
Constitution  here  again  was  out  of  date,  and  on  the  26th  of  June, 
1802,  a  draft  of  a  constitution  prepared  in  Paris  was  delivered  to 
the  Genoese  by  the  French  ambassador  Salicetti,  the  same  person 
whose   name  is  associated  with  Napoleon  in  his  youth.     This 

*  Archives  of  Vienna. 


^T.  33]  Elba  Annexed   to   France  255 

constitution  was  gratefully  accepted  by  the  government  while 
announcing  to  the  people  of  Genoa  that  "it  was  meet  that  he 
who  changed  the  face  of  all  Europe  should  also  give  a  new  form 
to  the  Ligurian  Republic."     Even  before  this  time,  in  December, 

1801,  the  little  Republic  of  Lucca  had  been  provided  from  the 
Tuilerics  with  a  constitution  placing  at  the  head  a  Gonfalonier 
who,  like  the  Dutch  President,  was  to  hold  office  for  a  brief 
period  lest  he  should  acquire  lasting  importance,  the  real  ruler 
being  the  political  agent  of  France.  No  less  dependent  upon 
France  was  the  kingdom  of  Tuscany-Etruria,  where  Napoleon 
appointed  his  generals  Clarke  and  Murat  as  guardians  to  the 
incapable  young  king,  after  whose  death,  in  1803,  they  continued 
in  like  office  to  the  queen,  while  even  the  details  of  the  military 
organization  were  determined  upon  in  Paris.     Finally,  in  August, 

1802,  when  the  British  had  withdrawn  from  it,  the  island  of 
Elba,  relinquished  by  Spain,  was  declared  a  French  province. 
For  the  sake  of  making  it  appear  in  this  case  also  as  if  he  proceeded 
according  to  the  will  of  the  people,  the  Consul  summoned  to  Paris 
a  delegation  from  Porto  Ferrajo,  which  on  its  arrival  at  the  capital 
was  sumptuously  entertained  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  while 
to  each  of  its  members  was  presented  a  purse  of  several  thousand 
francs,  whereupon  these  gentlemen  expressed  in  a  speech  ready 
prepared  for  the  occasion  the  gratification  felt  by  their  country- 
men at  being  united  with  France. 

Thus  by  midsummer  of  1802  the  whole  of  Upper  Italy  as 
far  as  Austrian  Venetia  had  come  to  be  directly  or  indirectly 
imder  the  sceptre  of  France.  Piedmont  alone  was  insufficient 
to  furnish  uninterrupted  and  adequate  communication  with 
these  territories.  During  the  course  of  the  last  campaign 
Napoleon  had  learned  the  value  of  communication  by  way  of 
the  Swiss  Alps,  and,  with  his  mind  always  intent  upon  the 
renewal  of  hostilities,  he  determined  upon  securing  these  per- 
manently for  himself.  He  accordingly  demanded  of  the  Re- 
pubfic  of  Helvetia  the  reUnquishment  of  the  district  of  Valais 
through  which  ran  the  highway  over  the  Simplon,  for  wlilch 
he  proposed  to  give  in  exchange  the  Frickthal,  ceded  to  him  by 
the  Emperor  Francis  in  the  Treaty  of  Lun^ville.     But  the  in- 


256        The  Last  Years  of  the   Consulate        [1S02 

habitants  of  Valais  were  averse  to  any  scheme  of  incorporation 
with  France,  and  Napoleon  was  discreet  enough  not  to  insist 
upon  it.  He  never  hesitated  to  employ  roundabout  means  to 
reach  an  end  when  it  proved  unattainable  by  the  more  direct 
way.  So  he  contented  himself  for  the  time  being  with  seeing 
Valais  separated  from  Switzerland  and  formed  into  a  repubhc 
by  itself  with  a  president  of  its  own  (August  30th,  1802).  Actual 
independence  was  here  entirely  out  of  the  question,  for  by 
Article  2  of  its  constitution  the  entire  republic  was  at  the  outset 
put  under  the  "protection  "  of  the  French  and  Italian  RepubUcs, 
while  Article  7  exempted  the  government  from  the  duty  of 
guarding  its  passes,  and  Article  9  directly  forbade  the  inhabit- 
ants to  open  any  roadway  leading  beyond  the  country  without 
the  consent  of  France.  The  rest  of  Switzerland  was  moreover 
quite  as  much  imder  the  supremacy  of  its  western  neighbour. 
As  far  back  as  the  time  of  the  Directory  Helvetia  had  already 
been  indispensable  as  a  connecting  link  between  French  an- 
nexations in  Italy  and  those  along  the  Rhine,  and  if  Napoleon 
was  to  maintain  the  offensive  position  of  the  Revolution, — and 
in  this  he  had  no  choice, — he  could  not  give  up  his  supremacy 
in  this  mountain  country.  For  this  reason  it  was  generally 
supposed  in  Europe  at  the  time  of  the  Consulate  that  he  would 
place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  government  here  as  he  had  done 
in  Lombardy,  and  it  is  asserted  that  such  was  for  a  time  his  in- 
tention. But  in  the  way  of  carrying  out  such  a  programme  there 
were  two  obstacles, — first,  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  guaranteeing 
to  Switzerland  its  nomhial  independence,  and  second,  an  ad- 
monition from  Russia  to  the  First  Consul  requesting  him  to 
respect  the  independence  of  his  neighbours  and  thereby  help  to 
dissipate  the  apprehensions  of  Europe.  Any  design  which  Na- 
poleon may  have  entertained  of  securing  the  presidency  of  Switz- 
erland for  himself  was  promptly  given  up,  but  in  the  withdrawal 
of  his  troops  which  followed  he  nevertheless  insured  his  own 
power  in  the  country  by  stirring  up  into  open  warfare  the  dissen- 
sion which  existed  between  the  Federalists  of  the  aristocratic 
party  and  the  liberal  Centralists,  affording  him  the  opportunity 
of  appearing  on  the  scene   as  a  party  concerned   and   armed 


^T.  33]  Switzerland 


257 


mediator.*  The  Old-Federalists  had  already  asked  aid  from 
England  and  Austria,  and  a  British  agent  had  already  reached 
Berne  with  a  view  to  operating  here  against  French  influence, 
when  Napoleon  suddenly  intervened.  At  his  command  30,000 
men  under  Gen.  Ncy  were  again  marched  into  the  country,  and 
a  delegation  of  fifty  deputies  of  Switzerland  summoned  to  meet 
the  Consul  in  Paris,  where  they  were  granted  an  "Act  of  Media- 
tion." In  this  the  aspirations  of  both  parties  were  taken  into 
consideration;  it  was  acceptable  to  the  Federalists,  since  it 
granted  to  every  canton  its  own  constitution,  and  to  the  Lib- 
erals because  it  upheld  the  principle  of  equaUty  among  all  citi- 
zens. A  diet  composed  of  representatives  of  all  the  cantons 
and  presided  over  by  a  Landamman  was  to  regulate  the  foreign 
affairs  of  the  State  (February  19th,  1803). f  By  this  clever 
artifice  the  First  Consul  obtained  his  much-desired  end,  for 
throughout  the  entire  course  of  his  rule  in  France  Svatzerland 
remained  at  peace  within  and,  while  inaccessible  to  all  ap- 
proaches from  other  powers,  was  absolutely  submissive  to  the 
influence  of  France. 

The  spread  of  Napoleon's  power  found,  as  has  been  seen, 
no  great  obstacle  in  the  Alps,  one  of  the  natural  boundaries 
of  France.  Was  the  second  of  those  boundaries,  the  Rhine, 
destined  to  be  held  in  any  greater  respect? 

After  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  as  after  that  of  Campo  Formio 
there  yet  remained  unsettled  the  question  of  indemnity  to 
those  German  princes  who  had  lost  to  France  a  part  or  the 
whole  of  their  lands  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  After 
Campo  Formio  the  Congress  of  Rastatt  was  empowered  to  solve 

*  As  early  as  April  30th,  1801,  he  had  submitted  to  delegates  of  both 
parties  a  rough  draft  of  a  constitution  intended  to  give  satisfaction  to 
both,  but  they  had  been  unable  to  come  to  an  agreement  upon  the  sub- 
ject. 

t  Jomini  in  his  account,  "Precis  politique  et  militaire  des  campagnes 
de  1812  k  1814,"  II.  224,  says  that  "the  'Act  of  Mediation'  was  the 
work  of  the  best  heads  of  Switzerland  and  not  that  of  the  First  Consul." 
This  statement  is  correct  to  this  extent,  that  Napoleon  instructed  Haute- 
rive,  Director  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  submit  to  him  the  result  of  the  propo- 
sitions made  by  both  parties. 


258        The  Last  Years  of  the   Consulate        [I802 

this  problem,  when  renewed  war  deprived  its  decisions  of  vahdity. 
This  question  was  now  taken  up  again.  It  had  been  deter- 
mined in  Rastatt  that  the  secular  princes  who  had  suffered  these 
losses  should  receive  compensation  in  the  shape  of  ecclesias- 
tical territories  lying  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  This 
was  confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Luneville.  Napoleon's  motive 
in  this  was  exactly  that  of  the  Revolution,  which  had  done 
away  in  France  with  the  political  significance  of  mortmain  and 
which  carried  across  the  boundary  into  Germany  the  principle 
of  universal  secularization  of  Church  property.  There  was  in 
Germany  a  class  of  ecclesiastical  and  consequently  non-heredi- 
tary princes  who  were  moved  by  no  interest  of  family  to  try, 
like  the  secular  princes,  to  obtain  all  possible  independence  and 
sovereignty  for  their  houses.  They  had  for  that  reason  always 
been  firm  supporters  of  the  feudal  empire,  and  their  Catholic 
faith  had  retained  them  as  partisans  of  Austria  and  its  ruHng 
house.  Now,  should  these  principalities  be  subdivided  among 
the  secular,  that  is  to  say  the  dynastic.  States,  the  old  imperial 
constitution  would  be  shaken,  the  Empire  would  lose  its  stan ch- 
est adherents,  the  tendency  to  disintegration  would  prevail, 
and,  as  a  result  of  this  subversion  of  the  order  of  things,  there 
would,  at  the  best,  arise  a  confederation  in  place  of  the  Empire. 
The  only  possibility  of  maintaining  the  Constitution  of  the  Em- 
pire lay  in  preserving  to  the  princes  of  the  Church  all  property 
not  needed  to  indemnify  those  princes  who  had  been  deprived 
of  their  lands ;  but  it  would  fall  inevitably  if  all  of  the  ecclesias- 
tical principaUties  were  secularized.  The  Revolutionary  govern- 
ments of  France  had  each  adopted  as  a  principle  the  necessity  for 
the  secularization  of  all.  In  the  year  1795,  when  for  a  moment 
a  general  treaty  of  peace  was  under  consideration  in  Paris,  this 
project  was  brought  by  Sieyes  before  the  Convention  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety,  his  proposal  being  the  complete  dis- 
memberment of  German  ecclesiastical  principalities  for  the 
benefit  of  secular  princes,  and  this  scheme  was  doubtless  sub- 
mitted at  a  later  date  to  the  consideration  of  Napoleon  and 
his  ministers.*  The  famous  abbd  had  in  those  earlier  days 
*  How  important  a  part  in  foreign  politics  during  the  Consulate  and 


iEr.  33]       The   Secularizations   in    Germany         259 

established  the  principle  that  the  ruling  German  powers,  Prussia 
and  Austria,  should  be  kept  at  the  greatest  possible  distance 
from  the  Rhine,  while  along  the  river  there  should  be  tolerated 
only  States  of  secondary  importance.  Against  encroachments 
from  the  two  other  powers  these  States  would  be  protected  by 
France,  to  which  country  they  would  be  faithful  adherents. 
But  to  such  a  plan,  according  to  Sieyes,  the  ecclesiastical  prin- 
cipalities were  not  adapted,  since  they  as  elective  principalities 
without  dynastic  interests  furnished  no  guarantee  of  permanent 
alliance.  Consequently  they  ought  to  be  secularized,  as  had 
already  been  done  with  some  of  their  number  at  the  time  of 
the  Peace  of  WestphaUa. 

And  while  this  was  the  view  of  the  situation  taken  by  France, 
that  of  the  two  ruling  German  powers  was  not  directly  opposed  to 
it.  In  so  far  as  Prussia  was  concerned,  the  secularization  which 
had  been  a  part  of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia  had  very  consid- 
erably strengthened  the  power  of  Brandenburg,  and  the  great- 
ness of  this  State  in  the  past  accordingly  rested  upon  the  very 
principle  which  was  now  being  promulgated  by  the  Revolution, 
Moreover,  the  House  of  Brandenburg  was  just  then  interested  in 
seeing  indemnified  on  German  soil  the  ejected  hereditary 
Stadtholder  of  Holland,  who  was  a  relative.  Austria,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  demanding  for  herself  in  the  Treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  an  ecclesiastical  principality, — the  Archbishopric  of 
Salzburg, — had  already  conceded  to  France  the  right  to  assist 
her  in  acquiring  it.*  Later,  in  the  Treaty  of  Lun^ville,  a  stipula- 
tion was  made  to  the  effect  that  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany 
also  was  to  receive  compensation  in  Germany  for  his  loss  of 
tenitory,  for  which  purpose  Salzburg  was  again  set  aside  with 
Berchtesgaden.  The  fact  was  that  in  Vienna  the  interests  of 
Austria  outweighed  those  of  the  German  Empire,  as  had  once 
before  been  the  case,  under  Joseph  H.,  when  the  scheme  had 

the  Empire  is  to  be  a.scribed  directly  to  Sieves  is  a  question  which  -will 
be  more  closely  examined  later. 

*  Article  5.  The  French  Republic  will  use  its  good  offices  to  enable 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  to  acquire  for  Germany  the  Archbishopric 
of  Salzburg,  etc. 


26o        The  Last  Years  of  the   Consulate        [I802 

arisen  for  the  general  secularization  of  the  ecclesiastical  princi- 
palities of  Germany.  Consequently  neither  of  the  great  Ger- 
man powers  was  opposed  on  principle  to  this  solution  of  the 
problem — a  fact  of  decisive  importance.  Another  of  equal 
weight  was  that  the  question  had  ceased  to  be  such  as  to  in- 
volve Germany  alone.  By  this  policy  of  assigning  German 
territory  to  princes  not  themselves  German, — such  astheStadt- 
holder  of  Holland  and  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany, — and  record- 
ing the  agreements  in  international  treaties,  German  questions 
of  indemnification  had  become  the  common  concern  of  all  Eu- 
rope. It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  France,  which  had  won 
for  herself  the  first  place  among  the  nations,  should  assume  in 
this  case  the  predominant  part,  and  that  the  question  should 
be  decided,  not  at  the  Imperial  Diet  at  Ratisbon,but  at  theTui- 
leries.  The  various  German  dynasties  at  once  hastened  to  open 
direct  negotiations  with  the  First  Consul.  Then  followed  a 
scene  of  courting  and  enlisting  the  good-will  of  Talleyrand  and 
his  officials,  a  buying  and  selling  of  favour  and  protection,  a 
disgraceful  driving  of  bargains  in  which  the  glory  of  the  Empire 
and  honour  of  the  nation  were  sacrificed  on  account  of  a  few 
scraps  of  land.  At  length,  on  the  20th  of  May,  1802,  a  separate 
treaty  was  concluded  between  France  and  Wiirtemberg  by 
which  the  latter  was  promised  a  considerable  increase  of  terri- 
tory from  ecclesiastical  sources;  the  House  of  Wiirtemberg 
being  related  to  that  of  Russia,  it  was  hoped  that  the  assent  of 
Alexander  I.  would  thus  be  obtained  to  the  whole  transaction. 
Three  days  later  followed  a  similar  treaty  with  Prussia  which 
awarded  likewise  to  Frederick  William  III.  extensive  "indem- 
nification" taken  from  Church  possessions.*  On  the  24th  of 
the  same  month  a  treaty  with  Bavaria  was  signed  at  Paris, 
which  was  soon  followed  by  settlements  with  Baden  and  Hesse. 
Upon  the  strength  of  these  agreements  there  was  devised  in 
Paris  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  general  secularization  which 
left   undisturbed  only  the  single  Archbishopric  of  Mainz.     To 

*  The  ecclesiastical  territ()ri(>s  named  in  this  treaty  are  Ilildesheim, 
Paderborn,  Eichsfeld,  Essen,  Werden,  and  Quedlinburg,  all  of  which  were 
already  mentioned  as  the  share  of  Prussia  in  Sieyds'  project  of  1795. 


^Et.  33]     The   German   Empire   Undermined       261 

this  on  June  3d,  1802,  Napoleon  obtained  Russia's  consent  with 
her  promise  to  assist  France  in  securing  its  adoption  at  the 
Imperial  Diet  at  Ratisbon. 

Austria  had  purposely  been  kept  in  ignorance  of  these  pro- 
ceedings. Her  ambassador  at  Paris  first  learned  through  the 
"Moniteur  "  of  the  fact  of  the  agreement  with  Russia  and  of  the 
scheme  for  indemnification.  Emperor  Francis  protested,  not 
because  as  Head  of  the  Empire  it  was  his  duty  to  protect  its  con- 
stitution and  honour  against  foreign  intrusion,  but  because  the 
portion  of  the  spoils  accruing  to  Prussia  was  too  large  and  that 
to  Austria  too  small.  But  it  was  in  vain  that  his  troops  were 
sent  to  occupy  the  territory  of  the  bishopric  of  Passau,  which 
had  been  allotted  to  Bavaria.  The  German  princes  had,  for 
once,  made  common  cause  with  France,  and  Napoleon's  categori- 
cal summons  forced  the  Austrian  Court  to  yield.  Further,  the 
Austrians  were  forced  to  accept  with  such  grace  as  they  could 
the  dispositions  according  to  which  the  Grand  Duke  received  in 
exchange  for  Tuscany  not  only  Salzburg  and  Berchtesgaden,  but 
Brixen,  Trient,  and  a  portion  of  the  bishopric  of  Eichstadt  as  well, 
while,  as  a  return  for  these  losses,  the  Austrians  were  compelled 
by  a  treaty  with  France  dated  December  26th,  1802,  to  confirm 
all  the  changes  made  in  Upper  Italy.  Meanwhile  the  Diet  at 
Ratisbon  had  been  brought  to  accept  the  scheme  for  indemni- 
fication presented  by  France  and  Russia;  it  was  ratified  Feb- 
ruary 25th,  1803,  by  formal  enactment.  The  temporal  power  of 
the  German  princes  of  the  Church  had  ceased  to  exist;  the  founda- 
tions upon  which  rested  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  Empire 
had  been  demolished. 

Thus  had  the  nations  beyond  the  Rhine  also  been  made  to 
feel  Napoleon's  political  power,  while  the  small  neighbouring  Ger- 
man States,  particularly  those  in  the  south,  had  been  brought 
into  a  certain  attitude  of  dependence  toward  his  government. 
In  the  diplomatic  campaign  which  he  had  been  carrying  on 
against  Aastria  Napoleon  had  come  off  victorious  at  every  point; 
the  power  on  the  Danube  had  been  completely  isolated,  its  conclu- 
sive defeat  being  marked  by  the  treaty  of  December,  1802.  If  his 
persecution  of  the  conquered  power  now  ceased,  the  cause  lay 


262        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        II802 

solely  in  the  fact  of  new  developments  in  another  quarter  demand- 
ing his  attention. 

The  treaty  with  England  signed  at  Amiens  had,  it  is  true, 
brought  about  a  condition  of  affairs  making  it  possible  for  arms 
to  be  cast  aside  for  a  moment,  but  it  had  given  no  promise  of 
lasting  peace.     There  were  voices,  as  has  before  been  observed, 
raised  in  the  British  Parliament  emphatically  denouncing  the 
abandonment  of  Italy  to  Napoleon,  thereby  giving  him  the  mas- 
tery over  the  Continent.     While   the   preUminaries  of  peace  of 
October,  1801,  were  greeted  with  rejoicing  by  the  English  people 
exhausted  by  the  long  and  expensive  war,  the  ratification  of  the 
same  in  March,  1802,  met  with  far  less  enthusiasm.    And  for  good 
reason ;  for  the  expectations  of  the  English  of  being  able  to  make 
use  of  the  cessation  of  hostiUties  for  the  benefit  of  their  com- 
merce proved  by  the  end  of  a  few  months  to  be  but  an  illusion. 
Napoleon  had  not  only  refused  to  accede  to  the  renewal  of  the 
Treaty  of  Commerce  of  1786,  but,  in  order  to  protect  French  in- 
dustry, by  the  imposition  of  high   duties    he   had    practically 
closed  to  English  goods  the  ports  of  France  and  of  her  dependent 
States,  Italy  and  Holland.     Thus  it  was  that  manufacturers  and 
merchants  on  the  British  side  of  the  Channel  had  come  to  desire 
war,  which  would  at  least  be  less  prejudicial  to  their  interests 
than  this  peace  which  was  working  their  ruin.     And  what  if  the 
First  Consul  were  to  be  successful  in  extending  still  further  the 
French  federative  system,  thereby  restricting  to  a  yet  greater 
degree    England's    commercial   sphere   on  the    Continent?     In 
1798  he  had  menaced  her  colonial  existence  with  his  Egyptian 
expedition,    and    now    his    attitude    was    equally    threatening 
toward  her  industries.     And  now,  as  had  then  been  the  case, 
it  was  a  matter  of  life  or  death  to  the  island  nation.     Further 
extension    on    the    part    of   her  rival   must  be    prevented    and 
her  utmost  endeavours  put  forth  to  lessen   the  ascendency  of 
France. 

Napoleon  was  himself  convinced  of  the  probability  of  a  rup- 
ture with  England,  to  judge  at  least  ])y  what  he  said  to  the 
Austrian  ambassador  as  early  as  May,  1802;  but  so  absolute  did 
he  take  to  be  England's  need  of  peace,  since  she  had  intervened 


iEi. ;«]  Napoleon's  Colonial   Policy  263 

in  favour  of  neither  Italy  nor  Holland  when  the  treaty  \a  as  drawn 
up,  that  he  counted  nevertheless  upon  a  somewhat  longer  season 
of  peace  in  that  quarter.  In  any  case  he  began  to  put  into  oper- 
ation a  comprehensive  economic  experiment  which  could  suc- 
ceed only  under  that  supposition.  This  was  nothing  else  than 
a  vast  colonial  scheme  which,  while  it  was  to  have  San  Domingo 
as  its  principal  base,  was  also  to  include  the  Antilles  and  the 
American  territory  of  Louisiana,  which  had  been  ceded  to  France 
by  Spain.  Obstacles  to  this  plan  presented  themselves  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic. 

At  the  time  of  the  last  war  a  remarkably  intelligent  negro, 
on  the  island  of  San  Domingo,  Toussaint  Louverture  by  name, 
had  distinguished  himself  in  his  leadership  of  the  negroes,  op- 
posing so  determined  a  resistance  to  the  Enghsh  that  they  had 
been  obliged  to  withdraw.  He  had  then  assumed  authority  and 
founded  a  severe  but  excellent  government.  According  to  the 
Constitution  with  which  he  provided  the  island,  the  suzerainty 
of  France  was  to  be  maintained  as  strictly  nominal,  while  he  him- 
self, as  president  for  life,  should  rule  independently.  (Evidently 
Napoleon  had  already  made  disciples.)  Under  this  government 
San  Domingo  flourished.  Its  coloured  inhabitants,  though  freed 
from  slavery,  were  nevertheless  kept  at  work  by  the  authority 
of  their  president;  commerce  released  from  restriction,  brought 
rich  returns  to  the  country.  But  all  this  was  utterly  irreconcil- 
able with  the  colonial  scheme  which  Napoleon  was  meditating 
and  of  which  Talleyrand  was  perhaps  the  instigator.  The  Consti- 
tution was  accorduigly  rejected  by  the  First  Consul,  who  sent  his 
brother-in-law,  Leclerc,  with  an  army  of  25,000  men  to  the  island 
to  re-establish  its  commercial  dependence  upon  France.  This 
army,  it  may  incidentally  be  remarked,  which  was  assigned  by 
Napoleon  to  operate  at  such  a  distance  in  a  noxious  climate,  was 
selected,  doubtless  not  without  design,  from  those  bodies  of  troops 
which  had  been  under  the  command  of  Moreau  in  the  recent  war 
and  who  were  among  the  most  faithful  adherents  of  his  cause 
and  of  the  republican  system.  Leclerc,  like  Richepanse,  who 
had  been  sent  to  Martinique,  was  under  orders  to  re-estabUsh 
slavery  among  the  negroes;  Toussaint,  at  the  head  of  his  people. 


264        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I802 

resisted,  and  it  was  only  at  the  expense  of  extraordinary  courage 
and  perseverance  on  the  part  of  the  French  that  he  was  at  length 
forced  to  surrender  on  condition  of  amnesty  to  himself  and  his 
followers.  But  the  expedition  proved  nevertheless  a  failure. 
Every  day  hundreds  of  brave  soldiers  were  carried  off  by  yellow 
fever,  so  that  in  July,  1802,  after  seven  months  upon  the  island; 
Leclerc  had  only  8000  men  left  under  his  command.  He  feared 
a  new  onslaught  on  the  part  of  Toussaint,  who  had  retained  his 
rank  as  general,  and  recommended  to  Napoleon  that  the  redoubt- 
able leader  of  the  San  Domingans  be  summoned  to  France  and 
there  kept  in  confinement.  This  was  done,  and  toward  the 
close  of  March,  1803,  Toussaint  ended  his  days  in  the  fortress  of 
Joux,  a  victim  to  the  harsh  climate  and  to  ill  treatment  by  his 
custodians.  But  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean  Leclerc  also  died, 
smitten  by  yellow  fever,  nor,  in  spite  of  considerable  reinforce- 
ments, was  his  successor  able  to  re-establish  French  supremacy 
in  the  island,  so  that  before  the  end  of  the  year  1803  the  French 
were  obliged  to  abandon  it  altogether.  The  second  of  the  bases  of 
operation  in  Napoleon's  colonial  scheme  came,  likewise,  to  naught, 
for  the  United  States  of  America  entered  a  threatening  protest 
against  the  expansion  of  French  influence  in  Louisiana.  And 
now,  in  addition,  peace  with  England  was  on  the  point  of  rup- 
ture earlier  than  Napoleon  had  counted  upon,  robbing  his  scheme 
of  that  most  essential  consideration,  safety  of  traffic  upon  the 
^ea. 

During  the  course  of  the  year  1802,  while  France  was  engaged 
in  the  San  Domingo  enterprise,  public  opinion  in  England  had 
taken  a  more  and  more  pronounced  attitude  against  France,  and 
so  marked  had  this  feeling  become  that  finally  even  the  peace- 
loving  ministry  of  Addington  was  compelled  to  yield  to  the  pres- 
sure. The  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens  had  not  yet  all 
been  fulfilled ;  an  important  pledge  yet  remained  in  British  keep- 
ing— the  island  of  Malta,  that  highly-prized  halting-place  on  the 
route  to  India.  In  view  of  the  encroachments  of  France  upon 
the  Continent  England  had  delayed  tlie  fulfilment  of  her  com- 
pact to  restore  the  island  to  the  Knights  of  St.  John,  and  now 
rather  regarded  its  possession  as  a  desirable  compensation  for 


iEr. 33]  Threatening   England  265 

Napoleon's  expansion.  The  situation  was  aggravated  by  the 
scathing  attacks  of  EngUsh  newspapers  upon  the  ruler  of  France, 
and  by  the  fact  that  when  he  demanded  a  cessation  of  this 
journalistic  persecution,  the  London  government  waived  respon- 
sibiUty,  referring  him  to  the  legalized  freedom  of  the  press  in  Eng- 
land. It  was  a  time  of  suspense  in  which  the  hostiUty  of  feeling 
on  both  sides  increased  from  day  to  day.  But  Napoleon  did  not 
long  remain  undecided.  His  next  step  was  to  threaten.  Should 
this  foreign  power  be  intimidated  by  threats  he  would  derive  this 
advantage,  that  his  prestige  in  France  and  in  Europe  would  be 
enhanced  by  just  so  much ;  but  in  case  England  really  meant  war, 
the  colonial  scheme  must  of  course  be  given  up,  in  which  case, 
however,  there  opened  up  the  alluring  prospect — since  England 
would  not  remain  without  alHes — of  a  profitable  war  upon  the 
Continent,  a  prospect  which,  as  has  been  seen,  was  continually 
kept  in  mind  by  the  First  Consul.* 

A  pretext  was  found  in  the  autumn  of  1802,  when  England 
made  complaint  of  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland 
through  the  entry  into  that  country  of  the  French  army  under 
Ney.  Hereupon  Napoleon  dictated  to  his  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  instructions  for  the  guidance  of  the  French  amba.ssador. 
Otto,  in  London,  and  these  reveal  in  the  germ  his  entire  future 
policy.  In  regard  to  Switzerland,  the  matter  was  to  be  con- 
sidered closed.  The  establishment  of  British  hirelings  in  the 
Alps  would  not  be  tolerated  by  him.  In  case  war  were 
threatened  upon  the  further  side  of  the  Channel  the  question 
would  arise  of  what  sort  it  was  to  be.  A  mere  naval  warfare 
would  be  of  little  advantage  to  England  on  account  of  the  paucity 
of  spoils.  It  would,  it  is  true,  blockade  the  French  ports,  but 
it  would  at  the  same  time  bring  about  a  counter  blockade,  since, 
upon  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  all  the  coast  from  Hanover 
to  Taranto  would  be  guarded  by  French  troops.  And  what 
if  the  First  Consul  were  to  assemble  the  fiat-boats  of  Flanders 
and  Holland,  thus  providing  means  of  transport  for  a  hundred 

*  Napoleon  had  already  announced  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  in 
May,  1802,  that  a  rupture  with  England  would  necessarily  involve  war 
upon  the  Continent. 


266        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I802 

thousand  men  with  which  to  keep  England  in  a  perpetual 
state  of  alarm  over  an  always  possible,  and  indeed  even  probable, 
invasion?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  London  Cabinet  should 
conclude  to  rekindle  war  on  the  Continent,  Napoleon  would 
thereby  simply  be  compelled  to  proceed  to  the  conquest  of  all 
Europe.  "The  First  Consul  is  but  thirty-three  years  of  age," 
concludes  this  document,  "  up  to  this  time  he  has  destroyed  none 
but  states  of  secondary  rank.  Who  knows,  if  he  were  forced  to 
it,  what  length  of  time  he  would  require  to  change  once  more  the 
face  of  Europe  and  to  resuscitate  the  Western  Empire  ?  "  (Octo- 
ber 23d,  1802.) 

It  was  but  a  feeble  echo  of  this  strain  which  was  transmitted 
by  the  ambassador  in  London,  and,  for  the  time  being,  peace  was 
preserved.  Talleyrand  and  the  other  ministers  as  well  as  Na- 
poleon's brothers  were  unreservedly  in  favour  of  the  avoidance 
of  open  warfare.  The  Consul  alone,  irritated  by  the  continued 
refusal  to  evacuate  Malta  and  the  defiant  tone  of  the  English 
press,  allowed  himself  to  be  impelled  to  war.  He  now  definitely 
gave  up  his  colonial  plans  and  himself  sought  to  precipitate 
matters.  He  ordered  copied  in  the  Moniteur  a  report  made  by 
General  Sebastiani,  whom  he  had  sent  on  a  secret  mission  to 
Egypt.  This  report  was  to  the  effect  that  the  British  had  failed 
as  yet  to  evacuate  Alexandria;  also  that,  while  existing  hostili- 
ties continued  there  between  the  Turks  and  Mamelukes,  6000 
French  soldiers  would  be  sufficient  to  reconquer  the  country. 
If  this  report  was  published  with  a  view  to  exasperating  Eng- 
land, no  doubt  could  remain  as  to  its  having  accomplished  its 
purpose.*  The  prospect  of  seeing  the  route  to  India  again  im- 
perilled was  intolerable  to  the  English,  and  any  thought  of  re- 
nouncing the  possession  of  Malta  was  from  now  on  out  of  the 
question  with  them. 

But  Napoleon  carried  matters  yet  further.     In  the  annual 

*  Sebastiani  himself  bears  witness  that  this  was  the  intention,  for  he 
recounts  somewhat  later  that  after  his  report  had  been  read  the  Consul 
exclaimed;  "Well,  we  shall  see  whether  that  is  not  enough  to  drive 
John  Bull  to  fight.  As  for  me,  I  have  no  dread  of  war."  (M6moires  de 
Lucien,  II    165.) 


Mt.  331         The   Beginning  of  Hostilities  267 

report  which  he  submitted  to  the  legislative  body  hi  February, 
1803,  the  subject  discussed  was  the  conflict  between  the  two 
parties  into  which  the  English  were  divided,  those  in  favour 
of  peace  as  opposed  to  those  who  were  hostile  to  France.  A 
half -million  of  soldiers,  said  he,  must  be  kept  in  readiness  by 
France  against  the  possibility  of  victory  to  the  second  of  these 
parties.  England  alone,  however, — so  the  report  went  on, — 
was  not  sufficient  to  cope  with  France.  British  national  pride 
was  touched  to  the  quick  by  this  new  insult.  George  III. 
promptly  offered  an  ultimatvuii  requiring,  among  other  things, 
the  indemnification  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  and  the  evacuation 
of  Holland  and  Switzerland  on  the  part  of  France.  These  terms 
w^ere  rejected.  Toward  the  middle  of  ^lay,  1803,  the  ambassa- 
dors of  both  countries  were  recalled.     War  w^as  declared. 

Hostilities  had  meanwhile  already  begun.  For  weeks  before 
that  time  England  had  given  chase  to  all  French  merchantmen 
who  had  ventured  out  relying  upon  peace,  and  Napoleon  made 
returns  by  putting  under  arrest  all  such  Englishmen  as  were 
living  in  France.  Soon  after  British  squadrons  were  sent  to 
blockade  the  French  ports,  whereupon  Napoleon  began  to 
carry  out  to  the  letter  the  plan  of  campaign  which  he  had  mapped 
out  in  his  instructions  to  Otto.  It  consisted,  as  has  been  seen, 
chiefly  in  three  acts :  the  first  being  to  blockade  England  in  her 
turn  by  making  inaccessible  to  her  ships  the  coast  of  the  Con- 
tinent "from  Hanover  to  Taranto,"  all  of  which  should  be 
guarded  by  French  troops;  the  second  step  was  to  threaten 
an  invasion  by  the  gathering  of  an  expeditionary"  army  on  the 
Channel;  and  third,  in  case  the  British  power  should  be  success- 
ful in  kindling  a  war  on  the  Continent  in  which  her  allies  should 
be  opposed  to  France,  it  was  his  purpose  to  make  the  Con- 
tinent tributary  to  himself  as  far  as  the  weapons  of  France 
could  be  made  to  carry.  This  programme  was  further  accen- 
tuated by  the  order  now  issued  by  the  Consul  reviving  the  cele- 
l^Tation  of  the  birthday  of  the  Maid  of  Orleans  for  the  sake  of 
nourishing  the  spirit  of  jingoism  toward  the  ancient  enemy  of 
France. 

Before  the  month  of  May  had  expired  a  French  army  corps 


268       The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate         [i803 

was  marched  into  Hanover,  which  territory  belonged  to  the 
King  of  England,  and  the  troops  of  the  Elector  without 
much  show  of  resistance  capitulated.  By  means  of  this  occu- 
pation the  ships  of  the  enemy  were  debarred  from  the  mouths 
of  the  Weser  and  Elbe  rivers,  thus  closing  to  British  trade  the 
most  important  avenues  of  communication  with  Northern 
Germany.  The  consequences  soon  became  evident.  "You 
have  dealt  England  a  fatal  blow,"  writes  Napoleon  to  General 
Mortier;  "many  houses  have  become  bankrupt."  He  admon- 
ishes him  to  be  personally  watchful  to  prevent  any  possible 
British  consignment  of  merchandise  finding  entrance.  Soon 
after  this,  in  June,  a  second  army  corps  under  command  of 
Gouvion  Saint-Cyr  penetrated  into  the  kingdom  of  Naples  and, 
contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  occupied  the  ports  of  Taranto, 
Brindisi,  and  Otranto. 

The  two  extremes  of  the  cordon  being  thus  made  secure, 
all  that  remained  between  was  now  closely  and  inseparably 
attached  to  the  policy  of  France.  First  in  turn  came  the  Ba- 
tavian  Republic.  It  was  compelled  by  treaty  to  provide  sus- 
tenance for  French  troops  to  the  number  of  18,000  men  and 
to  hold  in  readiness  for  service  a  force  of  16,000;  in  addi- 
tion, five  ships  of  the  line  and  a  hundred  sloops  carrying  cannon 
were  to  be  furnished  for  the  naval  war.  In  return  Napoleon 
guaranteed  to  the  republic  the  integrity  of  its  territory,  and  prom- 
ised to  restore  to  it  any  colonies  which  might  be  lost  during  the 
course  of  the  war  and  (circumstances  permitting)  with  the 
addition  of  Ceylon  (June  25th,  1803).  Switzerland  was  the 
next  to  pledge  herself  in  favour  of  France.  An  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  with  her  powerful  neighbour  imposed  upon 
her  the  obligation  to  raise  an  army  of  16,000  men,  which  was 
to  be  increased  to  28,000  in  case  France  were  attacked;  that  is 
to  say,  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  military  force  of  the  nation 
was  put  at  the  service  of  a  totally  foreign  interest.  Finally 
Spain  and  Portugal  also  were  induced  to  enter  the  league.  With 
Spain  it  had  become  a  question  of  no  slight  significance.  When, 
in  the  spring  of  1803,  Napoleon  (l(>finitely  renounced  his  colonial 
enterprise,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Louisiana,  which  liad 


Mt.  34]  Napoleon  Sells  Louisiana  269 

been  acquired  from  Charles  IV.,  would  prove  to  him  nothing  but 
a  burden.  The  territory  was  coveted  by  the  United  States,  and 
Napoleon  now  offered  to  sell  it  to  that  country.  The  offer 
was  accepted,  and  for  the  sum  of  80,000,000  francs  Louisiana 
became  a  part  of  the  United  States. 

But  Spain  in  her  treaties  with  France  had  reserved  to  her- 
self the  privilege  of  reclaiming  Louisiana,  and  Napoleon's  vio- 
lation of  the  agreement  aroused  such  intense  excitement  at 
Madrid  that  Godoy,  the  Prince  of  Peace,  considered  for  a  time 
the  advisability  of  opposing  resistance  to  this  neighbour,  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  fact  that,  instead  of  the  25  ships  and  28,000 
men  which  the  Court  of  Madrid  had  agreed  in  1796  to  hold  in 
readiness  for  the  service  of  France  in  the  event  of  war,  the  Consul 
now  demanded  vast  subsidies  of  money,  6,000,000  francs  a 
month,  enforcing  his  requisition  by  means  of  an  army  gathered 
at  Bordeaux. 

But  Bonaparte  would  accept  of  no  gainsaying.  He  made 
complaints  to  the  king  concerning  the  Prince  of  Peace,  not  even 
forbearing  to  make  allusion  to  the  scandalous  relations  existing 
between  the  latter  and  the  queen.  The  expedient  proved 
effectual.     The  minister  humbled  himself,  and  on  October  19th, 

1803,  the  treaty  was  concluded  according  to  the  wishes  of  Na- 
poleon. Spain  was  thus  ranged  among  the  enemies  of  England 
and  forced  to  undergo  the  experience  of  having  war  declared 
against  her  by  the  British  Cabinet  in  the  year  1804.  Naturally 
Portugal  could  not  remain  unaffected  by  all  that  was  thus  taking 
place,  and  she  was  compelled  to  purchase  neutrality  by  the 
payment  to  France  of  1,000,000  francs  a  month.     Li  February, 

1804,  Genoa  also  was  put  under  obligation  to  furnish  6000 
sailors  to  her  powerful  neighbour  for  use  in  his  naval  warfare. 

While  the  Consul  in  these  ways  prepared  the  "blockade" 
of  England,  he  was  assembling  on  the  coast  of  the  Channel  near 
Boulogne  an  imposing  army,  which  he  thoroughly  equipped  and 
exercised — whether  as  mere  demonstration  or  with  a  view  to 
actual  occasion — in  what  was  requisite  to  accomplish  with 
success  the  transit  across  the  Chaimel.  Flat  transport-boats 
were  built  in  great  number,  and  the  field-soldiers  practised  in 


270       The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [1803 

the  duties  of  the  sailor.  It  was  a  gigantic  apparatus  which  was 
here  displayed  for  the  consternation  of  John  Bull.  But  it  was 
not  to  be  brought  immediately  into  action.  The  enemy  from 
without  was,  unfortunately  for  him,  not  the  only  one  against 
which  Napoleon  had  to  do  battle.  In  the  interior  of  the  country 
arose  another  enemy  which  was  not  to  be  subdued  with  army 
and  navy.  Against  this  foe  he  now  turned.  In  this  case 
also  he  was  destined  to  conquer,  and,  with  his  genius  for  making 
everything  contribute  to  his  end,  his  prostrate  antagonist  was 
made  to  serve  but  as  a  stepping-stone  to  new  greatness. 

After  the  death-blow  had  been  dealt  to  the  Jacobin  party  in 
the  decree  of  proscription  issued  in  1801,  there  remained  but  two 
political  factions  who  followed  with  irreconcilable  vindictiveness 
the  existing  system  of  personal  government  and  its  representa- 
tive: there  were,  first,  the  Moderate  Republicans,  the  citizens 
of  the  13th  Vendemiaire,  who  recognized  General  Moreau  as  their 
leader;  and,  second,  the  Ultra-Royalists  who  had  been  driven 
out  of  the  country  and  who  regarded  the  capitulation  of  Vendue 
in  1800  as  only  a  truce  which  they  were  determined  to  disregard 
at  the  first  favourable  opportunity.  The  last-named  had  their 
headquarters  in  England,  their  head  being  Charles  d'Artois,  the 
brother  of  the  executed  monarch,  Louis  XVI.,  while  among  their 
most  active  agents  were  Pichegru  and  Dumouriez.  These  two 
parties  had  remained  quiescent  during  the  continuance  of  peace, 
but,  now  that  war  had  again  broken  out,  they  had  imbibed  fresh 
hope.  There  even  arose  at  this  time  a  kind  of  coalition  between 
them,  although  this  was  only  of  an  outward  character.  Pichegru 
went  to  l*aris  and  mad(^  advances  to  Moreau.  To  the  latter,  who 
was  indispensabk;  to  the  accomplishment  of  their  purpose,  was 
to  be  accorded  a  temporary  position  of  power,  that  he  might  then 
play  the  part  of  the  English  General  Monk  and  prepare  for  the 
Bourbons  a  way  of  return  to  their  native  land.  The  conspiracy 
was  based  upon  the  supposition  that  it  was  going  to  be  possible 
to  do  away  with  Napoleon.  This  time  he  was  to  be  more  surely 
dealt  with  than  had  been  the  case  on  that  Christmas  evening  in 
the  rue  Saint-Nicaise  when  the  infernal  machine  failed  to  accom- 
plish its  purpose.     To  carry  out  this    plan    for   assassination, 


Mt.  34]  The  Royalist  Plot  27 1 

Georges  Cadoudal,  a  leader  among  the  Veiidcaiis,  came  secretly 
to  Paris  and  put  himself  there  at  the  head  of  trusted  partisans 
whom  the  many  years  of  civil  war  had  transformed  into  veritable 
political  bandits.  The  plan  was  for  a  sufficient  number  of  them 
openly  to  assail  the  First  Consul  when  he  drove  through  the 
streets  surrounded  by  his  body-guard,  to  seize  him  and — so  it 
was  asserted  in  the  "  Moniteur  " — to  kill  him  and,  with  his  death, 
overthrow  the  government.  Certain  English  ministers  were 
initiated  into  the  plan,  and  sanctioned  it  at  least  in  so  far  as  it 
went  toward  bringing  about  the  dowTifall  of  their  hated  enemy.* 
But  Napoleon  received  warning  in  time  to  avert  the  threatening 
danger.  His  London  agents  had  revealed  the  plot  to  him  before 
any  one  of  the  conspirators  had  so  much  as  set  foot  upon  French 
soil.  One  by  one,  then,  as  they  reached  the  country  they  were 
put  under  arrest  and  the  whole  extent  of  the  conspiracy  ascer- 
tained, though  not  without  application  of  coercive  measures. 
Moreau,  also,  was  taken  into  custody.  At  the  end  of  a  pro- 
longed trial  Cadoudal,  with  a  number  of  his  assistants,  was  sen- 
tenced and  shot;  Pichegru  was  discovered  strangled  in  his  prison 
cell;  Moreau,  whose  collusion  with  Pichegru  could  be  proven, — 
though  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  understanding  with  Cadou- 
dal,— was  sentenced  to  two  years'  imprisonment,  but,  though 
judgment  had  already  been  pronounced.  Napoleon  insisted  upon 
a  revision  of  the  case,  and  the  penalty  was  changed  to  banish- 
ment to  America.  But  the  essential  point  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  cause  of  the  Bourbons  was  apparently  compromised,  and 
that  Moreau,  the  only  dangerous  rival  to  the  First  Consul,  lost 
his  influence  in  the  army  as  a  consequence  of  his  connection, 
however  slight,  with  the  conspirators,  while  Napoleon's  popu- 
larity with  the  non-partisan  mass  of  the  people  was  onl)^  the 
further  increased  by  the  danger  which  had  threatened  him. 

But  he  himself  undid  no  small  part  of  this  favourable  im- 
pression through  an  act  which  defies  all  attempt  at  justification. 
Cadoudal  had  asserted  during  the  course  of  his  trial  that  the  royal 
princes  of  France  were  cognizant  of  the  projected  assault,  and 

*  On  the  character  and  degree  of  the  complicity  of  the  English  govern- 
ment see  Rose,  "  Life  of  Napoleon  I.,"  I.  416-17. — B. 


272        The  Last  Years  of  the   Consulate       [i804 

that  they  had  been  intending  to  be  present  when  it  was  perpe- 
trated. Artois  was  the  person  thus  denoted,  he  having  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  been  party  to  the  scheme  with  the  declared  intention 
of  being  present  in  Paris.  From  this  of  com^se  it  was  clear  that 
certain  members  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  were  abettors  to  the 
crime;  but  this  was  not  true  of  all,  not,  for  instance,  of  the  Con- 
des,  who  disapproved  of  the  conspiracy  and  had  refused  all  par- 
ticipation in  it.  To  this  branch  of  the  Bourbons  belonged  the 
young  Prince  d'Enghien,  the  last  scion  of  his  line.  Love  for  his 
cousin,  Charlotte  de  Rohan,  had  drawn  him  to  Ettenheim  in  the 
grand  duchy  of  Baden,  which  modest  town  still  belonged  to  the 
diocese  of  the  Cardinal  de  Rohan  and  had  served  as  residence  for 
him  and  his  niece  since  he  had  been  ejected  by  the  Revolution 
from  Strasburg.  Here  the  prince  was  secretly  married  to  the 
lady  of  his  choice,  and  here  he  lived  upon  a  pension  granted  to 
him  by  England,  it  being  his  desire,  now  that  war  was  about  to 
begin,  to  show  his  gratitude  either  by  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  the 
English  or  by  doing  service  upon  the  Continent  in  some  such  way 
as  by  organizing  a  corps  of  volunteers  from  among  the  discon- 
tented elements  always  to  be  met  with  in  Alsace  and  neighbour- 
ing garrisons.  His  offer  was,  however,  refused  by  the  British 
government,  and  Enghien  had  to  content  himself  with  remain- 
ing inactive  in  his  exile.  It  so  chanced  that  England  was  just 
at  this  time  secretly  sending  out  agents  into  Switzerland  as  well 
as  into  Southern  Germany,  in  the  effort  to  stir  up  feeling  against 
France,  and  of  these  machinations  exaggerated  reports  were  car- 
ried to  Paris.  One  of  these  rumours  now  associated  the  name  of 
the  young  prince  with  these  emissaries,  among  whom  it  was 
claimed  that  the  feared  and  hated  emigre  Dumouricz  had  been 
discovered.  From  this  Napoleon  concluded  that  Enghien  also 
could  not  be  entirely  unconcerned  in  the  conspiracy  against  his 
person,  and  conceived  the  idea  of  taking  him  into  custody,  since 
he  had  been  unable  to  get  possession  of  the  Comte  d' Artois.  It 
was  of  little  consequence  to  Napoleon  that,  in  order  to  carry  out 
this  scheme,  it  would  be  necessary  to  invade  foreign  territory 
and  violate  the  law  of  nations.  On  the  15th  of  March  General 
Ordener  crossed  the  Rhine  with  a  few  hundred  dragoons,  laid 


JET.B4]  The  Due  d'Enghien  273 

hold  of  the  prince,  who  was  just  making  ready  to  start  on  a  hunt- 
ing excursion,  and  carried  him  off  to  Strasburg,  whence  he  was 
at  once  conducted  to  Paris  by  a  competcn4:  escort. 

While  he  was  yet  on  the  way  the  ultimate  fate  of  the  prisoner 
was  being  deliberated  upon  in  privy  council.  Napoleon  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  he  should  be  tried  before  a  court-mar- 
tial; Cambac<5res  advised  against  this  course,  while  Lebrun, 
when  questioned,  made  an  evasive  reply;  Talleyrand  and  Fouch6, 
however,  counselled  strongly  in  its  favour,  and  the  First  Consul 
accordingly  decided  upon  it,  although  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
convincing  himself  from  the  prince's  papers  that  he  stood  in  no 
sort  of  relationship  to  the  conspirators,  while  the  hated  "Du- 
mouriez"  turned  out  to  be  a  person  of  verj^  small  consequence 
by  the  name  of  "Thumery."  These  revelations  did  not,  how- 
ever, change  Napoleon's  decision,  for  he  was  determined  upon 
sacrificing  one  of  the  Bourbons  for  the  sake  of  t<?rrifjang  the 
others  from  any  further  attacks. 

On  the  very  evening  of  Enghien's  arrival  in  Vinceimes 
a  military  tribunal  of  carefully  selected  judges  was  there  con- 
voked. The  accused  was  subjected  to  a  trial  in  which  he  denied 
connection  of  any  kind  ^ith  Pichegru  and  the  others,  but  on 
the  other  hand,  proudly  asserting  the  truth,  he  declared  that, 
since  the  commencement  of  hostihties,  he  had,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  sought  to  engage  in  the  service  of  England  and  had  hoped 
to  have  a  part  to  play  on  the  Rhine,  while  the  fact  that  prior  to 
this  time  he  had  fought  against  France  was  known  to  all.  This 
was  sufficient  to  induce  the  judges  to  pronounce  a  sentence  which 
would,  as  they  knew,  give  satisfaction  to  their  lord, — and  one  not 
altogether  without  semblance  of  justice,  since  the  Revolution  in 
each  of  its  phases  had  threatened  with  death  open  warfare  on  the 
part  of  a  Frenchman  against  his  native  countr\',  and  the  law  in 
question  had  never  been  abrogated.  Doubtless  it  was  to  this 
also  that  Napoleon  had  reference  when  he  met  his  A%ife's  entrea- 
ties for  leniency  toward  the  prisoner  with  the  reply:  "I  am  the 
man  of  the  State,  I  am  the  French  Revolution,  and  I  shall  up- 
hold it."  Hardly  had  the  verdict  of  the  court-martial  been 
signed  by  the  colonels  composing  it,  before  the  prince  was  led 


274        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [i804 

out  in  the  darkness  of  the  same  night — March  20th,  1804 — to 
the  castle  moat;  there  he  was  placed  in  front  of  a  grave  already 
prepared,  and  shot  by  a  company  of  gendarmes.  According  to 
all  authentic  accounts  the  last  of  the  Cond^s  died  like  a  true 
hero.* 

At  the  tidings  of  this  crime  mute  horror  took  possession  of 
every  one.  A  member  of  the  family  which  for  centuries  had 
governed  France  had  been  sentenced  and  executed  in  its  capital 
at  the  nod  of  a  foreigner !  The  massacres  of  the  Reign  of  Terror 
it  seemed,  then,  had  not  yet  come  to  an  end  even  under  this  gov- 
ernment which  had  understood  drawing  up  such  excellent  codes 
of  law.  If  the  prince  had  even  really  been  in  collusion  with  the 
conspirators  against  the  head  of  the  state,  his  fate  would  have 
been  more  comprehensible.  But  this  was  not  the  case.  It  had 
been  necessary  first  to  abduct  him  from  a  foreign  country  in 
order  to  slay  him.  Moreover,  the  deed  had  not  been  commanded 
in  the  heat  of  blind,  tumultuous  passion  at  the  criminal  assault, 
but  after  long  and  quiet  deliberation  such  as  is  given  an  act  of 
the  state.  With  the  words  "my  policy"  Napoleon  had  expected 
to  be  able  to  silence  every  objection  raised  against  his  severity^ 
and  this  policy  he  characterized  in  this  wise :  "  At  least  they  will 
see  what  we  are  capable  of  and  henceforth,  I  hope,  they  will  let 
us  alone."  But  he  was  unable  to  convince  any  one.  Even  the 
classes  which  were  closely  bound  to  him  through  regard  for  their 
material  interests  did  not  remain  entirely  unmoved.  On  'Change 
stocks  fell  very  considerably,  and  the  Consul  was  obliged  to  ex- 
pend millions  in  order  to  sustain  prices  and  to  abate  the  ex- 
citement. 

Up  to  this  time,  besides  the  respect  rendered  to  his  genius. 
Napoleon  had  elicited  the  sympathy  of  many.     But  this  was 

*  A  moment  before  his  death  the  prince  put  into  the  hands  of  the 
commanding  officer  a  ring  and  a  lock  of  hair  to  be  deUvered  with  his 
last  farewell  to  the  Princess  de  Rohan.  This  wish  of  the  condemned 
was  allowed  to  remain  unfulfilled.  The  relics  were  deposited  with  the 
records  of  the  trial  among  the  archives  of  the  Paris  Pr<''fecture  de  Police, 
whence  Napoleon  III.,  in  the  early  years  of  his  reign,  ordered  them  re- 
moved to  th(!  imperial  chancery.  Since  then  they  with  the  papers  have 
vanished.     (Lalarme,   "  Les  Derniers  Jours  du  Consulat,"  p.  xii.) 


I 


Mt.  34]    The  Moral  Effect  of  the  Execution       275 

now  withdrawn,  and  his  rule  was  henceforth  tolerated  solely  with 
a  view  to  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  it.  Obedience 
might  still  be  counted  upon,  but  affection  no  longer  accompa- 
nied it,  and  what  he  yet  held  would  be  withdrawn  whenever  the 
French  ceased  to  feel  that  their  interests  were  best  served 
through  him.  Their  confidence  in  this  respect,  however,  had 
not  been  impaired  by  the  crime  of  Vincennes.  "The  trial  of 
General  Moreau,  and  above  all  the  death  of  the  Due  d'Enghien, 
brought  about  a  revulsion  of  feeling,  but  opinions  still  remained 
unshaken,"  says  Madame  de  Remusat  in  her  Memoires;  and 
Lucchesini,  the  Prussian  ambassador  at  Paris,  whose  excellent 
account  of  these  events  has  recently  been  made  public,  says  in 
the  course  of  it :  "If  the  character  of  the  French  nation  had  not 
at  all  times  given  to  its  acts  the  stamp  of  fervour  rather  than  of 
steadfastness,  one  would  suppose  that  the  First  Consul  in  his 
act  of  tyranny  toward  the  Due  d'Enghien  would  have  lost  a 
large  and  important  part  of  the  confidence,  the  enthusiasm,  the 
devotion,  and  the  attachment  upon  which  his  present  authority 
rests  and  upon  which  his  future  dignity  must  be  founded.  But 
it  is  possible  that  he  knows  the  French  better  than  they  know 
themselves;  perhaps  he  has  been  taught  by  the  example  of 
Cardinal  Richelieu,  who  ordered  the  execution  of  a  Mont- 
morency, that  in  France  just  those  most  daring  poUtical  acts 
tend  rather  to  secure  than  to  shake  the  supreme  power." 

The  conjecture  of  the  Prussian  diplomat  was  in  many  re- 
spects correct.  We  have  watched  through  all  of  their  phases 
Napoleon's  efforts  to  secure  a  monarch's  power.  Two  years 
before  he  had  contented  himself  with  the  consulship  for  life; 
but  it  was  no  part  of  his  plan  to  stop  at  that.  In  May,  1802, 
the  AiLstrian  ambassador  had  already  seen  enough  to  lead  him 
to  notify  the  home  government  that  supreme  power  for  life  was 
to  be  conferred  upon  Napoleon  with  the  title  of  "Emperor  of 
the  Gauls,"  and  at  precisely  the  same  time  the  Prussian 
charg^  d'affaires  announced  to  his  superiors  that  the  Consul 
was  intending  not  only  to  change  his  title,  but  also  to  make  the 
supreme  power  hereditary  in  his  family.  In  March,  1803,  the 
Englishman  Jackson  made  a  note  to  the  same  effect  in  his  diary. 


276        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [I804 

and  from  that  time  the  idea  of  an  ' '  Empire  des  Gaules  "  never 
again  disappeared  below  the  surface.  Napoleon  himself  played 
in  this  case  exactly  the  same  part  that  he  had  played  on  former 
occasions.  This  time  also  he  wished  to  be  sought.  And  again 
was  found  just  the  person  needed  to  bring  this  about.  Fouche, 
who  had  never  ceased  to  repine  at  the  loss  of  his  lucrative  posi- 
tion as  Minister  of  Police,  hoped  to  recover  it  if  he  could  bring 
about  the  fulfilment  of  the  First  Consul's  secret  desire.  An 
admirably  adapted  pretext  was  furnLshed  by  the  conspiracy 
against  Napoleon's  life  and  the  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  in- 
terior of  the  country  threatened  in  his  removal.  After  his 
escape  numberless  congratulatory  addresses  had  poured  in  from 
the  departements,  corporations,  etc.,  and  upon  the  ground  of 
these  demonstrations  Fouche  came  to  an  agreement  with  a 
tumber  of  senators  in  regard  to  a  new  amendment  to  the  con- 
stitution, for  the  power  of  amendment  since  1802  had  been 
acknowledged  to  belong  to  the  Senate.  Upon  this  body  also  the 
deepest  of  impressions  had  been  made  by  the  danger  in  which 
the  Consul  had  been  involved.  A  subversion  of  the  existing 
government  would  unquestionably  have  deprived  the  senators 
of  their  lucrative  positions  by  putting  an  end  to  the  corrupt 
munificence  of  Napoleon.  But  with  this  self-interested  con- 
sideration was  associated  another  less  miworthy.  It  was  un- 
deniable that  a  Coup  d'Etat  with  the  civil  discord  which  would 
follow  was  far  more  readily  possible  while  the  system  of  govern- 
ment was  dependent  upon  a  single  individual  and  its  overthrow 
could  be  accomphshed  by  the  removal  of  one  person  only.  The 
matter  assumed  a  different  aspect  if  the  office  of  the  chief  ruler 
were  made  hereditary,  so  that  a  legitimate  successor  could  at 
once  step  into  Napoleon's  place  and  continue  to  rule  according 
to  his  maxims ;  heredity  would  in  this  wise  of  itself  give  promise 
of  greater  stability,  since  it  would  prevent  further  attempts  at 
assassination  by  making  them  vain  and  fruitless.  The  estab- 
lishment of  a  hereditary  revolutionary-monarchical  power  was 
thus  at  once  demanded  by  the  common  interest  and  by  the 
personal  advantage  of  the  senators,  and  for  that  reason  even 
the  crime  of  Vincennes  did  not  prevent  this  act  of  legislation 


JEt.  34]  The  State  of  Public  Feeling  277 

and  a  week  had  scarcely  elapsed  after  that  miserable  proceeding 
before  a  deputation  from  the  Senate  presented  itself  before  the 
First  Consul  and  addressed  him  in  these  words:  "You  have 
founded  a  new  era,  but  it  is  your  duty  to  perpetuate  it;  the 
result  attained  is  as  nothing  if  not  permanent.  We  cannot 
doubt  that  this  great  idea  has  already  received  your  consid- 
eration, for  your  creative  genius  embraces  everything  and  over- 
looks nothing.  But  do  not  longer  delay.  Everything  urges 
upon  you  the  necessity  for  this  step,  the  state  of  the  times  and 
recent  events,  conspiracies  and  plots  of  the  ambitious,  and,  in 
another  way,  the  spirit  of  anxiety  which  agitates  every  French- 
man. You  have  the  power  to  master  both  times  and  events, 
to  disarm  the  ambitious,  to  calm  and  tranciuillize  all  France  by 
giving  to  it  institutions  which  wdll  cement  the  edifice  which  you 
have  erected  and  which  will  continue  to  the  children  that  which 
you  have  given  to  the  fathers.  The  ship  of  state  may  not  be 
exposed  to  the  danger  of  losing  her  pilot  without  an  anchor  to 
protect  her  against  shipwreck.  Citizen  First  Consul,  be  assured 
that  the  Senate  speaks  thus  here  to  you  in  the  name  of  every 
citizen." 

The  senators  were  not  mistaken .  When  their  proceeding  be- 
came known  there  were  many  more  voices  raised  in  commenda- 
tion than  in  disapproval.  ' '  Not  that  any  movement  of  affection 
toward  the  First  Consul  had  favoured  this  new  accession  of 
greatness  to  him  and  his  family,"  says  Miot  de  MeUto;  "on  the 
contrary,  at  no  time  had  he  been  less  beloved;  but  so  urgent 
was  the  need  of  rest  and  stability,  so  disquieting  the  future,  so 
great  the  dread  of  terrorism,  so  much  to  be  apprehended  seemed 
the  return  of  the  Bourbons  with  their  many  wrongs  to  be  avenged, 
that  the  people  seized  eagerly  upon  everything  that  could  avert 
these  dangers  against  which  no  other  means  of  defence  could  be 
devised.* 

*  Other  witnesses  concur  with  Miot  in  these  assertions.  The  Prussian 
envoy  reported  at  Berlin :  "The  event  is  everjTvhere  expected,  and  however 
considerable  may  be  the  number  of  persons  who  are  jealous  or  discon- 
tented with  an  enterprise  contrary  alike  to  the  wishes  of  the  Royalists 
and  to  the  principles  of  the  Republicans,  Paris  and  all  France  will  hardly 
make  their  true  feelings  apparent  in  this  case.     The  universal  demand  is 


278         The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [i804 

But  to  Napoleon  it  was  not  enough  that  the  new  dignity 
should  be  conferred  upon  him  by  the  Senate.  The  subjection 
of  this  body  to  the  ruhng  power  was  for  his  purpose  far  too  noto- 
rious. He  wished  to  receive  it  as  the  offer  of  those  who  had 
previously  opposed  the  idea  of  a  monarchy. 

He  doubtless  reasoned  that  he  would  thus  provide  before- 
hand against  opposition  of  any  kind  and  at  the  same  time  pre- 
vent any  possibihty  of  confusion  between  his  rule  and  that  of 
the  kings  of  France.  For,  it  would  be  argued,  it  would  not  be 
possiblp  for  him  to  kill  one  of  the  Bourbons  to-day  and  to 
appear  himself  on  the  morrow  as  planning  to  usurp  their  in- 
heritance. Consequently  the  initiative  must  come  from  the 
Tribunate.  A  member  of  that  body,  named  Curee,  was  induced, 
by  the  promise  of  one  of  the  richly  endowed  places  in  the  Senate, 
to  make  the  follomng  proposition  which  had  been  formulated 
in  the  Cabinet  of  the  Consul:  1st.  That  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
be  entrusted  as  Emperor  with  the  government  of  the  French 
Republic;  2d.  That  the  imperial  dignity  be  declared  hereditary 
to  his  descendants.  A  second  tribune,  an  exile  of  the  18th 
Fructidor,  was  commissioned  to  second  the  motion.  In  the 
session  of  April  30th,  1804,  Curee  presented  his  proposal,  and 
there  appeared  but  a  single  individual  who  argued  against  its 
acceptance — Carnot;  all  the  others  voted  in  favour  of  it.  The 
legislative  body  also  was  then  assembled  in  all  haste  for  a  special 
session  and  cast  a  similar  vote.  Thereupon  a  new  Constitution 
was  elaborated  under  the  direction  of  Napoleon  by  a  govern- 
ment committee  which  included  Talleyrand  and  Fouche  with 
the  Consuls.  This  constitution  was  then  discussed  in  the  Council 
of  State  and  finally  transmitted  to  the  Senate  for  sanction. 
In  the  solemn  session  of  May  18th,  1804,  it  was  then  adopted 
by  that  body — "this  change  bchig  demanded  by  the  interests 
of  the  French  people  " — by  a  vote  in  which  there  were  but  four 
dissenting  voices,  one  of  them  that  of  Sieyes;  the  new  Con- 
stitution of  France  was  then  delivered  over  to  the  First  Consul 

for  tranquillity,  the  guarantee  of  present  possessions  is  the  object  of  desire, 
with  the  prospect  of  a  future  undisturbed.  The  new  order  of  things  aflfords 
hope  of  this." 


^T.  34]  New   Dignitaries  279 

at  Saint-Cloud,  where  it  was  published  upon  the  same  day  as  the 
fundamental  law  of  the  state.    The  Republic  had  an  Emperor. 

This  Constitution  of  the  year  XII  was  not  of  those  which 
impose  limitations  to  the  power  of  the  monarch.  Nor  had 
that  by  any  means  been  the  intention  in  its  preparation.  In 
the  Senate  only  the  suggestion  was  brought  forward  in  an  ex- 
cessively timid  fasliion.  Importance  was  attached  chiefly  to 
the  question  of  the  hereditabiUty  of  the  chief  power  of  the  state. 
To  the  Emperor,  who  was  himself  childless,  the  right  was  con- 
ceded to  adopt  as  his  own  the  children  or  grandchildren  of  his 
brothers,  in  which  case  the  power  was  to  pass  to  them  on  his  de- 
cease. But  should  Napoleon  die  without  sons,  whether  the 
issue  of  his  marriage  or  adopted,  his  brothers  Joseph  and  Louis 
and  iheir  descendants  were  to  succeed  him  in  the  imperial 
office.  These  possible  heirs  were  proclaimed  French  princes. 
The  civil  Ust  of  the  Emperor  was  fixed  at  the  figure  named  in 
the  royal  constitution  of  1791;  that  is  to  say,  a  yearly  income 
of  25  millions  of  francs.  The  imperial  throne  was  to  be  sur- 
rounded by  six  grand  dignitaries,  who  were  to  enjoy  the  same 
honours  as  the  princes  and,  hke  them,  were  to  be  addressed  as 
"  Your  Highness "  and  ' '  Monseigneur  " ;  these  were  the  Grand 
Elector  (Grand  Electeur),  the  Arch-Chancellor  of  the  Empire, 
the  Arch-Chancellor  of  State  (Archichancelier  d'Etat),  the 
Arch-Treasurer,  the  Constable,  and  the  Lord  High  Admiral. 
Then  followed  the  high  officere  of  the  Empire;  that  is  to  say, 
sixteen  marshals  and  a  number  of  great  civil  functionaries;  these, 
like  the  six  grand  dignitaries,  were  all  membere  of  the  Senate. 
Besides  this  House  of  Lords,  which  Napoleon  did  not  consider 
as  possessing  either  national  or  representative  character,  there 
yet  remained  the  legislative  body  and  the  Tribunate.  Indeed, 
to  the  first  of  these  they  went  so  far  as  to  restore  the  power  of 
speech,  of  which,  however,  they  might  make  use  only  behind 
closed  dooi-s  and  in  the  privacy  of  the  three  sections  (the  juridi- 
cal, the  administrative,  and  the  financial)  into  which  it  was  to 
be  divided.  No  syllable  of  its  proceedings  was  to  reach  the  public. 

Shortly  after  tlie  pronudgation  of  the  Constitution  followed 
the  nominations.     The  two  Consuls,  Cambac^res  and  Lebrun, 


2  8o        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [i804 

were  appointed  grand  dignitaries,  the  former  Arch-Chancellor 
of  the  Empire,  the  latter  Arch-Treasurer.  Joseph  Bonaparte 
was  elevated  to  the  post  of  Grand  Elector,  and  Louis  to  that  of 
Constable.  Talleyrand,  who  had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  the 
establishment  of  the  new  constitution,  had  also  set  his  hopes 
upon  one  of  these  offices  of  grand  dignitary,  largely  because  it 
yielded  a  yearly  income  of  a  third  of  a  million  francs  ($65,000), 
but  he  was  disappointed;  he  remained  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  the 
office  of  minister  and  that  of  grand  dignitary  could  not  be  filled 
at  once  by  the  same  person.  Fouche,  on  the  contrary,  received 
the  reward  he  had  been  working  for;  he  was  again  made  Min- 
ister of  Police,  and  from  thenceforth  stood  in  the  front  rank 
among  those  with  whom  the  Emperor  took  counsel.  Fo,urteen 
generals  were  appointed  marshals  of  France:  Jourdan  on  ac- 
count of  his  victory  at  Fleurus  in  1794,  Berthier  for  his  ser- 
vices rendered  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Massena  for  Rivoli, 
Zarich  and  Genoa,  Lannes  and  Ney  for  divers  brilliant  actions, 
Augereau  for  Castiglione,  Brune  for  the  affair  on  the  Helder  in 
1799,  Murat  for  his  management  of  the  cavalry,  Bessieres  for 
his  command  of  the  Guards,  Davout  for  his  deeds  in  Egypt, 
and  in  addition  to  these  Bernadotte,  Soult,  Moncey,  and  Mortier. 
The  court  of  the  new  Emperor  was,  moreover,  organized  on 
quite  as  magnificent  a  scale  as  the  state.  It  included  a  Grand 
Almoner  (Cardinal  Fesch),  a  Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace  (Duroc), 
a  Grand  Chamberlain  (Talleyrand),  a  Grand  Master  of  the 
Hounds  (Berthier),  a  Grand  Master  of  the  Horse  (Coulain- 
court),  a  Grand  Master  of  Ceremonies,  and  in  addition  to  these 
a  perfectly  endless  train  of  Prefects  of  the  Palace,  court  ladies, 
and  minor  functionaries.  Napoleon  showed  marked  preference 
in  securing  for  these  positions  persons  bearing  names  of  ancient 
lineage.  Nor  did  he  fail  in  finding  descendants  of  noble  families 
eager  to  enter  his  service  At  the  court  of  the  little  Brienne 
cadet  who  had  once  been  the  target  for  the  jeers  of  the  young 
nobility  now  figured  a  Salm,  an  ArenlxTg,  a  La  Rochefoucauld, 
and  a  Montcsquiou.  He  had  forgiven  them  now,  but  not,  to  be 
sure,  until  he  had  brought  them  completely  into  subjection. 


^T.  34]  Imperial    Etiquette  281 

Among  the  court  officers  that  of  Master  of  Ceremonies  became 
of  special  importance  This  was  bestowed  upon  a  converted 
Emigre,  Monsieur  de  S^gur,  who  had  at  one  time  represented 
Louis  XVI.  at  the  Russian  court.  With  his  experience  of  the 
old  court  life  dc  Segur  soon  became  one  of  the  most  sought  after 
and  one  of  the  most  harassed  of  men.  For  etiquette  had  be- 
come a  matter  of  profound  study  at  the  Tuileries.  Enormous 
volumes  on  the  subject  of  ceremonial  during  the  reign  of  Louis 
XIV,  were  consulted,  extracts  made  from  them,  and  formal  dress- 
rehearsals  instituted.  Madame  Campan,  formerly  first  lady- 
in-waiting  to  Marie  Antoinette  and  now  principal  of  a  school  for 
young  ladies,  was  summoned  to  court  and  taken  into  counsel. 
Naturally  the  new  empire  of  the  parvenu  provided  ample  ma- 
terial for  secret  ridicule  and  all  manner  of  witticisms  at  the  capi- 
tal. Among  other  things  it  was  said  that  Liberty  had  made 
but  a  brief  appearance  in  Paris;  entering  by  the  "Barriere  de 
I'Enfer"  she  had  vanished  again  by  way  of  the  "Barriere  du 
Trone."  A  caricature  devised  by  some  satirist  represented  a 
woman  well  known  about  town,  w'ho  had  been  condemned  for 
the  theft  of  a  diadem;  she  was  now  making  an  appeal  to  the 
new  Emperor  asking  whether  such  a  transgression  be  really 
deserving  of  punishment  and  sohciting  a  new  trial.  These  were, 
however,  only  occasional  voices  finding  but  Httle  popular  re- 
sponse. When  the  question  was  put  to  the  French  people, 
not  as  to  whether  Napoleon  should  be  Emperor, — that  ai> 
peared  to  be  a  matter  of  course, — but  as  to  whether  the  imperial 
dignity  should  be  made  hereditary  in  his  family,  there  were 
but  two  thousand  five  hundred  "noes"  against  three  million 
five  hundred  "ayes."  * 

France  had  thus  declared  itself  in  favour  of  the  hereditabihty 
and  permanence  of  the  Revolutionary  Monarchy  with  all  its 
consequences.  Now  the  most  momentous  of  these  conse- 
quences was  war.  In  the  constitution  of  the  year  1804  the 
most  striking  feature  is  the  distinction  made  between  "Empire" 

*  These  were  the  figures  given  in  the  "  Moniteur."  A  detail  not  ^^-ithout 
interest  is  the  fact  that  from  among  two  hundred  Paris  lawj-ers  only  three 
voted  "yes." 


282        The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate        [1804 

and  "Etat"  (Empire  and  State),  \^^lat  constituted  the  State 
of  France  was  well  recognized;  the  Revolution  had  marked  out 
its  boundaries  with  the  Alps,  the  Rhine,  and  the  Pyrenees.  But 
what  was  the  extent  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire?  Where  were 
its  boundaries?    Had  it,  indeed,  any? 

This  uncertainty  was  an  earnest  of  war  instead  of  that  peace 
which  was  so  ardently  desired.  As  long  as  the  Empire  shall 
last  it  will  contmue  to  be  at  war,  and  when  it  ceases  to  be  vic- 
torious, it  wiU  disappear.  Wlien  the  time  came  for  selecting 
the  design  for  the  new  seal  of  state  the  committee  in  charge 
proposed  as  a  heraldic  device  a  "lion  in  repose."  These  words 
Napoleon  crossed  off  with  heavy  strokes  and  scrawled  hastily 
above  them:  "an  eagle  in  flight." 


i 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  WAR  OF  1805 

But  a  few  weeks  after  his  elevation  to  the  imperial  dignity 
Napoleon  betook  himself  to  the  camp  at  Boulogne,,  there  to 
distribute  crosses  of  the  Legion  of  Honour  to  officers  and  soldiers 
who  had  distinguished  themselves  in  the  recent  war.  The 
same  insignia  were  used  in  decorating  the  common  soldier  as  the 
officer  who  commanded  him,  a  most  remarkably  judicious 
measure,  observing  the  Revolutionary  principle  of  equaUty  and 
at  the  same  time  flattering  the  ambition  of  the  lowUest.  To 
appreciate  the  pride  which  was  engendered  by  this  popular 
decoration,  held  as  it  was  in  respect  by  the  whole  nation,  one 
should  read  the  narrative  of  Captain  Coignet,  who  received 
the  cross  as  a  simple  trooper.  From  henceforth  this  feeling  of 
pride  crowded  out  every  other  sentiment  in  the  army.  To  the 
enthusiasm  for  liberty  which  had  animated  the  soldiers  of 
Revolutionary  times  now  succeeded  the  love  of  glory  and  the 
striving  to  distinguish  oneself  and  to  be  distinguished.  The 
commanders,  Ukewise,  became  as  amenable  to  Napoleon's  will 
as  were  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army.  Now  was  the  time  when 
he  first  spoke  to  them  of  the  ' '  Empire  of  Europe  "  of  which  the 
various  countries  were  to  fall  to  his  generals  as  fiefs,  bringing 
before  their  eyes  glorious  prospects  of  magnificence  and  riches. 
It  depended  only  upon  them  whether  they  would  help  him  and 
themselves  to  obtain  all  this.  And  they  needed  no  further 
urging.  It  was  thus  that  the  republican  army  became  impe- 
riaUzed,  and  faithful  to  the  spirit  of  imperialism  does  it  remain 
as  long  as  a  single  ray  of  glory  rests  upon  the  "Little  Corporal." 
Said  Joseph  Bonaparte  at  this  time,  speaking  to  the  Pnissian 
ambassador:  "It  is  this  great  train  of  forces,  always  kept  in  the 
hope  of  advancing  at  the  sound  of  his  voice  and  in  his  footsteps 

2S3 


284  The  War  of  1805 


[1804 


to  the  acquisition  of  fresh  laurels  and  further  riches,  which 
constitutes  the  real  power  and  security  of  my  brother." 

The  army  on  the  northern  coast,  one  of  the  finest  and  best 
ever  at  Napoleon's  disposal,  was  placed  under  the  command 
of  Marshals  Bemadotte  (who   occupied   Hanover),  Ney,  Soult, 
Davout,  Augereau  and  the  General  of  Division  Marmont.     The 
infantry  was  unceasingly  practised  in  sea-service  on  the  fiat- 
boats,  and  everything  appeared  to  indicate  that  England  was 
to  be  made  to  suffer  in  her  own  territory  for  the  serious  losses 
which  she  had  inflicted,  since  the  reopening  of  hostilities,  upon 
the  commerce  of  France  and  Holland  and  their  colonies.     There 
were  officers  in  the  army  who  regarded  the  enterprise  as  ex- 
tremely hazardous,  while  others,  on  the  contrary,  considered  it 
practicable;   the  latter,  according  to  Marmont,  constituting  the 
greater    number.      The    crucial    question,    however,    yet    re- 
mains as  to  whether   Napoleon  planned  actually  to  make  the 
expedition  across  the  Channel,  or  whether,  in  accordance  with 
the  instructions  forwarded  to  Otto  in  October,  1802,  it  was  his 
intention  merely  to  keep  England  "in  constant  fear"  of  an  in- 
vasion.    The  latter  presumption  is  not  lacking  in  support  of  a 
weighty  character.     It  has  already  been  seen  how  gladly  he 
avoided  this  enterprise  in  1798  on  account  of  the  innumerable 
difficulties    involved.     These    difficulties   were    doubtless   yet 
before  his  eyes.     He  said  on  one  occasion  to  his  brother  Joseph 
that  he  had  no  thought  of  conducting  the  expedition  in  person, 
but  was  intending  to  entrust  it  to  Ney,  who  was,  moreover,  not 
to  be  sent  to  England,  but  to  Ireland.     The  most  complete  un- 
certainty   prevails    in   his   letters   concerning   the   time   which 
would  be  required  for  making  the  passage.     When  Fulton  sub- 
mitted to  him   his   project  for  a  steamboat  which  would  have 
made  him  indcpondont  of  wind  and  weather  and  assured  his 
superiority  to  the  English  upon  the  sea,  their  own  element,  his 
response  was  simply  to  dismiss  the  inventor  as  a  "charlatan" 
without  investigation  of  the  matter.     Finally  he  asserted  in 
later  years  that  there  had  never  been  any  serious  intention  of 
making  the  invasion.     Further,  the  observations  noted  down  by 
keen-sighted  persons  of  his  time — Madame  de  llemusat,  Miot 


^T.  33]    The  Projected  Invasion  of  England       285 

de  Melito,  General  Hulot,  and  the  diplomatists  Lucchesini  and 
Mettemich — contain  more  than  one  passage  indicating  doubt 
as  to  whether  this  project,  announced  with  so  much  rhetorical 
pomp  and  devised  with  all  possible  care,  ever  had  been  in- 
tended for  actual  execution.  In  any  case  the  outcome  of  it 
was  that  action  was  postponed  from  the  autumn  of  1803  to  the 
spring  of  1804,  and  then  again  to  the  following  autumn,  being 
destined  even  then  to  non-fulfilment.* 

But  even  thus  a  double  purpose  had  been  accomplished.  In 
the  first  place  the  steps  taken  had  been  really  successful  in 
arousing  the  fears  of  the  English.  An  army  of  volunteers  had 
been  organized  and  drilled  at  great  expense  for  a  war  of  defence; 
the  coast  was  fortified  and  a  large  part  of  the  British  fleet  held 
inactive  in  the  Channel.  In  the  second  place  it  had  been  pos- 
sible for  Napoleon,  under  pretext  of  this  invasion,  to  assemble  a 
powerful  army  which  might,  if  occasion  offered,  be  put  to  use  on 
the  Continent.  In  January,  1805,  at  a  session  of  the  Council  of 
State  in  which  the  budget  was  under  discussion  the  Emperor 
made  the  following  statement:  "For  two  years  France  has  been 
making  the  greatest  sacrifices  which  could  be  asked  of  her,  and 
she  has  borne  up  under  them.  A  general  war  upon  the  Continent 
would  demand  no  more.  I  have  the  strongest  army,  the  most 
complete  military  organization,  and  I  am  now  placed  just  as  I 
should  need  to  be  if  war  were  to  break  out  on  the  Continent. 
But  in  order,  in  times  of  peace,  to  be  able  to  assemble  such 
forces, — to  have  20,000  artillery  horses  and  entire  baggage 
trains, — some  pretext  must  be  found  for  creating  and  assembling 
them  without  allowing  the  Continental  powers  to  take  alarm. 
Such  a  pretext  was  furnished  by  this  projected  invasion  of  Eng- 
land. I  am  well  aware  that  to  maintain  all  these  artillery  horses 
in  time  of  peace  is  to  throw  thirty  millions  to  the  dogs ;  but  to- 
day I  have  twenty  days  advantage  of  all  my  enemies,  and   I 

*  Lucchesini,  for  instance,  writes,  May  17th,  1804:  "I  cannot  often 
enough  repeat  the  statement  that,  with  circumstances  as  they  at  present 
are,  the  secret  desire  of  the  First  Consul  is  for  a  Continental  war.  It  re- 
lieves his  honour  from  being  compromised  by  all  the  ado  that  has  been  made 
in  announcing  this  invasion. 


286  The  War  of  1805  [1803 

could  be  a  month  in  the  field  before  Austria  would  have  bought 
artillery  horses.  I  should  not  have  been  able  to  say  this  to  you 
two  years  ago,  and  yet  that  was  even  then  my  sole  aim."  * 

Such,  then,  were  the  military  preparations  made  for  the  Con- 
tinental war  so  long  planned  by  Napoleon,  but  the  diplomatic 
proceedings  have  yet  to  be  considered.  Napoleon's  first  poUtical 
steps  taken  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  with  England  were 
distinctly  offensive  in  nature.  The  occupation  of  the  German 
Electorate  of  Hanover  implied  at  bottom  a  violation  of  peace 
with  the  German  Empire,  and,  had  that  Empire  not  been  at  the 
point  of  dissolution,  this  act  would  in  itself  have  sufficed  to 
bring  about  open  warfare.  But  under  these  circumstances  the 
head  of  the  German  Empire  had  become  indifferent  to  such 
attacks  as  were  not  aimed  directly  at  Austria.  In  Prussia,  to 
be  sure,  the  Minister,  Haugwitz,  had  advised  that  the  Prussian 
troops  forestall  the  French  in  the  occupation  of  Hanover,  but 
the  other  councillors  of  the  cabinet  and  Queen  Louise  were  op- 
posed to  this  step,  while  Frederick  William  III.  himself  declared 
that  not  until  a  Prussian  subject  had  been  killed  on  Prussian 
soil  would  he  depart  from  his  neutrahty.  There  was  indeed 
Btill  a  German  Empire,  but  a  German  policy  had  long  ceased  to 
exist. 

But  the  occupation  of  Naples  was  destined  to  entail  more 
serious  consequences  than  that  of  Hanover.  This  affected  Russia, 
and  that  in  more  than  one  respect.  In  the  first  place  the  Consul 
had  pledged  himself,  in  the  secret  treaty  of  October  11th,  1801, 
to  leave  unmolested  the  kingdom  of  Queen  Caroline,  and  this 
agreement  he  had  now  violated.  In  the  second  place  the  occu- 
pation of  Taranto  put  a  check  not  only  upon  the  English  on  the 
islanrl  of  Malta,  but  also  upon  the  Russian  troops  on  the  island 
of  Corfu,  where  they  had  been  stationed  since  the  war  of  1799. 
Finally,  the  French  position  on  the  Adriatic  was  of  special  signi- 
ficance, since  it  favoured  the  plans  which  Napoleon  cherished  in 
regard  to  the  Orient,  these  being  diametrically  opposed  to  those 
of  the  Empire  of  the  Czars.     And  here  again  the  policy  was 

*  Miot  de  Melito,  who  heard  the  Emperor  make  this  speech,  quotes 
the  above  in  his  M^moires  (II.  258). 


.Et.  34]  Napoleon   and   Russia  287 

nothing  else  than  the  continuance^  of  that  of  tlie  Director)', 
whose  secret  alliances  with  the  factious  elements  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  were  instrumental  in  precipitating  the  last  war  with 
Russia.  Already  the  diplomatists  were  making  announcement 
in  their  reports  of  Napoleon's  designs  in  regard  to  the  Morea, 
nor  were  they  mistaken  hi  their  surmises,  for  we  have,  for  in- 
stance, his  letter  of  February  21st,  1803,  to  Decrds,  the  Minister 
of  the  Navy,  in  which  he  commissions  the  latter  to  fit  out  a  ship 
■with  arms  and  munitions  for  the  rebellious  SuUots  as  well  as 
for  the  inhabitants  of  the  Peloponnesus  who  were  at  war  with  the 
Turks.  At  Ragusa,  whose  Senate  had  established  relations 
with  Bonaparte  during  the  course  of  the  campaign  in  Italy  and 
had  since  remained  entirely  devoted  to  him,  the  French  Consul, 
Bruyere,  had  been  commissioned  to  bribe  the  Bishop  of  Monte- 
negro to  deliver  into  the  hands  of  the  French  the  mountains  and 
the  Gulf  of  Cattaro,  a  scheme  which  was  discovered  by  Austria 
in  June,  1803,  and  reported  at  St.  Petersburg.  There  Alexander 
had  resumed  the  policy  of  Catharine  II.  which  aimed  not  only  to 
conquer  Constantinople,  but  had  other  aspirations  equally  high, 
her  ambition  having  been  to  establish  an  ascendant  position 
on  the  Mediterranean.  The  Czar  was  much  offended  at  these 
machinations  of  Napoleon's,  and  the  effects  soon  became  appar- 
ent. The  Consul  had  no  wish  to  break  wdth  the  Czar;  on  the 
contrary,  he  had  counted  from  the  outset  upon  Alexander's  pre- 
serving a  neutral  attitude  and  had  chosen  him  as  arbiter  in  his 
quarrel  with  England.  But  the  Czar,  wishing  to  remam  en- 
tirely unhampered,  had  refused  that  office  and  had  instead 
proffered  his  services  as  mediator.  Yet  the  conditions  which 
he  proposed  at  Paris  and  London  in  August,  1803,  already 
clearly  indicate  a  prejudice  on  his  part  against  France.  He  did 
indeed  demand  that  England  should  evacuate  ]\Ialta,  in  exchange 
for  which  that  country  should  receive  the  island  of  Lampcdusa, 
but  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  his  proposition,  France  was 
at  the  same  time  to  evacuate  Hanover,  Switzerland,  and  Upper 
and  Lower  Italy,  retaining  only  Piedmont,  for  which  the  French 
were,  however,  at  last  to  indemnify  the  former  king.  Such  a 
programme  was  clearly  designed  with  a  view  to  resistance  against 


288  The  War  of  1805  [1804 

the  encroachments  of  Napoleon.  He  refused  the  acceptance  of 
these  terms,  whereupon  Markoff,  the  Russian  ambassador,  left 
Paris.     The  rupture  between  the  two  powers  had  taken  place.* 

At  the  first  sign  of  troubled  relations  with  France,  Russia 
had  taken  steps  toward  winning  Austria  and  Prussia  to  her 
cause,  but  at  first  without  success.  Prussia  remained  neutral 
for  reasons  already  given,  and  it  was  not  until  the  following  year, 
May  24th,  1804,  that  she  consented  to  form  a  defensive  aUiance 
with  the  Czar,  to  be  in  force  only  in  case  Napoleon  should  at- 
tempt to  extend  his  power  beyond  Hanover  or  directly  attack 
Prussia,  Frederick  William  then  directed  his  efforts  in  Paris 
to  prevent  either  of  these  contingencies,  and  he  received  satis- 
factory assurances  there,  Jime  1st,  1804. 

Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been  too  much  weakened 
by  the  recent  war  to  think  so  soon  of  taking  up  arms  again. 
Although  Russia's  change  of  policy  was  welcomed  with  lively 
satisfaction  in  Vienna,  the  Austrians  were  determined  not  to  be 
led  into  assuming  an  offensive  attitude  toward  France,  but  were, 
on  the  contrary,  ready  to  make  advances  toward  Napoleon  and  to 
yield  more  than  he  required  in  order  to  make  certain  of  leaving 
him  no  pretext  for  hostile  action.  At  the  very  opening  of  hos- 
tilities between  England  and  France  Francis  II.  had  closed  his 
ports  to  ships  of  both  nations,  a  measure  particularly  disadvan- 
tageous to  the  English.     To  Madame  de  Stael,  the  enemy  of 

*  Although  the  real  cause  of  the  breach  has  for  years  been  known, 
one  nevertheless  frequently  meets  in  the  most  recent  books  with  the 
assertion  that  the  animosity  of  Alexander  I.  toward  the  Corsican  was  due 
to  his  indignation  at  the  execution  of  Enghien.  Now  in  the  Memoirs 
just  published  of  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  the  year  1804,  there  is  a  document  clearly  setting  forth  Russia's 
Oriental  policy  of  that  time:  "The  body  of  the  territory  of  Turkey  in 
Europe  should  be  divided  into  small  states  with  local  governments  all 
united  in  a  federation  over  which  Russia  might  be  assured  of  decisive 
and  legal  influence  through  the  title  of  Emperor  or  Protector  of  the  Slavs 
and  of  the  Orient  which  should  be  conferred  upon  His  Imperial  Majesty. 
.  .  .  Austria,  in  case  it  should  be  necessary  to  procure  her  assent,  might 
be  appeased  with  Croatia,  a  part  of  Bosnia  and  Wallachia,  Belgrade, 
Ragusa,  etc.  Russia  would  have  Moldavia,  Cattaro,  Corfu,  and,  above  all, 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles  with  the  neighbouring  ports,  giving 
us  the  ascendency  there." 


^T.  35]   The  Creation  of  the  Empire  of  Austria    289 

Napoleon,  was  refused  permission  to  reside  in  Austria.     The 
same  precaution  was  taken  in  respect  to  the  Due  d'Enghien,  who, 
in  the  winter  of  1803—4,  wished  to  travel  to  England  by  way  of 
Vienna.     Books  were  forbidden  in  which  the  ruler  of  France  was 
attacked.     The  wearing  of  Bourbon  orders  was  prohibited  to 
French  6migr^s,  and  approach  within  a  limit  of  fifty  miles  of 
the   French   and   Swiss   boundaries   was   interdicted   to   them. 
When  the    princes   of  South   Germany  had   begun   to   incor- 
porate the  knights  of  the  Empire  and  the  latter  sought  protec- 
tion   of    Austria    and    actually    obtained    a    re-enforcement   of 
Imperial  troops  on  the  Austrian  frontier  France   categorically 
demanded  the  abrogation  of  that  measure,  and  to  this  the  Cabi- 
net of  Vienna  at  once  acceded.     Again,  when  the  territory  of 
the  German  Empire  was  trespassed  upon  in  the  arrest  of  Enghien. 
the  Emperor  Francis,  at  the  instigation  of  Russia,  made  at  first 
some  feeble  remonstrance,  but,  when  it  was  learned  in  \''ienna 
that  the  execution  of  the  Prince  had  taken  place,  the  court  con- 
tented itself  with  sapng  that  public  policy  sometimes  imposed 
"harsh  necessities,"  and  declared  the  affair  to  be  one  in  which 
France  alone  was  concerned.     Even   Napoleon's  title  of  Em- 
peror was  cheerfully  acknowledged,  though  on  condition  that 
Napoleon  should  hi  return  sanction  the  Empire  of  Austria,  newly 
constituted  August    10th,  1804,  pronounce  it  upon  an  equality 
with  France,  and  yield  precedence  to  Emperor  Francis  II.  as 
head  of  the  German  Empire.     After  some  hesitation  Napoleon 
consented  to  these  terms.     No  one  knew  as  well  as  he  for  how 
short  a  time  existence  was  yet  to  be  vouchsafed  to  the  German 
Empire,  and,  as  if  to  show  how  small  a  value  was  to  be  attached 
to  this  formal  concession,  he  betook  himself  just  at  this  time — 
September,   1804 — by  way  of    Belgium  to  Aix-la-Chapelle,  to 
hold  court  in  the  old  imperial  palace  of  Charlemagne  among  his 
Gennan  subjects  and  to  receive  their  homage.     Did  it  not  seem 
like  an  insult  to  Austria  to  demand  of  her  sovereign,  who  yet 
wore  the    crown   of  the    Carolingians,  that  the  document  in 
which  he  recognized  the  new  French  Empire  should  be  sent  to 
precisely  this  place?     But  Austria  was  ready  to  make  this  con- 
cession also  for  the  sake  of  peace,  and  promptly  at  the  time 


290  The  War  of  1805  [ism 

appointed   her   ambassador   made    his   appearance   at   Aix-la- 
Chapclle. 

Against  such  comphance  all  the  pressure  which  could  be 
brought  to  bear  by  Russia  and  England  was  futile.  It  was  in 
vain  that  Friedrich  Gentz  again  called  attention  to  the  revo- 
lutionary and  subjugating  character  of  French  policy  and 
showed  that  the  Empire  itself  was  nothing  but  the  Revolution 
again  under  another  form.  For,  said  he.  it  was  not  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  revolutionary  powers  that  Napoleon  had  reached 
his  new  dignity,  but  thanks  alone  to  their  aid.  He  had  not 
commissioned  the  army  to  proclaim  him  Emperor,  but  had 
fomided  his  elevation  upon  the  popular  sovereignty  of  the 
Revolution,  so  that  it  was  nothing  else  than  giving  sanction  to 
the  Revolution  to  accord  recognition  to  the  new  Empire.  The 
most  determined  resistance  must  be  opposed  to  it,  and,  above  all, 
Austria  and  Prussia  must  stand  and  act  together.  But  to  this 
view  of  matters  the  authorities  in  Vienna  could  not,  for  the  time 
being,  be  aroused.  They  would  be  content  if  France  only  did 
not  interfere  with  interests  specifically  Austrian.  The  occu- 
pation of  Hanover  might,  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  make 
difficulties  for  Prussia;  they  had  no  objection  to  seeing  their 
ancient  adversary  put  to  some  trouble;  and  if  Russia's  schemes 
in  regard  to  the  Orient  were  deranged,  that  was,  after  all,  notliing 
to  the  disadvantage  of  Austria. 

But  the  calm  of  neutrality  was  to  be  vouchsafed  for  a  short 
time  only  to  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Soon  after  his  elevation 
to  the  Imperial  throne  Napoleon  made  direct  assault  upon 
the  sphere  of  Austrian  interests,  and  just  at  the  point  indeed 
where  that  power  had  always  been  most  vulnerable — in  Italy. 
Austria  still  owned  territory  in  the  northern  part  of  the  penin- 
sula, and  every  new  encroachment  there  was  a  threat  to  her  pos- 
sessions. Meanwhile  the  following  events  had  taken  place. 
In  May,  1804.  the  new  Emperor  of  the  French  had  already  said 
to  the  Charge  d'Affaires  of  the  Italian  Republic  that  it  was  not 
fitting  that  he  should  at  the  same  time  be  Emperor  and  Presi 
dent  of  a  Republic,  and  in  case  he  were  to  continue  to  assure  to 
this  Republic  the  benefit  of  his  rule  the  Consulta  of  Milan  might 


yET.  35]  The  Treaty  between  Austria  and  Russia    29 1 

consider  the  matter  and  suljniit  to  liini  its  proposals.  The  Aus- 
trian ambassador  had  been  apprised  by  Melzi  in  Milan  of  this 
new  development,  and  the  question  was  now  debated  in  Vienna 
as  to  what  designs  Napoleon  had  upon  Italy.  It  soon  be- 
came clear  that  here  also  the  aim  was  to  establish  a  hereditary 
monarchy  by  means  of  which  Italy  was  to  be  bound  perma- 
nently and  more  closely  than  ever  to  France.  But  this  was 
directly  contrary  to  Austria's  designs,  since  she  was  determined 
on  no  account  to  yield  forever  the  hope  of  regaining  her  ascen- 
dency on  the  peninsula.  In  the  treaty  of  peace  with  France  of 
December;  1802,  she  had,  it  is  true,  recognized  Napoleon's  presi- 
dency for  life,  but  that  did  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  car- 
rying out  these  plans  for  the  future,  while  the  establishment 
of  a  Bonaparte  dynasty  in  Italy  would  put  a  definite  end  to 
any  such  prospects.  So  thoroughly  disquieted  were  the  Aus- 
trian authorities  over  this  matter  that  Cobenzl  even  declared 
that  the  future  fate  of  the  Republic  was  the  touchstone  whereby 
Napoleon's  real  intentions  might  be  discovered;  should  he  do 
away  with  the  independence  of  Lombardy  he  would  proceed 
to  make  all  Italy  tributary  to  himself,  nor  rest  content  until  he 
had  extended  his  sway  over  North  and  South  Germany  and 
conquered  the  Morea  and  Egypt.  It  was  this  danger  which 
now  roused  Austria  from  her  lethargy  and  led  her  to  draw  closer 
to  Russia,  whose  support  in  case  of  need  would  be  indispensable. 

November  6th,  1S04,  the  two  powers  concluded  a  treaty 
which  was.  however,  purely  defensive  in  character  and  was  to 
come  into  force  only  in  case  France  were  to  be  guilty  of  making 
further  encroachments  whether  in  Germany,  in  Italy,  or  in  the 
Orient  but  wliich,  in  case  of  victory  to  the  allies,  was  to  assure 
extension  of  the  Austrian  bomidary  to  the  Adda  and  the  return 
of  the  Archdukes  to  Tuscany  and  Modena  as  well  as  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  the  kingdom  of  Piedmont.  The  question  of  the 
Papal  Legations  which  had  been  so  much  disputed  was  left  to 
agreement  between  the  two  contracting  parties.  To  guard 
against  sudden  invasion  the  Austrian  garrisons  in  Venetia  were 
re-enfoiced  on  the  pretext  of  establishing  a  sanitary  cordon. 

While  the  eastern  powers  were  thus  arming  themselves  against 


292  The  War  of  1805  [I804 

further  encroachments  on  the  part  of  France,  Pope  Pius  VII, 
was  making  preparations  in  Rome  for  the  journey  to  Paris  for 
the  coronation  of  Napoleon.  This  ceremony  had  seemed  neces- 
sary to  the  Emperor  in  order  to  lend  glory  and  splendour  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world  to  his  self-imposed  dignity.  Only  under  pro- 
test and  after  prolonged  controversy  in  regard  to  the  form  of 
oath  to  be  administered  had  the  vicar  of  Christ  at  length  con- 
sented to  undertake  the  arduous  winter  journey  in  order  to 
anoint  him  who  had  but  shortly  before  been  accounted  guilty 
of  a  bloody  crime.  His  decision  was  doubtless  influenced  by 
two  contrary  emotions,  fear  and  hope:  fear  of  bringing  upon 
himself  by  refusal  the  wrath  of  the  mighty  potentate,  and  of 
being  thus  eventually  despoiled  of  the  States  of  the  Church; 
and  hope  of  obtaining  new  possessions,  perhaps  regaining  the 
long-desired  Legations,  and  having  Europe  see  how  the  most 
powerful  of  her  rulers,  the  adherent  of  the  Koran  in  1798, 
would  bend  his  knee  before  the  Bishop  of  Rome.  Nor  was  the 
Pope  alone  in  his  decision,  for  the  majority  of  the  College  of  Car- 
dinals, and  with  them  the  gifted  Secretary  of  State,  Consalvi, 
were  in  favour  of  the  journey's  being  undertaken,  and  before  the 
end  of  November,  1804,  the  Pope  arrived  in  Paris.  But  here 
he  at  once  became  aware  that  every  token  of  subordination,  even 
to  the  most  trifling  details,  was  being  carefully  avoided  by  Na- 
poleon.* In  one  matter  only  did  he  yield  submission.  Jo- 
sephine, who  had  long  been  in  dread  of  a  separation,  had  re- 
vealed to  the  Pope  that  she  had  been  united  with  her  husband 
by  civil  marriage  only  and  obtained  from  the  Holy  Father  his 
promise  that  he  would  make  the  coronation  conditional  upon 
the  previous  consummation  of  a  religious  marriage.  The  Em- 
press hoped  thus  to  bind  her  husband  irrevocably  to  herself,  a 

*  Savary  relates  in  his  "M^moires  "  that  in  the  drive  with  the  Pope 
from  Fontainebleau  to  the  capital  the  Emperor  even  took  the  seat  of 
honour  in  the  carriage,  and  this  assertion  has  been  accepted  by  Lanfrey 
and  repeated  in  his  biography.  Other  authorities,  however,  make  state- 
hients  to  the  contrary.  Consalvi  in  his  "M^moires"  makes  complaint 
only  in  a  general  way  of  "little  inconsiderate  acts  "  on  Napoleon's  part 
toward  his  guest  which  were  intended  to  remove  from  his  mind  any  illu- 
sions which  he  might  entertain  in  regard  to  his  own  superiority  of  position. 


.^^T.  35]       Napoleon  Crowned  by  the  Pope  293 

hope  later  doomed  to  disappointment.  For  the  time  being, 
however,  she  was  in  so  far  successful  that  the  church  marriage 
was  solemnized  in  secret  by  Fesch  on  the  day  before  the  coro- 
nation of  the  Imperial  couple,  which  took  place  December  2d 
in  the  cathedral  of  Notre-Dame.  It  was  observed  that  Napo- 
leon kept  the  Pope  awaiting  his  appearance,  and  that  instead 
of  allowing  the  pontiff  to  place  the  crown  of  golden  laurel  upon 
the  imperial  brow,  as  had  been  arranged,  the  candidate  himself 
seized  the  diadem  and  set  it  upon  his  head  before  Pius  could 
reach  it.  Not  even  in  this  formahty  would  he  yield  pre-emi- 
nence to  any  one.  The  Pope  recognized  that  his  hopes  had  been 
but  vain.  The  role  which  he  had  been  called  upon  to  play  in 
Paris  had  been  detrimental  rather  than  advantageous  to  his 
prestige.  This  indeed  he  did  accomplish:  that  the  French 
bishops,  who  had  sworn  fidelity  to  the  Civil  Constitution  and 
were  therefore  classed  as  heretics,  were  brought  to  return  to  the 
fold  of  the  Roman  primate ;  but  of  his  other  demands  there  was 
granted  and  assured  only  one,  and  that  of  very  secondary 
importance:  the  re-establishment  of  the  Gregorian  Calendar 
■with  the  understanding  that,  beginning  with  January  1st,  1806, 
the  Revolutionary  Calendar  should  be  abandoned.  The  saints 
of  the  Church  and  their  festal  days  again  obtained  recognition 
and  honour  in  France.  To  this  Napoleon  had  no  objections. 
Was  not  his  owti  precursor  and  ideal,  Charlemagne,  also  of  their 
number? 

And  now  that  the  papal  benediction  had  consummated  the 
estabUshment  of  the  Empire  the  Itahan  question  had  also  in  its 
turn  to  come  up  for  solution.  The  Itahans  were  well  content 
that  the  Republic  should  remain  in  the  form  of  a  kingdom  imder 
French  dominion,  but  they  protested  against  further  pajTnent 
of  tribute  and  demanded  assurance  that  the  territory  of  the 
state  should  not  suffer  diminution  and  that  French  officials 
should  be  superseded  by  natives  of  the  country.  It  had 
been  Napoleon's  original  plan  to  turn  over  this  vassal  kingdom 
to  one  of  his  brothers.  Joseph  or  Louis,  but  both  refused  the 
dignity,  behig  unwilling  to  renounce  their  claims  upon  the  throne 
of  France;  these  two  men,  who  but  ten  years  before  had  been 


294  The  War  of  1805  [isos 

at  a  loss  where  to  look  for  daily  bread,  now  spumed  a  crown. 
Exasperated  at  this  unlooked-for  opposition  to  his  wishes,  the 
Emperor  determined  upon  himself  assuming  the  title  of  King 
of  Italy  and  entrusting  to  a  viceroy  the  government  in  his  stead. 
This  post  was  to  be  occupied  by  Eugene  Beauhamais,  who,  to- 
gether with  Murat,  was  now  raised  to  the  rank  of  Prince  of  the 
Empire  and  Grand  Dignitary  of  France.  This  project  was  dis- 
closed to  a  body  of  Italian  delegates  who  had  come  to  Paris, 
whereupon  they,  on  March  5th,  1805,  officially  and  formally 
offered  the  crown  to  Napoleon.  On  the  following  day  he  an- 
nounced to  the  Senate  that  he  accepted  the  office,  and  on  May 
26th  crowned  himself  in  the  cathedral  of  Milan  with  the  iron 
crown  of  Lombardy  as  King  of  Italy.  He  is  alleged  to  have 
pronounced  at  that  time  in  a  strikingly  menacing  tone  the 
ancient  formula:  "God  has  bestowed  it  upon  me;  woe  to  him 
who  shall  lay  hands  upon  it!  " 

That  which  had  been  so  much  dreaded  in  Vienna  had  thus 
come  to  pass;  for  no  doubt  existed  in  the  mind  of  any  one 
there  but  that  Napoleon  meant  by  "Italy"  something  quite 
different  from  the  territory  comprised  within  the  Hmits  of  the 
Cisalpine  Republic.  Henceforth  he  proceeded  in  a  manner 
more  than  ever  disregardful  of  every  Austrian  interest.  Hardly 
more  than  a  few  weeks  had  elapsed  after  the  coronation  in  Milan 
before  he  conferred  upon  his  sisters  the  territories  of  Piombino 
and  Lucca,  and  introduced  into  Parma  and  Piacenza  the  French 
code  of  laws,  finally  arousing  the  greatest  excitement  through- 
out Europe  by  taking  away  the  independence  of  the  Ligurian 
Republic  through  the  simple  process  of  incorporating  with  France 
the  land  and  city  of  Genoa.  All  of  these  acts  were  in  direct  con- 
flict with  the  treaty  of  December  26th,  1802.  to  which  Austria 
had  been  forced  to  submit,  while  the  erection  of  the  kingdom 
of  Italy  and  its  union  with  France  was  in  addition  a  flagrant 
violation  of  the  Peace  Convention  of  Luneville,  which  had  ex- 
pressly provided  that  the  territories  of  Austria  and  France 
should  remain  separated  from  one  another  by  intermediary 
states.  From  this  time  Francis  II.  trembled  not  only  for  the 
influence  which  he  had  hoped  to  regain  in  Italy,  but  for  what 


.ivr.  351  The   Coalition   of  1805  295 

had  been  left  of  his  possessions  there, — for  Venice.  And  indeed 
tidings  were  soon  brought  from  Milan  to  the  intent  that  Napo- 
leon was  planning  the  acquisition  of  that  territory  also,  and 
proposed  to  offer  Servia  and  Bosnia  to  Austria  in  compensa- 
tion. As  an  offset  to  the  sanitary  cordon  established  by  Aus- 
tria, Napoleon  posted  two  armies,  each  numbering  30,000  men, 
at  Verona  and  Alessandria,  and  they,  under  the  guise  of  manoeu- 
vres, rehearsed  again  the  battles  of  Castiglione  and  Marengo. 
To  an  Austrian  general  who  came  to  present  salutations  Napo- 
leon made  answer  by  alluding  to  the  Austro-Russian  alliance, 
adding  that  he  had  no  dread  of  war,  kno\ving  how  it  should  be 
carried  on. 

Wliile  Napoleon  was  thus  challenging  Austria  in  Italy, 
Russia  and  England  were  most  actively  engaged  in  endeavours 
to  force  Emperor  Francis  into  declaring  war.  In  England 
Addington's  peace-loving  ministry  had  been  forced  to  give 
place  during  the  preceding  year,  1804,  to  that  of  Pitt  with  its 
aggressive  policy,  the  first  act  of  which  was  to  organize  a  coali- 
tion against  France.  It  was  not  long  before  the  British  Cabinet 
had  established  an  understanding  with  Sweden,  where  reigned 
Gustavus  IV.,  one  of  Napoleon's  bitterest  foes,  and  this  step 
was  soon  followed  by  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Russia,  dated 
April  11th,  1805,  which  had  as  its  basis  a  general  uprising  of  the 
Continental  States  against  the  dominion  of  the  Corsican.  It 
was  part  of  the  project  to  induce  Prussia  and  Austria  to  enter 
the  coalition.  But  all  attempts  to  persuade  Prussia  ended  in 
failure.  Frederick  William  felt  peace  to  be  sufficiently  assured 
to  Northern  Germany  by  the  defensive  treaty  entered  into 
on  May  24th  of  the  preceding  year;  he  refused  to  make  attack 
upon  France;  indeed,  under  the  influence  of  Hardenbcrg,  he 
allowed  himself  to  become  involved  with  Napoleon  in  negotia- 
tions having  for  their  object  the  acquisition  of  Hanover.  With 
Austria,  however,  the  efforts  were  successful.  It  was  certainly 
no  sUght  demand  upon  this  power  to  change  from  the  attitude 
of  defence  which  she  had  hitherto  assumed  to  one  of  aggression 
against  Napoleon.  For  at  that  time  the  Austrian  army  num- 
bered hardly  more  than  40,000  men  imder  arms  without  a  single 


296  The  War  of  1  805  [I805 

battery  completely  equipped  with  horses,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
deplorable  state  of  the  finances.  Archduke  Charles,  the  only 
veteran  commander  at  the  disposal  of  the  government,  had,  just 
at  this  critical  time,  instituted  a  radical  reform  of  the  army 
requiring  for  its  execution  a  series  of  years  of  peace,  and  he 
advised  strenuously  against  war  with  a  man  whose  superiority 
on  the  field  he  acknowledged  mthout  reserve.  But  England 
and  Russia  made  every  effort  to  quiet  these  scruples,  the  former 
by  offers  of  large  financial  support,  and  the  latter  by  promises 
of  re-enforcement  to  the  Austrian  forces  from  the  Russian  army 
and  of  securing  the  co-operation  of  Prussia  even  should  it  prove 
possible  only  through  coercion.  But,  in  spite  of  all,  the  two 
powers  were  unable  to  persuade  Austria  to  the  decisive  step 
until  Pitt  had  declared  that  the  English  subsidies  were  avail- 
able only  for  the  expenses  of  a  war  which  should  be  begun  before 
the  termination  of  the  year  1805,  and  Alexander  I.  threatened  to 
withdraw  from  the  project  entirely  in  case  there  were  any  further 
hesitation.  It  was  a  sort  of  diplomatic  surprise  which  placed 
the  Austrian  Cabinet  where  it  must  choose  between  the  two 
alternatives  of  regaining,  by  aid  of  a  coalition  of  the  great 
Powers,  its  former  possessions  and  status  in  Italy,  including 
possibly  even  a  part  of  Bavaria,  and,  in  case  Prussia  continued 
to  withstand  the  advances  of  the  Powers,  Silesia  likewise, — 
or  of  losing  this  powerful  support  and  being  exposed  entirely 
alone  to  the  attacks  of  Napoleon.  Under  such  constraint,  on 
July  7th,  1805,  Francis  II.  resolved  upon  entering  the  coalition, 
and  gave  orders  for  the  mobilization  of  the  army.  General 
Mack,  who  was  regarded  as  a  genius  in  matters  of  organization, 
and  who,  in  opposition  to  Archduke  Charles,  was  convinced  of 
the  practicability  of  putting  the  Austrian  army  in  marching  order 
within  the  allotted  time,  now  received  commission  to  accom- 
plish this  feat.  War  on  the  Continent,  then,  was  no  longer  a 
matter  of  doubt.  This  outcome  was  satisfactory  to  England, 
as  relieving  her  of  the  fear  of  French  invasion;  it  was  equally 
so  to  Russia  as  a  means  of  turning  Napoleon's  attention  from 
the  Orient;  and  France  was  about  to  engage  in  a  conflict  ardently 
desired  by  her  sovereign  as  an  excuse  for  abandoning  the  haz- 


-Et.  35]  England  or  Austria?  297 

ardous  project  of  invasion  in  favour  of  certain  triumph  else- 
where, while  Austria  had  nothing  to  lead  her  to  take  part  beyond 
her  sanguine  hopes  of  victory  and  of  territorial  acquisitions. 

England's  negotiations  with  the  Powers  on  the  Continent 
had  remained  no  secret  to  Napoleon.  To  avoid  the  appearance 
of  being  the  aggressor  in  the  coming  war  he  had  addressed  a 
letter  in  January,  1805,  to  George  III.,  exhorting  him  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  which  in  contents  and  purpose  closely 
resembled  that  former  document  by  means  of  which  he  had 
so  dexterously  brought  about  the  war  of  1800.*  The  reply 
was  to  the  effect  that  England  must  first  come  to  agreement 
with  the  Continental  Powers  with  which  she  was  maintaining 
confidential  relations.  This  was  equivalent  to  open  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  project  of  a  coalition.  Moreover,  in  February 
Pitt  had  demanded  and  received  from  Parliament  the  sum  of 
five  and  a  half  million  pounds  sterling  for  secret  purposes;  this 
was  a  subsidy  for  Austria's  assistance.  Napoleon  might  there- 
fore feel  assured  that  the  Continent  was  making  preparations  for 
resistance  against  him.  In  spite  of  this,  it  was,  according  to 
his  correspondence,  his  intention  to  make  a  descent  upon  Eng- 
land in  the  middle  of  August  with  the  combined  Spanish  and 
French  fleets.  Or  was  this  only  artifice,  with  the  intention, 
perhaps,  of  keeping  England  in  suspense  up  to  the  last  possible 
moment  and  of  lulUng  to  rest  the  uneasiness  of  Austria?  That 
remains  to  be  seen. 

On  July  16th  the  Emperor  issued  orders  to  Admiral  Villeneuve 
to  join  forces  with  the  Spanish  squadron  at  Ferrol,  to  assemble 
with  these  the  squadrons  at  Rochefort  and  Brest,  and  under 
favourable  conditions — Nelson  having  been  lured  away  to  the 
West  Indies — to  make  his  appearance  in  the  Channel.  This 
letter  contains  a  very  remarkable  postcript:  the  Admiral,  in 
case  of  change  in  the  situation  through  unforeseen  contin- 
gencies, was  rather  to  return  to  Cadiz. f 

*  See  page  194. 

t  The  passage  reads  literally:  "If,  in  consequence  of  battles  sustained. 
of  considerable  separation  of  ships,  or  of  other  contingencies  which  ha\ c 
not  been  foreseen,  your  situation  should  be  considerably  altered,  ...  in 


298  The  War  of  1805  [isos 

On  July  20th  Berthier  received  instructions  to  prepare  for 
embarkation  a  part  of  the  army  at  Boulogne  for  use  in  any 
exigency.  But,  strange  as  it  may  appear,  it  was  at  just  about 
this  time  that  Napoleon  began  systematically  to  force  the  war 
with  Austria.  By  August  2d  Lucchesini,  the  Prussian  ambassa- 
dor, announced  to  the  home  authorities  that  French  newspapers 
were  filled  with  affronts  toward  Austria  and  Russia,  and  that 
the  Emperor — as  he  had  long  surmised — appeared  to  be  incit- 
ing the  Continental  war.  This  conjecture  proved  correct,  for 
on  the  following  day  Napoleon  instructed  his  ambassador  in 
Vienna  to  demand  of  Francis  II.  that  he  should  withdraw  to 
their  cantonments  in  Bohemia  and  Hungary  the  troops  garri- 
soning Venice  and  the  Tyrol.  Failure  to  comply  would  be  re- 
garded as  an  indication  that  he  was  not  desirous  of  remaining 
at  peace  with  France.  This  summons  was  repeated  some  days 
later,  couched  in  more  pressing  terms,  and  again  on  August  13th, 
in  the  most  peremptory  manner  possible.  On  that  same  day 
Napoleon  wrote  to  Talleyrand  that  he  was  determined  upon 
attacking  Austria,  and  upon  being  in  Vienna  before  November, 
in  order  to  advance  thence  against  the  Russians,  when  he  should 
be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  compliance  on  the  part  of 
the  Austrian  government  with  a  demand  to  disband  the  army. 
He  must  have  assurance  on  this  subject  within  two  weeks,  or 
else — and  this  was  to  be  imparted  by  the  minister  to  the  Aus- 
trian ambassador — Emperor  Francis  should  not  celebrate  the 
Christmas  festival  in  Vienna.* 

The    fortnight's    respite    allowed    to    the    Austrian    Cabinet 

this  case,  which  with  God's  help  will  not  arise,  it  is  our  wish  that,  after 
having  raised  the  blockade  of  our  squadrons  at  Rochefort  and  Ferrol, 
you  should  come  to  anchor  preferably  in  the  port  of  Cadiz." 

*  In  this  letter  is  to  be  found  amongst  other  statements  the  following: 
"The  explanations  made  by  Monsieur  de  La  Rochefoucauld  [the  French 
ambassador  at  the  Austrian  court]  in  Vienna,  and  my  first  conmiunication 
[of  the  3d  instant]  have  opened  this  question;  the  connnunication  which 
I  sent  you  shortly  afterwards  [of  the  7th  instant]  has  continued  this 
question,  and  tliis  which  I  send  you  to-day  [of  the  13th  instant]  should 
close  it.  You  know  ttiat  it  is  one  of  my  principles  to  pursue  the  same 
course  as  the  poets  do  to  prepare  a  dramatic  conclusion.  Impetuosity 
does  not  lead  to  the  desired  end." 


^T.  36]  The   Blow  Strikes  Austria  299 

paasod,  but  \'illcneuve  did  not  make  his  appearance  in  the 
Channel.  He  had  in  fact  found  in  his  way  the  obstacleB  which 
had  been  anticipated,  and  had  supposed  himself  authorized  to 
turn  back  to  Cadiz.  Napoleon  pretended  the  utmost  wrath  at 
this  conduct  on  the  part  of  his  admiral.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
it  could  not  have  caused  surprise  and  must  on  the  contrary  have 
been  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  him.  On  the  very  next  day 
after  the  arrival  of  N'illeneuve's  despatches,  August  23d,  he 
charged  Talleyrand  to  prepare  the  manifesto  declaring  war 
against  Austria.  In  it  he  was  to  take  as  key-note  the  allegation 
that  Emperor  Francis  had  thrown  his  troops  into  Italy  and  the 
Tyrol  just  at  the  moment  when  the  French  forces  were  being 
embarked  for  the  invasion  of  England.  That  was,  to  be  sure, 
absolute  falsehood,  for  the  Austrian  preparations  dated  from 
months  previous  and  had  also  been  observed  by  Napoleon  for 
that  length  of  time,  W'hile  the  embarkation  of  the  army  at  Bou- 
logne was  not  carried  out  until  August, — the  last  orders  dating 
from  the  20th  to  the  22d.  Moreover,  he  had  been  negotiating 
with  Prussia  as  early  as  the  middle  of  July  to  arrange  to  have 
the  troops  of  Frederick  William  relieve  his  owti  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  Hanover,  which  is  evidence  in  itself  that  he  was  even  at 
that  time  counting  upon  the  march  toward  the  east.  These 
facts  tempt  one  to  think  that  this  whole  proceeding  of  em- 
barkation was  nothing  but  a  pretext  for  the  sake  of  giving  some 
apparent  basis  to  his  accusation  against  Austria,  and  of  being 
able  to  say  in  his  manifesto  that  the  course  pursued  by  Vienna 
had  hindered  him  in  his  great  undertaking  against  England  and 
compelled  him  to  carry  the  war  into  Austria.* 

On  the  evening  of  August  27th  the  Emperor  signed  the 
official  marching  orders  directing  the  steps  of  the  entire  army 
toward  tlie  east.  Three  days  earlier,  on  the  24th,  Marmont 
had  already  received  secret  commands  to  proceed  by  forced 

*  Later,  in  ISll,  he  went  through  the  same  manneuvre  when  he  wrote 
to  Decres,  the  Minister  of  the  Navy,  in  these  words:  "It  is  even  my  inten- 
tion to  embark  20,000  men  upon  the  vessels,  frigates,  and  transports  of 
these  two  squadrons,  and  to  keep  them  thus  embarked  for  a  month  or  six 
weeks,  so  that  the  menace  may  be  real."  See  also,  in  regard  to  1805,  Piou 
des  Loches,  "Mes  Campagnes,"  p.  137. 


^oo  The  War  of  1805  [I805 

marches  to  Mainz.  The  camp  at  Boulogne  was  broken  up. 
The  Continental  war  had  begun. 

Down  to  the  most  recent  times  the  statements  of  General 
Daru  have  been  recounted  and  beheved,  according  to  which  the 
idea  of  a  Continental  war  was  first  conceived  by  Napoleon  after 
the  arrival  of  the  despatches  from  Villeneuve  and  the  plan  of 
campaign  dictated  extemporaneously  at  a  single  stroke  as  if 
moved  by  sudden  inspiration.  That  forms  a  part  of  the  Napo- 
leonic legend.  The  war  had  been  for  years  foreseen  and  the 
manner  of  its  execution  of  course  maturely  weighed  and  resolved 
upon.  But  even  in  this  case  Napoleon's  foresight  and  calcula- 
tion are  none  the  less  amazing.  For  events  were  to  prove  him 
correct  in  his  reckoning:  November,  1805,  actually  did  find  him 
in  the  heart  of  Austria,  and  his  opponent  did  not,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  celebrate  the  Christmas  festival  in  his  capital.  There  has 
probably  never  been  another  man  who  understood  measuring 
with  such  precision  his  own  forces  against  those  of  the  rest  of 
the  world.  People  have  thought  that  they  saw  in  this  something 
preternatural.  But  Napoleon  formed  no  exception  to  the  rest 
of  humanity.  It  was  only  that  in  him  certain  human  attri- 
butes were  developed  to  an  extraordinary  degree  which  lent  to 
his  personality  something  surpassingly  great,  even  gigantic. 
He  could  still  see  clearly  when  the  sight  of  others  was  dim^ 
and  what  was  to  most  people  mere  chaos  presented  itself  to  his 
eye  in  clear  and  distinct  outlines.  General  Rapp  recounts  in 
his  Memoires  a  characteristic  occurrence.  One  day  Cardinal 
Fesch  wished  to  make  some  expostulations  in  regard  to  the  policy 
which  the  Emperor  was  pursuing.  Hardly  had  he  uttered  a 
couple  of  words,  however,  when  Napoleon  led  him  to  the  win- 
dow and  asked  him:  "Do  you  sec  that  star?"  It  was  broad 
daylight.  "No,"  replied  the  Cardinal.  "Very  well,  then;  so 
long  as  I  remain  the  only  one  who  can  perceive  it  will  I  go  my 
way  and  permit  no  manner  of  comment."  Thus  with  a  firm  and 
steady  hand,  generally  without  others  suspecting  his  designs, 
did  he  trace  out  his  course  into  the  future. 

While  the  French  army  was  advancing  toward  the  Rhino  as 
quietly  as  possible  under  forced  marches  such  as  had  until  then 


^T.  30]       The  Austrian  Plan  of  Campaign  301 

been  unheard  of  even  under  Napoleon's  Icadcrsliij),  AitPtria  was 
also  making  preparations  for  the  contest,  and  on  September  3d, 
1805,  issued  a  declaration  of  war  agauist  France.  On  the  same 
day  Cobenzl,  the  minister,  informed  the  French  ambassador 
that  Austria  was  assembling  her  forces  "in  order  to  aid  in  estab- 
lishing in  Europe  a  state  of  affairs  conformable  to  the  treaties 
which  France  had  broken  in  violation  of  international  law. ' ' 
On  September  8th  the  troops  of  Emperor  Francis  crossed  the  Inn. 
It  would  be  natural  to  suppose  that  Austria  would  have  in- 
formed herself  exactly  by  this  time  in  regard  to  the  strength 
of  the  Boulogne  army,  and  have  concluded  that  it  would  take  the 
most  direct  route,  so  that  Germany  would  be  made  the  principal 
field  of  operations.  But  such  was  not  the  case.  Instead  of  this 
Italy  was  the  point  always  kept  in  mind  in  Vienna  even  from  the 
military  standpoint.  A  plan  of  campaign  sketched  by  Arch- 
duke Charles  had  been  adopted  as  early  as  July  for  the  guidance 
of  the  Austrian  forces,  and  according  to  this  three  armies  were 
to  be  stationed  in  Italy,  in  the  TjtoI,  and  on  the  Inn,  and  opera- 
tions were  to  be  begun  by  the  strongest  of  these,  the  one  in 
Italy.  This  army,  under  the  command  of  Archduke  Charles, 
was  to  establish  itself  securely  in  Lombardy,  while  the  German 
army,  having  effected  a  junction  with  the  Russians,  was  to 
advance  into  Southern  Germany,  and  the  third,  under  Archduke 
John,  through  Switzerland.  In  particular  it  was  decided  to 
press  forwartl  as  rapidly  as  possible  through  Bavaria  and  be- 
yond the  lUer,  so  as  to  carry  the  war  into  foreign  territory  and 
to  make  sure  of  the  troops  of  Elector  ]\Iaximilian  Joseph  of 
Bavaria,  who  was  friendly  to  France.  No  engagement,  how- 
ever, was  to  be  ventured  before  the  arrival  of  the  Russians,  but 
rather,  if  necessity  demanded,  the  army  was  to  retreat  behind 
the  Inn.  According  to  the  mihtary  convention  between  these 
two  powers  the  Russians  were  to  set  forth  toward  Austria  in  three 
distinct  armies  and  in  such  manner  that  the  van  of  the  first, 
numbering  something  over  50,000  men,  should  reach  the  Inn  on 
October  16th.  At  the  decisive  point,  therefore,  the  forces 
were  insufficient  on  account  of  their  separation.  Archduke 
John,  w^ho  had  taken  part  in  the  deliberations,  says  in  his  j\Ie- 


302  The  War  of  1805  [isoo 

moirs:  "Austria  counted  upon  the  Russian  auxiliary  troops 
already  on  the  march,  and,  though  knowing  perfectly  at  what 
time  they  were  to  be  looked  for  on  the  Inn,  failed  to  take  pre- 
cautions in  the  intervening  time  during  which  her  active  and 
indefatigable  adversary  might  appear  with  his  mobile  and  well- 
equipped  forces."  This  was  perhaps  a  cardinal  blunder,  but 
another  of  equal  importance  was  committed  in  failing  to  appoint 
to  the  command  of  the  German  army  the  general  who  had  for- 
merly on  several  occasions  defeated  the  French  on  German  soil 
— in  sending  Archduke  Charles  to  Italy,  while  Mack,  as  Quarter- 
master General  to  the  Emperor,  was  to  conduct  operations  at 
the  point  of  critical  interest.  The  young  Archduke  Ferdinand 
of  Modena-Breisgau  was  with  the  army  solely  as  representative 
of  Francis  II.  and  under  instructions  to  submit  without  reserva- 
tion to  such  dispositions  as  should  seem  good  to  Mack.  The 
last-named  was  well  known  to  Napoleon;  an  irresolute  char- 
acter, puffed  up  with  conceit,  who  considered  liimself  vastly  the 
superior  of  any  adversary  and  who  now,  on  account  of  his  skill 
as  an  organizer,  possessed  the  unlimited  confidence  of  his  sov- 
ereign. It  was  after  the  Neapolitan  campaign  of  1799,  when 
Mack  had  been  sent  to  Paris  as  prisoner  of  war,  that  Napoleon 
had  made  his  acquaintance  and  expressed  himself  in  regard  to 
him  to  Bourrienne  in  these  words:  "  Mack  is  one  of  the  most 
mediocre  men  that  I  have  ever  seen  in  my  life;  presumptuous 
and  vainglorious,  he  thinks  himself  efficient  in  every  respect 
It  would  please  me  to  have  him  sent  some  day  as  opponent  to 
one  of  our  good  generals ;  that  would  be  something  worth  seeing. 
He  is  self-important  and  that  leaves  nothing  more  to  be  said. 
Unquestionably  he  is  one  of  the  most  incapable  men  in  exist- 
ence. To  add  to  this  he  is  usually  imlucky."  And  now  this 
insignificant  creature  stood  opposed  to  the  all-powerful  com- 
mander himself. 

Mack  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the  French  would 
leave  a  strong  army  behind  on  the  shores  of  the  Channel  to  protect 
the  country  against  an  invasion  of  the  l^^nglisli,  while  another 
army  would  have  to  be  left  within  the  country  itself  to  prevent  a 
threatening  revolutionary  movement;  Napoleon  would  therefore 


.t:t.  36]  Bavaria  Sides  with   Napoleon  303 

not  bo  able  to  appear  in  Germany  with  any  very  consiclerable 
forces,  nor  before  the  arrival  of  the  Russians  upon  the  scene 
of  action.*  Relying  upon  this  supposition,  Mack  hurried  for- 
ward with  troops  hastily  collected,  poorly  equipped,  and  defi- 
cient in  numbers,  to  take  advantage  of  the  possibility  of  invad- 
ing France  before  the  forces  of  the  enemy  should  be  concen- 
trated. Moreover,  following  Napoleon's  example,  he  had  re- 
solved upon  supplying  the  armies  by  means  of  requisitions,  a 
step  which  from  the  outset  produced  tremendous  confusion. 
The  course  of  wisdom  would  have  been  to  await  behind  the  Inn 
the  coming  up  of  the  Russians,  but,  his  desire  of  securing  the 
aid  of  the  Elector's  troops  being  allowed  to  override  all  other 
considerations,  he  pressed  on  into  Bavaria,  where  his  hopes  w^ere 
after  all  doomed  to  disappointment.  For  the  Elector  Maxi- 
milian Joseph,  though  bound  by  ties  of  kinship  to  Russia,  was 
more  firmly  linked  by  his  interests  to  the  cause  of  France  and, 
after  some  wavering,  allowed  himself  to  be  won  over  by  the  latter. 
He  ordered  his  troops  to  retire  before  the  Austrians,  concluded 
an  aUiance  with  Napoleon,  whose  army  then  in  passing  through 
absorbed  that  of  Bavaria.  This  step  shattered  the  plans  of 
the  Austrians,  but  Mack  hastened  onward  nevertheless,  hoping 
to  gain  the  bank  of  the  lUer  and  fortify  it,  since  he  assumed  that 
the  enemy  would  advance  through  the  Black  Forest. 

When,  on  September  19th,  Archduke  Ferdinand  came  to  take 
command,  he  found  the  bulk  of  his  army,  about  60,000  men 
strong,  on  the  march  between  the  Inn  and  Munich,  while  trust- 
worthy information  announced  to  him  that  Napoleon  had  set 
out  from  Boulogne  with  the  entire  army  of  the  coast,  amounting 
to  150,000  men,  and  might  appear  on  the  Iller  by  October  10th. 
This  was  radically  different  from  all  that  Mack  had  assumed. 
Under  these  conditions  the  Austrians  by  advancing  farther 
would  involve  the  risk  of  being  still  more  widely  separated 

*  The  English  did  as  a  matter  of  fact  phin  a  descent  upon  Quibeion 
and  asked  for  the  Austrian  General  Radetzky  as  head  of  the  general  staff 
The  unfounded  report  of  a  revolt  against  Napoleon  in  France  had  long 
been  spread  abroad  by  their  agents.  According  to  Radetzky's  M^moires, 
recently  published,  this  was  one  of  the  causes  which  induced  Mack's 
premature  advance  into  Germany. 


304  The  War  of  1805  [i805 

from  the  allies  who  were  following  them,  and  thus  overpowered 
in  their  isolated  condition.  This  fact  was  promptly  recognized 
by  the  Archduke,  who  ordered  the  army  to  halt.  But  Mack  in- 
duced Emperor  Francis,  who  was  just  then  for  a  short  time  with 
the  troops,  to  order  the  command  to  halt  recalled,  and  in  the 
last  week  of  September  the  principal  force  of  the  army  was 
actually  assembled  on  the  Iller,  so  as  to  rely  upon  Ulm  as  a 
support  if  the  enemy  should  advance  by  way  of  Stuttgart,  or 
upon  Memmingen  in  case  he  should  come  by  Strasburg  and 
through  the  Black  Forest.  He  counted  particularly  upon  Ulm, 
which  place  had,  upon  his  recommendation,  been  surrounded 
in  1796  with  new  defences.  It  never  crossed  his  mind,  however, 
that,  should  the  French  troops  stationed  in  Hanover  and  Hol- 
land but  march  southward,  his  line  of  retreat  must  inevitably 
be  endangered. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  Austrians  were  gathering  on  the 
Iller,  the  principal  body  of  Napoleon's  army  was  crossing  the 
Rhine  between  Kehl  and  Mannheim.  They  had  marched  by 
night  as  well  as  by  day  almost  without  sound.  To  give  tidings 
of  its  movements  was  strictly  forbidden  to  the  newspapers.  It 
consisted  of  five  divisions  of  cavalry  commanded  by  Murat  and 
five  army  corps  under  orders  of  Ney,  Lannes,  Soult,  and  Da- 
vout.  Two  other  corps,  under  Marmont  and  Bemadotte,  ad- 
vanced from  the  north  toward  Wiirzburg.  A  seventh,  under 
Augereau,  constituted  the  reserve  in  Alsace.  Auxiliary  troops 
furnished  by  Southern  Germany  increased  the  size  of  the  army 
by  28,000  men.  All  told  Napoleon  had  at  his  command  more 
than  200,000  warriors,  a  splendid  and  imjiosing  army  upon 
which  he  never  wearied  of  congratulating  himself.  The  com- 
manders of  the  various  corps  were  for  the  most  part  no  older 
than  himself,  and  Davout  even  a  year  his  junior,  while  Mar- 
mont was  but  thirty-one  years  of  age;  but  all  were  experienced 
soldiers  and  completely  devoted  to  the  man  who  was  their  leader. 
The  "Italian  Army,"  cut  off  as  it  was  from  the  "Grand  Army," 
was  exp(^cted  to  carry  on  its  operations  alone  inider  the  com- 
mand of  Massena. 

Hardly  had  the  Emperor  learned,  by  means  of  the  field  tele- 


-Et.  36]  Mack's   Delusion  305 

graph  and  excellent  Bpios,  that  Mack  was  marching  upon  Ulm 
while  the  Russians  were  still  far  from  reaching  the  Inn,  when  he 
determined  upon  passing  to  the  left  of  the  Black  Forest  and 
crossing  the  Danube  below  Ulm,  so  as  to  thrust  himself  between 
the  Austrians  and  their  allies  and  defeat  each  of  them  sepa- 
rately. Murat  with  the  cavalry  reserve  was  commissioned 
to  confirm  Mack  in  his  illusions  by  demonstrations  in  the  Black 
Forest,  making  it  apparent  that  the  French  were  coming  from 
that  quarter  and  masking  the  advance  of  the  four  corps  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  This  mancEUvre  was  carried  out 
with  the  utmost  precision.  On  October  7th  Davout,  Soult, 
Lannes,  and  Ney  reached  the  Danube,  their  corps  forming  a 
line  reaching  from  Heidenheim  to  Ottingen,  while  Bernadotte 
had  followed  the  direct  road  from  Wiirzburg  to  IngoLstadt 
through  the  Prussian  principality  of  Ansbach,  Marmont  being 
stationed  a  little  to  the  west  at  Neuburg.  Two  days  later  the 
army  had  crossed  the  river  and  now  advanced  from  the  east  upon 
Ulm.  Bernadotte  and  Davout  alone  remained  ])ehind  to  keep 
watch  upon  the  Russians,  who  were,  moreover,  not  yet  in  sight. 
To  prevent  the  possibility  of  the  enemy  escaping  into  the  Tyrol 
Soult  was  ordered  to  seize  Memmingen  with  his  corps. 

Of  these  movements  Mack  did  not  remain  in  ignorance. 
He  was  kept  informed  of  them  by  Schulmeister,  a  spy  serving 
both  of  the  contestants  and  who  acquired  a  certain  notoriety 
during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  But,  instead  of  realizing  that  the 
French  army  was  bent  upon  his  capture.  Mack  deluded  himself 
with  "nothing  but  a  dream," — as  he  himself  later  denominated 
the  hisane  notion, — that  Napoleon  was  on  the  retreat  toward 
France,  whither  he  had  been  recalled  by  the  danger  of  revolution 
and  the  fear  of  an  invasion  of  the  British.*     The  Austrian 

*  The  opinion,  frequently  expressed,  that  Schuhneister  misled  Mack 
into  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  was  retreating  into  France  has  been 
proved  erroneous.  French  discontent  with  Napoleon  was  in  Austrian 
governmental  circles  a  fixed  idea  having  important  political  consequences. 
(Cobenzl  to  Kutusoff,  October  12th,  1805,  in  Angeli,  "  Ulm  und  Austerlitz," 
Militiirzeitung,  1878,  p.  302.)  Schulmeister's  reports  were  correct. 
It  was  not  until  Mack  sent  him  to  Stuttgart  "  to  gather  information 
concerning  the  revolt  of  the  French  against  their  Emperor  "  that  this 


306  The  War  of  1805  [I805 

troops,  thought  he,  could  do  no  better  under  such  circum- 
stances than  to  remain  concentrated  at  Ulm,  whence  they  could 
harass  and  pursue  the  flank  of  the  French  as  they  hurried  past. 
The  idea  was  in  itself  an  absurdity;  for  him,  Mack,  to  pursue 
Napoleon,  and  that  with  an  army  which  had  in  its  haste  been 
obliged  to  forego  all  that  was  most  essential;  which  through 
forced  marches  and  countermarches  had  lost  almost  all  power 
of  endurance  and  possessed  only  a  feeble  reserve  artillery  with 
entirely  insufficient  ammunition,  and  among  whose  regiments 
there  were  several  which  marched  absolutely  barefoot  and  had 
at  their  disposal  nothing  but  the  cartridges  in  their  pouches! 
It  was  in  vain  that  Archduke  Ferdinand,  who  appreciated  the 
distress  and  danger  incurred,  opposed  this  foolhardy  project; 
in  vain  that  all  the  generals  of  inferior  rank  protested  against 
it;  Mack  obstinately  persisted  in  maintaining  that  the  French 
army  was  in  retreat. 

Meanwhile  the  various  French  corps,  like  the  fingers  of  a 
grasping  hand,  were  encompassing  the  enemy;  they  threw 
back  into  Ulm  every  advanced  division,  and  finally  bombarded 
the  city  and  called  upon  it  to  surrender.  The  victory  gained  by 
Ney  at  Elchingen  on  October  14th  effectively  contributed  to 
this  result.  It  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  that  the  Arch- 
duke, acting  upon  his  own  responsibility,  succeeded  in  cutting 
his  way  out  with  two  battahons  and  eleven  squadrons  by  way 
of  Goppingen  to  Nordlingen  and  thence  into  Bohemia.  Not 
until  then  did  Mack  rouse  from  his  dream.  On  October  16th 
he  declared  himself  ready  to  enter  upon  negotiations,  and  on 
the  17th  they  were  concluded.  If  within  a  week — so  read  the 
terms — there  arrive  no  relief,  the  army  at  Ulm  shall  be  prisoners 
of  war  with  the  exception  of  the  officers,  who  shall  be  allowed  to 
go  free  upon  parole ;  an  entrance  shall  be  opened  to  the  French, 
enabling  them  to  station  a  l^rigade  in  the  fortress.  But,  as  if 
this  ignominy  were  still  not  sufficient,  Mack,  in  an  interview 
with  Napoleon,  allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  into  agreeing 
that  the  capitulation  should  take  effect  as  early  as  October  20th, 

wary  man  gave  up  the  cause  of  Austria  as  lost  and  thenceforth  served 
Napoleon  alone. 


^T.  36]  The   Surrender   of  Ulm  307 

On  that  day  three  Austrian  corps,  still  numbering  23,000  men, 
laid  down  their  arms  before  the  enemy.  "The  shame  which 
overwhelms  us,"  wrote  the  Austrian  Captain  de  L'Ort  in  his 
journal,  "the  mire  which  clings  to  us,  leaves  spots  which 
can  never  be  cleansed.  While  the  battalions  were  defiling  past 
to  lay  down  their  arms,  Napoleon,  in  the  simplest  garb,  sur- 
rounded by  his  marshals  adorned  with  gold  and  embroideries, 
conversed  with  Mack  and  several  of  our  generals  whom  he  called 
to  himself  after  they  had  filed  past.  The  Emperor,  in  the  uni- 
form of  a  common  soldier,  wearing  a  gray  cloak  scorched  at 
elbows  and  skirts,  a  hat  without  any  distinctive  mark  crushed 
down  upon  his  head,  his  arms  crossed  behind  his  back  and  warm- 
ing himself  at  a  camp-fire,  talked  with  vivacity  and  presented 
an  aspect  of  good-nature."  He  had  won  an  almost  bloodless 
victory.  "I  have  accomplished  what  I  set  out  to  do,"  he  had 
written  on  the  preceding  day  to  Josephine,  "I  have  destroyed 
the  Austrian  army  by  means  of  marches  alone."  And,  in 
fact,  except  for  the  corps  of  Kienmayer,  which  was  advancing 
along  the  Inn,  the  re-enforcements  which  had  draw7i  near  from 
the  Tyrol  but  had  now  again  withdrawn  thither,  and  for  the 
small  detachment  with  which  the  Archduke  had  made  his  escape, 
Austria  had  lost  all  her  forces  upon  the  scene  of  operations  north 
of  the  Alps.* 

Naturally  the  catastrophe  at  Ulm  had  its  reactionary  effect 
upon  the  other  army  divisions.  Archduke  Charles  found  him- 
self compelled  to  abandon  his  secure  position  behind  the  Adige 
in  order  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Italy  with  the  least  possible 
loss.  A  successful  encounter  with  Massdna  at  Caldiero  on 
October  30th  and  31st  enabled  him  to  make  an  orderly  retreat, 
even  though  not  without  considerable  losses,  and  to  effect  a  junc- 

*  Mack  made  an  attempt  later  to  justify  himself.  He  endeavoured 
to  lay  the  blame  upon  the  conduct  of  the  Archduke,  upon  that  of  his 
generals,  or  tlie  violation  of  the  Ansbach  territory  on  the  part  of  the 
French.  But  investigation  soon  disclosed  the  frailty  of  these  subter- 
fuges and  recognized  in  him  alone  the  culprit.  He  was  deprived  of  rank 
and  honours  and  sentenced  to  two  years'  imprisonment.  History  has 
since  that  time  wholly  and  unreservedly  confirmed  this  judgment  of 
condemnation. 


308  The  War  of  1805  [i805 

tion  at  Marburg  on  November  20th  with  Archduke  John,  whose 
continuance  in  the  Tyrol  had  Hkewise  become  impossible.  The 
fate  of  Mack  had  thus  overthrown  the  entire  Austrian  plan  of 
campaign:  from  his  attitude  of  offence  Emperor  Francis  had 
been  reduced  to  that  of  defence,  and  his  remaining  hopes  now 
depended  solely  upon  the  Russians,  since  Archduke  Charles 
was  three  times  as  far  away  from  the  capital  as  was  the  enemy, 
and  want  of  supplies  necessitated  his  approach  to  the  Hun- 
garian frontiers.  It  was  a  hard  fate  to  be  obliged  to  rely  upon 
foreign  troops  for  defence.  Moreover,  the  alhance  with  Russia 
had  already  ceased  to  be  of  a  very  deep-seated  nature,  since 
Alexander  at  heart  resented  Austria's  aspirations  toward  domi- 
nation in  Italy  as  much  as  ever  Paul  I.  had  condemned  them. 
Still  for  the  present  the  common  danger  continued  to  hold  the 
allies  closely  bound  to  one  another. 

But  almost  at  the  same  moment  that  the  coalition  against 
France  received  so  rude  a  blow  upon  the  Continent,  it  gained 
upon  the  seas  a  victory  which  must  remain  forever  memorable. 
Villeneuve  had  remained  with  the  combined  French  and  Span- 
ish fleets  ever  since  August  in  Cadiz,  followed  unremittingly  by 
Napoleon's  resentment.  Writing  to  the  Minister  of  the  Navy 
after  his  departure  from  Boulogne,  the  Emperor  said  of  the  Ad- 
miral: "Villeneuve  is  a  wretch  who  ought  to  be  ignominiously 
dismissed;  lacking  all  gift  at  combination,  without  courage 
and  without  general  interest,  he  would  sacrifice  everything  to 
save  himself."  It  is  easy  to  recognize  now  how  far  from  genuine 
was  this  wrath  and  how  glad  the  Emperor  was,  in  secret,  to  be 
at  last  rid  of  the  project  of  invasion.  To  his  hard  heart  it  was 
not  a  matter  of  the  slightest  importance  that  his  selection  of  a 
scapegoat  should  be  an  innocent  man.  To  the  admiral,  whom 
he  ought  to  have  discharged  if  his  guilt  had  really  been  so  great, 
he  now  gave  orders  to  sail  from  Cadiz  toward  Naples  to  the 
support  of  Saint-Cyr,  and  to  attack  the  English  on  the  way  at 
any  time  when  he  should  have  the  advantage  in  point  of  num- 
ber of  ships.  Villeneuve  represented  in  reply  that  his  squad- 
ron was  in  the  worst  of  condition,  that  the  Spanish  ships  in 
particular  were  manned  chiefly  by  sailors  who  had  never  been 


.Et.  36]  The   Battle   of  Trafalgar  309 

through  a  naval  mancEuvrc,  leaving  the  chances  in  battle  very 
much  against  him.  All  quite  without  avail.  He  had  to  set 
sail  and  to  prepare  forthwith  for  combat,  since  Nelson  confronted 
him  almost  immediately  after  leaving  port  with  but  twenty-seven 
ships  of  the  line  to  oppose  to  Villeneuve's  thirty-three.  The 
British  vessels  were,  to  be  sure,  admirably  equipped  through- 
out and  manned  by  experienced  seamen  under  command  of  the 
admiral  of  greatest  genius  belonging  to  the  foremost  seafaring 
nation  in  the  world.  The  result  was  inevitable.  Nelson 
departed  somewhat  from  the  usual  form  of  attack,  a  fact  which 
did  not  escape  Villeneuve,  but  with  his  inferior  material  he  was 
unable  to  meet  the  blow,  and  thus  was  lost  to  Napoleon  the  naval 
battle  at  Cape  Trafalgar  on  October  21st,  1805.  Of  the  French 
ships  eighteen  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  eleven  fled  back 
to  Cadiz,  while  the  remaining  four  beat  out  to  sea  and  were 
eventually  captured  like  the  first.  More  than  seven  thousand 
Frenchmen  fell  in  this  furious  battle,  the  English  losing  hardly 
a  third  as  many,  though  among  them  was  one  man  who  more 
than  equalled  a  fleet  in  value — Nelson  himself.  Villeneuve 
did  not  long  survive  him.  Tormented  and  crushed  by  the 
wrath  of  his  sovereign, — who  could  not  forgive  the  admiral 
for  the  error  which  he  had  himself  committed, — life  became 
insupportable,  and  he  committed  suicide  upon  his  return  from 
captivity.  It  is  said  that  the  Emperor  would  never  allow  the 
21st  of  October  to  be  recalled  to  his  mind,  and  that  the  victims 
of  this  disaster  never  received  any  but  ungracious  recognition 
at  his  hands.  And  it  must  be  admitted  that  at  Trafalgar  more 
had  been  decided  than  the  outcome  of  a  battle.  The  fate  of 
an  entire  continent  hung  upon  the  fact  that  henceforth  British 
supremacy  on  the  seas  was  incontestable  and  a  direct  invasion 
of  England  was  therefore  scarcely  to  be  regarded  as  a  possibility. 
This  circumstance  overclouded  the  success  at  Ulm.  New 
victories  would  have  to  be  won  to  re-establish  the  glory  of  the 
Empire.  But  Napoleon,  knowing  as  yet  nothing  of  the  defeat 
and  loss  of  his  fleet,  hastened  to  pursue  the  Russians,  who  had 
indeed  reached  the  Inn  and  there  united  themselves  with  Kien- 
mayer's  corps,  but  upon  hearing  the  fate  of  Mack  had  at  once 


3IO  The  War  of  1805  [i805 

begun  a  retreat.  It  was  his  hope  that  these  forces  of  the  enemy 
would  make  a  stand  against  him  on  the  Traun  or  on  the  Enns, 
whence,  having  beaten  them,  he  would  proceed  in  triumph 
straight  toward  the  capital  and  there  dictate  terms  of  peace. 
But  Kutusoff,  the  leader  of  the  Russians,  whom  Emperor  Fran- 
cis had  appointed  general-in- chief  of  the  combined  army, 
sought  before  all  else  to  retire  where  he  could  effect  a  junction 
with  the  second  Russian  army  advancing  under  Buxhoewden; 
he  was  not  to  be  overtaken,  and  eventually  slipped  across  the 
bridge  at  Krems  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  whence  he  pro- 
ceeded in  a  northeasterly  direction  toward  Briinn  by  way  of 
Znaim.  Murat  with  his  cavalry  had  pressed  the  most  closely 
on  the  heels  of  the  enemy,  being  unremittingly  urged  to  haste  by 
his  brother-in-law.  But  he  now  drew  down  upon  himself  bitter 
reproaches  for  hastening  on  to  Vienna  instead  of  following  up 
the  foe  upon  the  other  bank  of  the  river.  From  the  convent 
of  Melk  Napoleon  wrote  him  on  November  11th:  "You  received 
orders  to  follow  close  upon  the  Russians.  ...  I  try  in  vain  to 
find  an  explanation  of  your  conduct.  .  .  .  You  have  lost  me  two 
days  and  have  thought  only  of  the  vainglory  of  entering  Vienna. 
But  no  glory  is  to  be  gained  where  no  danger  is." 

The  Emperor  saw  at  once  that  this  course  had  imperilled  an 
unprotected  division  marching  on  the  farther  side  of  the  river 
under  command  of  Mortier,  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  came  near 
being  wiped  out  by  the  Russians  on  that  very  day  near  Diirrn- 
stein.  It  made  no  amends  for  this  reverse  that  at  the  same 
time  Davout  near  Leoben  came  upon  an  Austrian  corps  com- 
manded by  Merveldt  which  had  separated  from  Kutusoff  at 
Steyer  in  order  to  protect  the  approaches  to  the  Alps,  and  forced 
it  into  a  retreat  which  soon  became  a  flight  toward  Graz. 

But  in  spite  of  all  Nai)olcon  found  means  of  turning  the  new 
situation  to  account.  If  Murat  was  now  on  the  march  to  Vienna, 
he  must  make  sure  there  of  the  passages  across  the  river  and 
thence  make  his  way,  followed  by  two  army  corps,  northwest- 
ward toward  Znaim,  there  to  cut  off  from  Kutusoff  the  way  into 
Moravia.  Since  haste  was  a  prime  consideration,  much  de- 
ix'iidcd  upon  preventing  the  Vieimese  from  destroying  the  Tabor 


Mr.  36]  Murat's  Trick  3 1  i 

bridge.  To  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  Murat  showed 
himself  fully  equal.  On  the  13th  he  entered  the  city  and 
marched  directly  through  it  to  the  bridge  which  spanned  the  arm 
of  the  river  in  three  divisions.  The  garrison,  under  command 
of  a  Prince  of  Auersperg,  was  drawn  up  on  the  opposite  bank 
with  orders  upon  the  first  approach  of  the  French  to  set  fire 
instantly  to  the  arches,  which  had  been  covered  in  advance 
with  inflammable  materials.  But  ]\Iurat  succeeded  in  deluding 
the  Austrian  commander  into  the  l)eliof  that  negotiations  for 
a  suspension  of  hostilities  had  been  concluded,  offering  an  imme- 
diate prospect  of  peace.  Auersperg  and  his  oflicers,  with  the 
exception  of  Kienmayer,  believed  these  assurances  the  more 
readily  as  General  Bertrand  pledged  his  word  of  honour  as  to 
their  truth.  The  bridge  was  not  fired,  the  French  passed  over 
it,  and  the  Austrian  General  barely  got  his  troops  away  along 
the  road  to  Briinn. 

The  statements  made  by  Murat  were  nothing  but  a  trick. 
It  was  true  that  Emperor  Francis  had  opened  negotiations  on 
November  3d,  but  these  had  come  to  naught  in  view  of  the 
demands  of  Napoleon,  which  had  been  nothing  less  than  the 
cession  of  Venetia,  the  Tyrol,  and  Upper  Austria,  and  the  hopes 
of  the  Austrians  again  depended  solely  upon  Kutusoff's  effect- 
ing a  junction  with  the  second  column  and  then  striking  a  decisive 
blow  with  the  combined  forces  which  should  compel  the  enemy 
to  give  way. 

To  Napoleon,  on  the  other  hand,  everything  depended  upon 
getting  the  Russians  between  two  fires.  One  part  of  the  French 
army  were  in  pursuit  of  them,  while  ]\Iurat  operated  against  their 
right  flank  with  the  corps  of  Davout  and  Lannes.  It  seemed 
for  a  time  as  if  this  plan  were  going  to  be  successful  and  that 
the  decisive  moment  was  at  hand.  Kutusoff,  who  clearly  rec- 
ognized his  situation,  had  retreated  by  forced  marches,  but  in 
consequence  his  troops  were  in  urgent  need  of  some  days  of  rest. 
He  was,  it  is  tnie,  far  in  advance  of  the  French  who  were  pur- 
suing him,  but  he  was  notwithstanding  in  inmiinent  danger  from 
the  corps  advancing  from  the  south.  This  must  at  all  hazards 
be   evaded.     For   this   purpose   Bagration,    one   of   Kutusoff's 


312  The  War  of  1805  [I805 

generals,  was  detailed  with  some  thousands  of  men  to  intercept 
and  detain  Murat  on  the  road  by  which  he  was  advancing,  and 
so  protect  the  repose  and  further  advance  of  the  main  army. 
To  the  north  of  Hollabrunn,  Murat,  who  had  with  him  at  the 
time  only  a  part  of  Lannes'  corps,  came  upon  the  enemy  and, 
thinking  himself  confronted  by  the  bulk  of  the  hostile  forces, 
did  not  venture  to  attack  until  re-enforced.  To  gain  the  time 
necessary  for  the  remainder  of  the  corps  to  come  up  he  made 
pretence  of  proposing  an  armistice,  and  to  this  Kutusoff,  to 
whom  nothing  could  have  been  more  opportune,  consented, 
though  purposely  delaying  his  reply.  A  document  was  there- 
upon drawn  up  according  to  which  the  Russian  pledged  himself 
— with  no  less  fraudulent  intention — to  march  out  of  Austria 
as  soon  as  Napoleon  should  have  ratified  the  treaty.  The 
Russian  had  thus  gained  the  days  of  respite  needed  by  the 
army.  When  the  tidings  reached  Napoleon  at  Schonbrunn  he 
was  beside  himself  with  rage  at  this  successful  stratagem  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy  which  had  enabled  liim,  by  leaving  Ba- 
gration  behind,  to  escape  to  the  north,  where  at  Porlitz,  near 
Briinn,  he  efTected  a  junction  with  the  Viennese  garrison  and 
another  at  Wischau  with  the  second  Russian  army.  It  was  no 
consolation  that  on  November  16th  Bagration  was  overcome 
by  Murat  with  a  force  greatly  superior  in  number  to  the  Rus- 
sians, who  were  thereby  forced  to  retreat.  The  name  of  Holla- 
brunn was  not  to  be  inscribed  on  the  Arc  de  Triomphe  in 
Paris. 

Napoleon  had  not  accomplished  his  purpose.  Kutusoff  had 
escaped  and  might  now,  protected  by  the  cannon  of  Olmiitz, 
safely  await  re-enforcements,  which  had  been  already  brought 
within  no  very  considerable  distance  by  General  Essen,  while  a 
force  of  45.000  men  under  General  Bennigscn  was  advancing 
from  Breslau.  In  Bohemia  Archduke  Ferdinand  had  assem- 
bled a  corps  which  formed  in  a  manner  the  right  wing  of  the 
Russo- Austrian  position.  Archduke  Charles  was  marching 
toward  Marburg  with  the  intention  of  reaching  Vienna  by  way 
of  Konncnd  and  Raab.  Moreover,  the  })()litical  situation  of 
the  allies  had  also  changed  materially  for  the  better.     Prussia 


Alt.  3G]      Prussia  Leans  towards  the  Coalition     3  1  3 

seemed  at  last  convinced  in  spite  of  all.  The  absolute  disre- 
gard of  formalities  on  the  part  of  the  French  before  marching 
through  the  territory  of  Ansbach  had  suddenly  changed  the 
feeling  of  Frederick  WilUam  III.  The  neutrality  upon  which 
he  prided  himself  as  the  supreme  achievement  of  his  pohtical 
course  had  been  violated  and  his  self-esteem  thereby  much 
injured.  He  now  assented  to  Riussia's  urgent  petition  for  pas- 
sage for  her  troops,  and  allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  by 
Emperor  Alexander,  who  came  to  Berlin  toward  the  end  of 
October,  not  indeed  into  immediate  participation  in  the  war, — 
from  that  he  was  held  back  by  Hardenberg, — but  at  least  into 
making  a  compromise  according  to  the  terms  of  which  Prussia 
was  to  demand  of  Napoleon  the  liberation  of  Naples,  Holland, 
and  Switzerland,  the  disunion  of  the  Italian  and  French  crowns, 
and  the  indemnification  of  the  King  of  Sardinia, — in  short,  the 
restriction  of  the  French  system  of  expansion, — and,  in  case 
of  refusal,  to  enter  the  coalition  with  a  contribution  of  180,000 
men  (November  3d,  1805).  Count  Haugwitz  was  despatched 
to  lay  the  matter  before  Napoleon.  He  was  given  until  the 
middle  of  December  to  decide  the  question,  the  Prussian  army 
standing  equipped  ready  at  any  moment  to  take  part  in  the 
conflict.  The  convention  had  this  great  advantage  for  the 
Russians  now  at  war,  that,  in  case  of  being  beaten  in  Moravia, 
they  could  retreat  into  Silesia  and  there  be  supported  by  an 
army  of  about  50,000  men. 

As  will  be  readily  seen.  Napoleon's  situation  was  by  no 
means  favourable.  He  had  hoped  to  dictate  terms  of  peace  in 
Vienna,  and  now  instead  he  had  been  obliged  to  extend  his  line 
of  operations  far  beyond  what  he  had  purposed  and  to  detach 
many  of  his  troops  to  serve  as  protection  to  his  flanks.  Ney 
had  marched  toward  the  Tyrol,  Marmont  toward  Styria,  Da- 
vout  toward  the  Hungarian  frontiers,  and  Bernadotte  toward 
Bohemia,  so  that  there  now  remained  at  his  immediate  disposal 
only  the  corps  of  Murat,  Lannes,  and  Soult.  Fully  appreciatmg 
the  situation  in  wliich  he  thus  found  himself,  he  learned  just  at 
this  time  of  Prussia's  sudden  change  of  policy  and  of  the  defeat 
at  Trafalgar,  and  reaUzed  that  his  most  earnest  efforts  must  now 


314  The  War  of  1805  [I805 

be  directed  toward  finding  some  relief  from  these  accumulated 
difficulties  through  division  among  his  enemies.  In  spite  of  the 
refusal  of  Francis  II.  to  conclude  peace  on  the  before-mentioned 
conditions,  Napoleon  had  not  broken  off  all  relations  with  the 
headqviarters  of  his  opponent,  and  after  the  seizure  of  Vienna 
had  even  addressed  himself  once  more  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
with  such  result  that  the  Austrian  diplomat  Stadion  came 
accompanied  by  General  Gyulai  to  the  French  headquarters  at 
Briinn  with  a  view  to  entering  upon  negotiations.  They  were 
commissioned  to  act  in  conjunction  mth  Haugwitz,  the  Prus- 
sian negotiator,  who  now  approached  with  intentional  slowness. 
It  is  a  matter  of  profoundest  interest  to  study  the  way  in  which 
Napoleon  set  to  work  to  prevent  this  co-operation.  His  first 
step  was  to  send  the  Austrian  ambassadors  to  Talleyrand  at 
Vienna  under  pretence  that  he  was  himself  about  to  repair 
thither;  meanwhile  he  issued  orders  to  have  Haugwitz  detained 
at  Iglau  and  at  the  same  time  sent  his  adjutant-general,  Savary, 
to  Alexander  I.,  who  had  now  joined  the  Russian  army,  to  ask 
for  an  armistice  and  a  parley,  in  which — as  he  intimated  to  the 
adjutant  of  the  Czar — he  purposed  to  surrender  Turkey  to 
Russia.  Should  Alexander  consent  to  the  proposed  terms  and 
conclude  peace,  Austria  might  be  harassed  to  the  uttermost; 
should  he  not,  a  new  basis  would  of  course  have  to  be  found 
upon  which  to  treat  with  Austria.  The  latter  alternative  was 
the  outcome  of  his  diplomacy.  The  Czar  remained  firm,  and 
on  November  30th  Napoleon  directed  Talleyrand  in  writing  to 
cease  to  demand  from  Austria  the  whole  of  Venetia  and  the 
Tyrol,  but  merely  the  districts  of  Legnano  and  Verona  for 
the  kingdom  of  Italy,  and  Augsburg,  Eichstiidt,  the  Breisgau, 
and  Ortenau  for  his  South  German  allies.  But  Stadion  also 
remained  immovable,  at  least  he  would  not  enter  upon  nego- 
tiations without  the  co-operation  of  Haugwitz.  The  latter  had, 
however,  received  from  his  king  oral  instructions  to  preserve 
peace  whatever  the  circumstances,  and  having  observed  in 
Briinn  preparations  for  an  early  encounter  between  the  armies, 
was  evidently  determined  to  learn  the  outcome  before  commit- 
ting himself  and  was  not  to  be  coerced  into  premature  action. 


Mt.  36]  The   Russian   Advance  3 1  ^ 

Beyond  saying  to  Talleyrand,  in  convcrRation  with  him  on 
December  Ist,  that  hiw  sovereign  ardently  desired  peace  and 
was  ready  to  make  contribution  toward  its  re-establishment, 
he  would  give  no  indication  of  his  mission. 

But  while  Napoleon  thus  vainly  strove  to  improve  his  situ- 
ation, the  adversary  himself  took  steps  which  helped  him  out 
of  his  pretlicament.     With  his  reduced   forces  Napoleon   had 
not  dared  to  follow  up  the  Russians  beyond  Briinn  and  attack 
them  in  their  secure  position  protected  by  a  stronghold.     What 
had  been,  however,  beyond  his  most  sanguine  hopes  now  took 
place:  the  Russians    came   to  him.     To  their  misfortune  the 
Czar  had  set  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  and  this  young 
prince,  devoured  by  ambition,  was  urgently  desirous  of  winning 
the  glory  of  having  defeated  a  Bonaparte  in  the  field.     His 
plan  was  to  take  the  offensive  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  only 
rational  course  lay  in  standing  upon  the  defensive  until  the  arrival 
of  the  re-enforcements,  the  nearer  approach  of  the  Archdukes. 
and  until  Prussia  should  be  ready  to  take  part  in  the  action. 
There  were  indeed  at  the  headquarters  of  the  allies  many  who 
uttered  warnings,  but  there  were  also  numbers  who  advised  the 
step.     Kutusoff  was  in  favour  of  further  delay,  but  nevertheless 
too  truly  a  courtier  to  offer  decided  opposition  to  the  washes  of 
his  sovereign;  glad  to  be  relieved  of  the  responsibility,  he  gave 
his  acquiescence   to   Alexander's   project.     Among   those   fore- 
most in  promoting  the  same  was  the  Austrian  Colonel  WejTother, 
who  had  been  assigned  to  the  Czar  as  chief-of-staff — a  second 
Mack  in  point  of  immoderate  ambition  and  self-conceit.      He 
had  already  on  a  former  occasion  as  adviser  of  Wurmser  and 
Alvinczy  found   himself  confronted   by  Napoleon   during   the 
Italian  campaign,  and  later  he  had  occupied  toward  Suvaroff 
the   position  which  he   now  filled    toward  Alexander.     It  was 
Weyrother's  proposition  to  advance  against  the  enemy,  over- 
power his  right  flank,  and  cut  off  his  communication  with  Vienna. 
This  scheme  might   possibly  have   met  with  success  at  a  later 
day  with  Archduke  Charles  near  at  hand.     Its  execution  was 
now,  to  say  the  least,  premature.     Wcyrother,  however,  insisted 
upon  a  decision  and,  in  secret  with  Alexander,  elaborated  a  plan 


2i6  The   War   of  1805  [I805 

of   battle,  Emperor  Francis — who  was  also  with  the   army — 
being  kept  in  complete  ignorance  of  it  all. 

For  Napoleon,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing  could  be  more  im- 
portant than  to  defeat  the  allies  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
— before  the  Russian  re-enforcements  should  arrive,  before 
Archduke  Charles  should  advance  farther  north,  and  before 
Prussia,  as  he  now  also  began  to  fear,  should  decide  upon  taking 
active  measures.*  He  was  therefore  all  the  more  astonished 
to  learn  that  the  foe  was  advancing  to  meet  his  wishes.  When 
he  heard  through  a  deserter  on  November  27th  of  the  forward 
march  of  the  Russians  he  was  at  first  completely  incredulous. 
S^gur  relates  in  his  "Memoirs"  that  "to  Berthier  this  seemed 
so  improbable  that  he  gave  orders  for  the  arrest  of  the  bearer 
of  the  tidings,  but  his  story  was  almost  immediately  confirmed 
by  advices  from  Marshal  Soult,  who  had  been  attacked  at  Auster- 
htz."  Napoleon  at  once  gave  orders  for  his  advance-guard  to 
retire  with  all  haste  before  the  enemy,  in  order  to  infuse  into  the 
latter  a  yet  greater  degree  of  confidence,  while  he  took  up  his 
position  on  both  sides  of  the  highway  between  Briinn  and  Auster- 
litz,  his  army  extending  southerly  to  Sokolnitz  and  Tilnitz.  He 
next  drew  to  himself  all  available  troops;  Davout  and  Ber- 
nadotte  were  summoned,  and  by  December  1st  the  latter  had 
already  reached  the  convent  of  Raigern.f  Napoleon  then  pro- 
ceeded to  mark  out  his  plan  of  battle  also.  The  movement  of 
the  enemy  against  his  right  wing  had  not  long  remained  unob- 
served by  him,  and  it  was  upon  this  that  he  based  his  scheme  of 

*  "Bonaparte's  interests  demanded  that  no  time  should  be  lost;  ours, 
that  time  should  be  gained.  He  had  every  occasion  for  venturing  a  decisive 
battle;  we,  for  avoiding  the  same.  Your  Imperial  Majesty  will  recall  that 
I,  at  the  time,  repeatedly  made  representations  to  that  effect  and  im- 
parted them  also  to  every  one  who  would  listen  to  me.  The  right  course 
was  to  wear  out  the  enemy  by  means  of  skirmishes,  always  keeping  the 
bulk  of  the  army  beyond  his  reach;  to  conquer  Hungary  and  establish 
connections  with  the  Archduke."  (Czartoryski  to  Emperor  Alexander, 
April,  1806.) 

t  "  If  you  are  about  to  give  battle,"  .said  Napoleon  once  at  about  this 
time,  "a.ssemble  all  your  forces,  omitting  none  whatever;  a  single  bat- 
talion sometimes  decides  the  day." 


jet.  36]  Austerlitz  3 1 7 

action.  As  he  said  to  his  gonoralfi,  this  which  ho  was  roRolvod  to 
gain  was  to  be  no  ordinary  battle,  but  a  decisive  action  which 
should  not  permit  of  the  enemy's  withdrawing  and  gathering 
anew;  for  every  orderly  retreat  of  the  Russians  which  left  them 
in  fighting  trim,  since  it  did  not  improve  his  own  situation, 
might  prove  ruinous  to  him.  For  this  reason  he  refrained  from 
occupying  the  secure  position  which  offered  itself  on  the  plateau 
of  Pratzen,  but  left  that  to  the  enemy,  even  inviting  attack  upon 
his  right  wing  by  advancing  it  and  exposing  its  flank  in  order 
to  confirm  Alexander  in  his  purpose  to  surround  it  and  thus 
induce  him  to  make  a  wide  circuit  involving  the  weakening 
of  his  centre ;  this  enfeebled  centre  was  then  to  be  broken  through 
and  the  battle  thus  decided.  It  was  therefore  \v\ih  boundless 
satisfaction  that  on  December  1st  he  saw  the  Russians  already 
making  actual  dispositions  for  executing  this  flank  movement. 
"That  is  a  wretched  move!"  exclaimed  he  to  those  about  him, 
trembling  with  joy  and  clapping  his  hands.  "They  are  walking 
into  the  trap!  They  are  delivering  themselves  over!  Before 
to-morrow  evening  this  army  is  mine!"  And  of  a  truth,  on 
December  2d,  the  "sun  of  Austerhtz"  witnessed  before  its 
setting  the  destruction  of  the  allied  armies.  The  attack  upon 
their  centre,  stripped  of  all  cavalry,  had  been  undertaken  with 
great  vigour  by  Soult  and  had  proved  completely  successful. 
The  hostile  line  was  broken,  the  left  wing  entirely  severed  and 
put  to  rout,  the  right  thrown  back  upon  Austerlitz.  The  Rus- 
sians had  suffered  the  loss  of  about  20,000  men,  and  the  Austrian 
corps  under  Liechtenstein  in  the  neighbourhood  of  6000.  The 
former,  cut  off  from  their  Hne  of  retreat  toward  Olmiitz  and  hav- 
ing parted  with  all  artillery,  munitions,  and  baggage,  moved  in 
confusion  along  the  road  toward  Coding  and  Holitsch.  "Neither 
regiments  nor  army  corps  existed  any  longer  in  the  army  of  the 
allies,"  says  Czartoryski,  "there  remained  only  hordes  of  men 
going  off  in  disorder,  marauding  as  they  went  and  thus  increas- 
ing still  further  the  desolation  of  the  country.  In  the  villages 
as  we  passed  along  was  to  be  heard  notliing  but  the  confused 
cries  of  people  seeking  in  drink  forgetfuhiess  of  their  mis- 
fortunes." 


31  8  The  War  of  1805  [i805 

One  of  the  most  brilliant  of  victories*  had  been  won  for 
France.  "Soldiers,"  said  the  victor,  addressing  his  troops,  "  I  am 
satisfied  with  you!  In  the  battle  of  Austeriitz  you  have  justi- 
fied all  my  expectations  of  your  intrepidity ;  you  have  adorned 
your  eagles  with  immortal  glory.  .  .  .  Soldiers,  when  the  im- 
perial crown  was  placed  upon  my  head  by  the  people  of  France 
I  relied  upon  you  for  preserving  to  it  always  that  refulgent  glory 
which  alone  could  give  it  value  in  my  sight.  .  .  .  When  every- 
thing shall  have  been  accomplished  necessary  to  the  assurance 
of  happiness  and  prosperity  to  our  country  I  will  lead  you  back 
to  France;  there  you  will  be  the  object  of  my  most  tender  care. 
My  people  will  look  upon  you  with  joy,  and  it  will  be  enough  for 
any  one  of  you  to  say, ' I  was  at  the  battle  of  Austeriitz,'  to  draw 
forth  the  reply,  '  Here  is  a  brave  man. ' " 

Napoleon  had  been  wholly  correct  in  saying  that  the  victory 
of  December  2d  was  to  be  no  "ordinary"  one.  The  result  of 
the  battle  was  to  bring  peace.  Shortly  before,  as  has  been 
seen,  he  had  been  driven  by  his  dangerous  position  to  modify 
his  demands  in  proposing  terms  of  peace.  The  situation  of 
affairs  was  now  totally  changed.  On  December  3d  Napoleon 
was  already  writing  to  Talleyrand  at  Vienna:  "All  negotiations 
have  become  null  and  void,  since  it  is  evident  that  they  were 
nothing  but  a  stratagem  intended  to  lull  me  to  sleep.     Say  to 

*  Military  writers  are  wont  to  date  from  Austeriitz  a  new  epoch  in  the 
history  of  warfare.  Jomini  said  that  the  great  field-battles  of  our  day 
date  from  180.5.  A  recent  historian  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  carries  out 
the  idea  thus:  "In  this  first  of  the  Napoleonic  battles  are  at  once  recog- 
nizable all  those  characteristics  which  distinguish  more  modern  battles 
from  those  of  the  period  of  Frederick  the  Great.  In  the  latter  the  entire 
army  was  set  in  motion  as  a  whole  and  could  and  must  remain  throughout 
the  course  of  the  battle  within  the  grasp  of  the  commander,  capable  of 
manoeuvring  according  to  his  wishes.  Were  its  close  relations  broken 
up  at  any  point,  its  cause  was  lost.  In  modern  battle  the  centre  may  be 
broken  through  while  victory  is  carried  off  by  the  encompassing  wings; 
one  wing  may  be  annihilated  while  the  other  crushes  the  enemy;  indeed 
in  a  well-conducted  battle  some  such  success  is  always  yielded  to  the 
enemy  upon  some  portion  of  the  field,  in  order  to  be  able  to  bring  to  bear 
a  superior  force  at  the  point  selected  for  administering  the  decisive  blow." 
Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  "Napoleon  als  Feldherr,"  I.  241. 


m.y.  36]  Negotiations  for   Peace  3 1 9 

Monsieur  de  Stadion  that  I  have  not  been  duped  by  their  arti- 
fice, that  it  was  for  that  reason  that  I  sent  them  l)ack  from 
Briinn,  and  that  now  that  the  battle  is  lost  the  conditions  can 
no  longer  remain  what  they  were." 

At  the  headquarters  of  the  allies  it  was  agreed  upon  that 
Emperor  Francis  should  ask  for  a  conference  with  the  conqueror 
and  demand  an  armistice.  The  request  was  granted,  and  on 
December  4th  the  interview  took  place  at  Nasiedlowitz  on  the 
highroad  between  Austerlitz,  where  Napoleon  had  taken  up  his 
residence,  and  Holitsch,  whither  the  allied  monarchs  had  retired. 

Much  that  is  false  has  been  circulated  in  regard  to  this  meet- 
ing. The  Emperor  of  the  French  conducted  himself  in  a  manner 
by  no  means  brusque  and  discourteous,  as  has  been  narrated, 
but  was  on  the  contrary  most  affable  and  gracious.  He  was 
prepared  to  grant  the  desired  suspension  of  hostilities  in  case 
the  Russians  would  at  once  return  homeward.  The  question 
of  peace  was  also  discussed.  Were  Russia  willing  to  conclude 
peace  at  once  \\4thout  delay  in  company  with  Austria, — though 
with  the  proviso  that  its  territor}^  should  be  closed  to  the  Brit- 
ish,— Austria  should  be  released  from  any  cession  of  lands  what- 
soever; but  should  Russia  choose  another  course,  a  separate 
agreement  would  necessitate  to  Austria  the  surrender  of  \'enetia 
to  the  kingdom  of  Italy  and  of  the  Tyrol  to  Bavaria.  The 
latter  condition, — in  regard  to  the  Tyrol, — at  the  earnest  en- 
treaty of  Francis,  Napoleon  consented  to  set  aside.  Upon  his 
return  from  the  conference  the  Emperor  of  Austria  at  once 
acquainted  his  ally  with  the  demands  made  by  the  victor,  at 
the  same  time  assuring  him  that  he  was  ready  to  continue  the 
struggle  if  Russia  would  stand  by  him.  But  to  that  Alexander 
was  in  no  ■s\'ise  to  be  persuaded.  Inconsiderate  as  he  had  been 
in  bringing  about  the  danger,  he  was  just  as  Httle  inclined  to 
take  upon  himself  the  consequences  of  his  folly.  But  neither 
was  he  willing  to  make  peace  under  the  conditions  offered,  since 
English  commerce  was  nothing  less  than  a  vital  question  to 
Russia.  There  remained  then  nothing  but  for  him  to  place  in 
safety  the  fragments  of  his  army.  The  answer  which  he  sent 
to  Emperor  Francis  was  that  Austria  might  no  longer  count 


320  The  War  of  1805  [I805 

upon  him,  and  on  December  6th  he  took  his  departure.  On 
the  same  day  the  armistice  between  France  and  Austria  was 
signed.* 

In  the  negotiations  for  peace  Austria  had  now,  besides  her 
own  forces,  only  the  friendly  offices  of  Prussia  to  count  upon. 
But  these  also  were  to  be  denied  her.  Napoleon  had  taken  the 
precaution  to  have  inserted  in  the  instrument  regulating  the 
armistice  a  clause  to  the  effect  that  while  the  treaty  should  be 
in  force  no  foreign  troops  should  set  foot  upon  Austrian  soil, 
and  then  forthwith  proceeded  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
Haugwitz  alone.  If  now  Haugwitz  remained  faithful  to  his 
secret  orders  to  maintain  peace  with  France,  nothing  could  be 
done  with  the  ultimatum  which  he  was  charged  to  tender  to 
Napoleon.  On  the  other  hand,  Napoleon  was  now  no  longer  will- 
ing to  allow  Prussia  to  maintain  a  neutral  position,  but  de- 
manded that  she  should  form  a  close  offensive  and  defensive 
alHance  with  himself.  According  to  this  proposal  Frederick 
William  would  be  bound  to  surrender  to  France  the  part  of  the 
duchy  of  Cleves  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the 
fortress  of  Wesel,  and  the  principality  of  Neufchatel,  and  to 
Bavaria  the  margraviate  of  Ansbach ;  he  might  retain  Hanover, 
already  occupied  by  his  troops;  the  British  were  to  be  denied 
access  to  its  shores;  further,  he  was  to  recognize  the  "kingdom 
of  Bavaria"  in  the  extent  to  which  it  should  attain  through 
Austrian  concessions.  This  compact  was  signed  by  Haugwitz 
on  December  15th,  1805,  and  thenceforth  Austria  had  lost  her 
Prussian  support.  She  was  now  given  up  defenceless  and  alone 
to  the  will  of  the  conqueror. 

*  Even  in  the  most  recent  publications  one  meets  with  the  statement 
that  immediately  after  the  battle  Austria  drew  away  from  Russia,  whereas 
in  point  of  fact  it  was  the  Czar  who  left  liis  ally  in  the  lurch.  This  is 
testified  to  even  by  authorities  emanating  from  the  Russian  camp,  such, 
for  instance,  as  J.  de  Maistre  and  Czartoryski.  The  bold  reproach  which 
was  later  made  by  the  Russians  in  official  form  against  the  Austrians — 
that  they  had  not  fought  bravely  at  Austerlitz — met  with  cutting  irony 
from  Napoleon  in  the  "  Moniteur."  "  Those  who  saw  the  battle-field,"  said 
he  therein,  "will  testify  that  at  the  spot  where  the  chief  collision  took 
place  the  ground  was  covered  with  Austrians,  while  at  other  points  it 
was  covered  only  with  Russian  knapsacks." 


Mt.Z6]  Negotiations  with  Austria  321 

The  question  now  was  whether  Napoleon  himself  desired 
to  bring  about  peace  at  once,  or  whether  he  would  profit  by 
favourable  circumstances  to  continue  the  war  against  Austria, 
subduing  her  still  further  with  a  view  to  puting  an  end  forever 
to  her  power.  In  his  military  surroundings  there  was  no  lack 
of  voices,  notably  that  of  the  self-seeking  Murat,  who  coun- 
selled taking  the  latter  course.  Talleyrand,  on  the  contrary,  was 
emphatically  of  the  other  opinion.  He  was  an  avaricious  man, 
certain  of  rich  pecuniary  returns  in  case  of  an  agreement  being 
brought  about,  and  he  skilfully  persuaded  the  Emperor  to 
decide  upon  terminating  a  war  which  he  had,  moreover,  advised 
against  from  the  outset.  "It  is  to  the  interest  of  France,"  said 
he  to  Napoleon,  "that  I  want  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  your 
generals,  in  regard  to  which  I  feel  not  the  sUghtest  concern. 
Reflect  that  you  lower  yourself  in  taking  the  same  ground  as 
they,  and  that  you  are  too  great  to  be  merely  a  soldier,"  These 
words  produced  the  desired  effect,  and  Napoleon  declared  him- 
self ready  to  conclude  peace.  The  negotiations  were  allowed 
to  proceed,  but  now  he  would  no  longer  consider  the  imposition 
of  less  rigorous  conditions.  When  Prince  Johann  Liechtenstein, 
the  new  negotiator  of  the  Austrian  Emperor,  arrived  in  Briinn 
Napoleon  had  ceased  to  be  satisfied  with  his  former  exaction 
of  the  ItaHan  territory  of  Venice,  but  now  required  Venice  with 
the  same  extent  in  which  it  had  been  ceded  to  Austria  in  1797, 
that  is  to  say,  including  Istria  and  Dalmatia.  Shortly  after  he 
repudiated  the  promise  which  he  had  made  to  Francis  II.  on 
the  Austerlitz  highway,  and  demanded  the  Tyrol  for  Bavaria. 
This  was  followed  within  a  short  time  by  further  requirements — 
the  district  of  the  Inn  and  Austria's  consent  to  the  dispossession 
of  the  Royal  House  of  Naples.  Before  the  great  battle  Napoleon 
would  have  contented  himself  with  a  war  indemnity  of  five  mil- 
Uon  gulden  ($2,000,000);  fifty  million  francs  ($9,500,000)  was  his 
present  demand,  from  which  he  was  with  difficulty  persuaded  to 
abate  ten  millions.  "Every  hour  witnesses  the  birth  of  new 
exactions,"  wrote  Liechtenstein  from  Pressburg,  where  he  had 
been  negotiating  with  Talleyrand  ever  since  December  20th.  Per- 
plexity and  discouragement  prevailed  at  Holitsch,  where  Em- 


322  The  War  of  1805  [i805 

peror  Francis  awaited  the  outcome.  In  his  despair  he  even 
considered  for  a  time  taking  up  arms  again.*  But  Archduke 
Charles  was  most  strenuous  in  his  advice  against  such  a  course, 
having  been  convinced  ever  since  the  capitulation  at  Ulm  that 
Austria  could  have  no  hope  of  success  except  by  means  of  the 
pen,  and  Francis  yielded  to  his  representations.  Cobenzl,  the 
Minister,  who  was  singled  out  by  public  opinion  as  the  obstacle 
to  agreement  with  the  enemy,  was  compelled  to  resign  his  oftice 
and  was  succeeded  by  Count  Stadion.  Soon  afterwards,  on 
December  26th,  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Pressburg.f 
Before  its  ratification  Archduke  Charles  was  commissioned 
to  make  efforts  in  a  personal  interview  with  Napoleon  to  obtain 
more  moderate  terms.  The  conference  took  place,  but  was 
productive  of  no  result,  and  on  New  Year's  Day,   1806,  the 

*  Napoleon  declared  at  a  later  date,  in  conversation  with  the  Bavarian 
Minister  Montgelas,  that  his  army,  "weakened  by  its  victories,  was  very 
unfavourably  located,  between  the  fortress  of  Ohniitz — which  it  was 
hardly  possible  to  besiege  in  winter-time  with  the  hostile  army  close  at 
hand — and  the  Austrian  capital,  populous,  ill  disposed,  and  difficult  to 
control;  that  thereafter  its  dispositions  seemed  unsafe  and  badly  sup- 
ported, all  the  more  so  because  Russia,  still  hostile,  might  at  any  moment 
order  an  advance  of  her  forces;  and  finally,  that,  though  Prussia  had 
indeed  signed  a  treaty,  it  had  not  yet  been  ratified,  and  through  its  rela- 
tions with  the  two  emperors  that  power  might  have  prepared  for  him 
embarrassments  of  the  worst  order.  It  was,  therefore,  when  the  cir- 
cumstances were  rightly  considered,  a  matter  for  self-congratulation 
that  the  Austrian  court  offered  so  little  steadfast  opposition  and  so  eagerly 
desired  the  termination  of  the  war.  (Montgelas,  "  Denkwiirdigkeiten  " 
(1887),  p.  124.)  Radetzky  also  bears  witness  in  his  Recollections 
that  at  the  time  Vienna  was  in  a  ferment. 

t  Recent  Austrian  historians  have  named  December  27th  as  the  date 
of  signature  to  this  instrument,  but  this  is  inexplicable.  The  following 
passage  from  Napoleon's  letter  of  December  25th,  1805,  to  Talleyrand 
directing  the  Minister  to  sign  the  treaty  on  the  following  day,  may  be 
quoted  for  its  illustration  of  Napoleon's  character:  "Finally — should  it 
be  impossible  to  append  your  signature  at  once — wait  and  sign  it  upon 
New  Year's  Day;  for  I  have  niy  prejudices  and  am  very  glad  that  the 
peace  should  date  from  the  renewal  of  the  Gregorian  calendar,  which 
betokens,  I  hope,  as  much  good  fortune  to  my  reign  as  it  has  enjoyed  under 
the  old  one  [i  e.,  the  Revolutionary  calendar].  To  sum  up :  sign  to-morrow 
if  you  can,  or  else  on  the  first  day  of  the  year." 


^T.  36]  The  Treaty  of  Pressburg  323 

monarch  of  Austria  sot  his  name  to  one  of  the  most  onerous 
treaties  which  that  power  has  ever  concluded.  P^mperor  Francis 
dehvered  back  all  that  he  had  received  in  the  Treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  as  belonging  to  Venice,  both  the  Italian  territory  and  all 
its  dependencies,  and  Venice,  Istria,  Dalmatia,  and  Cattaro  were 
united  with  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  It  was  only  with  great  re- 
luctance that  Napoleon  left  to  him  Trieste,  which,  according  to 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  he  had  intended  to  use  as  a  base  in  a  new 
undertaking  against  Egypt  and  India.  Austria,  furthermore, 
gave  her  assent  to  all  the  changes  and  establishments  in  Pied- 
mont, Genoa,  Parma,  Lucca,  and  Piombino,  and  acknowledged 
as  kings  the  Electors  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg,  to  the 
former  of  whom  she  gave  up  the  Tyrol  with  Vorarlberg,  Brixen, 
Trent,  Passau,  Eichstadt,  Burgau,  and  Lindau,  besides  counties 
and  possessions  of  lesser  importance;  while  to  the  latter  she 
relinquished  five  cities  on  the  Danube  with  their  territories, 
the  counties  of  Hohenberg  and  Nellenburg  and  a  part  of  the 
Breisgau.  Baden  received  another  portion  of  the  Breisgau,  the 
Ortenau,  the  city  of  Constance,  and  the  island  of  Mainau.  The 
King  of  Bavaria  was  to  surrender  Wiirzburg  to  the  Archduke 
Elector  of  Salzburg,  who  was  in  his  turn  to  pass  on  this  terri- 
tory to  Austria. 

The  Austrian  Power  was  thus  crowded  out  of  Italy  and 
Germany,  while  the  French  sphere  of  action  now  extended  at 
the  south  as  far  as  the  Balkan  Peninsula;  Austria  had  been 
compelled  to  give  up  about  23,000  square  miles  of  territory, 
more  than  two  and  a  half  million  souls,  and  nearly  fourteen  mil- 
Uon  gulden  of  annual  income,  and  for  this  enormous  loss  she 
received  compensation  amounting  to  almost  nothing.  In  re- 
gard to  this  point,  indeed,  Talleyrand  was  not  of  the  same  mind 
as  his  lord.  He  had  interceded  in  behalf  of  Austria  and  written 
to  Napoleon  even  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign:  "At  the 
present  day  the  Turks  are  no  longer  formidable,  they  have 
themselves  everything  to  fear.  But  the  Russians  have  taken 
their  place;  Austria  is  still  the  chief  bulwark  which  Europe 
has  to  oppose  to  them,  and  it  is  against  themtliatwe  ought  now 
to  fortify  her."     He  proposed  later,  during  the  course  of  the 


324  The  War  of  1805  [isos 

negotiations,  to  indemnify  the  power  at  Vienna  with  Moldavia, 
Wallachia,  Bessarabia,  and  Northern  Bulgaria.  But  his  propo- 
sition was  not  received  with  favour,  either  by  the  Austrians — 
who  rightly  foresaw  in  it  only  a  cause  of  dispute  and  wrangUng 
with  Russia,  and  were  at  the  same  time  not  yet  ready  to  give  up 
definitely  their  position  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Central 
Europe — or  by  Napoleon,  whose  plans  included  the  curbing 
of  the  power  of  the  Czars  also  at  some  future  day  beneath  his 
own  sceptre.  This  was  the  great  gulf  separating  him  from 
Talleyrand,  as  from  all  patriotic  Frenchmen:  they  desired, 
of  course,  a  strong,  national,  predominating  France,  but  at  the 
same  time  admitted  the  existence  of  a  system  of  counterbalanc- 
ing powers,  while  the  Emperor  saw  in  all  Europe  nothing  but 
his  own  personal  domain.  In  France  the  Revolution  was  ex- 
tinguished and  no  one  had  any  further  sjrmpathy  with  its 
spirit  of  conquest;  but  in  Europe  this  spirit  was  yet  ahve,  em- 
bodied in  a  single  man,  to  be  sure,  but  this  man,  with  mighty 
power,  arrogated  to  himself  dominion  over  the  entire  Continent. 


I 


CHAPTER  XII 
NAPOLEONIC  CREATIONS.     BREACH  WITH  PRUSSIA 

The  battle  fought  on  December  2d,  1805,  is  one  of  the  four 
pre-eminently  decisive  in  effect  upon  the  career  of  Napoleon  as  a 
monarch.  Marengo  had  secured  to  him  his  control  over  France, 
Austerlitz  established  his  ascendency  in  Europe;  the  work  of 
Austerlitz  was  undone  at  Leipzig,  and  what  Marengo  had  given 
was  finally  lost  at  Waterloo.  For  a  moment  his  entire  scheme 
of  personal  dominion  throughout  the  world  had  wavered  in  the 
balance  in  Moravia.  For  the  most  important  effect  of  the 
successfully  conducted  retreat  of  the  Russians  was  to  put  in 
question  Napoleon's  prestige  with  his  army,  upon  whom  alone 
he  might  depend  for  the  realization  of  his  dream.  The  masterly 
manoeuvres  at  Ulm,  the  surprise  of  Vienna,  and  the  seizure  of 
the  bridges  of  the  Danube  were  regarded  as  mere  premises  lack- 
ing a  conclusion,  and  in  the  army  voices  were  already  raised  in 
criticism.  Then  came  the  victory,  thrust  upon  the  Corsican 
by  the  astounding  foolhardincss  of  his  adversary,  which  re- 
moved the  danger  which  had  threatened  his  standing  among 
his  troops. 

Nor  was  the  army  alone  in  feeling  this  effect;  throughout 
the  French  people  public  opinion  was  again,  by  this  victory, 
turned  to  the  Emperor's  favour.  No  war  had  ever  been  more 
unpopular  in  France  than  this.  The  rigidly  enforced  conscrip- 
tion had  been  endured  with  ill-concealed  impatience,  and  a 
serious  financial  crisis  following  close  upon  it  had  reawakened 
the  scarcely  laid  doubt  as  to  whether  the  prevailing  system  and 
the  man  who  represented  it  really  gave  promise  of  abiding  pro- 
tection to  material  interests;  the  expedition  against  San  Do- 
mingo began  to  be  recalled  as  a  very  expensive  venture  which 
had  cost  50,000  men  and  60,000,000  francs;   the  loss  to  com- 

325 


326  Napoleonic  Creations  [isoe 

merce  with  the  East  consequent  upon  the  naval  war  was  com- 
puted, as  also  the  deficit  resulting  to  France  through  the  rapid 
occupation  of  the  colonies  by  Englishmen;  even  the  most  zeal- 
ous champions  of  the  Napoleonic  system  were  not  wholly  averse 
to  entertaining  the  thought  of  Joseph  in  the  seat  of  power  should 
Napoleon  lose  his  life  in  battle.  But  every  such  consideration 
was  put  to  flight  when  word  was  received  of  the  sudden  victory 
and  peace  so  soon  after  extorted.  The  French  as  a  people  were 
far  too  proud,  too  vain,  not  to  lay  claim  to  a  man  who  gave 
commands  to  monarchs,  who  made  and  immade  kings,  and 
through  whom  the  name  of  France  had  been  exalted  beyond 
any  point  ever  reached  under  any  of  her  former  rulers.  Ac- 
cording to  the  testimony  of  an  eye-witness:  "The  French,  trans- 
ported by  the  tidings  of  such  a  victory,  leaving  nothing  to  be 
desired  since  it  terminated  the  war,  were  again  fired  with  en- 
thusiasm and  there  was  no  need  for  encouragement  to  popular 
rejoicing.  The  nation  identified  itself  once  more  with  its  suc- 
cessful army.  This  moment  I  regard  as  the  culmination  of 
Bonaparte's  prosperity,  for  the  mighty  deeds  of  their  monarch 
were  at  this  time  approved  and  adopted  by  the  greater  part  of 
the  people."  Napoleon  was  extolled  by  the  national  pubhc 
bodies  in  most  extravagant  terms.  According  to  them  his 
renown  had  overshadowed  all  other  immortal  names,  and  admi- 
ration and  wonder  could  but  blush  to  remember  previous  objects 
of  regard,  etc. 

The  French  people  while  thus  acclaiming  the  conqueror  were 
acting  under  a  twofold  delusion.  In  the  first  place  they  did  not 
suspect  that  this  continental  war  had  been  long  planned  by  the 
Emperor,  the  campaign  carefully  devised,  and  the  crisis  brought 
about  by  his  own  machinations,  but  believed  the  statements 
published  by  his  obedient  creatures,  that  he  had  been  the  party 
threatened  and  attacked  and  that  his  people  could  not  enough 
admire  the  ready  art  with  wliich  he  had  been  able  to  make  a 
defence  against  the  conspiracy  of  all  Europe.  The  second  error 
of  the  French  peopk^  consistetl  in  regarding  Napoleon  as  their 
P^mperor  who  vanciuishcd  the  enemy  in  order  to  insure  glory, 
prosperity,  and  peace  to  the  country  to  the  left  of  the  Rhine, 


^T.  36]  Naples  327 

while  he  had  in  rcahty  long  since  ceased  to  be  the  Emperor  of 
France  except  in  name.  To  those  acquainted  with  Napoleon's 
Bccret  intentions  before  the  campaign  it  will  be  no  matter  of 
surprise  that  he  made  use  of  his  victories  to  advance  interests 
quite  unrelated  to  the  exaltation  of  the  power  of  the  French 
state  or  the  diminution  of  that  of  Austria,  interests  entirely 
incomprehensible  except  from  the  standpoint  of  one  aspiring  to 
establish  an  empire  not  limited  by  the  Gallic  boundary-lines. 

During  the  negotiations  with  the  Austrian  envoys,  upon 
one  occasion  before  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  the  kingdom  of 
Naples  had  come  under  discussion.  After  that  event  the  sub- 
ject was  not  again  touched  upon.  Napoleon  now  considered 
himself  strong  enough  to  carry  out  his  intentions  throughout 
all  Italy  without  the  consent  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Hardly 
had  the  signatures  been  appended  to  the  treaty  of  peace  at 
Pressburg  when  he  announced  on  the  day  following — and,  char- 
acteristically enough,  in  a  mere  military  order  issued  to  the 
army — that  the  Bourbon  dynasty  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples 
had  ceased  to  reign.  The  pretext  for  this  step  had,  it  must  be 
acknowledged,  been  furnished  by  the  Neapolitan  court  itself. 
Pressed  by  both  EngUsh  and  Russians,  Queen  Caroline  had  de- 
termined upon  risking  all  to  gain  all  and,  setting  aside  the  prom- 
ise made  to  France  in  August  to  remain  neutral,  opened  the 
port  of  her  capital  to  Russian  and  British  troops.  This  had 
taken  place  in  the  midst  of  the  war,  and  hence  Napoleon's  course 
in  sending  Massena  with  a  large  body  of  troops  across  the  Nea- 
pohtan  frontier  was  capable  of  justification  according  to  the  laws 
of  war.  The  outcome  of  it  was  that  the  effects  of  the  victory  of 
Austerlitz  made  themselves  felt  here  as  elsewhere,  for  the  Czar, 
still  crushed  by  his  defeat,  recalled  his  troops  from  Naples  to 
Corfu,  and  the  English,  following  his  example,  also  evacuated 
the  port  and  sailed  for  Sicily,  leaving  to  the  mercy  of  the  exas- 
perated foe  those  whose  fate  had  been  confidingly  put  in  their 
keeping.  No  answer  was  received  to  the  letter  in  which  the 
queen  made  submission  to  the  Emperor  imploring  his  clemency, 
and  in  the  middle  of  February,  ISOG,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  wlu) 
had  put  in  an  appearance  with  the  army,  took,  as  Imperial  Vice- 


328  Napoleonic  Creations  [I8O6 

roy,  immediate  possession  of  the  capital  whence  the  legitimate 
reigning  family  had  shortly  before  taken  flight.  Only  a  few 
weeks  later,  before  the  end  of  March,  and  the  Bourbon  troops 
which  offered  resistance  on  the  peninsula  had  been  overcome 
and  Sicily  alone  was  left  under  dominion  of  Caroline  and  the 
English. 

On  March  30th.  1806,  Napoleon  apprised  the  Senate  by 
letter  of  his  determination  to  set  his  brother  Joseph  upon  the 
throne  as  monarch  of  Naples  and  Sicily.  This  meant,  as  the 
letter  itself  implied,  that  the  kingdom  would  henceforth  be  in- 
cluded within  the  sphere  of  Napoleonic  power,  since  it  expressly 
stated  that  the  new  king  of  the  Two  Sicilies  should  remain  a 
Grand  Dignitary  of  France.  In  view  of  this  the  law  providing 
that  the  two  crowns,  the  French  and  the  Neapolitan,  should 
never  be  united  upon  one  head  might  as  well  never  have  existed.* 

Together  with  this  decree  there  were  submitted  to  the  Senate 
several  others  concerning  Italy.  One  of  these  dealt  with  the 
question  of  incorporating  the  Venetian  territory  with  the  king- 
dom of  Italy.  Another  had  as  its  object  the  assignment  of  the 
principality  of  Guastalla  to  the  Princess  Borghese  and  her  hus- 
band. Still  others  disclosed  an  entirely  new  and  special  pur- 
pose on  the  part  of  the  head  of  the  State.  Napoleon,  that  is 
to  say,  proposed  to  found  within  the  limits  of  the  newly-con- 
quered Venetian  territory  twelve  titular  duchies:  Dalmatia, 
Istria,  Friuli,  Cadore.  Belluno,  Conegliano,  Treviso,  Feltre, 
Bassano,  Vicenza,  Padua,  and  Rovigo,  and  four  similar  ones  in 
the  kingdom  of  Naples:  Gaeta,  Otranto,  Taranto,  and  Reggio, 
one  in  the  principality  of  Lucca,  and  three  in  Parma  and  Pia- 
cenza.  One  fifteenth  part  of  the  revenue  from  these  lands  was 
to  serve  as  endowment  to  the  incumbent.  Besides  these  Napo- 
leon reserved  to  himself  domains  in  Venetia  amounting  in  value 
to  30,000,000  francs,  and  in  Lucca  amovmting  to  4,000,000,  and  in 
addition   1,200,000  francs  annual   tribute  to   be  furnished   by 

*  Louis  Bonaparte  and  Murat,  Iho  I<]niperor's  brother-in-law,  likewise 
retained  their  French  dignities  upon  becoming  European  monarchs  at 
this  time;  that  is  to  sav,  they  remained  subjects  of  him  who  bore  the 
title  of  Emperor  of  the  French. 


iEx.  30]  The  Situation  ut  the  Pope  329 

the  kingdom  of  Italy  and  1,000,000  by  Naples.  These  titled 
estates  and  these  funds  were  intended  for  use  as  rewards  for 
conspicuous  acts  of  service.  The  recipients  of  these  favours — 
and  who  these  were  to  be  will  shortly  appear — acquired  thereby, 
it  is  true,  no  prerogatives  of  any  kind,  but  title  and  revenue  were 
assured  to  the  heirs  in  direct  male  line.  This  new  feudal  system 
had  little  more  than  the  name  in  common  with  the  ancient 
and  obsolete  one  and  should  not  be  confused  with  it.  Of 
especial  significance,  however,  was  the  international  element 
in  it,  for,  according  to  it,  citizens  of  one  state  could  be  trans- 
ferred with  their  claims  to  another,  French  marshals  and  offi- 
cials might  acquire  a  legitimate  share  in  state  revenues  of  Italy, 
and  but  little  later  in  those  of  Poland  and  Germany  also — 
an  additional  proof  that  Napoleon's  idea  of  an  empire  had  long 
since  been  extended  beyontl  the  boimdaries  of  France.  Madame 
de  Remusat,  speaking  in  her  "Memoires"  of  the  new  nobiUty, 
pauses  to  remark:  "Our  country  came  before  long  to  seem  to 
Napoleon  nothing  more  than  a  great  province  of  the  empire 
which  he  had  resolved  upon  bringing  into  submission  to  him- 
self." 

But  in  nothing  did  this  imperial  design  disclose  itself  more 
clearly  than  in  Napoleon's  conduct  toward  the  Pope.  After 
the  expulsion  from  Naples  of  the  legitimate  Royal  House  the 
entire  Italian  peninsula  had  become  subject  to  the  will  of 
the  conqueror  with  the  exception  of  the  States  of  the  Church. 
It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  herein  also  the  rule  was 
to  be  carried  out,  and  all  misgivings  on  that  score  received  but 
too  speedy  confirmation  in  the  bestowal  of  the  Neapolitan 
principalities  of  Ponte  Corvo  and  Benevento  upon  the  French 
dignitaries  Bernadotte  and  Talleyrand,  without  regard  to  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Pope.  It  yet  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
Pius  would  consent  to  play  a  role  like  that  of  Joseph  Bona- 
parte as  vassal  king  under  Napoleon.  Acceptance  of  this  ar- 
rangement would  mean  possible  continuation  of  the  temporal 
power  of  the  Pope,  rejection,  supposably  its  sacrifice  to  the 
design  of  the  great  potentate  for  a  world  empire.  That  the 
Pope  could  not  be  counted  upon  as  a  docile  tool  in  the  hands  of 


330  Napoleonic   Creations  [I8O6 

the  Corsican  had  already  been  shown  in  the  recent  war  when 
Pius,  demanding  for  himself  unconditional  neutrality,  had 
raised  a  protest  against  the  French,  who,  disregarding  his  atti- 
tude, occupied  Ancona  on  their  way  toward  Naples.  Far  from 
submitting  quietly  to  such  abuse,  he  had  publicly  affirmed  that 
as  the  father  of  all  believers,  to  observe  political  impartiality 
was  his  duty.  In  addition  to  these  acts  of  contumacy  Pius, 
adducing  the  decisions  of  the  Coimcil  of  Trent,  had  refused  in 
June,  1805,  Napoleon's  request  to  dissolve  the  marriage  of  his 
youngest  brother  Jerome  with  Miss  Patterson,  an  American. 

Such  perversity  on  the  part  of  the  pontiff  exasperated  the 
Emperor,  who  considered  himself,  in  contrast  with  his  republican 
predecessors,  to  have  made  sufficient  conciliatory  advances. 
After  his  victory  over  the  coalition  he  had  the  statement  pro- 
mulgated at  Rome  that  he  had  occupied  Ancona  because  the 
military  forces  of  the  Papal  See  would  have  been  insufficient 
to  hold  the  port  against  the  English  or  the  Turks, — i.e.,  against 
Protestants  and  Infidels, — and  because  he.  Napoleon,  regarded 
himself  as  protector  of  the  Church.  Notwithstanding  all  this, 
Pius  still  refused  to  comprehend  and,  with  mirufflcd  suavity, 
requested  the  return  of  the  Legations  as  compensation  for  his 
good  offices  at  the  time  of  the  coronation.  And  this  time  Na- 
poleon spoke  in  terms  quite  unmistakable.  Writing  February 
13th,  1806,  he  says:  "All  Italy  is  to  be  subject  to  my  law.  I 
shall  in  no  wise  interfere  with  the  independence  of  the  Papal 
See,  but  upon  condition  that  yoiir  Holiness  shall  show  toward 
myself  in  things  temporal  the  same  respect  which  I  observe 
toward  your  Holiness  in  things  spiritual.  .  .  .  Your  Holiness 
is  sovereign  of  Rome,  but  I  am  its  emperor."  And  to  Fesch, 
who  was  now  his  representative  at  the  Papal  court,  he  gave 
orders  to  demand  the  expulsion  of  all  subjects  of  England, 
Russia,  Sweden,  and  Sardinia,  and  the  closing  of  the  port  of 
Rome  to  ships  of  these  nations,  adding  that  Joseph  had  instruc- 
tions to  uphold  him  by  force  of  arms.  The  Roman  pontiff  was, 
moreover,  to  trouble  himself  no  further  with  political  affairs, 
since  his  protection  had  been  assumed  by  Napoleon  against  the 
whole  world.     "Say  to  him,"  he  continues,  "that  my  eyes  are 


JEr.^G]  Holland  331 

open  and  that  I  do  not  allow  myself  tf»  ])C  imposed  upon  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  1  desire;  say  to  him  that  I  am  Charlemagne, 
the  Sword  of  the  Church,  their  Emperor,  and  that  I  propose  to 
be  treated  as  such." 

Among  those  surrounding  Joseph  at  this  time  was  Miot  de 
Melito,  who  says  that  Napoleon  spoke  freely  in  his  correspondence 
with  his  brother  in  regard  to  his  real  intentions.  He  had  thoughts 
of  going  to  Rome  in  order  to  have  himself  crowned  as  Emperor 
of  the  West,  which  would  imply  the  entire  relinquishment 
of  temporal  power  on  the  part  of  the  Pope,  who  would  have  to 
be  satisfied  with  the  chief  spiritual  authority  alone  and  a  few 
million  francs  income  as  compensation.  This  scheme  had  been 
confidentially  revealed  in  Rome,  but  the  cardinals  had  declared 
against  it  and  were  resolved  rather  to  die  than  to  live  under 
such  conditions.  The  strictest  secrecy  was  maintained  about 
the  whole  matter.  Only  to  the  second  letter  above  mentioned 
did  Pius  reply  to  the  effect  that  Napoleon  was  indeed  Emperor 
of  the  French  but  in  nowise  Roman  Emperor,  and  that  any  such 
close  relation  with  himself  as  he  demanded  would  deprive  the 
Papal  See  of  its  authority  in  other  countries.  One  concession, 
however,  was  made  to  the  oppressor:  Consalvi,  the  Pope's  Sec- 
retary of  State,  having  been  indicated  by  Napoleon  as  the  mov- 
ing spirit  in  the  resistance  to  him,  was  deposed  from  his  office. 
Relations  remained  strained  and  eventually  resulted  in  com- 
plete rupture.  For  the  present,  however,  the  Emperor  turned 
his  attention  to  the  extension  of  his  system  in  another  direc- 
tion. 

Holland  was  now  the  objective  point.  This  state,  having 
once  come  within  the  sphere  of  French  influence,  had  been 
obliged  to  undergo  the  same  changes  in  its  constitution  as  France 
itself.  Eventually,  as  has  been  seen,  the  Batavian  Republic 
had  been  established  there  with  a  sort  of  consular  constitution 
having  a  Grand  Pensionary  at  its  head.  Ever  since  June,  1808, 
this  government  had  sided  with  Napoleon  in  times  of  war. 
Two  years  from  that  date,  while  the  main  army  was  fighting 
under  Napoleon  in  the  east,  his  brother  Louis  was  given  the 
task  of  defending  the  country  against  the  English  and  Swedes, 


332  Napoleonic  Creations  [I8O6 

No  engagement  took  place,  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  making 
it  unnecessary,  and  Louis  returned  to  Paris  to  the  disgust  of 
his  imperial  brother,  who  was  planning  to  set  him  also  upon  a 
throne  and  had  fixed  upon  that  of  Holland  as  best  adapted  to 
his  purpose.  In  January,  1805,  it  had  already  been  rumoured  at 
The  Hague  that  the  French  Emperor  was  intending  to  set  up 
a  monarchy  again  in  Holland.  Louis,  to  whom  the  idea  of 
becoming  a  king  in  Holland  was  as  little  attractive  as  that  of 
mounting  a  throne  in  Italy,  was  unwilling  to  give  encourage- 
ment to  such  reports  by  remaining  in  the  country.  But  with 
Napoleon  objections  of  that  kind  on  the  part  of  his  brothers 
were  no  longer  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  his  designs.  The 
banishment  of  Lucien  served  as  a  warning  to  the  perverse; 
the  choice  lay  between  exile  and  implicit  obedience.  Like 
Joseph,  Louis  ended  by  choosing  obedience  and  declared  him- 
self ready  to  assume  the  crown  of  Holland.  As  for  the  Dutch, 
scant  regard  was  vouchsafed  to  their  preferences.  One  who  feels 
himself  sufficiently  superior  to  laws  and  treaties  to  treat  them 
with  disdain  has  no  need  for  anything  more  than  a  pretext  for 
proceeding  as  he  thinks  fit.  The  Grand  Pensionary  Schimmel- 
penninck,  having  discovered  what  was  being  plotted  in  Paris, 
sent  thither  a  deputation  of  Dutch  notables  with  Admiral  Ver- 
huell  at  their  head  to  avert  the  threatened  danger.  On  March 
14th,  1806,  Napoleon  wrote  to  Talleyrand  in  regard  to  the 
matter:  "I  saw  M.  H.  Verhuel  this  evening.  Here,  in  a  couple 
of  words,  is  what  I  have  reduced  the  question  to :  Holland  is 
without  executive  power,  she  must  have  such,  I  will  give  her 
Prince  Louis.  A  compact  shall  be  made  according  to  which  the 
religion  of  the  country  shall  be  respected ;  the  prince  will  retain 
his  own  and  each  part  of  the  nation  will  retain  its  own.  The 
present  constitution  will  remain  in  force,  with  the  only  differ- 
ence that  in  place  of  a  Grand  Pensionary  there  will  be  a  king. 
Indeed  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  giving  him  the  title  of  Stadt- 
holder.  ...  In  all  foreign  relations,  in  the  government  of  the 
colonies,  and  in  all  affairs  of  state  th(^  acts  will  be  in  the  name  of 
the  stadtholder  or  king.  Make  me  a  draft  of  this  scheme  and  send 
a  clever  person  to  The  Hague  to  attend  to  this  business.  .  .  . 


I 


1 


iEr.  30]       Louis  Bonaparte  King  of  Holland        333 

'Ihis  is  a  matter  upon  which  my  mind  is  made  up — either  that 
or  incorporation  with  France.  The  arguments  to  be  brought  to 
bear  with  the  Dutch  a  e  that  otherwise  I  will  not  see  that  a  single 
one  of  the  colonies  lost  to  I^igland  is  restored  to  them  when 
peace  is  made.  On  the  other  hand,  if  my  terms  are  accepted, 
I  will  not  only  assist  them  to  regain  all  the  colonies,  but  even 
give  them  to  understand  that  I  will  add  Friesland  besides.  As 
you  see,  not  a  moment  is  to  be  lost."  It  was  useless  for  the 
deputies  to  refer  to  the  treaty  of  1803,  in  which  Napoleon  had 
solemnly  promised  them  the  reacquisition  of  the  colonies  in 
return  for  their  support  of  him  during  the  war,  to  say  nothing 
of  Ceylon,  which  under  favourable  circumstances  he  was  also 
going  to  procure  for  them.  It  availed  nothing  to  adduce  the 
treaty  of  1795  with  its  first  article  reading:  "The  French  Re- 
public recognizes  the  Republic  of  the  United  Provinces  as  a  free 
and  independent  power  and  guarantees  to  it  that  liberty  and 
independence."  Napoleon  was  not  to  be  moved,  and  when  the 
negotiations  at  The  Hague  began  to  drag,  since  the  people  were 
absolutely  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  monarchy,  he  threatened 
them  with  measures  so  severe  that  they  at  length  yielded  to  his 
wishes.  The  same  people  which  in  former  times  had  laid  waste 
its  own  country  in  order  to  save  it  from  the  cupidity  of  Louis 
XIV.  now  complied  without  resistance.  Tlie  Dutch  Council  of 
State  authorized  the  Grand  Pensionary  to  sign  a  treaty  with 
France  according  to  which  Louis  Bonaparte  became  king  of 
Holland  (May  24th,  1806),  and  on  June  5th  a  deputation  an- 
nounced at  the  Tuileries  that  "after  mature  deliberation"  it 
had  been  decided  that  for  the  future  a  constitutional  monarchy 
was  best  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  country,  and  that  the  mis- 
sion of  the  deputation  was  to  beseech  the  prince  to  found  such 
an  one.  To  this  solemn  address  the  Emperor  replied  in  words 
no  less  impressive,  and  Europe  counted  one  more  amongst  her 
list  of  kings.  After  the  audience,  it  is  true,  Napoleon  threw 
aside  the  mask  and  called  upon  his  little  nephew,  Louis's  son, 
to  recite  to  the  Empress  and  the  ladies  of  the  court  the  fable 
about  "The  frogs  who  desired  a  king."  After  all  did  the  people 
of  these  nations  deserve  anything  better  than  the  mockery  of 


^34  Napoleonic   Creations  [isoe 

this  .solitary  upstart  who  belonged  to  none  of  them  and  yet  had 
Biibjugated  them  all? 

Nor  were  the  Germans  to  be  spared  the  ignominy  of  being 
counted  among  the  nations  tributary  to  the  Corsican.  In  his 
correspondence  with  the  Pope  there  is  frequent  reference  to 
Germany,  and  its  perusal  leaves  the  impression  that  the  writer 
did  not  regard  himself  as  other  than  lord  of  that  nation  also. 
In  his  letter  of  February  13th,  1806,  for  instance,  he  blames  the 
advisers  of  the  head  of  the  Church  as  the  cause  of  Germany's 
persistence  in  religious  anarchy.  "If  your  Holiness,"  he  pro- 
ceeds, ''would  recall  to  mind  what  I  said  in  Paris,  rehgion  in 
Germany  would  be  organized  and  not  in  its  present  wretched 
condition."  This  is  a  part  of  the  same  letter  in  which  Napo- 
leon declared  himself  to  be  Emperor  of  Rome,  Emperor  of  the 
West,  and  Charlemagne,  who  likewise  had  held  sway  over 
Frankish,  Italian,  and  German  lands.  And  in  point  of  fact  did 
matters  not  stand  very  much  as  he  thus  claimed?  In  1805  the 
princes  of  Southern  Germany,  as  if  feudal  vassals,  had  followed 
the  call  to  arms  of  this  foreigner  who  promised  them  protection 
and  profit  and  who  led  them  against  their  own  imperial  sover- 
eign, who  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to  extend  such  protection 
and  whose  aim  was  rather  toward  the  weakening  than  upbuild- 
ing of  the  secular  states  of  the  Empire.  Upon  the  re-establish- 
ment of  peace  Napoleon  rewarded  his  German  adherents  with 
enlargement  of  their  borders,  elevation  of  rank  as  princes,  and 
the  conferring  of  "sovereignty."  The  14th  article  of  the  Treaty 
of  Pressburg  ran  as  follows:  "Their  Majesties  the  Kings  of 
Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  and  His  Serene  Highness  the  Elector 
of  Eaden  will  enjoy  complete  sovereignty  over  the  territories 
ceded  to  them,  as  also  over  their  former  states,  including  all 
rights  proceeding  therefrom  and  which  have  been  guaranteed 
to  them  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  King  of 
Italy,  in  like  maimer  as  similar  privileges  are  enjoyed  by  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  Austria  and  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  Prussia  in  respect  to  their  German  lands.  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  Austria  pledges  himself 
not  to  hinder,  either  as  Emperor  or  Estate  of  the  Empire,  the 


I 


JEt.3c>]         Alliances  with  German  Princes  335 

cxccvitidii  of  clocreet;  wliich  they  may  have  mado  or  may  make 
in  consequence."  Certainly  from  that  side  everythhig  had  been 
made  safe.  But  so  nmch  the  more  felt  was  the  pressure  soon 
brought  to  bear  by  the  overpowering  authority  proceeding  from 
the  west.  When,  in  February,  1806,  the  King  of  Bavaria  ven- 
tured modestly  to  make  objections  to  having  his  troops  detailed 
from  Germany  to  join  the  French  army  in  Italy,  he  met  with  the 
humihating  response  that  he  need  not  flatter  himself  that  Ba- 
varia had  been  elevated  to  a  kingdom  out  of  consideration  for 
himself,  this  change  having  been  made  solely  as  a  result  of  the 
French  system.  Accordingly  what  in  respect  to  Austria  was 
designated  as  "sovereignty"  was  shown  in  respect  to  France 
to  be  nothing  else  than  vassalage. 

But  in  order  to  secure  permanency  to  these  conditions  and 
to  make  certain  of  the  fidelity  of  his  German  adherents  Napo- 
leon resolved  upon  two  measures.  The  first  consisted  in  uniting 
with  his  own  the  famiUes  of  the  South  German  princes.  As 
early  as  1804,  soon  after  his  coronation  as  Emperor,  he  had 
meditated  estabUshing  a  relationship  with  the  ancient  reigning 
houses  of  Germany,  and  had  at  that  time  proposed  at  the  Elec- 
toral Court  a  marriage  between  his  stepson  Eugene  and  the 
Princess  Augusta  of  Bavaria.  Indeed  it  appears  from  the  re- 
cently published  Memoirs  of  the  Bavarian  Minister  Montgelas 
that  he  had  already  at  this  time  taken  steps  in  Munich  to- 
ward bringing  about  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  and 
had  held  out  to  Maximilian  Joseph  hopes  of  elevation  to  the 
dignity  of  king  in  case  of  the  consummation  of  this  marriage, 
upon  which  it  is  evident  that  Josephine  had  set  her  heart.  This 
proposal  was  at  the  time  neither  accepted  nor  rejected  by  the 
Elector,  and  decision  of  the  question  merely  postponed.  But 
immediately  after  the  opening  of  negotiations  at  Pressburg 
Napoleon  returned  to  the  subject.  The  Elector  might  hideed 
still  hesitate,  but  he  could  no  longer  refuse,  and  on  January  14th, 
1806,  the  marriage  of  the  Viceroy  took  place.  The  same  princess 
had  been  before  this  time  sought  in  marriage  by  the  hereditary 
Prince  of  Baden;  he  was  now  promised  the  hand  of  Josephine's 
niece,  Stephanie,  who,  however,  accepted  this  engagement  only 


336  Napoleonic  Creations  [I8O6 

with  reluctance,  being  loath  to  leave  Paris,  where,  according 
to  report,  she  was  on  terms  of  intimacy  with  the  Emperor.* 
And  BO  also  with  the  third  court  of  South  Germany.  Ever 
since  October,  1805,  a  family  alliance  had  been  meditated  and 
agreed  upon :  Jerome  was  to  marry  Katharine,  the  only  daughter 
of  Frederick,  King  of  Wiirtemberg,  a  project  which  was  car- 
ried out  in  1807,  the  bridegroom  having  meanwhile  himself 
been  made  a  king. 

The  second  method  of  subjecting  Western  Germany  per- 
manently to  his  will  was  suggested  to  Napoleon  by  the  designs 
of  the  governments  preceding  his  own.  This  was  to  consist  in 
uniting  the  southern  and  middle  German  states  in  a  special 
league  independent  of  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  in  subordinat- 
ing this  league  by  treaty  to  the  control  of  France.  This  was  a 
French  idea  of  long  standing,  having  been  formulated  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  later  adopted  by  the  Revolution.  In 
the  correspondence  between  Talleyrand  and  Sieyes  in  1798  there 
is  frequent  reference  to  the  advisability  of  founding  a  third 
German  state  of  this  kind,  the  control  of  which  should  remain  in 
the  hands  of  France.  Later,  after  Napoleon  had  divided  up  the 
German  ecclesiastical  states  according  to  his  own  good  pleasure, 
he  took  up  this  scheme  with  Talleyrand.  Both  then  had  irter- 
views  in  Mainz  with  the  Archbishop,  Dalberg,  the  only  one  of 
the  clerical  electors  who  had  escaped  the  general  secularization. 
"They  represented  to  him,"  wrote  the  Bavarian  Minister  Edels- 
heim  to  the  Russian  ambassador  in  Vienna,  "that,  since  France 
could  not  tolerate  constant  encroachments  from  Austria  and 
Prussia  upon  the  possessions  of  the  other  German  princes  and 
states,  it  was  an  urgent  necessity  that  a  firm  and  imposing  con- 
federation should  be  formed  against  enterprises  of  that  nature, 
a  confederation  to  be  composed  of  all  the  states  of  the  Empire, 
exclusive  of  the  two  powers  already  mentioned,  and  to  be  able 
in  case  of  need  to  furnish  150,000  men.  Should  the  princes 
be  so  blind  to  their  own  interests  as  to  be  unable  to  come  to  an 
agreement  in  the   matter,  Napoleon  would  make  over  to  the 

*  Indeed  until  our  own  day  the  belief  has  survived  that  Kaspar  Hauser, 
the  my.sterious  foundling  of  Nuremberg,  was  her  son  and  Napoleon's. 


^T.  30]        The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine         337 

Elector  of  Bavaria  tho  on  tiro  country  lying  botwoon  the 
Rhine  and  Austria,  since  ho  would  rather  deal  with  three  powers 
than  with  these  small  and  good-for-nothing  states  powerless 
through  their  disunion." 

Now.  whatsoever  else  may  be  made  a  matter  of  reproach 
to  these  "small  and  good-for-nothing  stat<^s,"  it  cannot  be  said 
that  their  princes  were  "blind  to  their  own  interests."  Ac- 
cordingly when  the  victor  of  Austerlitz  renewed  his  proposition 
somewhat  later  he  found  Little  Germany  quite  ready  to  accede 
to  his  demands.  Indeed  it  did  not  wait  for  advances  to  be 
made.  In  April  1806.  Dalberg  addressed  a  memorial  to  Napo- 
leon which  serves  in  a  measure  to  explain  to  us  the  latter's  allu- 
sions in  his  letters  to  Pius  VII.  "The  worthy  German  nation," 
this  document  reads,  "groans  in  the  misery  of  political  and 
religious  anarchy,  be  thou  Sire,  the  restorer  of  her  constitu- 
tion." And  what  did  Dalberg  mean  by  this?  Religious  an- 
archy was  to  be  dispelled  through  the  establishment  of  a  na- 
tional German  church  of  which  he  was  to  be  the  head,  and  he 
actually  succeeded  in  furthering  this  plan  so  far  as  to  induce 
Napoleon  to  write  to  Fesch  at  Rome  that  if  the  Pope  did  not 
yield  the  religious  affairs  of  Germany  would  be  regulated  with 
Dalberg  as  primate. 

As  for  temporal  affairs,  the  Electoral  Arch-Chancellor  de- 
sired, as  he  wrote  to  the  French  ambassador  Hedouville.  "that 
the  Western  Empire  should  Uve  again  in  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
such  as  it  had  been  under  Charlemagne,  composed  of  Italy, 
France,  and  Germany."  For  the  time  being,  at  least.  Napoleon 
himself  could  desire  nothing  more.  He  appointed  to  Talley- 
rand and  Labesnardiere  the  task  of  preparing  the  draft  of  a 
federal  constitution,  and  had  it  signed  on  July  12th,  1806.  by 
the  ambassadors  of  the  different  states  party  to  it.  And  now, 
just  as  had  been  the  case  four  years  previous,  German  emis- 
saries courted  favour  and  consideration  at  the  hands  of  the 
minister,  offering  unstinted  gold  to  obtain  the  promulgation 
of  a  political  existence  to  which  honour  was  a  stranger.  In  this 
all  did  not  meet  with  success.  For  when  the  document  came 
to  be  signed  it  was  discovered  that  a  long  array  of  principalities 


338  Napoleonic  Creations  [I8O6 

and  dukedoms,  hitherto  subject  only  to  the  German  Empire, 
had  been  absorbed  into  the  territories  of  the  princes  of  the 
Confederation  and  made  subservient  to  them, — had  been  me- 
diatized,— that  is  to  say,  a  foreign  ruler,  without  a  shadow  of 
right  and  acting  purely  according  to  preference,  had  done  away 
with  a  number  of  political  units  in  Germany  for  the  benefit  of 
others  whose  submission  to  his  will  he  thereby  purchased. 
Among  the  most  highly  favoured  were  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg, 
and  the  new  "grand  duchy"  of  Baden,  Nassau,  Hesse-Darm- 
stadt, and  Dalberg.now  "Prince  Primate,"  to  whom  fell  the  city 
and  territory  of  Frankfort  on  the  Main.  In  addition  to  these 
the  Confederation  included  several  smaller  princes  who.  through 
bribery  or  other  means,  had  protected  themselves  against  medi- 
atization.  Among  these  were  Arenberg,  Liechtenstein,  Salm, 
Hohenzollem  and  Von  der  Leyen.  The  Elector  of  Hesse  did 
not  join  the  Confederation.  In  his  place  a  new  sovereign  was 
appointed:  the  Duke,  or  rather  now  "Grand  Duke,"  of  Cleves 
and  Berg,  those  strips  of  land  which  had  been  ceded  by  Prussia 
and  Bavaria  in  the  preceding  year  and  which  had  been  trans- 
ferred by  Napoleon  in  March,  1806,  to  his  brother-in-law  Murat. 
In  the  first  two  articles  of  the  Act  of  Confederation  these  princes 
declared  that  they  were  separated  wholly  and  forever  from  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  of  the  German  nation,  that  they  thereby 
formed  a  special  alliance  under  the  name  of  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  and  should  recognize  no  further  claim  upon  them- 
selves put  forth  by  the  ancient  imperial  power;  that  they  were 
independent  of  foreign  powers  with  the  sole  exception  of  France, 
whose  Emperor,  as  Protector  of  the  Confederation,  was  to  de- 
termine upon  the  admission  of  new  members  to  the  same,  to 
appoint  the  Prince  Primate,  and  direct  the  equipment  of  the 
troops  of  the  Confederation.  Each  of  the  princes  had  a  speci- 
fied quota  of  troops  to  furnish:  Bavaria  30,000,  Wiirtemberg 
12,000.  Baden  8000,  Darmstadt  4000,  Berg  5000,  and  Nassau, 
together  with  the  rcnnaining  small  states,  4000  men — forces  over 
which  Napoleon  from  that  time  assumed  absolute  control  and 
made  use  of  in  all  his  wars,  for,  as  set  forth  in  Article  35,  an 
alliance  between  the  French  Empire  and  the  states  of  the  Con- 


^T.  36]    Dissolution  of  the  Old  German  Empire    3  39 

federation  of  the  Rhine  had  boon  entered  into  according  to 
which  "every  Continental  war  involving  any  one  of  the  parties 
to  the  treaty  became  at  once  common  to  all  the  others." 

The  miUtary  forces  of  the  conqueror  had  thus  been  increased 
by  an  army  and  the  territory  under  his  political  authority 
enlarged  to  the  extent  of  fifty  thousand  square  miles  with 
eight  millions  of  souls.  On  August  1st,  1806,  the  official 
communication  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederation  was 
made  to  the  Diet  of  Ratisbon  by  the  Confederation  and  its 
Protector  with  the  declaration  that  the  old  Empire  was  to  be 
regarded  as  no  longer  existing. 

The  question  now  was  as  to  what  attitude  the  two  great 
German  powers  would  assume  toward  this  new  order  of  things. 
Austria's  monarch  was  still  Emperor  of  Germany,  and  the 
dissolution  of  the  Empire  had  been  resolved  upon  entirely  with- 
out his  foreknowledge.  To  this  empty  title,  to  be  sure,  no  im- 
portance had  for  a  long  time  been  attached  in  Vienna,  not  since 
1802,  when  foreign  influence  had  made  itself  felt  in  German 
affairs  and,  with  the  help  of  the  Germans  themselves,  had 
become  paramount  in  the  poUtics  of  the  Empire.  The  defence 
of  Italy  had  been  undertaken  with  zeal,  but  there  would  have 
been  much  greater  reluctance  to  entering  upon  a  war  for  the 
benefit  of  Germany.  Moreover,  in  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg, — 
particularly  in  the  before-mentioned  Article  14, — the  abdica- 
tion of  the  German  Emperor  had  already  been  indirectly  an- 
noimced.  and  such  delay  as  was  occasioned  at  the  Court  of  Vi- 
enna was  due  to  the  hope  of  securing  compensation  of  some  kind 
for  the  renunciation  of  the  imperial  diadem.  But  Napoleon 
had  no  thought  of  purchasing.  His  method  was  to  demand 
categorically  of  ^"incent,  the  Austrian  ambassador  to  Paris, 
that  his  master  should  resign  without  further  ado  and  recognize 
the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  Without  even  awaiting  the 
arrival  in  Paris  of  the  delegate  from  Vienna  sent  to  negotiate 
in  the  matter  the  official  act  was  signed  at  the  French  capital 
and  the  Austrian  cabinet  thus  confronted  with  an  accom- 
plished fact.  Francis  11.  had  no  choice  but  to  deliver  through 
his  envoy  at   Ratisbon  a  note  bearing  the    date  August  6th, 


340  Napoleonic   Creations  [isoe 

1806,  to  the  intent  that  he  regarded  as  dissolved  the  ties 
which  had  until  then  united  him  with  the  German  Empire, 
and  that  he  resigned  his  crown.  The  old  German  Empire  was 
no  more. 

In  this  interview  with  Vincent  Napoleon  had  assumed  a 
severe  and  threatening  tone  and  intimated  that  his  army  was 
standing  in  readiness  to  enforce  his  demands  at  any  moment 
by  overrunning  Austria.  Nor  were  such  words  without  founda- 
tion in  fact,  for  the  victorious  host  had  not  by  any  means  re- 
turned to  France,  nor  even  so  much  as  completely  evacuated 
Austria,  for  a  powerful  garrison  was  maintained  within  the  fron- 
tier fortress  of  Braunau.  This  last  fact  was  the  result  of  circum- 
stances involving  all  Europe.  It  has  been  seen  to  what  a  degree 
the  ire  of  Russia  had  been  roused  against  Napoleon  through 
the  intrigues  of  the  French  in  the  Adriatic  and  Ionian  seas, 
where  Russia  had  schemes  of  her  own.  Anxiety  in  regard  to 
Napoleon's  intentions  in  the  East  was  further  aroused  at  the 
Russian  court  by  his  demand  that  Dalmatia  and  Cattaro  should 
be  included  with  Istria  in  the  territory  promised  to  him  in 
the  Treaty  of  Pressburg.  This  led  to  Russia's  withdrawal 
from  Naples  in  order  to  establish  herself  more  securely  at  Corfu 
and  thus  be  prepared  to  close  the  Balkan  Peninsula  against 
French  influence,  and,  with  the  same  end  in  view,  a  Russian 
squadron  cruising  in  the  Adriatic  received  orders  to  occupy 
the  Gulf  of  Cattaro.  It  was  urged  that  the  time  appointed  for 
delivering  the  same  to  the  French  was  passed  and  that  the  coast 
therefore  was  now  to  be  regarded  as  belonging,  not  to  Austria 
but  to  France,  that  is,  to  the  enemy,  whereupon  the  Austrian 
commander  promptly  relinquished  the  place  to  the  Russians. 
At  this  Napoleon  was  fairly  beside  himself  with  rage,  and,  insist- 
ing upon  his  treaty  with  the  Court  of  Vienna,  he  demanded  of 
the  latter  that  it  should  drive  out  the  enemy  in  order  to  deliver 
to  him  the  Gulf,  threatening  to  retain  his  troops  in  Braunau  until 
after  this  should  be  accomplished.  All  appeals  made  by  Austria 
to  Russia  to  induce  her  to  give  up  the  Gulf  were  unavailing; 
nothing  but  evasions  were  to  be  extorted  from  St.  Petersburg. 
Napoleon,   however,   carried  out  meanwhile  to  the  letter  his 


-SiT.  36]  The  Situation  of  Prussia  341 

threat  of  maintaining  troops  in  Southern  Germany,  a  fact  which 
hastened  in  no  small  degree  the  accomplishment  of  his  project  for 
a  confederation  of  the  states  of  the  Rhine. 

The  true  importance  of  this  military  occupation  of  South- 
em  Germany  lay  in  the  fact  that  through  it  not  Austria  alone, 
but  also  the  state  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  the  second  great  power 
in  Germany,  was  held  in  check.  When  last  mentioned  Prussia 
was  in  a  predicament.  The  narrow-minded  determination  of 
its  sovereign  to  preserve  the  peace  with  Napoleon,  coupled  with 
circumstances  resulting  from  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  had  com- 
pelled Haugwitz  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  at  Schonbrunn, 
December  15th,  1805.  This  outcome  was  not  without  its  draw- 
backs. For  one  thing  the  covenant  binding  her  to  an  ofTensive 
and  defensive  alliance  with  Napoleon  made  Prussia  appear 
quite  too  thoroughly  a  partisan  of  France,  a  circumstance 
which  could  not  but  be  prejudicial  to  her  standing  as  a  Euro- 
pean power;  furthermore,  through  the  immediate  transfer  of 
Hanover  to  Prussian  administration  entanglements  with  Eng- 
land must  inevitably  follow.  To  avoid  these  difficulties  Haug- 
witz, upon  his  return,  himself  proposed  to  the  king  that  he  should 
not  ratify  the  treaty  exactly  according  to  its  original  wording, 
but  in  a  somewhat  altered  form.  In  place  of  "offensive  and 
defensive  alliance"  the  word  "alliance"  alone  was  substituted, 
while  it  arranged  that  Hanover  should  be  delivered  to  Prussia 
only  upon  the  cessation  of  hostilities  between  France  and  Eng- 
land, being  meanwhile  merely  occupied  by  Prussian  troops. 
The  aim  was  thus  to  make  sure  of  the  Guelph  Electorate  with- 
out becoming  involved  in  a  European  war  on  its  account.  With 
the  document  thus  modified  Haugwitz  took  his  departure  for 
Paris,  and  such  misgivings  as  to  its  reception  by  Napoleon 
as  had  been  harboured  at  home  by  Minister  Hardenberg  were 
dispelled  by  the  arrival  just  at  this  time — about  January  20th, 
1806 — of  a  lettter  from  Talleyrand  to  Laforet,  the  French  am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  telling  of  the  readiness  of  the  Emperor  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  Prussia.  Actuated  by  these  wel- 
come tidings  he  even  went  so  far  as  to  advise  disarmament, 
a  proposal  which  was  so  promptly  carried  into  effect  that  before 


342  Napoleonic   Creations  [isoe 

the  end  of  January  the  greater  part  of  the  Prussian  army  had 
actually  been  disbanded. 

But  affairs  had  meanwhile  taken  an  unexpected  turn  in  Paris. 
Far  from  being  ready  to  accept  the  emendations  made  at  Berlin, 
Napoleon  was  determined  upon  having  Prussia  absolutely  upon 
his  side  in  order  to  make  her  weight  felt  in  the  approaching 
negotiations  with  England.  For  this  reason  he  not  only  re- 
jected the  treaty  in  its  altered  form,  but  declared  as  null  and 
void  the  agreement  of  December  15th,  since  it  had  not  been 
ratified  within  the  stipulated  time.  In  its  place  he  forced  upon 
the  envoy  another  document  which  contained,  indeed,  no  allu- 
sion to  an  "offensive  and  defensive  alliance, "  but  imposed  con- 
ditions far  harder  than  those  of  the  Treaty  of  Schonbrunn: 
Prussia  had  now  to  cede  Valengin  in  addition  to  Neufchatel,  and 
to  renounce  all  claim  to  compensation  for  Ansbach,  which  had 
been  turned  over  to  Bavaria;  furthermore,  she  was  to  recognize 
and  to  defend  just  as  before  the  integrity  of  Turkey,  to  take  im- 
mediate possession  of  Hanover,  and  to  close  to  England  the 
ports  on  the  North  Sea,  the  mouths  of  the  rivers  flowing  there- 
into, and  the  port  of  Liibeck.  Disaster  was  plainly  written  on  the 
very  face  of  such  a  document,  for  if  the  defence  of  Turkey  was 
more  than  likely  to  provoke  a  quarrel  with  Russia,  the  closing 
of  these  ports  must  inevitably  mean  war  with  England.  Yet 
in  spite  of  all  Haugwitz  affixed  his  signature  to  this  treaty  on 
February  15th,  1806,  nor  did  Frederick  William  refuse  to  ratify 
it.  With  his  army  upon  a  footing  of  peace  and  the  French 
troops  stationed  in  Southern  Germany  no  choice  was  open  to 
him.* 

*  An  Austrian  officer,  travelling  at  that  time  upon  a  secret  mission 
in  Southern  Germany,  writes  from  Munich.  March  31st  1806  "Moreover, 
the  truly  admirable  position  held  by  the  French  army  in  respect  to 
Prussia  seems  not  to  have  been  accorded  sufhcient  attention.  With 
his  army  so  extended  that  the  two  extremes  touched  Austerlitz  at  one  end 
and  Bregenz  at  the  other,  lionaparte  withdrew  his  forces  from  Austria  in 
columns  by  a  flank  movement  All  of  a  sudden,  through  Augereau's 
move  [upon  Frankfort],  the  army  was  placed  in  a  threatening  attitude, 
having  Frankfort  as  its  centre  with  the  Upper  Palatinate  and  the  Weser 
at  the  extreme  ends  and  leaving  it  in  possession  of  all  streams  and  heights 


^T.  36]  The   Death   of  Pitt  343 

And  now  followed  the  result  to  which  all  these  events  had 
been  leading.  Prussia's  occupation  of  Hanover  had  been  ac- 
cepted at  the  outset  by  England  without  any  token  of  hostility, 
but  the  closing  of  the  ports  of  the  Elbe,  Weser,  and  Ems  engen- 
dered the  wildest  excitement.  At  once,  early  in  April,  1S06, 
without  A\aiting  for  a  formal  declaration  of  war,  the  British 
ministers,  certain  of  the  absolute  concurrence  of  Parliament, 
sequestrated  all  Prussian  merchant-vessels  lying  in  her  ports, — 
there  were  some  hundreds  of  them, — and  gave  chase  to  those 
upon  the  open  sea.  This  alone  involved  a  loss  of  many  millions 
to  Prussia,  without  taking  into  account  the  vastly  more  grievous 
loss  which  must  inevitably  be  sustained  by  Silesian  commerce 
as  a  result  of  the  closing  of  the  northern  seaports.  All  this 
calamity  for  the  sake  of  Hanover,  the  possession  of  which  was 
after  all  not  so  sure  a  thing  as  had  been  assumed  by  those  in 
Berlin  who  favoured  the  idea  of  an  alliance  with  France.  What 
would  happen  if,  for  instance,  England  and  France  should 
come  to  a  reconciliation?  Would  Napoleon,  out  of  consid 
eration  for  Prussia,  be  deterred  from  returning  the  Electorate 
if  the  question  of  peace  depended  upon  it?  And  indeed  indi- 
cations all  pointed  to  some  such  adjustment  of  differences. 

The  victories  of  the  Emperor  had  not  unnaturally  awakened 
a  feeling  of  deep  uneasiness  in  London.  It  was  with  true  heavi- 
ness of  heart  that  Pitt  witnessed  the  peace  made  with  Austria, 
the  Russians  returning  home,  and  the  disintegration  of  the 
coalition  which,  at  bottom,  had  been  of  his  making.  Ailing 
as  he  was  in  body,  he  completely  succumbed  to  these  un- 
expected blows,  and  died  January  23d,  1806.  Shortly  before 
his  end,  as  his  glance  chanced  to  fall  upon  a  map  of  Europe,  he 
gave  orders  to  roll  it  up,  since  there  would  be  no  occasion  to  use 
it  during  the  course  of  the  next  ten  years.  It  was  as  a  true 
prophet  that  this  man  of  genius  quitted  the  scene.     There  was 

from  which  Prussia  could  be  intimidated.  Berlin,  it  was  reckoned, 
could  be  reached  in  ten  marches,  and  they  counted  upon  but  one  battle 
between  Wiirtemberg  and  Breslau.  Prussia,  whose  attention  was  kept 
occupied  with  negotiations  during  all  these  manoeuvres,  awoke  too  late 
to  a  realization  of  her  situation  and  was  compelled  to  subscribe  to  all 
conditions  imposed  upon  her." 


^44  Napoleonic   Creations  [isoe 

in  the  Grenville  ministry,  which  succeeded  that  of  Pitt,  an 
element  friendly  to  France,  led  by  Fox,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  This  man  has  already  been  noticed  as  an  enthusiastic 
admirer  of  the  hero  of  the  18th  of  Brumaire.  He  now  made 
approaches  to  the  government  at  Paris  in  a  manner  smacking 
of  the  romantic,  by  giving  information  of  a  conspiracy  against 
the  life  of  the  Emperor,  which,  although  apparently  nothing 
more  than  a  concoction  of  his  own  brain,  was  received  graciously 
by  Napoleon,  who  was  well  pleased  to  accept  the  pretext  as 
genuine  and  made  a  courteous  reply.  Shortly  afterwards  Lord 
Seymour,  Earl  of  Yarmouth,  one  of  the  Englishmen  arrested 
in  Paris  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  was  commissioned  by  the 
London  cabinet  to  open  negotiations  with  Talleyrand.  By 
June,  1806,  these  had  been  entered  upon.  It  was  scarcely  feasible 
to  withhold  Malta  from  the  victor  of  Trafalgar  if  he  were  to  be 
asked  to  give  back  the  conquests  he  had  made,  and  Napoleon's 
minister  made  a  direct  offer  of  the  island  to  the  Englishman, 
proffering  in  addition — as  though  no  treaty  of  alliance  between 
Prussia  and  France  had  ever  existed — the  return  of  Hanover 
to  its  hereditary  sovereign.  The  possession  of  Sicily,  moreover, 
was  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  its  Bourbon  king,  provided 
England  would  acknowledge  Joseph's  sovereignty  at  Naples. 

Of  all  this  no  word  reached  Berlin  for  some  time.  Never- 
theless the  king  could  not  overcome  his  distrust  of  an  ally  who 
imposed  upon  him  conditions  so  hard.  He  turned  to  Russia 
for  countenance  and  support.  Duke  Charles  of  Brunswick 
was  despatched  on  a  secret  mission  to  St.  Petersburg,  there  to 
obtain  above  all  else  a  promise  from  Alexander  L  to  respect  the 
integrity  of  Turkey,  lest  in  the  end  Prussia  be  driven  to  making 
war  against  him.  But  such  an  assurance  was  not  to  be  gained. 
So  much  progress  only  was  made  toward  an  understanding 
between  them  that  the  two  sovereigns  exchanged  declarations 
according  to  which  the  Czar  promised  to  use  all  his  powers  to 
preserve  the  state  of  Prussia  independent  and  inviolable,  while 
Frederick  William  bound  himself  not  to  make  war  against 
Russia  if  perchance  hostilities  should  arise  in  consequence  of  an 
attack  upon  Turkey  by  France  (July  Ist,  1806).     The  surest 


/Et.  36]  Negotiations  with   Russia  345 

guarantee  of  tranquillity  to  Prussia  would  indeed  have  lain  in 
the  establishment  of  peace  between  France  and  Russia,  and  for 
a  time  it  seemed  as  if  this  were  to  be  the  actual  outcome.  Alex- 
ander, having  heard  of  negotiations  between  Napoleon  and  Eng- 
land, was  determined,  in  case  they  should  result  in  reconciUation, 
not  to  be  left  alone  to  sustain  the  war  against  the  formidable 
Emperor.  For  this  reason  the  Russian  ambassador  Oubril  now 
betook  himself  to  Paris,  and  there  indeed,  on  July  20th,  1806, 
concluded  a  separate  treaty  according  to  the  terms  of  which 
Russia  was  to  relinquish  Cattaro  and  withdraw  to  the  Ionian 
Islands,  in  return  for  which  France  was  to  evacuate  Germany 
within  three  months  and  also  release  the  recently  occupied  Rc- 
pubhc  of  Ragusa.  Both  parties  acknowledged  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  the  Porte.  King  Ferdinand  was  to  receive 
the  Balearic  Islands  as  compensation  for  his  former  kingdom 
of  Naples  and  Sicily.  To  this  treaty,  which  reminds  one  of  that 
which  Count  St.  Julien  was  once  inveigled  into  signing,  there 
was  lacking  nothing  but  the  signature  of  the  Czar. 

But  with  neither  Russia  nor  England  was  peace  to  follow 
in  spite  of  all  these  negotiations.  For  scarcely  had  the  Russian 
envoy  arrived  in  Paris,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  establishment 
of  amicable  relations,  when  Napoleon  began  to  retract,  one 
after  the  other,  every  concession  he  had  made  to  England  and 
finally  insisted  upon  the  cession  of  Sicily  to  Joseph.  The 
effect  of  this  was  to  disconcert  Fox,  and  when  the  Constitution 
of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  became  fully  known,  giving 
France  ascendency  upon  the  Continent  and  at  the  same  time 
surrendering  further  territory  to  French  commerce,  he  gradually 
withdrew  altogether  from  the  agreement,  and  the  negotiations 
were  at  length  brought  to  a  close  without  result.  His  death 
also  followed  shortly  after,  and  with  him  disappeared  almost 
the  last  man  across  the  Channel  upon  whom  Napoleon  could 
count  as  disposed  toward  reconciliation.  From  thenceforth  he 
was  never  to  find  another  in  all  Great  Britain. 

It  was  just  at  this  time,  too,  that  the  war  party  in  Russ^ia 
regained  the  ascendency.  Alexander,  who  did  not  relish  the 
idea  of  having  his  hands  tied  in  the  Orient  nor  of  being  beguiled 


34^  Napoleonic  Creations  [isoe 

out  of  the  possession  of  Cattaro,  refused  his  sanction  to  the 
treaty  signed  by  Oubril.*  Moreover,  a  deep  impression  had 
been  made  upon  him  in  learning  of  the  disruption  of  the  ancient 
German  Empire,  of  which  he  had  been  pleased  to  regard  himself 
as  the  guarantor.  He  had  it  announced  in  Paris  that  he  would 
conclude  the  treaty  of  peace  only  upon  condition  that  France 
would  renounce  all  claim  upon  Dalmatia  and  Albania,  restore 
Sicily  to  King  Ferdinand,  and  finally  indemnify  the  King  of 
Sardinia  for  the  loss  of  Piedmont.  He  was  perfectly  aware  that 
Napoleon  would  never  consent  to  such  terms,  and  it  was  with 
the  same  breath  that  he  gave  orders  to  mobilize  the  army  and 
push  it  forward  to  the  Prussian  frontier. 

During  all  the  time  that  these  changes  were  taking  place  in 
the  political  situation  of  the  Great  Powers,  Prussia  had  been 
bending  in  sorrow  and  anguish  beneath  the  yoke  of  her  alliance 
with  France.  It  is  said  that  after  the  signing  of  the  compact 
tears  were  more  than  once  seen  in  the  eyes  of  the  king.  Had 
not  certain  possessions  been  given  in  exchange  for  uncertain? 
The  relinquished  districts,  such  as  Ansbach,  had  been  forthwith 
occupied  by  the  French,  and  yet  to  this  insatiable  ally  even 
these  promised  to  be  insufficient.  In  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  new  duchy  of  Berg  there  were  three  abbeys  to  which 
there  were  rich  coal-fields  appertaining;  these  had  fallen  by 
inheritance  to  Prussia  in  1802  and  no  longer  belonged  to  Cleves 

*  In  the  negotiations  between  Oubril  and  the  French  it  is  noticeable 
that  he  definitely  refused  to  treat  for  peace  in  conjunction  with  England. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  British  ambassador  used  his  persuasions;  he 
was  acting  under  orders.  It  is  even  yet  not  entirely  clear  to  what  cause 
should  be  ascribed  this  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Czar.  No  mis- 
take, however,  will  be  made  in  assuming  that  Russia  was  unwilling  to 
reveal  to  England  her  posture  of  attack  in  regard  to  Turkey.  Certain  it 
is  that  Paget,  the  English  ambassador  at  Vienna,  "upon  his  knees" 
entreated  Count  Raaumoffsky,  the  representative  of  Russia,  to  evacuate 
the  Gulf  of  Cattaro,  and  all  to  no  avail.  (Martens,  "Recueil  des  traitds 
et  conventions  conclus  par  la  Russie  a\ec  les  puissances  etrangeres," 
II.  .W4.)  Oubril  Icarnod  to  his  cost  how  thoroughly  the  Czar  was 
resolved  upon  keeping  this  port,  for,  having  allowed  himself  to  be  cajoled 
in  Paris  into  promising  its  reliiKiuishmenl,  he  lost  favour  with  his  prince 
and  waa  deprived  of  his  office  and  dignities. 


iEr.  36]       Prussia   Reduced   to    Desperation  347 

except  in  the  matter  of  provincial  representation.  In  npitc  of 
this  fact,  Joachim  I.^as  Murat  was  now  called — simply  or- 
dered his  troops  to  occupy  these  territories,  and  was  brought  to 
evacuate  them  only  by  dint  of  positive  reclamation  by  the 
Prussian  government.  Essen,  the  property  of  one  of  these  ab- 
beys, formed  the  connecting  link  between  Clcves  and  the  Prus- 
Bian  county  of  I\Iark.  Now  Napoleon's  policy  aimed  likewise 
at  the  acquisition  of  this  county,  since  it  was  essential  to  his 
plans  to  strengthen  Murat's  jurisdiction  in  order  to  estabUsh  a 
firm  foothold  for  himself  in  Northern  Germany  such  as  he  had 
already  obtained  in  the  south.  With  this  in  view  the  French 
ambassador  in  Berhn  received  explicit  instructions  to  incite 
Prussia  to  open  warfare  with  Sweden  in  order  to  take  from 
her  Swedish  Pomerania.  while  Prussia  herself  should  relinquish 
the  county  of  Mark  to  the  Duke  of  Berg.  It  was  with  difficulty 
that  the  court  at  Berlin  was  able  to  resist  these  demands.  To 
add  to  his  other  offences  Napoleon  did  not  give  up  to  his  brother- 
in-law  the  fortress  of  Wesel  belonging  to  Cleves  and  situated  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  but — in  direct  violation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris — occupied  it  w^ith  his  own  troops  in  order  to 
secure  also  a  military  point  of  support  in  the  north. 

At  the  conduct  of  France  in  this  matter,  taken  with  the 
vexatious  tone  adopted  by  her  in  the  documents  which  were 
interchanged,  fears  began  to  make  themselves  felt  in  Prussia 
that  Napoleon  was  but  seeking  a  pretext  for  brlngmg  about 
a  rupture  of  the  peace  in  order  to  extend  his  power  beyond  the 
Prussian  boundaries.  By  the  beginning  of  July  the  question 
was  already  under  consideration  whether  it  were  not  best  to 
make  miUtary  preparation  against  such  a  contingency.  Tid- 
ings arriving  from  Southern  Germany  ill  calculated  to  calm  such 
fears  seemed  to  confirm  the  advisability  of  being  in  readiness. 
Napoleon  himself  assumed  the  task  of  aimouncing  in  Berlin  the 
founding  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhme,  only  seeking  to 
moderate  the  impression  which  such  tidings  must  create  by 
proposing  that  Frederick  William  III.  establish  a  similar  league 
on  his  own  account  in  the  north.  Hardly,  however,  had  this  sug- 
gestion been  taken  into  consideration  in  Berlin,  before  it  had  to 


34^  Napoleonic  Creations  [isoe 

be  rejected  again;  for,  late  in  July,  Lucchesini  sent  word  from 
Paris  that  Lord  Yarmouth  had  confided  to  him  that  the  Em- 
peror was  about  to  restore  Hanover  to  England.  Hanover! 
without  which  Prussia  could  have  no  hope  of  holding  a  position 
of  importance  in  Northern  Germany,  for  the  possession  of  which 
she  had  made  such  tremendous  sacrifice  of  territory,  possessions, 
and  esteem,  and  of  which  Napoleon  had  but  just  asseverated 
that  he  had  no  thoughts  of  denying  her !  Was  there  then  any  re- 
spect in  which  reliance  could  be  placed  on  Napoleon?  Moreover, 
other  alarming  reports  began  to  pour  in  from  all  sides.  From 
Westphalia  General  Bliicher  sent  notification  that  the  French 
were  being  re-enforced  in  Wesel  and  on  the  Lippe,  a  fact  which 
could  have  but  one  signification — an  attempt  to  take  the 
Mark  and  Westphalia  from  Prussia  for  Murat.  From  Ratisbon 
and  Munich  news  came  that  French  troops  had  occupied  Wiirz- 
burg,  and  tidings  from  everywhere  agreed  that  they  were  ad- 
vancing upon  Saxony  and  Prussia.  What  was  to  be  believed 
of  all  this?  Could  these  reports  actually  be  true?  And  why 
not?  In  their  weakness  the  people  could  not  but  feel  wholly  at 
the  mercy  of  this  power  advancing  totally  regardless  of  cause 
or  right,  and,  as  if  in  a  fever,  the  one  thought  prevailing  was 
but  to  escape  in  some  way  from  this  helpless  condition.  Even 
Haugwitz  advised — as  he  had  before  done  in  1803 — to  arm  and 
prepare  for  war,  and  this  time — feehng  himself  injured  and 
deceived  in  the  conduct  of  France — the  king  yielded.  Lucche- 
sini's  despatch  had  reached  Berlin  on  August  6th;  four  days 
later  Frederick  William  wrote  to  the  Czar  asking  his  support 
and  saying  that  Napoleon  had  offered  Hanover  to  England 
without  equivalent,  and  this  to  all  intents  and  purposes  meant 
that  he  had  resolved  upon  annihilating  Prussia.  For,  should 
the  Emperor  actually  deprive  the  state  of  the  Electorate,  he 
must  be  prepared  to  see  Prussia's  king  at  the  head  of  all  his 
other  enemies  in  the  next  war,  and  so,  in  order  to  avert  this 
danger.  Napoleon  intended  to  avail  himself  of  so  favourable  an 
opportunity  as  the  present  to  destroy  him  singly.  On  August  9th 
orders  to  mobilize  the  army  were  issued  in  Berlin,  and  the  French 
ambassador  was  notified  that  preparations  were  behig  made 


2ET.37]  Did  Napoleon  Want  War  ?  349 

for  war  because  various  measures  taken  by  Napoleon  must  be 
regarded  as  aimed  against  Prussia;  for  even  were  they  nothing 
more  than  demonstrations,  the  necessity  was  nevertheless  laid 
upon  the  country  of  making  a  counter-display  lest,  as  had 
occurred  on  a  previous  occasion — in  February — it  be  forced 
to  suffer  under  the  constraint  of  such  demonstrations. 

And  was  Prussia  justified  in  these  forebodings?  Did  Napo- 
leon really  want  war?  Yes  and  no.  He  wanted  war  because 
it  constituted  part  of  his  system.  Ever  since  the  time  of  the 
Directory  the  revolutionary  policy  had  been  planned  upon  the 
idea  of  some  day  crowding  Prussia,  as  also  Austria,  as  far  as 
possible  toward  the  east.  Of  Napoleon  particularly  it  is  said 
that  he  had  borne  a  grudge  against  Frederick  WilHam  III.  ever 
since  the  latter's  equivocal  attitude  in  the  previous  year,  and 
that,  in  February,  1806,  the  King  of  Bavaria  had  already  been 
led  by  Napoleon  to  entertain  hopes  of  Bayreuth,  although  it 
was  certain  that  Prussia  would  be  no  more  willing  to  part  with 
it  without  a  struggle  than  with  Hanover.  But  it  is  quite  an- 
other question  whether  it  was  Napoleon's  plan  to  make  war  just 
then  in  the  summer  of  1806  against  the  principal  power  of 
Northern  Germany.  It  would  seem,  indeed,  rather  unUkely 
that  he  had  any  such  intention.  True,  his  army  was  maintain- 
ing in  Germany  an  attitude  of  offence  toward  Prussia  also,  but 
its  location  there — aside  from  the  financial  importance  of  sus- 
taining troops  at  foreign  cost — was  on  account  of  Austria. 
After  the  consent  of  Francis  II.  to  the  formation  of  the  Confed- 
eration of  the  Rhine,  followed  by  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
with  Oubril  involving  in  its  conditions  the  evacuation  of  Ger- 
many by  the  French,  Napoleon  really  made  preparations  for 
\\athdrawing  his  troops.  On  August  17th  he  WTote  to  Talley- 
rand and  Berthier  in  regard  to  the  matter  and  instructed  the 
latter  to  send  home  the  Austrian  prisoners  of  war.  Hearing 
just  at  this  time  of  the  mobilization  of  the  Prussian  army,  he 
simply  laughed  at  it  as  the  outcome  of  an  unjustifiable  alarm. 
Even  as  late  as  August  26th  he  wrote  to  Berthier  at  Mimich; 
"The  Berlin  cabinet  is  seized  with  a  panic  of  fear.  It  imagines 
that  in  our  treaty  with  Russia  there  are  clauses  which  will  de- 


350  Napoleonic  Creations  [I8O6 

prive  Prussia  of  several  provinces.  To  that  must  be  attributed 
the  absurd  mihtary  preparations  which  it  is  making  and  to 
which  no  attention  should  be  paid,  it  being  my  vmfeigned  pur- 
pose to  recall  my  troops  to  France."  But  a  week  later  the 
question  had  taken  a  totally  different  turn.  News  had  arrived 
from  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Czar  refused  to  accept  the  treaty 
of  July  20th,  and  at  this  the  preparations  suddenly  assumed  a 
new  meaning  in  Napoleon's  estimation,  since,  from  the  coinci- 
dence of  the  two  facts,  he  concluded  that  there  must  be  an 
understanding  between  Russia  and  Prussia,  especially  as,  simul- 
taneously with  the  Russian  courier,  there  arrived  General 
Knobelsdorff  from  Berlin  demanding  in  the  name  of  his  sov- 
ereign the  evacuation  of  Germany.  It  was  further  assumed  in 
Paris  that  England  also  had  given  up  all  thought  of  making 
peace  with  France,  so  that  it  is  not  astonishing  that  Napoleon 
should  infer  the  existence  of  a  new  coalition  similar  to  that  of 
the  preceding  year,  except  that  in  this  Austria  was  replaced 
by  Prussia.  Under  this  supposition — which  was  moreover  a 
mistaken  one— he  at  once  countermanded  the  marching  orders 
issued  to  the  army  in  Germany  and  refused  to  Knobelsdorff 
the  fulfilment  of  Frederick  William's  request  so  long  as  the 
Prussian  army  should  remain  upon  a  footing  of  war.  Prussia 
must  begin  by  laying  down  its  arms. 

With  his  cold,  clear  glance  the  French  Emperor  surveyed 
the  whole  situation.  He  saw  but  two  possibilities  before  him, 
and  these  he  submitted  to  his  ambassador  at  Berlin  in  a  letter 
of  September  12th,  1806,  in  which  he  wrote:  "Either  Prussia 
has  taken  up  arms  simply  from  fear, — in  which  case,  since  there 
no  longer  exists  any  cause  for  alarm,  the  troops  will  be  dis- 
banded, especially  as  they  occasion  great  expense, — or  else 
Prussia  has  meant  so  to  place  herself  for  the  time  being  that 
agreements  which  she  has  already  made  or  proposes  to  make 
with  Russia,  England,  and  Sweden  shall  come  to  light.  In  the 
latter  case  the  policy  of  the  Emperor  demands  that  he  should 
take  advantage  of  the  favourable  time  of  year  to  reach  Berlin 
before  the  Swedes  and  Russians,  to  scatter  the  Prussian  army 
as  he  has  scattered  the  Austrians,  to  attack  his  enemies  before 


^T. 37]  Public   Feeling   in   Germany  351 

thoy  can  unite,  and  ovorcoino  tlioin  sin«i;ly.  Tlio  quostion 
reduces  itself,  then,  to  these  two  conditions;  it  admits  of  no 
third.  '  Possibihties,'  'probabilities,'  'persuasions,'  'inmost 
convictions'  are  in  the  eyes  of  His  Majesty  nothing  more  than 
idle  fancies  by  which  he  does  not  allow  himself  to  be  misled. 
If  perchance  .  .  .  any  hypothesis  besides  those  mentioned 
might  be  admitted,  it  could  only  be  this,  that  the  same  Provi- 
dence which  has  always  hitherto  guided  the  Emperor  has 
decreed  that  Berlin  shall  fall  beneath  his  blow  on  the  anniver- 
sary of  the  day  upon  which  he  entered  Vienna." 

Everything  now  depended  upon  whether  the  King  of 
Prussia  would  accede  to  the  demanrls  of  the  Corsican.  He  had 
in  reality  taken  up  arms  ''  from  fear,"  but  the  same  fear  with- 
held him  now  from  laying  them  down  again.  And  besides  this 
fear  was  concern  for  the  position  of  the  state  as  a  power  which 
seemed  to  be  threatened  in  Hanover,  so  recently  acquired; 
concern  for  the  honour  and  majesty  of  the  throne;  and,  finally, 
respect  for  a  popular  sentim(>nt  demanding  resistance  to  France, 
which  now  for  the  first  time  made  itself  plainly  felt. 

For  there  was  no  denying  that  among  the  German  people 
there  was  growing  up  a  reaction  of  the  nation  against  Napoleon's 
system  of  international  conquest.  Through  the  absolute  arbitra- 
riness with  which  the  Emperor  had  cast  off  the  republican  forms 
of  the  Revolution  he  had  made  himself  enemies  of  the  democrats 
of  Southern  Germany,  those  who,  even  at  the  time  of  the  Direc- 
torj',  had  been  full  of  enthusiasm  about  the  "liberating"  policy 
of  France;  his  despotism  and  boundless  ambition  had  exas- 
perated those  who  valued  the  independence  of  their  nation, 
who  clung  to  their  hereditary  dynasties,  and  who  regarded  with 
disfavour  their  diminution.  To  be  sure,  besides  those  who  were  so 
opposed  to  Napoleon  there  were  millions  who,  destitute  of  politi- 
cal sentiment  of  any  kind,  lived  only  for  material  gain  and  en- 
joyment, and  would  therefore  prefer  slavish  tranquillity  under 
the  iron  hand  of  the  foreign  power  to  the  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence and  freedom  of  action;  and  then  again  there  were 
serious-minded  men  in  whom  the  principle  of  equality  had  en- 
gendered sympathy  with  France,   who  saw  their  ideal  in  the 


352  Napoleonic   Creations  [18O6 

cosmopolitan  union  of  the  nations  however  brought  about,  and 
who  therefore  felt  no  antipathy  to  Napoleon,  regarding  him  as 
the  instrument  through  whom  this  was  to  be  accomplished. 
But  it  was  against  just  such  as  the  last-mentioned  that  some  of 
Germany's  best  thinkers  now  entered  the  arena  in  the  early 
part  of  the  year  1806 :  Schleiermacher,  with  his  sermons  upon 
the  value  of  nationality ;  Fichte,  with  his  speeches  addressed  to 
German  warriors;  Ernst  Moritz  Arndt,  with  his  book  on  "The 
Spirit  of  the  Tmies"  and  his  crushing  denunciation  of  the  Cor- 
sican's  ambition  for  universal  dominion.  Thus  it  was  in  the 
north.  In  the  south  appeared  pamphlets  and  fugitive  com- 
positions deploring  unreservedly  the  contemptible  attitude  of 
the  nation.  For  it  was  felt  to  be  ignominious  and  disgraceful 
that,  in  spite  of  the  conclusion  of  peace,  Napoleon  should  leave 
his  army  as  a  matter  of  course  to  domineer  and  support  itself 
upon  German  soil.  The  French  Emperor  was  aware  of  this  new 
popular  movement  and  did  not  underestimate  it.  but  he  hoped 
by  means  of  a  solitary  example  of  inexorable  severity  to  par- 
alyze it  at  a  blow.  Consequently  he  instructed  Berthier  to 
proceed  according  to  martial  law  against  the  Nuremberg  pub- 
lishers of  these  political  libels,  that  is  to  say,  to  summon  them 
before  a  military  tribunal  and  have  them  shot  at  the  expiration 
of  twenty-four  hours.  As  he  wrote  to  the  Major-General, 
August  5th,  1806,  "the  sentence  will  mean  that  wherever  there 
is  an  army,  it  being  the  duty  of  the  commmander  to  provide 
for  its  safety,  such  and  such  individuals  convicted  of  having 
tried  to  excite  the  inhabitants  of  Suabia  against  the  French 
army  are  condemned  to  death."  This  might,  perhaps,  have 
been  reasonable  in  time  of  war  and  in  a  hostile  land,  but  here,  in 
the  midst  of  peace  and  in  the  country  of  an  ally,  such  a  pro- 
ceeding was  nothing  else  than  absolute  barbarity.  It  was  not 
to  be  long  ere  a  victim  was  found.  One  of  the  pamphlets,  en- 
titled "Germany  in  her  Deep  Al^asement, "  had  been  written  by 
one  Yelin  of  Ansbach  and  was  not  at  all  an  incendiary  docu- 
ment. A  Nuremberg  bookseller,  Palm,  had  published  and  cir- 
culated it  and  was  now  on  that  account  arrested  and,  declining 
to  save  himself  by  flight,  was  shot  in  Braunau  on  August  25th, 


JEt.  37]         The   Prussian   Patriotic   Party  353 

1806,  A  tempest  of  indignation  and  despair  s\vei)t  over  all 
Germany.  What  the  execution  of  d'Engliien  had  been  to  the 
nobility  the  murder  of  Palm  now  was  to  the  people.  It  was 
this  occurrence  more  than  any  other  which  fostered  the  German 
hatred  of  the  French,  so  that  Frederick  Gentz  in  writing  from 
Saxony  to  Starhemberg,  the  Austrian  diplomat,  could  say:  "The 
war  is  to  be  a  national  war  to  the  full  intent  of  the  word;  within 
a  short  time  all  Germany  will  be  taking  part  in  it.  The  recent 
crimes  of  the  French,  and  most  of  all  that  one  of  which  the  news 
has  just  filled  all  minds  with  horror,  have  incensed  the  nation  to 
such  a  degree  that,  following  upon  the  first  success  scored  by 
the  Prussians,  a  repetition  of  the  Sicilian  Vespers  will  every- 
where be  seen." 

Even  the  leading  circles  of  Berlin  could  not  shut  themselves 
away  from  these  floods  of  popular  feehng.  Opposed  to  the 
"Frenchmen," — as  the  peace-loving  adherents  of  a  neutral 
policy  had  been  dubbed, — there  had  existed  here  for  several 
years  a  "war  party"  which  had  counselled  a  close  defensive 
alliance  with  Austria  in  1804  and  had  been  unreservedly  in 
favour  of  joining  the  coalition  in  the  following  year.  The  hour 
of  triumph  had  finally  arrived  to  these  advocates  of  resistance, 
who  numbered  among  them  such  men  as  Stein,  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  Generals  Bliicher,  Riichel,  and  Pfull,  the  scholars  Jo- 
hannes von  Miillcr  and  Alexander  von  Humboldt,  with  many 
others.  Indeed,  even  at  court,  among  those  nearest  to  the 
king,  the  party  counted  its  supporters:  Queen  Louise,  the  Prin- 
cesses William  and  Radziwill,  Princes  Louis  Ferdinand,  William, 
Henry,  and  the  Prince  of  Orange — all  acknowledged  adherence 
to  it  and  urged  that  the  state  should  rise  warlike  in  self-defence 
rather  than  continue  to  sink  peacefully  into  decay.  But  that 
which  produced  the  deepest  impression  upon  the  mind  of  the 
tranquillity-loving  king  was  the  fact  that,  especially  in  tl.e  army, 
a  feeling  of  positive  antipathy  to  France  was  making  itself 
evident,  taking  in  some  cases  the  form  of  serious  deliberation 
and  in  others  that  of  arrogant  presumption;  it  turbulently  de- 
manded the  dismissal  of  Haugwitz  and  idolized  Harden  berg, 
who  had  drawn  upon  himself  the  hatred  of  Napoleon,  even  in 


354  Napoleonic   Creations  [I806 

some  cases  overstepping  the  bounds  of  discipline.  This  had 
been  hitherto  unheard  of  in  the  Prussian  army,  and  so  overcame 
Frederick  William  with  astonishment  that  for  a  moment  he  con- 
sidered abdicating  the  throne.  Of  disarmament  in  response 
to  Napoleon's  demand  no  thought  could  now  be  entertained. 
A  refusal  was  sent  in  response  to  it,  and,  solely  for  the  sake  of 
gaining  time,  Prussia  renewed  her  demand  in  Paris  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  army,  this  time  in  the  form  of  an  ulti- 
matum, giving  Napoleon  until  October  8th  to  return  a  decisive 
answer. 

Only  with  reluctance  and  justifiable  apprehension  had  the 
king  allowed  himself  to  be  persuaded  into  this  course.  Russia 
he  might  indeed  reckon  upon  as  friendly,  but  support  from  the 
Czar  could  not,  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances,  reach 
the  seat  of  war  before  the  end  of  November.  With  England 
the  existing  quarrel  must  first  be  settled  before  there  could  be 
hope  of  receiving  from  her  the  subsidies  indispensable  to  the 
course  now  entered  upon.  There  remained  as  an  ally  only  Sax- 
ony, which  was  exasperatingly  slow  about  making  her  prepara- 
tions for  war,  while  the  Elector  of  Hesse,  selfishly  regarding  only 
his  own  interest,  remained  neutral.  For  the  rest  Prussia  had 
but  her  own  forces  to  rely  upon.  These  Frederick  William  did 
not  overrate.*  During  the  long  years  of  peace  which  had 
elapsed  the  defects  in  the  military  administration  had  become 
ineradicably  fixed;  the  army  was  practically  without  a  com- 
mander, for  the  only  person  qualified  for  the  position — the  Duke 
of  Brunswick — was  irresolute  and  enfeebled  by  age  and — as  a 
contemporary  justly  observed — "  better  fitted  to  receive  than 
to  issue  orders."     So  situated  it  certainly  was  an  act  of  colossal 

*  Montgelas  says  in  his  "Memoirs"  that  "the  King  was  by  nature 
and  principle  opposed  to  all  warlike  undertaking  and  yielded  rather  to 
impulse  from  without  than  to  any  fixed  conviction  of  his  own.  He 
feared  Napoleon's  superior  genius  and  had  little  confidence  in  his  own 
army,  which  seemed  to  him  not  in  condition  to  carry  on  war  with  success. 
It  is  almost  l^cyond  question  that  he  betook  himself  to  the  army  with  the 
idea  that  ho  should  lose  a  battle  and  thus  be  furnished  with  a  pretext  for 
concluding  j)eace,  since  then  the  most  incredulous  would  be  convinced 
that  resistance  was  impossible." 


Mr.  37]  War    with    Prussia   Begins  355 

audacity  for  the  Prussians  to  set  tiiemselves  up  against  the 
ever-victorious  leader  of  the  French,  and  for  a  long  time  lie  him- 
self could  not  be  brought  to  believe  that  they  had  any  such 
intention  and  simply  designated  the  undertaking  as  insane. 
On  September  10th  he  wrote  to  Berthier:  "Say  in  strict  con- 
fidence to  the  Khig  of  Bavaria  that  if  I  have  a  quarrel  with 
Prussia— which  I  consider  most  unUkely — but  if  ever  she  should 
be  guilty  of  such  madness,  he  shall  have  Bayreuth."  Within 
his  inmost  soul,  however,  there  was  nothing  he  so  much  dreaded 
as  that  Frederick  William  should,  after  all,  decide  to  disarm  and 
so  deprive  him  of  the  favourable  opportunity  for  overcoming 
him  while  single-handed.  The  Prussian  army,  especially  its 
cavalry,  enjoyed  an  excellent  reputation  throughout  Europe, 
and  Napoleon,  who  shared  the  general  opinion  of  it,  was  not  with- 
out disquietude.  So  much  the  more,  therefore,  did  it  behoove 
him  to  be  on  the  alert  to  catch  and  destroy  this  army  by  itself. 
To  accomplish  this  end  the  Prussian  envoy  to  Paris  was  de- 
tained there  in  suspense  without  explanation,  while  the  French 
ambassador  to  Berlin  was  directed  to  allow  himself  to  be  drawn 
into  no  agreement  of  any  kind,  but  rather  to  feign  illness  if  no 
other  way  of  escape  presented.  And  for  this  end  the  available 
forces  had  already  been  started  weeks  before  in  all  possible 
quietness  and  secrecy  in  the  direction  of  the  Rhine  and  toward 
Aschaffenburg,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  army  in  Germany  by 
100,000  newly  levied  troops.  For  this  it  was  that  the  Emperor 
himself  suddenly  left  Paris  on  September  25th,  without  noti- 
fying the  Senate,  and  journeyed  in  haste  to  Mainz,  where  he 
issued  the  final  orders.    The  war  had  begun. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FROM  JENA  TO  TILSIT 

The  good  opinion  of  the  Prussian  army  which  Napoleon 
entertained  impelled  him  now  to  proceed  with  still  greater  cau- 
tion than  in  the  preceding  year  against  the  Austrians.  For  in 
this  army  he  saw  the  creation  of  the  great  Frederick  whom  he  so 
warmly  admired,  and  its  generals,  if  observant,  might  have 
accquainted  themselves  with  his  strategic  manoeuvres  during  the 
campaigns  of  1800  and  1805  and  have  prepared  themselves  for 
defence  against  them.  He  wrote  to  Soult  that  he  had  disposed 
his  forces  so  as  to  outnumber  those  of  the  enemy,  because  he 
proposed  to  leave  nothing  to  chance  and  meant  to  attack  the 
adversary  with  twice  as  many  men  as  he  could  muster  wherever 
he  should  make  a  stand.  It  was  with  eight  corps  (including  the 
Guard)  under  command  of  the  most  trusted  leaders,  a  strong 
cavalry  reserve  under  Murat,  and  a  Bavarian  auxiliary  contin- 
gent,— in  all  with  about  200,000  men, — that  he  planned  to 
attack  Prussia,  and  that  from  the  direction  of  Southern  Germany 
on  the  line  between  Bamberg  and  Berlin,  which  he  had  weeks 
before  ordered  studied  in  detail  by  French  officers.  He  ex- 
pected to  make  this  advance  between  the  Thuringian  Forest  and 
the  Erzgebirge  with  a  force  and  rapidity  which,  with  the  heart 
of  the  Prussian  kingdom  so  seriously  threatened,  should  impel 
his  opponent,  whom  he  supposed  in  Thuringia,  to  withdraw  to 
Magdeburg  in  order  to  hasten  thence  to  the  protection  of  the 
capital.  These  were  still  his  plans  when  he  wrote  from  Stras- 
burg  to  the  King  of  Holland.  His  line  of  retreat  would  be  toward 
the  Danube  in  case  the  enemy  should  meet  him  earlier  than  he 
had  planned  for,  and,  should  this  way  be  cut  off  through  an 
advance  of  the  enemy  toward  Southern  Germany,  he  would  pass 
over  and  beyond  him  along  the  line  between  Leipzig  and  Frank- 

356 


iET.  37]        Napoleon's  Plan  of  Campaign  357 

fort  to  the  Rhine,  which  river  was  to  be  defended  by  his  brother 
Louis  from  Wesel  to  this  point,  while  a  special  corps  under 
Mortier  was  to  stand  guard  in  the  vicinity  of  Mainz.  Thus 
prepared  against  all  contingencies  he  could  push  forward  his 
whole  army  toward  the  east  without  leaving  occupied  the  space 
between  the  Rhine  and  Franconia.  For  to  him  that  was  the 
point  of  supreme  importance, — and  this  he  had  learned  from 
experience  in  the  preceding  year, — to  keep  all  parts  of  his  army 
directly  under  control  "as  a  major  does  his  battaUon."  On 
October  5th,  1806,  he  communicated  his  orders  to  the  various 
corps  of  the  army:  they  were  first  to  march  in  three  columns 
toward  Coburg,  Lohenstein,  and  Hof,  whence  they  were  to  pro- 
ceed toward  Gera  by  way  of  Saalfeld  and  Schleiz  under  his 
direction.  Meanwhile  the  whereabouts  and  purposes  of  the 
enemy  must  be  clearly  ascertained. 

But  as  to  these  his  opponent  was,  alas,  almost  as  much  in  the 
dark  as  Napoleon,  and  at  the  Prussian  headquarters  there  was 
no  appearance  of  a  fixed  plan  of  action.  Only  a  year  previous 
an  army  of  250,000  men  had  been  levied ;  the  present  enumera- 
tion revealed  scarcely  the  half  of  that  number,  and  in  any  case 
it  was  vastly  inferior  to  that  arrayed  against  it.  The  King  had 
entrusted  the  supreme  command  to  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
the  same  man  who  had  commanded  the  German  army  in  1792 
and  1793,  but,  unwilling  to  absent  himself  from  the  field  of 
honour,  he  joined  the  army  in  person.  The  fact  of  his  pres- 
ence was  not  without  unfortimate  consequences.  His  military 
surroundings  prejudiced  him  against  the  measures  taken  by  the 
commander-in-chief  and,  as  a  result  of  the  weak  and  irresolute 
character  of  the  Duke,  it  soon  became  a  question — as  it  was 
expressed  by  one  of  the  officers  present  in  a  letter  of  October 
6th — "whether  'headquarters'  was  to  be  regarded  as  meaning 
the  King  or  the  Duke."  This  officer  was  none  other  than  Colonel 
Scharnhorst,  chief  of  the  general  staff  at  headquarters.  He  had 
already,  weeks  before,  elaborated  a  plan  of  attack  whose  high 
value  has  found  appreciation  in  later  criticism;  the  army, 
according  to  this,  should  cross  the  Thuringian  Forest  in  order 
to  gain  the  plain  beyond,  where  the  excellent  cavalry  might  be 


35^  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I8O6 

used  to  the  best  advantage.  The  army  would  thus  have  been 
two  weeks  ahead  of  the  enemy  in  making  its  way  to  this  region, 
giving  promise  of  a  successful  encounter.  But  the  King  clung 
with  such  pertinacity  to  the  thought  of  peace  that  he  was  ready 
to  sacrifice  anything  rather  than  appear  to  violate  it.  He  was 
desirous  of  waiting  until  after  October  8th,  which  was  the  date 
set  for  the  reply  of  France  to  his  ultimatum.  But  no  reply 
arrived.  Instead  of  it  came  the  French  themselves,  making 
the  execution  of  Scharnhorst's  plan  impossible.  For  the  ad- 
vanced position  along  the  Thuringian  Forest  was  senseless 
unless  the  army  were  taking  the  offensive,  while,  in  consequence 
of  this  period  of  waiting,  the  Prussians  were  forced  upon  the 
defensive,  to  which  the  position  which  they  then  held — with 
their  centre  under  Brunswick  at  Erfurt,  the  right  wing  under 
Riichel  at  Gotha,  and  the  left  under  Hohenlohe  at  Weimar — 
was  thoroughly  unfavourable.  When  it  was  learned,  then,  that 
the  French  were  marching  upon  them  in  the  east,  it  was  the 
opinion  at  headquarters — that  is  to  say,  of  Scharnhorst  and 
Brunswick — that  it  was  best  to  venture  an  attack  of  the  entire 
army  upon  Napoleon's  flank;  Init  in  this  also  the  commander- 
in-chief  was  not  allowed  to  have  his  way.  It  was  only  after 
prolonged  discussion  that  it  was  decided  to  send  Hohenlohe 
ahead  to  the  Saale,  where  his  troops  engaged  on  the  9th  at 
Schleiz  the  French  middle  column,  and  on  the  10th  at  Saal- 
feld,  their  western  column.  It  was  here  at  Saalfeld  that 
Prince  Louis  Ferdinand,  who  commanded  the  vanguard,  was 
killed — an  event  more  demoralizing  in  its  effect  upon  the  army 
than  the  loss  of  the  battle.  Several  of  the  generals  demanded 
categorically  the  removal  of  the  commander-in-chief,  attrib- 
uting to  him  all  the  mistakes  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  whereas 
the  only  one  which  could  really  be  ascribed  to  him  lay  in  hav- 
ing yielded  to  obey  where  he  should  have  conunanded. 

While  matters  were  thus  shaping  themselves  in  the  most 
unfavourable  way  for  the  Prussians,  Napoleon  had  been  ac- 
quainting himself,  on  liis  way  to  (Jera,  in  regard  to  his  opponent, 
whose  principal  force  ho  conchulcd  to  l^e  at  Erfurt.  He  at  once 
recognized  the  possibility  of  outflanking  him.     On  October  12th 


^T.  37]  The   Battle   of   Jena  359 

he  gave  orders  for  the  whole  army  to  abandon  its  northward 
course  and  wheel  about  to  the  left  in  the  direction  of  the  Saale, 
this  being  the  same  manoeuvre  which  he  had  executed  the  year 
before  after  crossing  the  Danube,  and  in  1800  when  beyond  the 
Po.  Before  the  close  of  the  same  day  Murat  reached  Naumburg 
with  his  cavalry.  When  word  of  all  this  was  brought  to  the 
Prussian  headquarters  indescribable  consternation  prevailed. 
No  hope  of  escape  from  being  surrounded  by  the  enemy  remained 
to  the  Duke  except  in  decampment  that  very  night.  But,  as 
if  the  necessity  for  this  step  were  not  obvious  enough  to  the 
most  undiscerning,  it  was  not  until  after  nine  precious  hours 
had  been  wasted  in  discussion  that  it  was  put  into  execution, 
during  all  of  which  time  the  enemy  was  inexorably  drawing 
nearer.  So  it  was  that  Davout,  hastening  ahead  toward  the 
west  with  his  corps,  encountered  at  Auerstadt  the  main  body 
of  the  army  under  Brunswick  while  on  the  march,  and  that  at 
Jena  Napoleon  with  the  bulk  of  his  troops  came  upon  Hohenlohe, 
who  was  to  conduct  the  rear-guard  and  protect  the  retreat  of 
the  army  toward  the  north. 

At  both  points  battle  was  waged  on  October  14th.  Napo- 
leon had  for  days  been  longing  for  such  an  encounter.  He 
supposed  himself  to  be  now  in  face  of  the  principal  force  of  his 
adversary,  and,  drawing  to  himself  all  the  corps  at  his  dis- 
posal, he  attacked  Hohenlohe  with  a  number  vastly  superior 
to  those  opposed  to  him.  Early  in  the  morning,  while  it  was 
yet  dark.  Napoleon  rode  up  to  the  troops  commanded  by  Mar- 
shal Lannes,  who  were  to  be  the  first  to  come  under  fire,  and 
reminded  them  of  the  victories  of  the  previous  year,  saying 
that  matters  now  stood  exactly  as  they  had  at  the  time  when 
they  captured  Mack.  This  corps  then,  in  company  with  the 
advance-guard  under  Ney,  so  stout-heartedly  withstood  the 
attack  of  the  entire  hostile  army  as  to  enable  the  Emperor  to 
hold  the  Guard  in  reserve  until  the  arrival  of  fresh  forces.* 

*  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  from  the  ranks  of  the  Guard  there 
suddenly  resounded  behind  Napoleon  an  impulsive  cry  of  "  Forward  1" 
whereat  the  Emperor  rebuked  the  over-confident  speaker  with  the  obser- 
vation that  he  should  wait  until  he  had  commanded  in  twenty  battles 
before  venturing  to  advise  him. 


360  From   Jena   to  Tilsit  [I80G 

With  these  the  task  of  overcoming  the  enemy  was  soon  accom- 
phshed.  Hohenlohe,  recognizing  the  greatness  of  the  danger, 
had  sent  to  summon  the  assistance  of  Riichel  with  his  army, 
but  the  latter  was  prevented  from  coming  to  his  rescue  by  a 
contrary  order  from  the  commander-in-chief,  and  when,  later, 
he  arrived  in  spite  of  it  upon  the  field  of  battle,  Hohenlohe 
had  already  been  overpowered  and  there  was  no  possibility  of 
changing  the  outcome  of  the  battle.  Napoleon's  cavalry  threw 
itself  upon  the  Prussians  as  they  began  to  give  way,  and  the 
army  turned  and  fled  in  wild  confusion. 

While  this  was  taking  place  near  Jena,  Brunswick  had 
joined  battle  with  Davout  at  Auerstadt,  and,  in  spite  of  the 
advantage  which  Prussia  here  enjoyed  in  point  of  numbers, — 
she  had  35,000  against  33,000  of  the  French, — in  this  action 
also  she  was  defeated.  The  advantage  had  been  with  the  Prus- 
sians in  the  early  part  of  the  battle,  and  victory  must  have 
been  theirs  had  General  Kalkreuth  brought  his  reserve  force 
of  18,000  men  into  action.  He  failed  to  do  so  because  he  re- 
ceived no  orders  to  that  effect,  and  no  orders  could  reach  him 
because  the  general-in-chief,  mortally  wounded,  was  no  longer 
able  to  issue  commands  and  there  remained  no  sort  of  unity  of 
direction.  It  had  thus  become  impossible  for  the  troops  to 
clear  the  way  for  themselves  through  Naumburg,  and  the  King, 
who  now  assumed  supreme  command,  ordered  a  retreat  to 
Weimar,  where  he  hoped  to  find  the  detachments  of  Riichel  and 
Hohenlohe  intact;  the  wiser  course,  which  would  have  been  to 
swerve  toward  the  north,  he  refused  to  consider  for  a  moment. 
But  instead  of  finding  comrades  he  came  upon  the  enemy;  it 
was  a  moment  of  most  cruel  disappointment  and  at  the  same 
time  of  great  personal  danger.  Headquarters  and  the  rem- 
nants of  the  army  were  soon  in  irreprc^ssible  flight  before  the 
pursuing  French.  Instead  of  reassembling,  the  army  dissolved 
almost  completely,  desertion  became  general,  and  discipline  a 
thing  of  the  past.  Of  the  original  130,000  soldiers  there  soon 
remained  only  10,000  of  the  regular  troops,  who,  conducted 
by  Hohenlohe,  described  the  arc  of  a  great  circle  through 
Nordhausen,  Magdeburg,  and  Neu-Ruppin  to  Prenzlau  in  the 


^T.  37]  Prussia's  Fall  361 

Ukermark  [northern  Brandenburg],  where  they  were  finally 
brought  to  capitulation  by  Murat,  who  asseverated  to  the  German 
general  that  his  corps  was  surrounded  by  100,000  P>ench  sol- 
diers, a  statement  as  completely  without  foundation  in  fact  as 
the  romance  he  had  invented  the  year  before  of  a  conclasion 
of  peace  when  the  question  involved  was  the  taking  of  the  bridges 
over  the  Danube  at  Vienna.  Other  smaller  detachments  sur- 
rendered likewise,  that  of  Bliicher,  however,  not  without  heroic 
resistance — a  notable  exception.  Added  to  these  disasters 
came  the  deliverance  to  the  enemy  of  all  the  most  important 
fortresses  throughout  the  land,  and  the  haste  manifested  in 
their  surrender  by  those  in  command  was  a  disgrace  without 
parallel  in  history'.  Thus  it  was  at  Erfurt  and  again  at  Magde- 
burg.— whither  had  fled  for  safety  a  reserve  army  which  had 
suffered  defeat  at  Halle. — and  the  same  was  true  of  Stettin 
and  Ciistrin.  "Those  were  days  of  horror,"  wTote  Captain  von 
Gneisenau  to  a  friend;  "better  a  thousand  times  to  die  than 
experience  them  again.  These  wall  make  an  extraordinary 
page  in  our  history." 

There  being  now  nothing  further  to  bar  the  way,  Napoleon, 
surrounded  by  pomp  and  splendour,  rode  triumphantly  into 
Berhn  on  October  27th,  1806.  As  Coignet  reports:  "The  Em- 
peror was  proud  in  his  modest  apparel,  with  his  Uttle  hat  and 
penny  cockade.  His  staff,  on  the  contrary,  was  in  full  uniform, 
and  to  the  foreigners  it  was  a  curious  thing  to  see  in  the  most 
meanly  clad  of  them  all  the  leader  of  so  fine  an  army. ' '  On  the 
previous  day  he  had  stood  beside  the  tomb  of  Frederick  II.  in 
Potsdam;  the  effect  of  the  admiration  which  he  professed  for 
the  dead  hero  was,  however,  marred  by  his  act  in  taking 
thence  Frederick's  sword  and  sash  and  sending  them  as  a  gift 
to  the  Invalides  at  Paris. 

Arrived  at  Berlin  he  computed  the  measure  of  his  victories. 
They  had  delivered  into  his  hand  all  Prussian  territories  as  far 
as  the  Vistula,  and  it  was  not  exaggeration  when  on  November 
12th  he  proclaimed  to  the  w'orld  at  large  from  the  residence  of 
the  HohenzoUerns:  "The  entire  kingdom  of  Prussia  is  in  my 
power."     The  only  question  was  whether  it  would  so  remain. 


362  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I8O6 

Prussian  arms  could,  it  is  true,  no  longer  hope  to  avert  the  down- 
fall of  the  Fatherland,  for,  except  for  a  little  band  of  15,000 
men  and  a  few  fortresses  in  Silesia  and  on  the  Baltic  Sea,  the 
armed  forces  of  the  country  had  been  dispersed  and  annihilated. 
But  there  were  other  enemies  still  left  to  Napoleon.  One  of 
these — ^Russia — had  already  declared  itself  Prussia's  friend  and 
champion,  while  another — England — might  become  such  at 
any  moment.  For  it  was  part  of  the  Napoleonic  system  that 
his  policy  must  always  embrace  the  whole  continent  and  there- 
fore never  could  deal  with  one  opponent  alone. 

On  the  day  after  the  battle,  the  aid-de-camp  of  the  con- 
quered king  had  arrived  at  the  French  headquarters  with  an 
appeal  for  peace.  This  Napoleon  declined  to  grant,  saying 
that  he  had  already  gained  too  great  advantages  not  to  follow 
them  up  as  far  as  Berlin;  peace  would  there  more  easily  be  de- 
termined upon.  Frederick  William  then  sent  Lucchesini  to 
him  with  full  powers  to  sign  preliminaries  of  peace.  Hanover, 
Bayreuth,  and  all  territory  west  of  the  Weser,  besides  a  hand- 
some sum  of  money  as  war-indemnity,  were  what  they  were 
prepared  to  pay  for  the  privilege  of  being  left  undisturbed. 
But  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  enemy  were  far  beyond 
anything  conceived  by  Prussia.  He  demanded  all  territory 
to  the  left  of  the  Elbe  up  to  Magdeburg  and  the  Altmark,  100,- 
000,000  francs  war-indemnity,  and,  over  and  above  this,  Prussia's 
consent  that  Saxony  and  the  German  countries  beyond  the  Elbe 
should  become  identified  with  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
Lucchesini  and  von  Zastrow,  the  Prussian  minister,  had  agreed 
without  undue  delay  to  accept  these  harsh  terms,  a  resolve  to 
which  they  were  the  more  readily  brought  by  a  rumour  which 
had  gained  currency  that  the  Emperor  was  about  to  re-establish 
the  ancient  kingdom  of  Poland,  of  whose  lands  Prussia  now 
owned  vast  stretches,  including  Warsaw  and  Posen.  But  by 
this  time  Napoleon  had  concluded  to  impose  conditions  even 
more  severe.  Hohenlolic  had  meanwhile  capitulated,  and  the 
French  columns  had  reached  out  even  as  far  as  the  Vistula. 
Success  so  vast  ought  surely  to  be  employed  to  some  better  ad- 
vantage than  simply  to  make  peace  with  Prussia  alone!    The 


Mt.  37]  Napoleon  and   Poland  363 

Emperor  increased  his  demands,  and  finally  stopped  talking  of 
peace  alto(j;ethor ;  for  the  present  he  would  grant  nothing  but  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  and  that  only  under  the  most  oppressive 
conditions :  the  French  were  to  occupy  the  whole  country  up  to 
the  Bug  River,  eight  fortresses  were  to  be  surrendered, — Danzig, 
Kolberg,  Thorn,  and  Graudcnz  among  them, — while  the  Russians, 
who  were  already  standing  upon  East  Prussian  soil,  were  to  be 
ordered  out  of  the  country  by  the  King.  Even  this  was  agreed 
to  by  the  envoys  who  signed  the  treaty  on  November  16th.  But 
the  King  would  none  of  it.  He  recognized  that  in  such  condi- 
tions the  aim  was  none  other  than  the  complete  disarmament 
of  Prussia  and  separation  between  the  courts  of  Berhn  and  St. 
Petersburg.  Relying  upon  Russia's  aid,  he  determined  to  risk 
resistance  to  his  mighty  foe.  \Vlien  Napoleon  learned  of  P'red- 
erick  William's  refusal  to  ratify  the  treaty,  he  drafted  a  procla- 
mation embodying  for  the  House  of  Brandenburg  the  same 
deadly  intent  as  had  been  conveyed  in  the  Decree  of  Schon- 
brunn  in  respect  to  the  Court  of  Naples:  that  it  had  ceased  to 
reign.  This  difference,  however,  existed  between  the  two  occa- 
sions: at  the  time  of  the  former,  toward  the  end  of  December, 
1805,  the  decisive  victory  had  already  been  gained,  and  in  this 
case  the  battle  was  yet  to  be  fought.  For  the  time  being  the 
proclamation  was  not  made  pubUc. 

For  Napoleon  everything  depended  upon  vanquishing  the 
ever-advancing  Russians.  This  task  he  did  not  confide  to  his 
army  alone.  He  proceeded  at  once  with  a  scheme  for  playing 
off  the  Poles  against  the  empire  of  the  Czar.  Under  his  protec- 
tion there  arose  a  committee  of  insurrection  at  Warsaw,  and  a 
deputation  of  the  high  nobility  from  Posen,  which  appeared  in 
Berlin  on  November  19th,  received  from  him  the  assurance  that 
France  had  never  acknowledged  the  partition  of  Poland  and 
that  he  himself,  as  Emperor  of  the  French,  would  feel  a  deep  in- 
terest in  seeing  the  national  throne  re-established.  On  Novem- 
ber 25th  he  repaired  in  person  to  Posen  in  order  to  stimulate 
the  insurrection  to  a  yet  greater  degree.  Many  were  the  tokens 
of  homage  bestowed  upon  him  as  the  hberator  of  the  Father- 
land, and  he  was  unsparing  m  his  use  of  encouraging  words  until 


364  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I8O6 

an  enrolment  of  volunteers  was  under  way  in  Warsaw  which 
furnished  a  national  guard  of  60,000  men.  Not  that  he  had  the 
slightest  intention  of  furthering  the  ideal  aim  of  the  Polish  nation ; 
sentiments  of  that  kind  had  long  before  ceased  to  appeal  to  him, 
and,  as  he  was  shortly  to  make  evident  in  Spain,  he  was  fast 
reaching  the  point  where  he  was  no  longer  able  even  to  under- 
stand them.  In  Poland  he  saw  nothing  more  than  an  instrument 
convenient  to  the  furtherance  of  his  policy,  one  which  should 
now  be  made  to  serve  his  ends  against  Prussia  and  Russia,  but 
which  he  was  resolved  to  set  aside  as  soon  as  its  utility  to  him- 
self should  be  exhausted.  A  single  unfortunate  feature  in  these 
plans  lay  in  the  fact  that  Austria,  like  the  other  two  states,  now 
included  extensive  Polish  territories,  at  that  time  reaching 
northward  to  the  Bug  River,  and  would  necessarily  be  affected 
by  a  national  uprising  upon  its  borders,  while  Napoleon  had 
every  reason  for  remaining  on  the  best  possible  terms  with  the 
power  on  the  Danube  in  order  to  be  safe  from  attack  upon  his 
flank.  Accordingly,  through  General  Andreossy.  his  ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna,  he  had  the  suggestion  made  to  Stadion,  the  Aus- 
trian minister,  that  Austria  should  exchange  her  Polish  provinces 
for  Prussian  Silesia.  But  Russia,  likewise  on  the  alert,  had  at 
the  same  time  sent  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  a  fellow  countryman  of  Napo- 
leon's, as  her  envoy  to  the  Viennese  court.  Austria,  thus  ap- 
proached by  both  of  the  rival  powers,  declined  to  listen  to  either 
and  remained  neutral,  contenting  herself  with  pushing  a  corps 
of  observation  gradually  forward  toward  the  Prussian  frontier, 
partly  to  prevent  a  revolt  in  Galicia  and  partly  in  order  not  to 
be  unarmed  while  watching  further  developments  in  the  northeast. 
Napoleon  was  now  prepared  to  play  a  second  trump  against 
Russia  in  the  shape  of  the  Eastern  question.  It  has  been  already 
repeatedly  intimated  that  it  was  Napoleon's  purpose  to  include 
Turkey  in  his  system  of  universal  sovereignty  of  Europe;  this 
was  really  the  ultimate  cause  of  hostilities  with  Russia.  It 
was,  then,  but  natural  that  after  his  victorious  campaign  of 
1805  he  should  take  up  this  plan  again.  In  January,  1806,  the 
generals  of  his  suite  had  already  begun  to  make  conjectures 
that  he  was  meditating  an  expedition  to  Turkey,  and  by  the 


/Et.  37]  Napoleon   and  Turkey  365 

following  May  the  Prussian  envoy  reported  to  his  government 
that  the  Emperor  was  planning  alliances  with  the  Porte,  with 
the  Republic  of  Ragusa,  and  with  Persia,  and  that  General  S^ 
bastiani  had  imparted  to  him  Napoleon's  conviction  that  Russia 
would  have  to  be  crowded  back  behind  a  barrier  erected  be- 
tween the  Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea.  This  same  Sebastian!  was 
sent  soon  after  this  on  a  special  mission  to  Constantinople;  he 
was  instructed,  in  case  the  Czar  should  refuse  to  make  peace  with 
France,  to  incite  the  Porte  against  him,  and  he  was  actually  in 
BO  far  successful  as  to  induce  the  Sultan,  Selim  III.,  against 
the  letter  of  an  earher  treaty,  to  dispossess  the  Woiwodes  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  who  were  partisans  of  Russia,  whereat 
the  Czar,  who  had  long  been  waiting  merely  for  a  pretext,  sent  an 
army  do\\Ti  to  the  lower  Danube.  On  November  11th,  1806, 
Napoleon  wrote  from  Berlin  to  the  frightened  Grand  Seignior 
that  all  Prussia  was  subject  to  him  and  that  he  was  following 
up  his  advantages  at  the  head  of  300,000  men,  adding  that  Fate 
had  ordained  the  continuance  of  the  Turkish  Empire  and  had 
chosen  himself  as  its  saviour ;  that  now  was  the  moment  for  ad- 
vancing to  the  Dniester  with  an  Ottoman  army,  whilst  he  was 
himself  operating  against  Russia  from  the  region  of  the  Vistula. 
Of  course  his  object  was  simply  thus  to  divide  the  Russian  forces 
so  that  they  might  not  all  stand  opposed  to  him  at  once  and  at 
the  same  time  to  fasten  Austria's  political  attention  upon  the 
Danube,  since  Menna  could  not  view  with  unconcern  any  en- 
croachments of  Russia  upon  Turkish  territory.  In  both  at- 
tempts he  was  successful.  Alexander  I.  declared  war  against 
the  Porte  and  despatched  80,000  men  against  that  power,  and 
through  the  progress  of  the  Russian  troops  upon  the  lower  Dan- 
ube Austria  actually  was  prevented  later  on  from  making  a 
close  alliance  with  her  northern  neighbour  against  Napoleon. 
The  attempt  to  entice  Vienna  with  Silesia  as  bait  had  indeed 
miscarried,  but  the  same  end  had  been  reached  by  awakening 
her  apprehensions  in  regard  to  Russia. 

But  Great  Britain,  the  most  powerful  enemy  of  Napoleon's 
poUcy,  was  just  awakening  to  the  fact  that  her  formidable 
opponent  had  laid  in  ruins  a  state  upon  the  Continent.     On 


366  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [isofi 

November  21st  a  decree  was  issued  from  Berlin  to  all  the  world 
declaring  England  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade  and  closing  to  her 
the  Continent  as  far  as  it  lay  within  the  circle  of  Napoleonic 
supremacy.  It  will  be  remembered  with  what  precision  Bona- 
parte had  devised  this  programme  back  in  1802  upon  the  first 
indications  of  renewed  hostilities.  "If  England  attempts  to 
kindle  war  upon  the  Continent,  her  course  will  compel  the  First 
Consul  to  conquer  all  Europe."  These  had  been  his  words  in  that 
memorable  letter  written  by  Talleyrand  to  Otto.*  The  Emperor 
was  well  on  his  way  toward  the  fulfilment  of  that  threat,  and 
Great  Britain  must,  of  course,  suffer  the  consequences.  "The 
British  Isles,"  so  reads  the  decree  of  Berlin,  "are  from  the 
present  time  in  a  state  of  blockade;  all  commerce  with  them 
is  forbidden;  letters  and  parcels  bearing  an  English  address 
shall  be  confiscated,  as  also  every  English  warehouse  upon  the 
Continent,  whether  upon  the  territory  of  France  or  that  of  its 
allies;  the  same  shall  be  true  of  all  English  merchandise;  all 
EngHsh  vessels,  as  also  those  coming  to  the  Continent  from 
English  colonies  and  bonded  ports^  shall  be  refused  entrance  to 
any  European  port.  Any  English  subject  found  upon  French 
soil  shall  be  made  prisoner  of  war."  This  decree  was  preceded 
by  the  statement  that,  since  the  English  had  arbitrarily  ex- 
tended the  rights  of  war  upon  the  sea  to  cover  also  private  prop- 
erty, the  Emperor  had  concluded  to  repay  them  on  land  with 
the  same  coin  To  the  mind  of  this  extraordinary  man,  with  a 
determination  knowing  absolutely  no  bounds,  his  purpose  stood 
clearly  defined.  Europe  was  to  be  rendered  submissive  to 
himself  to  enable  him  as  its  lord  to  close  it  against  England. 
Great  Britain's  commerce  and  industries  must  in  consequence 
stagnate  and  fall  into  decay,  and  if  it  should  ever  become 
possible  by  land  to  divert  from  her  the  stream  of  riches  flowing 
in  from  India,  the  proud  island  realm  would  be  conquered  and 
would  have  no  choice  but  to  submit  to  him  who  alone  remained 
to  sway  the  sceptre  over  land  and  sea.f    This  goal  was  indeed 

*  See  p.  266 

■j"  There  can  be  no  question  that  tlio  Emperor  was  constantly  intent 
upon  India.     His  brotlier  Joseph  testified  to  that  eiTect  in  conversation 


Mr.  37]      The  French  Advance  into  Poland         367 

still  far  distant,  and  the  men  upon  tho  chcHs-lxtanl  of  iMirope 
must  first  be  moved  about  with  skill  and  artifice  until  the  last 
king  was  checkmated;  but  the  end  seemed  not  unattainable, 
and  it  was  with  a  mind  filled  with  these  designs  tnat  Napoleon 
led  his  army  against  the  Russians.  And  were  not  these  the 
same  forces  whom  he  had  with  but  little  trouble  vanquished 
the  year  previous?  Moreover,  since  that  time  the  self-confidence 
of  his  troops  had  but  increased  as  a  result  of  new  triumphs 
over  the  dreaded  Prussian  army.  He,  then,  if  any  man,  was 
justified  in  the  beUef  that  the  destiny  of  a  world  lay  Avithin  his 
clenched  fist. 

On  November  27th,  1806,  the  day  upon  which  Napoleon 
reached  Posen,  the  advance-guard  of  Murat's  cavalry  came  upon 
Russian  troops  at  Blonje  to  the  west  of  Warsaw.  General 
Bennigsen  commanded  the  most  advanced  of  the  two  Russian 
armies.  General  Buxhowden  the  other  which  was  approaching. 
Before  the  French  armies,  which  were  being  hurried  forward 
by  forced  marches,  General  Bennigsen  withdrew  to  Warsaw  and 
finally  across  the  Vistula  and  Narew  to  Ostrolenka,  where  he 
thought  best  to  wait  until  the  second  column  should  come  up 
before  again  moving  forward.  This  junction  of  forces  took 
place  before  the  middle  of  December,  whereupon  he  piLshed  for- 
ward with  his  troops  as  far  as  Pultusk  and  the  Ukra.  The 
Russian  arm}'  was  re-enforced  by  an  East  Prussian  corps,  13,000 
men  strong,  under  L'Estocq,  who  took  up  his  position  to  the 
east  of  Thorn,  constituting  a  sort  of  right  wing  to  the  forma- 
tion. General  Kamenski  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  united 
forces.  The  French  occupied  Warsaw  and  Thorn  and  crossed  the 
Vistula  on  a  line  between  these  two  points:  the  corps  of  Bes- 
sieres,  Ney,  and  Bernadotte  turned  eastward  from  Thorn,  while 
Murat,  Davout.  and  Lannes  marched  toward  the  north  from 
Warsaw;  between  them  Augereau  and  Soult  advanced  toward 
the  Ukra,  which  thej'  crossed  under  fire  from  the  enemy  anil  in 
the  presence  of  Napoleon,  who  had  come  up  by  way  of  Warsaw. 

with  the  Prussian  envoy  at  that  time,  and  Napoleon  himself  told  his 
physician  O'Meara  at  St.  Helena  that  in  1800  after  the  war  with  Austria 
he  had  planned  an  expedition  to  Hindustan.  In  the  same  year  three 
n gents  were  sent  to  Persia  in  the  interest  of  France. 


368  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I8O6 

The  Emperor,  who  now  conjectured  the  principal  force  of  the 
enemy  to  be  at  Golymin,  west  of  Pultusk,  decided  upon  attack- 
ing it  from  in  front  at  that  point  with  two  corps,  while  Lannes 
with  his  corps  should  march  to  the  right  upon  Pultusk  and  thus 
prevent  the  retreat  of  the  Russians  across  the  Narew,  Soult  and 
Bernadotte  meanwhile  directing  their  course  around  to  the  left, 
toward  Makow,  in  order  to  cut  off  the  road  to  Ostrolenka.  T.ike 
all  plans  previously  conceived  by  Napoleon  this  was  based  upon 
the  idea  of  annihilating  the  enemy;  it  resulted  in  complete 
failure.  The  body  of  the  Russian  army  was  located,  not  at 
Golymin,  but  at  Pultusk,  where,  on  December  26th,  it  sustained 
an  indecisive  battle  against  Lannes,  making  possible  its  retreat 
across  the  Narew,  and  the  forces  with  which  Napoleon  engaged 
on  the  same  day  at  Golymin  proved  to  be  nothing  more  than  the 
rear-guard  of  the  hostile  army  and  which,  though  beaten,  was 
allowed  to  draw  off  toward  the  north  without  pursuit.  With  the 
enemy  situated  in  this  wise  Soult's  flank  movement  was  rendered 
absolutely  objectless.  The  Russians  had  thus  escaped  the  en- 
compassing arms  of  the  French  army,  while  the  latter  had  no 
other  gain  to  show  than  that  of  a  few  square  miles  of  barren 
land. 

What  a  change  from  the  tales  of  victory  dm^ing  the  last  few 
months!  And  such  unvarying  success  made  Napoleon  impru- 
dent. For  lack  of  caution  was  clearly  manifest  in  attempting 
to  fall  upon  the  enemy  without  arranging — as  ever  before — 
to  keep  the  army  concentrated,  and  again  to  base  a  double  en- 
circhng  manoeuvre  upon  a  supposition  which  had  not  been 
proved  a  certainty.  Moreover,  there  were  also  attendant  diffi- 
culties of  which  it  is  evident  that  the  Emperor  had  scarcely 
estimated  the  full  importance  beforehand.  The  tract  of  coun- 
try in  which  these  encounters  were  taking  place  had  shortly 
before  been  occupied  by  the  Russians,  who  on  their  departure 
had  carried  with  them  everything  transportable  and  destroyed 
the  rest,  so  that  the  French  who  followed  came  only  upon  desert 
places  affording  nothing  in  the  way  of  food  or  shelter.  Hunger 
confronted  them.  The  requisition  S5'^stem  had  to  be  abandoned 
and  storehouses  established,  and,  as  has  been  repeatedly  testified 


Mr.  37]  Hardships  of  the  French  369 

by  eye-witnesses,  the  only  thing  which  saved  the  army  from 
starvation  was  the  spirit  of  speculation  among  the  Jews.  To 
add  to  their  other  misfortunes,  the  marshy  soil  was  now  softened 
by  a  sudden  thaw,  making  the  task  of  reconnoitring  more  than 
ever  difficult  and  hampering  all  movements  of  the  army.  The 
entire  region  was  like  a  sea  of  mud  over  knee-deep  in  which  the 
gallant  soldiers  waded  and,  weak  from  hunger,  dragged  them- 
selves laboriously  forward,  while  the  artillery  stuck  fast  in  the 
bog  and  became  useless.  On  the  march  toward  Pultusk  there 
were  outbursts  of  direst  despair,  and  many  a  valiant  soldier, 
who  but  shortly  before  had  courageously  faced  death  in  battle, 
now  took  his  own  life.  Even  the  Emperor's  own  coach  could 
go  no  further  over  roads  so  seemingly  without  bottom;  a  horse 
had  to  be  led  up  to  the  carriage  door,  so  that  he  could  ride  on  to 
Pultusk  where,  a  few  days  before,  Lannes's  soldiers,  up  to  the 
thighs  in  mire,  had  braved  the  fire  of  the  enemy  for  eight  long 
hours.  Along  this  road,  as  his  troops  passed  before  him,  the 
Emperor  saw  the  depth  of  misery  to  which  they  were  reduced 
and  overheard  complaints  uttered  against  their  will  by  even 
those  most  loyal  to  him — the  soldiers  of  the  Guard.*  This  made 
a  deep  impression  upon  him.  A  year  before — it  was  on  the  day 
before  the  battle  of  Austerlitz — he  had  spoken  amongst  his 
generals  of  his  former  plans  in  respect  to  the  East.  One  of  them 
ventured  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  scheme  might  even  now 
be  resumed,  since  the  army  was  after  all  on  the  way  toward  Con- 
stantinople; but  he  was  checked  by  Napoleon:  "I  know  the 
French,"  said  he.  "Long  expeditions  are  not  easily  put 
through  with  them.  .  .  .  France  is  too  beautiful;  they  do  not 
like  to  get  so  far  from  it  or  to  remain  away  for  so  long."  How 
much  more  unhappy,  then,  their  lot  here  under  conditions  so 
absolutely    desperate,    with    every    mancBUvre    hampered    and 

*  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  accept  the  assurances  of  Savary  and  Rapp 
that  in  the  reproaches  which  the  troops  allowed  to  reach  the  ears  of  the 
Emperor  there  existed  in  reality  nothing  more  than  the  rough  jokes  of  a 
body  of  soldiers.  They  were  nieant  in  all  seriousness.  Coignet,  for 
instance,  relates  that  the  Guards,  upon  the  return  to  winter  quarters, 
met  with  sharp  reproof  that  they  had  not  held  out  more  courageously 
in  time  of  adversity. 


370  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [isoe 

every  art  of  warfare  laughed  to  scorn!*  On  December  2d,  the 
anniversary  of  AusterUtz,  in  an  order  of  the  day  he  had  reminded 
the  troop?  of  the  victory  in  Moravia.  "Soldiers."  said  he,  "we 
are  not  going  to  lay  down  our  arms  until  universal  peace  shall 
have  esta])lished  and  secured  the  power  of  our  alhes  and  shall 
have  restored  to  our  commerce  its  liberty  and  its  colonies.  Upon 
the  Elbe  and  the  Oder  we  have  gained  Pondicherry,  our  enter- 
prises in  the  Indies,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  the  Spanish 
colonies.  Who  would  give  to  the  Russians  the  right  to  control 
Destiny?  Who  would  give  them  the  right  to  frustrate  plans  so 
appropriate?  They  and  we — are  not  both  the  soliders  of  Aus- 
terUtz?" But  what  cared  these  brave  warriors  in  the  swamps 
of  Poland  for  Pondicherry  and  the  Spanish  colonies?  Were 
France,  perchance,  in  danger,  or  even  only  her  glory  and  her 
extent,  the  appeal  would  not  have  been  in  vain.  Moreover,  it 
seemed  as  if  the  Russians  of  Pultusk  really  were  no  longer  those 
of  Austerlitz.  They  had  fought  and  endured  quite  as  valiantly 
on  December  26th  as  had  the  soldiers  of  the  invader.  And 
Napoleon  recognized  that  he  durst  not  overstrain  the  bow 
which  constituted  his  only  weapon.  Therefore,  instead  of  fol- 
lowing in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy,  he  allowed  the  army 
to  move  into  winter  quarters.  Along  the  Vistula  from  Elbing 
to  Warsaw  depots  were  set  up  for  each  army  corps,  but  the 
troops  themselves  remained  on  the  farther  side  of  the  river, 
pushed  forward  to  a  line  running  from  the  Frische  Hafif  through 
Willenberg  and  Ostrolenka  to  Warsaw.  The  difficulties  attend- 
ing the  commissariat  had  made  necessary  this  unusual  extension. 
But  this  time  of  repose  did  not  continue  for  long.  The  Rus- 
sians had  retreated  in  two  columns  in  the  direction  of  Grodno 
and  Bielostok,  and  later  united  under  command  of  Bennigsen 
near  Szuczyn.  Through  the  retreat  of  their  allies  the  Prussians 
under  L'Estocq  had  likewise  been  crowded  toward  the  East 
into  the  vicinity  of  Angerburg,  so  that  communication  with  Dan- 

*  The  Dnko  of  F^zensac  alludes  repeatedly  in  his  "Souvenirs"  to  the 
impossibility  of  collecting  sufficient  intelligence  by  means  of  reconnois 
sance,  and  describes  the  extraordinary  hardships  attending  the  performance 
of  the  duties  of  an  orderly. 


.^T.  37]  Bennigsen   Forces  a   Battle  371 

zig  was  entirely  cut  off  and  even  the  route  to  Konigsberg  lay 
exposed  to  sudden  attack  by  the  French.  And  such  an  attack 
was  actually  attempted.  Ney,  whose  corps  was  encamped 
between  Thorn  and  Willenberg  and  had  suffered  great  privation, 
acting  upon  his  own  responsibility  set  out  with  his  troops  toward 
the  north  in  the  early  part  of  January,  1S07,  in  order  to  find 
better  quarters  for  them  and,  if  possible,  to  capture  Konigs- 
berg— a  move  which  greatly  vexed  Napoleon,  by  whom  he  was 
sharply  reprimanded  and  ordered  back  to  his  post.  In  the 
course  of  this  excursion  the  Marshal  had,  however,  chanced  upon 
the  Prussian  corps,  the  consequence  of  which  was  that  Bennigsen 
had  arisen  with  his  entire  army  to  destroy  Ney  while  on  the 
march  in  an  exposed  condition,  and  to  force  Bernadotte,  who 
occupied  the  region  about  Elbing,  back  across  the  Vistula  and 
thus  re-establish  communication  with  Danzig.  His  expecta- 
tion was.  then,  while  giving  protection  to  the  fortresses  and 
being  at  the  same  time  supported  by  them,  to  acquire  a  strong 
position.  By  this  stroke  Napoleon  might  perhaps  be  induced 
to  give  up  his  threatening  position  at  Warsaw  and  concentrate 
his  forces  farther  West. 

The  news  of  this  offensive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
reached  Napoleon  in  Warsaw,  whither  he  had  repaired  from  Pul- 
tusk  in  order  to  gain  some  repose  for  himself  also.  The  capital 
of  the  former  kingdom  of  Poland  was  doing  its  utmost  to  please 
and  flatter  him.  the  women  being  by  no  means  the  most  back- 
ward in  their  complaisance,  and  it  is  alleged  that  Napoleon 
gave  no  cause  for  being  considered  prudish.  But  at  the  news 
of  Bennigsen's  proceeding  he  tore  himself  at  once  away  and 
promptly  determined  upon  his  course  of  action.  He.  also, 
would  assume  the  offensive.  With  his  army  united  in  a  com- 
pact mass  he  would  strike  northwards,  break  through  the  ene- 
my's long  line  of  march  before  it  could  concentrate  its  detach- 
ments for  battle,  and  scatter  its  various  corps.  Fortunately  for 
Bennigsen,  this  plan  was  revealed  to  him  tlirt)ugh  a  letter  from 
headquarters  to  Bernadotte  which  was  intercepted.  Acting 
upon  this  information,  he  hurriedly  collected  about  himself  all 
his  detachments  and  tried  to  evade  the  collision  with  the  French 


3/2  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [1807 

by  turning  northward  in  the  direction  of  Guttstadt  and  Lands- 
berg.  During  his  march  forward  he  had  directed  the  Prussian 
corps  to  describe  the  arc  of  a  great  circle  about  Freistadt  to  the 
west  of  Mohrungen,  and  this  body  of  troops  had  now  in  hke 
manner  to  hasten  toward  the  north  so  as  to  escape  the  French 
and  be  enabled  to  unite  itself  with  the  Grand  Army.  Napoleon's 
purpose  was  thus  already  frustrated.  He  might,  it  is  true,  still 
overtake  the  enemy,  but  he  could  not  surprise  him;  he  might 
conquer  but  not  annihilate  him.  With  five  corps  he  pressed  on 
beyond  Willenberg;  a  sixth  remained  behind  on  the  Narew  to 
keep  watch;  a  seventh  under  Bernadotte,  who  had  received  no 
orders,  could  only  follow  far  in  the  rear.  It  was  not  until  Feb- 
ruary 7th.  when  they  reached  Prussian  Eylau,  that  they  came 
upon  Bennigsen,  who  now  drew  up  his  forces  for  battle  and  on 
the  same  day  repulsed  the  foremost  detachments  of  the  French 
under  Murat  and  Soult.  Meanwhile,  however,  came  up  the 
body  of  the  French  army  with  the  exception  of  Ney,  who  had 
kept  behind  L'Estocq's  corps  in  order  to  hinder  its  junction 
with  Bennigsen.  On  the  morning  of  February  8th  the  hostile 
armies  were  drawn  up  opposite  one  another  for  battle.  The 
forces  were  about  equal  in  number,  from  70,000  to  80,000  men 
on  each  side;  the  Russians  had  the  advantage  only  in  point  of 
artillery.  The  snow  blown  by  the  icy  north  wind  did  not  yet 
cover  the  victims  of  the  previous  day's  encounter,  but  already 
the  struggle  had  recommenced,  and  this  was  to  be  bloodier  than 
any  of  the  battles  yet  fought.  After  a  prolonged  artillery  com- 
bat Napoleon  proceeded  to  the  attack.  He  was  prepared,  if  need 
be,  to  sacrifice  his  left  wing  in  order  to  triumph  the  more  deci- 
sively with  his  right.  Augereau,  who  formed  the  connect- 
ing link  between  the  centre  and  Davout.  here  rushed  forward 
upon  the  central  point  of  the  Russian  line  much  as  Soult  had 
done  at  Austerlltz.  But  how  different  the  result!  There  the 
enemy  gave  way,  while  here  he  not  only  stood  his  ground,  but 
drove  back  the  assailant  with  heavy  loss.  Grape-shot  fell  like 
hail  upon  the  corps  advancing  toilsomely  in  the  face  of  the  snow- 
storm, and.  as  it  wheeled,  the  Russian  cavalry  fell  upon  and  put 
to  the  sword  half  of  the  devoted  band.     On  charged  the  horse- 


.!>.  37]  The    Battle  of  Eylau  373 

men  of  the  enemy,  headed  direct  for  the  cemetery  of  Eylau,  where 
Napoleon  had  taken  up  his  station,  insomuch  that  his  suite 
already  called  for  horses  in  order  to  remove  headquarters  to  a 
place  of  safety.  But  the  Emperor  is  said  to  have  impatiently 
motioned  his  disapproval  and  contented  himself  with  ordering 
forward  a  detachment  of  the  Guartl,  at  sight  of  which  the  troop 
of  horse,  now  quite  out  of  breath,  turned  to  the  right-about.  But 
it  was  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  and  using  as  a  screen  80 
squadrons  which  Murat  assembled  for  a  mighty  attack,  that  he 
was  able  to  fill  the  gap  thus  made  in  his  position.  At  this  point 
Davout  entered  the  lists  and  pushed  his  way  relentlessly  for- 
ward against  the  left  wing  of  the  Russians,  and  this  he  succeeded 
in  turning  completely  so  that  it  faced  northwards,  whereupon 
he  proceeded  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  hne  of  retreat.  Bennigsen's 
army  seemed  lost  when  suddenly  appeared  Schamhorst  with  a 
few  thousands  of  L'Estocq  s  Prussians,  the  remainder  having 
been  left  behind  in  combat  with  Ney;  this  last-comer  imme- 
diately turned  upon  Davout  and  forced  him  back  a  long  dis- 
tance. Orders  to  take  part  in  the  battle  had  not  been  received 
by  Ney  until  noon,  and  by  the  time  he  reached  the  left  wing 
darkness  had  already  put  a  stop  to  the  hideous  carnage. 

The  losses  mounted  up  into  the  tens  of  thousands.  Weeks 
afterward  there  yet  remained  mounds  of  unburied  dead,  and 
untold  numbers  of  wounded,  suffering  from  hunger  as  well  as 
from  their  injuries,  sought  a  miserable  shelter  in  the  roofless 
houses  of  Eylau  or  in  abandoned  ammunition -wagons.  Auge- 
reau's  corps  had  suffered  such  frightful  loss  as  to  make  it  neces- 
sary to  disband  it  altogether.  And  all  this  sacrifice  had  been 
made  for  nothing!  For  the  battle  had  remained  indecisive. 
Napoleon  for  the  first  time  had  failed  to  win.  In  the  first  few 
hours  after  the  battle  he  had  even  considered  retreat,  and  WTote 
to  Duroc  that  it  would  soon  be  necessary  to  transfer  head- 
quarters to  Thorn,  and  that  consignments  of  funds  might  be 
retamed  in  Kiistrm  and  Posen,  since  it  was  possible  that  he 
should  retire  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  "in  order  to  secure 
quiet  winter  quarters  sheltered  from  the  Cossacks  and  from  that 
swarm  of  light  troops."     But  Bennigsen  ordered  it  otherwise. 


374  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [1807 

At  midnight  he  decamped  with  his  Russian  army,  and  on  the 
morning  of  February  9th  the  French  found  a  clear  field  before 
them.  Napoleon  at  once  accepted  this  as  a  concession  of  vic- 
tory to  himself.  Scharnhorst  denounced  it  as  "a  sin  and  a 
shame."  Napoleon,  however,  unhesitatingly  and  at  once  laid 
claim  to  the  proffered  laurels;  his  bulletin,  giving  a  garbled 
report  of  the  manner  in  which  the  battle  had  gone,  announced 
to  all  the  world  his  triumph,  and,  rather  for  the  sake  of  con- 
firming his  statements  than  with  any  hope  of  deriving  profit 
from  the  expedition,  he  despatched  Murat  a  few  days'  journey 
in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy.*  This  done,  however,  he 
withdrew  his  entire  army  behind  the  Passarge  and  had  them 
there  resume  winter  quarters,  since  he  felt  himself  too  weak  to 
follow  up  the  enemy.  For  the  losses  incurred  in  battle  had 
not  been  alone  in  reducing  the  strength  of  his  army.  Many 
thousands,  driven  by  hunger  and  want,  had  dropped  from  the 
ranks  and  were  roving  over  the  country,  extorting,  from  the 
wretched  inhabitants  by  dint  of  craft  or  violence  the  httle  yet 
remaining  to  them.  And  such  was  the  effect  of  this  example 
of  levying  contributions  without  authorization  that  the  number 
of  such  marauders  was  estimated  by  one  of  the  generals  as  reach- 
ing nearly  60,000.t     Others  may  have  been  intimidated  by  the 

*  The  hand  of  the  Bonaparte  of  old  is  at  once  recognizable  again  in 
the  letter  written  by  the  Emperor  to  Cambac6res  in  which  he  directs 
him  to  insert  in  the  "Moniteur"  that  the  Russian  army  was  wholly  dis- 
banded; and  again  in  the  61st  bulletin,  where  he  says  that  Konigsberg 
may  congratulate  herself  that  it  did  not  come  within  his  plans  to  follow 
the  Russians  up  closely;  and  still  again  when  in  several  letters  written 
on  the  same  day  he  gives  different  figures  as  the  number  of  lost:  3000 
wounded  in  his  account  to  Cambac^res,  7000  to  8000  in  that  intended 
for  Daru.     The  truth  was  that  there  were  three  times  that  number. 

t  This  is  the  number  according  to  F^zensac  How  terrible  was  the 
destitution  may  be  learned  from  Coignet's  narrative.  The  Emperor 
himself  wrote  of  it  to  Joseph  and  to  Talleyrand.  In  a  letter  to  the  former 
he  says:  "We  are  living  here  in  the  midst  of  snow  and  mud,  without 
wine,  without  brandy,  without  bread."  France,  to  be  sure,  was  not 
to  be  informed  of  their  situation,  and  Ihorefore  one  of  his  letters  to  Fouch6 
contained  also  a  statement  to  the  cfTcct  that  "the  sanitary  condition  of 
the  army  was  perfect,  that  it  was  supplietl  with  provisions  enough  for  a 


^T.  37]  Winter  Quarters  375 

indomitable  valour  of  the  Russians,  which  excited  even  Napo- 
leon's admiration  at  Eylau.  Others  there  were,  as  Baron  von 
Gagem  claims  to  have  personally  known,  who  openly  resented 
the  abominable  slaughter  of  human  beings  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  ministering  to  the  insane  ambition  of  a  single  individual.  Thus 
situated,  the  Emperor  resolved  upon  acquiring  a  firm  position 
in  regions  where  it  would  be  easier  to  care  for  the  troops  and 
to  assemble  re-enforcements  so  as  to  march  against  the  enemy, 
when  the  a^^'ful  winter  should  have  passed,  with  forces  greater 
than  his.  He  would,  no  doubt,  have  even  better  preferred  to 
withdraw  to  the  other  side  of  the  Vistula,  as  he  was  counselled 
to  do  by  his  generals,  including  even  the  pliable  Berthier.  But 
that  would  have  looked  like  retreat  before  the  Russians,  whose 
commander-in-chief  had  not  neglected  to  proclaim  himself 
victor  of  Pultusk  and  Eylau.  Therefore  there  must  be  no  fur- 
ther concessions;  the  army  had  to  remain  posted  between  the 
Vistula  and  the  Passarge  facing  eastward,  with  Ney's  corps  as 
van-guard  pushed  forward  as  far  as  Allenstein  on  the  Alle,  while 
another  under  Massena  still  remained  unchanged  in  position 
on  the  Narew.  This  arrangement  afforded  the  advantage, — 
and  it  was  the  only  gain  resulting  from  the  last  battle, — that 
the  Russians  were  thus  cut  off  from  the  route  to  Danzig,  whose 
fortress  was  now  most  zealously  besieged. 

Napoleon  selected  Osterode  as  the  place  for  his  headquarters. 
And  even  here  for  weeks  at  a  time  there  was  not  more  than  just 
enough  to  support  the  army,  and  he  and  his  officers  frequently 
subsisted  upon  what  the  soldiers  tracked  down  and  brought 
back.  At  first  he  had  to  be  satisfied  with  a  barn  as  dwelling- 
place  until  something  more  suitable  could  be  found.  It  was 
not  until  early  in  April,  when  he  moved  into  the  castle  of  Fink- 
enstein,  that  his  surromidings  became  in  any  wise  comfortable. 
Nevertheless  he  endured  the  misery  of  the  hard  winter  with  a 
cheerfulness  of  spirit  which  was  an  example  to  his  officers,  while 
physically  the  tcnls  of  the  campaign  seemed  rather  beneficial  to 
him  than   otherwise;    he  later  asserted  that  he  had  never  felt 

whole  year,  and  that  it  was  absurd  to  imagine  that  in  a  country  like 
Poland  there  could  be  any  lack  of  bread,  meat,  and  wine." 


3/6  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [iso? 

better  in  his  life.  Osterode  was  the  scene  of  much  animation. 
Innumerable  messengers  came  and  went.  Here  the  Emperor 
developed  a  marvellous  rapidity  of  execution,  and  Savary  was 
not  without  grounds  for  the  assertion  in  his  Memoirs  that 
Napoleon  would  have  required  at  the  least  three  months  in  a 
large  city  for  the  business  which  he  accomplished  in  less  than 
one  in  this  httle  hole  of  Osterode,  where  he  had  everything 
immediately  at  hand  and  could  at  once  set  it  in  motion.  And 
there  was  plenty  of  occasion  for  unceasing  labour,  for  Napo- 
leon's political  situation  corresponded  with  the  military  outlook 
and  was  not  a  whit  more  encouraging.  Turkey  had  not  been 
successful  in  overcoming  Russia  and  in  compelling  her  to  put 
forth  a  great  display  of  forces  upon  the  lower  Danube;  on  the 
contrary,  the  advantage  there  lay  entirely  upon  the  side  of  the 
northern  power,  so  that  the  Czar  might  consider  transferring 
half  of  the  corps  from  that  expedition  to  the  northern  theatre 
of  war.  From  Austria,  whose  attitude  had  remained  uncertain, 
came  tidings  of  armament  which  were  exaggerated  by  the  envoy 
Andreossy  in  his  reports  into  readiness  for  war.  The  Swedes 
were  advancing  upon  Stralsund,  and  a  way  must  be  found  for 
warding  off  or  at  least  paralyzing  their  attack.  England  was 
announcing  to  the  world  at  large  that  she  was  on  the  point  of 
sending  an  expeditionary  corps  to  the  North  Sea  coast  of  the 
Continent,  which  made  it  necessary  for  France  to  post  an  army 
of  its  own  under  Brune  at  the  points  threatened.  Even  Spain, 
heretofore  so  submissive,  seemed  about  to  raise  difficulties.  To 
add  to  these  perplexities,  at  the  news  of  the  retreat  to  the  Pas- 
sarge  rentes  had  fallen  at  the  exchange  in  Paris,  and  with  them 
confidence  in  the  Emperor.  Without  question,  then,  Napoleon 
had  plenty  to  do  if  he  were  going  to  improve  his  situation  or 
even  to  prevent  being  attacked  during  the  next  few  weeks  which 
he  needed  for  strengthening  his  army. 

His  first  step  was  to  renew  advances  to  Frederick  William. 
Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Eylau — as  if  Scharnhorst's 
valorous  deed  had  brought  Prussia  to  life  again — that  state 
acquired  new  importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  would-be  conqueror, 
and  from  the  battle-field  itself  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand  at  War- 


jet.  37]  The  Treaty  of  Bartenstein  377 

saw,  directing  him  to  re-establish  relations  with  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns.  Indeed,  so  much  in  haste  did  he  feel  to  have  this  accom- 
plished that  the  way  via  Poland  came  to  seem  too  long,  and  a 
few  days  later  he  sent  his  aid-de-camp,  Bert  rand,  direct  to  the 
King  at  Memel  to  offer  him  the  restitution  of  all  his  territory  as 
far  as  the  Elbe  if  he  would  conclude  a  separate  treaty  of  peace 
with  France.  But  Frederick  William  held  stanch  to  his  ally, 
and  notified  his  adversary  of  this  determination  by  a  special 
messenger,  whereupon  Napoleon  declared  himself  willing  even 
to  take  part  in  a  congress  relative  to  the  negotiation  of  a  general 
peace,  provided  only — and  to  him  that  was  the  important  point 
— an  armistice  should  be  agreed  upon  relegating  the  French  be- 
hind the  Vistula,  but  the  Russians  behind  the  Niemen.  But 
this  also  he  was  unsuccessful  in  obtaining.  Instead,  Prussia  and 
Russia  allied  themselves  only  the  more  closely  by  a  treaty 
signed  at  Bartenstein,  April  26th,  1807,  according  to  the  terms 
of  which  England,  Sweden,  Austria,  and  Denmark  should  be 
solicited  to  unite  once  more  with  the  original  parties  to  the 
treaty  in  forming  a  great  coalition  of  liberation  with  the  object 
of  driving  out  Napoleon  from  Germany  and  Italy.  Under  no 
circumstances,  however,  was  either  Russia  or  Prussia  to  con- 
clude a  separate  peace  with  France. 

Rebuffed  by  Prussia,  Napoleon  turned  to  Austria.  He  com- 
missioned Andreossy  to  demand  from  that  country  that  it  should 
at  last  make  a  positive  declaration  of  its  intentions;  he  was, 
moreover,  to  state  that  the  Emperor  of  the  French  was  still  will- 
ing and  ready  to  conclude  an  alliance  for  the  sake  of  which  he 
would  give  up  Silesia,  which  had  been  nearly  completely  con- 
quered by  his  troops, — meaning  those  of  the  Confederation  of 
the  Rhine, — and  even,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  exchange  Dal- 
matia  for  some  equivalent.  But  Austria  turned  a  deaf  ear  to 
these  proposals  also.  Vienna,  where  Archduke  Charles  was 
foremost  in  counselling  against  taking  part  in  the  war,  was 
prepared  to  offer  nothing  beyond  her  mediation,  and  submitted 
the  following  as  basis  for  the  same:  a  readjustment  of  German 
affairs,  the  integrity  of  Turkey,  the  division  of  Poland  as  here- 
tofore, and  the  participation  of  England  in  the  negotiations. 


378  From  Jena   to  Tilsit  [I807 

(April  3d,  1807.)  And  even  to  these  conditions  Napoleon  was 
disposed  to  accede,  if  for  nothing  more  than  the  sake  of  having 
nothing  to  fear  from  Austria  during  the  next  few  weeks ;  but  to 
the  mediatorial  proposals  of  Vienna  Russia  and  Prussia  replied 
with  a  pressing  invitation  to  take  part  in  the  Treaty  of  Barten- 
stein.  This  again  Emperor  Francis  felt  called  upon  to  refuse, 
considering  that  it  would  be  better  to  wait  until  Napoleon  had 
been  defeated  before  taking  the  step,  while  Russia,  being  too 
weak  to  bring  about  this  result  unaided,  wanted  Austria's  help 
precisely  on  this  account.  It  was,  then,  vastly  to  the  advan- 
tage of  France  that  Austria  decided  upon  remaining  neutral. 
"This  was,"  says  Montgelas  in  his  Memoirs,  "at  all  events 
the  greatest  service  ever  rendered  to  Napoleon,  for  he  would 
never  have  been  able  to  resist  an  attack  from  Austria."  The 
French  Emperor  could  hardly  bring  himself  to  believe  in  such 
good  fortune  and  felt  by  no  means  secure  in  respect  to  his 
right  flank. 

So  much  the  greater  his  zeal,  therefore,  in  attempting  to  instil 
new  life  into  the  Turkish  forces  and  in  organizing  in  the  East  a 
great  coalition  against  Alexander.  He  tried  to  bring  about  an 
agreement  between  the  Porte  and  Persia,  so  that  the  latter  also 
might  take  up  arms  against  Russia.  "Persia  also  must  be 
roused" — were  his  directions  sent  to  Sebastiani — "so  that  it 
shall  direct  its  energies  against  Georgia.  Prevail  upon  the 
Porte  to  give  orders  to  the  Pasha  of  Erzerum  to  march  with  all 
his  forces  against  that  province.  Maintain  the  good  will  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Abkhasians,  and  persuade  him  into  taking  part 
in  the  great  diversion  against  the  common  enemy."  Even  this 
seemed  to  him  not  enough.  Toward  the  end  of  April  there 
arrived  at  Finkenstein  a  messenger  from  the  Shah,  and  with  him 
Napoleon  concluded  a  treaty  in  which  he  bound  himself  to 
compel  the  evacuation  of  Georgia  by  Russia  and  to  send  cannon 
and  artillerymen  to  the  King  of  kings.  The  latter  was  in 
return  forced  to  pledge  himself  to  break  off  his  relations  with 
England,  to  confiscate  all  l^ritish  merchandise  and  to  refuse 
entry  into  her  ports  to  all  Hritisli  vessels,  t<>  stir  up  the  Afghans 
and  the  peoples  of  Candahar  against  England,  and  to  send  an 


Mr.  37]      Treaty   with   the  Shah   of  Persia  379 

army  against  Iiulia.  "And  if" — so  reads  Article  12 — "the 
Emperor  of  the  French  should  desire  to  send  an  army  by  land 
against  the  English  possessions  in  India,  the  Shah  of  Persia, 
as  a  good  and  faithful  idly,  shall  grant  them  free  passage  through 
his  dominions,  in  which  case  a  special  agreement  shall  be  made 
in  advance  stipulating  as  to  the  route  to  be  taken  by  the  troops, 
the  supplies  and  the  means  of  conveyance  to  be  furnished,  as 
well  to  what  auxiliary  troops  it  would  be  expedient  for  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Persia  to  unite  with  this  expedition." 
Truly  a  marvellous  spectacle,  this — of  a  man  in  the  midst  of  such 
embarrassments,  where  the  advance  of  a  single  Austrian  army 
corps  might  mean  catastrophe,  making  agreement  w^ith  an 
Oriental  monarch  concerning  the  most  distant  object  of  his 
aspirations.  This  is  precisely  what  constitutes  historical  great- 
ness: the  ability  to  keep  the  ultimate  aim  in  view  even  in  ad- 
versity, and  to  see  over  and  beyond  present  calamity  into  the 
far-distant  future. 

But  the  matter  of  paramount  importance  was  after  all  for 
him  to  strengthen  his  army  with  fresh  troops  at  the  earhest 
possible  moment  so  that  his  opponent,  who  was  likewise  mak- 
ing ready,  might  be  outnumbered  and  so  remain  during  the 
engagement  now  imminent.  For  this  purpose  he  summoned 
from  France  and  Italy  everything  available  in  the  way  of  mili- 
tary forces,  replacing  them  there  with  80,000  men  of  the  levy  of 
1808  accorded  him  by  the  Senate,  which  in  the  last  months  of 
the  preceding  year  had  granted  his  demand  for  the  levy  of  1807. 
From  Spain  and  from  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  he  like- 
wise demanded  new  auxiliary  troops.  He  was  thus  enabled  not 
only  to  create  a  reserve  army  in  Germany  to  keep  watch  upon 
Austria,  but  to  increase  the  corps  laying  siege  to  Danzig  and 
make  to  his  main  army  the  addition  of  from  160,000  to  170,000 
men — a  figure  to  which  Russia  was  far  from  attaining.  And 
when,  on  May  24th,  the  proud  fortress  on  the  Baltic  was 
brought  to  yield,  another  detachment  which  had  been  engaged 
there  was  released  to  swell  the  command  upon  the  Pa.ssarge. 

And  while  the  French  army  was  thus  increasing  in  strength 
the  winter  drew  to  a  close.     It  had  been  a  terrible  enemy  to  the 


380  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [i807 

invaders,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  a  faithful  ally  to  their  oppo- 
nents, the  only  trouble  being  that  they  had  not  been  able  to 
appreciate  it  at  its  true  worth.  During  the  long  weeks  of  cold 
Bennigsen  had  taken  not  a  single  serious  step  to  hinder  the 
enemy's  task  of  replenishing  his  army.  In  February,  having 
begun  to  follow  the  French,  he  had  been  advised  to  make  an 
onset  also  upon  them  at  this  time,  so  as  to  drive  them  behind  the 
Vistula,  or  at  least  to  protect  Danzig  by  contesting  their  control 
of  the  Frische  Nehrung;  but  he  neglected  everything  of  this 
kind  and  contented  himself  with  forming  plans  of  attack,  some- 
times upon  Ney,  who  occupied  an  advanced  position,  and  again 
upon  Elbing,  each  of  which  he  would  in  the  end  discard,  so  that 
Scharnhorst  was  persuaded  that  the  Russian  general  was  resolved 
not  to  risk  the  loss  of  his  reputation  of  having  never  been  defeated 
by  a  Napoleon.  It  was  only  when  Danzig  had  fallen  and  the 
enemy  stood  opposed  to  him  stronger  than  ever,  when  the  advent 
of  favourable  weather  had  made  the  roads  passable  and  the 
maintenance  of  the  army  less  difficult,  when  the  ground  was 
once  more  in  fit  condition  for  precise  reconnoitring  and  for 
rapid  manoeuvre,  when  Napoleon  had  determined  upon  his  own 
method  of  attack, — in  short,  when  it  was  entirely  too  late, — that 
Bennigsen  began  to  bestir  himself.  Now  he  proposed  to  fall 
upon  the  advance-guard  under  Ney,  annihilate  it  and  then  pro- 
ceed with  his  forces  against  the  main  body  of  the  army.  But 
the  intrepid  Marshal  fought  his  way  most  gloriously  back  to 
the  main  army.  With  this  the  Emperor  was  now,  in  his  turn, 
moving  forward,  contriving  at  the  same  time  to  slip  in  between 
Bennigsen  and  the  Prussian  corps  and  driving  both  before  him. 
The  situation  was  again  as  before  Eylau. 

Napoleon's  design  was  to  outflank  the  enemy  upon  the  left 
while  holding  his  attention  absorbed  at  the  front  and,  the  victory 
gained,  to  drive  him  back  against  the  Russian  frontier.  There 
was  this  peculiarity  about  th(!  plan — and  it  has  been  for  this 
reason  condemned  by  the  greatest  military  critics — that  it  left 
a  way  of  escape  open  to  the  enemy,  while,  if  the  encircling  move- 
ment had  been  carried  out  by  the  right  wing,  the  Russians  would 
have  had  no  choice  but  to  take  the  road  to  Konigsberg,  where 


J 


JEt.37]  Friedland  381 

they  could  have  been  utterly  destroyed  through  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  French.  The  question  arises  whether,  per- 
chance, Napoleon  did  not  intentionally  avoid  the  annihilation 
of  Alexander's  army.  There  may  have  been  a  revival  of  an 
idea  which  had  often  occupied  his  mind  and  which  had  found 
expression  even  before  the  battle  of  Austerlitz, — of  coming  to 
terms  with  the  Czar.  And  that  is  by  no  means  an  improbable 
explanation  of  his  conduct  at  this  time.  Certain  it  is  that  at 
Eylau  the  Russian  army  had  greatly  impressed  him,  and  he  was 
assuredly  obeying  something  beyond  the  mere  inspiration  of 
the  moment  when  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand  on  March  14th:  "I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  an  alHance  with  Russia  would  be  most  advan- 
tageous if  it  were  not  for  the  absurdity  of  it  and  if  any  reliance 
could  be  placed  upon  that  court."  There  was  besides  this  a 
special  reason  for  such  a  course,  for  just  at  this  time — in  the 
early  part  of  June,  1807 — Napoleon's  purposes  in  regard  to 
Turkey  came  to  shipwreck.  The  Sultan  Selim  III.,  as  the  result 
of  a  mistrust  but  too  well  justified,  had  refused  the  offer  of  a 
French  auxiliary  corps  of  25,000  men  under  command  of  Mar- 
mont,  while  his  own  general  had  conducted  the  war  against  Rus- 
sia in  an  indolent  fashion,  not  preventing  the  enemy  from  press- 
ing forward  as  far  as  Orsowa,  and  it  was  but  a  short  time  aft^r 
this  that  the  janizaries,  opponents  of  all  reform,  had  stripped 
the  Sultan  of  his  power  and  set  up  as  his  successor  on  the  Bos- 
phorus  Mustapha,  of  whom  Sebastian!  wrote  on  June  1st  that  he 
was  hostile  to  France  and  that  no  influence  was  to  be  obtained 
over  him.  Under  such  circumstances  was  it  not  perhaps  the 
part  of  discretion  to  execute  his  designs  upon  Turkey  by  uniting 
with  Russia  for  the  present  rather  than  by  striving  against  her — 
that  is,  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Czar  at  the  expense  of  the 
ungrateful  Moslem  who  so  little  understood  assuming  the  role  of  a 
wiUing  tool  for  the  furtherance  of  French  pohcy?  And  would  it 
be  expedient,  if  this  were  the  end  in  view,  to  attempt  the  de- 
struction of  the  Russian  army? 

But  be  this  as  it  may,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Emperor 
sent  one  portion  of  his  army  to  the  left,  northwards,  to  surround 
the  enemy,  another  detachment  under  Victor  against  the  Prue- 


382  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [1807 

Bians,  leaving  Ney  and  the  Guards  to  protect  the  rear,  while  he 
himself  with  three  corps  tried  to  overtake  Bennigsen.  In  the  last 
he  was,  indeed,  successful  on  the  evening  of  June  10th  at  Heils- 
berg,  but  here  the  enemy  had  entrenched  itself  strongly  and  re- 
pulsed the  French  as  they  approached.  Only  the  fear  of  being 
surrounded  on  the  north  then  compelled  the  Russian,  in  spite  of 
his  victory,  to  draw  farther  back  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Alle, 
while  Napoleon,  grown  cautious,  awaited  the  coming  up  of  Ney 
and  the  Guards,  whom  he  had  summoned  before  following  Bennig- 
sen upon  the  left  bank.  On  June  14th  the  latter  reached  Friedland 
on  the  route  from  Bartenstein  to  Wehlau,  At  this  point  he  crossed 
the  river  in  order  to  attack  the  French  while  on  the  march,  hoping 
to  demolish  the  vanguard  under  Lannes  and  break  through  the 
line.  The  manoeuvre  was,  however,  so  slowly  executed  that  while 
the  action  with  Lannes  was  yet  in  progress  the  other  French  corps 
had  time  to  come  up  and  be  set  in  battle  array  by  Napoleon.  The 
Russian  had  now  no  choice  but  to  accept  battle, — and  he  lost  it, 
not,  however,  without  valiant  defence.  For  Ney,  who  advanced 
with  his  command  against  the  left  wing  of  the  Russians,  was  at  first 
thrown  back  and  the  battle  was  saved  to  the  French  only  by  the 
audacious  act  of  Napoleon,  who,  recognizing  the  danger,  rushed 
with  his  reserve  corps  through  the  midst  of  the  fleeing  soldiers  to 
renew  the  attack.  A  heavy  cannonading  brought  the  Russians 
upon  this  side  to  yield,  and  at  this  Bennigsen  was  compelled  to 
order  the  retreat  of  the  centre  and  right  wings  through  Friedland 
and  across  the  Alle.  But  now  the  French  pressed  on  in  piu^uit 
from  everywhere,  so  that  the  crossing  of  the  river  could  be  but 
imperfectly  accomplished,  and  one  detachment  of  the  Russian 
troops  was  perforce  left  on  the  further  side  of  the  river  to  destruc- 
tion by  the  enemy's  cannon.  On  the  same  day  the  Prussian  corps 
also  sustained  defeat  by  itself  at  the  hands  of  the  encircling  army; 
it  was  driven  back  under  the  very  ramparts  of  Konigsberg,  and 
escaped  only  with  greatest  difficulty  and  almost  disbanded  to 
Tilsit  on  the  Niemen,  where,  on  June  18th,  liennigsen  also  amved 
on  his  retreat.  The  latter,  having  crossed  the  river,  destroyed 
the  bridges  behind  him. 


^T.  37]  Truce   with   Russia  383 

On  the  day  follo^\ing  this  victory  Napoleon  wTotc  to  Josephine: 
"My  children  have  appropriately  celebrated  the  anniversary  of 
Marengo;  the  battle  of  Friedland  will  contribute  to  the  fame  and 
glory  of  my  people  as  much  as  the  other.  The  entire  Russian 
army  put  to  rout,  80  cannon  seized,  30,000  men  killed  or  captured, 
25  of  their  generals  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  prisoner,  the  Russian 
Guard  demolished — this  makes  a  sister  worthy  of  Marengo. 
Austerlitz,  or  Jena ! "  This  account  was  to  some  extent  exaggerated. 
Bennigsen's  army  had,  it  is  true,  been  thoroughly  scattered  during 
the  action,  but  by  the  time  it  reached  Allenburg  m  its  fhght  it  had 
already  gathered  again,  so  that  it  was  able  to  proceed  thence  in 
tolerable  order.  Their  losses  w^ere,  indeed,  so  great  that  the 
general-in-chief  proposed  to  the  Czar  to  enter  into  negotiations 
for  peace,  but  his  intention  in  suggesting  this  course  was  only  with 
a  \aew  to  securing  tune  for  re-enforcement.  For,  in  the  first  place, 
he  was  certain  of  finding  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Memcl  L'Es- 
tocq's  corps  of  Prussians  and  a  reserve  body  of  Russians  under 
Labanoff,  and,  in  the  second,  the  army  had  not  been  crowded 
away  from  its  line  of  operations,  so  that  Napoleon  might  still  look 
fon\-ard  to  the  possibility  at  any  time  of  a  new  engagement  against 
which  he  also  was  having  preparations  made  to  the  west  of  Tilsit, 
The  worst  feature  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  attitude  of  complete 
dissatisfaction  prevaiHng  throughout  the  Russian  army  and  partic- 
ularly among  the  officers,  who  almost  without  exception  belonged 
to  the  party  headed  by  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine  and  who 
condemned  "fighting  for  foreign  interests."  And  this  feeling 
manifested  itself  with  a  freedom  defying  all  discipline.  It  is  even 
claimed  that  Alexander  was  pointedly  reminded  of  the  fate  of  his 
father.  Even  in  the  days  immediately  after  the  battle  there  is 
said  to  have  been  carried  on  a  correspondence  between  Constantine 
and  Murat  in  consequence  of  which  Prince  Labanoff  was  sent  on 
June  19th  to  conclude  a  truce  with  Napoleon.  The  latter  demanded 
as  a  condition  the  surrender  of  certain  Prussian  fortresses  which 
had  not  yet  fallen ,  among  others  Kolberg  and  Graudenz.  Having 
no  power  to  regulate  the  disposal  of  these  strongholds,  the  envoy 
turned  homeward,  but  the  Emperor  at  once  sent  Duroc  after  him 
commissioned  to  say  to  the  adversar}^  that  Napoleon  was  ready  for 


384  From   Jena  to  Tilsit  [iso? 

a  cessation  of  hostilities  even  without  these  concessions  if  Russia 
would  enter  into  negotiations  for  a  separate  peace.  This  offer 
was  made  known  to  the  Czar,  who  agreed  to  accept  it.  On  the 
21st  the  truce  was  signed,  and  on  the  24th  Labanoff  returned  to 
TUsit  with  written  instructions  for  proposing  an  alliance  and  an 
interview  between  the  two  sovereigns. 

This  course  was,  indeed,  directly  contrary  to  the  wording  of  the 
Treaty  of  Bartenstein  signed  on  April  26th,  and  in  reality  treachery 
to  Prussia.  But  in  regard  to  that  the  Czar  did  not  greatly  concern 
himself.  After  all,  as  he  might  have  argued,  had  not  that  treaty 
remained  practically  nothing  more  than  a  pious  wish?  Supposing 
he  had  formed  the  plan  now  as  in  1805  of  marching  as  it  were  at 
the  head  of  the  legitimate  powers  of  Europe  against  the  usurper 
in  order  to  compel  his  descent  from  the  pinnacle  upon  which  he  had 
placed  himself,  would  it  not  be  but  too  evident  that  Europe  was 
not  supporting  him? 

England  had  taken  up  arms  in  a  way  far  too  half-hearted  and 
incomplete  to  be  able  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  conflict,  and 
now  had  become  in  addition  obdurate  in  the  matter  of  money, 
for  to  Russia's  appeal  for  an  indispensable  subsidy  of  6,000,000 
pounds  she  had  returned  a  refusal.  On  the  other  hand  British 
supremacy  on  the  sea  bore  heavily  upon  Russian  vessels  and  oc- 
casionally made  itself  very  grievously  felt.  Nothing  more  was 
needed  to  create  an  aversion  to  England  in  the  mind  of  the  Czar. 
But  if  England  had  acceded  only  conditionally  to  the  Treaty  of 
Bartenstein,  Austria,  as  has  been  seen,  had  refused  absolutely  to 
give  it  adherence.  It  was  only  after  the  possibility  of  a  separate 
peace  between  France  and  Russia  had  been  brought  to  the  at- 
tention of  the  Court  of  Vienna  that  an  envoy  was  despatched  to 
Alexander,  there  to  reawaken  hopes  of  Austria's  co-operation; 
but  he  came  too  late.  In  view  of  the  neutrality  of  the  power  on 
the  Danube  Gentz  had  already  in  April  counselled  the  Czar  in  a 
memorial  to  conclude  peace  with  Napoleon  and  save  for  the  future 
his  forces  which  now,  without  assistance  from  Austria,  were  be- 
ing uselessly  squandered.  These  representations  are  said  to 
have  made  a  profound  impression  upon  the  young  monarch.*    Id 

*  Martens,    Recueil,  VI.   419.      Gentz    advised    the   Czar    to    impel 


JEt.37]      Napoleon  and  Alexander  at  Tilsit         385 

the  case  of  Sweden,  too,  there  was  an  obstacle  to  perfect  agree- 
ment. This  state  had,  to  be  sure,  taken  part  in  the  war  against 
Napoleon.  But  Finland  was  still  a  Swedish  province,  and  Finland 
lay  in  the  path  of  what  v.^as  called  the  "natural  expansion  "of 
Russia.  And  herein  lay  the  element  of  discord  in  Russian  poli- 
tics: that  in  fighting  in  behalf  of  the  ancient  order  of  things  in 
Europe  she  was  defending  a  cause  to  which  her  own  interests  urged 
destruction  and  those  who  are  prone  to  conch  mn  the  character  of 
Alexander  as  vacillating  and  untrustworthy  will  do  well  to  lay  the 
blame  not  upon  him  alone,  but  upon  the  political  aim  of  his  em- 
pire as  well.  He  was  now  personally  under  pressure  from  that 
party  which  demanded  peace,  and  under  this  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances it  is  not  a  matter  for  astonishment  that  he  should 
accept  the  proposals  of  the  enemy. 

He  further  expressed  a  desire  for  an  interview  with  Napoleon 
to  which  the  latter  readily  consented.*  On  the  25th  of  June 
took  place  the  meeting  between  the  two  Emperors.  Upon  a  raft 
in  the  middle  of  the  Niemen  was  erected  a  magnificent  tent  in 
which  the  interview  might  go  on  without  witnesses.  Both  mon- 
archs  were  conveyed  thereto  in  small  boats  accompanied  by  the 
acclamations  of  their  respective  Guards  lining  the  opposite  banks 
of  the  river.    The  conference  lasted  for  more  than  an  hour,dur- 

Aiistria  to  take  part  in  the  war  by  declaring  in  Vienna  that  he  would 
otherwise  share  with  France  v.hat  no  one  would  assist  Russia  in  defending. 
Alexander  appears  to  have  followed  this  advice,  for,  toward  the  middle 
of  the  month  of  May,  his  ambassador,  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  had  a  conversation 
with  Stadion  in  which  he  represented  to  him  that,  in  case  of  Austria's 
refusal,  peace  might  very  possibly  be  agreed  upon  without  the  co-opera- 
tion of  that  power:  "which  would  remain  excluded  from  a  system  estab- 
lished under  circumstances  which  she  alone  would  have  caused  to  be  so 
unfavourable." 

*  This  is  at  least  according  to  what  Napoleon  himself  wrote  to  Talley- 
rand on  June  24th,  1807.  (This  is  confirmed  by  the  instructions  of  the 
Czar  to  Labanoff  in  which  he  said:  "  I  like  to  entertain  the  hope  that  we 
shall  easily  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Emj)eror  Napoleon  if  we  can 
confer  without  any  intermediary."  Taking  the  hint,  Napoleon  propo.'sed  a 
personal  interview  through  Duroc,  June  24th.  Martens,  Recueil  des 
Traitfe  et  conventions  conclus  par  Russia  avec  les  puissances  etrangfires, 
XIII.  298,  299.— B.) 


386  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I807 

ing  which  time  the  retinue  remained  waiting  outside  of  the  tent, 
and  within  this  hour  the  face  of  the  world  was  changed.  Of 
exactly  what  took  place  on  this  occasion  we  have  no  direct 
record.  It  was  alleged  by  some  that  they  caught  the  opening 
of  the  conversation.  According  to  these  accounts  Alexander 
accosted  Napoleon  with:  "I  hate  the  English  as  thoroughly  as 
you  do,  and  I  will  second  you  in  ever3'^thing  you  are  willing 
to  undertake  against  them";  to  which  Napoleon  replied:  "In 
that  case  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  adjusting  matters  between 
us,  and  peace  is  made."  And  naturally!  For  why  continue  at 
war  if  he  could  now  obtain  peacefully  that  which  he  had  de- 
termined by  conquering  and  overmastering  Russia  to  compel 
her  to  give — her  accession  to  the  blockade  of  the  Continent  in 
case  England  should  refuse  to  accept  the  conditions  imposed? 
Assuming  that  this  was  to  be  the  outcome,  he  now  doubtless  re- 
sumed the  project  of  a  march  upon  India  which  had  never 
ceased  to  occupy  his  mind  and  to  participation  in  which  he  had 
won  over  Alexander's  father  in  his  day.  Concessions  were 
furthermore  made  upon  both  sides.  The  Corsican  agreed  to 
sacrifice  the  integrity  of  Turkey, — that  point  which  had  been 
the  cause  of  contention  between  the  two  powers  in  July,  1S06, — 
renounced  the  idea  of  a  re-establishment  of  ancient  Poland,  and 
assigned  Finland  to  Russia,  in  return  for  which  the  Czar  de- 
clared himself  ready  to  accept  all  changes  which  Napoleon 
should  make  in  the  south,  in  Italy  or  in  the  Iberian  peninsula, 
a  basis  for  agreement  being  thus  furnished  with  which  both 
parties  were,  for  the  time  being,  content.  It  is  indeed  open  to 
question  whether  all  these  considerations  were  brought  up  dur- 
ing that  first  interview,  but  it  is  certain  that  they  were  zealously 
discussed  during  those  weeks  of  familiar  intercourse  between 
the  two  sovereigns.  On  June  26th  Frederick  William  also  was 
granted  an  interview  with  Napoleon,  though  only  in  the  char- 
acter of  a  prot6g6  of  the  Czar's  and  not  as  a  sovereign  of  equal 
rank  pleading  his  own  cause. 

Two  weeks  were  thus  spent  together  in  Tilsit  before  the 
treaty  of  peace  was  signed.  Napoleon  displayed  his  utmost 
graciousness  of  manner  so  as  to  captivate  the  Czar,  and  a  prince 


^vr.  37]  The   Peace   of  Tilsit  387 

so  vain  could  not  but  be  gratified  and  allured  by  the  fact  that 
the  victor  offered  to  him,  the  vanquished,  the  homage  of  his 
friendship.  Both  sides  were,  moreover,  obliged  to  yield  upon 
certain  points  which  held  concealed  the  germs  of  future  discord. 
Napoleon,  to  be  sure,  no  longer  laid  stress  upon  the  re-establish- 
ment of  Poland,  but  he  was  none  the  less  opposed  to  having  the 
duchy  of  Warsaw  fall  back  into  the  possession  of  Prussia;  he 
had  involved  himself  too  deeply  with  the  Polish  patriots  to  ad- 
mit of  that.  He  even  went  so  far  at  first  as  to  suggest  that 
Poland  be  united  with  Prussian  Silesia  to  form  a  kingdom  wiiich 
should  be  assigned  to  his  brother  Jerome,  but  he  soon  recognized 
that  the  time  had  not  yet  come  for  his  purpose  of  extending  his 
power  as  far  as  the  Vistula,  and  withdrew  his  proposition.  Silesia 
remained  the  property  of  Prussia,  and  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  fell 
to  the  King  of  Saxony,  though  with  the  provision  that  it  should 
not  be  incorporated  with  his  state.  Only  the  Polish  crown  lands, 
of  some  27,000,000  francs  value.  Napoleon  reserved  to  himself 
for  future  use  in  rewarding  his  generals.  For  Jerome  a  com- 
pensation was  provided  by  uniting  the  Prussian  territories  west 
of  the  Elbe  with  lands  from  the  electorate  of  Hesse  and  duchy 
of  Brunswick  to  form  a  kingdom  of  Westphalia.*  On  the  other 
hand  Alexander  had  counted  as  a  certainty  upon  securing  Con- 
stantinople, and  had  been  likewise  obliged  to  yield.  At  last,  on 
July  7th,  1807,  matters  had  reached  a  point  where  it  was  possible 
for  the  diplomats  Talleyrand  and  Kurakin  to  append  their  signa- 
tures to  the  documents. 

Of  these  there  were  two,  a  peace  convention  and  a  treaty  of 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  In  the  former  were  taken  up 
and  dealt  with  all  stipulations  involving  Prussia.     It  was  herein 

*  Westphalia  was  to  consist  of  the  states  of  Brunswick-Wolfen- 
biittel,  the  Alt-Mark,  and  the  territory  of  Magdeburg  to  the  left  of  the 
Elbe,  the  territories  of  Halle,  Hildesheini,  and  the  city  of  Goslar,  the 
petty  state  of  Halberstadt  and  Hohenstein,  the  territory  of  Quedlinburg. 
the  county  of  Mansfeld,  the  Eichsfeld,  the  cities  of  Miihlhausen  and 
Nordhausen,  the  county  of  Stolberg,  the  states  of  Hesse-Cji.ssel.  the 
former  Hanoverian  principalities  of  Gottingen  and  Grubenhagen  with 
Hohenstein  and  Elbingerode,  the  bishoprics  of  Osnabriick  and  of  Padcr- 
bom,  Minden,  Ravensberg,  and  the  county  of  Rittberg-Kaunitz. 


388  From  Jena  to  Tilsit  [I807 

stated  that:  "Out  of  regard  for  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all 
the  Russias,  and  wishing  to  give  proof  of  his  sincere  desire  to 
unite  the  two  nations  by  the  links  of  an  unalterable  trust  and 
friendship,"  the  Emperor  of  the  French  now  restored  to  Frederick 
William  his  territories  lying  east  of  the  Elbe  except  for  the 
circle  of  Kottbus,  which  was  to  go  to  Saxony,  and  the  Polish 
provinces  of  South  Prussia  and  New  East  Prussia,  of  which  the 
circle  of  Bielostok  was  to  fall  to  Russia,  w^hile  the  remainder 
went  to  make  up  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  just  mentioned.  The 
Czar,  moreover,  recognized  Joseph  as  King  of  Naples,  and  pledged 
himself  to  recognize  him  as  also  Lord  of  Sicily  as  soon  as  a  com- 
pensation should  be  found  for  its  legitimate  prince.  Russia 
also  gave  her  acquiescence  to  the  establishment  of  Louis  as  King 
of  Holland,  and  that  of  Jerome  as  King  of  Westphalia,  as  w^ell  as 
to  the  Confederation  of  the  States  of  the  Rhine.  Cattaro  and 
the  Ionian  Islands  were  to  be  Napoleon's  in  return  for  the  release 
of  Danzig.  He  undertook  to  mediate  between  Russia  and  Tur- 
key, while  Alexander  was  to  bring  about  peace  between  France 
and  England. 

Thus  was  it  with  the  peace  convention.  The  question  was 
here  still  left  open  as  to  what  was  to  take  place  in  case  England 
and  Turkey  did  not  consent  to  the  conditions  imposed  by  the 
mediating  powers.  To  this  the  answer  was  contained  in  the  second 
instrument — the  secret  treaty  of  alliance.  In  this  the  contract- 
ing parties  pledged  themselves  to  mutual  support  whether  offen- 
sive or  defensive,  the  first  object  of  their  attack  being  England  if 
that  power  should  not  have  accepted  by  November  1st,  1807,  the 
Russian  terms  of  peace,  which  demanded  nothing  less  of  Great 
Britain  than  that  she  should  restore  to  France  and  her  ally  all 
conquests  which  she  had  made  since  1805  and  grant  complete  in- 
dependence upon  the  sea  to  all  flags,  upon  compliance  with  which 
conditions  Hanover  should  again  be  hers.  The  Porte  was  to  be 
next  in  order  in  case  the  mediation  of  France  should  have  led  to  no 
satisfactory  result  within  three  months  of  the  conclusion  of  the 
Treaty  of  TUsit.  In  the  first  event  Russia  pledged  hereclf  to  break 
off  all  relations  with  England,  to  use  her  power  in  the  system  of 
Continental  blockade,  and,  in  combination  with  France,  to  compel 


Mr.  37]  The  Treaty  with  Prussia  389 

likewise  Denmark,  Sweden,  Portugal,  and  Austria  to  take  part  in 
the  war  against  England's  commerce.  In  the  second  event  Rus.«ia 
and  France  were  to  unite  their  forces  to  snatch  from  Turkey  all  her 
European  possessions  with  the  exception  of  Constantinople  and 
Roumelia.  Should  Denmark.  Portugal,  or  Sweden  offer  resistance 
to  the  demands  of  the  allies,  the  country  so  resisting  should  be 
invaded  by  war  conducted  by  both  powers,  should  Sweden  alone 
refuse  to  comply,  Denmark  should  be  constrained  to  csunry  on  the 
contest  against  her.*  In  a  special  agreement,  which  was  probably 
only  verbal,  a  division  of  Turkish  territory  is  said  to  have  been 
arranged;  but  although  Napoleon  showed  a  disposition  to  favour 
the  designs  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  he  would  not  consent  to 
having  the  project  clearly  and  distinctly  formulated. 

Two  days  later,  on  July  9th.  1807.  peace  was  Ukewise  signed 
with  Prussia.  It  was  without  avail  that,  unmindful  of  the  re- 
peated affronts  which  had  been  offered  her  through  Napoleon's 
bulletins,  the  young  and  beautiful  Queen  Louise  appeared  before 
the  powerful  enemy  to  her  country  to  entreat  for  it  a  fate  less  hard, 
or  at  least  the  restitution  of  Magdebiu"g.  She  could  obtain  noth- 
ing beyond  mere  civilities  and  vague  promises  to  which  the  Em- 
peror paid  not  the  slightest  regard  next  morning.  His  stipulations 
in  regard  to  Prussia  remained  precisely  as  had  been  before  agreed 
upon  with  Alexander.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the 
unhappy  country'  was  obliged  to  bind  itself  to  keep  all  ports 
closed  against  England  and.  in  case  John  Bull  should  fail  to 
comply  with  the  terms  of  peace  imposeel.  to  enter  into  a  league 
with  France  and  Russia  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  war 
against  him. 

The^e  were  the  essential  points  in  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  .An 
attempt  has  been  made  to  see  in  this  a  division  of  the  mastery  of 
Europe  according  to  the  principle  that  Napoleon  yielded  to  the 
Czar  the  eastern  half  of  the  Continent,  while  reserving  to  himself 

*  The  authentic  wording  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  has  here  been 
followed.  Since  the  publication  of  the  German  edition  of  this  book,  when 
the  text  of  the  secret  treaty  was  for  the  first  time  published  complete, 
it  has  been  publit^hed  by  Vandal,  "Napoleon  et  Alexandre  I.,"  p.  515,  and 
by  Martens  in  his  Ilecueil,  XIII,  322. 


390  Fram  Jena  to  Tilsit  [1807 

undisturbed  dominion  over  the  west.  But  the  facts  in  the  case 
would  not  bear  out  this  idea  in  all  particulars.  In  spite  of  every- 
thing the  difference  between  victor  and  vanquished  is  clearly  dis- 
cernible in  the  documents.  Napoleon  made  not  the  least  show  of 
withdrawing  from  Turkey,  and  through  his  aUiance  with  Persia 
he  still  maintained  a  firm  foothold  in  the  East.  Moreover,  the 
duchy  of  Warsaw  was  now  ruled  by  one  of  the  princes  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  States  of  the  Rhine. — for  such  had  the  new  "king  " 
of  Saxony  become  in  December.  1806, — and  was  thus  imder  direct 
influence  of  his  policy.  Here  was  a  card  which  might  be  played 
against  Russia  at  any  time  when  he  should  feci  so  inclined.  And 
Russia  herself  was  at  the  mercy  of  France,  at  least  in  the  matter 
of  her  industries,  from  the  moment  in  which  the  war  against  Eng- 
land's commerce  began.  No!  In  the  treaty  of  July  7th,  1807, 
there  was  nothing  which  looked  hke  renunciation  or  change  of 
purpose  on  the  part  of  Napoleon.  His  concessions  to  Russia 
meant  nothing  more  than  a  pause  on  the  way  to  universal  do- 
minion. As  far  back  as  1803,  when  war  with  England  had  be- 
come inevitable,  the  First  Consul  is  said  to  have  made  approaches 
to  Alexander  I.  with  proposals  culminating  in  a  combined  at- 
tack upon  Great  Britain  and  which  were  probably  similar  in 
nature  to  those  of  Tilsit.  Cobenzl,  the  Austrian  minister  and 
a  clear-sighted  diplomat,  at  that  time  expressed  himself  in  re- 
gard to  Napoleon  and  his  purposes  in  these  words:  "Never 
has  any  one  laid  himself  more  open  to  the  suspicion  of  aspiring 
to  a  universal  monarchy,  and  a  man  must  begin  by  being  one 
of  two  to  finish  by  being  the  only  one." 


I 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  SITUATION  OF  AFFAIRS  IN  FRANCE.       BAYONNE  AND 

ERFURT 

It  would  be,  however,  not  only  a  mistake,  but  an  injustice  to 
Napoleon's  powers  of  penetration,  to  assume  that  he  had  allowed 
himself  to  be  persuaded  by  the  demands  of  his  external  policy 
alone  to  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Alexander  in  1807  in- 
stead of  abiding  by  his  original  intention  of  unshackling  Poland 
and,  in  alliance  with  that  hereditary  enemy  of  Russia,  extend- 
ing his  owii  dominion  by  conquest  to  the  farthest  borders  of  the 
Continent.  That  which  more  than  aught  else  determined  him 
to  arrest  his  course  at  the  Niemen  was  consideration  for  pubHc 
opinion  in  France,  knowing  that  he  durst  not  forfeit  all  favour 
and  kindly  feeling  on  the  part  of  his  people;  for  he  was  already 
on  the  highway  to  such  an  outcome.  The  French  had  refused 
their  sympathy  with  the  war  of  1805,  and  it  was  only  through 
the  marvellous  victories  of  the  Emperor,  coupled  with  many  an 
addition  to  the  contents  of  the  state's  treasury,  that  they  could 
be  reconciled  to  it.  But  when,  a  year  later,  these  cruel  wars 
broke  out  afresh,  the  people  began  to  see  that  their  soldiers  were 
no  longer  fighting  in  the  interests  of  their  country,  but  were 
wasting  their  blood  only  for  the  sake  of  the  boundless  ambition 
of  this  foreigner;  that  his  policy  was  not,  as  he  pretended,  the 
policy  of  France.  Henceforth  no  success  however  great  could 
alter  the  popular  feeUng.  A  contemporary  relates  that  even 
the  victory  of  Jena  made  absolutely  no  impression  in  Paris. 
On  the  other  hand,  dissatisfaction  with  the  Empire  steadily  in- 
creased, though  in  secret.  But  however  anxiously  conceak\i 
from  the  innumerable  spies  in  his  employ,  the  facts  still  came 
to  Napoleon's  ears;  here  it  was  the  audacious  joke  of  some  idler 
on  the  boulevard  which  was  reported,  there  the  cutting  witti- 

391 


392  Affairs  in   France  [i807 

cism  of  an  inhabitant  of  the  Faubourg  St.  Germain,  or  perchance 
a  newspaper  article  not  discreetly  enough  revised: — nothing  es- 
caped the  vigilance  of  his  informants.  But  even  without  spe- 
cial reports  of  this  kind  he  would  have  been  aware  that  the 
French  people,  whose  sons  he  had  demanded  to  fight  his  bat- 
tles, no  longer  made  the  sacrifice  with  the  conviction  that  it 
was  for  the  good  of  the  nation,  but  that  it  was  inwardly  threat- 
ening to  turn  completely  from  him.  Such  a  symptom  as  this 
he  was  too  discerning  to  underestimate.  Although  he  felt  him- 
self able  to  cope  with  any  popular  uprising  through  the  mighty 
army  which  he  had  attached  to  himself  personally,  he  had  never- 
theless learned  too  much  from  the  Revolution  not  to  reckon  the 
current  of  popular  sentiment  as  a  distinct  and  important  poht- 
ical  factor.  It  was  appalling  to  consider  what  would  become 
of  him  if  France  should  eventually  cease  to  honour  his  drafts 
upon  the  future.  Such  an  eventuaUty  must  on  no  account  be 
allowed  to  occur.  And  it  was  because  he  knew  the  craving  for 
peace  existing  among  the  French  people  and  its  horror  of  in- 
cessant war  that  he  made  peace  with  Russia  and,  even  before 
leaving  Tilsit,  took  steps  for  spreading  abroad  in  France  the  re- 
port that  the  war  of  blockade  was  nearing  its  end.  Then  he 
returned  to  Paris  to  prove  himself  the  solicitous  administrator 
and  bring  about  forgetfulness  of  his  career  as  a  conqueror. 

Here  he  was  greeted  with  an  enthusiasm  outwardly  similar 
to  that  of  a  year  previous;  there  were  illuminations  and  accla- 
mations, speeches  and  addresses  somewhat  more  bombastic 
even  than  those  of  the  former  occasion,  which  had  even  then 
been  lacking  in  spontaneity.  For  instance,  the  President  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  declared  to  his  face  that  Napoleon  had  ceased 
to  belong  to  ordinary  human  history,  but  should  be  classed 
among  the  heroes  of  antiquity.  He  listened  with  a  serious  coun- 
tenance to  such  disquisitions,  and  was  doubtless  no  less  serious 
in  his  contempt  for  an  orator  capable  of  such  servility.  At  the 
opening  of  the  Corps  Legislatif  he  read  a  speech  from  the  throne 
in  which  he  expressed  to  the  French  the  pride  and  satisfaction 
felt  in  the  nation  by  its  monarch,  and  in  the  Council  of  State  was 
drawn  up  a  report  setting  forth  the  blessings  conferred  by  th^ 


^T.  37]  Guiding   Public   Opinion  393 

imperial  government.  Such  reports  had  repeatedly  been  made 
before  this  under  the  Empire.  The  first  time  was  toward  the 
close  of  1804  and  the  second  in  March,  1806,  after  the  Peace  of 
Pressburg,  in  both  of  which  cases  the  key-note  had  been  the 
same:  that  Napoleon  was  indefatigably  intent  upon  promoting 
the  well-being  of  his  people,  but  was  nevertheless  constantly 
interrupted  in  this  task  by  disturbances  from  without.  The 
result  had  been  that  France  had  turned  with  fury  against  these 
antagonists  and  hailed  with  acclamation  the  commander  who 
promptly  and  brilliantly  overcame  them.  80  had  it  been  even 
in  1805,  but  at  present  matters  wore  a  different  aspect.  The 
next  year,  in  order  to  be  believed  when  asserting  that  the  Em- 
peror had  no  further  plans  of  conquest  and  no  longer  desired 
the  bloody  laurels  which  others  had  compelled  him  to  pluck, 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior  had  to  seek  an  entirely  new  funda- 
mental principle  for  use  in  his  public  declarations.  This  new 
theme  was  soon  found,  and  now  the  story  ran:  that  even  if 
Europe  had  been  so  wicked  as  to  force  war  upon  the  Emperor, 
he  had  not  been  prevented  by  it  from  the  fulfilment  of  his  duties 
as  a  ruler,  especially  as  the  war  itself  had  been  carried  on  solely 
in  the  interests  of  France.  This  text  was  further  varied  by  the 
Minister  in  his  representations  of  1807,  in  which  he  said  of  Napo- 
leon that:  "^Vhile  he  was  seeking  out  the  soldier  in  his  tent 
amidst  the  snows  of  Lithuania,  his  eyes  were  resting  in  France 
upon  the  cottage  of  the  poor,  upon  the  workshop  of  the  me- 
chanic; .  .  .  while,  as  for  us,  we  realized  his  absence  only  in 
hearing  of  his  exploits."  True,  certain  branches  of  industry  had 
suffered,  but  this  was  nothing  but  a  passing  inconvenience,  for 
the  war  in  progress  was  a  war  for  commercial  independence,  and 
every  conquest  made  in  it  by  the  Emperor  was  a  future  gain  to 
French  traffic.  Moreover,  it  was  no  small  merit  on  the  part  of 
the  monarch  to  have  removed  to  such  a  distance  the  scene  of 
operations  that,  "while  the  rest  of  Europe  was  writhing  in  the 
torments  of  war,  France,  serene  and  confident  in  her  power, 
could  look  hito  the  future  with  the  feeling  of  security  whicli  is 
the  result  of  a  happy  past,  desiring  peace  without  being  tired 
of  the  war  and  aspiring  to  that  high  destiny  which  lias  been  pre- 


394  Affairs  in  France  [I807 

pared  for  her  by  him  in  whom  she  has  placed  her  confidence, 
her  glory,  her  affection.  This  expectation  of  a  great  people 
has  been  fulfilled,  her  fondest  hopes  surpassed.  The  hour  of 
prosperity  has  come,  who  will  venture  to  prophesy  its  termina- 
tion?" 

Though  essentially  hypocritical,  these  assurances  did  never- 
theless contain  two  statements  not  unsupported  by  fact:  in 
the  first  place  Napoleon  did  himself  consider  the  commercial 
war  against  England  to  be  an  enterprise  actually  conducive  to 
the  welfare  of  France,  and  in  the  second,  even  during  the 
course  of  the  war  he  had  not,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  dropped 
from  his  shoulders  the  burden  of  the  administration  in  France. 
For  Cambaceres,  though  appointed  Napoleon's  representative, 
was  such  in  form  only,  and  the  couriers  to  Warsaw,  Osterode, 
or  Finkenstein  were  charged  with  questions  in  regard  to  even 
the  most  insignificant  details.  From  such  a  distance  it  was 
nevertheless  impossible  to  undertake  any  very  vigorous  meas- 
ures, and  it  was  only  now  upon  his  return  that  the  undivided 
attention  of  the  monarch  could  be  accorded  to  affairs  of  the  in- 
terior. Napoleon  well  knew  how  little  had  been  accomplished 
by  the  fine  words  of  his  minister;  France  must  be  convinced  by 
acts  and  deeds  that  only  under  his  own  guidance  could  she  be 
assured  of  prosperity  and  honour. 

He  demanded  at  once  upon  his  arrival  to  be  furnished  with 
the  figures  as  to  the  exports  and  imports  of  French  commerce, 
and  to  be  informed  how  Italy  and  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  could  be  made  serviceable  to  it.  The  new  commercial 
code  was  pubhshed.  The  bank  was  ordered  to  reduce  the  rate 
of  discount.  To  check  impoverishment  and  to  help  the  needy 
state  workshops  were  opened  in  all  departments  for  those  who 
were  in  distress,  and  work  renewed  upon  public  constructions 
planned  and  begun  after  the  victorious  campaign  of  1805;  these 
included  roads  over  the  Siinplon  and  Mont-Cenis,  new  canals, 
telegraph  lines  for  the  acceleration  of  correspondence,  the  resto- 
ration of  the  Basilica  of  St.  Denis, — particularly  the  crypt  which 
was  used  as  th(^  tomb  of  royalty  and  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  Revolution, — the  founding  of  a  new  city  in  the  Vendue, 


I 


Mt.  37]  The  Jewish   Question  39^ 

the  erection  of  monumental  arches  of  triumph  in  PariK,  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  quais  on  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  the  embelHsh- 
ment  of  the  capital  by  a  wide  Btreet  running  from  the  Tuileries 
to  the  boulevards  (the  Rue  de  la  Paix),  the  completion  of  the 
Louvre,  the  laying  out  of  a  park  on  the  Rue  de  Rivoli,  the  build- 
ing of  the  Pont  des  Arts,  the  Pont  d'Austerhtz,  and  the  Pont 
d'Jena,  the  raising  of  a  column  of  triumph  on  the  Place  Ven- 
dome,  besides  many  other  works  of  the  same  order.  All  these 
provided  labour  for  many  hands,  and  prevented  general  distress, 
so  that  it  was  possible  to  forbid  beggary. 

Among  public  abuses  there  was  one  especially  which  had 
fixed  Napoleon's  attention  even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
with  Prussia.  This  was  the  condition  of  unremitting  poverty 
prevailing  among  the  peasants  of  the  eastern  departments,  the 
cause  of  which  was  eventually  found  to  lie  in  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  people  by  the  Jews  through  usury.  For,  ever  since 
the  National  Assembly  in  1791  had  accorded  to  the  Israelites 
civil  rights  similar  to  those  of  all  other  Frenchmen,  there  had 
poured  in  from  foreign  countries  to  the  eastward  streams  of 
Jewish  tradesmen  who  had  settled  in  the  departments  on  the 
Rhine  and  here  for  the  most  part  carried  on  a  business  of 
usurious  money-lending.  Especially  after  pubhc  security  had 
been  re-established  by  Bonaparte  in  the  interior  did  they  mass 
themselves  in  the  German -speaking  provinces.  According  to 
an  official  account  submitted  to  Napoleon  by  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior  in  April,  1807,  the  sums  demanded  upon  mortgages 
by  the  Jews  since  1799  amounted,  in  the  Alsatian  department 
of  the  Upper  Rhine  alone,  to  more  than  23,000,000  francs,  and 
Marshal  Kellerman  set  at  something  more  than  70  per  cent 
the  rate  of  interest  customarily  extorted  by  them.  Most  of 
them  were  successful  in  evading  military  service.  For  a  moment 
Napoleon  had  thought  of  declaring  null  and  void  all  debts  upon 
mortgages  at  usurious  rates,  but  upon  further  consideration 
vouchsafed  to  apply  measures  somewhat  less  severe.  An  as- 
sembly of  Jewish  Rabbis — a  sort  of  revival  of  the  great  Sanhe- 
drim of  Jewish  history — was  to  take  coimsel  together  to  find  a 
remedy  against  this  evil,  and,  in  fact,  a  series  of  resolutions 


39^  Affairs  in   France  [1807 

was  drawn  up  by  this  body  in  Paris,  March,  1807,  forbidding 
their  fellow  believers  to  exact  usury  as  sinful  and  urging  the 
youth  of  the  nation  to  learn  handicrafts.  Thus  stood  matters 
at  the  time  of  the  return  of  the  Emperor  from  his  campaign. 
These  resolutions  seemed  to  him,  however,  to  offer  too  little 
guarantee,  and  he  ordered  elaborated  an  exceptional  law  bear- 
ing upon  the  Jewish  population,  which  was  to  remain  in  opera- 
tion for  a  first  period  of  ten  years  and  of  which  the  essential 
features  were  the  following:  Interest  at  more  than  5  per  cent 
should  be  reduced  by  the  proper  authorities,  while  that  at  more 
than  10  per  cent  should  be  declared  usurious  and  the  debt  can- 
celled; no  Jew  might  carry  on  business  without  a  license  from 
the  proper  authorities,  and  none  lend  money  upon  a  mortgage 
without  an  act  attested  before  a  notary;  Hebrews  not  yet 
resident  in  Alsace  at  the  moment  when  this  decree  was  put  in 
force — it  was  promulgated  March  17th,  1808 — could  not  estab- 
lish themselves  there;  in  other  departments  they  were  allowed 
to  settle  only  on  condition  of  becoming  landowners;  every 
IsraeUte  must  perform  military  service  and  was  debarred  the 
privilege  of  hiring  a  substitute.  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  this 
law  was  contrary  to  the  Napoleonic  Code,  but  it  was  effectual. 
Reports  from  the  eastern  departments  showed  improvement 
even  within  a  few  years,  and  Napoleon  was  enabled  to  allow  of 
exceptions  being  made  to  a  constantly  increasing  extent  until 
the  state  of  complete  equality  before  the  law  was  again  attained. 
The  Emperor's  concern  for  the  material  prosperity  of  the 
French  was  closely  aUied  with  his  financial  policy.  Up  to  this 
time  he  had  carried  on  his  wars  without  substantially  increasing 
the  taxation  and  without  assuming  debts.  "As  long  as  I  hve,'' 
he  wrote  on  May  18th,  1805,  to  Barbe-Marbois,  "I  shall  issue 
no  paper."  No  method  seemed  to  him  so  certain  to  mitigate 
the  avereion  felt  by  the  people  toward  his  wars  as  to  prove  that 
they  demanded  no  pecuniary  sacrifice.  The  system  of  requisi- 
tions in  foreign  countries  had  until  now  made  it  possible  to  abide 
by  this  policy,  and  it  was  further  relieving  the  country  of  a  heavy 
burden  to  liavc  the  greater  part  of  the  standing  army  remain, 
even  in  peace,  without  its  borders.     But  this  was,  after  all,  far 


Mr.  37]  Financial   Policy  397 

from  sufficient,  for  in  1805  a  painful  cxpcricncp  had  been  under- 
gone. The  taxes  had  not  been  increased  at  the  opening  of  the 
war,  but  money  was  nevertheless  an  imperative  necessity. 
It  had  therefore  been  derived  at  this  time  from  the  cash  ad- 
vanced to  the  government  by  an  association  of  financiers,  with 
the  banker  Ouvrard  at  their  head,  who  had  been  accustomed  to 
discount  the  assignments  by  the  receivers  of  taxes  of  the  income 
due  in  the  course  of  the  ensuing  year.  This  same  company  man- 
aged incidentally  also  the  financial  affairs  of  the  Spanish  crown 
by  advancing  the  subsidies  exacted  by  France  from  Spain, tak- 
ing repayment  with  substantial  interest  upon  the  arrival  of  the 
silver  fleet  from  America.  But  the  war  now  declared  upon 
Spain  by  England  prevented  the  conveyance  of  the  ingots, 
plunging  the  company  into  difficulties  from  which  it  was  to  be 
extricated  only  by  aid  of  the  Bank  of  France,  which  w^as,  for 
this  purpose,  compelled  to  exhaust  its  supply  of  ready  money. 
A  crisis  was  the  immediate  consequence,  bringing  in  its  train 
bankruptcy  to  many  important  houses;  capitalists  throughout 
the  country  became  uneasy.  It  was  just  at  the  time  that  Napo- 
leon was  negotiating  for  peace  with  Austria  in  December,  1805. 
His  presence  in  France  became  indispensable,  and,  as  Montgelas 
asserts,  it  was  this  consideration  more  than  any  other,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  later  testimony,  which  impelled  him  to  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg,  an  opportunity  which  the 
Austrians  might  easily  have  turned  to  account  by  occasioning 
delays  which  would  have  caused  serious  embarrassment  to  Na- 
poleon. But  such  a  predicament  must  never  again  befall.  On 
that  occasion  the  proclamation  of  peace,  the  newly  established 
confidence  of  the  people,  and  the  40,000,000  francs  of  Austrian 
war-indemnity  had  averted  disaster.  Now,  after  the  second 
victorious  campaign,  the  millions  exacted  from  Prussia,  Poland, 
and  WestphaHa  were  taken  to  estabhsh  not  only  a  war- 
treasure,  but  likewise  a  "Service  Bank"  (Caisse  de  Sennce) 
which  should  make  unnecessary  the  assistance  of  bankers  in 
the  future,  and  even  furnish  advance  moneys  upon  the  taxes. 
There  was  further  established  a  treasury  board  {cour  des  Comptes) 
which  was  to  assume  control  of  the  administration  of  finances. 


398  Affairs  in  France  [1807 

The  Emperor  was  thus  enabled  to  demonstrate  to  the  French 
people  that  his  wars  not  only  demanded  no  new  sacrifices  on 
their  part,  but  that  they  might  with  their  results  actually  be 
advantageous  to  the  public  finances.  Nor  was  the  encouraging 
aspect  of  affairs  delusive,  for  the  material  situation  of  the  coun- 
try continued  to  make  real  improvement.  Commerce  did  in- 
deed suffer  from  the  blockade,  while  the  advanced  prices  of 
sugar  and  coffee  bore  hard  upon  all  classes,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  exclusion  from  Europe  of  English  manufactures  was 
helping  to  build  up  French  industries.  Hopes  of  universal 
peace  and  the  re-established  credit  of  the  state  contributed  to 
raise  the  price  of  government  5  per  cents  to  93  in  1807,  a 
point  to  which  they  were  destined  never  again  to  rise  during 
the  reign  of  the  Emperor. 

But  Napoleon  knew  only  too  well  that  a  people  of  so  high  a 
grade  of  intelligence  as  the  French  craved  not  material  pros- 
perity alone,  but  was  sensible  of  other  needs  which  were  not  to 
be  satisfied  with  money  and  bread.  Precisely  what  these  were 
he  was  confident  that  he  knew.  Wlien  in  1797  at  the  close  of 
the  Italian  war  he  for  the  first  time  considered  making  himself 
master  of  France  and  set  that  as  his  goal,  he  expressed  himself 
in  confidence  to  Miot  in  the  following  words :  ''The  French  want 
glory  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  vanity,  but  as  for  liberty 
they  have  no  realization  of  what  it  means."  And  from  that 
time  he  had  adopted  this  maxim  as  his  guide.  From  every 
battlefield  he  had  sent  to  assure  them  of  the  glories  of  their  arms 
and  thus  ministered  to  their  national  pride.  His  next  care  was 
to  make  provision  for  their  personal  vanity.  On  August  12th, 
1807,  he  addressed  to  Cambac^r^s  a  most  extraordinary  epistle 
in  which  he  said:  "Since  it  is  part  of  human  nature  for  a  man 
to  wish  to  leave  to  his  children  some  token  of  the  esteem  in  which 
he  has  been  held,  as  well  as  to  provide  for  them  a  suitable  and 
sufficient  inheritance,"  he  reserved  to  himself  the  right  to  confer 
other  titles  of  nobility  upon  such  as  had  rendered  service  to  the 
state  in  the  same  way  as  the  titular  duchies  had  been  founded 
in  the  previous  year.  Ministers,  senators,  Councillors  of  State, 
presidents   of    the   Corps   L^gislatif,  and   archbishops  as  well, 


/Et.  38]  The  New  Nobility  399 

should  be  granted  the  right  to  the  title  of  Count,  which  might 
be  transmitted  to  their  heirs  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
primogeniture  provided  the  testator  could  entail  with  it  a  yearly 
income  of  30,000  francs;  the  presidents  of  the  electoral  colleges 
and  courts  of  justice  who  were  appointed  for  life,  the  attorneys- 
general,  and  mayors  of  the  most  important  cities  of  the  country 
should  be  made  Barons  and  miglit  likewise  transmit  the  title  by 
entail  if  endowed  with  a  yearly  income  of  15,000  francs;  the 
members  of  the  Legion  of  Honour  might  transmit  their  knight- 
hood with  an  income  of  3000  francs,  while  a  Grand  Dignitary 
must  be  able  to  leave  an  income  of  200,000  francs  to  his  heir  in 
order  to  preserve  to  him  the  title  of  Prince.  Now  all  this  was 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  laws  of  inheritance  as  set  forth  in 
the  Napoleonic  Code.  The  Emperor,  however,  tried  to  make  the 
matter  acceptable  to  the  Senate  by  clearly  pointing  out  to  that 
body  that  no  manner  of  political  privilege  was  associated  with 
these  hereditary  titles  any  more  than  with  the  new  feudal 
duchies,  and  that  the  fundamental  law  of  equaUty  thus  remained 
absolutely  inviolate.  Allured  by  the  title  of  Count,  the  senators 
yielded  consent,  and  in  March,  1808,  the  law  went  into  effect.* 

*  Shortly  after  his  promulgation  of  the  decree  respecting  the  new 
nobility  Napoleon  expressed  himself  to  Madame  de  R^musat  somewhat 
as  follows:  "Liberty  is  a  need  felt  by  a  class  small  in  number  and  gifted 
by  nature  with  abilities  above  those  of  the  common  run  of  humanity. 
It  can  thus  be  restrained  with  impunity.  Equality,  on  the  contrary, 
pleases  the  multitude.  I  do  not  in  the  least  offend  against  it  in  bestowing 
titles  which  are  accorded  to  such  and  such  persons  without  regard  to  the 
question  of  birth,  which  is  just  at  present  out  of  fashion.  These  titles 
are  a  sort  of  civic  crown ;  they  can  be  earned  by  good  works.  Moreover, 
clever  men  will  give  to  those  whom  they  govern  the  same  impulses  which 
they  themselves  have.  Now  my  own  impulse  is  altogether  upward,  and 
a  similar  one  is  needed  to  give  a  like  impetus  to  the  nation.  .  .  .  Not  that  I 
fail  to  see  that  all  these  nobles,  and  especially  these  dukes  that  I  create 
and  upon  whom  I  bestow  such  enormous  dotations,  are  going  to  become 
somewhat  independent  of  me.  Decorated  and  wealthy,  they  will  attempt 
to  escape  my  grasp  and  probably  assume  what  they  will  call  the  spirit 
befitting  their  rank.  Still  they  will  not  run  so  fast  but  that  I  shall  know 
how  to  come  up  with  them  well  enough."  In  later  years,  however,  after 
his  fall,  he  did  characterize  it  as  a  mistake  after  all  to  have  made  his 


400  Affairs  in   France  [I807 

But  these  distinctions  accorded  to  civil  functionaries  were  trifling 
as  compared  with  those  which  Napoleon  allotted  to  his  com- 
panions-in-arms.  Now  began  the  bestowal  of  the  long  list  of 
Italian  titles  upon  his  marshals:  Soult  became  Duke  of  Dal- 
matia;  Mortier,  Duke  of  Treviso,  Savary,  Duke  of  Rovigo; 
Bessieres,  Duke  of  Istria;  Duroc,  of  Friuli;  Victor,  of  Belluno; 
Moncey,  of  Conegliano;  Clarke,  of  Feltre;  Caulaincourt,  of 
Vlcenza;  Massena,  of  Rivoli;  Lannes,  of  Montebello;  Mar- 
mont,  of  Ragusa;  Oudinot,  of  Reggio;  Macdonald,  of  Taranto; 
Augereau,  of  Castighone;  Bernadotte,  Prince  of  Ponte  Corvo; 
Davout,  Ney,  and  Lefebvre  had  acquired  ducal  titles  in  Germany: 
those  of  Auerstadt,  Elchingen,  and  Danzig  respectively;  while 
Berthier  had  secured  for  himself  the  principality  of  Neufcha- 
tel.*  With  these  titles  were  presented  rich  estates  from  the 
domains  which  the  Emperor  had  reserved  to  himself  from  Poland, 
Italy,  and  Germany,  and  which  were  to  be  hereditary  with  the 
titles  according  to  the  laws  of  primogeniture.  For  the  time 
being  the  Emperor  dispensed  11,000,000  francs  among  these 
favourites,  one  half  in  cash  and  the  rest  in  securities.  Berthier 
was  the  recipient  of  a  milhon,  while  Ney,  Davout,  Soult,  and 
Bessieres  each  received  600,000  francs,  Massena,  Augereau,  Ber- 
nadotte, Mortier,  and  Victor  each  400,000,  and  the  others  200,000 
francs.f     Provision  was  further  made  for  the  entire  victorious 

instruments  independent  through  wealth.  Berthier,  the  one  whom  he 
had  endowed  the  most  splendidly  of  all,  was  the  first  to  desert  him. 

*  Besides  these  military  dukes  there  were  also  created  a  certain  number 
from  amongst  the  civilians:  Cambac^res  was  made  Duke  of  Parma; 
Maret,  of  Bassano;  Lebrun,  of  Piacenza;  Fouch^,  of  Otranto;  and  Cham- 
pagny,  of  Cadore. 

t  The  incomes  of  the  marshals  were  some  years  later  increased  to  a 
considerable  extent,  so  that  Berthier,  for  instance,  as  Prince  of  Neufchatel, 
Vice-Constable,  Marshal,  and  Grand  Himtsman,  was  annually  in  receipt 
of  1,.3.').'),000  francs;  Davout,  Duke  of  Auerstadt,  and  Prince  of  Eckmiihl, 
of  910,000  francs;  Ney,  Duke  of  Elchingen,  and  after  1812  Prince  of 
Moskowa,  of  728,000  francs;  Mass6na,  Duke  of  Rivoli,  and  after  1809 
Prince  of  Esslingen,  of  683,000  francs  As  for  the  civilians,  under 
the  Empire  the  emoluments  of  the  oflice  of  Minister  averaged  not  less 
than  200,000  francs,  while  the  Minister  of  Foreign  AfTairs  received  even 
more.     Ambassadors,  who  were  called   upon  to  represent  the  power  of 


^T.  38]  Rewards   to   the  Army  401 

army.  Of  the  18,000,000  francs  which  was  employed  for  this 
purpose  12,000,000  fell  to  the  rank  and  file,  and  was  so  appor- 
tioned that  the  wounded  received  a  triple  share,  the  remain- 
ing 6,000,000  being  distributed  among  the  officers.  Such  sol- 
diers as  had  lost  a  limb  in  the  campaign  were  allowed  pensions 
of  500  francs,  while  officers,  commissioned  and  non-commis- 
sioned, who  had  particularly  distinguished  themselves  were 
granted  annuities  up  to  10,000  francs.  Naturally  the  object  of 
all  this  was  but  to  make  the  more  certain  the  loyalty  of  the 
army  the  less  confident  the  Emperor  became  of  his  grasp  upon 
the  sympathies  of  the  other  part  of  the  French  people.  It  had 
been,  moreover,  for  a  long  time  his  endeavour  to  denationalize 
the  army  as  far  as  possible,  so  that  it  should  not  cease  to  serve 
his  international  schemes.  On  this  account  also — and  not  alone 
for  reasons  of  finance  and  foreign  politics — did  he  leave  the 
Grand  Army  in  Germany  and  Poland,  which  countries  it  was 
to  evacute  only  when  Prussia  should  have  paid  off  the  exorbi- 
tant sum  which  he  had  demanded  as  war-indemnity.  Only 
the  Guard  had  been  allowed  to  return  home,  where  it  had  been 
given  strict  orders  to  hold  itself  to  the  greatest  possible  extent 
aloof  from  civil  hfe. 

In  his  care  for  the  material  interests  of  the  French,  for  their 
thirst  for  glory,  and  for  their  vanity,  Napoleon  felt  that  he  had 
done  enough  for  this  country  of  France  which  he  had  once  cyni- 
cally called  his  mistress  and  which  was  so  devoted  that  she  was 
ready  to  sacrifice  for  him  her  treasures  and  her  blood.  He  still 
held  firmly  to  his  idea  that  liberty  was  no  requisite  of  the  com- 
mon people,  but  only  a  pretence  of  those  whom  he  disdainfully 
styled  "  Ideologists,"  upon  whose  shoulders  he  laid  the  blame  of 
the  anarchy  of  the  Revolution,  and  against  whose  influence  upon 
pubhc  opinion  he  waged  war  with  all  his  force.  Hence  arose  his 
measures  against  the  press,  against  newspapers  and  books,  which 
became  from  year  to  year  more  severe;  hence  his  sohcitude  to 

the  Emperor  in  the  most  splendid  manner  at  foreign  courts,  were  furnished 
with  a  salary  more  than  sufficient,  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  Caulain- 
court,  who  was  now  sent  to  Russia  with  an  annual  stipend  of  from  700,000 
to  800,000  francs. 


402  Affairs  in  France  [1807 

withhold  from  all  publicity  the  discussions  of  his  laws,  hence  his 
attempts  against  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  which  could 
provide  a  refuge  to  the  opponents  of  his  system  of  compulsory 
benefits,  and  hence  also  his  plan  for  protecting  the  coming 
generation  from  all  temptations  of  unrestricted  mental  activity 
by  means  of  a  correct  and  uniform  method  of  instruction.  In  all 
of  these  directions  he  displayed  an  indefatigable  zeal  which  must 
not  be  passed  over  without  comment  in  an  historical  sketch. 

Mention  has  already  been  made  of  Napoleon's  antipathy  to 
Madame  de  Stael,  whom  he  compelled  to  leave  France  and  event- 
ually sentenced  to  perpetual  banishment  "because,"  as  he  inti- 
mated, "she  inspired  thought  in  people  who  had  never  taken  it 
into  their  heads  to  think  before  or  who  had  forgotten  how."  He 
wrote  from  Finkenstein  to  Fouch^  that,  much  to  his  satisfaction, 
she  was  no  longer  talked  about.*  Chateaubriand,  who,  in  1802, 
had  dedicated  his  ' '  Genie  de  Christianisme  "  to  the  ' '  Restorer 
of  Religion,"  had  brought  himself  into  disfavour  with  the  Em- 
peror by  an  adverse  criticism  of  the  d'Enghien  episode  and  was 
likewise  soon  after  obhged  to  leave  his  native  country  because  his 
influence  in  the  salons  of  the  opposition  party  in  Paris  seemed 
dangerous.  An  article  on  Spain  wliich  he  wrote  in  the  "Mer- 
cure  de  France"  shortly  before  Napoleon's  return  in  1807,  and 
which  contained  allusions  not  to  be  misunderstood,  had  the  fur- 
ther result  of  depriving  him  of  his  property.  A  still  harder  fate 
would  have  been  his  but  for  the  friendship  of  Fontanes,  who, 
like  many  another,  had  gladly  put  his  talents  at  the  service 
of  the  all-powerful  Emperor.  Jacques  Delille,  the  author  of 
"I'Homme  des  Champs"  and  " rimagination "  and  the  trans- 
lator of  the  iEneid,  escaped  unscathed  only  on  account  of  the 
high  esteem  in  which  he  was  held  and  the  uncensurable  nature 
of  the  matter  of  which  he  treated.  His  example  was  followed 
by  a  number  of  poets  who  carefully  avoided  every  political  and 
social  problem  and  confined  themselves  to  subjects  of  an  indif- 

♦  Madame  de  R^camier  and  Madame  de  Chevreuse  shared  the  same 
fate  as  Madame  de  Stael.  Even  when  stricken  with  mortal  illness  Madame 
de  Chevreuse  was  not  allowed  to  return  to  Paris  that  she  might  consult 
her  physician,  and  died  in  exile. 


JErr.zs]         The  Censureship  of  Literature  403 

ferent  or  inferior  order  which,  as  if  in  compcnBation,  they 
treated  in  a  masterly  way,  and  it  is  perhaps  safe  to  ascribe  in 
some  measure  at  least  to  that  time  of  restricted  thought  and 
hampered  imagination  the  high  value  already  attached  in 
France  to  the  art  of  pleasing  expression  and  perfection  of  form 
in  and  for  itself.  Upon  the  stage,  to  which  the  Emperor  devoted 
special  attention,  he  wished  to  see  no  subjects  presented  which 
dealt  with  '•  times  too  near  the  present";  they  must  in  any  case 
belong  to  a  period  before  Henri  IV.,  for  which  popular  character 
he  entertained  the  most  decided  aversion.  "I  see,"  said  he  one 
day,  "  that  you  are  playing  a  tragedy  of  Henri  IV.  That  period 
is  not  yet  distant  enough  to  fail  to  awaken  the  passions.  What 
the  stage  requires  is  antiquity."  Not  until  Mozart's  "  Don 
Juan  "  had  been  demonstrated  to  him  to  be  not  dangerous  to 
"I'esprit  pubhc"  could  authorization  be  obtained  for  its  produc- 
tion. Drama  and  comedy  casting  reflections  upon  modem 
life  were  in  like  manner  interdicted,  ''  because,"  as  Madame 
de  Remusat  explains, ' '  no  one  dared  to  exhibit  upon  the  boards 
the  weaknesses  and  foibles  of  the  various  classes  of  society  when 
all  society  had  been  renewed  by  Bonaparte,  whose  work  had  to 
be  respected." 

With  such  a  fate  for  "  belles-lettres  "  no  one  could  doubt  as 
to  what  would  be  that  of  the  daily  press.  The  beginnings  of 
ne^\'spaper  censorship  imder  the  Consulate  have  already  been 
considered.  Under  the  Empire  there  remained  at  the  end  of  a 
short  time  but  four  independent  papers  in  Paris:  the  "  Citoyen 
Frangais,"  the  "  Mercure  de  France,"  the  "  Journal  des  Debats," 
and  the  "  Publiciste."  Even  the  names  were  displeasing  to 
the  Emperor,  who  wanted  nothing  to  do  with  "  Citoyens  "  and 
"  Debats,"  and,  in  fact,  the  "  Gtoyen  "  was  compelled  to  change 
its  appellation  to  "  Courrier  Frangais, "  while  the  ''Journal  des 
Debats"  had  to  become  the  ''Journal  de  I'Empire."  These 
papers  stood  m  constant  danger  of  being  suppressed.  Wlien, 
in  1805,  they  ventured  upon  one  occasion  to  make  some  ob- 
servations in  regard  to  the  luxury  displayed  at  court,  the  editore 
were  infonncd  "  that  the  Revolutionary  times  were  past  and 
over  and  that  there  now  remained  but  a  single  party  in  France, 


404  Affairs  in  France  [I807 

which  would  never  suffer  the  newspapers  to  say  or  do  anything 
contrary  to  its  mterests."  A  year  later  Napoleon  wrote  to 
Talleyrand:  "It  is  my  intention  to  have  the  pohtical  articles 
for  the  '  Moniteur '  written  by  officials  in  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
after  I  have  observed  for  a  month  how  these  are  done  I  shall 
forbid  the  other  newspapers  to  discuss  polities  otherwise  than 
in  imitation  of  the  articles  in  the  'Moniteur.'"  But  when,  as  a 
result  of  these  restrictions,  the  contents  of  the  Paris  papers  be- 
came destitute  of  force  or  meaning  he  was  no  better  satisfied 
than  before.     He  wanted  to  be  extolled. 

And  just  as  he  had  prohibited  all  critical  discussion  of  his 
government  in  hterature  and  periodical  pubUcations  did  he 
want  to  impose  silence  also  in  the  Tribunate,  the  one  body  to 
which  the  right  of  discussion  still  legally  remained  as  provided 
for  in  the  Constitution.  He  determined  to  make  this  impossible 
even  behind  closed  doors.  Accordingly  at  its  last  session  in 
December,  1807,  a  decree  of  the  Senate  was  submitted  to  the 
"  Corps  Legislatif  "  pronouncing  the  dissolution  of  the  Tribunate, 
the  members  of  which  were  appointed  to  office  among  the  vari- 
ous sections  of  the  "Corps  Legislatif,"  while  its  president  was 
called  to  the  Senate,  and,  further,  fixing  the  age  fimit  for  mem- 
bership in  the  "  Corps  Legislatif"  at  forty  years.  Napoleon,  who 
was  himself  at  that  time  but  thirty-eight,  knew  full  well  how 
much  youth  was  disposed  to  be  precipitate  in  dealing  with  po- 
litical projects,  and  wished  to  see  only  sedate  and  tranquilly- 
disposed  men  in  this  body,  which  for  appearance*  sake  was  still 
called  legislative,  but  was  such  only  in  name.  His  will  alone 
gave  laws  to  France,  all  else  was  mere  unessential  form.  Hence 
he  was  able  to  issue  a  decree  by  which  he  evaded  the  irremovability 
of  judges,  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution,  by  requiring  every 
judge  to  pass  through  a  period  of  five  years'  probation  before 
he  could  be  recognized  as  definitely  irremovable,  the  final  de- 
cision to  come  from  a  commission  of  ten  senators  appointed 
by  the  Emperor.  Hence  it  was,  also,  that  imprisonment  for 
political  offenders  again  became  a  possibility.  And  every- 
where the  Senate  co-operated  with  obsequious  assiduity,  heed- 
less   of   the    concealed    aversion    of   unprejudiced    minds    for 


iKT.  38]  A  System   of  Repression  405 

Buch  boundless  servility.  Wliat  mattered  it  to  the  senators 
that  their  conduct  was  regarded  with  contempt  as  expressed, 
for  instance,  by  Joseph  Ch^nier  in  his  "Tiberius"  where,  speak- 
ing of  the  Roman  senators,  he  says : 

"They  daily  seek  their  own  opinion  in  mine  eyes. 
Reserving  to  the  wretched  their  hireUng  insolence, 
Flattering  in  their  discourse,  in  their  very  silence  cringing. 
Fearing  to  think,  to  speak,  perform  an  act. 
'Tis  I  must  blush  for  them,  since  e'en  to  blush 
They  lack  the  courage "  ? 

But  Ch4nier  was  sufficiently  mindful  of  his  own  advantage 
to  keep  his  '•Tiberius"  secure  in  his  own  possession  under  lock 
and  key.  while  his  "  Cyrus"  eulogized  the  Emperor.  And  what 
mattered  it  that  the  words  "despotism"  and  "tyranny"  were 
whispered  about?  They  were  only  whispered,  and  for  that 
very  reason  could  not  be  far-reaching  in  their  effect.  As  one 
day  Suard,  one  of  the  most  respected  publicists,  was  speak- 
ing to  Napoleon  in  terms  of  admiration  regarding  Tacitus  and 
his  descriptions  of  the  Roman  emperors,  his  Majesty  replied: 
"  Excellent,  but  he  ought  to  make  clear  to  us  how  it  was  that 
the  Roman  people  tolerated  and  loved  even  the  bad  emperors. 
That  is  the  point  upon  which  it  was  of  consequence  to  inform 
posterity."  And  here  he  hinted  at  the  real  foundation  of  his 
own  power,  for  he  was  perfectly  aware  that  the  moment  was 
not  yet  come  when  France  could  get  on  without  him.  He  made 
frequent  comparisons  of  his  own  government  with  that  of  the 
Roman  emperors,  especially  with  that  of  Diocletian.  "You  who 
are  so  well  acquainted  with  history,"  said  he  to  Narbonne  in 
1814,  "are  you  not  struck  by  the  points  of  resemblance  be- 
tween my  government  and  that  of  Diocletian,  by  this  close- 
woven  net  which  I  spread  to  such  a  distance,  by  these  ubiquitous 
eyes  of  the  Emperor,  and  by  this  civil  authority  which  I  have 
known  how  to  maintain  in  all  its  force  in  an  Empire  absorbed 
in  war?  I  have  many  traits  in  common  with  Diocletian  from 
Egypt  to  Illyria,  only  I  neither  persecute  the  Christians  nor 
abdicate  the  imperial  throne."  *    Madame  de  Remusat  lamented 

*  Villemain,  Souvenirs,  p.  177. 


4o6  Affairs  in  France  [i807 

to  Talleyrand  upon  one  occasion  at  about  this  time  that,  al- 
though she  had  no  choice  but  to  remain  at  the  French  court, 
she  could  not  help  hating  the  Emperor  for  his  evil  qualities, — 
for  he  sowed  discord  between  friends  and  between  man  and 
wife,  and  made  the  most  of  the  weaknesses  of  his  attendants, 
so  that  he  might  govern  them,  thus  divided,  all  the  more  surely. 
To  this  repUed  the  diplomat,  who  was  also  far  from  being  kindly 
disposed  toward  Napoleon:  ''Child  that  you  are,  why  is  it 
that  you  are  always  putting  your  heart  in  all  that  you  do? 
Trust  me,  do  not  compromise  it  by  feeling  any  attachment  for 
that  man,  but  be  assured  that,  with  all  his  faults,  he  is  still  very 
necessary  to  France,  which  he  knows  how  to  uphold  and  to  this 
object  each  of  us  ought  to  contribute  all  in  our  power.  ..." 
Therein  lay  the  secret  of  the  Emperor. 

With  such  precautions,  then,  Napoleon  might  rest  content 
that  not  so  much  as  a  breath  of  adverse  criticism  would  reach 
the  mass  of  the  French  people  to  disturb  the  respect  and  esteem 
with  which  it  regarded  his  government.  But  besides  this  he 
had  for  a  long  time  cherished  the  idea  of  protecting  the  rising 
generation  from  the  outset  against  any  assaults  of  that  kind  by 
bringing  them  up  to  believe  in  imperialism,  much  as  the  Jesuit 
schools  trained  its  disciples  to  ultramontanism.  Beginnings 
toward  the  establishment  of  such  a  system  had  already  been 
made  in  the  time  of  the  Consulate  and  have  already  been 
alluded  to;  they  were  now  completed  by  the  institution  of  the 
"University."  A  special  circumstance  added  its  weight  to  the 
furtherance  of  this  project.  'In  1804  the  great  diocesan  semi- 
naries had  been  founded  in  conformity  with  the  stipulations  of 
the  Concordat.  Only  a  short  time  afterwards  the  clergy  had 
associated  with  them  the  so-called  "little  seminaries,"  which, 
like  the  state  "lyc^es,"  or  colleges,  were  preparatory  to  the 
higher  professional  studies.  These  ecclesiastical  schools,  like 
the  secondary  schools  of  the  state,  were  open  to  all  and  were 
the  better  attended  as  the  instructors  made  the  most  of  their 
opportunities  for  finding  fault  with  the  methods  of  teaching  as 
well  as  tlie  morals  of  the  imperial  institutions.  But  criticism 
wa.s  not  to  be  tolerated  by  Napoleon,  who  now  proposed  to  have 


^T.  38]  The   Imperial   University  407 

the  entire  administrative  organization  regarded  as  his  personal 
achievement,  and  a  plan  was  maturing  in  his  mind  for  ridding 
himself  with  the  least  possible  delay  of  this  competition  in  the 
education  of  the  French  youth.  On  May  10th,  1806,  he  issued 
a  decree  that  a  corporation  should  be  established  under  the 
name  of  the  "Imperial  University,"  to  which  should  be  given 
exclusive  charge  of  public  instruction  and  the  whole  educational 
system.  In  the  report  made  by  Fourcroy,  the  Director  of  the 
Section  of  Instruction,  occurred  this  statement:  "His  Majesty 
desires  a  corporation  whose  teachings  are  not  exposed  to  every 
fever  of  fashion,  which  shall  keep  on  when  the  government  rests 
from  its  labours,  and  of  which  the  management  and  the  regula- 
tions shall  be  so  national  in  character  that  none  will  inconsid- 
erately lay  hands  upon  it  to  interfere  in  its  workings.  If  this 
hope  should  be  realized  His  Majesty  expects  to  find  in  this 
corporation  a  guarantee  against  the  pernicious  theories  of 
universal  revolution.  His  Majesty  proposes  to  carry  out  in  a 
state  containing  40,000,000  inhabitants  all  that  has  been  en- 
joyed by  Sparta  and  Athens  and  what  the  religious  orders  have 
striven  with  but  imperfect  success  to  attain."  On  March  17th, 
1808,  this  statute,  having  been  elaborated,  was  promulgated 
without  authorization  of  the  legislature.  From  this  time  the 
university  included  all  branches  of  pubUc  instruction  now  mon- 
opolized by  the  state — all  institutions  of  learning  from  the 
primary  school  up  to  the  faculties  of  the  learned  professions.* 
It  was  provided  with  its  own  budget  in  the  form  of  an  endow- 
ment of  400,000,000  francs  in  government  stocks,  and  this 
was  to  be  separate  from  the  state  budget,  "so  that  education 
might  not  have  to  suffer  under  the  temporary  distresses  of  state 
finances."  At  the  head  of  the  corporation,  formed  of  the  entire 
scholastic  profession  of  France,  there  stood  a  Grand  Master 
appointed  by  the  Emperor,  and  with  him  a  Chancellor  and  a 
Treasurer,  besides  a  University  Council  consisting  of  thirty 
members,  of  which  ten  were  appointed  by  the  Emperor  for  hfe 

*  To  this  rule  there  were  excepted  only  certain  higher  technical  schools, 
such  as  the  "Ecole  polytechnique,"  which  was  organized  on  a  niilitary 
basis,  the  scientific  schools,  and  the  great  ecclesiastical  seminaries. 


4o8  Affairs  in  France  [i807 

and  the  remaining  twenty  by  the  Grand  Master  for  a  year's 
time.  This  Council  was  to  draw  up  the  regulations  for  the  schools, 
to  decide  upon  text-books  and  methods  of  instruction,  and  to 
exercise  disciplinary  power  over  the  members  of  the  University, 
that  is,  over  the  whole  body  of  instructors  in  France.  A  part 
of  this  number — for  instance,  the  professors  at  the  "lycees" — 
had  to  pledge  themselves  to  celibacy.  All  were  free  from  the 
performance  of  military  service.  The  teachers  of  the  secondary 
schools  were  trained  for  their  calling  in  the  "Ecole  Normale." 
Those  particularly  distinguishing  themselves  there  were  awarded 
— aside  from  promotion — titles  of  honour  by  the  Grand  Master 
and  became  titular  officers  of  the  University.  The  sphere  of 
instruction  throughout  the  whole  country  was  divided  up  into 
districts  called  "Academies,"  each  presided  over  by  a  Rector 
and  an  Academic  Council  resembling  the  Grand  Master  and 
Council  of  the  University.*  The  whole  system  of  public  in- 
struction was  then  henceforth  as  strictly  centralized  and  ruled 
with  the  same  spirit  of  absolutism  as  the  other  departments  of 
government.  The  institution  has  since  that  time  received  high 
commendation  and  has  been  condemned  with  equal  vigour. 
One  thing  is  certainly  true,  that  young  men  attending  the 
"lycees"  learned  more  than  the  sons  of  the  aristocratic  families 
who  were  taught  at  home.  The  one  fault  of  the  system  lay  in 
the  fact  that  the  uniformity  of  the  requirements  left  all  too  little 
scope  for  originality  on  the  part  of  the  teacher,  and,  if  one  of 
the  principal  tasks  of  education  consists  in  the  development 
and  mental  stimulation  of  individual  talents  so  that  these  may 
at  some  future  time  be  of  the  greatest  possible  service  to  the 
general  good,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  herein  the  system  was 
more  than  a  failure,  for  the  exact  contrary  was  the  result  attained 

*  In  establishing  the  University  Napoleon  had  in  mind  only  the 
instruction  of  boys.  He  would  not  tolerate  the  idea  of  public  schools  for 
girls.  "I  do  not  think  that  there  is  any  occasion  for  considering  the 
method  of  instruction  for  girls,"  was  his  reply  when  his  attention  was 
called  to  this  deficiency;  "they  cannot  be  better  brought  up  than  by 
their  mothers;  puljlic  education  is  not  suitable  for  th{>in,  since  they  are 
not  called  upon  to  take  part  in  public  life."  It  was  evident  that  Madame 
de  Stael  was  not  to  be  put  out  of  his  mind. 


^T.  38]  The   Catechism   of  Loyalty  409 

and  probably  intended;  for  the  ultimate  purpose  of  this  insti- 
tution was  after  all,  like  the  others,  only  to  subserve  the  Em- 
peror's own  system.  But  even  if  the  national  government  had 
relinquished  the  direction  of  education  to  tiie  corporation,  and 
thus  relieved  itself  of  the  burden,  it  still  retained  closely  within 
its  grasp  the  superintendence  and  control  over  the  same.  The 
decisions  of  the  Grand  Master  had  to  be  submitted  first  of  all 
to  the  judgment  of  the  Council  of  State,  which  had  power  to 
annul  them,  and  in  the  departments  the  schools  were  visited 
by  the  prefects,  who  reported  upon  them  to  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  In  fact  the  minister  came  forward  to  provide  the 
very  first  text-book  for  the  University:  the  catechism  which 
had  been  brought  to  completion  in  1806  with  the  concurrence  of 
the  Cardinal  Legate  Caprara,  whom  Napoleon  had  repeatedly 
assisted  out  of  financial  straits.  In  this  catechism  the  political 
creed  of  the  rising  generation  in  France  was  thus  formulated: 
"We  owe  to  our  Emperor  Napoleon  I.  love,  respect,  obedience, 
fidelity,  military  service,  tributes  decreed  for  the  defence  of  the 
Empire  and  of  his  throne;  we  owe  to  him  also  ferv-ent  prayers 
for  his  safety  and  for  the  prosperity  of  the  state,  both  spiritual 
and  material.  We  are  under  obligations  to  perform  all  of  these 
duties  toward  him  because  God  has  erouTied  him  with  manifold 
gifts  in  war  as  in  peace,  establishing  him  as  our  sovereign,  the 
instrument  of  His  power,  and  giving  him  His  own  likeness  upon 
earth.  To  honour  and  serve  our  Emperor  is  to  honour  and 
serve  God  Himself,  and  this  is  especially  our  duty  because  he  it 
is  whom  God  the  Most  High  hath  raised  up  in  troublous  times 
to  re-establish  public  worship  in  the  holy  religion  of  our  fathers 
and  to  be  its  protector.  He  it  is  who  by  his  profomid  and  ener- 
getic w'isdom  has  brought  back  and  maintained  public  order, 
who  has  defended  the  state  with  his  powerful  arm,  and  who  has 
become  the  anointed  of  the  Lord  through  consecration  at  the 
hands  of  the  Pope,  the  sovereign  pontiff  of  the  Church  Universal." 
To  the  question  what  was  to  be  thought  of  those  who  should 
fail  to  perform  their  obligations  toward  the  Emperor,  the  cate- 
chism made  answer:  "According  to  St.  Paul  they  would  sin 
against  the  ordinances  of  God  Himself  and  draw  down  upon 
themselves  eternal  damnation." 


41  o  Affairs  in  France  Liso? 

That  was  surely  no  small  measure  of  success  to  have  been 
attained  by  the  famishing  lieutenant  of  Valence,  to  see  himself 
revered  by  the  most  cultured  nation  in  the  world  as  "the  like- 
ness of  God  upon  earth."  And  yet  this  was  but  a  trifle  when 
compared  with  his  inordinate  ambition.  The  bounds  of  that 
state  had  long  been  to  him  too  restricted,  and  to  walk  the  earth 
simply  as  the  image  of  deity  was,  after  all,  not  just  to  his  mind. 
On  the  day  of  his  coronation  as  Emperor,  in  December,  1804,  he 
had  said  to  Decres,  the  Minister  of  the  Navy,  that  he  had  been 
born  too  late  into  the  world,  in  which  there  was  no  longer 
anything  great  to  be  accomplished;  and  when  Decres  replied 
that  he  ought  to  be  satisfied,  he  rejoined:  "My  record  has  been 
brilliant,  I  acknowledge,  and  I  have  had  an  excellent  career. 
But  how  different  from  ancient  times!  Take  Alexander,  for 
instance;  after  having  conquered  Asia  he  announced  himself 
to  the  people  to  be  the  son  of  Jupiter,  and,  with  the  exception 
of  his  mother,  Olympias,  who  was  in  a  position  to  know,  and  of 
Aristotle  and  a  few  Athenian  pedants,  he  was  believed  by  the 
entire  Orient.  Well,  then,  take  my  case!  If  I  were  to  announce 
myself  to-day  to  be  the  son  of  the  Everlasting  Father,  if  I  were 
to  declare  that  I  was  going  to  return  thanks  to  Him  by  virtue 
of  that  fact,  there  isn't  a  fish-wife  who  would  not  jeer  at  me  as  I 
passed!  The  people  are  far  too  much  enlightened;  there  is 
nothing  great  left  to  be  done."     In  short,  he  was  not  satisfied. 

No  one  realized  this  more  unmistakably  than  those  imme- 
diately about  him.  From  the  Empress  down  to  the  meanest 
lackey  the  entire  court  had  to  suffer  from  this  perpetual  dissat- 
isfaction. Josephine,  who  well  remembered  how  the  young 
general  had  at  one  time  regarded  the  union  with  herself  as  a 
stroke  of  fortune,  had  now  sunk  far  beneath  his  level  and  trem- 
bled at  the  prospect  of  divorce,  in  regard  to  which  Napoleon  now 
first  began  to  make  intimations.  Not  that  he  desired  a  sepa- 
ration from  the  companion  in  life  to  whom  he  had  become 
accustomed;  it  was  only  consideration  for  the  inheritance  of 
his  crown  which  brought  the  idea  more  than  formerly  to  mind. 
For  Louis's  son,  the  little  Napoleon,  whom  the  Emperor  had 
once  had  thoughts  of  adopting,  and  who  in  gossip  was  spoken 


^T.  38]       Changes  in  Napoleon's  Manner         411 

of  as  his  OUT!  child,  had  died  during  the  last  campaign,  while 
his  httle  brother  was  only  an  infant  two  years  of  age  and  of  very 
delicate  constitution.*  Moreover,  the  alhance  with  Russia  had 
suggested  to  him  the  idea  of  a  union  vdih  the  house  of  the  Czars 
which  should  be  "suitable  to  his  rank";  at  least  it  is  claimed 
that  such  had  been  under  discussion  even  in  Tilsit.  Under  such 
circumstances  it  was  not  easy  for  Josephine  to  assert  her  posi- 
tion. She  was  all  submissiveness  and  pliant  devotion,  addressed 
the  Emperor  even  in  the  most  confidential  intercourse  only  as 
"Your  Majesty,"  having  long  ceased  to  use  the  familiar  "thou" 
in  speaking  to  him,  squandered,  as  she  had  been  told  to  do,  her 
600,000  francs,  and  even  more  of  pin-money,  anxiously  avoided 
every  occasion  in  which  she  might  be  in  the  way  of  her  tyrannical 
lord,  and  remained  at  all  times  equally  gracious,  equally  amiable, 
equally  insignificant.  To  the  whole  court  she  set  an  example 
of  anxious  foreboding,  and  her  apprehension  at  her  husband's 
return  as  a  victor  was  characteristic,  "for,"  said  she,  "the  Em- 
peror is  so  prosperous  that  he  \\'ill  surely  have  much  fault  to  find." 
And  indeed  the  whole  court  was  characterized  by  uneasi- 
ness and  awe.  Since  the  war  of  1805  Napoleon  was  a  changed 
man  in  one  respect,  inasmuch  as  he  now  carefully  avoided  all 
famiUarity  with  any  one,  surrounded  himself  with  great  cere- 
mony, and,  if  he  allowed  himself  to  be  misled  for  a  moment  into 
using  a  tone  of  confidential  and  friendly  feeling,  at  once  effaced 
its  impression  by  a  few  curt  words  addressed  as  to  an  inferior. 
No  one  of  his  brothers  was  allowed  to  seat  himself  in  his  presence, 
no  one  of  them  might  venture  to  direct  a  word  to  him  until 
spoken  to,  no  one  of  them  continued  to  use  "thou "  in  addressing 
him.  Frequently  on  reception  evenings  there  would  be  many 
more  than  a  hundred  persons  gathered  together,  of  whom  not 
one  dared  to  utter  a  word,  all  awaiting  speechless  the  appear- 
ance of  His  Majesty,  And  in  case  the  Emperor  was  then  in 
ill-humour  on  account  of  the  msolent  Enghsh  papers,  which 
were  severe  enough  in  their  usage  of  "  General  Bonaparte,"  the 
entire  court  was  made  to  feel  the  consequences.    Then  he  cast 

*  The  third  son  of  Queen  Hortense,  the  future  Emperor  Napoleon  III., 
was  in  1807  j'et  unborn. 


412  Affairs  in   France  [1807 

off  all  semblance  of  courtesy;  he  would  say,  for  instance,  to  a 
lady  after  she  had  stated  her  name :  "  O  Heavens !  I  had  been 
told  that  you  were  pretty,"  or  to  an  old  man:  ''You  have  not 
much  longer  to  live,"  and  other  Uke  urbanities.  The  melan- 
choly dreaminess  which  had  characterized  him  at  the  time  of 
the  Consulate  had  thus  given  place  to  almost  constant  morose- 
ness,  and  it  became  more  and  more  difficult  to  wait  upon  him. 
His  manner  of  Ufe  was  irregular.  He  would  sometimes  keep  his 
Council  in  session  about  him  until  far  into  the  night  without 
being  himself  in  the  least  wearied  thereby.  And  again,  as  fre- 
quently occurred,  he  would  rise  in  the  middle  of  the  night  in 
order  to  work,  when  he  would  dictate  to  his  secretaries  with 
such  rapidity  that  his  words  could  be  followed  only  with  a  sort 
of  short-hand;  or  else  he  would  remain  for  hours  in  the  bath,  a 
habit  he  had  acquired  at  the  recommendation  of  his  physician- 
in-ordinary,  Corvisart,  who  was  of  opinion  that  it  would  tend  to 
quiet  his  nerves.  But  in  this  he  could  scarcely  be  said  to  have 
been  successful;  his  nervous  irritabihty  was  constantly  upon 
the  increase,  sometimes  taking  the  form  of  convulsive  weeping. 
The  same  man  who  had  felt  in  perfect  health  in  the  midst  of  the 
fatigues  and  cares  of  the  campaign  and  who  did  not  move  so 
much  as  an  eyelash  even  at  the  most  critical  moments  of  a 
battle,  could  fly  into  a  rage  at  the  most  trifling  discomfort  in 
his  own  palace.  Many  a  garment  did  he  tear  to  pieces  in  his 
impatience  because  it  incommoded  him  even  in  the  slightest 
possible  degree,  and  it  was  understood  among  his  attendants  that 
it  was  necessary  to  supply  state  apparel  which  should  be  exactly 
fitting.  For  this  reason  he  commonly  presented  rather  a  slovenly 
appearance,  and,  now  that  he  had  grown  corpulent  during  the 
last  few  years,  he  made  in  walk  and  bearing  anything  but  a 
majestic  impression. 

But  BO  much  the  more  splendid  became  the  display  of  the 
court  about  him.  Upon  his  return  to  Paris  he  had  reproached 
Fouch^,  his  Minister  of  Police,  the  "Jacobin  grown  wealthy,"  as 
he  called  him,  with  not  having  exercised  sufficient  surveillance 
over  the  aristocratic  salons  in  the  Faubourg  St.  Germain  with 
their  conversations  and  witticisms  all  savouring  of  the  opposi- 


I 


^T.  38]  Court   Life  413 

tion.  Fouch6  at  this  announced  to  the  high  nobility  that  they 
could  disarm  the  anger  of  the  potentate  only  by  making  ad- 
vances to  him,  and,  as  a  result,  a  large  number  of  men  of  an- 
cient lineage,  who  had  until  now  ranged  themselves  against 
the  government,  actually  had  themselves  presented  at  court, 
thus  enhancing  its  brilhancy  to  a  very  considerable  extent. 
Besides  these  additions  there  now  came  to  Paris  also  several  of 
the  Princes  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  either  to  render 
personal  homage  to  their  new  lord  or  to  beg  of  him  some  new 
favour.  One  of  the  two  Grand  Dukes  of  Mecklenburg  con- 
cluded that  the  surest  way  of  attaining  his  object  lay  in  paying 
conspicuous  attentions  to  the  Empress.  Dalberg  also  made  his 
appearance  to  solemnize  the  marriage  of  Jerome  to  the  Princess 
Katharina  of  Wiirtemberg  on  August  23d,  1807.  He  is  said  to 
have  stood  out  prominently  among  the  other  German  sovereigns 
as  the  only  one  with  whom  an  animated  conversation  could  be 
carried  on.  Those  veterans  who  had  aided  Napoleon  in  winnmg 
his  victories,  the  marshals,  were  also  for  the  most  part  at  court; 
not  in  uniform,  however,  but  in  state  dress;  not  as  warriors, 
but  as  chamberlains,  because  Napoleon  did  not  like  to  be  re- 
minded of  hours  of  more  familiar  intercourse  on  the  field  and 
of  many  a  sacrifice  which  had  been  made  for  him  there.  He 
spoke  of  them  also  sometimes  in  a  way  which  was  by  no  means 
flattering.  "  Davout,"  said  he,  "is  a  man  upon  whom  I  might 
bestow  honours,  but  he  will  never  know  how  to  wear  them  grace- 
fully"; Neyhad  ''an  ungrateful  and  factious  disposition";  Bes- 
sieres,  Oudinot,  and  Victor  were,  accordmg  to  him,  nothing 
more  than  "  mediocre."  Of  them  all  Lannes  alone  had  contin- 
ued to  address  him  as  "  thou,"  to  which  manner  of  speech  on 
his  part  Napoleon  came  at  last  to  be  reconciled,  for  he  was  in- 
dispensable. Besides  this  one  man  hardly  Soult  himself  had  the 
courage  to  express  an  opinion  differing  from  his  m  regard  to 
mihtary  matters.  Most  of  the  others  were  under  the  spell  of 
his  powerful  personaUty.  The  brutal  ^'andamme  admitted 
upon  one  occasion  that  he  began  to  tremble  when  he  came  into 
the  presence  of  "this  devil  of  a  man,"  and  that  Napoleon  could 
drive  him  through  the  eye  of  a  needle. 


414  Affairs  in  France  [I807 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  summer  of  1807  the  Court  was  at 
Fontainebleau.  There  were  organized  theatrical  performances 
by  the  best  actors  of  the  "  Comedie  Frangaise,"  concerts  by 
the  best  ItaUan  singers,  balls,  hunts  on  horseback,  and  other 
like  diversions.  But  there  was  not  much  pleasure  taken  in 
them.  Napoleon  was  occupied  with  affairs  of  business  here  as 
everywhere  else,  and  generally  out  of  temper.  "  I  pity  you," 
said  Talleyrand  to  Monsieur  de  Remusat,  the  Prefect  of  the 
Palace,  "  for  you  are  expected  to  amuse  the  imamusable."  The 
entire  court  suffered  imder  it.  The  formal  receptions  or  "cer- 
cles, "  where  no  one  spoke,  and  the  perpetual  tragedies — for 
comedy  was  prohibited — were  productive  of  tedium  and  weari- 
ness. This  fact  did  not  escape  the  Emperor,  who  asked  Talley- 
rand what  could  be  the  cause  of  it,  to  which  his  illustrious  diplo- 
mat replied:  "It  is  because  pleasure  is  not  forthcoming  at 
beat  of  drum,  and  you  always  look  as  if  saying  to  each  of 
us,  'Come,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  forward,  march!'"  Talley- 
rand might  venture  to  say  more  than  most  men.  Napoleon 
affirmed  that  he  was  the  only  person  with  whom  he  could  talk. 
There  was  one  thing,  however,  which  must  above  all  be  guarded 
against :  he  must  not  for  a  moment  think  himself  indispensable, 
as  had  seemingly  been  threatened  since  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 
For  that  reason  he  bestowed  upon  him  after  the  war  the  Grand 
Dignitary  office  of  Vice-Grand  Elector  with  a  munificent  in- 
come, but  deprived  him  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  his 
new  dignity  being  incompatible  with  the  old  office,  which  fell 
to  the  lot  of  Champagny,  who  had  been  until  now  Minister  of 
the  Interior.  Talleyrand  was,  however,  to  continue  his  per- 
manent adviser,  and  at  Fontainebleau  he  was  indeed  to 
be  seen  every  evening  limping  into  the  Emperor's  cabinet, 
whence  he  would  not  again  appear  until  after  long  hours  had 
elapsed. 

And,  in  fact,  matter  enough  did  the  times  provide  for  their 
discussions. 

Suddenly,  in  the  midst  of  the  festivities  at  Fontainebleau, 
arrived  tidings  which  amazed  and  terrified  the  world  at  large, 
but  which  to  Napoleon  and  his  plans  were  of  very  special  sig- 


^T.  38]       England  Seizes  the  Danish  Fleet  415 

nificance:  England  had  sent  a  fleet  with  an  expeditionary 
corps  to  surprise  and  attack  Denmark,  which  was  a  neutral 
power;  Copenhagen  had  been  bombarded  for  three  days,  from 
the  2d  to  the  5th  of  September,  1807,  and  the  Danish  fleet  there 
stationed  carried  off.  Such  an  abrupt  and  swiftly-executed 
act  on  the  part  of  the  ever-dilatory  British  had  been  anticipated 
by  no  one,  not  even  by  Napoleon  himself.  It  developed  later, 
to  be  sure,  that  soon  after  the  conclusion  of  the  secret  Treaty 
of  AlUance  at  Tilsit  the  English  government  was,  through  an 
indiscretion,  made  acquainted  with  its  contents  and  had  gath- 
ered from  it  that  Denmark  was  soon  to  be  constrained  to  take 
part  in  the  Continental  Alliance  and,  with  her  fleet,  to  shut 
out  British  vessels  from  the  Baltic.  The  London  ministry  had 
now  warded  off  this  stroke  by  the  outrage  committed  upon 
Copenhagen.  For  although  the  energetic  Frederick,  Prince 
Regent  of  Denmark,  governing  in  place  of  the  dotard  Christian 
VII.,  now  concluded  an  alliance  with  France, — on  October  30th 
1807, — his  fleet  was  already  gone,  leaving  no  means  of  guard- 
ing the  passage  through  the  Sound  against  the  British. 

This  conduct  on  England's  part  furnished  the  solution  to 
one  of  the  two  great  questions  which  had  been  left  open  at  the 
time  of  the  Tilsit  Alliance:  there  was  no  longer  any  possibility 
of  an  amicable  arrangement  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
Continent  while  under  the  ascendency  of  Napoleon.  Russia 
was  obUged  to  acknowledge  as  hopeless  her  mission  to  mediate 
peace  and,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Alliance, 
to  declare  war  against  England.  And  this  she  proceeded  to 
do  on  November  7th,  1807.  It  was  not  indeed  without  mis- 
givings that  the  Czar  made  up  his  mind  to  this  step,  for,  as  has 
been  stated,  traffic  with  the  island  realm  was  a  necessity  to 
his  empire.  The  source  of  Russia's  wealth  lay  in  the  export  of 
the  products  of  her  rich  fields  and  forests,  which  were  disposed 
of  through  the  agency  of  the  British,  who  could  handle  them 
better  and  more  economically  than  any  one  else;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  lack  of  home  industries  made  articles  of  British  manu- 
facture indispensable  to  Russian  consumers.  Those  classes  of 
the  population  most  immediately  concerned — first  of   all  the 


41 6  Affairs  in   France  [1807 

landed  nobility,  then  the  merchants  and  the  financiers — saw 
themselves  threatened  with  enormous  losses;  the  amiy,  which 
had  previously  been  itself  desirous  of  peace,was  now  more  than 
ever  dissatisfied  at  the  prospect  of  having  shed  its  blood  for 
nothing  but  the  ruin  of  the  country ;  in  short,  the  opposition  to 
the  introduction  of  the  Continental  blockade  was  almost  uni- 
versal and  manifested  itself  here  and  there  with  suspicious  open- 
ness. This  feeling  is  supposed  to  have  had  much  influence 
later  in  leading  to  the  rupture  with  Napoleon.  But,  for  the 
present  at  least,  Alexander,  who  was  convinced  that  it  would 
be  long  before  a  successful  war  could  be  waged  against  the  all- 
powerful  French,  maintained  his  own  autocratic  will,  although 
he  felt  httle  personal  confidence  in  his  great  ally.*  The 
essential  point  was  to  him,  after  all,  that  he  saw  in  this  aUiance 
the  means  of  obtaining  possession  of  the  Turkish  principalities 
upon  the  Danube — Moldavia  and  Wallachia — as  well  as  of  Fin- 
land, still  belonging  to  Sweden. 

Hardly  more  than  a  few  days  had  passed  after  his  rupture 
with  England  before  he  formally  demanded  of  Savary,  the 
French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersbm"g,  that  these  two  princi- 
palities should  be  united  to  Russia  and  that  they  should  pro- 
ceed to  the  partition  of  Turkey,  the  plan  of  which  had  been  pro- 
posed at  Tilsit.  For  French  mediation  between  Russia  and 
Turkey,  which  constituted  one  of  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty 
of  AUiance  and  which  was  to  have  brought  about  peace  be- 
tween the  two  powers,  had  resulted  in  nothing.  On  August 
29th,  1807,  prehminaries  had,  it  is  true,  been  signed  at  Slobosia, 
but  the  Czar  had  refused  to  ratify  them  since  they  contained 
no  word  of  ceding  to  him  the  two  principaUties. 

This  question  was  very  soon  to  give  rise  to  discord  between 
the  allies,  not,  to  be  sure,  outspoken  and  pubhc,  but  secret. 
Napoleon  was  kept  exactly  informed  concerning  the  current  of 
the  opposition  in  Russia  by  his  envoy  Savary,  who  was  replaced 
at  St.  Petersburg  in  December  ])y  the  "Ambassador  Extraordi- 

*  In  November,  1807,  upon  beinj^  warned  by  Scholer,  the  Prussian 
ambassador,  against  reposing  too  much  confidence  in  Napoleon,  he  had 
repHed  that  in  deahng  with  that  man  there  could  be  no  thought  of  reliance. 


iET.  38]  The  Turkish  Question  417 

nary  "  Caulaincourt,  and  by  tSoiilt  and  Davoiit,  who  had  remained 
with  their  corps  in  Poland  and  Prassia.  He  also  knew,  and 
that  through  personal  experience,  how  suddenly  the  Czar  might 
be  persuaded  into  taking  a  political  course  directly  contrary  to 
that  which  he  had  been  pursuing.  He  was  thus  obliged  to  bear 
constantly  in  mind  the  possibility  of  a  change  of  front  on  the 
banks  of  the  Neva.  It  was,  as  has  been  said,  his  principle  of 
guidance  to  treat  all  friends  as  if  they  might  at  any  time  become 
his  enemies.  And  how  easy  it  would  be  for  Russia  under  pre- 
vailing conditions  to  change  again  into  a  foe!  And  he  was  to 
assist  such  an  ally  to  greater  power!  He  was  actually  to  pro- 
cure the  principahties  on  the  Danube  for  the  Czar  and  thus 
yield  to  him  the  most  direct  influence  upon  Oriental  affairs,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  he  so  especially  desired  to  control  them 
himself!  Of  a  surety  not.  He  refused  peremptorily  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey;  in  the  first  place,  as  he 
said,  England  would  surely  take  the  lion's  share  in  appropri- 
ating Egypt,  Cyprus,  etc.,  which  would  make  her  position  in 
India  mvuhierable  and  thus  put  an  end  to  his  own  vast  schemes. 

For  this  reason,  he  beheved  it  to  be  indispensable — and  there 
were  other  reasons  which  argued  in  favour  of  such  a  decision — to 
keep  his  army  on  the  watch  along  the  Russian  border-line,  and 
to  delay  the  evacuation  of  Prussia  by  the  continual  exaction 
of  new  and  inordinate  contributions  from  that  state.*  And 
there  was  still  another  consideration. 

As  has  been  observe ed,  there  now  prevailed  m  Turkey  also  a 
feehng  of  opposition  to  France;  already  the  Porte  had  begun 
to  make  advances  toward  England  and  threatened  to  estab- 
lish friendly  relations  with  that  power.  If  that  result  should 
be  brought  about,  British  commerce,  which  was  to  have  been 

*  In  a  convention  signed  July  12th,  1807,  the  Prussian  negotiator, 
General  Kalkreuth,  had  allowed  the  French  to  impose  upon  him  the 
stipulation  that  Prussia  should  indeed  be  evacuated  according  to  designated 
times  and  stages,  but  onlj-  upon  its  having  paid  the  war-indemnity  in  full 
or  upon  having  furnished  sufficient  guarantee  of  its  payment  But, 
since  this  indemnity  had  by  order  of  Napoleon  been  arbitrarily  set  at  over 
150,000,000  francs,  there  was  little  prospect  that  Frederick  William  III 
would  ever  be  able  to  fulfil  that  condition. 


41 8  Affairs  in   France  [I807 

shut  out  from  all  Europe,  would  thus  have  opened  to  it  a  wide 
access,  while  to  Napoleon,  whose  thoughts  were  always  bent 
upon  an  expedition  to  India,  the  sally-port  toward  the  east 
would  be  closed.  That  was  not  to  be  tolerated.  The  Balkan 
Peninsula  must  be  brought  absolutely  under  his  own  control. 
For  this  it  was  that  he  had  demanded  Corfu,  and  for  this  that 
he  now  ordered  it  fortified  in  all  haste  and,  immediately  upon 
hearing  of  the  Russian  declaration  of  war  against  England, 
gave  orders  to  his  Minister  of  the  Navy  to  assemble  a  fleet  with 
which  he  might  again  conquer  Malta  and  Sicily,  whilst  shutting 
out  the  British  in  the  west  from  any  access  to  the  Mediterranean 
by  an  attack  upon  Gibraltar;  for  this  he  now  requested  of  the 
Sultan  permission  for  his  troops  to  pass  from  Dalmatia  through 
Albania,  and  for  this  also  he  re-enforced  the  corps  in  Dalmatia. 
This  was  expecting  much  of  Turkey;  to  ask  more  would  have 
meant  driving  her  into  England's  arms.  To  demand  that  she 
should  surrender  the  principalities  on  the  Danube  to  her  he- 
reditary foe  would  unquestionably  have  brought  about  that 
result.  It  may  be,  as  Alexander  afterwards  averred,  that  Na- 
poleon was  the  first  to  speak  of  the  Danubian  principalities  at 
Tilsit,  but,  if  so,  it  was  of  course  only  for  the  sake  of  winning 
over  the  Czar  to  his  system  of  opposition  to  England.  Since, 
then,  this  object  had  been  accomphshed  by  Russia's  declara- 
tion of  war  against  George  III.,  there  was  no  further  occasion 
for  heeding  his  promise.  Instead  of  this  the  Corsican  now 
made  two  moves  upon  the  great  poUtical  chess-board  which  ab- 
solutely checkmated  Russia's  Oriental  schemes. 

In  the  first  place,  while  making,  of  course,  constant  affirma- 
tions of  his  friendship  to  the  Czar,  he  declared  himself  ready 
indeed  to  procure  the  countries  on  the  Danube  for  Russia,  but 
only  in  case  that  state  would  authorize  his  annexation  of  Prus- 
sian Silesia;  otherwise,  in  case  the  Czar  did  not  withdraw  his 
troops  from  Wallachia,  his  own  should  continue  to  occupy  Ger- 
many. Now  Russia  could  not  with  any  semblance  of  decency 
lend  her  own  assistance  to  the  s})oliation  of  I'russia,  whom  she 
had  taken  under  her  protection,  and  accortlingly  dechncd,  leav- 
ing her  divisions  on  the  Danube,  thus  enabling  Napoleon   to 


jet.  38]  Overreaching   the   Czar  419 

refer  in  Constantinople  to  his  own  good  offices  and  to  the  ma- 
licious Russians  who  did  not  want  peace, — by  means  of  which 
representations  he  was  actually  successful  in  inducing  the  Turks 
to  keep  their  ports  closed  against  the  English. 

Then  he  proceeded  to  make  his  second  dexterous  move 
against  Alexander.  Gustavus  IV.  of  Sweden,  partly  from  fear 
of  experiencing  the  fate  of  Denmark,  and  partly  out  of  personal 
dislike  of  Napoleon  and  his  system,  had  adhered  to  his  alliance 
with  England.  Napoleon  now  reminded  the  Czar  of  that  arti- 
cle of  their  agreement  presupposing  this  case,  urging  Alexander 
to  declare  war  against  his  brother-in-law,  the  King  of  Sweden, 
and  conquer  Finland  for  himself,  saying  that  he  would  gladly 
lend  his  assistance,  and  that  Bernadotte  with  his  army  corps 
in  Holstein  was  already  set  apart  for  that  purpose.  Although 
the  principalities  on  the  Danube  lay  nearer  the  heart  of  the  Czar 
than  Finland,  he  nevertheless  acceded  to  this  proposal,  and, 
while  his  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg  was  still  deluding  the 
Swedish  ambassador  with  false  assurances  of  safety,  the  Russian 
troops  suddenly  crossed  the  border  into  Finland  during  the 
last  week  of  February,  1808.  Evidently  he  had  counted  upon 
the  expedition  as  being  very  easy  of  accompUshment,  especially 
in  view  of  the  promised  aid  from  France,  and  had  not  reduced 
his  forces  upon  the  Danube.  The  outcome  was,  however,  quite 
different  from  what  he  had  looked  for.  The  Swedes,  supported 
by  the  English,  offered  effectual  resistance,  whereat  the  Czar 
began  to  appreciate  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  enterprise 
and  that  his  expeditionary  army  must  be  re -enforced.  Poland 
could  not  be  stripped  of  soldiery  on  account  of  the  French  in 
Prussia,  and  he  thus  saw  himself  compelled  to  draw  his  re- 
enforcements  after  all  from  the  Danubian  principalities,  which 
meant  giving  up  hope  of  conquest  there  for  the  time  being. 
This  measure  would,  it  is  true,  not  have  been  necessar}'  if  Berna- 
dotte had  really  given  the  promised  support  to  the  Russians. 
But  he  did  nothing  of  the  kind.  For  it  was  precisely  the  pur- 
pose of  Napoleon  to  entangle  Alexander  so  inextricably  in  the 
Finnish  undertaking  that  he  would  abandon  Turkish  enter- 
prise of  his  own  accord.     To  Caulaincourt  the  Czar  made  com- 


420  Affairs  in   France  [I8O8 

plaint,  demanding  to  know  why  it  was  that,  althougli  France 
had  pledged  herself  to  give  efficient  support  to  Russia's  efforts 
against  Sweden,  Marshal  Bernadotte  had  suddenly  ceased  to 
advance.  In  reply  the  ambassador  could  only  allege  as  the 
reason  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  crossing  the  Belt  to  Schonen. 
But  this  was,  of  course,  not  the  true  answer.  That  the  Czar 
might  have  read  in  a  letter  of  Napoleon's  to  Talleyrand,  dated 
April  25th,  1808,  in  which  he  said:  "You  understand  well 
enough  that  I  could  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  so  lightly  turn  my 
soldiers  upon  Sweden,  and  that  my  concerns  do  not  lie  in  that 
direction."  On  the  contrary,  the  French  divisions  in  Poland 
and  Prussia  were  now  concentrated  and  strong  fortifications 
erected  at  the  strategic  point  near  Modlin  where  the  Bug  River 
flows  into  the  Vistula^a  precaution  against  all  contingencies, 
for  dissatisfaction  was  increasing  daily  in  the  land  of  the  ally 
and  there  was  no  knowing  what  would  come  of  it.  Meanwhile, 
as  a  decoy  to  Russia,  he  instructed  Caulaincourt,  his  ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburg,  not  to  refuse  frankly  to  discuss  the 
partition  of  Turkey,  but  to  reserve  the  solution  of  the  question 
for  a  new  interview  between  the  two  emperors. 

This  attitude  which  Napoleon  had  assimied  toward  Russia 
must  be  kept  in  mind  in  order  rightly  to  comprehend  his  con- 
duct of  the  same  time  toward  the  other  states  of  Europe.  As 
a  matter  of  course  it  was  impossible  under  existing  circum- 
stances for  Prussia  and  Austria  to  escape  from  the  sphere  of 
his  power,  for  the  incessant  occupation  of  Northern  Germany 
not  only  had  the  effect  of  holding  Russia  in  check,  but  at  the 
same  time  threatened  and  hampered  the  political  affairs  of  the 
powers  of  Middle  Europe.  Therefore  Alexander  had  hardly  more 
than  issued  his  manifesto  against  England  before  the  Prussian 
Court  at  Memel  was  compelled  to  recall  its  ambassador  from 
London  on  November  29th.  In  February,  1808,  Napoleon  de- 
clared without  the  least  circiunlocution  to  the  brother  of  Fred- 
erick William  in  Paris  that  the  question  of  the  evacuation  of 
Prussia  had  its  own  place  in  the  great  combination  of  universal 
policy  and  was  not  in  the  least  a  matter  of  money,  which  was 
equivalent  to  saying  that  even  upon  the  fulfilment  of  all  French 


/Et  38]  Pressure   on    Austria  421 

demands  the  King  could  not  hope  to  be  rid  of  the  French  in- 
vaders. 

Toward  Austria  Napoleon  proceeded  in  a  manner  somewhat 
less  summary.  During  the  course  of  the  last  two  years  that 
state  had  completed  the  reorganization  of  its  army  and  had 
maintained  it,  in  spite  of  financial  distress,  undiminished  in 
number.  A  certain  consideration  was  therefore  called  for  in 
dealing  with  this  power.  But  it  was,  after  all,  nothing  more 
than  a  matter  of  form  when  Napoleon  suggested  to  the  Aus- 
trian court  that  it  should  attempt  to  mediate  peace  in  England, 
demand  the  return  of  the  Danish  fleet  and,  in  case  this  were 
refused,  recall  its  ambassador.  It  was  in  reality  a  command 
which  Austria,  hard  pressed  by  a  Franco-Russian  alliance  and 
threatened  by  a  French  army  to  the  north,  had  no  choice  but 
to  obey.  In  consequence,  in  January,  1 808,  Count  Starhemberg 
demanded  his  passports  in  London  and  only  in  strictest  confi- 
dence informed  the  government  of  George  III.  that,  in  spite  of 
appearances,  Austria  remained  amicably  disposed  toward  Eng- 
land. In  fact  Austria  was  expected  to  account  herself  fortu- 
nate because  in  October  the  French  had  at  last  condescended 
to  evacuate  Braunau,  to  atone  for  which,  however,  they  had 
proceeded  in  the  regulation  of  the  Italian  boundary-line  very 
much  to  the  disadvantage  of  Austria.  In  Vienna  there  was, 
indeed,  talk  of  overtures  which  France  had  made  in  regard  to 
this  matter  of  a  division  of  Turkey  in  which  Austria  should  be 
invited  to  share.  Napoleon  had,  it  is  true,  admitted  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a  partition  and  had  promised  to  her,  as  he  had 
to  Russia,  her  portion  in  the  spoil;  but  the  Emperor  had  aimed 
only  to  excite  one  of  these  powers  against  the  other,  Turkey 
constituting  for  the  future  an  excellent  apple  of  discord,  so  as 
to  make  both  serve  the  ends  of  his  own  policy.  And  when  one 
hears  of  Stadion,  the  Minister,  cherishing  the  vain  hope  of  ob- 
taining a  fat  morsel  including  Bosnia,  Servia,  and  a  slice  of  Bul- 
garia besides  a  strip  of  country  connecting  it  with  Saloniki, 
and  then  compares  with  this  Napoleon's  promises  made  at  the 
same  time  to  Russia,  one  can  scarcely  restrain  a  smile  at  see- 
ing how  the  machinations  of  the  Corsican,  one  after  another 


42  2  Affairs  in   France  [isos 

were  unfailingly  successful  and  how  he  never  failed  in  finding 
dupes. 

But  if  Napoleon  could  thus  impose  his  will  upon  the  Great 
Powers,  how  much  more  disregardful  and  emphatic  his  deal- 
ings with  the  smaller  states  which  could  have  no  thought  of 
resistance!  To  begin  with  Italy,  English  wares  had  here  found 
a  place  of  refuge  in  the  Tuscan  harbour  of  Livorno.  They 
arrived  there  under  the  American  flag,  were  stored  and  for- 
warded from  time  to  time  as  far  as  Leipzig.  The  dowager  queen 
of  Etruria,  who,  imprudently  enough,  had  surrounded  herself 
with  persons  ill-disposed  toward  France,  declared  it  to  be  im- 
possible for  her  to  close  her  ports  to  a  neutral  flag.  Thereupon 
Napoleon,  at  the  end  of  August,  1807,  ordered  General  Miolhs 
with  6000  men  to  march  into  Tuscany  and  confiscate  all  Eng- 
lish merchandise  in  the  country,  following  up  this  act  by  an 
announcement  to  the  queen  that  she  must  surrender  to  France 
her  country,  for  which  she  would  find  compensation  on  the  Ibe- 
rian Peninsula  according  to  arrangements  made  with  Spain.  On 
May  30th  Tuscany,  likewise  Corsica  and  Elba,  were  declared 
constituent  parts  of  France  and  apportioned  into  three  de- 
partments. 

There  now  remained  in  Italy  only  a  single  small  state  which 
dared  to  defy  Napoleon's  system;  this  was  that  of  the  Pope. 
This  bordered  on  two  seas  and  could  not  be  omitted  in  case  the 
Continental  system  of  blockade  were  to  be  rigidly  enforced. 
The  strained  relations  existing  between  Pope  and  Emperor  prior 
to  the  last  war  have  already  been  spoken  of.  During  the  war 
the  French  ambassador  Alquier  had  devoted  all  his  energies  to 
the  effort  to  induce  the  Holy  Father  to  acknowledge  Joseph 
as  King  of  Naples  and  to  participate  in  what  was  termed  the 
"Italian  Federation"  under  the  suzerainty  of  Napoleon,  or, 
in  oth(»r  words,  in  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with 
Naples  and  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  But  he  met  with  no  success. 
The  Pope  would  recognize  Joseph  only  upon  condition  of  a 
guarantee  of  his  own  independence  and  neutrality,  that  is,  that 
he  should  not  be  called  upon  to  join  the  league  directed  against 
England.     Upon  this  refusal,  on  July  22d,  1807,  Napoleon  had 


-(Et.  38]  Pressure  on   the   Pope  423 

written  from  Dresden  to  Eugene  Beauharnais  a  letter  which 
was  to  be    shown  to   Pius  VII.     "The  present  Pope,"   wrote 
Napoleon  in  truly  characteristic  style,  "is  too  powerful.     Priests 
are  not  qualified  for  governing.     Why  is  it  that  the  Pope  will 
not  'render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that   are  Caesar's'?     Is   he 
greater  here  on  earth  than  Jesus  Christ?     Perad venture  the  time 
is  not  far  distant,  if  my  state  affairs  continue  to  be  interfered 
with,  when  I  shall  cease  to  recognize  the  Pope  as  anything  but 
Bishop  of  Rome,  having  the  same  rank  and  privileges  as  the 
bishops  of  other  states  under  my  sway.    I  should  not  be  afraid 
to  unite  the  Galilean,  Italian,  German,  and  Polish  churches  in  a 
council  for  carrying  on  my  affairs  without  a  Pope."     Of  more 
practical  significance  was  a  command  issued  by  Talleyrand  on 
the  same  day  to  the  ambassador  at  Rome:  he  was  to  exact  of 
the  Holy  Father  the  admission  of  twenty-four  Frenchmen  into 
the  College  of  Cardinals  and  his  bestowal  of  full  powei-s  upon 
Caprara,  his  legate  in  Paris,  for  the  execution  of  a  treaty  regulat- 
ing the  questions  now  at  issue.     To  neither  of  these  demands 
would  the  Pope  accede.     Instead,  Baj'anne,  who  had  been  none 
the  less  appointed  by  France  as  Cardinal,  was   despatched  by 
the  Curia  to  Napoleon  to  appease  him  and  accord  to  him,  if 
need  be,  what  had  been  refused   scarcely  a  year  before — coro- 
nation as  Emperor  of  the  West — but  on  no  account  the  increase 
in  the  number  of  the  Cardinals,  and  the  entrance  into  the  Fed- 
eration.    But  this  was  to  Napoleon,  whose  plans  in  the  Medi- 
terranean have   already  been  set    forth,   the    essential    point. 
"What  is  most  of  all  important  to  the  Emperor  of  the  French," 
wrote  Champagny  to  Caprara,  "is  that  the  temporal  sovereign 
of  Rome  should  act  with  France  so  that,  situated  in  the  midst 
of  the  great  Empire,  surrounded  by  his  armies,  he  should  not  be 
foreign  to  his  interests  or  to  his  policy.  .  .  .  The  interests  of 
humanity,  the  voices  of  60,000,000  of  men,  are  calling  to  him: 
'Compel  England  to  live  at  peace  with  us,  to  give  us  back  our 
ports,  our  coasts,  our  ships,  our  maritime  and  commercial  rela- 
tions.'    If  the  Pope  alone  upon  the  Continent  desired  to  remain 
attached  to  these  Britons,  would  it  not  be  the  duty  of  the  head 
of  the  Empire  to  unite  at  once  with  the  Empire  that  part  of  his 


424  Affairs  in  France  [I807 

domains  which  isolated  itself  from  it  by  its  political  attitude  and 
to  annul  the  gift  of  Charlemagne,  which  was  being  used  as  a 
weapon  against  his  successor?  .  .  .  And  yet  the  Emperor  would 
be  contented  with  uniting  to  his  Empire  only  the  legations  of 
Urbino,  of  Macerata,  and  of  Ancona,  which  are  indispensable  to 
him  in  order  to  unite  Upper  Italy  with  Naples."  This  was  his 
chief  requirement,  but  to  this  were  attached  sundry  minor  de- 
mands: the  suppression  of  religious  orders  in  Italy,  the  increase 
in  the  number  of  French  Cardinals,  and  the  extension  of  the 
Italian  Concordat  to  include  Venetia. 

The  threat  of  annexing  the  three  legations  produced  in 
Rome  the  most  painful  impression.  It  had  not  been  forgotten 
there  how  Pius  had,  three  years  before,  made  the  long  and 
wearisome  journey  to  Paris  and  there  even  discredited  himself  to 
some  extent  in  the  eyes  of  the  Catholic  world  for  the  sole  object 
of  regaining  the  previously  surrendered  territories  of  Bologna, 
Ferrara,  and  Romagna,  and  now  for  a  second  time  was  he  to  lose 
a  portion  of  his  territories  and  precisely  that  portion  yielding 
the  most  revenue.  The  Cardinals — the  same  who  out  of  re- 
gard for  their  financial  advantage  had  before  counselled  in  fa- 
vour of  the  coronation  journey — now,  on  the  same  account,  urged 
the  Pope  to  yield.  He  at  length  did  so,  and  declared  himself 
ready  to  make  common  cause  with  France  against  England  and 
to  receive  French  garrisons  into  Ancona  and  Civita  Vecchia. 
But  Napoleon  must  have  foreseen  this  compliance,  for  he  acted 
accordingly.  Without  a  waiting  the  decision  of  the  Curia,  he  gave 
orders  to  General  Lemarrois  toward  the  end  of  December,  1807, 
to  march  without  delay  into  the  three  legations  in  question, 
while  he  meanwhile  prevailed  upon  Cardinal  Bayanne  in 
Paris  to  sign  a  treaty  sanctioning  all  his  demands,  amongst 
others  also  the  one  requiring  that  in  the  future  the  College  of 
Cardinals  should  consist  of  Frenchmen  to  the  extent  of  one  third. 
His  real  purpose  in  this  course  was  to  force  the  Pope  from  his 
conciliatory  attitude  into  one  of  resistance,  so  as  to  take  from 
him  the  whole  instead  of  a  part  only  of  the  States  of  the  Church. 
And  this  ])urpos(^  was  accomplished.  Pius,  deeply  wounded  at 
the   arbitrary   occupation    of   his   eastern   provinces,   not   only 


JF.T.3H]  The   Papal   States  Annexed  425 

refused  his  ratification  to  the  treaty  just  agreed  upon,  but  would 
have  no  further  concern  in  the  .federation  against  England. 
This  was  all  that  Napoleon  had  been  waiting  for.  He  could  now 
with  some  appearance  of  truth  denounce  the  Pope  to  the  world 
as  the  hindrance  in  the  great  work  of  the  estabUshment  of  peace, 
reason  enough  to  justify  Charlemagne  the  second  in  taking  back 
the  gift  made  by  the  first  of  that  name.  Before  the  end  of  Jan- 
uary, 1808,  General  MiolUs  received  instructions  to  occupy 
Rome,  and  on  February  2d  he  entered  that  city.  He  was  to 
banish  from  the  country  all  non-Roman  prelates,  to  incorporate 
the  papal  battalions  into  those  of  France,  to  dissolve  the  Holy 
Father's  guard  of  nobles,  and  take  upon  himself  the  administra- 
tion of  the  affairs  of  the  country.  All  this  was  carried  into 
completion  by  April,  1808,  the  States  of  the  Church  being  thus 
converted  into  a  French  province. 

Napoleon  was  at  this  time  in  Bayonne.  He  had  been  led 
thither  by  a  political  transaction  of  far-reaching  significance 
in  the  world's  history.  Spain  was  the  country  concerned.  Its 
king,  Charles  lY.,  had  up  to  this  time  continued  an  incapable 
existence  and  the  queen  a  shameful  one,  while  the  people  had 
suffered,  destitute  and  oppressed,  under  the  rule  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  who  submitted  unresistingly  to  the  hegemony  of 
the  neighbouring  state.  At  the  command  of  Napoleon  the 
country  had  become  involved  in  war  with  England  after  having 
sacrificed  its  ships,  its  commerce,  and  to  some  extent  its  colo- 
nies, in  order  to  preserve  its  existence,  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  imperilled  by  France,  an  existence,  which  had  con- 
tinually to  be  purchased  anew  by  the  payment  of  high  tribute 
both  in  men  and  troops.  Not  until  the  time  when  Napoleon 
began  to  make  war  against  Prussia  was  there  any  evidence  that 
the  court  at  Madrid  might  cease  to  yield  its  customary  submis- 
sion. At  that  time  the  Russian  ambassador  used  all  persua- 
sions to  induce  Spain  to  take  part  in  the  coalition,  while  the 
English  threatened  to  foment  revolt  in  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
South  America.  The  fate  of  the  Bourbon  king  of  Naples,  Ferdi- 
nand IV.,  who  was  a  brother  of  the  Spanish  king,  further  added 
to  the  fear  in  which  Napoleon  was  held,  and,  when  it  became 


426  Affairs  in  France  [I8O8 

known  that  he  was  going  forth  to  contend  against  the  renowned 
Prussian  army,  preparations  for  war  began  to  be  made  in  Madrid 
in  the  hope  that  he  would  meet  with  defeat;  a  manifesto  issued 
somewhat  prematurely  spoke  in  ambiguous  terms  of  strife  which 
had  become  unavoidable.  But  this  document  bore  a  fatal  date — 
October  14th — that  of  the  battle  of  Jena.  The  news  of  the 
brilhant  victory  overthrew  the  entire  project  of  resistance;  the 
mobilization,  which  had  been  represented  to  the  French  am- 
bassador as  directed  against  Portugal,  was  discontinued  and 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  was  again  overflowing  in  assurances  of 
his  devotion  to  France. 

But  Napoleon's  ambassador  had  not  been  in  the  least  misled 
as  to  the  true  meaning  and  progress  of  affairs.  He  reported 
upon  them,  and  the  Emperor  read  the  despatch  and  the  famous 
manifesto  in  Berlin  just  at  the  moment  when  he  believed  him- 
self to  be  nearing  his  goal  of  universal  domiriion  and  was  pre- 
paring to  take  his  last  steps  eastward  toward  attaining  it.  Eye- 
witnesses declare  that  he  became  pale  with  excitement.  Still 
he  was  able  to  master  his  feelings.  Spain  was  allowed  to  have 
no  inkling  that  he  had  any  knowledge  of  the  change  of  bearing 
planned  at  Madrid,  of  which  he  had  furthermore  received  con- 
firmation particularly  through  intercepted  reports  of  the  Prus- 
sian ambassador  in  Madrid.  He  quietly  received  the  renewed 
protestations  of  devotion  as  if  of  pure  gold,  from  which  he  at 
once  proceeded  to  derive  profit.  He  demanded  that  a  contin- 
gent of  15,000  men  should  be  sent  from  the  troops  now  under 
arms  to  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  to  take  part  in  the  defence 
against  England,  demanded  that  the  Continental  blockade 
should  be  strictly  enforced,  the  Si)anish  fleet  united  with  that 
of  France  in  Toulon,  and  imposed  uj^on  the  court  of  Madrid 
the  burden  of  the  maintenance  of  25,000  Prussian  prisoners. 
Now  had  there  been  at  the  head  of  Spanish  affairs  a  strong 
and  popular  government,  it  might  have  availed  itself  of  this 
moment  to  open  its  ports  to  England  and  declare  itself  against 
France.  Ensuing  years  have  proved  that  in  this  country  of 
Charles  IV.  there  was  no  lack  of  forces  available  for  rosistan(;e, 
and  who  can  say  what  might  have  been  the  effect  of  such  a  de- 


JE^.  38]  Demands  upon   Portugal  427 

sertion  after  the  indecisive  battle  at  Eylau?  But  Spain's  gov- 
ernment was  weak  and  not  in  the  slightest  degree  popular; 
Godoy  and  the  guilty  queen  were  absolutely  hated  and  only 
the  Crown  Prince  rejoiced  in  the  sympathies  of  the  people,  and 
that  for  the  very  reason  that  the  queen  and  the  Minister  were 
devising  means  of  cutting  him  off  from  the  succession  to  the 
throne.  It  was  upon  these  contentions  between  government 
and  people  and  amongst  the  ruling  powers  themselves  that 
Napoleon  based  his  purpose  of  bringing  Spain  more  completely 
under  his  own  dominion.  The  only  question  was  how  this  was 
to  be  accomplished.  Talleyrantl  would  have  been  in  favour  of 
a  marriage  between  the  Spanish  Crown  Prince  and  a  French 
Princess,  one  of  the  Taschers,  for  instance,  as  a  means  of  bring- 
ing the  state  into  the  federal  system  of  the  French  hegemony. 
The  Emperor,  however,  had  other  views.  It  may  be  that 
upon  reading  Godoy's  manifesto  his  determination  was  at  once 
made  to  deprive  the  Bourbons  here  also  of  the  throne  and  give 
it  to  some  member  of  his  own  family.  The  path  was  a  devious 
one  by  which  he  ultimately  reached  this  goal.  It  led  in  the 
first  place  by  way  of  Portugal, 

111  Tilsit  it  had  been  agreed  in  regard  to  the  court  at  I^isbon 
that  it  should  be  summoned  to  make  a  declaration  of  war  against 
England  and,  in  event  of  refusal,  be  treated  as  an  enemy.  In 
this  Spain  was  now  called  upon  to  co-operate.  This  was  mak- 
ing no  small  demand,  for  the  Crown  Prince  John  of  Portugal^ 
regent  for  his  mother,  who  was  of  unsound  mind,  was  the  son- 
in-law  of  Charles  IV.;  but  in  spite  of  this  fact  the  Spanish  am- 
bassador in  Lisbon  associated  himself  with  the  representative 
of  France  when  the  latter  demanded  the  closing  of  the  ports  of 
Portugal,  the  dismissal  of  the  British  ambassador,  and  even  the 
arrest  of  all  Englishmen  within  the  country,  with  the  confisca- 
tion of  their  property.  In  the  answer  returned  by  the  Portu- 
guese Minister,  who  had  secretly  come  to  an  understanding 
with  England,  he  agreed  to  the  closing  of  the  ports,  though  not 
to  the  arrest  of  the  foreigners,  to  whom,  moreover,  a  hint  was 
surreptitiously  given  to  retire  from  the  country  at  the  earliest 
possible   moment.     This   result   was   far   from  satisfactory   to 


428  Affairs  in   France  [I807 

Napoleon,  who  had  been  thus  overbearing  in  his  demands 
merely  for  the  sake  of  provoking  opposition,  and  he  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  act.  On  September  30th,  1807,  the  two  ambassadors, 
French  and  Spanish,  left  Lisbon,  and  on  October  18th  20,000 
French  soldiers  under  Junot  crossed  the  border,  directing  their 
march  upon  Portugal.  On  October  27th  a  secret  treaty  be- 
tween France  and  Spain  was  signed  at  Fontainebleau  in  which 
the  following  points  were  agreed  upon:  Portugal  was  to  be 
conquered  and  divided  into  three  parts,  of  which  the  northern- 
most, lying  between  the  Duero  and  Minho  rivers,  should  con- 
stitute the  kingdom  of  North  Lusitania,  to  be  given  to  the 
Queen  of  Etruria  as  compensation  for  Tuscany;  the  southern- 
most, which  was  formed  of  the  provinces  of  Alemtejo  and  Al- 
garve,  was  to  be  Godoy's  under  the  name  of  the  Principality 
of  Algarve,  while  the  middle  portion  was  to  remain  in  the  hands 
of  France  imtil  the  establishment  of  universal  peace.  The  Por- 
tuguese colonies  were  to  be  likewise  divided,  and  the  King  of 
Spain  was  to  assume  the  title  of  Emperor  of  America.  In  the 
drawing  up  of  this  treaty  Champagny,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  purposely  left  out  and  Duroc  ordered  to  put  his 
name  to  the  document ;  Tallejrrand  also  had  no  knowledge  of  it. 
The  only  other  person  in  the  secret  was  Murat,  who  foresaw 
here  a  possibihty  of  at  last  gaining  a  kingdom  for  himself.  No 
danger  but  that  the  treaty  would  receive  ratification  in  Ma- 
drid in  view  of  the  interest  in  it  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  who 
had  even  before  the  last  war  sought  vainly  in  Paris  to  get  pro- 
vision made  for  himself  at  the  expense  of  Portugal.  On  the 
same  day  the  military  part  of  the  enterprise  was  also  regulated 
in  a  separate  convention:  France  was  to  proceed  through  Spain 
against  Lisbon  with  30,000  men,  while  16,000  of  the  Spanish 
troops  should  occupy  Northern  and  Southern  Portugal.  A 
special  article  conceded  to  France  the  right  to  assemble  at  Bay- 
onne  a  further  force  of  40,000  men,  who  were,  however,  to  in- 
terfere only  in  case  the  British  should  attempt  to  land  troops 
in  Portugal. 

In  view  of  these  threatening  hostilities.  Prince  John  had  for 
a  moment  hesitated  as  to  whether  it  were  not  better  after  all 


;Et.  38]  The  Attack  on   Spain  429 

to  submit  absolutely  and  uncoiulitionaliy  to  Napoleon,  but  his 
decision  was  anticipated  by  the  "Moniteur"  of  November  15th, 
1807,  which  read:  "The  Prince  Regent  of  Portugal  loses  his 
throne.  The  downfall  of  the  House  of  Braganza  furnishes  one 
more  proof  that  ruin  is  inevitable  to  whomsoever  attaches  liim- 
self  to  the  EngUsh."  There  now  remained  to  him  no  alter- 
native but  flight,  since  his  little  country  could  not  contend 
alone  against  Spain  and  France.  On  November  27th  the  royal 
family  took  ship  for  Brazil  to  seek  a  new  home  beyond  the  seas. 
A  few  days  later  Junot  with  a  handful  of  exhausted  troops  arrived 
at  the  city  now  without  a  master  and  without  thought  of  resist- 
ance ;  the  Portuguese  colours  were  lowered  from  the  citadel  to 
give  place  to  the  tricolour  of  France. 

The  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau  is  historically  important,  not 
so  much  for  its  political  adjustments  as  for  the  military  arrange- 
ments therein  agreed  upon.  The  Spanish  troops  were  directed 
toward  the  west,  which  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  a  French 
army  would  be  thus  enabled  to  reach  Madrid  without  encoun- 
tering serious  resistance.  And  that  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  purpose  which  Napoleon  had  in  mind.  Circumstances  at 
the  court  of  Madrid  were  largely  responsible  for  the  fact  that  he 
was  able  to  carry  it  out.  For  just  at  this  time  the  internal  dis- 
cord there  reached  its  climax.  Ferdinand,  the  Crown  Prince, 
was  conspiring  against  his  mother  and  Godoy  to  get  hold  of  the 
reins  of  government;  the  plot  was  discovered  and  a  manifesto 
issued  by  the  king  proclaiming  the  high  treason  of  his  son. 
Both  parties  turned  "for  counsel"  to  Napoleon.  That  impartial 
adviser,  thinking  the  time  propitious  for  action  on  his  owti  part, 
admonished  Charles  IV.  against  delaying  the  important  expedi- 
tion against  Portugal  on  account  of  palace  squabbles,  and  gave 
at  the  same  time  secret  instructions  to  the  bearer  of  the  letter 
to  acquaint  himself  carefully  in  regard  to  public  feeling  in  Spain 
and  the  strength  of  her  fortresses  and  army.  On  the  same  day, 
November  13th,  1807,  General  Dupont,  who  commanded  the 
second  French  expeditionary  corps  of  40,000  men,  also  received 
orders  to  advance  across  the  Spanish  frontier  as  far  as  ^'ittoria, 
although  there  was  as  yet  not  the  slightest  indication  of  a  disem- 


430  Affairs  in   France  [I8O8 

barkation  of  English  troops.  vSoon  after — early  in  December — 
the  Emperor  betook  himself  to  Upper  Italy  in  order  to  meet  his 
brother  Joseph  in  Venice  and  offer  to  him  the  Spanish  crown,  an 
arrangement  already  agreed  upon  in  most  profound  secrecy  be- 
tween the  two  emperors  in  Tilsit,  so  that  Joseph  now  despatched 
a  trusted  messenger  to  Alexander  I.  to  convey  to  that  monarch 
messages  of  respect  which  should  secure  the  Czar's  favour  to 
himself  in  the  new  capacity  in  which  he  was  about  to  appear.* 

During  December  and  January  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
30,000  French  soldiers  marched  into  Spain  and  took  up  positions 
temporarily  near  Valladolid  and  Burgos;  Murat  was  made  com- 
mander-in-chief. No  one  knew  what  was  their  purpose  there. 
The  Spanish  people  assumed  that  they  had  come  to  set  the 
Crown  Prince  upon  the  throne  and  to  overthrow  the  hated  rule 
of  Godoy,  and  welcomed  them  therefore  with  rejoicing.  And 
Ferdinand  himself  was  of  the  same  opinion.  Charles  IV.,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  an  anxious  letter  begged  for  enUghtenment. 
Napoleon's  answer  was  a  lie.  The  troops,  said  he,  were  destined 
to  prevent  a  debarkation  of  the  English  and  were  consequently 
to  march  on  to  Cadiz.  Godoy,  who  saw  to  the  bottom  of  the 
scheme,  advised  flight  to  the  southern  provinces,  but,  when 
preparations  for  that  course  were  begun,  the  people  seized  the 
idea  that  Godoy  was  trying  thus  to  make  impossible  the  change 
of  system  planned  by  Napoleon,  and  proceeded  to  Aranjuez, 
where  the  court  was  staying,  and  there  compelled  the  king  to 
dismiss  his  minister  and  himself  to  abdicate  in  favour  of  his  son. 

This  development  was  thoroughly  out  of  keeping  with  the 
plans  of  the  Emperor.  It  had  been  his  hope  that  the  royal 
family  would,  Uke  that  of  Portugal,  actually  take  to  flight,  which 

*  Upon  this  point  the  "M6inoires"  of  Miot  de  Melito  (II.  p.  349  and 
following),  the  confidant  of  Joseph,  are  a  witness  scarcely  to  be  disputed 
He  even  mentions  the  name  of  the  officer  who  was  entrusted  with  the 
mission  to  St.  Petersburg.  Moreover,  lAicien,  whom  Napoleon  chanced 
upon  in  Mantua,  December,  1807,  relates  that  he  also  among  others 
was  offered  the  kingdom  of  Spain  by  his  imperial  brother,  who  e.xclaimcd: 
"Do  you  not  see  it,  then,  falling  into  the  hollow  of  your  hand  thanks  to 
the  follies  of  your  beloved  Bourbons  and  to  the  stupidity  of  your  friend  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace?" 


-Et.  38]  The   Conference   at   Bayonne  431 

he  would  then  have  demonstrated  in  this  case,  as  he  had  in  the 
other,  to  be  due  to  attachment  to  England.  But  now  on  March 
23d,  1808,  immediately  following  Murat's  entrance  into  Madrid, 
the  new  king,  Ferdinand  \'1I.,  also  puts  in  his  appearance  amidst 
the  joyful  acclamations  of  the  people.  To  a  large  projjortion 
of  the  population  it  now  first  began  to  seem  as  if  the  French 
had  really  been  preparing  the  way  to  the  throne  for  the  young 
prince.  This  was  fatal  to  Napoleon's  own  plans.  He  at  once 
set  about  devising  some  means  of  separating  the  yoimg  mon- 
arch from  his  people,  whom  he  had  not  yet  recognized  as  king. 
For  this  purpose  Savary  was  sent  to  Madrid.  He  was  to  repre- 
sent to  Ferdinand  that  the  Emperor  was  himself  on  the  way  to 
Spain,  and  that  it  would  be  a  way  of  ingratiating  himself  for 
the  young  king  to  go  out  to  meet  him  and  ask  his  recognition. 
Ferdinand  thereupon  actually  set  out  for  Burgos  and  continued 
on  thence  to  Vittoria,  without,  however,  seeing  anything  of  the 
Emperor.  Instead  there  was  delivered  to  him  here  a  letter  from 
Napoleon  to  the  effect  that  before  he  could  sanction  the  accession 
to  the  throne  he  must  satisfy  himself  in  an  interview  with  Ferdi- 
nand as  to  whether  Charles  IV.  had  really  abdicated  of  his  owti 
free  will  or  only  under  compulsion,  this  interview  to  take  place 
in  Bayonne.  Among  those  about  the  young  prince  there  were 
many  who  raised  their  voices  in  warning  against  undertaking 
the  journey  thither;  the  populace  of  \'ittoria  used  every  effort 
to  prevent  his  crossing  the  frontier.  But  what  else  was  to  be 
done?  All  about  the  French  were  encamped  and  the  invitation 
was  in  reality  a  command.  "At  Vittoria,"  said  Savary  at  a 
later  date,  "I  thought  for  a  moment  that  my  prisoner  was  going 
to  escape  me;  but  I  managed  it  after  all  by  frightening  him." 
On  April  14th,  Ferdinand — a  prisoner  in  truth — reached  Bay- 
onne, whither  Napoleon  had  likewise  invited  the  king  and  queen, 
his  parents,  and  Godoy. 

It  will  surprise  no  one  to  learn  that  the  Prince  did  not  find 
here  what  he  had  come  to  seek.  Napoleon  not  only  refused  to 
him  his  recognition,  but  demanded  of  him  outright  that  he 
should  give  back  the  crown  to  his  father,  confident  that 
Charles  IV.  had  no  further  desire  to  return  to  a  country  wiiich 


43 2  Affairs  in  France  [I8O8 

execrated  his  rule  and  where  unmistakable  affronts  awaited  him- 
self and  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  Ferdinand  attempted  at  first 
to  refuse,  but  when  news  penetrated  to  Bayonne  of  an  insurrec- 
tion in  Madrid  which  was  attributed  to  his  instigation,  and  when 
Napoleon  threatened  to  treat  him  as  a  rebel,  he  yielded  and 
returned  the  crown  to  Charles  IV.,  who  confidingly  placed  it  in 
the  hands  of  the  Emperor.  On  June  6th,  1808,  Napoleon  set  it 
upon  the  head  of  his  brother  Joseph.*  It  was  not  without  the 
use  of  guile  and  of  brutal  force,  to  be  sure,  but  Napoleon  had 
nevertheless  gained  his  end.  The  Pyrenean  peninsula  had  now 
come  indirectly  under  his  sway. 

It  was  yet  to  be  seen  whether  it  would  so  remain.  Were  that 
the  case,  then  the  band  which  he  had  been  forging  against  Eng- 
land was  actually  welded,  and  from  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  as  far 
as  the  Vistula  the  Continent  was  subject  to  his  more  or  less  per- 
emptory orders;  then  the  colossus  in  the  East  would  no  longer 
venture  to  think  of  separating  from  him  to  pursue  his  own 
course.  He  must  have  experienced  a  feehng  of  high  satisfac- 
tion in  contemplating  the  successes  of  the  year  just  past,  suffi- 
cient to  drive  far  from  him  any  misgivings  which  he  might  have 
had  as  to  the  morality  of  his  proceedings.  He  could  give  new 
scope  to  his  designs.  The  English,  either  because  of  the  attack 
directed  against  Sweden  by  Russia,  or  because  of  the  events  in 

*  Joseph  had  not  remained  uninterruptedly  the  person  upon  whom 
Napoleon  desired  to  confer  the  Spanish  crown.  At  one  time — after  the 
first  abdication  of  Charles  IV. — the  Emperor  had  offered  it  to  his  brother 
Louis  in  a  letter  of  March  27th,  1808.  The  reason  for  this  was,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  personal  resentment  against  Joseph,  who  had  permitted  himself 
a  slight  deviation  from  one  of  the  orders  issued  by  his  brother,  whereat 
the  Emperor  had  reprimanded  him  in  harshest  terms  on  March  25th  (Du 
Casse,  "Suppl^iment  k  la  correspondance  de  Napoleon  I."  p.  100),  and 
on  the  other  hand  Napoleon  had  received  notification  of  the  extensive 
smuggling  carried  on  by  the  English  under  the  American  flag  in  Holland, 
artd  for  that  reason  was  already  cherishing  the  wish  to  incorporate  that 
country  completely  with  France.  (See  Napoleon's  letter  of  March  29th, 
1808,  to  his  Minister  of  Finance,  Gaudin,  in  the  Ifith  volume  of  his  "Corre- 
spondance.") Louis  declined  the  offer,  saying  that  he  was  bound  by  his 
oath  already  given  to  the  people  of  Holland,  and  shortly  afterwards 
Joseph  was  again  restored  to  favour. 


Mt.38]       Project  for  the  Invasion  of  India  433 

Portugal,  had  been  brought  to  withdraw  the  larger  part  of  their 
ships  from  the  Mediterranean  and  the  ocean  and  had  directed 
them  toward  the  north.  Napoleon  at  once  resolved  to  fortify 
rapidly  his  already  strong  position  in  the  great  interior  basin,  to 
equip  three  fleets,  of  which  two,  making  the  circuit  of  Africa 
and  bearing  18,000  soldiers,  should  set  sail  for  India,  while  the 
third  should  start  from  Toulon  to  debark  20,000  men  in  Egypt. 
At  the  same  time,  as  had  been  agreed  upon  at  Tilsit,  an  expe- 
ditionary corps  composed  of  French,  Russian,  and  Austrian 
troops  should  penetrate  into  Turkey, — for  it  was  with  this  in 
mind  that  Napoleon  had  brought  up  the  question  of  its  partition 
in  Vienna  and  at  St.  Petersburg, — march  upon  Constantinople 
and  thence  plunge  into  Asia,  where  they  were  to  cross  Persia — as 
they  frankly  acknowledged,  although  that  country  had  been  an 
ally  of  France  since  1807 — and  continue  thence  toward  the  East. 
The  mere  tidings  that  the  corps  was  on  the  march,  as  Napoleon 
said  to  himself,  would  provoke  an  insurrection  among  the  popu- 
lations of  India  which  had  been  subjugated  by  the  British;  that 
insurrection  would  destroy  the  credit  and  influence  of  England, 
and  that  country,  recognizing  its  ruin,  would  be  compelled  to 
sign  a  treaty  of  peace  which  would  put  an  end  to  the  tyrannical 
domination  which  it  exercised  upon  the  seas  and  would  thus 
cause  to  disappear  the  last  and  greatest  obstacle  which  was  pre- 
venting the  extension  of  his  Empire  over  the  entire  globe. 
According  to  Talleyrand's  statement  to  Metternich,  Napoleon 
wrote  on  June  30th  to  Eugene  Beauharnais  that  by  October  or 
November  he  should  be  in  Italy,  to  direct  from  there  all  this 
vast  undertaking.* 

*  Vandal's  "Napoleon  et  Alexandre  I*'"  has  established  the  fact  that 
early  in  March,  1808,  the  project  of  invading  India  formed  the  topic 
of  long  discussions  between  the  Czar  and  Caulaincourt  at  the  same  time 
that  the  question  of  the  partition  of  Turkey  was  being  agitated.  Public 
sentiment  also  was  aroused  in  regard  to  it.  Indeed  in  Danz's  interesting 
pamphlet,  published  in  Jena  in  1808  and  bearing  the  title  "The  Marcii  of 
the  French  upon  India,"  this  expedition  is  spoken  of  as  a  matter  already 
determined  upon:  30,000  Russians  and  30,000  Frenchmen,  supported 
by  Persia  and  countenanced  by  the  dissatisfied  Nabobs,  were  to  put  an 
end  to  English   rule   in  India.      The  general  peace  so  much  ^\ished  for 


434  Affairs  in   France  [iso-s 

But  what  if  these  successes  should  not  prove  lasting?  What 
if  there  came  to  distiu-b  his  reckoning  a  factor  which  he  had 
overlooked,  a  force  which  he  was  unable  to  appreciate  or  to 
weigh  because  he  was  himself  wanting  in  the  feelings  which  gave 
it  birth?  If  he  had  but  accepted  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  West  in  1795,  he  would  have  come  to  know  in  La  Vendee 
from  personal  observation  the  heroic  courage  engendered  in  a 
people  which  had  been  wounded,  deceived,  and  driven  to  despera- 
tion, and  he  would,  perhaps,  not  have  been  led  into  the  mistake 
which  he  now  made  of  showing  his  disdain  of  popular  feeling  in 
Spain  by  practising  deception  upon  it.  He  would  perhaps  have 
followed  the  counsel  of  Talleyrand  and  have  attached  the  popu- 
lar young  king  to  his  family  and  interests  in  place  of  thrusting 
him  from  his  throne.  Ferdinand  was  of  course  a  worthless  char- 
acter, and  Napoleon's  purpose  to  elevate  the  standing  and  civi- 
lization of  Spain  an  intention  deserving  of  the  highest  praise, 
but  the  point  upon  which  everything  turned  was,  after  all,  that 
the  will  of  a  people  whose  power  was  not  to  be  computed  was 
opposing  its  resistance  to  his  projects.  The  Emperor  was  to 
learn  this  to  his  cost,  and  that  within  a  very  short  time. 

In  July,  1808,  Joseph  made  his  entrance  into  Madrid.  He 
had  ceded  the  throne  of  Naples  to  Murat.  Charles  IV.  with  his 
wife  and  favourite  repaired  to  Italy.  The  young  prince,  Ferdi- 
nand, remained  under  surveillance  at  Valenjay  in  France.  The 
new  king  brought  with  him  a  new  constitution  which  had  been 
deliberated  upon  in  Bayonne  by  150  Spanish  notables;  he  brought 
also  capable  ministers  and  the  most  excellent  intentions  to  raise 
the  decadent  kingdom  to  new  power  and  new  splendour.  But 
he  found  the  country  in  a  state  of  tumult.  There  were  doubtless 
in  Spain  intelligent  statesmen  who  recognized  the  advantage 
to  their  country  of  a  newly  regulated  system  of  government  and 
who  were  ready  to  contribute  their  services  toward  its  main- 
could  be  attained  only  through  victorious  combat  with  England.  It  was 
an  idea  of  gigantic  proportions  thus  to  keep  occupied  in  Asia  the  elements 
of  Europe  which  were  dissat  isfied  with  Napoleon's  hegemony,  while  demon- 
strating to  the  nations  of  Europe  that  this  step  was  indispensable  to  the^'"" 
welfare  and  happiness. 


I 


/Et.  38]    The  Uprising  of  the  Spanish  People      435 

tenance,  but  their  prudent  judgment  was  more  than  offset  by 
the  wounded  feeling  of  millions  who  regarded  it  as  a  national 
disgrace  which  must  be  revenged  to  have  been  thus  taken  un- 
awares and  duped  by  the  foreigners.  Moreover,  religious  pride 
was  linked  with  patriotism  among  this  people  which  had  over- 
come the  unbelieving  Moors  and  the  heretical  Reformation,  and 
the  hatred  toward  the  foreign  despot  was  the  more  pronounced 
because  he  it  was  who  had  robbed  the  Pope  of  his  throne.  In 
short,  the  nation  "refused  ratification  to  the  Treaty  of  Bayonne," 
as  Napoleon  himself  subsequently  expressed  it,  and  sprang  to 
arms. 

And  success  crowned  the  effort.  The  revolt  had  begun  in 
Asturias,  and  before  the  end  of  May  had  spread  with  furious 
rapidity.  Messengers  were  despatched  to  England  to  ask  as- 
sistance, and  found  ready  sympathy.  Ever}'^'here  bands  were 
forming,  for  the  most  part  under  leadership  of  the  monks,  and 
in  many  cities  there  arose  Juntas,  that  is  to  say,  councils  gov- 
erning in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  who  alone  was  recognized 
and  spoken  of  as  king.  At  first,  it  is  true,  the  French  troops 
were  able  to  make  their  way  throughout  the  country,  but  be- 
fore long  they  foimd  themselves  resisted  by  the  "banditti." 
The  population  of  Saragossa  fought  heroically  against  the  be- 
sieging forces  and  compelled  them  to  withdraw;  in  Valencia 
the  same  occurred;  and  although  Bessieres  conquered  on  July 
1-lth,  on  the  open  plain  near  Medina  de  Rio  Seco,  his  conquest 
was  counterbalanced  by  the  loss  in  the  mountains  of  Dupont's 
entire  corps  of  17,000  men,  which  was  obliged  to  surrender  near 
Baylen  on  July  22d.  The  tidings  of  this  event  drew  all  re- 
maining Spain  into  the  insurrection,  so  that  even  Joseph's  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers  was  affected  by  it.  He  himself  no  longer  felt 
secure  in  the  residential  cit}',  and  before  the  end  of  July  turned 
northward,  withdrawing  the  entire  French  army  behind  the 
Ebro.  Meanwhile  the  longed-for  support  from  England  had 
landed  in  Portugal,  where,  on  August  30th,  near  Cintra,  Junot 
was  brought,  although  on  tenns  most  honourable,  to  surrender. 
And  as  if  tliese  disasters  were  not  sufficient,  the  Spanish  soldiers 
stationed  in  Fiinen,  Langeland,  and  Jutland,  upon  hearing  of 


43^  Affairs  in   France  [I8O8 

the  great  revolution,  at  once  deserted  their  French  commanders 
and  took  ship  upon  EngHsh  vessels  which  would  bear  them 
back  to  their  native  country. 

Napoleon,  when  leaving  Bayonne  in  July,  had  felt  no  doubt 
that  the  revolt  in  Spain  would  soon  be  subdued,  and  the  news 
of  these  events  astounded  and  perturbed  him  greatly;  Dupont's 
capitulation  made  him  beside  himself  with  rage,  while  the  re- 
port from  Cintra  seemed  rather  to  depress  and  discourage  him, 
for  there  had  taken  place  that  which  caused  him  the  most  pain : 
the  British  had  again  obtained  mastery  of  Portugal,  the  cordon 
was  broken.  If  this  damage  were  to  be  made  good,  stronger 
forces  must  be  brought  to  bear  than  had  hitherto  been  em- 
ployed in  Spain,  the  ''Grand  Army"  must  be  partially  if  not 
wholly  drawai  thither  from  Germany.  But  this  was  equivalent 
to  giving  up  his  dominating  position  in  the  east  by  means  of 
which  he  had  for  a  year  been  holding  in  check  three  of  the  Great 
Powers:  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  And  this  was  the  more 
unfortunate  because  just  at  this  moment  there  were  beginnmg 
to  be  perceptible  smouldering  fires  of  resistance  in  the  two  Ger- 
man states  which  might  but  too  easily  flame  out  in  war  if  the 
pressure  now  held  upon  them  were  to  be  once  removed. 

It  was  not  without  solicitude  that  Vienna  had  observed 
events  occurring  in  Italy:  the  incorporation  of  Tuscany  and 
the  ejection  of  the  Pope  from  his  temporal  dominions.  Then 
followed  the  occurrence  at  Bayonne,  producing  a  tremendous 
impression.  It  was  useless  then,  apparently,  to  show  oneself 
docile  and  obedient  in  the  performance  of  all  that  seemed  good 
to  the  all-powerful  Emperor — useless  to  be  allied  with  him, 
the  risk  of  falling  into  his  toils  was  not  thereby  lessened.  All 
ancient  dynasties  of  Europe  seemed  threatened  by  a  similar 
fate,  and  Austria  was  pre-eminently  a  dynastic  state,  since  it 
was  in  the  reigning  family  that  its  dissimilar  component  parts 
found  their  chief  bond  of  union.  Therefore  it  was  that  the 
danger  to  dynasties  was  here  especially  regarded  as  a  menace 
to  the  state,  and  Austria  prepared  for  war.  During  May  and 
June,  1808,  were  organized  on  a  modern  plan  a  reserve  and  a 
Landwehr,  and  the  people  crowded  eagerly   into   the    rapidly 


Mr.  38]  Unrest  in   Germany  437 

formed  battalions.*  Napoleon  made  a  categorical  demand  for 
explanation,  and  in  July  threatened  war;  it  was  iniiversally 
supposed  that  it  must  follow.  But  the  renouncement  of  this 
purpose  was  for  the  time  being  necessitated  through  the  arrival 
of  the  disastrous  tidings  from  Spain.  Provision  for  careful 
observation  of  Austria  was,  however,  made  by  the  instructions 
to  Davout  to  move  back  into  Silesia  from  Poland,  while  Mor- 
tier's  corps  was  ordered  to  remain  in  Franconia.  The  corps  of 
Ncy  and  Victor  were  summoned  back  across  the  Rhine. 

Prussia  was  meanwhile  in  no  less  a  ferment  than  Austria, 
though  feeling  w^as  necessarily  more  suppressed  and  concealed 
on  account  of  the  presence  of  the  French  and  their  adherents. 
In  the  previous  year,  after  the  battle  of  Eylau,  a  conspiracy 
was  formed  under  the  leadership  of  former  Prussian  and  Hessian 
officers  to  stir  up  a  revolt  throughout  the  territory  between 
the  Weser  and  the  Elbe  in  case  the  British  should  land  in  north- 
em  Germany.  Ever  since  the  peace  of  Tilsit  the  feeling  of  bit- 
terness among  the  people  had  but  increased  under  the  oppres- 
sion of  the  French  soldiery.  Under  the  very  eyes,  as  it  were, 
of  the  foreigners  there  were  held  secret  meetings  for  the  pro- 
motion of  hatred  and  of  thirst  for  war;  in  April,  1808,  the 
"Tugendbund"  of  Konigsberg  was  instituted,  which,  though  in 
itself  innocent,  was  later  to  lend  its  name  to  all  secret  organiza- 
tions hostile  to  France.  Besides  these  the  government,  with 
Stein  and  Scharnhorst  in  the  lead,  worked  at  the  regeneration 
of  the  state  and  its  army  to  strengthen  both  against  the  ap- 
proaching   contest.     All   this    could    not    permanently   escape 

*  On  August  10th,  1808,  the  French  ambassador,  Andr^ossy,  reported 
by  letter  to  the  home  government:  "From  what  takes  place  before  our 
eyes  and  from  reports  arriving  from  all  sides  it  would  appear  that  Austria 
has  never  presented  so  martial  an  aspect  as  now,  that  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment has  never  before  been  the  cause  of  an  impulse  such  as  it  has  now 
communicated  to  the  nobility  and  to  all  classes  of  citizens.  The  'Moria- 
mur'  of  the  Hungarians  under  Maria  Theresa  surely  did  not  call  forth 
proportionally  as  many  combatants,  nor  were  they  more  promptly  armed 
and  drilled  than  the  number  of  men  that  the  call  to  arms  of  the  govern- 
ment commissioners  and  the  enrolment  have  just  furnished  to  the  militia." 
(Archives  of  Foreign  Affairs.) 


438  Affairs  in   France  [I8O8 

Napoleon,  and,  even  if  he  had  not  otherwise  had  knowledge 
of  it,  an  intercepted  letter  from  the  Minister,  Stein,  to  the  Prince 
of  Wittgenstein  dated  August  15th,  1808,  must  have  revealed 
it  to  him,  for  therein  was  it  plainly  said  that  the  national  bitter- 
ness in  Gennany  was  to  be  encouraged,  and  if  Napoleon  should 
refuse  the  proposals  put  fonvard  by  Prussia  the  plans  of  the 
sprhig  of  the  previous  year  should  be  resumed.  It  scarcely 
seemed  possible  that  this  was  the  same  Prussia  which  he  sup- 
posed Jiimself  to  have  annihilated  in  those  two  battles  in  Thu~ 
ringia  and  whose  very  existence  he  had  granted  only  as  a  sort 
of  favour. 

And  not  in  Germany  only  but  even  in  the  southeast,  where 
Napoleon  had  expended  his  utmost  skill  in  diplomacy,  did  the 
results  of  his  efforts  appear  to  be  slippmg  from  his  grasp.  In 
Turkey  a  revolt  had  nearly  broken  out,  Mustapha  IV.  had  been 
driven  from  the  throne  and  his  brother  Mahmud  II.  made  Sultan 
on  July  28th,  1808.  Under  his  rule  France  no  longer  found 
any  sort  of  spirit  of  tractability.  The  ambassador  was  con- 
fronted with  reproaches  in  regard  to  the  fickle  policy  of  France, 
and  was  impressed  with  the  idea  that  Turkey  was  intent  upon 
a  separate  treaty  with  Russia  rather  than  upon  the  friendship 
of  Napoleon. 

The  entire  edifice  of  Napoleonic  supremacy  over  the  Conti- 
nent, so  closely  approaching  its  completion,  seemed  tottering. 
The  Emperor  at  once  recognized  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
but  he  was  no  less  swift  in  perceiving  the  means  of  relieving  it. 
The  only  power  capable  of  preserving  quiet  in  Prussia  and 
Austria  until  Spain  could  be  reduced  to  order  was  Russia.  The 
thing  to  do,  then,  was  to  attempt  to  secure  once  more  the  good- 
will of  that  country,  lliere  w^as,  indeed,  no  denying  that  he 
had  conducted  himself  toward  the  Czar  in  a  most  equivocal 
manner,  but  that  impression  was  not  ineffaceable.  The  evacua- 
tion of  Prussia  was  already  to  be  regarded  as  a  concession  made 
to  Alexander,  and  Napoleon  hastened  to  represent  it  as  such. 
A  second  concession  with  respect  to  the  Danubian  principalities 
would,  he  hoped,  secure  his  end.  Hitherto  he  had  been  putting 
off  the  Czar  in  regard  to  these  coveted  territories  until  the  mat- 


^T.  39]       Alexander  Decides  for  Napoleon  439 

ter  could  be  discussed  verbally  between  them.  This  interview 
should  now  take  place.  Hanlly  had  Joseph's  flight  from  Madrid 
been  made  known  in  Paris  l^efore  an  envoy,  bearing  the  invita- 
tion to  an  interview  in  Erfurt,  was  despatched  post-haste  to 
St.  Petersburg,  where  he  was  to  call  attention  to  the  withdrawal 
of  the  troops  from  Pmssia  and  to  make  request  of  the  Czar 
that  he  would  protest  in  Vienna  against  further  military  prepa- 
rations. Erfurt  had  previously  been  suggested  by  Alexander 
as  the  place  of  meeting,  and  he  was  now  urged  to  name  the  date 
for  that  occasion.  Everything  depended  upon  Russia's  de- 
cision, for  Austria  also  had  been  making  approaches  to  the 
same  power,  and  England  had  sent  to  ascertain  the  attitude  it 
would  assume,  while  the  King  of  Prussia  had  intimated  in  con- 
fidential letters  that  he  was  not  disinclhied  to  make  common 
cause  with  the  Court  of  \'ienna.  It  was  everywhere  recognized 
that  Alexander  w^as  not  really  at  heart  a  party  to  the  French 
alliance,  and  if  he  had  at  this  time  tendered  his  aid  to  the  other 
powers,  it  is  most  likely  that  the  result  would  have  been  then 
what  came  to  pass  five  years  later.  Ncjthing  is  known  of  what 
took  place  in  the  council  of  the  Czar;  one  fact  alone  has  tran- 
spired: that  at  a  certain  moment  Alexander  was  keenly  hn- 
pressed  by  a  letter  from  Tolstoi,  his  ambassador  in  Paris,  and 
particularly  by  the  following  passage:  "Austria's  destruction 
should  be  looked  upon  as  the  forerunner  and  means  to  our  own." 
But  the  Czar  was  not  to  be  prevailed  upon  by  his  neighbours. 
He  knew  that  he  was  necessary  to  Napoleon,  and  that  he  would 
therefore  be  allowed  his  own  way  in  his  Oriental  plans — much  as 
they  might  be  opposed  to  Napoleon's  desires.  The  war  against 
Sweden  had  meanwhile  assumed  a  more  favourable  aspect, 
and  Russia  was  again  at  liberty  to  turn  her  attention  toward 
the  South.  To  desist  now  once  again  from  hostilities  toward 
his  southern  neighbours,  so  as  to  ally  himself  with  Prussia  and 
Austria  in  opposing  France,  would  have  postponed  into  the 
distant  future  the  object  so  ardently  coveted — the  possession 
of  the  jjrincipalities  on  the  Danube,  and  possibly  also  Constanti- 
nople. Moreover,  Alexander  was  not  without  vanity,  and  he 
was  anxious  to  demonstrate  to  the  opposition  in  the  country 


440  Affairs  in   France  [I8O8 

by  means  of  a  striking  success  that  he  had  not  erred  in  his  choice 
of  the  way  to  Russia's  greatness  when  deciding  at  Tilsit  to  at- 
tach himself  to  the  Emperor  of  the  French.  Of  course  apostasy 
now  would  be  regarded  only  as  an  acknowledgment  on  his  part 
that  his  judgment  had  been  at  fault.  And  the  longer  Napoleon 
was  kept  occupied  in  Spain  the  better  Alexander's  hopes  of  at- 
taining his  goal  in  the  East.  Therefore  nothing  must  be  allowed 
to  occur  which  should  interrupt  Napoleon  in  his  undertaking 
upon  the  Iberian  Peninsula;  Austria  and  Prussia  must  be 
brought  to  a  state  of  tranquillity,  since  a  war  brought  about 
by  them  would  call  the  French  eastward  and  necessitate  the 
directing  of  Russian  forces  toward  the  west  instead  of  letting 
them  gather  in  the  south  the  laurels  which  had  come  within 
such  easy  reach.  The  interests  of  Alexander  and  Napoleon 
were  thus  for  the  time  being  identical  upon  this  point,  that  the 
swords  of  the  powers  of  Middle  Europe  should  be  kept  in  their 
scabbards  as  long  as  the  war  in  Spain  should  continue.  Hence 
it  was  that  the  Czar  zealously  dissuaded  his  friend  Frederick 
William  III.  from  taking  part  in  any  hostile  act  on  Austria's 
part,  and  urged  him  to  ratify  that  most  oppressive  convention 
which  Prince  William  had  signed  in  Paris  on  September  8th, 
1808,  according  to  which  Prussia  had  still  to  pay  140,000,000 
francs,  to  deliver  to  the  French  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder,  to 
maintain  the  number  of  the  army  at  a  figure  below  42,000,  and, 
in  case  of  war  between  France  and  Austria,  to  furnish  an  auxili- 
ary corps.  In  Vienna  also  he  gave  warning  that  quiet  must 
be  preserved  so  that,  as  he  said,  the  painful  necessity  might 
be  spared  him  of  arraying  his  forces  against  Austria.  This 
done  he  took  his  departure  for  Erfurt. 

Here,  from  September  27th,  festivity  followed  upon  festivity. 
It  was  not  known  until  afterwards  that  the  life  of  the  Corsican 
Caesar  was  being  threatened  by  Prussian  conspirators.  Napo- 
leon did  the  honours  to  his  imperial  guest  with  pomp  and  splen- 
dour as  before  at  Tilsit.  His  grenadiers  were  selected  as  mili- 
tary attendants,  while  his  political  train  was  composed  of  the 
princes  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhhie.  The  actors  from 
the  "Com6die  FranQaise"  played  before  "a  parterre  of  kings" 


^T.  39]  The  Conference  at  Erfurt  441 

the  masterpieces  of  French  tragedy  and  upon  a  certain  occasion 
when  Voltaire's  "(Edipus"  was  being  performed,  as  Tahna 
pronounced  the  words: 

"The  friendship  of  a  great  man 
Is  a  true  gift  of  the  gods, " 

the  Czar  arose  and,  seizing  the  hand  of  Napoleon,  clasped  it 
in  his  own,  to  the  applause  of  the  audience.  Yet,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  there  existed  not  the  slightest  trace  of  sympathy  of 
feeling  between  these  two  men,  and  everything  which  would 
appear  as  the  outward  expression  of  such  was  simply  the  result 
of  calculation.  Alexander  was  at  heart  not  in  the  least  degree 
attached  to  Napoleon,  whose  encroachments  he  regarded  as  an 
unmixed  evil.  "The  torrent  must  be  allowed  its  course,"  said 
he  one  day.  But  each  of  them  recognized  his  o\\ti  advantage 
in  their  appearing  to  Europe  as  friendly  and  united,  and  acted 
accordingly.  We  are  not  so  much  in  the  dark  as  to  their  inter- 
views as  is  the  case  with  the  meeting  at  Tilsit.  We  know  that 
Napoleon  asked  Alexander  to  unite  with  him  in  demanding  of 
Austria  the  recognition  of  Joseph  as  king  of  Spain,  and,  by 
way  of  enforcing  his  demand,  he  was,  according  to  Talleyrand's 
Memoirs,  to  post  a  Russian  army  corps  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  Austrian  frontier.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  known  that 
Alexander  did  not  accept  the  proposal,  reserving  to  himself 
simply  liberty  of  action  in  respect  to  Turkey,  and  promising 
co-operation  only  in  case  Austria  should  declare  war.  Napoleon's 
secret  object  in  this  had  been  to  involve  Russia  in  war  with  her 
German  neighbours  and  thus  keep  her  forces  employed  so  that 
they  could  not  be  directed  against  Turkey.  Alexander,  for  his 
part,  believed — as  was  whispered  by  Talleyrand,  who  had  now 
already  begun  to  side  against  Napoleon — that  in  abstaining  from 
threats  of  any  kind  to  Austria  he  should  hold  France  in  check 
with  the  help  of  Vienna  and  vice  versa,  and  thus  be  enabled  to 
pursue  his  own  designs  upon  the  lower  Danube  without  having 
aught  to  fear  from  either. 

Napoleon's  first  scheme  having  thus  failed,  he  besought  the 
Czar  to  defer  bringing  about  a  rupture  with  the  Porte,  at  least 


442  Affairs  in   France  [isoa 

until  after  England  should  have  accepted  or  rejected  the  pro- 
posals of  peace  which  they  were  together  about  to  submit  to  her. 
But  Alexander  had  determined  upon  demanding  the  two  prin- 
cipalities of  Turkey  as  the  condition  of  peace,  and  again  refused 
acquiescence,  and  Napoleon  was  once  more  obliged  to  be  con- 
tent. The  final  result  of  the  meeting  at  Erfurt  was  a  new  treaty 
of  alliance  signed  on  October  12th,  1808,  and  which  was  to 
remain  secret  "for  ten  years  at  least."  The  first  matter  therein 
decided  was  that  the  two  powers  should  unite  in  presenting  to 
England  a  new  proposal  of  peace,  and  that  upon  the  basis  of 
present  possession  ("Uti  possidetis"),  a  totally  gratuitous  pro- 
ceeding, since  it  was  just  this  existing  supremacy  of  France  upon 
the  Continent  which  England  had  been  contesting  ever  since 
1803.  In  Articles  8  to  10  Napoleon  then  acknowledged  the  ex- 
tension of  the  Russian  boundary  as  far  as  the  Danube,  and  further 
engaged  not  to  interfere  in  affairs  between  the  Czar  and  Sultan, 
and  to  take  no  part  therein  in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  war  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey  unless  Austria  should  molest  Russia 
in  her  proceedings. 

There  it  stood  now,  legally  drawn  up  and  signed — the  act 
providing  for  that  against  which  he  had  for  so  long  secretly  con- 
tended :  Russia  was  to  enter  into  possession  of  the  principalities 
on  the  Danube.  For  himself  there  had  been  but  one  thing  gained, 
and  for  that  the  interview  was  scarcely  requisite:  he  could  now 
really  proceed  to  the  regulation  of  affairs  in  Spain  without  danger 
of  immediate  interruption  by  threatenings  in  the  East.  On  the 
whole  it  was,  however,  nothing  less  than  a  political  defeat  which 
he  had  undergone.  The  Czar  indeed  felt  that  to  make  an  en- 
trance into  Constantinople  was  all  very  fine,  but  that  there  were 
also  very  real  advantages  to  be  derived  from  a  conquest  in  which 
there  was  no  obligation  to  share  with  others.  Later,  in  1810, 
Napoleon  in  conversation  with  Metternich  expressed  regret  at 
"having  been  thrown  out  of  his  course"  at  Erfurt.  Possibly  his 
consequent  ill-humour  was  the  occasion  of  sundry  unfeeling  acts 
at  this  time  of  whicli  history  has  preserved  the  record.  As,  for 
instance,  upon  one  occasion  he  invited  Prince  William  of  Prussia, 
who  was  present  as  the  representative  of  his  brother,  to  a  rabbit- 


JET.S9]  Napoleon   and   Goethe  443 

hunt  upon  the  battlefield  of  Jeiui;  while  another  da}',  in  the 
presence  of  Alexander,  he  called  upon  soldiers  who  w'cre  march- 
ing through  the  town  to  recount  their  exploits  in  the  war  against 
Russia,  and  rewarded  some  of  them  therefor  with  the  order  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour.  Talleyrand  characterized  such  conduct 
very  justly  in  saying  to  Montgelas:  "We  Frenchmen  are  farther 
advanced  in  civilization  than  our  sovereign;  he  has  not  passed 
the  stage  of  civilization  in  Roman  history." 

But  while  Napoleon  was  not  always  extremely  courteous  in 
his  bearing  toward  princes,  he  distinguished  with  special  favour 
the  great  men  of  Germany  whom  he  saw  during  his  sojourn  at 
Erfurt.  On  October  2d  the  author  of  "Faust"  was  admitted  to 
audience.  Goethe  himself  has  reported  in  regard  to  the  occasion 
that  Napoleon  greeted  him  with  the  words:  "You  are  a  man!"* 
and  talked  with  him  about  "Werthers  Leiden,"  dramatic  art, 
and  fate  tragedy,  and  proposed  to  him  the  composition  of  a  work 
in  which  the  death  of  Ciesar  should  be  represented  in  a  manner 
more  worthy  and  imposing  than  had  been  possible  to  Voltaire. 
"The  world  should  be  shown,"  said  the  Emperor, — and  it  is  not 
difficult  to  perceive  his  object, — "that  Caesar  would  have  been  a 
benefaction  to  it,  and  that  everything  would  have  been  very 
different  if  he  had  but  been  allowed  time  to  execute  his  magnani- 
mous projects."  A  tragedy  such  as  this  would,  in  his  opinion, 
be  instructive  both  to  kings  and  peoples.  For  what,  indeed,  did 
one  want  of  fate  in  tragedy?  Statecraft,  according  to  him,  was 
the  real  destiny.  And  just  as  he  had  summoned  Goethe  to  think 
highly  of  Caesar,  or,  in  other  words,  of  himself,  did  he  endeavour 
to  brhig  Wieland  to  inculcate  a  better  opmion  of  the  Roman 
emperors  than  that  commonly  entertained.  It  was  the  same 
view  about  Tacitus  which  he  had  already  repeatedly  discussed 
with  Suard,  Johannes  von  Miiller,  and  others,  always  with  the 
idea  that  he  might  eventually  be  compared  with  the  successors 
of  Augustus.  Christianity  was  another  of  the  subjects  which  he 
brought  up  in  conversation  with  Wieland,  and  which  he  desig- 
nated as  "  an  unsurpassable  system  of  philosophy,  since  in  recon- 

*"Vous  6tes  un  homme."  See  Diintzer's  Life  of  Goethe,  p.  578. 
note  3.— B. 


444  Affairs  in  France  [I8O8 

ciling  man  with  himself  it  at  the  same  time  secures  public  order 
and  tranquillity  to  the  state  in  the  same  degree  that  hope  and 
happiness  are  assured  to  the  individual."  There  was  evident 
purpose  in  Napoleon's  conduct  in  Erfurt  and  Weimar  in  mani- 
festing far  greater  respect  to  the  princes  among  poets  than  to 
the  different  local  rulers:  in  the  first  place  he  desired  to 
show  sympathy  of  some  kind  with  the  German  nation,  which  was 
constantly  drawing  farther  from  him,  and  next  he  wished  the 
world  to  see  that,  in  spite  of  crown  and  sceptre,  he  felt  himself 
more  closely  allied  with  men  of  genius  than  with  those  whom 
birth  alone  had  placed  above  the  ordinary  level. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN  SPAIN   AND  AUSTRIA.      MARIE  LOUISE 

Napoleon  had  obtained  in  Erfurt  the  respite  of  which  he 
stood  in  need  for  carrying  on  his  contest  against  Spain.  How 
long  this  respite  would  last  was  indeed  uncertain,  and  he  must 
therefore  be  on  the  alert  to  crush  out  the  rebellious  movement 
b>  the  most  expeditious  and  forcible  stroke  possible  and  thus 
get  back  the  lost  throne  for  his  brother.  And  this  was  necessary 
not  only  for  the  sake  of  confirming  his  power,  but  also  for  the 
sake  of  his  prestige.  The  world  must  never  be  allowed  to  assume 
that  he  had  made  a  mistake  in  robbing  the  Spaniards  of  their 
native-bom  king,  or  indeed  that  he  were  capable  of  a  mistake 
of  any  kind,  for  he  did  not  feel  sufficiently  secure,  nor  was  he 
high-minded  enough,  to  acknowledge  an  error  without  fear  of 
detriment  to  himself.  For  this  double  reason  he  resolved  to  cross 
the  Pyrenees  hhnself  with  forces  far  outnumbering  those  of 
Spain,  and  prove  to  all  Europe  that  resistance  to  hhnself  was  an 
impossibility.  The  troops  which  had  undergone  defeat  in  Spain 
had  been  for  the  most  part  only  young,  untried  soldiers;  those 
whom  he  now  took  with  him  were  the  unconquered  veterans  of 
Uhn  and  Austerlitz,  of  Jena  and  Friedland.  It  cost  no  small 
struggle  to  these  troops  simply  to  pass  through  their  native 
country  after  having  been  absent  from  it  for  three  years,  and 
Napoleon  tried  to  inspire  them  with  enthusiasm  by  making 
speeches  to  them  full  of  fire  and  flattering  promises,  and  secretly 
gave  orders  to  the  municipal  officers  of  the  cities  to  honour  them 
upon  their  march  with  banquets  and  carousals,  with  songs  and 
speeches  expressing  pride  in  their  past  achievements  and  confi- 
dence in  those  to  follow,  seeking  thus  to  impress  the  warriors 
with  the  idea  that  the  hopes  and  desires  of  France  were  really 

445 


44^  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isos 

centred  in  the  feats  of  arms  Avhich  they  were  about  to  perform.* 
And  with  the  troops  went  also  their  tried  and  trusted  leaders: 
Lannes,  Soult  and  Bessieres,  Ney  and  Lofcbvrc,  Moncey  and 
Victor,  all  were  detailed  to  Spain  with  Berthier  as  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff.  All  together,  besides  the  Guard  and  the  cavalry 
reserve,  there  were  eight  army  corps  sent  to  engage  in  the  struggle 
with  the  rebellious  people;  for  even  Junot,  who  had  been  de- 
feated at  Cintra,  was  again  to  take  part  in  the  conflict  with  his 
20,000  men.  An  army  was  thus  made  up  of  more  than  200,000 
combatants  under  leadership  of  the  greatest  of  military  geniuses, 
fitted  out  with  every  equipment  and  excellently  clothed  and  fed. 
All  these  exertions  put  forth  by  Napoleon  in  order  to  regain 
the  prestige  which  he  had  lost  in  Spain  were  in  striking  contrast 

*  Two  of  Napoleon's  decrees  addressed  to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
in  September,  1808,  are  exceedingly  characteristic.  "I  desire,"  said  he 
in  one  of  them,  "that  you  should  direct  the  prefects  of  departments 
along  the  line  of  march  to  be  unsparing  in  attentions  to  the  troops  and 
to  use  every  means  to  keep  up  the  good  spirits  animating  them  and  their 
love  of  glory.  Harangues,  couplets,  free  theatrical  exhibitions,  banquets — 
these  are  what  I  expect  of  citizens  in  honour  of  soldiers  who  are  returning 
as  victors."  A  few  weeks  later  he  wrote :  "The  troops  have  been  feasted 
at  Metz,  at  Nancy,  at  Rheims.  It  is  my  wish  that  they  should  be  similarly 
entertained  at  Paris,  at  Melun,  at  Sens,  at  Saumur,  at  Tours,  at  Bourges, 
and  at  Bordeaux,  which  will  mean  three  times  for  the  same  troops.  You 
will  kindly  send  me  an  account  of  what  the  cost  of  this  will  be  per  head, 
according  to  what  you  have  authorized.  Order  songs  made  ready  in 
Paris  for  distribution  in  these  various  cities.  These  songs  are  to  recount 
the  glory  acquired  by  the  army  and  that  which  is  yet  to  be  won,  to  extol 
the  freedom  of  the  seas  which  is  to  be  the  result  of  its  victories.  These 
songs  are  to  be  sung  at  the  banquets  to  be  given.  You  will  have  to 
order  three  collections  of  songs  so  that  the  soldier  shall  not  hear  the  same 
ones  twice  over."  These  orders  were  carried  out  to  the  letter.  F^zensac, 
for  instance,  mentions  in  his  "Momoires"  that  "The  march  of  these 
different  corps  through  France  was  a  triumphant  progress.  The  municipal 
authorities  in  all  cities  vied  with  one  another  in  showing  zeal  in  their 
reception.  Everywhere  were  organized  military  festivities;  everywhere 
banquets  were  tendered  them.  Compliments,  harangues,  soldier  songs 
followed  one  upon  another  celebrating  the  triumphs  of  the  Grand 
Anny  and  predicting  others  to  follow."  No  one  realized  that  all  of  this 
had  been  secretly  prearranged  by  the  Emperor  and  paid  for  out  of  his 
pocket. 


jet.39]  Lack  of  Preparation  in  Spain  447 

to  the  preparations  made  by  his  opponents,  which  were  pitifully 
meagre.  Instead  of  following  up  and  turning  to  the  best 
account  their  victories  at  Baylen  and  elsewhere  driving  the 
French  completely  out  of  the  country  and  making  provision 
for  its  defence,  the  Spaniards  had  given  themselves  com- 
pletely over  to  an  intoxication  of  joy  which  made  them  forget 
all  danger  threatening  in  the  future  and  imagine  their  task 
of  national  liberation  already  accomplished.  Every  one  over- 
estimated the  amount  of  forces  at  disposal,  as  also  the 
capacity  of  the  generals  and  the  courage  of  the  troops,  for 
whom  nothing  could  have  been  more  pernicious  than  this 
over-hasty  giving  up  to  the  triumphs  already  won;  the  va- 
rious Juntas  in  their  rivalry  worked  at  cross-purposes  to  one 
another,  and  the  different  generals  likewise;  the  people,  hereto- 
fore accustomed  to  the  most  absolute  rule  and  now  left  sud- 
denly without  a  master,  sank  into  helplessness  and  anarchy. 
"The  French  were  welcome  to  enter  the  country  if  they  pleased; 
they  would  be  surrounded  right  and  left  and  taken  prisoners  all 
at  once" — this  was  the  opinion,  not  as  expressed  by  subordinates 
and  the  lower  classes  of  people,  but  as  the  conclusion  of  a  council 
of  war  held  in  September.  In  fact  some  of  the  newspapers  even 
spoke  seriously  of  "wreaking  vengeance  upon  the  other  side  of 
the  Pyrenees."  And  meanwhile,  blinded  by  this  infatuation, 
the  army — which  had  been  ostentatiously  estimated  at  between 
300,000  and  400,000  men,  while  numbering  in  reality  little 
more  than  100,000 — was  left  without  sufficient  cavalry,  the 
troops  were  not  drilled  for  fighting  and  were  without  clothing 
and  provisions.  Moreover,  instead  of  putting  it  under  com- 
mand of  a  general-in-chief,  the  military  guidance  was  entrusted 
to  a  war-committee,  which  was  to  direct  operations  from  Aran- 
juez,  where  it  had  established  headquarters.  Under  such 
management  there  could  result  nothing  but  cruel  disappoint- 
ment, the  contest  was  by  far  too  unequal. 

Nothing  would  have  been  more  satisfactoiy  for  Napoleon  than 
for  the  Spaniards  actually  to  carry  out  their  plan  of  marching 
forth  and  attempting  to  surround  the  French  army,  "\^^lile  still 
in  Erfurt  he  gave  orders  to  allow  the  left  wing  of  the  adversary, 


44^  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isos 

consisting  of  over  oO,0()0  men  under  General  Blake,  to  advance 
as  far  as  possible  toward  Biscay  and  Navarre,  so  as  to  fall  upon 
it  in  the  rear  with  considerable  forces  which  should  be  thrust  in 
between  it  and  the  Spanish  centre.  But  toward  the  end  of 
October  Lefebvre  was  tempted  to  offer  battle  ahead  of  time,  and 
the  enemy  was  compelled  to  retreat  from  Durango  to  Valmaseda, 
thus  frustrating  the  plans  of  the  Emperor.  Upon  arrival  of  the 
latter  at  headquarters  in  Vittoria,  on  November  5th,  1808,  Le- 
febvre was  sternly  reprimanded,  but  the  plan  for  breaking  through 
the  line  of  the  enemy  was,  after  all,  not  given  up.  The  Spanish 
centre,  consisting  of  about  25,000  men,  was  held  under  command 
of  Castanos  between  Calahorra  and  Tudela  on  the  Ebro,  and 
the  right  wing  under  Palafox  at  Saragossa.  The  advance  of  the 
main  body  of  the  French  army  was  now  directed  between  Cas- 
tanos and  Blake  towards  Burgos,  while  two  corps  were  detailed 
to  follow  at  the  heels  of  Blake.  The  conquest  of  Burgos  was 
brought  about  after  the  defeat  of  an  insignificant  Spanish  re- 
serve army  on  November  10th,  and  at  the  same  time  Blake  was 
involved  in  a  battle  near  Espinosa,  which  he  lost  on  the  11th. 
Cut  off  from  his  Ihie  of  retreat,  it  was  ordy  by  abandoning  his 
entire  baggage-train  that  he  was  able  to  save  himself  from  cap- 
ture by  Soult.  He  directed  his  flight  toward  Asturias,  where 
a  small  Spanish  corps  under  Romana  received  the  fragments 
remaining  of  what  had  been  the  left  wing  of  the  Spanish 
army. 

The  next  task  which  Napoleon  now  set  himself  was  to  crush 
Castanos,  who  had  meanwhile  joined  forces  with  Palafox.  For 
this  purpose  he  proceeded  to  send  Ney,  with  his  corps  some- 
what re-enforced,  from  Burgos  southeastward  to  Soria,  so  as 
to  fall  thence  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  or  cut  off  his  line  of 
retreat,  while  Tvannes  should  attack  in  the  front  from  Navarre. 
The  attack  in  front  took  place  as  arranged  and  was  successful, 
Lannes  defeating  the  cnemj'^  in  the  battle  of  Tudela  on  Novem- 
ber 23d.  Palafox  was  obliged  to  retreat  to  Saragossa,  while  Cas- 
tagnos  fled  toward  the  south,  where  he  would  unquestionably 
have  been  captured  by  Ney  had  the  latter  not  been  deceived 
through  exaggerated  reports  as  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy, 


Mr.  39]  The   Capture   of  Madrid  449 

which  made  him  hesitate  and  finally  remain  in  Soria.  But  at  all 
events  the  two  Spanish  amiies  had  been  scattered. 

There  yet  remained  the  British  expeditionary  corps  in  Por- 
tugal, to  which  Junot  had  before  been  compelled  to  surrender 
at  Cintra,  and  which  was  now  approaching  under  John  Moore 
by  way  of  Salamanca,  while  10,000  Englishmen  were  advancing 
from  Corunna.  Of  this  movement  Napoleon  was  as  completely 
in  ignorance  as  was  Moore  of  the  defeats  of  the  Spaniards.  The 
Emperor,  who  had  proceeded  from  Burgos  on  to  Aranda,  assumed 
rather  that  the  English  would  march  through  the  valley  of  the 
Tagus  upon  Madrid,  and  therefore  bent  all  his  energies  upon 
putting  himself  in  possession  of  the  capital.  After  giving  orders 
to  Moncey  to  blockaile  Saragossa  he  marched  on  toward  the 
Sierra  de  Guadarrama,  which  encloses  and  defends  the  plain  to 
the  north  of  ^Madrid,  while,  preceding  the  main  army,  Lefebvre 
advanced  upon  its  right  to  Segovia  by  way  of  Valladohd,  and 
Ney  upon  its  left  in  the  direction  of  Guadalajara.  The  pass  of 
Somosierra  was  defended  by  12,000  Spaniards,  who,  provided 
with  artillery,  were  in  a  position  to  make  further  progress  an 
arduous  matter  to  the  French.  The  declivities  and  the  solitary 
road  here  mounting  abruptly  were  covered  by  sixteen  cannon  be- 
hind which  were  concealed  strong  detachments  of  infantry.  The 
first  thing,  before  dawn,  on  November  30th  Napoleon  ordered 
his  tirailleurs  to  climb  the  heights,  a  feat  successfully  accom- 
plished under  cover  of  fog;  the  road,  although  swept  by  the 
Spanish  artillery,  was  cleared  by  the  Polish  horse-guards,  who 
rode  at  a  gallop  into  the  face  of  the  terrific  fire,  hewing  down 
the  gunners  and  driving  back  the  enemy's  infantry  as  well. 
The  defenders  of  the  pass  fled  in  all  directions  without  thought 
of  order.    The  road  to  Madrid  was  free  of  all  obstructions. 

At  that  capital  uncontrollable  excitement  prevailed  at  the 
realization  of  the  contrast  between  the  self-complacent  and  boast- 
ful assurances  with  which  the  Juntas  had  until  now  been  delud- 
ing the  nation,  and  the  fact  of  the  French  being  at  the  gates  of 
the  city.  The  horrors  of  despair  which  this  knowledge  brought 
with  it  were  of  advantage  only  to  the  conqueror,  who  was  thus 
enabled  to  appear  as  the  restorer  of  order,  and  who,  b}'  the  harsh 


450  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  isos 

measures  with  which  he  subdued  all  manifestations  of  anarchy, 
was  successful  in  calming  no  small  part  of  the  population  and  even 
to  some  extent  in  v/inning  them  to  himself.  On  December  4th 
the  city  surrendered  to  the  Emperor,  and  before  the  close  of  the 
same  da}^  he  promulgated  four  decrees  calling  for  a  complete 
revolution  of  public  affairs  in  Spain:  the  Inquisition  was  sup- 
pressed and  its  domains  declared  national  property;  all  feudal 
rights  werei  abolished;  the  provincial  tariffs  were  done  away; 
the  monasteries  were  reduced  to  one  third  of  their  number  and, 
for  such  monks  as  desired  of  their  own  free  will  to  enter  the 
secular  clergy,  pensions  were  provided.  Joseph,  who  followed 
his  brother's  victorious  army,  protested  indeed  that  these  were 
encroachments  upon  his  rights  as  a  ruler  and  threatened  to  re- 
sign, but  this  privilege  was  denied  him  by  Napoleon,  who  de- 
clared to  him,  as  he  did  to  the  inhabitants  of  Madrid,  that  he  had 
come  as  a  conqueror,  since  the  act  of  Rayonne  had  been  nullified 
by  the  Spanish  rebellion,  and  his  right  was  that  of  the  victor. 
In  Burgos  he  had  already  published  a  decree  of  proscription, 
and  those  thereby  made  outlaws  had  reason  to  rejoice  at  suffer- 
mg  no  greater  hardship  than  being  carried  off  to  France,  their 
property  being,  of  course,  confiscated.  In  this  exhibition  of  sever- 
ity, as  in  every  act  of  Napoleon's,  there  was  a  distinct  purpose, 
and  his  aim  here  was  to  make  the  rule  of  his  mild  and  lenient 
brother  seem  desirable.  In  a  proclamation  of  December  7th  he 
called  the  attention  of  the  Spaniards  to  Joseph  and  his  moderate 
and  constitutional  government.  "It  depends  only  upon  your- 
selves," said  he,  "to  determine  whether  this  constitution  shall 
remain  your  law.  But  if  all  my  efforts  prove  vain  and  you  will 
not  justify  the  confidence  which  I  repose  in  you,  there  will  be 
left  to  me  no  alternative  but  to  treat  you  as  conquered  provinces 
and  to  place  my  brother  upon  another  throne.  I  shall  then  my- 
self assume  the  crown  of  Spain,  and  I  shall  find  means  of  making 
it  respected  by  the  refractory,  for  God  has  endowed  me  with  both 
power  and  will  to  overcome  all  obstacles."  The  desired  effect 
was  at  once  produced.  In  Madrid  citizens,  officials,  and  even  the 
clergy  hastened  to  swear  allegiance  to  Joseph  as  king,  and  from 
the  provinces  also  (at  least  those  into  which  the  French  had 


^T.  39]  Movements  of  the   English  451 

already  made  their  way)  there  came  in  the  oaths  which  Napo- 
leon had  demanded.  It  was  through  religious  fervour  that  the 
Spanish  people  had  been  kindled  into  opposing  the  most  ener- 
getic possible  resistance,  and  it  was  Napoleon's  tlesign  to  make 
use  of  that  same  religious  zeal  for  binding  the  nation  into  sub- 
jection by  an  oath  based  upon  it. 

"WTiile  affairs  were  being  thus  managed  in  Madrid  Moore  with 
his  English  troops  had  advanced  to  Salamanca,  where,  hearing 
of  the  various  defeats  of  the  Spanish,  he  had  been  for  some  time 
awaiting  developments,  not  daring  to  continue  his  march  farther. 
It  was  a  considerable  time  before  this  came  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  Emperor,  who  had  never  ceased  to  suppose  that  the  British 
would  march  straight  upon  the  capital.  Even  as  late  as  Decem- 
ber 14th  he  had  ordered  Victor  and  Bessieres  to  Talavera  and 
beyond,  while  Ney  was  to  leave  part  of  his  troops  to  cope  with 
the  remains  of  Casta iios'  corps  and  return  with  the  other  part 
to  ]\Iadrid.  It  was  not  until  some  days  later  that  he  learned  the 
true  facts  of  the  case  from  Soult,  who  was  stationed  near  \'alla- 
dolid  so  as  to  maintain  communication  between  the  main  army 
and  France.  These  tactics  on.  Moore's  part  seemed  at  first  incom- 
prehensible, but  Napoleon  at  once  recognized  how  they  might 
be  turned  to  the  destruction  of  the  British.  Soult,  who  had 
shortly  before  been  instructed  to  march  into  Galicia,  now  re- 
ceived re-enforcements  with  orders  to  entice  Moore  as  far  as 
possible  toward  the  east,  whilst  Napoleon  himself  would  march 
from  Madrid  with  40,000  men  in  a  northwesterly  direction,  so 
that,  after  crossing  the  mountains,  he  could  fall  upon  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  in  01<1  Castile. 

The  plan  was  excellent,  but  was  destined,  after  all,  to  but 
partial  success.  Infonnation  had  reached  Moore  of  Napoleon's 
earlier  command  to  Soult  to  proceed  into  Galicia,  and,  acting 
upon  this,  he  had  not  continued  his  advance  for  the  present  to- 
ward Valladolid,  but  had  swerved  to  the  north  from  his  course 
in  order  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  forces  approaching  from 
Corunna  before  venturing  an  attack  upon  Soult.  This  movement 
had  the  effect  of  placing  a  greater  distance  between  himself  and 
the  army  m  pursuit  from  Madrid.     Now  Napoleon  may  very 


452  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isos 

likely  have  supposed  the  march  through  the  Guadarrama  Pass 
and  the  Old  Castilian  plains  a  much  simpler  and  easier  matter 
than  it  proved  to  be,  for  he  encountered  all  sorts  of  difficulties. 
In  the  mountains  the  troops  suffered  from  snow-storms  and  sleet. 
He  was  obliged  to  order  his  horse-guards  to  dismount  and  break 
the  way  leading  their  horses,  whilst  he  himself  walked  in  their 
midst.  This  occurred  on  December  22d  as  they  were  making 
their  way  across  the  Pass  of  Espinar.  On  the  following  day  there 
came  a  thaw,  turning  the  rivers  into  raging  torrents,  and  these 
had  to  be  forded,  since  all  bridges  had  been  washed  away,  threat- 
ening a  new  danger.  All  these  obstacles  combined  to'  hamper 
and  impede  the  progress  of  the  troops,  so  that  it  was  with  great 
difficulty  that  they  finally  got  as  far  as  Astorga.  Moore,  having 
meanwhile  discovered  the  true  situation  of  affairs,  had  bent 
his  course  toward  Corunna ;  owing  to  the  start  which  he  had  of 
his  pursuer,  he  was  able  to  escape  the  danger  of  being  ground  to 
atoms  between  the  armies  of  Soult  and  Napoleon,  and  the  French 
had  to  content  themselves  with  following  him  up  closely,  a  task 
which  the  Emperor  turned  over  to  Soult  alone,  returning  himself 
from  Astorga  to  Benavente  and  thence  to  Valladolid.  Could  he 
have  foreseen  that  the  English  upon  reaching  Corunna  would 
not  find  the  transport  fleet  ready  and  would  be  obliged  to  draw 
up  in  line  of  battle,  that  through  Soult's  dilatoriness  they  would 
be  afforded  time  for  assuming  an  advantageous  position,  and 
finally  for  embarkation,  he  would  probably  have  set  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  pursuing  forces.  But  all  this  was  not  to  be  fore- 
seen, and,  regarding  his  own  work  as  ended,  after  directing  Soult 
to  occupy  Portugal,  he  left  the  country  on  January  17th  and 
hastened  to  Paris. 

He  had  undertaken  the  campaign  in  Spain  with  a  twofold 
purj)ose;  of  this  but  one  part  had  been  accomplished:  with  one 
or  two  rapid  blows  he  had  conquered  the  victors  of  Baylen  and 
restored  the  halo  of  his  own  invincibility.  The  second  was, 
however  a  failure:  Spain's  resistance  had  not  been  overcome. 
Battles  had  been  won  and  amiies  had  been  beaten,  dispersed, 
driven  off,  but  the  country  remained  unconquered,  the  people 
unsubdued.    The  remains  of  the  vanquished  armies  might  still 


Mr.  39]  Why  Napoleon  Left  Spain  453 

reassemble  in  the  south  and  strengthen  themselves  for  new  com- 
bat; the  British  might  land  with  their  fleet  in  Portugal  or  else- 
where. In  the  judgment  of  Jomini,  the  great  war-critic,  it  would 
have  required  a  systematic  campaign  of  two  years'  duration, 
with  the  expenditure  of  from  300  to  400  million  francs  for  the 
sustenance  of  the  army,  to  carry  through  the  subjugation  of 
Spain.  But  we  know  how  much  Napoleon  was  pressed  for  time 
and  upon  how  unsteady  a  basis  his  supremacy  in  Europe  was 
resting.  For  it  was  one  of  the  consequences  of  his  world-em- 
bracing policy  that  it  was  constantly  assigning  new  problems  to 
him  before  he  had  been  able  to  solve  that  upon  which  he  was 
already  engaged. 

Down  to  very  recent  times  the  truth  of  the  assertion  has  never 
been  questioned  that  on  January  2d,  1809,  Napoleon  received 
letters  in  Astorga  whose  contents  gave  him  cause  for  serit)us 
imeasiness  and  eventually  led  him  to  determine  upon  turning 
back  with  the  Guard;  in  these  letters  there  were  supposed  to 
have  been  reports  of  new  and  energetic  preparations  for  war  in 
Austria  and  of  secret  agreements  between  his  formerly  antago- 
nistic ministers,  Talleyrand  and  Fouche,  which  prevented  the 
Emperor  from  losing  himself  in  the  mountains  of  the  west.  Lan- 
frey  and  other  historians  have  characterized  this  as  mere  Napole- 
onic invention  and  given  it  as  their  opinion  that,  as  when  facing 
the  English  coast  in  1805,  the  Emperor  was  only  in  search  of  a 
pretext  for  escaping  from  the  situation  in  Spain  so  as  to  acquire 
new  glory  as  a  warrior  by  striking  another  blow  at  Austria.  This 
view  is,  however,  not  to  be  accepted  as  correct,  for  it  has  been 
shown  from  new  historical  sources,  such,  for  instance,  as  the 
"Souvenirs"  of  Maret  and  documents  of  Mettemich's,  that  there 
was  an  intrigue  which  was  by  no  means  insignificant  conducted 
by  Talleyrand,  Fouche,  and  others,  who  declared  the  Spanish 
undertaking,  and,  indeed,  all  of  the  world-embracing  policy  of 
the  Emperor  to  be  prejudicial  to  France.  Mettemich,  it  must 
be  admitted,  exaggerated  greatly  in  seeing  in  this  intrigue  a 
conspiracy  already  developed,  and  in  a  band  of  malcontents  a 
political  party  bent  upon  revolution  with  whom  reckoning  must 
be  made.     In  so  representing  matters  at  the  court  which  had 


454  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [i809 

sent  him  out  he  was  taking  the  course  best  adapted  to  lead  in 
Vienna  to  the  very  mistake  which  had  caused  Mack  in  1805  to 
advance  as  far  as  the  lUer.*  But,  however  this  may  have  been, 
there  was  enough  in  the  matter  for  the  news  in  regard  to  it  to 
make  an  impression  upon  the  Emperor,  who  was  by  nature  in- 
clined to  be  mistrustful,  and  to  recall  him  to  France  just  as  a  com- 
munication of  the  same  order  had  decided  him  to  return  after 
the  battle  of  Marengo  in  ISOCf 

But  of  greater  weight  than  this  in  determining  Napoleon  to 
leave  Spain  was  the  consideration  of  Austria's  attitude.  While 
he  had  been  fighting  in  Spain  Austria  had  zealously  pushed  for- 
ward her  military  preparations  and  appeared  resolved  upon 
war.  And  for  this  there  was  abundant  justification.  The  fact 
that  Napoleon  was  occupied  in  Spain  was  in  itself  a  favouring 
circumstance.  Metternich,  who  repaired  in  person  to  Vienna  in 
order  to  advise  in  the  light  of  what  he  had  seen  and  heard,  de- 
scribed the  available  forces  of  the  French  as  scarcely  superior 
in  number  to  those  of  Austria,  and  was  of  the  opinion  that  the 
Spanish  war  would  keep  busy  so  large  a  part  of  them  "that 
Austria's  forces,  inferior  to  those  of  France,  as  they  had  been 
before  the  Spanish  insurrection,  would  be  at  least  equal  to 
them  at  the  outset."  In  his  memorandum  of  December  4th, 
1808,  he  estimated  that  Napoleon  had  at  his  disposal  for  opera- 
tions in  eastern  Europe  only  a  little  more  than  200,000  men, 
and  on  the  same  day  Francis'  minister,  Stadion,  reported  to  him 
his  conviction  that  the  hour  had  come  "for  making  immediate 
use  of  the  forces  of  the  Austrian  state,  whose  reconstruction  had 
been  so  successfully  persevered  in  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the 
year.  The  desperate  financial  situation  furnished  another  argu- 
ment in  favour  of  decisive  action.  For  the  army  could  be  main- 
tained at  its  full  complement  only  until  spring,  when  measures 

*  "We  have  at  last  reached  an  epoch,"  said  the  Austrian  ambassador 
in  a  memorandum  dated  December  4th,  1808,  "where  allies  seem  to  be 
offering  within  the  PVench  Empire  itself,  and  these  allies  are  no  vile  and 
low-born  intriguers;  men  who  might  represent  the  nation  call  for  our 
support ;  that  support  is  to  our  own  interest,  our  one  interest,  and  like- 
wise to  that  of  posterity." 

t  See  page  203. 


^T.  39]  The  Situation  in   Prussia  455 

of  some  kind  would  have  to  be  taken.  For  weeks  already  England 
had  been  besought  for  subsidies,  but  these  had  been  promised 
only  upon  the  actual  breaking  out  of  war.  But  was  there,  then, 
no  other  help  besides  the  Spanish  diversion  and  England's  ma- 
terial support  upon  which  Austria  might  rely?  True,  there  was 
no  further  counting  in  Prussia  upon  the  ministry  of  Stein,  who 
had  advocated  a  German  national  revolt,  for  Stein,  at  the  request 
of  Napoleon,  had  been  deposed  from  office  and  had  come  as  an 
outlaw  to  reside  in  Austria.  But  his  downfall  had,  after  all, 
brought  about  no  real  change  of  system  at  the  Konigsberg  court. 
Was  it  not,  indeed,  to  be  regarded  as  a  distinct  indication  of 
amity  that  Count  Goltz  the  Prussian  minister,  should  frankly 
communicate  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  early  in  December 
the  fact  of  the  convention  entered  into  with  France  on  September 
8th  with  the  assurance  that  the  king,  even  if  not  able  to  draw 
out  at  once  from  the  obligations  thus  imposed  upon  him,  would 
nevertheless  seize  the  first  propitious  occasion  to  range  himself 
upon  the  side  of  Austria?  At  all  events  this  assurance  was  allowed 
great  weight  in  the  deliberations  in  Vienna.  They  had  indeed 
no  means  of  knowing  that  the  ministers  might  not  always  repre- 
sent exactly  the  views  and  purposes  of  the  King.  And  this  was 
just  what  happened  on  the  present  occasion.  Alexander  I.,  on 
his  journey  home  from  Erfurt  by  way  of  Konigsberg.  had  invited 
Frederick  William  to  visit  him  in  St.  Petersburg.  The  Czar's 
object  was  to  remove  him  from  his  surroundings,  where  all  were 
eager  for  war.  and  induce  him  to  abide  by  the  September  conven- 
tion. In  this  he  succeeded.  When  the  King  returned  to  his  own 
country  before  the  middle  of  February  he  would  thenceforth  hear 
nothing  more  of  taking  any  part  in  warlike  operations,  and  ex- 
horted Austria  to  preserve  the  peace,  or  at  the  utmost  to  limit 
her  action  to  parrying  an  attack  by  Napoleon;  he  should  himself 
not  separate  from  Russia.  Now  the  course  upon  which  Stadion 
had  fixed  was  based  upon  just  the  point  of  allowing  no  time  to 
the  foe  of  ancient  political  systems  to  concentrate  his  forces  and 
prepare  for  h\irling  himself  again  with  suj^erior  numbers  upon 
the  power  on  the  Danube.  His  proposal  was  rather  to  forestall 
such  a  possibility  by  attacking  Napoleon  before  the  Spanish 


45^  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isoo 

difficulties  should  have  ceased  to  engross  his  attention  and 
while  his  forces  were  still  to  a  great  extent  involved  in  the  penin- 
sula. 

This  announcement  of  Frederick  William's  meant  more 
than  the  destruction  of  the  hopes  of  Prussia  which  had 
been  entertained  in  Vienna.  It  revealed  at  the  same  time 
that  Austria  had  been  equally  mistaken  in  cherishing  hopes 
in  regard  to  Russia.  Talleyrand's  attitude  toward  the  Czar  at 
Erfurt  had  been  made  known  through  Metternich's  communi- 
cations from  Paris,  and  St.  Vincent,  the  Austrian  diplomat, 
upon  his  return  from  the  congress,  had  testified  that  every- 
thing had  not  passed  off  with  perfect  smoothness  between 
the  two  Emperors.  Doubts  had  therefore  arisen  as  to  the 
sincerity  of  the  friendship  between  Franr:e  and  Russia  in  spite 
of  the  ostentatious  manner  in  which  it  was  displayed,  and  the 
Russians  began  to  hope  that  the  Czar,  even  if  not  prepared  to 
adopt  an  entire  change  of  policy,  would  at  least  remain  neutral 
in  case  of  war  between  France  and  Austria.  But  to  Prince 
Schwarzenberg,  who  had  been  sent  as  Austrian  ambassador  to 
St.  Petersburg,  Alexander,  hoping  to  convince  Austria  with  the 
same  arguments  which  had  proved  efficacious  in  deahng  with 
Prussia,  flatly  announced  that  he  should  be  obliged  to  fulfil  his 
engagements  to  Napoleon,  since  the  Vienna  court  was  unquestion- 
ably the  aggressor  and  his  military  support  was  in  that  case 
pledged  to  France  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Erfurt  (March 
2d).  Now  the  object  of  the  Czar  was  simply  to  procure  for 
himself  the  widest  possible  freedom  of  action  in  the  Orient,  and 
he  was  in  nowise  concerned  in  furthering  Napoleon's  schemes  of 
dominion  over  the  world;  so  later,  when  he  recognized  that 
Austria  was  resolved  upon  war  in  spite  of  all  discouragements, 
he  vouchsafed  the  secret  assurance  that  he  would  avoid  dealing 
rigorously  with  her.     (April  15th.) 

But  even  if  the  Czar  and  the  King  of  Prussia  were  opposed 
to  war  with  France,  were  there  not  among  the  inhabitants  of 
their  countri  's  many  who  felt  otiicrwise  and  who  were  strong 
enough  to  co(  rce  their  governments  to  take  them  into  considera- 
tion?    Indeec   it  is  a  fact  of  the  greatest  significance  in  histor}- 


iET.  39]         Popular   Feeling   in   Germany  457 

that  at  this  time  neither  Alexaiuler  nor  Frederick  WilHam  did 
represent  the  feeUng  and  desires  of  their  peoples.  For,  just  as  in 
Austria  pubUc  opinion  had  clamoured  for  war  ever  since  the 
commission  of  the  crime  at  Bayonne  *  so  in  Germany  and 
Russia  enmity  toward  Napoleon  had  become  a  national  hatred 
which  was  making  itself  felt  more  and  more  plainly.  Public 
sentiment  in  Prussia  was  clearly  set  forth  in  a  letter  to  the  Queen 
from  the  Prussian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs :  "  If  the  King  delays 
any  longer  to  fix  upon  a  course  compatible  with  the  wishes  of  the 
people,  who  are  loud  in  their  demands  for  war  against  France, 
a  revolution  will  be  the  inevitable  result."  Even  personal  ene- 
mies of  Stein's,  such  as  the  Minister  Beyme,  importuned  Fred- 
erick William  to  separate  from  Russia  and  accept  the  homage 
of  the  provinces  which  had  formerly  been  his  on  the  farther  side 
of  the  Elbe.  Others  called  his  attention  to  the  danger  which  he 
was  incurring — that  Austria,  in  case  she  should  be  victorious  in 
this  war  of  liberation,  might  get  a  footing  also  in  northern  Ger- 
many, since  Silesia  v/as  already  signifying  her  desire  to  return 
under  Austrian  rule.  Ernst  Moritz  Arndt,  indeed,  cried  aloud 
to  the  world:  "Liberty  and  Austria!  shall  be  our  battle-cry; 
long  reign  the  House  of  Habsburg ! "  A  storm  of  enthusiasm  swept 
over  all  Germany  and  made  itself  felt  in  Vienna  in  spite  of  the 
dissuasions  and  warnings  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  now  again 
had  thoughts  of  abdicating  just  as  he  did  previous  to  the  battle 
of  Jena.  Was  it  then  so  serious  an  error  of  Stadion's  when,  acting 
upon  this  impression,  he  took  into  account  the  German  people 
rather  than  its  rulers,  and  finally  succeeded  in  constraining  even 
the  cold-hearted  Emperor  Francis  to  "hold  the  knife,  so  to 
speak,  to  the  throat  of  Napoleon"?   (End  of  February,  1809.) 

Just  what  Austria  hoped  to  gain  by  the  war  is  to  be  seen  from 
the  instructions  of  January  29th  given  to  Count  Wallmoden, 
who  was  empowered  to  act  as  plenipotentiary  in  the  negotiations 
with  England:  "to  get  back  to  the  point  of  inward  strength  and 

*  On  March  18th,  1809,  the  French  Charg^  d' Affaires  wrote  to  the 
home  Ministry  from  Vienna:  "In  1805  the  government  alone  advocated 
war,  neither  the  army  nor  the  people  desired  itj  in  1809  it  is  demanded 
by  government,  army,  and  people." 


458  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

consistency  at  which  the  country  stood  after  the  last  treaties 
previous  to  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg, .  .  ,  but  with  the  understand- 
ing that  the  right  is  reserved  to  make  certain  minor  arrangements 
concerning  the  improvement  of  our  frontier  and  our  position 
toward  Germany  when  a  favourable  opportunity  shall  present 
itself,  particularly  as  two  younger  branches  of  the  hereditary 
dynasty  have  been  deprived  of  their  rightful  inheritances  in  the 
course  of  the  revolutionary  wars  and  must  find,  either  in  Ger- 
many or  Italy,  rehabilitation  in  their  inherited  territories  or 
compensation  therefor."  Somewhat  farther  on  it  is  declared: 
"It  is  Austria's  desire,  if  she  should  be  successful  in  overthrow- 
ing the  tributary  system  of  Napoleon,  to  see  every  lawful  pro- 
prietor again  in  possession  of  the  lands  belonging  to  him  before 
the  time  of  Napoleon's  usurpations.  This  principle  is  to  apply 
first  of  all  to  Spain;  then  in  Italy  to  the  King  of  Naples,  the 
Pope,  and  the  King  of  Sardinia;  in  Germany  to  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, to  the  Elector  of  Hesse,  to  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  to 
the  King  of  England  as  regards  Hanover,  and,  lastly,  to  the 
present  duchy  of  Warsaw  in  favour  of  Prussia.  The  court  of 
Vienna  extends  this  principle  even  to  those  princes  of  Germany 
whom  in  the  approaching  war  it  would  be  compelled  to  treat  as 
foes,  but  whose  return  into  their  inherited  lands  at  the  close  of 
the  war  it  is  ready  to  guarantee  beforehand,  although  with  cer- 
tain conditions  more  or  less  severe  according  to  the  conduct 
observed  by  them  during  the  course  of  the  war."  * 

To  what  extent  Napoleon  was  informed  as  to  these  intentions 
on  the  part  of  Austria  when  he  so  abruptly  ceased  operations  in 
Spain  it  would  be  impossible  to  say  with  any  degree  of  accuracy. 
It  has,  however,  been  shown  that  many  a  bit  of  information 
reached  him,  generally  by  way  of  Munich,  concerning  the 
country's  preparations,  of  Austrian  agitations  to  rebellion  in 

*  Austria  was  even  prepared  "to  grant  to  the  King  of  Sardinia  an 
addition  to  his  former  territories  sufficient  to  prevent  his  being  compelled 
in  every  war  to  tal^e  slielter  under  tlie  1 'rench  flag  and  to  serve  as  advance- 
guard  to  tlie  I<"r(!neh  army.''  It  was  tiierclore  at  least  gross  exaggeration 
when,  upon  tlie  i)asis  of  this  very  document,  Austria's  aim  in  1809  was 
recently  described  as  "the  mastery  of  both  Italy  and  Germany."  (Oncken, 
Das  Zeitalter  der  Revolution,  II.) 


Mr.  39]  Napoleon's  Preparations  459 

Tyrol,  of  secret  agreements  between  the  Tyrolese  nobility  and 
the  government  at  Vienna,  with  various  other  acts  indicative  of 
a  renewal  of  hostilities.  During  his  Spanish  campaign  he  had  not 
for  a  moment  lost  sight  of  Austria,  and  although  he  had  left  only 
60,000  men  in  northern  Germany  under  Davout  and  30,000  in 
the  south  under  Oudinot,  he  was  constantly  intent  upon  the 
strengthening  of  these  forces,  which  would  have  l)Pon  by  no  means 
competent  to  resist  a  sudden  attack  of  the  Austrians.  He  de- 
manded of  the  Senate  the  conscription  of  1810,  and  succeeded 
in  having  the  number  of  annual  recruits  raised  from  80,000  to 
100,000  men.  This  last  measure  being  retroactive  enabled  him 
to  draw  20,000  men  additional  from  those  Uable  to  military 
service  in  each  of  the  years  from  1806  to  1809.  A  young  army 
of  160,000  men  was  thus  collected  out  of  which  he  organized  a 
fifth  battalion  to  every  regiment.  He  further  withdrew  from 
Spain  two  divisions  and  the  Guard,  and  ordered  two  other  di- 
visions which  were  already  on  the  march  thither  to  face  about 
and  return  to  Germany,  so  that  by  the  middle  of  April — the 
time  at  which  he  assumed  that  war  would  break  out — he  had  at 
his  disposal  there  200,000  men  exclusive  of  the  army  in  Italy. 
It  was  annoiuiced  in  Paris  that  the  Spanish  affair  was  at  an  end. 
the  country  subdued.  He  was  firmly  resolved  upon  the  new 
contest  and  was  unsparing  of  pains  in  preparation  for  it.  Here 
again  he  was  concerned  in  demonstrating  the  inviolability  of  his 
supremacy:  henceforward  no  one  need  cherish  the  hope  of 
agitating  with  impunity  against  him  whilst  he  was  elsewhere 
occupied.  In  his  eyes  any  state  manifesting  the  slightest  inde- 
pendence of  movement  was  regarded  as  rebellious  and  deserving 
of  punishment.  Moreover,  to  this  was  added  still  another  con- 
sideration. 

While  in  former  wars  the  army  had  been  self-sustaining  and 
had  yielded  in  addition  very  substantial  financial  profits,  the 
Spanish  campaign  had  not  only  brought  into  the  treasury  no 
war  indemnity,  but,  on  the  contrary,  had  occasioned  very  great 
expenditure.  The  financial  situation  had  thereby  suffered  greatly 
and  absolutely  demanded  improvement.  "He  is  in  need  of 
money,"  said  the  Russian  envoy  Romanzoff  to  Mettemich  in 


460  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [i809 

regard  to  Napoleon;  "he  made  no  attempt  to  conceal  the  fact 
from  me;  he  wants  war  with  Austria  as  a  means  of  getting  it." 
In  Vienna,  on  the  other  hand,  Zichy,  formerly  Minister  of  Finance 
and  now  a  member  of  the  ministry,  but  not  in  charge  of  a  depart- 
ment, was  Hkewise  crying:  "War,  for  the  business  situation 
demands  it!"  So  the  great  aims  of  world-mastery  on  the  one 
side  contending  with  world-liberation  on  the  other  were  inex- 
tricably bound  up  with  the  material  necessities  of  state  economy. 
Strife  was  inevitable  since  both  parties  desired  it.  But  to  Napo- 
leon, to  whom  it  had  so  often  meant  much,  it  was  now  doubly 
important  to  make  out  Austria  as  the  aggressor,  not  only  in  order 
to  be  able  to  demand  of  Russia  the  help  promised  under  those 
circumstances,  but  also  in  order  to  appear  again  to  the  French 
as  the  one  who  was  against  his  will  constantly  being  drawn  into 
war  by  foreign  powers.  To  this  intent  he  had,  for  instance,  cir- 
culated the  last  week  in  February  a  report  that  he  had  sent  to 
Vienna  to  make  proposals  of  a  most  acceptable  nature  in  the 
hope  of  maintaining  peace — a  statement  true  only  in  appearance. 
Moreover,  he  needed  time  to  complete  his  preparations,  for  the 
recruits  had  been  assembled  only  by  the  middle  of  February 
and  needed  first  to  be  drilled.  It  was  not  until  the  beginning 
of  March  that  he  gave  orders  to  concentrate  forces  in  southern 
Germany,  and  not  until  the  last  days  of  the  month  did  he 
arrange  the  strategic  arrangement  of  his  forces,  which  was  to 
be  completed  by  April  15th  under  supervision  of  the  staff.  Hos- 
tihties  would  not,  he  hoped  break  out  before  that  time  or  pref- 
erably until  even  later,  somewhere  about  the  end  of  April  or 
beginning  of  May,  as  he  wrote  on  March  27th  to  Eugene  Beau- 
harnais.  By  that  time  the  200,000  men  of  the  army  in  Germany 
ought  to  be  assembled  around  Ratisbon^  which  was  to  serve  as 
headquarters,  and  only  in  case  of  the  Austrians  engaging  earlier 
than  had  been  counted  upon  were  they  to  occupy  the  line  of  the 
Lech  with  Donauworth  as  point  of  support.  Should  they  be  suc- 
cessful in  assuming  the  position  at  Ratisbon — with  Davout  at 
Nuremberg,  Mass6na,  in  command  of  the  forces  last  sent  out,  at 
Augsburg,  and  Oudinot  with  the  Bavarian  troops  near  Ratisbon — 
they  were  prepared  against  all  contingencies.  The  enemy,  whose 


/Et.  39]  Vacillation   in   Austria  461 

main  arm}'  Napoleon  know  to  bo  in  Bohemia,  mip:ht  either  make; 
an  incui-sion  into  Bavaria  at  Cham  and  attempt  tf)  march  direct 
upon  Ratisbon,  in  which  case  the  French  divisions  rapidly  as- 
sembled would  stop  him  in  the  valley  of  the  Rep;en,  or  he  might 
direct  his  course  toward  Nuremberg  or  Bamberg,  running  the 
risk  of  being  cut  off  from  Bohemia,  or,  again,  he  might  de- 
bouch to  the  north  toward  Dresden,  when  the  French  would 
sally  into  Bohemia  and  follow  him  into  Germany;  but  if  the 
Austrians  should  arrange  to  outflank  the  French  position  on 
both  sides,  the  French  wovild  proceed  to  attack  their  centre, 
keeping  open  a  Hne  of  retreat  along  the  Lech.  Everything 
depended  upon  the  question  when  the  Austrians  would  open 
hostilities — for  the  first  step  must  be  left  to  them  to  take  on 
account  of  Russia — and  in  what  direction  that  step  would  be 
taken. 

In  the  offices  of  the  Austrian  quartermaster-general  the 
new  campaign  against  France  had  long  been  under  considera- 
tion. A  plan  had  been  elaborated  as  early  as  October,  1808, 
according  to  which  Davout  was  to  be  attacked  in  Saxony  and 
the  North  German  princes  and  peoples  incited  to  rise  in  oppo- 
sition to  Napoleon.  But  then  had  followed  a  long  series  of 
vacillations  due  to  the  fact  that  immediately  about  the  Emperor 
there  existed  all  the  time  two  currents  of  opinion,  one,  repre- 
sented by  Stadion,  advocating  the  most  expeditious  possible 
offensive  operations,  and  the  other,  represented  by  Archduke 
Charles,  advocating  extensive  equipments  for  defence  against 
the  possibiUty  of  Austria's  being  finally  attacked.  This  inde- 
cision continued  to  the  end  of  the  year,  and  the  question  was 
still  open  when  the  entire  month  of  January  had  passed  The 
only  certainty  reached  was  that  the  preparations  for  war  could 
not  be  completed  before  the  end  of  March.  It  was  not  until 
the  beginning  of  February  that  the  Emperor  decided  upon 
taking  the  offensive.  And  now  a  new  plan  of  operations  was 
formed  according  to  which  one  corps,  under  Archduke  Ferdinand, 
should  march  toward  Warsaw,  another  division  of  the  army, 
under  Archduke  John,  should  penetrate  into  Italy  and  roiLse 
the  Tyrol  to  insurrection,  while  a  corps  under  Hiller  should 


462  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

take  up  its  position  on  the  Inn,  but  the  body  of  the  army, 
under  Archduke  Charles,  shoukl  be  concentrated  in  Bohemia  so 
as  to  9perate  thence  according  to  the  position  which  the  main 
force  of  the  enemy  should  adopt.  (February  8th.)  But  by 
the  time  that  the  separate  corps  finally  began  to  assemble  in 
Bohemia,  news  came  of  the  advance  of  the  French  in  Suabia 
and  of  Davout's  march  upon  Wiirzburg,  that  is  to  say,  of  the 
concentration  of  the  hostile  army  in  the  valley  of  the  Danube, 
and  fears  began  to  be  felt  that  it  might  press  forward  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  river,  overpower  with  its  vastly  superior 
numbers  the  solitary  corps  under  Hiller  and  march  direct  upon 
the  capital,  while  the  main  body  of  the  Austrian  army  in  march- 
ing from  Bohemia  to  the  Danube  might  encounter  difficulties 
in  crossing  the  river  and  arrive  too  late  to  prevent  catastrophe.* 
Hence  it  was  decided  about  the  middle  of  March  that,  instead 
of  proceeding  directly  against  the  French  with  seven  of  the 
corps  which  had  been  assembled  in  Bohemia,  a  detour  should 
be  made  through  Linz  enabling  them  to  unite  first  with  Killer's 
detachment  and  so  assume  the  offensive  in  crossing  the  Inn 
rather  than  by  way  of  the  Bohemian  forest.  Two  army  corps 
only  which  were  left  behind  in  Bohemia  were  ordered  to  take 
the  direct  route  and  march  upon  Ratisbon  with  the  expectation 
that  they  would  have  rejoined  the  main  forces  before  the  de- 
cisive battle  should  take  place.  The  result  of  this  decision  was 
that  three  weeks  were  lost  in  executing  marches  with  extreme 
deliberation,  giving  time  to  the  Bavarians  to  make  all  their 
military  preparations,  including  the  evacuation  of  Munich.  It 
was  April  9th  before  the  Austrians  stood  at  the  Inn  ready 
for  crossing,  on  which  day  the  Archduke  Charles  sent  to  Munich 
his  declaration  of  war. 

A  few  days  before  the  Prince  had  addressed  his  army  in  a 

*  The  Austrian  Colonel  Stutterheim  claims  to  have  learned  from 
"those  who  were  well  informed"  that  these  were  the  reasons  which  in- 
fluenced the  decision,  but  the  whole  matter  is  at  present  still  wrapped  in 
darkness.  The  usually  accepted  idea  is  that  differences  in  regard  to  the 
plan  of  operations  arose  between  General  Mayer  on  the  one  hand  and 
Archduke  Charles  and  his  second,  General  Griiime,  on  the  other.  But 
this  view  lacks  confirmation. 


Mt.S9]  The  Meaning  of  the  Contest  463 

military  order  charging  them  with  the  mission  of  hherating 
the  Continent.  "Tiie  hberty  of  Europe  has  taken  refuge  under 
your  banners,"  said  he;  "your  victories  will  loose  its  fetters, 
and  your  German  brothers,  now  still  arrayed  in  the  ranks  of 
the  enemy,  await  dehverance  at  your  hands."  Then,  apos- 
trophizing Germany,  he  continued:  "Austria's  sword  is  not 
drawn  for  the  sake  of  her  own  independence  alone,  but  also 
in  behalf  of  the  liberty  and  national  honour  of  Germany."  By 
a  manifesto  issuing  from  the  pen  of  Gcntz  announcement  was 
made  to  the  world  that  it  was  not  against  France  that  war 
was  being  waged,  but  solely  against  the  system  of  constant 
expansion  which  had  been  the  cause  of  the  prevailing  confusion 
of  political  relations.  The  war  which  had  its  beginning  in 
April,  1809,  was  then  no  war  of  state  against  state,  no  contest 
to  decide  the  greater  or  less  extent  of  a  pohtical  sphere  of 
influence,  but  a  struggle  for  the  independence  of  the  nations 
of  Europe  against  a  power  which  had  long  ceased  to  recog- 
nize the  confines  of  state  boundaries,  but  which,  on  the  contrary, 
strove  to  obliterate  them  as  far  as  possible  and  impose  upon 
the  different  peoples  the  revolutionary  system  of  centralized 
equahty. 

Even  before  the  hostile  armies  encountered  one  another  in 
Bavaria  war  had  already  sprung  into  blaze  elsewhere.  First 
of  all  in  the  Tyrol.  A  deep-seated  hatred  against  Bavarian 
rule  existed  in  this  country,  particularly  among  the  nobility 
and  peasant  population,  and  that  government  could  count  its 
few  adherents  only  in  the  larger  cities  among  the  citizens  belong- 
ing to  liberal  circles.  This  feeling  of  resentment  was  due  to 
various  measures  taken  by  Bavaria  toward  the  tributary  coun- 
try. It  had  divided  it  into  three  districts,  had  abolished  its 
name,  done  away  with  the  provincial  diet,  introduced  military 
conscription,  and,  more  than  all,  had  hn posed  ecclesiastical 
reform.  Promises  made  by  Austrian  emissaries  and  the  gov- 
ernment at  Vienna  served  to  encourage  this  animosity,  and 
when  no  question  remained  of  open  war  the  Tyrolese  peasantry 
arose  and,  after  giving  successful  battle  to  the  Bavarian  troops, 
compelled  them  to  capitulate  and  took  possession  of  the  capital, 


464  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I8O9 

where  they  were  soon  joined  by  the  Austrians,  whose  arrival 
was  hailed  with  shouts  and  rejoicing.  At  the  same  time  the 
army  commanded  by  Archduke  John  advancing  from  Carinthia 
had  defeated  the  French  under  Beauhamais  at  Pordenone,  and 
on  April  16th,  1809,  had  overcome  them  a  second  time  in  the 
battle  of  Sacile  or  Fontana  Fredda,  driving  them  back  as  far 
as  the  Piave  and  Adige.  Success  had  likewise  attended  the 
corps  of  Archduke  Ferdinand  in  his  advance  into  Poland,  so 
that  on  April  20th  he  was  able  to  enter  Warsaw.  The  value 
of  these  successes  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of 
the  delay  to  the  Austrian  advance  caused  by  the  changes  in 
their  plan  of  operation.  Napoleon  was  none  the  less  taken  by 
surprise,  since  he  had  not  expected  attack  until  some  weeks 
later.  Much  now  depended  upon  whether  the  main  army  of 
Austria  would  understand  taking  advantage  of  the  favourable 
circumstances  to  effect  rapid  and  decisive  operations. 

Berthier  was  entrusted  with  the  supreme  command  of  the 
"German  Army"  until  the  Emperor  should  himself  reach  the 
theatre  of  war.  He  was,  however,  by  no  means  competent 
for  the  performance  of  this  task.  Napoleon  had  given  explicit 
directions  to  recall  Davout  to  the  Lech  and  there  concentrate 
the  army,  that  is,  whatever  the  circumstances,  to  unite  the 
forces  before  going  into  action ;  but,  instead  of  following  instruc- 
tions, Berthier  left  Davout  stationed  at  Ratisbon  and  relied 
upon  bringing  Oudinot  and  Massena  up  into  line  with  him  to 
the  south  of  the  Danube.  The  only  result  of  this  proceeding  was 
that  the  French  army,  instead  of  being  concentrated,  remained 
for  several  days  split  up  into  two  parts  liable  to  be  overpowered 
one  after  the  other  by  the  Austrian  army,  which  was  moving 
forward  as  a  single  solid  body.  But  this  favourable  oppor- 
tunity was  neglected  by  the  Austrians.  Six  days  were  spent, 
from  April  10th  to  16th,  in  getting  from  the  Inn  to  the  Isar, 
a  distance  covered  by  the  French  a  short  time  afterward  in  two 
days'  march,  and  when,  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  the  Arch- 
duke set  out  from  Landshut  northwards  toward  Ratisbon  so 
as  to  take  the  offensive  against  Davout,  that  general  had  al- 
ready fallen  back  in  spite  of  Napoleon's  orders.     The  Emperor, 


Mr.  39]  Napoleon  Joins  the  Army  465 

however,  arrived  upon  the  Danube  just  in  time  to  rescue  his 
army  from  its  perilous  situation. 

By  means  of  the  signal  telegraph  Napoleon  had  learned  in 
Paris  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  the  crossing  of  the  Inn  by 
the  Austrians  and  of  their  declaration  of  war.  He  at  once 
started  for  the  scene  of  action;  travelling  for  four  days  and 
nights  with  but  short  delays  for  rest  and  refreshment,  he  reached 
Donauworth  on  the  morning  of  the  17th.  Here  he  at  once 
perceived  the  mistake  which  the  Austrians  had  made  in  ad- 
vancing too  slowly,  and,  enraged  as  he  was  at  the  confusion 
which  Berthier's  blundering  had  caused,  the  position  held  by 
the  enemy  served  to  reassure  and  calm  him  again.  "Where  is 
the  enemy?"  he  asked  as  he  left  the  vehicle  in  which  he  had 
been  travelling.  "The  Archduke  crossed  the  Inn  and  the 
Isar,"  replied  Montyon,  who  often  described  the  scene  after- 
wards, "then  swers^ed  to  the  right  and  is  now  on  the  march 
to  natisbon."  This  report  seemed  at  first  incredible  to  the 
Emperor,  and  he  had  to  be  again  and  again  assured  of  its  cor- 
rectness before  he  would  put  faith  in  it.  "At  these  words," 
said  Montyon,  "the  Emperor  seemed  to  increase  in  stature, 
his  eyes  flashed,  and  extending  his  arms  toward  Ratisbon  he  ex- 
claimed, with  a  joy  which  was  betrayed  in  look,  voice,  and 
gesture:  "Then  they  are  mine!  That  is  a  lost  army!  In  one 
month  we  shall  be  in  Vienna!" 

The  Emperor  was  mistaken.  Three  weeks  were  to  suffice 
for  removing  all  obstacles  to  his  entry  into  the  Austrian 
capital. 

The  generalship  now  displayed  by  Napoleon  has  been  by 
common  consent  and  at  all  times  classed  among  the  greatest 
of  his  achievements.  It  is  needless  to  describe  the  campaign 
in  detail.     Only  its  results  need  to  be  indicated. 

The  two  French  armies  might  even  yet  have  been  defeated 
one  at  a  time  by  the  Austrians,  since  the  distance  m  a  straight 
line  from  Landshut  to  Ratisbon  was  only  seven  miles  and  that 
from  Augsl^urg  to  Ratisbon  sbcteen,  and  it  has  been  observed 
with  good  reason  that  Napoleon  had  years  before  even  less 
time   and    space   at   his   disposal   when    in   his   first   Italian 


466  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

campaign  he  defeated  separately  before  Mantua  the  two  Aus- 
trian armies  sent  to  the  reUef  of  that  city.  But  the  Austrians 
continued  their  advance  always  at  the  same  deliberate  pace, 
and  furthermore,  since  uncertainty  existed  as  to  whether  Da- 
vout  were  still  in  Ratisbon  or  had  moved  backward  toward 
the  west,  their  forces  were  divided  so  that  only  one  half  was 
directed  toward  that  city,  while  the  other  pushed  on  toward 
Abensberg  in  order  to  attack  the  Marshal  while  makhig  a 
flank  movement  and  prevent  his  junction  with  the  Bavarians.* 
Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  begun  to  issue  his  orders  from  the 
hour  of  his  arrival  on  the  17th:  Davout  was  to  fall  back  from 
Ratisbon  to  Ingolstadt,  following  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube, 
and  the  Bavarians  under  Lefebvre  were  to  keep  in  touch  with 
him,  while  Massena  was  to  advance  from  the  Lech  toward  the 
Inn.  The  latter  in  particular  was  directed  to  use  all  possible 
expedition,  since  Napoleon  in  the  end  fixed  upon  a  plan  which 
enabled  him  not  only  to  unite  his  own  army,  by  drawing  back 
the  left  wing  and  pushing  forward  the  right,  but  to  execute  his 
favourite  manoeuvre  as  well,  of  threatening  the  enemy  in  his 
line  of  retreat,  which  was  in  this  case  towards  I^andshut.  All 
these  movements  were  duly  carried  out  amidst  a  series  of  suc- 
cessful engagements  with  both  wings  of  the  Austrian  columns. 
It  was  not  long  before  the  concentration  of  the  army  had  been 
effected,  and  by  April  20th  Napoleon  was  prepared  to  take  the 
offensive  with  his  whole  line,  Davout  being  on  the  left  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Laber,  Massena  on  the  right  near  Moss- 
burg,  the  Emperor  at  the  centre  with  the  Bavarians,  and  several 
French  divisions  across  the  Abens.  Napoleon's  sagacity  in 
making  this  disposition  of  forces  was  clearly  proved  by  the  out- 
come, for  before  the  close  of  the  20th  he  had  already  pushed 
his  way  between  the  two  halves  of  the  hostile  army,  throwing 
back  upon  Landshut  one  of  them  which  had  pushed  forward 
to  the  northwest  under  command  of  liiller,  while  the  other, 
commanded  by  Charles,  succeeded  on  the  same  day  in  taking 

*  Radetzky,  who  himself  took  part  in  this  campaign,  regards  this 
division  of  forces  for  the  sake  of  taking  Ratisbon  as  the  second  great 
mistake  of  the  Austrians,  the  first  being  the  march  by  way  of  Linz. 


.t:t  39]        Napoleon's  Wonderful  Strategy  467 

Ratisbon.  Leaving  to  some  of  the  lesser  forces  the  task  of 
pursuing  Hiller  to  Neumarkt  and  beyond,  Napoleon  himself 
at  once  turned  against  the  Archduke.  That  general  had  drawn 
to  himself  in  Ratisbon  one  of  the  two  corps  from  Bohemia, 
which  had  likewise  taken  unnecessary  time  for  the  march,  and, 
thus  re-enforced,  he  advanced  on  the  22d  toward  the  south. 
But  at  Eckmiihl  Vandamme  attacked  and  overcame  the  corps 
under  Rosenberg  constituting  the  Austrian  centre,  while  Da- 
vout  forced  "back  its  right  wing  and  Lannes  threatened  to  out- 
flank its  left.  In  spite  of  extraordinary  bravery  displayed  by 
the  Austrians,  such  an  onset  proved  irresistible;  they  were 
forced  to  withdraw  again  into  Ratisbon,  where  on  the  following 
day  (the  23d)  occurred  another  engagement,  the  loss  of  which 
compelled  the  Archduke  to  cross  the  Danube  so  as  to  make 
his  way  back  to  the  capital  by  w-ay  of  Bohemia. 

Without  making  any  attempt  at  pursuit  of  the  Prince, 
Napoleon  now  gave  orders  to  advance  upon  Menna. 

In  later  years,  when  in  exile  at  St.  Helena,  he  repeatedly 
averred  that  the  greatest  and  most  adroit  of  military  manoeuvres 
had  been  that  which  he  had  carried  out  in  the  battles  of  Abensberg 
antl  Landshut  and  finally  completed  in  that  of  Eckmiiid,  the 
action  at  the  last-named  point  particularly  being  in  his  estima- 
tion the  military  feat  most  worthy  of  admiration.  And  indeed 
when  it  is  taken  into  consideration  that  less  than  a  week  before 
he  had  found  a  severed  army  iu  which  the  greatest  confusion  pre- 
vailed w^hile  confronted  by  an  enemy  with  concentrated  forces, 
and  had  wuthin  those  few  days  found  means  to  unite  his  owti 
army  and  divide  that  of  his  adversary  and  then  severally  to 
defeat  those  sundered  parts,  there  are  few  who  w^ould  deny  him 
the  honour  to  which  he  thus  laid  claim.  And  next  to  this 
strategic  genius,  that  which  was  most  truly  marvellous  in  this 
extraordinary  man  was  his  untiring  energy  of  mind  which 
allowed  him  no  sleep,  and  scarcely  even  food,  until  his  aim 
had  been  accomplished.  "Work  is  my  element,"  said  the  pris- 
oner at  St.  Helena.  "I  was  bom  and  bred  for  work.  I  have 
known  the  limitations  of  my  legs,  I  have  known  those  of  my  eyes, 
but  I  have  never  been  able  to  discover  my  limitations  for  work.'! 


468  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  |1809 

These  victories  in  Bavaria  were,  moreover,  important  not 
only  as  brilliant  military  achievements.  They  constituted  the 
decisive  feature  of  the  whole  war,  which  in  consequence  of  them 
totally  lost  its  original  character.  Austria  had  expected  to 
carry  on  an  offensive  warfare,  and  had  made  its  beginnings  with 
this  intention;  she  was  now  thrown  back  upon  the  defensive  and 
was  henceforth  never  able  to  assume  the  offensive  beyond  her 
own  confines.  Hardly  five  days  before  she  had  appeared  as  the 
foremost  combatant  of  all  Europe,  and  her  army  was  now  nothing 
more  than  the  defender  of  its  own  state !  For,  as  a  further  conse- 
quence of  the  disasters  suffered  by  Charles,  the  Archdukes  John 
and  Ferdinand  had  been  compelled  to  give  up  again  the  ground 
which  they  had  gained  in  Italy  and  Poland.  At  the  Austrian 
headquarters  there  prevailed  the  deepest  dejection.  From 
Cham,  whither  Archduke  Charles  had  withdrawn,  he  wrote  to 
Emperor  Francis :  '  'Another  such  an  encounter  and  I  shall  have 
no  army  left.  I  await  the  negotiations  for  peace."  But  in  spite 
of  the  enormous  losses  sustained  during  this  campaign  of  five 
days'  duration — and  these  were  estimated  at  over  50,000  men 
— the  Austrian  Emperor  was  not  yet  of  opinion  that  the 
time  had  come  for  yielding.  He  was  at  this  time  still  under 
the  influence  of  Stadion,  who  was  in  no  wise  ready  to  give 
up  hope  of  a  happy  issue.  "Everything  is  not  yet  lost," 
the  minister  writes  to  his  wife,  "if  only  we  can  manage 
to  infuse  courage  into  the  Archduke  and  his  army,  which, 
by  the  way  in  which  it  has  been  sacrificed,  has  every 
reason  to  feel  disheartened."  The  brother  of  the  Premier, 
Count  Frederick  Stadion,  was  to  this  intent  despatched  to 
headquarters,  and  as  a  result  the  voice  of  the  genera  1-in-chief 
actually  began  to  take  on  a  more  confident  tone.  He  did  in- 
deed write  to  Napoleon — to  which  no  reply  was  ever  vouch- 
safed— offering  to  enter  into  negotiations,  but  he  nevertheless 
cherished  the  hope  of  being  able  to  effect  a  junction  between 
Budweis  and  Linz  with  the  two  corps  under  Hiller,  which, 
falling  back  before  Napoleon,  had  reached  the  Inn  and  were  now 
marching  down  the  Danube,  and  with  their  help  to  conipel  the 
enemy  to  retreat  by  threatening  him  in  flank  and  rear.    (Letter 


jet.  39]  The  Capture  of  Vienna  469 

from  Archduke  Charles  to  Francis  II.  from  Neumarkt,  April  28th, 
1809.)  But  these  hopes  proved  illusive.  At  Linz  Hiller  was 
unable  to  iiold  his  own  against  the  pursuing  French,  who  far  out- 
numbered him,  and  after  a  heroic  combat  at  Ebelsberg  (May  4th, 
1809)  he  was  obligetl  likewise  to  yield  the  hne  of  the  Traun.  It 
was  not  until  Crems  was  reached  that  he  was  able  to  gain  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  here  he  awaited  the  Archduke,  who 
was  advancing  by  way  of  Zwettel  and  Meissau ;  about  the  middle 
of  May  the  two  portions  of  the  army  were  united  upon  the  eastern 
slope  of  the  ]5isamberg,  opposite  Vienna. 

In  conversation  with  General  Bubna  of  the  Austrian  army  at 
a  later  date  Napoleon  himself  designated  it  as  a  military  error 
not  to  have  followed  up  the  Archduke  into  Bohemia;  he  had,  said 
he,  long  hesitated  at  Ratisbon,  and  had  decided  in  favour  of  the 
advance  upon  Vienna  only  on  account  of  the  general  situation 
in  Europe;  that  is  to  say,  in  order  to  prevent  the  refractory 
elements  of  northern  Germany  from  allying  themselves  with 
Austria.  On  May  13th  he  made  himself  master  of  the  city, 
which  did  not  oppose  any  very  effective  resistance,  and  proceed- 
ed again,  as  in  1805,  to  set  up  his  court  in  Schcinbrunn.  Much 
had  indeed  been  thus  accomplished,  but  it  was  yet  far  from 
being  a  complete  conquest.  For  the  possession  of  the  enemy's 
capital  did  not  have  full  significance  until  the  hostile  army  posted 
opposite  the  city  should  be  likewise  vanquished,  and  if  Napoleon 
wished  to  continue  to  act  upon  the  offensive  he  must  risk  an 
engagement,  although  his  forces  were  diminished  by  detachments, 
Lefebvre  having  been  sent  with  the  Bavarians  against  the  Tyrol 
and  Bernadotte  left  in  Linz,  while  Davout  was  but  now  on  the 
march  toward  Vienna. 

He  selected  as  his  means  of  approach  to  the  enemy  a  crossing 
to  the  southeast  of  the  city  near  Kaiser-Ebersdorf.  By  this 
way,  during  the  night  of  May  20th,  he  ordered  his  light  cavalry-, 
the  corps  of  Massena  and  Lannes,  and  behind  them  the  Guard 
to  pass  first  to  the  large  island  of  Lobau  and  thence,  during 
the  next  night,  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  river,  all  of  which 
was  accomplished  without  interference  from  the  enemy.  It 
had  been  the  Archduke's  original  plan  to  await  the  onset  of  the 


470  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

French  in  a  position  supported  by  the  Bisamberg,  for  they 
seemed  to  be  planning  to  cross  at  Nussdorf,  but  upon  learning 
to  his  surprise  of  their  having  crossed  the  river  below  Vienna  and 
that  they  had  already  taken  possession  of  Aspern  and  Essling  on 
the  morning  of  the  21st,  he  determined  upon  issuing  forth  and 
attacking  them  with  his  superior  forces.  Furthermore,  in  order 
to  make  sure  of  remaining  in  this  numerical  superiority,  he  gave 
orders  to  destroy  the  bridge  across  the  main  stream  at  Ebersdorf 
by  means  of  boats  loaded  w^ith  stone  set  floating  down  the  river, 
thus  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  re-enforcements  reaching  the 
enemy.  But  this  undertaking  was  not  hnmediately  successful. 
The  French  continued  to  hold  the  points  which  they  had  occupied, 
and  during  the  course  of  the  night  Napoleon  was  still  able  to  draw 
over  the  river  enough  troops  to  allow  of  his  proceeding  farther 
on  the  morning  of  the  22d.  For  the  tv/o  armies  were  as  yet  not 
far  from  equal  in  point  of  numbers,  and  if  the  brigades  under 
Davout  should  come  up  so  that  he  could  count  upon  them, 
Napoleon  felt  that  victory  for  the  French  was  assured;  Davout 
could  then  relieve  Lannes  at  Essling,  and  the  latter  could  be 
entrusted  with  the  task  of  dashing  forward  and  breaking  through 
the  Austrian  centre.  And  in  fact  hardly  had  Davout  announced 
his  arrival  at  Ebersdorf  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  before 
Lannes  on  this  side  received  orders  to  advance.  This  command 
had  already  been,  carried  out  with  prodigious  energy,  and  the 
A-Ustrian  line  had  already  been  forced  to  bend  and  give  ground  in 
the  middle,  so  that  the  Archduke  was  able  to  avert  catastrophe 
only  with  greatest  difficult)^,  exposing  himself  personally  and 
bringing  into  action  all  reserve  forces,  when  suddenly  the  great 
bridge  in  the  rear  of  the  French  gave  way,  the  troops  under 
Davout  were  kept  back  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  Lannes, 
unsupported  by  troops  from  Essling,  was  forced  to  retreat.  But 
now  the  Austrians  on  their  side  with  unfaltering  courage  again 
advanced  to  the  attack;  Napoleon  was  once  more  forced  to 
assume  the  defensive,  and  the  battle  took  on  the  same  character 
which  it  had  borne  on  the  j)revi()us  day.  A  muuber  of  critical 
moments  were  yet  to  be  passed  tiu-ough  in  which  the  Archduke  is 
said  to  have  considered  the  advisability  of  retreat,  but  finall}''  the 


^T.  39]  Napoleon   Repulsed  471 

French  were  compelled  to  give  up  Aspem  and  Esslin<2;  and  retire 
to  the  island  of  Lobau,  a  movement  protected  with  <freat  valour 
by  Massena's  troops,  and  in  particular  by  the  heroic  General 
Mouton.* 

For  Napoleon  the  day  was  lost.  His  generals  had  covered 
themselves  with  glory,  but  the  commander-in-chief  had  suf- 
fered defeat.  He  was  conveyed  by  boat  to  Ebersdorf,  and 
there  he  is  reported  to  have  sat  before  his  improvised  supper 
alone,  immovable,  speaking  no  word  and  staring  straight  before 
him  until  his  eyes  filled  with  tears.  Was  he  weeping,  as  his 
flatterers  claim,  for  Lannes,  who  was  lying  mortally  wounded? 
Or  was  it  another  loss  which  extorted  from  him  these  tears? 
For  there  was  no  concealing  from  himself  the  fact  that  the 
fame  of  his  irresistibility  was  a  thing  of  the  past.  In  vain  did 
he  proclaim  to  the  world  in  his  bulletin:  "The  enemy  retired 
from  the  positions  which  it  had  taken,  and  we  remained  mas- 
ters on  the  field  of  battle."  No  one  would  give  credence  to  such 
a  statement. 

Shortly  before  he  had  conferred  with  his  marshals  on  the 
island  of  Lobau.  To  them  he  had  appeared  as  undaunted  and 
confident  as  ever.  He  had  not  been  willing  to  agree  to  their 
proposition  of  evacuating  the  island;  he  insisted  upon  holding 
and  fortifying  it.  And  in  this  events  proved  him  to  have  been 
in  the  right,  for  when,  during  the  night  of  May  23d,  the  Aus- 
trians  with  two  brigades  attempted  to  wrest  it  from  them, 
the  enterprise  f ailed. f    Whether  it  might  not  after  all  have 

*  There  is,  as  yet,  no  entirely  trustworthy  account  of  the  battle  at 
Aspem.  The  decision  in  favour  of  Austria  was  finally  brought  about 
by  the  cavalry  general,  Prince  John  Liechtenstein,  as  the  Archduke 
himself  declared  on  the  following  day  to  Francis  before  the  whole  army. 
Thus  Stadion,  who  accompanied  the  Emperor,  wTote  in  a  letter  to  his  wife 
dated  May  23d. 

t  This  was  the  announcement  made  by  the  Archduke  himself  to  his 
brother  the  Emperor.  In  a  memorial  of  the  29th  submitted  by  Wimpffen, 
his  Chief-of-Staff,  occurs  this  statement:  "Advantage  could  not  be  taken 
of  the  victory,  since  the  firm  position  of  the  enemy  rendered  all  pursuit 
impossible;  moreover,  the  Danube  could  not  well  be  crossed  as  long  as 
the  enemy  continued  to  maintain  a  considerable  part  of  his  anny  on  this 
side  of  the  main  stream  on  the  island  of  Lobau. 


472  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

been  successful  if  greater  forces  had  been  brought  to  bear  is 
indeed  open  to  question.  Marmont  relates  that  the  utmost 
confusion  prevailed  in  the  French  army,  which  was  compelled 
to  bivouac  on  the  island  for  three  days  until  the  great  bridge 
could  be  restored,  affording  the  enemy  the  opportunity  for 
making  a  sudden  attack  with  all  the  chances  in  his  favour.  But 
the  Archduke  contented  himself  with  seeking  out  the  best 
possible  position  on  the  Marchfeld  and  assuming  an  attitude 
of  waiting.  In  his  opinion  the  fruits  of  the  victory  should  be 
sought  in  a  diplomatic  rather  than  a  military  way,  that  is,  it 
should  be  made  the  means  of  obtaining  the  most  advantageous 
possible  terms  of  peace.  He  was  far  from  confident  of  win- 
ning a  second  victory  in  the  open  field.  "  The  battle  of  Aspem 
has  softened  Napoleon's  heart,"  he  wrote  within  the  next  few 
weeks  to  his  uncle,  Duke  Albert  of  Saxe-Teschen.  "We  ought 
to  profit  by  such  good  fortune,  which  we  are  hardly  likely  to 
experience  a  second  time." 

The  alternating  fortunes  of  the  struggle  had  engendered 
throughout  all  Europe  sensations  equally  fluctuating.  Those 
hostile  in  feeUng  to  Napoleon,  and  particularly  those  in  northern 
Germany,  had  been  carried  away  with  enthusiasm  at  the  first 
successes  of  the  Austrian  troops  in  Italy,  but  especially  at  the 
prosperous  issue  of  the  Tyrolese  insurrection.  All  the  coun- 
sellors of  Frederick  William  III.  were  now  pressing  in  their 
advice  to  form  an  alliance  with  Austria.  That  country  counted 
upon  the  alliance  as  a  certainty  and,  in  order  to  clinch  the  bar- 
gain, offered  to  Prussia  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  just  conquered 
by  Archduke  Ferdinand.  But  in  vain.  The  King  opposed  his 
counsellors;  regarding  the  national  warlike  uprising  in  his 
country  from  his  narrow  point  of  view,  in  which  Prussia  alone 
was  considered,  he  condemned  it  as  "criminal  disorder,"  par- 
ticularly when  Schill,  amidst  the  acclamations  of  the  populace 
and  acting  upon  his  own  responsibility,  led  forth  his  battalion 
from  Berlin  to  help  sustain  the  insurrection  under  leadership 
of  Dornberg  in  Westphalia;  and  it  was  not  until  word  came 
from  St.  P('t(;rsburg  that  the  Czar  did  not  intend  to  carry  on 
serious  hostilities  against  Austria  that  he  reluctantly  gave  his 


Mt.  39]      The  King  of  Prussia  holds  back        473 

consent  to  secret  preparations  for  war  and  stopped  the  pay- 
ment of  the  tribute  due  to  France.  This  was  taking  a  step 
which  must  of  necessity  be  followed  by  another  to  be  anything 
else  than  preposterous.  But  this  second  step  remained  un- 
taken.  The  defeats  inflicted  upon  the  Aastrians  in  Bavaria 
produced  their  effect,  and  the  King  persistently  maintained  his 
opinion  that  the  Emperor  of  the  French  would  be  able  to  con- 
quer also  an  army  composed  of  the  united  forces  of  Prussia 
and  Austria,  and  that  it  was,  after  all,  better  to  be  King  behind 
the  Oder  than  not  to  be  King  of  Prussia  at  all.  Even  the 
battle  of  Aspern  made  no  change  in  his  views,  for  the  fact  that 
no  advantage  was  taken  of  it  only  went  to  furnish  the  basis 
for  a  new  argument  which  Frederick  William  urged  against  his 
ministers.  To  add  to  all  this,  the  Austrian  government  now 
perpetrated  the  mistake  of  faiUng  to  accept  without  discussion 
the  proposals  made  by  Prussia  as  a  condition  to  an  alliance,  and 
replied  instead  with  only  vague  and  general  promises,  referring 
her  to  England  in  answer  to  her  demand  for  arms  and  money. 
When,  therefore,  towards  the  middle  of  June,  the  Austrian 
Colonel  Steigentesch  appeared  in  Konigsberg  somewhat  too 
ostentatiously  in  order  to  conclude  a  military  convention  there, 
he  found  that  he  had  missed  his  aim  and  was  obUged  to  take 
his  departure  again  without  having  accomplished  what  he 
came  for.  The  King  had  now  determined  to  await  the  issue  of 
the  next  battle.  In  spite  of  the  experience  of  1806  he  was  the 
same  man  that  he  had  been  in  1805.  It  was  his  people  only 
who  had  changed. 

Since  the  departure  of  the  Austrians  the  Tyrol  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Bavarians  and  French,  and  the  news  was  now 
received  with  enthusiasm  in  Prussia  that  the  Tyrolese  peasants 
had  again  risen  and  been  victorious  in  the  battle  on  Mount 
Isel  on  May  29th;  at  the  same  time  it  was  learned  that  a  de- 
tachment of  Austrian  troops  united  with  a  volunteer  corps 
recruited  by  Duke  Frederick  William  of  Bruns\sick  had  pene- 
trated into  Saxony  and  Franconia,  and,  finally,  that  the  Eng- 
lish were  threatening  to  land  troops  at  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe 
and  Weser.     Did  it  not  seem  as  if  the  hour  had  come  for  striking? 


474  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [1809 

That  was  the  ^dew  taken  of  it  at  least  by  the  Prussian  Generals 
Bliicher  and  Biilow,  who  were  in  command  in  Pomerania  and 
who  forthwith  decided  upon  a  military  uprising  against  Na- 
poleon, whether  with  or  without  the  sanction  of  the  King.  But 
just  then  arrived  other  news  which  marvellously  abated  this 
enthusiasm. 

After  the  battle  of  Aspern  the  two  armies  had  remained 
inactive  near  Vienna,  confronting  one  another.  The  Austrian 
army  refrained  from  assuming  the  offensive  for  the  sake  of 
allowing  the  victory  of  the  22d  to  produce  its  effect  at  a  dis- 
tance and,  as  is  asserted  by  one  of  the  initiated,  so  as  "not 
to  risk  the  destruction  of  this  effect  by  the  chances  of  an  un- 
successful battle."  The  Archduke  called  up  in  his  defence 
the  example  of  Fabius,  "the  Delayer,"  who  conquered  Han- 
nibal. "Napoleon  and  I,"  he  wrote  one  day  in  June  to  the 
Duke  of  Saxe-Teschen,  "are  watching  one  another  to  see  which 
will  be  the  first  to  commit  an  error  of  which  the  other  can  take 
advantage,  and  are  meanwhile  repairing  our  losses.  I  shall 
take  no  risks,  for  the  forces  which  I  now  command  are  the  last 
which  the  state  can  afford,  but  I  shall  use  the  utmost  energy 
in  grasping  every  opportunity  for  dealing  a  decisive  blow." 
But  Napoleon  was  guilty  of  no  further  mistakes  during  this 
campaign.  He  showed  himself,  on  the  contrary,  most  efficient 
in  taking  measures  for  entirely  wiping  out  the  consequences  of 
his  former  error.  He  now  drew  to  himself  for  the  decisive 
conflict  all  troops  whatsoever  at  his  disposal:  Eugene,  who  had 
followed  in  pursuit  of  Archduke  John,  approached  by  way  of 
Carinthia  with  over  50,000  men,  and  was  by  the  end  of  May 
already  across  the  Semmering  Pass;  Marmont,  with  10,000 
men,  was  summoned  from  Dalmatia;  Lefebvre  was  ordered 
from  the  Tyrol  to  I^inz,  where  he  was  to  relieve  the  forces  there 
under  command  of  Bornadotte  and  Vandammc,  and  they  and 
their  divisions  thus  set  free  moved  up  into  the  vicinity  of  Vienna. 
In  order  to  protect  these  forces  to  the  best  advantage,  the 
island  of  Lobau,  whore  Mass6na's  corps  had  remained  stationed, 
was  now  fortified,  the  great  bridge  across  the  Danube  protected 
by  stockades   and  guarded  by  a  flotilla  of  rowboats.     No  de- 


^T.  39]  The   Array   of  Forces  475 

tail  toward  assuring  victory  in  the  a[)proaching  encounter  was 
too  trifling  to  receive  the  attention  of  the  Emperor.* 

Upon  the  other  side  of  the  river  the  Archduke  had  meanwhile 
also  strengthened  himself,  summoning  to  his  aid  a  distant  corps 
under  Kollowrat,  while  his  brother  John  was  approachhig  by 
way  of  Hungary,  where  he  was  joined  by  the  "Insurrection,"  or 
provincial  militia,  levied  by  vote  of  the  diet  of  the  preceding  year 
as  contribution  toward  the  war.  All  this  did  not  take  place 
without  mishap.  To  prevent  a  junction  between  the  Archduke 
John  and  the  main  army  Napoleon  sent  out  the  Viceroy  against 
him,  and  on  June  14th  Eugene  revenged  himself  at  Raab  for  his 
defeat  at  Fontana  Fredda.  John  was  at  first  compelled  to 
retreat  toward  the  east,  and  it  was  only  after  crossing  the 
Danube  and  with  greatly  reduced  forces  that  he  at  length 
reached  Pressburg,  whence  he  was  again  able  to  enter  into 
communication  with  his  brother. 

By  the  first  days  of  July  Napoleon  was  ready  with  his  prepara- 
tions; to  the  130,000  men  at  the  disposal  of  the  enemy  he  could 
oppose  180,000  besides  an  excellent  artillery  equipment,  partic- 
ularly if  he  should  succeed  in  striking  the  blow  before  John 
should  be  able  to  reach  the  scene  of  action  from  Pressburg. 
On  the  night  of  July  4th  his  army  crossed  from  Lobau  to 
the  northern  bank  of  the  river  without  interference  from  the 
Austrians,  who  were  misled  by  a  demonstration  made  for  that 
purpose  at  Aspern.  During  the  following  day  Napoleon  was 
able,  without  encountering  any  very  vigorous  resistance,  to  draw 
up  his  troops  in  battle  array  facing  Archduke  Charles,  who,  in 
view  of  the  superior  number  of  the  enemy,  had  withdi-awn  his 
forces  into  a  position  of  defence  on  the  Bisamberg  and  behind  the 
Russbach,  which  runs  obliquely  across  the  Marchfeld.  A  con- 
siderable detachment  was  sent  forward  by  Napoleon  in  the 
direction  of  the  March  for  purposes  of  reconnoissance  in  order  to 

*  On  May  21st  he  had,  for  instance,  followed  the  course  of  the  battle 
from  the  island  of  Lobau  while  clinging  to  a  rope  ladder;  he  now  ordered 
conveyed  thither  one  of  the  great  sliding-ladders  such  as  are  used  in 
gardening  at  Schonbrunn  in  order  to  assure  himself  of  a  more  comfortable 
and  convenient  observatory.     (Archives  of  the  War  Office.) 


i^yd  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [1809 

find  out  whether  John  were  yet  approaching.  Upon  receiving 
information  of  a  reassuring  nature  from  that  quarter  he  deter- 
mined, late  in  the  evening  as  it  was,  to  make  an  attack  upon  the 
Austrians,  directing  the  shock  of  his  onset  with  superior  numbers 
against  the  left  wing  of  his  antagonist,  so  as  to  prevent  the  possi- 
bility of  a  junction  between  the  two  princes,  while  his  own  left 
wing  under  command  of  Mass^na  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
engaging  and  holding  the  main  body  of  the  hostile  army.  The 
attempt  failed.  The  Austrians  repelled  the  assault  and  drove 
the  French  back  to  the  position  whence  they  had  advanced  to  the 
attack. 

Next  morning  the  Archduke  detected  the  weak  point  pre- 
sented by  the  enemy,  and  gave  orders  to  his  right  wing  to  march 
forward  along  the  Danube,  while  the  centre  should  likewise 
advance  at  the  same  time.  These  combined  forces  Mass^na 
alone  was  not  able  to  cope  with,  and  to  prevent  being  flanked  he 
was  obliged  to  face  almost  toward  the  river ;  re-enforcements  sent 
to  his  assistance  proved  unable  to  prevent  a  retreat  which  was 
constantly  assuming  more  serious  proportions,  when  Napoleon 
appeared,  leading  a  considerable  portion  of  his  army,  and,  after 
making  a  fruitless  attempt  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  enemy  by 
means  of  his  cavalry,  he  brought  into  play  more  than  a  hundred 
cannon,  and  with  these  succeeded  where  the  cavalry  had  failed. 
But,  in  spite  of  this  danger  assailing  him  in  the  rear,  he  had  not 
lost  sight  of  his  aim  to  conquer  with  the  right  wing.  About 
noon  he  ordered  forward  to  Wagram  and  Markgraf-Neusiedl 
troops  sufficient  to  outnumber  the  Austrians,  assured  that,  once 
in  possession  of  Wagram,  he  would  be  able  to  com})el  the  re- 
treat of  the  Austrian  right  wing  from  its  advanced  position.  So 
certain  was  he  of  the  outcome  that  in  the  midst  of  the  battle  he 
ordered  his  faithful  Roussan  to  spread  out  a  bearskin  for  him 
on  the  ground  and  allowed  himself  twenty  minutes  of  sound 
sleep.*     Soon  after  this  the  enemy  was  indeed  compelled  to 

*  There  were  several  occasions  upon  which  Napoleon  fell  asleep  while 
a  battle  was  raping  about  him;  for  instance,  three  years  later,  at  the  battle 
of  Bautzen.  Speaking  of  this  afterwards  he  said  that  it  was  a  habit  of  no 
small    advantage    to   the    commander-in-chief.     He    could   thus   quietly 


^T.  39]  Wagram  477 

abandon  the  territory  uhich  it  had  gained,  and  ^^^th  tlic  suc- 
cessful storming  of  the  heights  near  Markgraf  Nousiedl  by 
Davout  the  fortunes  of  the  day  were  decided;  far  back  of  the 
Russbach  as  far  as  the  slopes  of  the  Bisamberg  and  the  roarl  to 
Briinn  were  the  Austrians  obliged  to  retire,  although  in  the 
most  perfect  order  and  without  having  been  absolutely  van- 
quished. Napoleon's  losses  had  been  so  great  as  to  prevent  his 
risking  another  battle.  Moreover,  his  immediate  object  had 
been  attained.  He  had  defeated  the  main  army  of  his  antago- 
nist and  rendered  impossible  its  junction  with  that  under  Arch- 
duke John.  For  when  the  latter  reached  the  Marchfeld  in  the 
afternoon  Charles  had  already  ordered  the  retreat,  and  the  newly- 
arrived  corps  found  nothing  further  to  be  done.  It  has  recently 
been  attempted  to  prove  that  John,  who  was  already  in  pos- 
session of  his  brother's  order  early  on  the  morning  of  July  5th, 
could  not  have  been  more  expeditious  in  setting  out  from  Press- 
burg  or  in  marching  to  the  front,  and  that,  even  if  he  bad  arrived 
in  time,  there  were  French  forces  yet  intact  which  would  have 
hindered  his  taking  part  in  the  action.  This  latter  point  would 
demand  thorough  proof  before  it  could  be  accepted  as  fact,  but, 
in  regard  to  the  former,  one  is  involuntarily  impelled  to  ask 
whether  a  French  general  under  precisely  similar  circumstances 
would  have  required  quite  as  long  for  carrying  out  a  command  of 
Napoleon's,  and  to  any  one  who  knows  the  history  of  these  wars 
none  but  a  reply  in  the  negative  would  be  possible. 

But  with  the  battle  of  Wagram  the  campaign  had  not  even 
yet  been  decided.  Austria  had  by  no  means  been  overcome.  The 
Archduke  had  still  under  his  command  an  army  ready  for  battle, 
which  he  now  concentrated  near  Znaim,  whither  Napoleon  could 
not  follow  him  with  all  his  forces,  since  he  would  have  to  leave 
Eugene  with  the  Army  of  Italy,  which  had  decided  the  fortunes 
of  the  day  on  July  6th,  to  watch  Vienna  and  Archduke  John. 
It  now  happened,  on  July  11th,  just  as  Mass^na  and  Marmont 
were  engaging  the  enemy  and  as  preparations  were  being  made 

await  the  reports  from  the  various  divisions  instead  of  allowing  himself 
to  be  influenced  and  carried  away  by  what  was  taking  place  before  his 
eyes.     (Las  Cases,  Memorial  of  St.  Helena.) 


4/8  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [1809 

for  anothc-r  battle,  that  thorc  arrived  at  Napoleon's  headquarters 
an  officer  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  propose  an  armistice.  Was  this 
to  be  accepted  or  rejected?  His  generals  counselled  the  latter, 
he  decided  upon  the  former.  In  this  he  was  actuated  b}'  various 
motives.  In  the  first  place  he  saw  that  by  the  new  method  of 
warfare — where  the  use  of  artillery  had  gradually  replaced  the 
use  of  the  bayonet  and  which  had  played  so  important  a  part 
at  Wagram — battles  were  being  made  more  sanguinary  without 
becoming  more  decisive,  so  that  he  began  to  lose  faith  in  battle 
as  the  infallible  means  of  success.  It  was  but  a  short  time  after 
this,  on  August  21st,  1809,  that  he  wrote  to  Clarke:  "Battle 
should  be  offered  only  when  there  remain  no  hopes  of  other 
turns  of  fortune,  since,  from  its  very  nature,  the  fate  of  a  battle 
is  always  dubious."*  Moreover,  he  had  recently  had  troublesome 
experiences  with  his  troops  which  further  served  to  establish 
him  in  this  opinion.  On  the  6th  Bemadotte's  corps  had 
retreated  without  offering  the  least  resistance  and  had  to 
be  dissolved,  and  on  the  following  night  tidings  of  John's 
approach  had  caused  a  panic,  driving  thousands  to  flight 
toward  the  Danube.  The  Emperor  bewailed  the  fact  that 
his  soldiers  were  no  longer  those  of  Austerlitz.  Finally,  in  the 
last  engagement  many  an  excellent  general  had  fallen  because 
he  had  been  compelled  to  expose  himself  in  leading  forward 
troops  which  responded  but  feebly  to  his  commands;  Massena 
had  been  in  danger  of  his  life.  The  Austrians,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  shown  themselves  worthy  foemen  who  knew  how  to 
win  when  the  forces  opposed  were  equal  in  number  and  whom 
he  had  succeeded  in  defeating  only  with  the  greatest  danger 
and  difficulty  in  cases  where  he  disposed  of  forces  numerically 
superior.  No,  the  thought  of  war  was  losing  its  charms  for  him. 
Accordingly,  on  July  12th,  he  accepted  the  proposal  of  a  cessa- 
tion of  hostilities,  giving  consent  thereto,  however,  only  at  the 
price  of  about  80,000  Sfjuare  miles  of  territory,   a  condition 

*  In  conversation  with  the  Austrian  General  Bubna  some  time  later, 
he  explained  the  immoderate  use  of  cannon  to  which  he  had  been  driven, 
saying:  "You  see  well  enough  that  my  infantry  is  far  from  perfection;  the 
best  of  it,  the  old  infantry,  is  in  Spain." 


Mr.  39]  The  Truce  of  Znaim  479 

which  Francis  ratified  only  aft^r  prolonged  refusal,  and  then 
with  the  secret  rosolvc  to  continue  the  war.  Since  in  this  deter- 
muiation  the  Archduke  was  unable  to  concur,  the  Emperor 
himself  assumed  the  supreme  command  of  the  army  and  Charles 
retired  completely  from  the  leadership. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Truce  of  Znaim  was  a  long  way 
yet  from  signifying  peace.  Austria  built  hopes  upon  Prussia, 
whose  King  seemed  this  time  really  to  have  made  up  his  mind 
to  interfere,  and  actually  sent  a  special  messenger  to  the  Aus- 
trian camp,  where  the  Emperor  held  his  court.  But,  as  events 
proved,  it  was  after  all  in  appearance  only  that  this  resolve  had 
been  taken.  Austria  also  built  hopes  upon  England,  which 
had  landed  a  new  army  in  Spain  under  Wellesley  and  was 
preparing  a  second  expedition  against  Holland  or  northern 
Germany.  She  further  entertained  hopes  of  support  from 
Russia,  which  had  not  shown  herself  an  overzealous  partisan 
of  the  Corsican,  and  was  likewise  hopeful  of  aid  from  Turkey, 
but  most  of  all  she  counted  upon  her  own  military  forces,  the 
munber  of  which  was  to  be  raised  to  200,000  men  and  put 
under  command  of  Prince  Liechtenstein.  It  was  in  order  to 
conceal  these  hopes  and  preparations  as  far  as  possible  that 
Francis  sent  to  solicit  peace  of  Napoleon. 

Now  that  adversary  was  genuinely  desirous  of  peace  for 
the  very  reasons  which  encouraged  Austria  to  resistance,  but 
he  was  no  less  careful  to  conceal  this  wish  than  was  Francis 
to  veil  his  warlike  inclinations,  in  order  to  derive  the  greatest 
possible  profit  from  the  negotiations.  He  at  first  refused  ab- 
ruptly to  consider  the  proposal,  spoke  of  a  partition  of  Austria 
and  of  demanding  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor,  and  vouch- 
safed compliance  only  upon  a  repetition  of  the  request  to  enter 
into  negotiations.  The  plenipotentiaries  of  the  two  powers, 
Champagny  and  Metternich,  then  repaired  to  Altenburg,  but 
their  negotiations  resembled  a  great  intrigue  rather  than  a 
serious  transaction.  Here  again  Napoleon  made  exaggerated 
demands,  requiring  the  cession  of  all  territoiy  then  occupied 
by  his  forces,  which  amounted  to  about  a  third  of  the  entire 
realm;   to  this  tlie  Austrians  responded  with  coimter-demands 


480  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

by  way  of  prolonging  the  conference,  and  matters  continued 
on  in  this  wise  until  at  last  decisive  changes  in  the  general 
situation  impelled  them  to  proceed  seriously  to  business. 

The  English  had  indeed  obtained  some  hard -won  victories 
in  Spain,  but  their  effect  had  not  been  lasting,  Wellesley  had 
forced  Marshal  Soult  to  withdraw  from  Portugal  and,  pene- 
trating into  Spain,  had  defeated  Victor  at  Talavera  on  July 
27th  and  28th,  1809,  but,  being  threatened  in  his  left  flank  by 
a  movement  of  Soult's,  he  was  obliged  to  return  to  Badajoz  on 
the  frontier  of  Portugal.  At  the  same  time  one  of  the  Spanish 
armies,  which  had  been  merely  dispersed  by  Napoleon,  was 
defeated  by  General  Sebastiani  (August  11th).  Soon  after  ca- 
lamity befell  likewise  the  British  enterprise  on  the  coast  of 
the  North  Sea.  Instead  of  landing  at  the  Elbe  and  summoning 
to  their  aid  the  general  uprising  among  the  German  nation, 
they  had,  with  a  view  only  to  their  own  interest,  directed  their 
course  to  Holland  in  order  to  take  Antwerp.  In  this  they 
utterly  failed  and,  toward  the  end  of  August,  were  compelled 
to  return  home  baffled  and  disgraced.  In  spite  of  the  ad- 
vances already  made  Frederick  William  III.  could  not  decide 
to  mobilize  against  Napoleon  even  upon  receiving  word  that 
Austria  was  ready  to  continue  the  war,  while  from  the  Czar 
word  came  to  Emperor  Francis  that  he  need  not  count  upon 
Russia  and  had  better  make  peace  with  France.  How  com- 
pletely changed  was  the  aspect  of  affairs  from  what  it  had 
been  but  shortly  before,  and  all  to  the  disadvantage  of  Aus- 
tria! But  the  most  important  consideration  of  all  was  the 
fact  that  Austria  could  no  longer  depend  upon  her  own  forces, 
since  a  fearful  malady  hud  begun  to  rage  throughout  the  army 
which,  according  to  Varnhagen,  who  was  then  in  the  Austrian 
service,  eventually  disabled  from  70,000  to  90,000  men. 

All  these  reasons  combined  to  efface  from  the  mind  of  Francis 
and  his  court  at  Totis  all  inclination  for  the  continuance  of 
hostilities,  and  Napoleon  now  threw  aside  pretence  and  ac- 
knowledged his  own  desire  for  peace.  "I  sincerely  wish  for 
peace,"  said  he  in  confidence  to  Count  Bubna,  whom  Francis 
had  sent  as  his  ambassador  and  through  whom  he  was  negoti- 


jet.40]  The   Peace  of  Schonbrunn  481 

ating  directly  with  Napoleon.  "Until  now  I  have  had  the 
support  of  Russio,  and  the  Czar  maintains  his  alliance  with 
me  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  nation — a  course  for  whicli 
I  give  him  due  praise,  for  a  sovereign  should  not  concern  him- 
self as  to  the  opinion  of  his  subjects."  (No  one  was  more  con- 
cerned in  respect  to  that  than  was  Napoleon.)  "But  what 
as.surance  have  I  that  everything  will  remain  thus?  As  for 
Prussia,  I  know  that  she  has  long  wavered  between  you  and 
me."  He  spoke  in  praise  of  the  Austrian  army,  saying  that 
if  commanded  by  himself  it  would  be  quite  as  good  as  the 
French  and  superior  to  all  others.  He  abated  the  demands 
made  at  Altenburg,  representing  them  as  due  to  the  private 
malice  of  Champagny,  but  he  still  exacted  the  surrender  of  three 
and  a  half  million  of  inhabitants  in  the  west,  the  south,  and  Gali- 
cia.  This  he  established  as  his  ultimatum  from  which  he  was 
not  again  to  be  moved,  and  when  Francis  finally  resolved  to 
accept  the  conditions  and  sent  Liechtenstein  direct  to  Schon- 
brunn with  full  powers, — the  negotiations  at  Altenburg  having 
been  broken  off, — Napoleon  added  to  this  the  exaction  of  a  war- 
indemnity  of  100,000,000  francs,  which  he  later  reduced  to 
75,000,000,  but  which  Champagny,  by  way  of  gratifying  his 
master,  caused  to  be  again  raised  to  85,000,000. 

Finally,  so  desperate  was  the  outlook  for  Austria,  left  soli- 
tary and  disabled,  that  on  the  night  of  October  1.3th, — impos- 
sible as  it  was  for  his  impoverished  nation  to  pay  such  a  sum, 
— Liechtenstein  was  brought  to  append  his  signature  to  even 
this  condition,  though  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  Emperor. 
Napoleon  did  not,  however,  wait  for  this  to  be  granted,  but 
on  the  following  morning  announced  by  cannon  to  the  Vien- 
nese that  peace  had  been  concluded. 

The  treaty  just  signed  despoiled  the  Austrian  Emperor  of 
more  than  40,000  square  miles  of  territory:  Salzburg,  Berch- 
tesgaden,  and  the  Inn  quarter  fell  to  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhme,  West  or  New  Galicia  to  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  as  like- 
wise the  district  about  the  city  of  Cracow  and  the  circle  of 
Zamosc  in  East  Galicia,  while  a  small  strip  of  East  Galician 
territory  was  made  over  to  Russia.     Into  the  possession  of  Na- 


482  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [i809 

poleon  himself  came  Gorz,  Moiitefalcone,  and  the  long-coveted 
city  of  Trieste,  besides  Carniola,  the  district  of  Villach  in  Carin- 
thia,  and  all  Croatian  lands  to  the  right  of  the  Save.  These 
tenitories  together  were  given  the  name  of  Illyria,  which  was 
to  have  a  government  of  its  own.  The  integrity  of  what  re- 
mained of  Austria  was  guaranteed  by  the  Emperor  of  the 
French,  while  Francis  I.  gave  his  sanction  to  all  changes  made, 
or  to  be  made,  by  Napoleon  in  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Italy.  As 
a  matter  of  course  Austria  was  now  compelled  to  break  once 
more  with  England  and  to  participate  in  the  continental 
blockade.  By  a  secret  article  Francis  I.  further  pledged  him- 
self to  reduce  his  army  to  150,000  men  and  to  pay  a  war- 
indemnity  set  by  Napoleon  at  75,000,000  francs,  but  which 
through  the  good  offices  of  Champagny  was  eventually  raised 
to  85,000,000. 

Before  the  morning  of  October  16th  Napoleon  had  already 
left  Schonbrunn.  An  incident  which  had  taken  place  there 
admonished  haste  on  his  part.  Three  days  previous,  while 
reviewing  the  troops  in  the  court  of  the  castle  at  Schonbrunn, 
a  young  man  had  attempted  to  force  his  way  to  him.  When 
arrested  he  was  found  to  be  armed  with  a  long  knife  and  frankly 
acknowledged  that  it  had  been  his  intention  to  assassinate  the 
Emperor.  The  youth,  Frederick  Staps  by  name,  had  scarcely 
outgrown  boyhood  and  was  the  son  of  a  Protestant  minister 
at  Naumburg.  Though  calm  and  quiet  by  nature,  the  misery 
and  distress  of  his  native  land  had  filled  him  with  such  un- 
speakable hatred  toward  the  oppressor  that  he  had  resolved 
upon  taking  his  life.  Napoleon  would  faui  have  believed  at  first 
that  this  was  nothing  more  than  a  case  of  insanity,  until  con- 
vinced against  his  will,  in  conversation  with  Staps  himself,  of 
the  deep-rooted  feeling  of  bitterness  in  Germany  and  of  the 
extent  to  which  it  had  already  armed  the  nation  against  him. 
To  Napoleon's  question  whether  he  would  be  grateful  if  granted 
pardon,  Staps  replied  calmly:  "I  should  still  seek  means  of 
killing  you."  He  was  ordered  shot  in  absolute  secrecy.  The 
matter  was  to  remain  entirely  hushed  up,  but  in  case  anything 
should  transpire  in  regard  to  it,  the  Minister  of  Police  was 


iEx.  40]  Dissatisfaction   in   France  483 

charged  to  disseminate  the  report  that  the  would-be  assassin 
was  considered  insane.  And  such  was  the  success  of  this  ruse 
that  the  idea  was  entertained  for  many  a  year  that  Staps  was 
in  custody  at  Vincennes. 

Once  more  did  Napoleon  return  in  triumph  to  Paris.  It  was 
indeed  not  generally  kno\\ai  how  narrowly  he  had  escaped  defeat 
in  this  last  campaign,  and  even  if  the  report  had  gained  publicity, 
was  not  the  treaty  of  peace  witness  to  the  contrary,  with  the 
humiliating  conditions  to  which  Austria  had  been  obliged  to  yield 
consent?  But  the  French  people  saw  after  all  nothing  further 
than  another  victorious  campaign,  bought  with  French  blood,  but 
redounding  in  nowise  to  the  advantage  of  France.  There  have 
already  been  noted  the  first  seeds  of  inward  discontent  with  the 
Emperor  to  whom  France  was  insufficient.  What  did  all  this 
amount  to,  all  that  he  accomplished  toward  gratifying  the  vanity 
of  the  French  people — of  what  account  was  all  the  fame  and 
glory  which  he  brought  back  to  them  as  compared  with  the 
undeniable  fact  that  his  ambition  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
French  throne?  A  striving  such  as  this,  in  opposition  to  national 
feeUng,  toward  aims  continually  farther  and  farther  removed, 
could  not  fail  in  the  end  to  deprive  him  of  popular  favour.  For 
there  is  but  one  thing  that  a  people  cannot  pardon  in  its  ruler, 
and  that  is  lack  of  patriotism.  There  were,  moreover,  reasons 
enough  besides  this  for  awakening  opposition.  There  still  re- 
mained unfulfilled  the  promise  given  the  year  before  that  the  war 
with  England  should  shortly  be  terminated;  it  continued  in  undi- 
minished vigour,  precluding  all  business  ventures  of  considerable 
extent.  Ports  which  formerly  existed  in  most  flourishing  condi- 
tion were  now  sinking  into  poverty  and  decay.  Nor  was  the 
prospect  of  a  cessation  of  hostilities  any  more  encouraging  with 
regard  to  the  offensive  war  against  Spain,  and  southern  France 
was  undergoing  enormous  losses  through  the  breaking  off  of  the 
lucrative  trade  formerly  carried  on  between  the  two  countries. 
A  further  grievance  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Emperor  displayed  a 
contempt  for  the  middle  classes  wiiich  was  deeply  felt.  The 
sons  of  certain  privileged  circles  alone  were  admitted  to  the 
positions  of  "auditeurs"  in  the  Councils  of  State,  and,  since  this 


484  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isoo 

was  the  only  road  to  the  higher  offices  and  dignities,  all  other 
aspirants  were  obliged  to  content  themselves  with  service  in  the 
humbler  departments.  And  yet  it  was  precisely  those  whom 
the  Emperor  counted  as  most  securely  bound  to  himself  through 
the  bestowal  of  these  privileges  who  were  in  fact  among  the 
most  disaffected.  An  observant  contemporary  remarks:  "The 
generals,  as  a  result  of  their  rich  dotations,  had  an  interest 
altogether  apart  from  that  of  their  sovereign — to  take  care  of 
what  they  had  acquired — and  were  for  that  reason  the  less 
willing  in  rendering  the  incessant  and  fatiguing  service  required 
of  them.  The  partiahty  shown  by  the  Emperor  for  attaching 
to  himself  priests  and  '  emigres '  had  won  for  him  only  lukewarm 
and  doubtful  adherents,  while  giving  cause  for  belief  that  he 
ignored  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  power — the  Revolution 
— of  which  he  had  been  the  issue.  The  members  of  the  ancient 
nobility  with  whom  he  was  so  fond  of  surrounding  himself 
accepted,  it  is  true,  the  dignities  offered  them,  but  betrayed  his 
secrets  on  every  occasion  when  they  succeeded  in  acquainting 
themselves  with  them,  flattered  him  grossly  to  his  face  and 
complained  behind  his  back  of  their  unhappy  fate  in  having  to 
serve  an  upstart.  The  clergy,  in  sooth,  carried  its  servility  to  the 
point  of  absurdity  in  its  religious  instruction,  preaching  absolute 
obedience  such  as  is  favoured  by  every  hierarchy,  but  bewailed 
at  other  times  the  fate  of  the  Pope."  And  now  it  was  just  at 
this  time  that,  as  a  result  of  an  indirect  order  of  the  Emperor, 
Pius  VII.  was  compelled  to  leave  Rome — an  act  which  aroused 
against  Napoleon  millions  of  pious  souls. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  behooved  the  Emperor  to  seek 
some  means  of  ingratiating  liimself  with  the  French  people  in  the 
hope  of  turning  the  tide  of  popular  favour  once  more  toward 
himself.  There  had  existed  for  years  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
general  public,  which  was  shared  also  by  those  who  surrounded 
the  Emperor,  that  he  should  acquire  a  direct  heir  by  means  of  a 
new  marriage.  People  thought  that  the  joys  of  a  family  of  his 
own  would  also  enhance  his  appreciation  of  the  state  and  recall 
his  mind  from  dwelling  upon  the  boundless  extension  of  his 
power.     And  this  wish  was  cherished  the  more  from  the  fact 


Kt.  40]  The   Divorce  485 

tliat  good  morals  did  not  exactly  reign  supreme  at  the  Imperial 
Court,  where  Josephine,  who  had  long  since  ceased  to  possess  the 
aflfections  of  her  husband,  now  rather  encouraged  than  interfered 
with  other  fancies  of  his,  solely  for  the  sake  of  retaining  her 
position.*  There  were  scandalous  tales  in  circulation,  particu- 
larly in  regard  to  the  brothers  of  the  Emperor,  and  the  feeling 
was  that  all  this  would  come  to  an  end  upon  the  introduction  of  a 
well-regulated  family  life  at  the  court.  Moreover,  the  hope  was 
entertained  that  a  new  marriage  with  a  daughter  of  one  of  the 
monarchs  of  Europe  woukl  be  a  pledge  of  peace  and  at  the  same 
time  act  as  a  restraint  to  his  lust  after  world-dominion. 

To  this  general  wish  Napoleon  was  now  ready  to  accede.  He 
appointed  her  son,  the  Viceroy  Eugene,  to  prepare  Josephine 
for  the  divorce  which  public  policy  inexorably  demanded, 
and  on  December  15th  summoned  a  family  council  at  the 
Tuileries,  where  he  announced  his  determination  to  enter  upon 
another  alliance.  "The  political  system  of  my  monarchy,"  said 
he,  "the  interests  and  needs  of  my  people,  which  have  at  all 
times  regulated  my  actions,  demand  that  I  leave  behind  to  my 
offspring — heirs  of  my  love  to  my  people — this  throne  upon 
which  Providence  has  placed  me."  Since  the  union  with  his 
well-beloved  wife  Josephine  allowed  him  no  hope  in  regard  to  this 
matter,  he  should  be  obliged  to  sacrifice  the  tenderest  impulses 
of  liis  heart  to  the  good  of  the  state  and  loose  the  bands  which 
united  him  with  her.  Being  but  forty  years  of  age,  he  hoped  to 
rear  in  his  spirit  and  in  his  ideas  the  successors  which  should  be 
granted  him.  The  Empress,  whom  he  had  himself  crowned, 
should  retain  her  title.  Josephine,  in  the  midst  of  sobs,  declared 
herself  ready  to  make  the  sacrifice  demanded  of  her  by  the 
state,  and  on  the  following  day  a  Senatus  consiUtum  declared  the 
Imperial  marriage  dissolved.  One  difficulty  was  still  to  be  over- 
come— some  way  must  be  devised  for  making  the  matter  accept- 

*  In  his  "Souvenirs"  de  Broglie  relates  tliat  he  saw  the  Empress 
before  the  war  of  1809,  "and  in  her  train  the  splendid  assernhhige  of 
maids  of  honour,  ladies  in  waiting,  and  ladies  of  the  palace,  including 
the  procession  of  readers  which  constituted  the  harem  of  our  Sultan 
and  which  helped  him  to  endure  for  a  while  longer  the  painted  antiquity 
of  the  former  Sultana." 


486  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  LI809 

able  to  those  of  the  Cathohc  faith.  For,  as  has  been  seen,  an 
ecclesiastical  marriage  had  been  entered  into  on  the  day  pre- 
ceding the  coronation.  But  Napoleon  declared  coolly  that  he 
had  given  his  consent  at  that  time  mider  moral  coercion,  and  this 
was  then  utilized  as  an  argument  for  the  nullity  of  the  religious 
marriage,  which  argument  was  accepted  by  the  Chancery  of  the 
Archbishop  in  Paris  before  the  end  of  January,  1810. 

Inmiediately  after  the  divorce  Josephine  retired  to  Mal- 
maison.  But  where  was  the  new  consort  to  be  found?  Unques- 
tionably political  motives  had  loosed  the  old  bonds  and  political 
motives  must  dictate  the  new.  No  other  consideration  was  here 
of  consequence  unless,  perchance,  it  was  that  of  ambition  in  the 
upstart  to  connect  himself  closely  with  one  of  the  ancient  royal 
families  of  Europe.  Of  these  the  most  illustrious  were  those  of 
Austria  and  Rassia.  The  policy  which  he  was  then  pursuing 
indicated  the  latter  to  the  Emperor  as  the  source  from  whence  to 
draw.  And  indeed  it  is  asserted  that  there  had  been  talk  of  a 
marriage  between  Napoleon  and  the  Grand  Duchess  Katharina 
even  at  the  time  of  the  interview  between  the  sovereigns  at  Tilsit, 
while  at  Erfurt  Alexander  had  spoken,  though  not  without  a 
certain  reserve,  of  his  younger  sister,  Anna.  The  former  had,  to 
be  sure,  been  married  meanwhile  to  Duke  George  of  Olden- 
burg, but  Anna  was  still  unclaimed.  The  question  then  arose 
as  to  how  this  marriage  would  conform  with  the  political 
situation. 

Since  the  events  at  Erfurt  much  had  taken  place  which 
threatened  rupture  between  the  two  countries.  There  had  been 
the  outbreak  of  war  with  Austria  which  the  Czar  would  so 
gladly  have  prevented  so  as  to  be  able  to  use  all  his  forces  against 
the  Swedes  and  Turks,  and  there  had  followed  French  victories 
which  had  occasioned  deep  anxiety  in  St.  Petersburg.  On  Sep- 
tember 19th,  1809,  by  the  Treaty  of  Friederichshamm,  Alexander 
had,  to  be  sure,  succeeded  in  forcing  Sweden  to  relinquish 
Finland,  but  Turkey  had  opposed  more  successful  resistance 
and  had  been  by  no  means  subjugated,  so  that  in  the  fall  of  the 
year  the  Russian  troops  were  again  obliged  to  return  across  th^ 
Danube.     But  that  which  caused  the  Czar  the  most  chagrin  was 


^T.  40]  Approaches   to   Russia  487 

Napoleon's  conduct  toward  the  Poles  during  the  course  of  the 
war.  For,  when  Napoleon  had  seen  with  what  intentional 
(lilatoriness  Russia  was  carryhig  on  the  war  against  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  he  turned  to  the  national  forces  of  the  duchy  of 
Warsaw  under  Poniatowski,  summoned  the  West  Galicians  to 
assert  their  independence  and  thus  accomplished  by  means  of  the 
Poles  what  the  Russians  had  denied  him.  Two  million  Gahcians 
added  to  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  was  the  form  in  which  the 
gratitude  of  the  Emperor  showed  itself.  The  allies  of  Tilsit  and 
Erfurt  were  now  mutually  distrustful.  But  for  Napoleon  it 
would  have  been  exceedingly  inconvenient  if  Russia  had  for  this 
reason  taken  up  arms  against  him  just  at  this  time  with  Prussia 
standing  ready  prepared  for  war.  Accordingly,  on  October  20th, 
1809,  only  a  few  days  after  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  Schonbnmn, 
a  despatch  was  sent  off  to  St.  Petersburg  representing  to  the 
Czar  how  impossible  it  had  been  for  the  Emperor  to  allow  the 
West  Galicians,  who  had  risen  with  one  accord  to  his  assistance, 
to  return  under  Austrian  dominion;  that  it  was,  however,  far 
removed  from  his  thoughts  to  awaken  any  hopes  of  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  Poland,  and  that  he  was,  on  the  contrary,  ready  to 
unite  with  Russia  in  obliterating  the  name  of  Poland  from  history. 
(He  did  not  suspect  that  Alexander  would  discover  that  he  was 
at  the  same  time  sending  to  assure  the  Poles  that  these  repre- 
sentations were  not  intended  seriously  by  him.)  But,  hi  order  to 
completely  reassure  the  Czar,  even  before  the  divorce  he  returned 
to  the  marriage  project  in  his  instructions  to  Caulaincourt  and 
asked  directly  for  the  hand  of  the  Grand  Duchess  Anna  (November 
22d,  1809).  There  would  be  Uttle  difficulty  in  making  it  clear 
that  this  offer  of  marriage  had  at  this  time  no  other  object  than 
to  appease  Russia.  Princess  .\nna  was  but  fifteen  years  of  age 
and,  according  to  Caulaincourt's  statements,  not  yet  fully  devel- 
oped. It  was  to  be  foreseen  that  Alexander  would  reply,  if  not 
with  a  refusal,  at  least  with  a  request  for  delay  which  might  be 
interpreted  as  a  rejection  of  Napoleon's  offer.  And  it  is  all  the 
more  impossible  to  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  his  solicitation 
because  at  the  same  time,  and  again  before  the  divorce,  there  was 
coming  to  form  and  maturity  a  second  project,  kept  in  profound 


488  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [I809 

secret,  for  a  marriage  with  the  Ai'chduchess  Marie  Louise  of 
Austria. 

Ever  smce  the  lack  of  warmth  betrayed  by  Russia  in  her 
behaviour  during  the  summer  just  past,  it  had  been  evident  to 
Napoleon  that  the  alliance  with  that  power  must  shortly  come  to 
an  end,  and  that  an  implacable  war  must  ensue  over  the  question 
of  the  mastery  of  the  world — ''to  see  which  of  the  two  should 
finally  be  sole  master."  And  when  that  should  be  the  German 
powers  of  middle  Europe,  or  Austria  at  least,  must  on  no  account 
be  under  Russian  influence.  This  consideration  probably  sug- 
gested to  the  Emperor  of  the  French  the  idea  of  a  marriage  with 
an  Archduchess;  there  was  besides  another  consideration  which 
was  of  some  importance,  that  this  Princess  belonged  to  a  family 
of  which  no  woman  had  been  barren.  It  depended  only  upon 
gaining  the  compliance  of  the  House  of  Austria.  In  order  to 
accomplish  this  end  all  possible  publicity  was  given  to  the 
Russian  marriage  project,  so  that  the  fear  in  Vienna  of  seeing  an 
intimate  alliance  between  Russia  and  France  should  smooth  the 
way  for  the  other  courtship,  or  perhaps  even  call  forth  advances 
froni  the  Austrian  side.  It  is  not  yet  clear  from  which  party 
came  the  first  decisive  word,  whether  the  suggestion  was  made 
to  Metternich  or  by  him  to  Count  Laborde,  a  confidant  of  Napo- 
leon's who  had  been  active  in  the  matter  of  the  negotiations  for 
peace  and  had  then  remained  in  Vienna  for  some  time.*     In  any 

*  In  a  despatch  to  Schwarzenberg  (Vienna,  December  25th,  1809)  Met- 
ternich reports  an  interview  between  himself  and  Alexander  de  Laborde, 
who  had  formerly  been  in  the  Austrian  service  and  had  formed  many 
attachments  in  Vienna,  particularly  with  Schwarzenberg  among  others. 
Previous  to  his  departure  Laborde  had  sounded  him  upon  the  possibility 
of  an  alliance  between  the  two  families,  suggesting  the  marriage  of  the 
Austrian  Crown  Prince  Ferdinand  with  a  daughter  of  Lucien's,  or  that 
of  Napoleon  with  the  Archduchess  Louise.  The  first  proposition  he  had 
at  once  rejected,  but  not  so  the  second.  On  the  other  hand  Laborde — 
and  not  Narbonne  as  Lanfrey.  Lefebvre,  and  others  have  miscalled  him — 
states  in  a  memorandum  which  he  most  probably  prepared  for  the  Em- 
jK'ror  in  early  December,  shortly  after  his  return  to  Paris,  that  Metteniich 
had  tried  to  persuade  him  to  postpone  his  departure  from  Vienna,  and  in 
a  discussion  about  means  of  establishing  better  relations  between  France 
and  Austria  had  directly  named  a  marriage  of  Napoleon  to  an  Austrian 


iET.  40]  Negotiations   with   Austria  489 

case  Emperor  Francis  and  his  present  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  regarded  a  family  alliance  with  Napoleon  as  a  certain 
security  for  the  state,  a  guarantee  for  its  continued  existence, 
and  for  the  sake  of  these  considerations  feelings  of  antipathy  to 
the  suitor  were  not  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way. 

After  the  first  secret  parleys  between  the  diplomats  the 
matter  was  brought  before  the  Countess  Metternich,  who  was 
then  in  Paris,*  by  Josephine  and  Hortense  themselves,  while 
Eugene  was  commissioned  with  a  similar  errand  to  the  Austrian 
ambassador.  Prince  Schwarzenberg;  for  Napoleon  insisted  that 
those  most  concerned  should  be  the  very  ones  to  collaborate 
in  furthering  his  new  marriage.*  His  next  step — ^which  was 
in  reality  nothing  more  than  a  matter  of  form — was  to  hold  a 
council  of  his  ministers  on  January  27th  in  order  to  be  able  later 
to  adduce  the  advice  of  his  ministers  when  dealing  with  Alex- 
ander. On  this  occasion  Maret,  who  had  been  taken  into  confi- 
dence by  Napoleon,  pleaded  in  favour  of  the  Austrian  and  against 
the  Russian  marriage,  and  on  February  7th,  ISIO,  the  decision 
of  the  Emperor  was  imparted  to  his  family  council.  Before  the 
close  of  the  same  everung  Schwarzenberg  had  signed  the  pro- 
visional marriage  contract.  The  Russian  project  was  accord- 
ingly definitely  abandoned.    The  first  proposal  of  Coulaincourt 

Archduchess  as  such  a  means,  in  case  the  French  Emperor  should  really 
carry  out  his  plan  of  divorce.  This  idea,  Metternich  had  hastened  to 
add,  was  of  his  own  devising,  he  being  ignorant  of  the  intentions  of  his 
sovereign,  though  he  was  convinced  that  they  would  be  favourable  to 
the  project.  Later,  in  a  letter  of  September,  1811,  to  Jakobi-Klost,  Metter- 
nich designated  himself  as  the  one  who  had  proposed  the  marriage  (M. 
Duncker,  "Aus  der  Zeit  Friedrich  des  Grossen  und  Friedrich  Wilhelm- 
III.,"  p.  325).  Finally,  in  his  "Memoires"  he  again  denies  the  statement 
and  puts  the  initiative  on  Napoleon,  though  men  well  situated  for  knowing 
the  truth  of  the  matter,  such  as  the  Bavarian  Minister  Montgelas,  name 
him  as  having  been  the  instigator  of  the  marriage.  However  it  may 
have  been,  this  much  is  to  be  inferred  from  all  the  sources:  that  both  sides 
were  more  than  willing  to  bring  the  matter  about. 

*  "The  Sovereign,"'  said  Montgelas,  who  was  certainly  informed 
with  great  exactitude  by  the  A'iceroy,  "did  not  wish  to  have  Eugene 
appear  as  a  victim  in  need  of  sympathy,  and,  on  the  contrary,  treated  it  as 
a  matter  of  importance  that  just  those  persons  who  were  most  nearly 
touched  by  his  new  marriage  should  outwardly  assist  in  bringing  it  to  pass." 


490  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isio 

had  remained  long  unanswered  and  was  followed  by  an  insis\.ent 
reminder.  When  there  came  from  St.  Petersburg  only  the 
anticipated  explanation  from  Alexander,  that  the  Grand  Duchess 
was  still  too  young  and  the  matter  would  have  to  be  postponed, 
Napoleon  at  once  grasped  at  the  opportunity  thus  presented. 
"Postponement,"  said  he,  "is  only  another  word  for  refusal; 
moreover,  I  will  have  in  my  palace  no  foreign  priests  to  come 
between  me  and  my  wife."  An  answer  couched  in  the  politest 
terms  was  returned  to  the  Neva  saying  that  the  thought  of  the 
marriage  was  given  up.  The  Czar  might  perhaps  feel  wounded 
at  this, — and  we  know  that  he  did  feel  resentment, — but,  once 
sure  of  Austria,  that  was  to  Napoleon  no  matter  for  apprehen- 
sion.    He  had  gained  the  object  of  his  double  dealing. 

Berthier,  as  Grand  Ambassador,  arrived  meanwhile  at 
Vienna  in  order  to  make  the  formal  proposals  for  Napoleon, 
which  were  followed  on  March  11th  by  the  ceremonious  nup- 
tial benediction  in  the  church  of  St.  Augustine  in  the  Austrian 
capital.  Archduke  Charles  stood  as  proxy  for  his  illustrious 
adversary.  Thence  the  bridal  party  hastened  towards  France 
and  was  met  by  the  Emperor  on  the  27th  at  Compiegne.  On 
April  1st  the  civil  marriage  was  celebrated  at  St.  Cloud,  which 
was  followed  next  day  by  a  repetition  of  the  church  marriage 
in  the  chapel  of  the  Louvre.  It  was  observed  that  the  cere- 
mony was  identical  with  that  at  the  marriage  of  Louis  XVL 
to  Marie  Antoinette,  and  that  the  marriage  articles  were  drawn 
up  word  for  word  like  those  in  1770. 

Marie  Louise  did  not  particularly  please  the  Parisians.  A 
fine-looking  girl  of  eighteen  years,  she  presented  indeed  a 
fresh,  wholesome  appearance  with  a  straightforward  look  in 
her  beautiful  blue  eyes,  but  in  spite  of  her  clear  complexion 
and  full  red  cheeks  she  was  thought  ugly  and,  above  all,  ill 
dressed.  The  courtiers  were  especially  impressed  with  her 
excessive  embarrassment.  But  she  soon  acquired  dignity  and 
a  certain  firmness  of  bearing,  especially  upon  meeting  with 
encouragement  and  great  respect  from  Napoleon,  to  whom  she 
saw  all  else  bow  in  humblest  submission.  Up  to  a  short  time 
before  she  had  hated  him  as  Austria's  bitterest  foe,  that  is, 


iEr.  40]  Marie  Louise  491 

she  had  hated  him  as  much  as  a  child  of  the  least  passionate 
of  monarchs  was  capable  of  violent  feeling,  and  her  recently 
published  letters  to  a  friend  at  that  time  show  how  great  was 
the  sacrifice  which  she  made  for  the  good  of  her  country.  On 
January  23d,  for  instance,  she  writes  from  Ofen  (or  Buda): 
"Since  Napoleon's  divorce  from  his  wife  I  always  open  the 
Frankfort  Gazette  with  the  idea  of  finding  the  name  of  the 
new  consort,  and  I  acknowledge  that  the  delay  causes  me  in- 
voluntary uneasiness.  I  place  my  fate  in  the  hands  of 
Divine  Providence,  which  indeed  alone  knows  what  is  best 
for  us.  But,  should  misfortune  will  it  so,  I  am  ready  to  sacri- 
fice my  personal  well-being  for  the  good  of  the  state,  satisfied 
that  true  happiness  is  to  be  found  only  in  the  fulfilment  of 
duty,  even  if  to  the  prejudice  of  one's  inclinations."  To  this 
she  added,  however:  "Pray  that  it  may  not  come  to  pass." 
But  it  was  to  be,  notwithstanding. 

But  however  much  there  might  be  found  to  criticise  as  to 
the  outward  appearance  of  the  new  Empress  in  Paris,  the 
event  in  general  was  nevertheless  hailed  with  great  satisfaction. 
To  be  sure  the  irreconcilable  element  of  the  Faubourg  St.  Ger- 
main was  indignant  at  this  alliance  between  Legitimacy  and 
the  Revolution,  and  the  radical  Republicans  likewise  at  the 
support  thus  given  in  Austria  to  the  rule  of  their  oppressor. 
But  the  great  mass  of  the  people  rejoiced  notwithstanding. 
The  soldiers  of  the  Guard  themselves  thought  this  marriage 
with  a  foreign  princess  to  be  a  guarantee  of  peace.  Rentes 
rose  when  it  was  learned  on  February  9th  that  the  contract 
had  been  signed.  Napoleon  took  immediate  advantage  of  this 
state  of  feeling  to  repeat  his  old,  familiar  assurances.  He 
gave  orders  to  Champagny  to  address  a  circular  letter  to  all 
foreign  ambassadors  asserting  his  love  of  peace:  "You  will 
say  in  it  that  one  of  the  principal  means  of  which  the  English 
availed  themselves  for  kindling  the  continental  war  consisted 
in  making  it  believed  that  it  was  part  of  my  purpose  to  destroy 
all  dynasties.  Since  circumstances  have  now  placed  me  in 
the  position  to  choose  a  consort,  it  has  been  my  desire  to  de- 
prive them  of  the  accursed  pretext  under  which  they  stirred 


49^2  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria  [isio 

up  the  nations  and  created  discord  which  flooded  Europe  with 
blood."  But  it  was  scarcely  to  be  expected  that  the  world 
would  place  confidence  in  these  affirmations.  At  the  Court 
of  Vienna,  as  Metternich  reports,  they  began  asking  them- 
selves what  had  been  the  scheme  upon  which  Napoleon  had 
been  reckoning  in  making  this  marriage:  whether  it  were  his 
intention  to  sheathe  the  sword  and  really  ground  the  future 
of  France  and  of  his  family  upon  the  principles  of  order  and 
peace,  or  whether  he  were  only  counting  upon  drawing  Aus- 
tria's forces  into  the  service  of  his  system  of  conquest.  And 
that  was  indeed  the  decisive  question.  It  was  not  long  to 
remain  unanswered.  When,  on  March  20th,  1811,  the  cannon 
of  the  Invalides  announced  to  the  anxiously  waiting  people  of 
Paris  the  birth  of  a  Prince,  to  the  initiated  the  political  horizon 
was  seen  to  be  already  thick  with  clouds  again,  nor  had  they 
any  question  as  to  the  origin  of  the  storm.  And  what  deep 
meaning  might  there  not  lie  concealed  in  the  title  which  the 
Emperor  bestowed  upon  his  new-born  son,  "The  King  of 
Rome"!  None  but  the  name  of  the  ancient  mistress  of  the 
world  seemed  to  him  yet  worthy  to  adorn  the  heir  to  his  power. 


I 


CHAPTER  XVI 
AT    THE    ZENITH 

It  was  a  decisive  factor  in  Napoleon's  life  as  a  ruler  that  at 
the  very  time  when  he  supposed  he  had  prostrated  the  govern- 
ments of  Europe  and  made  them  hamiless  to  his  plans,  he 
encountered  a  still  unsubdued  foe  in  the  subjects  of  those  govern- 
ments. When  he  declared  war  against  the  several  states  he  had 
evidently  not  foreseen  this  persistent  opposition  of  the  people, 
and  had  thus  committed  the  very  same  error  of  which  his 
predecessors  in  the  revolutionary  regime  had  been  guilty. 
Neither  the  Convention  nor  the  Directory  had  cared  whether  the 
nations  of  Europe  really  desired  to  be  freed  from  their  princes  and 
to  be  assembled  under  the  leadership  of  the  Republic.  And 
Napoleon  cared  just  as  little  whether  they  really  wanted  to  come 
under  the  hegemony  of  the  French  and  to  receive  his  laws  as  a 
gift.  He  thought  his  ambitious  schemes  were  sufficiently  se- 
cured if  he  brought  the  several  countries  under  constitutions  and 
governments  that  were  useful  to  himself  because  they  were 
dependent  on  him.  He  had  scarcely  any  appreciation  of  the 
instinct  of  nationality;  so  little,  indeed,  that  he  ignored  it  even 
among  the  French,  whom  he  was  hoping  to  unite  with  Dutch, 
Germans,  and  Italians  hi  one  empire  for  all  time.  This  was  quite 
natural.  What  he  had  once  possessed  in  his  youth,  and  soon  lost, 
was  a  mere  clan  feeling,  such  as  armed  Italians  against  Italians, 
Corsicans  against  Genoese,  dialect  against  dialect.  Of  the 
mighty  patriotism  which  throws  its  bonds  about  all  the  members 
of  a  powerful  race  owning  one  custom  and  tongue,  of  this  he  had 
no  knowledge.  Besides,  he  was  too  ardent  a  disciple  of  the 
cosmopolitan  rationalism  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  doctrine 
that  frowned  upon  the  difference  between  races  as  well  as 
between  social  classes,  and  cherished  the  ideal  of  a  citizenship  of 

493 


494 


At  the  Zenith  [1810 


the  world  without  distuictioii  of  race.  To  this  philosophy  he  had 
yielded  homage  until  his  mind  was  filled  with  the  one  dream  of 
seeing  all  mankind  reduced  to  a  common  level  and  subject  to  his 
will.  Hence  all  that  he  saw  was  populations,  not  nations,  and 
he  thought  he  had  subdued  them  when  he  had  defeated  their 
armies  and  humbled  their  governments.  But  when  he  attacked 
a  people  like  the  Spaniards,  in  whom  the  instinct  of  nationality 
was  highly  developed,  they  rose,  burning  with  rage,  seized  the 
arms  their  leaders  had  dropped  and  continued  the  conflict  with  des- 
perate resolution.  The  same  spirit  of  national  resistance  to  bound- 
less ambition  was  soon  astir  everywhere ;  and  it  is  characteristic 
of  the  most  far-sighted  enemies  of  the  French  Emperor  that  they 
justly  valued  this  movement  and  saw  in  the  arming  of  the  people 
the  surest  means  of  defence.  Thus  Pitt  in  England  had  long 
before  raised  his  army  of  volunteers,  Stadion  in  Austria  had 
insisted  on  creating  a  militia,  and  Schamhorst  in  Prussia  never 
tired  of  calling  for  a  law  requiring  universal  military  service.  A 
deep  significance  lay  hidden  in  the  words  of  the  Austrian  minister 
to  the  Russian  plenipotentiary:  "We  have  constituted  ourselves 
a  nation." 

And  what  energy  came  into  the  conflict  with  this  national 
element!  In  Spain,  which  Napoleon  thought  he  had  won  by  a 
simple  military  parade  of  Murat  to  Madrid,  the  flame  once 
kindled  would  not  be  quenched;  and  Austria,  although  on  the 
brink  of  ruin,  managed,  in  1809,  to  lead  into  the  field  forces  that 
gave  the  great  general  more  trouble  than  he  had  ever  had  with  the 
amiies  of  the  cabinet  of  Vienna,  Moreover,  there  were  uprisings 
in  the  Tyrol  and  northern  Germany,  while  in  Russia  a  current  of 
pul)lic  sentiment  sheathed  the  sword  of  the  Czar  against  the 
troops  of  Austria.  And  was  it  not  a  fatal  omen  for  Napoleon 
that,  at  the  very  time  when  national  hate  was  arming  the  peoples 
of  Europe,  in  France  itself  there  was  a  patriotic  feeling  agahist 
the  ambition  of  their  ruler  which  heeded  no  ties  of  country,  and 
the  ideal  of  a  national  state  aroused  a  secret  but  conscious  oppo- 
sition to  the  international  empire.  Just  as  the  Spanish  revolt 
broke  out  in  the  spring  of  1808,  the  police  hi  Paris  came  upon  the 
traces  of  a  republican  conspiracy  in  which  even  some  senators — 


^T.  40]   The  Pope  Excommunicates  Napoleon      495 

among  others  Sieyes — arc  supposed  to  have  been  s(jmewhat 
involved. 

This  popular  resistance  of  the  nations  to  Napoleon's  political 
schemes  found  in  1809  an  ally  in  His  Holiness  the  Pope.  It  was 
not  the  weapons  of  his  secular  power  that  he  wiekled,  for  Napoleon 
had  broken  them;  his  lands  were  occupied,  the  administration 
was  in  the  hands  of  foreign  officials,  and  it  needed  only  the  formal 
act  to  make  the  patrimony  of  St.  Peter  what  it  had  virtually  been 
since  April,  1808,  a  province  of  the  Empire.  No;  he  armed 
himself  against  the  Emperor  with  the  thimderbolts  of  his  spiritual 
authority,  which  rested  on  a  broad  popidar  foundation.  No 
sooner  had  the  Spaniards  revolted  than  he  protested,  from  the 
very  midst  of  the  French  troops  occupying  his  territory,  against 
the  outrage  on  himself,  and  forbade  the  bishops  in  the  Legations 
wrested  from  the  Papal  States  to  take  the  oath  of  fealty  to  the 
new  lord.  And  when,  after  the  victories  in  Bavaria  in  April, 
1809,  Napoleon  retorted  from  Vienna  with  two  decrees  which 
divested  the  Pope  of  all  temporal  sovereignty  and  declared  the 
Papal  States  to  be  a  provuice  of  the  French  Empire,  Pius  VII., 
under  the  impression  produced  by  the  daj'-  of  Aspem,  published 
against  his  oppressors  a  bull  of  excommunication  that  had  been 
ready  for  months.  This  opened  anew  the  whole  great  question, 
many  centuries  old,  of  the  conflict  between  the  imperial  power 
and  the  papacy,  and  Napoleon  was  forced  to  seek  a  solution. 
He  chose  the  one  that  conformed  best  with  his  aggressive  nature 
and  with  the  universal  system  of  the  Revolution  which  he  repre- 
sented. 

As  soon  as  he  heard  in  Schonbrunn  that  the  Pope  had  caused 
the  bull  to  be  posted  on  the  doors  of  the  churches  in  Rome,  he 
sent  to  the  King  of  Naples,  who  was  in  his  confidence  and  had 
full  charge  of  the  Roman  enterprise,  secret  instructions  that  the 
Pope  must  be  arrested  if  he  preached  insurrection;  such  a  course, 
he  said,  was  not  unheard  of,  as  Philip  the  Fair  and  Charles  V.  had 
done  so.  Murat  took  the  hint  for  what  it  was  meant  to  be,  a 
command,  and  on  the  6th  of  July,  just  as  tlie  fortunes  of  war 
were  deciding  in  favour  of  the  Emperor  at  Wagram,  Pius  was 
arrested  in  the  Quirinal  and  removed  from  Rome.    He  was  taken 


49^  At  the  Zenith  [isio 

at  first  to  Grenoble,  and  thence  on  a  special  order  of  the  Emperor 
to  Savona  on  the  Riviera,  most  strictly  guarded  throughout.* 
Somewhat  later,  before  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  Napoleon  ordered 
the  cardinals  and  generals  of  religious  orders,  the  pa  pal  court  and 
archives,  to  be  transferred  to  Paris,  whither  he  also  purposed  to 
summon  the  Pope  in  order  to  have  him  near  at  hand  as  an  instru- 
ment of  his  absolute  will.  But  what  if  Pius  refused  such  services ! 
Even  this  emergency  was  to  be  provided  for.  After  his  return 
from  the  campaign,  and  after  he  had  fully  arranged  his  marriage 
with  the  Austrian  princess  and  thereby  deprived  the  Pope  of  his 
last  prop  in  an  orthodox  Catholic  power,  a  Senatus  consultum  of 
February,  1810,  (enacted  at  his  instigation,)  openly  incorporated 
the  Papal  States  into  the  French  Empire,  divided  them  mto  two 
departments,  and  raised  Rome  to  the  rank  of  second  city  of  the 
Empire.  The  same  act  provided  an  annual  income  of  two 
million  francs  for  the  Pope,  and  boimd  future  Popes,  at  their 
accession  to  the  chair,  to  the  Galilean  articles  of  1682,  which  had 
established  the  independence  of  the  French  crown  of  any  foreign 
ecclesiastical  power,  the  fallibility  of  the  Church  in  matters  of 
faith,  and  the  superiority  of  tlie  councils  over  the  papacy,  points 
that  had  been  affirmed  by  the  Council  of  Constance.  The 
Emperor's  object  in  pursuing  this  course  was  quite  apparent:  it 
was  to  override  the  resistance  of  the  Curia  by  means  of  a  sub- 
servient council.  For  as  early  as  July,  1807,  he  had  written  to 
Eugene  that  he  would  not  shrink  from  assembling  in  one  councul 
the  churches  of  Gaul,  Germany,  Italy,  and  Poland,  and  get  along 
without  the  Pope.f 

And  the  Pope  really  did  resist.  He  not  only  refused  to  con- 
firm the  divorce  of  Napoleon  and  Josephine  pronounced  by  the 
Archbishop  of  Paris,  in  consequence  of  which  thirteen  cardinals 
declined  to  participate  in  the  subsequent  marriage  festivities;  he 
also  refused  to  the  bishops  nominated  by  the  Emperor  the  rite  of 
investiture,  a  privilege  reserved  to  him  by  the  Concordat.    The 

*  Afterwards  the  Emperor  publicly  declared  that  the  arrest,  which  he 
had  himself  secretly  ordered,  was  a  piece  of  folly,  and  at  St.  Helena  he 
emphatically  denied  all  complicity  iu  the  act. 

t  See  page  423. 


iEr.  40]  The   Conflict   with   the    Pope  497 

mild-tempered  man,  who  had  not  the  most  exact  knowledge  of 
canon  law,  was  deprived  of  his  advisers  with  the  hope  of  winning 
him  over  more  easily;  Austria  exerted  itself  to  settle  the  dispute; 
and  toward  the  end  of  the  year  Napoleon  miposed  more  severe 
restrictions  on  his  prisoner,  depriving  him  of  his  papers  and  all 
opportunity  of  correspondence,  and  even  of  his  writing  materials; 
but  all  was  in  vain.  Pius  remained  firm,  and  although  he  seemed 
inclined  now  and  then  to  make  concessions,  yet  the  very  next 
moment  he  woidd  retract  everything  for  fear  of  impairing  the 
dignity  of  his  position.  He  preferred  even  schism  to  the  subor- 
dination of  the  Vicar  of  Christ  to  a  secular  sovereign. 

Under  such  circumstances,  with  the  ecclesiastical  confusion 
prevailing  in  France,  Napoleon  felt  obliged  to  take  some  de- 
cisive step  if  he  wanted  to  carr>'  his  point.  He  now  actually 
convoked  the  national  council.  But  at  the  very  outset  a  pre- 
paratory commission  composed  of  prelates  urged  the  objection 
that  even  the  French  catechism  recognized  the  Pope  as  the 
"visible  head  of  the  Church,"  of  whom  she  could  not  divest 
herself  without  jeopardy;  and  that  Bossuet,  too,  whom  Na- 
poleon was  fond  of  quoting  as  an  opponent  of  ultramontanism, 
had  asserted  that  the  Holy  Father  required  for  the  exercise  of  his 
ecclesiastical  functions  complete  independence  of  any  secular 
power  whatsoever.  To  which,  indeed,  the  Emperor  then  glibly 
replied  that  that  might  have  applied  in  Bossuet's  time,  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  when  there  was  a  considerable  number  of 
acknowledged  secular  sovereigns,  no  one  of  whom  would  concede 
to  another  political  superiority  above  the  Pope;  but  now  that 
Europe  acknowledged  him  as  sole  ruler  such  a  consideration 
had  no  force.  Incidentally  he  insinuated  that  the  successors 
of  Peter  "were  constantly  bringing  discord  into  all  Christen- 
dom in  the  interests  of  their  potty  Roman  state  that  was  no 
bigger  than  a  duchy."  And  when  in  June,  1811,  the  prelates 
of  France,  i.e.,  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire,  assembled,  with  some 
ItaUans  and  Belgians  among  them,  their  first  resolution  con- 
cerned the  oath  of  loyalty  to  Pius  VII.  It  was  only  by  men- 
aces and  not  until  several  opponents  had  been  arrested  that 
the  council  was  brought  to  the  point  of  promulgating  as  its 


498  At  the  Zenith  [I8I0 

own  a  decree  dictated  by  Napoleon,  to  the  effect  that  if  the 
Pope  delayed  investing  a  bishop  more  than  six  months  after 
he  was  nominated  by  the  Emperor  the  metropohtan  might  invest 
him.  (August  5th,  1811.)  Pius  in  Savona  was  finally  prevailed 
upon  to  give  his  assent  to  this,  but  only  with  regard  to  the 
bishops  in  France ;  he  made  an  exception  of  the  Italian  bishops 
and  demanded  his  advisers  again.  This  by  no  means  ended 
the  conflict. 

It  was  not  yet  decided  whether  Pius  would  be  obliged  to 
submit.  But  any  one  who  viewed  the  general  situation  might 
venture  such  a  conjecture.  The  ill  treatment  suffered  by  the 
supreme  head  of  Catholicism,  and  his  appeal  to  the  faithful, 
did  not  produce  upon  them  the  profound,  stirring  impression 
which  had  been  produced  in  former  centuries.  The  world  had 
become  secularized  to  an  astonishing  degree.  Furthermore,  a 
large  part  of  the  Emperor's  foes,  English,  Russians,  and  Prus- 
sians, were  not  in  the  range  of  the  papal  authority,  while  other 
nations,  as  the  Catholic  Poles,  based  their  very  hopes  on  the 
strongest  union  with  Napoleon.  Nay,  even  the  Pope's  own  sub- 
jects showed  little  resistance  to  their  new  sovereign,  and  finally 
accepted  wdth  great  readiness  the  military  plans  of  administra- 
tion, the  reform  of  the  judiciary,  the  improvement  of  educa- 
tion, the  regulation  of  streets  and  rivers,  the  draining  of  swamps, 
and  other  valuable  innovations  of  the  godless  regime. 

Only  on  one  people,  the  Spaniards,  if  we  may  disregard  the 
peasants  of  the  Tyrol,  did  the  fate  of  Pius  VII.  have  an  influence 
that  helped  to  determine  its  political  attitude.  Their  priests 
were  unwearied  in  steeling  their  courage  against  the  man  who 
threatened,  as  they  said,  the  altars  as  well  as  the  thrones.* 
In  the  last  days  of  the  year  1808  the  revolutionary  Central 
Jimta,  which  conducted  the  government  for  the  exiled  King 
Ferdinand,  had  summoned  the  nation  to  a  guerilla  warfare: 
bands  were  to  be  formed  under  the  command  of  a  monk  or  a 

*  In  one  of  the  catechisms  composed  by  the  Spanish  priests  for  pur- 
poses of  war,  a  (hnilish  nature  is  ascribed  to  Napoleon  alonp;side  of  his 
human  nature,  the  shiving  of  a  Frenchman  is  called  a  meritorious  act, 
and  to  give  up  fighting  is  declared  an  infamy  worthy  of  death. 


jet.  40]  Conditions  in  Spain  499 

trained  officer  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  small  French  de- 
tachments, intercepting  courioi-s,  capturing  transports  of  weapons 
and  ammunition,  and  the  like.  The  appeal  met  with  an  im- 
mediate response.  The  guerilla  bands  were  everywhere  and 
nowhere;  they  might  be  driven  away  and  pursued,  but  could 
not  be  destroyed,  and  as  a  means  of  distressing  the  enemy 
they  were  unequalled.  Soon  after  the  call  of  the  Junta  a  mani- 
festo proclaimed  to  the  nations  of  Europe  that  in  Spain  the 
liberty  of  all  nations  was  at  stake,  and  appealed  to  them  for 
support.  The  P^nglish,  who  heretofore  had  appeared  on  the 
peninsula  merely  as  enemies  of  Napoleon,  now  entered  openly 
into  a  friendly  alliance  with  the  Spanish  insurgents  and  pledged 
their  utmost  efforts.  And  though  they  never  fully  met  this 
pledge, — there  were  never  more  than  30,000  British  on  the  side 
of  the  Spanish, — yet  at  their  head  was  a  man  of  genius,  Sir 
Arthur  Wellesley,  or  Lord  WelHngton  as  he  was  called  after 
the  battle  of  Talavera.  "If  the  war  on  the  Spanish  peninsula 
holds  out,  Europe  is  saved,"  he  was  wont  to  say,  and  he  acted 
accordingly.  With  prudent  calculation,  staying  on  the  de- 
fensive rather  than  risking  his  small  forces  in  daring  enter- 
prises, he  held  the  enemy's  superior  force  in  check  and  accom- 
plished his  object:  the  wound  in  the  body  of  the  Empire  was 
kept  open.  Despite  the  250,000  men  that  Napoleon  had  left, 
his  marshals  proved  unable  to  pacify  the  country.  At  variance 
among  themselves,  wearied  with  an  exhausting  war  that  prom- 
ised no  profit,  they  only  gained  unimportant  successes,  and 
when  the  Emperor  returned  from  Schonbrunn  to  Paris  the 
reports  from  the  south  were  anything  but  favourable. 

It  was  now  generally  expected  that  he  himself  would  go  to 
Spain,  bring  the  discordant  generals  to  act  together  and  win 
a  final  decisive  victory  by  the  force  of  his  superior  genius.  But 
he  did  not  go.  Of  those  who  knew  him  best  some  said  he  did 
not  wish  to  risk  his  life  in  a  country  where  fanaticism  was 
raging,  others  that  he  was  detained  by  his  divorce  and  remar- 
riage. It  is  possible,  too,  that  the  same  motive  which  at  tlie 
beginning  of  the  year  hastened  his  return  to  Paris  now  kept 
him  there,  i.e.,  distrust  of  Talleyrand  and  Fouch^,  whom  he 


500  At  the  Zenith  [isio 

had  observed  during  the  Austrian  campaign  in  secret  agreement 
with  Murat.  In  any  case,  he  treated  the  Spanish  affair  with 
great  contempt  (doubtless  to  avoid  contradicting  his  own  posi- 
tive statement  months  before  that  he  had  set  it  aside  once  for 
all),  and  contented  himself  with  directing  the  operations  of  his 
generals  from  Paris. 

At  first  it  really  seemed  as  if  that  would  suffice.  On  Novem- 
ber 19th,  1809,  the  French  defeated  at  Ocano  the  last  regular 
Spanish  troops,  drove  their  remnants  back  to  Cadiz,  and  brought 
Andalusia  into  the  hands  of  King  Joseph.  There  remained  now 
only  the  guerillas  and  the  English  alUes.  The  former  the 
Emperor  heeded  little.  Of  their  terrible  importance  he  had  no 
conception,  and  hardly  believed  it  when  he  heard  that  the  war 
with  them  was  far  more  horrible  than  that  in  the  Vendue.  He 
thought  better  of  the  English.  "The  English  are  the  only  dan- 
gerous element  in  Spain,"  he  wTote  to  Berthier  at  the  end  of 
January,  1810.  But  ought  they  not  to  manage  to  overcome  the 
few  thousand  British  even  without  his  presence,  especially  if  he 
considerably  increased(as  he  now  did)  the  forces  on  the  peninsula, 
and  secured  by  flatteries  and  promises  the  ablest  of  his  marshals, 
Massena,  for  the  great  undertaking  of  driving  Wellington  from 
Portugal?  Ney  and  Junot  were  to  command  under  Massena, 
while  Soult,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  army  in  Andalusia,  was 
to  proceed  from  there  to  Portugal  to  aid  him.  So  confident  was 
Napoleon  of  the  result  that  on  February  8th,  1810,  he  issued  a 
decree  which  withdrew  the  four  provinces  north  of  the  Ebro, 
Vizcaya,  Navarra,  Arragon,  and  Catalonia,  from  the  Spanish 
administration,  changed  them  into  four  French  mihtary  districts, 
and  clothed  four  generals,  Suchet,  Augercau,  Reille,  and  Thou- 
venot,  with  the  highest  civil  and  military  authority  in  them. 
They  were  to  provide  for  the  troops  under  them  out  of  the 
revenues  of  these  provinces,  as  the  government  of  Joseph  was  not 
in  a  position  to  exploit  the  resources  of  the  country  so  energet- 
ically as  to  cover  the  expenses  of  the  army ;  they  were  to  receive 
orders  from  Paris  only.  In  these  districts  the  tricolour  replaced 
the  Spanish  colours.  An  accompanying  letter  of  the  same 
day  addressed  to  Berthier  gave  still  more  general  expression 


Mt.4o]  Spain  to  be  Annexed  to  the  Empire       501 

to  the  purpose  of  the  Emperor  to  put  into  the  hands  of  the 
generals  the  administration  of  all  Spanish  territory  conquered 
by  them.  And  suppose  now  the  conquest  proceeded;  suppose 
Suchet  kept  pushing  farther  south  from  Catalonia  and  Mass^na 
really  wrested  Portugal  from  the  English :  would  all  Spain  then 
finally  come  under  French  rule?  Certainly  it  would;  nothing 
else  was  the  plan  of  Napoleon.  By  the  separation  of  the  four 
provinces  Joseph  had  lost  what  little  credit  he  had  won  by  his 
moderation  with  the  liberals  of  the  country,  and  when  he 
sent  his  minister  Azanza  to  Paris  to  secure  the  revocation  of 
the  edict  of  Februar}%  the  latter,  after  long  delay,  was  finally 
informed  that  the  Emperor  had  irrevocably  determined  to  incor- 
porate the  whole  of  Spain  into  France,  ''  of  which  it  is  the  natural 
continuation  " ;  its  king  was  to  abdicate  and  was  to  wait  for  that 
act  only  until  the  English  were  driven  from  the  peninsula.* 

All  now  depended  on  Mass^na  and  the  success  of  his  expedition. 
He  was  not  destined  to  succeed.  The  fortresses  that  blocked 
the  road  to  Portugal  capitulated  only  after  long  and  obstinate 
resistance ;  this  gave  Wellington  a  respite,  which  he  used  in  de- 
stroying, while  on  his  methodical  retreat,  all  the  resources  of  the 
country,  and  in  constructing  to  the  north  of  Lisbon  a  triple  belt 
of  forts  from  the  sea  to  the  Tagus.  At  this  strong  position 
near  Torres  Vedras,  despite  an  important  success  at  Busaco  in 
September,  1810,  the  French  army  met  a  signal  reverse,  having 

*  The  necessary  documents  even  were  handed  to  the  dismayed  diplo- 
mat drawn  up  in  full,  Joseph's  letter  of  abdication  and  a  manifesto  of 
Napoleon's  to  the  Spanish.  The  latter  contained  the  following:  "My 
brother  has  voluntarily  given  back  to  me  the  crown  which  I  resigned  to 
him,  and  has  entreated  me  not  to  permit  the  ruin  of  his  subjects.  He  is 
acquainted  with  your  affairs,  he  asked  my  protection  and  insisted  on  my 
receiving  you  into  my  empire."  A  rather  bold  perAersion  of  the  facts! 
The  contrary  was  the  truth.  Azanza  in  Paris  had  ascribed  the  general 
tumult  to  the  quarrels  and  thefts  of  the  French  generals  as  its  chief  cause, 
and  declared  that  Joseph's  moderation  was  the  only  means  of  pacifying  the 
country;  and  he  had  bogged  the  Emperor  to  sustain  the  latter  actively  for 
only  a  year  longer  without  violating  the  integrity  of  Spain.  The  above- 
mentioned  papers,  however,  never  reached  Madrid.  They  fell  into  the 
hands  of  a  guerilla  and  were  soon  afterwards  printed  in  the  newspapers  of 
the  Spanish  insurgents  and  in  the  "Courier  de  Londres." 


502  At  the  Zenith  [I810 

suffered  sorely  from  privations  on  the  march  and  having  failed 
of  receiving  the  needed  support  either  from  France  or  Soult;  so 
that  in  the  spring  of  1811  Mass^na  was  forced  to  return  to  Spain. 
After  a  new  defeat  which  he  suffered  in  the  beginning  of  May  at 
Fuentes  de  Onoro  he  lost  the  supreme  command,  which  the 
enraged  Emperor  transferred  to  Marmont. 

Portugal,  then,  was  not  conquered,  England  was  not  driven 
from  the  Continent ;  rather,  the  Briton  had  greatly  increased  his 
prestige  by  his  victory  over  the  ablest  marshal  of  the  Empire. 
The  various  French  divisions  and  their  unwilling  allies,  on  the 
other  hand,  suffered  beyond  description.  Unnumbered  human 
lives  were  swallowed  up  by  disease,  hunger,  and  the  secret  wiles 
of  the  foe.  "This  is  a  gruesome  war,"  writes  an  officer  of  the 
Rhenish  allies  about  the  incessant  warfare  with  the  guerillas; 
"here  there  is  no  alternative  but  victory  or  death,  and  at  the 
end — death  after  all."  For  instance,' the  regiment  of  the  Saxon 
principalities  which  in  the  spring  of  1810  arrived  in  Spain  2300 
strong,  lost  1000  men  by  September,  and  over  1200  more  were 
lying  in  hospitals.  In  October  only  27  were  still  fit  for  service. 
Of  the  detachments  sent  across  the  border  by  the  Emperor,  but 
a  fragment,  and  a  small  one  at  that,  ever  reached  its  destination. 
The  discouragement  of  the  warriors  kept  growing,  and  only  this 
one  hope  made  them  hold  on  until  1812,  that  the  great  Emperor, 
the  battle-winner,  would  surely  yet  come  to  make  a  glorious  end 
of  the  desperate  fighting. 

But  he  did  not  come  even  then,  although  the  situation  grew 
worse  and  worse,  and  for  very  definite  reasons.  He  did  not 
come  because  he  regarded  the  war  in  the  peninsula  as  only  a 
side  issue  in  the  mighty  feud  which  he  was  waging  against 
Great  Britain  in  all  comers  of  the  continent,  a  factor  of  secon- 
dary moment,  which  must  at  once  lose  all  its  importance  as 
soon  as  the  great  duel  was  elsewhere  victoriously  concluded. 
As  this  claimed  all  his  activities,  he  plainly  felt  that  he  could 
not  afford  to  enter  personally  into  the  subordinate  detail  of 
the  pcnhisular  stnigglo,  which  would  take  him  too  far  away 
from  the  centre  of  his  policy  and  its  iiuiuodiate  ahns.  In 
short,  the  war  of  commerce  was  the  main  issue  in  his  eyes; 


iEr.  40]  England   Nearing   Ruin  503 

that  was  the  essential  feature  of  his  poHcy.  In  1810,  at  the 
time  when  he  sent  Masscna  to  Lisbon,  he  reverted  to  it  with 
heightened  zeal,  and  adirnied  his  conviction  that  England  was 
already  so  weakened  financially  by  the  blockade  that  only  a 
few  years'  perseverance  would  suffice  to  exhaust  her  power 
completely.  Aiul  indeed  indications  were  not  wanting  that 
supported  this  belief.  The  English  treasury  had  suffered 
severely  from  the  endless  subsidies  to  Continental  powers  and 
expensive  expeditions  to  Spain  and  Holland;  the  notes  of  the 
Bank  of  England  had  fallen  below  par  20  per  cent;  on  the 
Continent  the  pound  sterling,  usually  exchangeable  for  25 
francs,  was  now  valued  at  only  1 7  francs.  A  conmiercial  crisis 
was  the  necessary  consequence,  and  there  were  numerous 
bank  failures.  A  respectable  opi)osition  in  Parliament  was 
earnestly  working  against  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The 
Continental  blockade  had  not  as  yet  been  enforced  with  full 
rigour.  Once  this  were  done,  then  Napoleon  felt  assured  that 
England  would  yield,  sue  for  peace,  and  renounce  her  supremacy 
of  the  seas.  That  would  naturally  end  the  Spanish  war  also. 
Under  such  circumstances,  so  he  argued,  would  it  not  be  absurd 
to  go  over  the  Pyrenees  himself,  instead  of  arranging  from 
Paris  for  the  strictest  enforcement  of  the  blockade  system? 
This  would  be  impossible  from  Spain  because  communication 
was  so  difficult.  No,  Wellington  was  not  to  be  defeated  on  the 
Iberian  peninsula  alone;  for  the  physical  force  of  this  or  that 
British  expedition  was  not  the  real  foe,  but  the  material  force 
of  British  wealth  which  equipped  these  expeditions,  organized 
coalitions,  and  incited  revolts.  That  niust  be  destroyed,  and 
that  first  of  all.  So  all  turned  perforce  on  the  one  question 
whether  the  Conthiental  blockade  could  really  be  enforced  so 
strictly  as  to  destroy  the  national  wealth  of  Britain,  as  Napoleon 
thought  it  could.  The  answer  involved  the  fate  of  the  world. 
It  has  been  repeatedly  pointed  out  in  this  biography  that  the 
idea  of  continuing  the  war  of  a  hundred  years  with  England 
by  closing  the  continental  market  to  British  manufactures 
and  colonial  products  did  not  originate  with  Napoleon,  but 
was  of  an  earlier  date.     As  a  matter  of  fact  it  had  iti  birth 


504  At  the  Zenith  [I810 

in  the  revolutionary  government  of  France  at  a  time  when  the 
young  General  Bonaparte  was  just  beginning  to  gather  his 
laurels  in  Italy.*  The  men  in  authority  in  the  RepubUc  were 
thoroughly  convinced  of  the  soundness  of  this  idea,  and  the 
Emperor  remained  true  to  it  as  well.  In  his  intercourse  with 
mdividual  states  he  constantly  worked  for  its  realization,  until, 
having  made  himself  conqueror  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  he 
issued  from  Berlin  in  November,  1806,  that  decree  of  blockade 
which  barred  from  the  coasts  of  the  Continent  all  ships  that 
came  from  England  and  her  colonies. f  To  this  the  English  had 
replied  in  1807  by  the  order  that  all  non-French  vessels  (the 
French  were  confiscated  out  of  hand)  which  wanted  to  trade 
with  blockaded  ports  must  first  touch  at  London  or  Malta  and 
secure  permission  at  a  high  price.  This  tyrannical  measure 
Napoleon  met  the  same  year  with  the  equally  rigorous  decree 
that  all  ships  which  should  submit  to  these  English  conditions 
or  touch  any  British  territory  whatever  in  their  voyage  were 
to  be  regarded  as  denationalized  and  treated  as  good  prize  in 
the  ports  of  France.  By  these  measures  the  marithne  trade  of 
neutral  powers  was  made  so  extremely  difficult  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  actually  forbade  its  citizens  all  com- 
merce with  Europe.  This  embargo  was  restricted  in  1809,  by 
the  Non-Intercourse  Act,  to  England  and  France  and  was 
then  generally  evaded,  for  American  shippers  took  English 
colonial  products  and  manufactures  on  board  and  traded 
with  Holland,  the  Hanseatic  towns,  and  the  ports  of  Russia 
and   Prussia,   making  false   declarations   as   to   the    place    of 

*  In  a  letter  dated  July  22d,  1796,  Mallet  du  Pan  writes  to  Thugut: 
"Hatred  of  England  has  gained  new  force;  the  preparations  for  a  landing 
there  are  being  continued,  and  a  plan  has  been  formed  and  partly  carried 
out  of  closing  the  ports  of  the  Continent  against  England."  A  week  later 
he  writes:  "As  far  as  possible  the  markets  of  the  Continent  will  be  closed 
to  England,  by  which  her  revenues,  her  factories,  in  short  her  most  important 
resources  will  be  attacked;  by  this  means  the  opposition  of  the  British 
nation  will  be  roused  and  thus  its  government  be  forced  to  sue  for  peace." 
An  article  in  the  official  "  Redacteur  "  of  ( )ct()ber  29th  of  the  same  year  con- 
tains this  sentence:  "Our  policy  must  limit  itself  to  ruining  the  conunerce 
and  thereby  the  power  of  England  by  shutting  her  out  of  the  Continent." 

t  See  page  30G. 


^T.4()]  Enforcing  the  Blockade  505 

shipment.  In  the  Mediterranean  the  neutral  Turkish  flag  on 
Greek  vessels  protected  the  British  cargoes  that  were  smug- 
gled into  Trieste,  Venice,  Genoa,  etc.  This  extensive  indirect 
trade  sorely  interfered  with  Napoleon's  great  scheme,  and  he 
cast  about  for  means  of  crippling  it  as  completely  as  the  direct 
commerce  with  England.  In  March,  1810,  he  issued  an  edict 
aimed  directly  against  the  neutrals;  (Jreek  vessels  in  the  south 
were  to  be  most  carefully  searched  for  indications  of  the  source 
of  their  cargo,  while  the  American  ships — and  here  the  embargo 
of  the  government  at  Washington  stood  him  in  good  stead — in 
all  French  ports  and  ports  accessible  to  French  arms  were 
threatened  with  confiscation.* 

But  it  was  not  the  trade  of  neutrals  alone  that  disturbed 
Napoleon's  policy  against  England.  Side  by  side  with  it  an 
immense  smuggUng  trade  had  been  developed  along  the  coasts 
of  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  which  continually  furnished  the 
Continent  with  the  prohibited  Enghsh  colonial  products  and  tex- 
tiles— at  very  high  prices,  to  be  sure — while  in  the  London  ware- 
houses the  home  products  rapidly  fell  in  value.  In  1810  the 
difference,  i.e.,  the  premium  on  smuggled  articles,  amounted  to 
nearly  fifty  per  cent  on  an  average.  In  order  to  put  a  stop  to 
this  contraband  trade,  the  Emperor  issued  August  5th  of  that  year 
at  Trianon  an  edict  which  required  all  merchants  to  pay  a  tax  of 
fifty  per  cent  and  more  ad  valorem  on  their  colonial  products, 
"  which  were,  of  course,  all  of  English  origin,"  and  also  threatened 
with  confiscation  all  storehouses  of  such  products  found  within 
four  days  of  the  borders  of  the  Empire.  By  this  decree  he  practi- 
cally drove  the  business  out  of  the  hands  of  the  smugglers  and 
secured  a  considerable  fund  for  his  own  treasury,  "the  extraor- 
dinary domain  "  which  a  Senatus  consultum  of  January,  1810,  had 
granted  to  him  separate  from  the  national  treasury  and  inde- 
pendent of  national  control  and  into  which  this  tax  flowed.     A 

*  This  measure  against  the  neutrals  also  was  earlier  designed  by  the 
Directory.  In  the  beginning  of  January,  1798,  that  body  recommended 
to  the  legislature  to  seize  all  neutral  ships  which  carried  English  wares,  no 
matter  who  the  owners  were,  and  to  close  the  French  ports  to  every  neutral 
ship  that  had  entered  English  harbours.  The  object,  it  was  stated,  was  to 
protect  the  liberty  of  the  seas. 


5o6  At  the  Zenith  [isio 

later  decree  issued  at  Fontainebleau  October  18th  ordered  all 
articles  of  English  manufacture  found  either  in  France  or  allied 
countries  to  be  burned  wherever  they  were  seized.  And  in  fact 
during  the  next  weeks  French  soldiers  were  seen  ever^^where 
crossing  the  border,  and  in  concert  with  the  customs  officers 
breaking  into  storehouses,  heaping  up  the  fruits  of  British 
industry  and  converting  them  to  ashes.  Sugar  and  coffee,  on 
the  other  hand,  were  carried  on  ammunition-wagons  to  Antwerp, 
Mainz,  Frankfort,  or  Milan,  where  they  were  sold  at  pubUc 
auction.  A  premium  was  set  on  official  zeal  in  this  task;  smug- 
glers and  receivers  of  their  goods  were  handed  over  to  the 
Draconian  penalties  of  a  covirt  established  in  November,  1810, 
for  this  special  purpose.  To  such  a  pitch  of  severity  had  the 
Continental  system  grown.  In  France  only  was  it  modified  by  the 
special  provision  that  certain  skippers  there  could  obtain  for  a 
round  sum  (which  likewise  went  into  the  privy  purse  of  the  Em- 
peror) permission  to  import  certain  classes  of  English  products ;  in 
particular  indispensable  provisions  and  dyestuffs.  In  this  way 
the  French  were  kept  in  good  humour,  although  in  other  countries 
the  nuisance  of  the  "Ucense"  system  caused  intense  bitterness  of 
feeling.* 

All  these  regulations,  however,  would  fail  of  their  object 
unless  they  were  enforced  with  equal  stringency  everywhere  on 
the  Continent;  i.e.,  unless  all  the  powers  of  Continental  Europe 
adopted  the  laws  against  the  neutrals  and  the  tariff  of  Trianon. 
Napoleon  made  no  delay  in  summoning  all  of  them  to  do  so; 

*  It  is  by  no  means  to  be  supposed  that  Napoleon  allowed  those  Euro- 
pean states  from  which  he  debarred  English  imports  to  trade  freely  among 
themselves  Even  in  1806  he  made  it  impossible  to  import  textile  fabrics 
into  France,  also  soda,  soap,  and  the  like  Again  in  1810  the  Italian 
market  was  closed  against  Swiss  stuffs,  and  Italian  raw  silks,  being  kept 
out  of  Switzerland  and  the  Rhenish  Confederation  by  high  tariffs,  were 
drawn  exclusively  to  Lyons  for  the  purpose  of  enriching  its  manufacturers, 
while  the  silk-growers  of  Lombardy  fell  into  poverty.  So  decidedly  was 
Napoleon  opposed  to  free  trade  that,  among  other  things,  he  permitted 
no  new  editions  of  J  B  Says  treatise  on  Political  Economy,  which  had 
appeared  in  1S0.3  It  may  be  added  that  not  even  the  "license"'  system 
was  originated  by  his  government;  licenses  had  been  issued  by  the  Direc- 
ory. 


yEr.  40]  The  Situation  of  Holland  507 

some  with  diplomacy,  others  with  menaces.  And  everj'thing 
seemed  to  depend  on  whether  they  all  really  comphed  or  resisted. 
One  of  the  states  had  already  fallen  a  victim  to  the  system — 
Holland.  The  Dutch  had  attainetl  importance  and  wealth  only 
through  their  shipping,  their  colonies  and  commerce;  these  were 
their  sole  dependence.  So,  when  Napoleon's  laws  making  all 
maritime  commerce  impossible  were  enforced,  their  ruin  was 
inevitable.  Of  this  the  Emperor  was  well  aware.  "Holland  can- 
not escape  her  ruin,"  he  ^\Tote  as  early  as  March,  1808,  to  his 
brother  Louis  when  he  offered  him  the  Spanish  crown  with  the 
object  of  annexing  Holland  to  France.*  For  it  had  not  escaped 
his  knowledge  that  the  Dutch  welcomed  American  ships  with 
their  British  cargoes,  and  sent  the  goods  farther  into  the  interior 
of  the  Continent  in  order  to  save  at  least  a  fraction  of  their  once 
magnificent  carrying  trade.  Louis  declined  at  that  time,  and 
Napoleon  also  temporarily  laid  the  plan  of  annexation  aside. 
But  immediately  after  the  Austrian  war  he  took  it  up  again. 
His  pretext  now  was  that  the  Dutch  had  not  been  able  to  raise 
sufficient  forces  against  the  English  invasion  of  1809.  And  in 
fact  it  was  the  marsh  fever  rather  than  the  troops  of  Iving 
Louis  that  kept  the  British  from  Antwerp  and  compelled  them 
to  beat  a  hasty  retreat  to  the  island  of  Walcheren,  where  one 
detachment  did  indeed  maintain  its  position  for  a  few  months. 
And  when  Louis  hastened  to  Paris  to  defend  himself  and  his 
country  from  the  charge  of  "treason  against  France,"  Napoleon 
openly  conveyed  to  him  his  intention  of  incorporating  Holland 
into  the  empire  and  of  endowing  him  with  a  German  principality. 
This  one  concession  was  granted  to  the  Iving,  that  a  Dutch  confi- 
dential agent  might  first  go  to  England  to  demand  secretly  the 
revocation  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  1807;  in  case  of  acceptance, 
he  offered  to  open  Holland  and  the  Hanseatic  towais,  while  in 
case  of  refusal  he  threatened  to  annex  them  to  France.  This 
mission,  the  sole  aim  of  which  was  e\adently  to  throw  upon 
England  the  blame  for  the  annexation  of  Holland,  proved  a 
failure,  as  the  English  government  wished  to  negotiate  openly  on  a 
peace  basis,  which  Napoleon  declined  to  do ;  and  the  ncighbour- 

*  See  page  432. 


5o8 


At  the  Zenith  [isio 


ing  state  would  surely  have  lost  its  independence  at  once  if  the 
moment  when  the  whole  world  was  hoping  for  peace  and  quiet 
to  result  from  his  marriage  with  the  "  daughter  of  the  Caesars  "  had 
not  seemed  to  the  Emperor  inappropriate  for  such  an  arbitrary 
act.  He  contented  himself  with  forcing  on  Louis  a  treaty 
ceding  to  France  all  Dutch  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  including  Zealand,  Brabant,  and  the  part  of  Guelders  on 
the  left  of  the  Waal;  placing  all  the  Dutch  coasts  under  the 
surveillance  of  a  French  corps  of  occupation  6000  strong  and  of 
French  customs  officers;  and,  furthermore,  binding  the  King  to 
equip  fifteen  large  war-ships.  In  return  for  all  this  the  Emperor 
promised  to  remove  the  restrictions  so  long  imposed  on  the 
trade  of  Holland  with  France  (March  16th,  1810). 

But  this  promise  was  not  seriously  meant;  Napoleon  aimed 
merely  to  strike  a  first  blow,  not  wishing  to  fell  the  tree  at  a 
single  stroke.  He  was  far  from  observing  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty.  The  customs  barriers  between  Holland  and  France 
remained  in  force,  the  French  corps  of  troops  was  increased  to 
four  times  the  stipulated  nimiiber,  and  in  concert  with  the  for- 
eign customs  officers  performed  intolerable  acts  of  violence,  and 
complaints  made  to  Paris  met  only  insults.  Thereupon  Louis 
no  longer  deemed  it  compatible  with  his  dignity  to  keep  the 
crown;  on  July  1,  1810,  he  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  younger 
son,  the  older  having  in  March,  1809,  become  Duke  of  Berg,  and 
secretly  withdrew  to  Austria.  Napoleon  was  surprised  by  this 
step  of  his  brother,  and  expressed  himself  bitterly  on  his  ingrati- 
tude.* It  was  of  course  an  embarrassing  thing  for  him  to 
appear  before  the  world  at  variance  with  his  nearest  relatives. 
But  that  made  no  change  in  the  course  of  events.  For  even 
before  the  news  of  Louis's  retirement  arrived  at  Paris,  a  decree 
already  lay  there  in  full  form,  the  first  provision  of  which  read: 
"  Holland  is  annexed  to  the  Empire."    Now  it  was  published,  and 

*  See  the  conversation  with  Caulaincourt,  page  27.  It  is  interesting 
to  compare  this  with  another  conversation  in  which  the  Emperor  shortly 
after  informed  the  Swedish  ambassador  that  he  had  driven  (I)  from 
the  throne  his  brother,  whom  he  loved  and  had  educated,  because  he 
had  been  powerless  to  deal  with  the  Dutch  smugglers.  (Lefebvre,  V.  73.) 


-^T.  40]  Annexations  to  the  Empire  509 

Lebrun,  Napoleon's  former  colleague  in  the  consulate,  went  to  the 
new  province  as  his  viceroy. 

Observe  the  method  of  these  usurpations.  In  Holland,  as 
well  as  in  Spain,  his  brothers  disappoint  the  hopes  of  the  Emperor, 
since  neither  Joseph  nor  Ijouis  is  able  to  escape  the  strong  national 
repulsion  toward  the  Empire.  Instead  of  appreciating  and 
heeding  these  impulses,  Napoleon  merely  deems  his  brothers  too 
weak,  too  ambitious,  or  too  obstinate  to  serve  him.  His  deep 
distrust  henceforth  extends  even  to  them,  and  he  abandons  the 
family  system  in  order  to  take  Europe,  so  to  speak,  under  his 
personal  rule.*  In  Spain  and  in  Holland  he  proceeds  in  the  same 
way.  There  in  February,  1810,  he  annexes  the  country  as  far 
as  the  Ebro;  here  in  March,  as  far  as  the  Waal;  and  at  the  same 
time  the  documents  were  already  complete  that  were  to  declare 
the  incorporation  of  both  these  countries  in  toio  into  the  Empire. 
In  Spain,  to  be  sure,  the  necessary  condition  was  not  yet  fulfilled, 
i.e.,  the  expulsion  of  the  English;  but  they  had  been  obliged 
to  evacuate  their  position  in  Walcheren  as  early  as  Decem- 
ber, 1809.     But  these  annexations  were  not  destined  to  stand. 

*'  The  British  Orders  in  Council  have  torn  to  shreds  the  pubUc 
law  of  Europe.  A  new  order  of  things  reigns  in  the  world." 
With  these  words  it  was  that  Napoleon  recommended  to  the 
Senate  to  make  the  union  of  Holland  with  France  constitutional. 
But  that  was  not  all  the  rescript  contained;  he  demanded  not 
only  the  mouths  of  the  Scheldt,  the  Mosel,  and  the  Rhine  as  "new 
guarantees"  against  England,  but  also  those  of  the  Weser  and 
the  Elbe;  and  the  obedient  senators,  in  a  consultum  of  December 
1810,  actually  declared  both  Holland  and  the  entire  German 
coast  of  the  North  Sea  to  be  parts  of  the  Empire,  includuig  the 
districts  of  Oldenburg,  Lauenburg,  the  three  Hanseatic  cities, 
Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck,  the  principalities  of  Arenberg 
and  Salm,  parts  of  Hanover  (which  in  January,  1810,  had  just, 

*  In  September,  1810,  he  said  to  Mettemich  among  others:  "There 
are  relatives  and  cousins  and  aunts.  But  they  all  amount  to  nothing.  I 
should  not  have  left  the  throne  even  to  my  brothers.  But  then,  time 
alone  makes  one  wise.  I  ought  to  have  appointed  only  regents  and  vice- 
roys." 


5IO  At  the  Zenith  [isio 

fallen  to  the  share  of  Jerome),  of  Westphalia  and  Berg;  in  brief, 
more  than  12,000  square  miles.  The  new  territories  were  to 
form  three  departments,  with  Osnabriick,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck 
as  capital  cities.  And  for  this  step  there  was  not  a  shred  of 
lawful  title,  no  legal  ground,  not  even  a  pretext;  it  was  purely 
arbitrary  from  beginning  to  end.  In  the  same  arbitrary  way 
Napoleon  at  this  time  mcorporated  the  Swiss  republic  of  the 
Valais.  "The  annexations  are  demanded  by  circumstances," 
said  the  minister  of  the  Emperor  in  his  report  to  the  Senate. 
But  what  could  it  be  that  would  not  be  demanded  by  circum- 
stances? On  the  same  ground  the  Emperor  might  justify  the 
union  of  entire  Europe  under  his  sceptre,  if  he  had  the  power 
to  unite  it.  In  this  direction  in  fact  his  thoughts  were  tending. 
Yet  not  even  these  annexations  from  Germany  were  original 
with  Napoleon,  for  along  with  the  blockade  system  against  Eng- 
land the  Directory  already  had  their  eyes  fixed  on  the  acquisition 
of  the  North  German  coast,  and  twelve  years  before  Sieyes  had 
termed  these  districts  the  "most  important  part  of  the  globe  to 
France";  once  possess  those,  and  the  English  can  be  excluded 
from  all  Continental  ports  from  Gibraltar  to  Holstein,  aye,  to 
the  North  Cape.*  This  programme  now  seemed  on  the  point 
of  being  carried  out.  For  even  Demnark,  whose  rule  at  that 
time  still  extended  over  Norway,  at  once  complied  with  the 
demand  of  Napoleon  to  proscribe  the  cargoes  of  neutral  ships. 
The  hatred  of  the  Danes  against  the  English,  which  had  gone 
beyond  all  bounds  since  the  bombardment  of  Copenhagen  in 
1807,  caused  Frederick  VI.  to  overlook  the  serious  consequences 
of  such  a  course  for  his  country;  and  besides  the  Danish  king 
was  influenced  by  the  hope  of  some  day  attaining  with  the  help 
of  France  the  throne  of  Sweden,  which  must  soon  fall  vacant. 
This  expectation,  however,  was  not  to  be  fulfilled.  For  a  change 
had  ensued  in  the  political  status  of  Sweden.  Even  during  the 
war  against  the  Russian-French  alliance,  a  war  which  resulted 
in  delivering  Finland  to  the  Russians  and  Swedish  Pomerania, 
with  Stralsund  and  Riigen  to  the  French,  the  unwise  enmity  of 
Gustavus  IV.  against  Napoleon  and  his  obstinate  clinging  to  the 

*  See  page  191. 


i5i>r.  40]  Sicily  £  I  I 

broken  reed  of  England  had  brought  the  country  into  a  sad 
plight.  In  March,  1809,  he  was  deposed  and  his  uncle  Charles 
XIII.  put  in  his  stead.  Then  the  Swedes  had  concluded  peace 
with  Russia  and  in  January,  1810,  with  France,  which  gave  Ponie- 
rania  back  to  them,  but  bound  them  to  the  strictest  observance 
of  the  Continental  blockade.  Nay,  more:  in  November,  1810, 
Charles  XIII.  even  went  so  far  as  to  declare  war  agahist  England, 
shortly  after  he  had  chosen  as  his  successor  (for  he  was  childless) 
Bemadotte,  whose  affability  had  won  many  friends  in  Swedish 
Pomerania,  little  suspecting  that  he  was  calling  to  his  side  one 
who  was  anything  but  a  friend  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French.* 

As  Napoleon  contended  with  his  principal  enemy  for  mas- 
tery of  the  far  north  of  the  Continent,  so  also  he  strove  to  be 
master  in  the  extreme  south.  In  Sicily  the  British  were  firmly 
established,  keeping  the  Bourbon  dynasty  under  the  pressure 
of  constant  interference  and  guardianship.  From  this  point 
they  had  undertaken  in  1809  an  expedition  against  Naples, 
with  the  same  deplorable  results,  however,  as  in  that  against 
Antwerp  in  the  north.  Napoleon  replied  by  commanding  his 
brother-ui-law.  King  Joachim  of  Naples,  to  wrest  Sicily  from 
the  English,  or  at  least  to  keep  their  troops  shut  up  so  that 
they  should  send  no  re-enforcements  to  Spain  and  Portugal. 
This  attempt  to  land  in  Sicily  failed  utterly  in  1810.  In  the 
following  summer  it  was  to  be  repeated  with  the  support  of 
the  Toulon  fleet;  but  as  the  ships  were  unable  to  put  out, 
the  undertaking  was  postponed.  In  reality,  like  the  conquest 
of  Spain  and  Portugal,  this,  too,  was  a  side  issue;  and  Messina 
might  be  won,  like  Lisbon,  in  other  ways.f 

*  In  December,  1810,  a  Russian  ambassador  in  Stockholm  reported 
that  the  Crown  Prince  Charles  John  (the  name  Bemadotte  now  bore)  used 
very  bitter  language  against  Napoleon,  asserting  that  he  had  been  always 
given  a  post  in  the  field  of  battle  where  he  might  easily  fall  (Re\'ue  His- 
torique,  XXXVII.  74).  It  should  be  remembered  that  Bemadotte  was  a 
Gascon. 

t  Of  some  interest  is  the  rumour  current  at  the  time  and  reported  to 
the  home  government  by  the  English  plenipotentiary,  Lord  Bentinck, 
that  Queen  Caroline,  ever  since  her  granddaughter  Marie  Louise  had 
married  Napoleon,  had  been  seeking  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with 


512  At  the  Zenith  [isio 

One  thing,  however,  becomes  perfectly  clear  when  we  con- 
sider Napoleon's  unbounded  activity  during  this  tune,  and  that 
is,  a  sore  disappointment  was  in  store  for  those  who  expected 
from  his  connection  with  an  old  dynasty  his  reconciliation  with 
the  system  of  the  old  states.  And  equally  astray  were  those 
who  beheld  in  the  birth  of  his  son  a  year  later  a  pledge  of  peace. 
For  at  that  very  time,  the  spring  of  1811,  his  plans  took  their 
loftiest  flight.  Sooner  or  later  Spain  and  Portugal  would  fall 
to  the  share  of  France,  either  through  conquest — for  Massena 
was  still  before  Lisbon — or  in  the  train  of  the  greater  events. 
From  the  southern  extremity  of  the  Italian  peninsula  to  the 
far-distant  north  where  the  Continent  ends  in  the  Arctic  Ocean, 
all  governments  were  under  his  influence,  apparently  without 
any  will  of  their  own;  and  only  the  Slavic  colossus  of  the  east 
yet  remained  to  reckon  with.  For  what  purpose  had  Napoleon 
bound  half  the  Continent  to  march  under  his  banner,  if  it  were 
not  to  become  master,  at  last,  of  the  whole? 

The  latest  news  from  England  served  only  to  confirm  the 
Emperor  in  the  course  he  had  entered  upon.  In  that  country 
the  economic  conditions  had,  in  consequence  of  the  annexation 
of  the  seaboard  states  to  France,  grown  more  and  more  serious. 
England,  to  be  sure,  had  taken  possession  of  most  of  the  European 
colonies  across  the  ocean  (including  the  French  colonies,  Isle 
de  Bourbon,  Isle  de  France,  and  Cayenne);  but  the  hope  of  a 
profitable  export  trade  with  them  in  manufactured  articles  was 
disappointed,  as  they  were  obliged  to  accept  in  exchange  colonial 
products,   to   which    Napoleon   closed   the   European   markets 

the  Napoleonic  dynasty  against  England,  whose  pressure  she  endured 
with  the  greatest  reluctance.  The  plan  was  said  to  have  been  that  her 
troops  should  in  1811  attack  the  British  on  the  island  while  Murat  stormed 
Messina.  Then  for  a  suitable  equivalent  Sicily  was  to  be  ceded  to  the 
latter  or  to  Napoleon,  while  the  Bourbon  prince  Leopold  was  to  marry  the 
niece  of  the  Corsican.  Satisfactory  proof  of  these  statements  has  not 
been  adduced.  The  despatches  of  Bentinck  that  mention  them  have 
but  recently  been  made  known.  But  l)esidcs  there  was  much  talk  of 
annexing  Naples  to  the  empire  and  of  Murat's  di.sgrace.  The  recently 
published  diaries  of  Queen  Catharine  of  Westphalia  also  make  mention  of 
these  things.  But  they  never  came  to  pass;  greater  events  thrust  such 
projects  into  the  background. 


^T.  41]  England  To  Be  Subdued.  513 

more  and  more  rigidly.  In  addition  the  use  of  machinery  had 
resulted  in  overproduction  and  loss  of  profits.  The  British 
Parliament  had  to  open  a  public  loan  for  the  distressed  manu- 
facturers. Of  course  French  industries  suffered  as  well,  but 
the  remedy  there  was  merely  a  matter  of  time,  as  the  Emperor 
supposed,  and  a  short  time  at  that.  Wlien,  a  few  days  after 
the  birth  of  his  child,  he  accepted  the  congratulations  of  a 
deputation  from  the  chambers  of  commerce  and  industry,  he 
spoke  with  the  greatest  confidence  of  his  ultimate  victory.  He 
now  openly  rejected  all  thoughts  of  peace.  "You  see,"  said 
he,  "how  far  England  has  come  down  hi  the  world.  Louis 
XIV.  and  Louis  XV.  were  obliged  in  their  day  to  make  peace, 
and  I,  too,  would  long  ago  have  been  obliged  to  seek  it,  if  like 
them  I  ruled  old  France;  but  I  am  not  the  successor  of  the 
French  kings,  but  of  Charlemagne,  and  my  empire  is  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  empire  of  the  Franks.  In  four  years  I  shall 
have  a  navy.  Once  my  squadrons  have  been  at  sea  three  or 
four  years,  then  we  can  try  conclusions  with  the  English.  I 
know  I  may  lose  three  or  four  naval  battles;*  very  well,  I  shall 
lose  them;  but  we  are  courageous,  always  booted  and  spurred, 
and  we  shall  succeed.  Ere  ten  years  pass  by  I  shall  have  sub- 
jugated England.  No  European  state  will  trade  with  her  any 
more.  It  is  my  customs  barriers  that  do  the  greatest  harm 
to  the  English.  Her  blockade  but  injured  herself  most  by 
teaching  us  how  we  could  dispense  with  her  products,  her 
sugar,  her  indigo.  Yet  a  few  years  and  we  shall  be  inured  to 
that.  Soon  I  shall  have  beet-sugar  enough  to  supply  all  Europe. 
For  your  manufactures  you  have  a  wide  market  open  in  France, 
Italy,  Naples,  and  Germany."  Then  the  Emperor  proceeded 
to  speak  of  the  French  national  treasury,  and  said  among  other 
things:  "I  take  in  nine  hundred  millions  annually  from  my 
own  country  and  have  three  hundred  milions  lying  in  the 
Tuileries;  the  Bank  of  France  is  filled  with  silver,  while  the 
Bank  of  England  has  not  a  shilling.  Since  1806  I  have  brought 
in  more  than  a  billion  francs  in  war  contributions.     I  aloue 

*  "Three  or  four  fleets,"  according  to  another  reading. 


514  At  the  Zenith  [I8II 

have  money.      Austria  is  already  bankrupt,  Russia  will  be,  and 
tingland  no  less."  * 

These  last  statements  of  the  Emperor  about  the  French 
finances  call  for  a  word  of  explanation.  It  is  true  that  Metter- 
nich,  too,  who  stayed  in  Paris  for  some  time  in  1810,  formed  the 
opinion  that  "France  is  without  question  the  richest  nation  of 
the  Continent  and  can  in  financial  matters  bid  defiance  to  any. 
other."  But  he  adds  the  qualification  that  "the  coffers  of  the 
state  are  empty,  those  of  the  ruler  are  full."  And  that  was  pretty 
near  the  truth;  for  over  against  the  nine  hundred  millions  of 
revenue  mentioned  by  Napoleon  there  stood  in  the  budget  of 
1811  nine  hundred  and  fifty-four  millions  of  expenses.  And 
although  the  annexation  of  Rome,  Illyria,  Holland,  and  the 
Hanseatic  department,  and  the  new  tariff,  contributed  to  raise 
the  revenues,  yet  the  expenses  of  the  military  system  had  grown 
rapidly.  The  estimates  of  the  Minister  of  War  for  that  year 
called  for  480  millions  (400  in  1810),  of  the  Minister  of  Marine 
for  170  millions  (110  in  1810).  To  meet  this  situation  Napoleon 
represented  in  a  memorial  of  December,  1810,  that  a  loan  was 
"immoral  because  it  burdened  future  generations,"  and  proposed 
only  an  increase  of  indirect  taxes  (droits  reunis),  and  in  addition 
a  new  impost,  the  tobacco  monopoly.  (He  expected  this  would 
yield  80  million  francs.)  His  forecast  proved  to  be  mistaken. 
The  year  1811  was  favourable  for  wine,  but  not  for  grain.  The 
drought,  which  ripened  grapes  to  a  memorable  sweetness,  with- 
ered the  grain,  the  price  of  flour  was  almost  doubled,  its  con- 
sumption decreased  correspondingly,  and  with  it  fell  the  revenue 
from  taxes.  The  year  closed  with  a  deficit  of  46  millions.  And 
while  Napoleon's  claim  of  300  millions  in  his  treasury  was  in 
the  main  correct,  it  is  certain  that  only  half  that  amount  was  in 
cash,  the  rest  consisting  of  claims  against  states  and  private 
individuals.     Evidently  the  brilliant  picture  which  the  Emperor 

*  The  speech  is  here  given  (as  a  fragment)  in  its  original  form  as  it 
was  published  in  the  Revue  Critique  of  18S0  from  two  independent  sources. 
The  version  in  Thiers  (XIII.  22-27)  evidently  represents  a  later  revision 
in  which  the  words  of  the  Emperor  were  communicated  to  the  diplomats 
and  German  n(;wspapers.  In  the  Memoirs  of  Miot  (III.  189)  there  appears 
a  third  version. 


^•:t.  41]      Plans  which  Embraced  the  World       515 

had  drawn  of  the  finances  of  France  was  far  from  truo.  We  may 
judge  by  that  how  severely  he  felt  the  blow  when — as  we  shall 
hear  later — Russia  closed  her  territory  to  French  exports,  and 
how  strenuous  were  his  efforts  to  multiply  sources  of  income  for 
the  French,  and  so  increase  their  power  to  pay  taxes,  by  con- 
quering new  markets  for  their  products  in  the  East.  Hence, 
just  as  in  1809,  so  three  years  later,  the  financial  situation  doubt- 
less helped  to  make  war  seem  a  necessity.* 

Any  one  who  will  compare  the  above  address  of  the  Emperor 
to  the  representatives  of  industry  with  his  commands  to  the 
Minister  of  the  Navy  in  the  same  month  of  March.  1811,  will  find 
in  them  the  whole  vast  plan  of  universal  empire  set  forth  in  the 
boldest  outlines.  The  empire  of  Charlemagne  no  longer  satisfies 
him ;  not  even  the  Continent  of  Europe ;  no,  he  requires  the  entire 
globe  to  come  under  his  iron  sceptre.  He  proposes  to  have  two 
immense  fleets  fitted  out  within  the  next  three  years,  one  for  the 
ocean  and  one  for  the  Mediterranean;  the  latter  destined  for 
Sicily  and  Egypt,  the  former  at  first  for  Ireland.  And  in  case 
matters  went  well  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  expeditions  were  to  be 
despatched  before  the  end  of  1812  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to 
Surinam,  Martinique,  etc.,  and  sixty  to  eighty  thousand  men, 
"avoiding  the  hostile  cruisers,"  were  to  be  distributed  over  both 
hemispheres.  At  the  same  time  the  last  decisive  Continental 
war  against  Russia  is  in  preparation  with  the  purpose  of  coercing 
the  Czar  if  he  refuses  to  enter  the  federative  system  under  Na- 
poleon's suzerainty,  and  of  opening  the  way  to  the  British  Indies. 
With  a  single  covetous  look  the  Emperor  encompassed  the  whole 
world,  and  so  completely  was  he  dominated  by  the  thought  of 
his  coming  universal  rule  that  he  no  longer  sought  to  conceal  it. 
"They  \vish  to  know  whither  we  are  bound,"  said  he.  "We 
shall  make  an  end  of  Europe,  and  then  throw  ourselves  like 
robbers  on  robbers  less  bold  than  ourselves,  and  possess  our- 
selves of  India,  of  which  they  have  made  themselves  masters." 

*  It  is  stated  that  the  minister  MoUien  advised  the  Emperor  against  war 
with  Russia  on  tlie  ground  that  the  finances  of  the  state  needed  {x>aee; 
whereupon  the  latter  replied:  "On  the  contrary,  they  are  falling  into  eon- 
fusion  and  for  that  reason  are  in  need  of  war."     Cf.  page  4G0. 


5i6  At  the  Zenith  [isu 

When  the  Bavarian  General  Wrede,  who  was  sojourning 
in  Paris  in  the  early  summer  of  1811,  on  one  occasion  spoke  a 
word  in  favour  of  peace,  the  Emperor  answered  him  with  severity 
in  tone  and  glance:  "Yet  three  years  and  I  am  master  of  the 
world." 

The  more  surely  Napoleon  counted  on  the  ultimate  success  of 
his  Continental  policy  against  England,  the  more  important  it 
became  for  him  to  deprive  British  goods  of  their  last  resort,  the 
ports  of  Russia.  Hence  he  had  to  arrive  at  an  understanding 
with  Russia  in  order  to  induce  her  to  adopt  his  measures  against 
the  neutral  flag;  i.e.,  his  tariff  to  bar  out  colonial  produce,  and 
his  decree  ordering  the  destruction  of  warehouses  of  English 
manufactures.  This  could  be  secured  by  amicable  means  if  the 
Czar  yielded,  or  by  forcible  means  if  he  resisted.  Under  existing 
conditions  the  latter  was  more  probable. 

We  have  already  seen  the  beginnings  of  serious  differences 
between  these  two  allied  powers.  They  date  from  the  war  of 
1809,  when  RiLssia  showed  a  lack  of  zeal  in  supporting  France 
against  Austria,  and  Napoleon  retaliated  by  adding  Galician 
territory  to  the  duchy  of  Warsaw.  The  Emperor's  marriage  with 
an  archduchess  might  also  be  regarded  as  a  move  in  the  game 
against  the  power  of  the  Czar,  and  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  on 
the  very  day  on  which  Napoleon  summoned  Prince  Schwarz- 
enberg  to  Paris  to  sign  the  marriage  contract,  February  6th,  1810, 
word  was  sent  to  the  French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that  a 
treaty  signed  by  him  on  January  5th  could  not  be  confirmed. 
That  treaty  concerned  Poland.  Alexander  I.  felt  keen  anxiety 
lest  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  should,  under  the  protectorate  of  the 
French  Emperor,  extend  some  day  over  the  entire  domain  of  the 
old  Polish  kingdom,  and  had  asked  for  guarantees  from  France  on 
that  point.  Caulaincourt,  still  keeping  in  mind  his  instructions 
to  keep  Russia  quiet,  had  gone  into  the  matter  and  had  formally 
promised  that  the  kingdom  of  Poland  should  never  be  restored ; 
nay,  more,  that  the  name  Poland  should  be  carefully  avoided  in 
all  pul)lic  documents.  To  sign  this  meant  for  Napoleon  to  lay 
down  one  of  the  most  effective  weapons  against  Russia,  which 
he  had  been  busily  forging  in  the  years  1806  and  1809,  and  to 


JET.n]  Relations  with   Russia  517 

guarantee  besides  that  ho  one  else  should  venture  tf)  restore 
Poland.  If  there  had  been  any  necessity  of  making  such  a  con- 
cession to  the  Czar,  it  would  have  been  different.  But  since  the 
Austrian  marriage  had  brought  the  Emperor  Francis  over  to 
the  side  of  France  there  was  no  such  necessity.  In  brief, 
Napoleon  did  not  ratify  the  treaty,  and  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
avoiding  offence  to  his  ally  he  had  a  counter-proposition  offered 
in  St.  Petersburg,  wherein  he  offered  to  bind  himself  merely  to 
support  no  attempt  to  restore  the  old  kingdom  of  the  Jagellons. 
This  was  to  be  incorporated  in  a  secret  treaty.  But  that  did  not 
satisfy  Alexander.  He  desired  a  public  treaty  which  would 
bind  the  French  Emperor  in  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world;  he 
insisited  on  his  original  demand,  and  appealed  to  the  promises 
which  he  had  received  soon  after  the  peace  of  Schonbrunn  was 
concluded.*  "The  Emperor,"  he  said  to  the  French  ambas- 
sador, "gave  me  the  most  positive  assurances,  and  at  that  time 
wanted  to  give  them;  why  not  now?"  The  answer,  to  be  in 
keeping  with  the  truth,  must  have  run  thus:  Because  the 
Emperor,  who  now  deems  himself  "sole  lord  of  Europe,"  has 
already  had  clearly  in  mind  this  breach  with  Russia  and  only 
wants  a  pretext  for  bringing  it  about  as  soon  as  it  is  advantageous 
to  him.  Of  course  that  was  not  the  answer  of  the  ambassador. 
But  the  Ru.ssian  monarch  knew  what  to  expect;  for  at  that  very 
time  (April,  1811)  he  assured  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski  that 
Napoleon  was  far  less  concerned  for  the  welfare  of  Poland  than 
he  was  to  "make  use  of  that  country  as  a  tool  at  the  moment 
when  he  should  want  to  make  war  upon  Russia."  This  moment 
had  not  yet  arrived;  but  it  was  not  very  far  distant.  As  earlj- 
as  October,  1810,  Metternich  had  returned  from  France  to  his 
master  with  this  conviction:  "In  the  year  1811  the  peace  of 
Continental  Europe  will  not  be  disturbed  by  any  new  attack  by 
France.  In  the  course  of  that  year  Napoleon  will  increase  his 
own  forces  and  assemble  his  allies  for  a  decisive  blow  against 
Russia.  Napoleon  will  open  the  campaign  in  the  spring  of  1812." 
The  Polish  question  was,  moreover,  but  one  link  in  a  long 
chain  of  disputes  that  arose  between  the  allies  of  Tilsit  in  the 

*  See  page  487. 


5i8  At  the  Zenith  [isii 

course  of  the  years  ISIO  and  181 1 .  An  element  of  eqvia  1  discord 
lay  in  Turkey,  where  Napoleon  had  in  secret  always  opposed 
Russia  most  strenuously.  The  Russians  had  victoriously 
crossed  the  lower  Danube  and  gained  such  decisive  successes 
that  there  was  a  fair  prospect  of  peace  with  the  Porte.  Napoleon 
was  very  sorely  displeased  at  that  prospect  because  it  must  be 
his  desire  to  keep  the  Russian  forces  continually  occupied  in  the 
south  when  he  made  his  attack  in  the  north.  To  accomplish 
this,  not  wishing  to  appear  openly  against  his  allies,  he  sought 
to  hide  behind  Austria.  He  advised  Metternich  to  occupy 
Servia,  which  Russia  clamied,and  promised  to  be  an  inactive 
spectator  if  the  Court  of  Vieima  contested  the  Danubian  princi- 
palities with  the  Czar.  The  p]mperor  Francis  would  have  none 
of  this.  Napoleon,  however,  had  gained  this  much,  that  Turkey, 
being  informed  of  the  interest  that  France  and  Austria  took  in 
her  fate,  persisted  in  refusing  the  Russian  demands,  and  the  war 
went  on. 

These,  however,  were  matters  of  secondary  importance  com- 
pared with  the  main  fact,  i.e.,  Russia's  attitude  in  the  Conti- 
nental blockade.  In  the  middle  of  October,  1810,  Napoleon  had 
called  upon  the  Czar  to  confiscate  neutral  vessels  found  in  his 
ports,  as  had  been  done  since  May  in  the  ports  of  France  and  of 
countries  under  French  influence.  "  If  Russia  confiscates  them," 
nms  the  despatch  on  this  subject,  "she  gives  England  the  'coup 
de  grace  '  and  ends  the  war  at  once."  And  to  Alexander  himself 
the  Emperor  wrote :  "It  depends  only  on  Your  Majesty  whether 
we  shall  have  war  or  peace."  The  Czar  refused;  he  could  not  do 
otherwise.  For  even  the  rupture  of  direct  commercial  relations 
with  England  had  inflicted  severe  losses  on  Russia.  Her  natural 
products  thus  k^st  their  most  important  market.  The  result 
was  inevitable;  three  years  later  the  deficit  equalled  the  revenues 
and  paper  money  fell  to  one  fourth  its  nominal  value.  In  truth, 
when  Napoleon  so  confidently  predicted  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
northern  empire,  he  knew  perfectly  well  the  source  of  his  ally's 
financial  distress.  Was  the  wish  to  increase  it  and  hasten  the 
catastrophe  lurking  in  the;  demand  now  made  on  St.  Petersburg 
to  turn  away  the  neutrals  as  well?    No;  the  Czar  could  not 


/Et.  41]  The   Breach  Widens  519 

accede  to  that.  Where  in  all  the  world  was  ho  to  look  for  active 
support  against  a  future  attack  of  Napoleon  if  now  he  himself 
helped  t<j  ruin  England?  He  replied  to  the  proposal  of  France 
by  declaring  that  he  was  willing  to  maintain  now  as  before  the 
anti-British  system  of  the  TiLsit  Treaty  and  confiscate  every  ship 
that  failed  to  give  unimpeachable  evidence  of  its  nationality, 
but  that  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  go  beyond  that,  as  Russia 
could  not  dispense  with  the  colonial  produce  and  depended  on 
the  trade  of  neutrals;  that  it  was  by  no  means  certain  that  the 
latter  carried  British  goods  only. 

This  was  a  blow  struck  at  Napoleon's  policy  in  its  most 
sensitive  spot.  For  as  soon  as  Russia  tolerated  neutral  flags  in 
her  ports  the  Continent  was  opened  to  British  exports,  and 
England  could  derive  new  hope  and  capacity  for  resistance  from 
the  Czar's  refusal.  If  anything  had  been  wanting  to  convince  the 
Imperat<ir  that  he  must  first  fight  Russia  if  he  wanted  to  ruin 
England  and  become  master  of  the  world,  nothing  was  lacking 
now.  Henceforth,  although  keeping  up  all  the  formal  courtesy 
and  seeming  candour  of  diplomatic  intercouse,  he  proceeds  to  take 
decisive  steps  against  his  ally.  Then  took  place  the  annexation 
of  the  North  German  seaboard  lands,  including  the  duchy  of 
Oldenburg,  whose  prince  was  closely  related  to  the  Russian 
dynasty.*  Napoleon  had  at  the  outset  left  the  Duke  the  choice 
between  ceding  his  territor}^  for  some  equivalent,  or  receiving 
French  troops  and  customs  officers.  But  when  the  ilistressed 
regent,  after  some  delay,  accepted  the  latter  alternative,  he 
was  informed  (the  same  old  game)  that  it  was  now  too  late  and 
that  his  land  was  already  taken  into  the  Empire.  As  a  compen- 
sation he  was  offered  the  petty  territory  of  Erfurt,  which  had 
belonged  to  the  electorate  of  Mainz,  then  to  Pnissia,  but  since  1806 
had  been  at  the  disposal  of  the  French  govenmient.  The  Czar 
spoke  the  truth  when  he  declared  to  the  French  envoys  that  that 
act  was  a  slap  in  his  face  before  all  Europe,  and  at  the  same  time 
a  flagrant  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  in  which  Napoleon  had 

*  Duke  Peter  I.,  who  governed  for  his  cousin  WiUiiun,  belonged,  like 
the  Czar,  to  the  house  of  Holsteiti-Gottorp;  he  was  the  uncle  of  Alexander 
I.,  and  his  younger  sou  George  was  the  latter's  brother-in-law. 


520  At  the  Zenith  [isii 

solemnly  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  Oldenburg  He  sent  a  cir- 
cular letter  to  the  European  powers  in  which  he  protested  against 
such  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  house  of  Holstein-Gottor}) 
to  the  duchy.  "What,"  said  this  letter,  "are  alhances  worth  if 
the  parties  to  them  are  not  held  by  the  treaties  on  which  they 
rest?"  Was  this  the  expected  rupture?  No,  not  yet;  the  con 
elusion  of  the  protest  was  conciliatory  in  tone  and  emphasized  the 
continuance  of  the  alliance.  But  that  was  mere  words.  The 
acts  of  Russia  hardly  left  an  opening  for  an  understanding. 
For  on  December  31st,  1810,  a  ukase  was  issued  which  not  only 
relaxed  the  control  over  neutral  ships  in  Russian  ports,  so  that 
colonial  produce  under  any  pretext  could  be  unloaded  and 
forwarded  south  into  the  interior  through  Brody,  but  also  made 
he  importation  of  certain  luxuries,  especially  silks  and  wines, 
almost  impossible  by  a  high  duty.  But  silks  and  wines  were 
among  the  chief  products  of  France  and  the  principal  articles  of 
her  export  trade.  This  was  another  blow  at  Napoleon.  He 
demanded  the  repeal  of  the  decree,  but  received  the  simple 
answer  that  the  measure  was  dictated  by  the  bad  financial 
situation  of  Russia. 

After  this  new  refusal  of  his  ally  Napoleon  began  most  stren- 
uously to  arm  himself  in  secret.*  In  March,  1811,  Davout,  who 
was  on  the  Elbe  with  his  army,  received  the  command  to  fly 
to  Danzig  "in  case  there  were  to  be  operations  against  Russia," 
and  there  to  strengthen  his  force  of  90,000  with  50,000  Poles 
and  Saxons.  It  was  now  that  Napoleon  spoke  of  his  world- 
wide plans  and  held  up  to  view  his  prospective  world-monarchy. 
In  March,  1811,  he  revealed  to  his  adjutant-general,  Narbonne, 
the  purpose,  long  cherished  and  constantly  reflected  upon,  of 
marching  through  Moscow  to  the  Ganges  in  order  to  overthrow 
British  rule  in  India.  But  Russia  also  was  facing  the  struggle, 
and  at  this  very  time  Alexander  I.  unfolded  to  the  Prussian 
ambassador,  as  a  plan  of  campaign,  the  invasion  of  the  duchy 
of  Warsaw  and  an  advance  to  the  Oder.     Both  empires  were 

*  In  Dor(>mhor,  1811,  he  admitted  openly  to  the  Prussian  ambassador 
Kruseinarch  that  ever  since  the  appearance  of  the  Russian  ukase  he  had 
been  quietly  preparing  for  war. 


JEr.4\]  War   Imminent  521 

determined  on  war,  both  were  arming,  Napoleon  hidin}!;  behind 
the  pretext  that  his  measures  were  called  forth  by  those  of  the 
Czar.  Upon  only  one  occasion  thereafter  does  he  seem  to 
have  considered  a  peaceable  understanding,  and  then  only  to 
gain  time.  This  was  when  the  news  of  Massena's  ill  fortune 
came  to  Paris.  Yet  he  would  not  grant  Alexander's  desire  to  ex- 
change Oldenburg  for  Warsaw.  He  had  no  wish  to  strengthen 
Russia  in  the  west  at  a  time  when  she  had  just  acquired  Fin- 
land in  the  north  and  was  in  a  fair  way  of  winning  the  Danu- 
bian  principalities  in  the  south.  Not  a  village  of  the  Polish 
duchy  should  be  yielded  to  the  Czar's  empire,  he  declared  to 
his  representative  in  a  public  audience  on  August  15th,  1811. 
But  Alexander  made  no  other  proposition,  and  left  unanswered 
one  made  by  Napoleon,  who,  as  a  matter  of  course,  demanded 
the  enforcement  of  the  blockade  and  promised  licenses.  The 
Czar  found  decided  encouragement  in  the  events  in  Spain  and 
in  the  dissatisfaction  in  North  Germany.  He  did  not  feel  that 
war  was  to  be  avoided  at  any  cost.  Before  the  end  of  1811  the 
French  Emperor  said  to  Kruscmarck  that  Russia  thought  he 
was  too  busy  in  Spain  to  draw  up  a  very  formidable  army 
elsewhere,  but  that  was  a  mistake;  that  he  could  very  well 
tolerate  the  English  on  the  peninsula,  as  they  could  not  drive 
out  his  troops;  that  he  must  first  bring  the  war  in  the  north 
to  an  end,  and  not  until  then  could  he  turn  again  to  the  south. 
His  only  concern  now  was  to  gain  enough  time  to  put  as  many 
troops  on  a  war  footing  as  he  deemed  necessary  for  his  de- 
cisive struggle  with  the  only  Continental  power  not  yet  pros- 
trated, and  to  choose  the  moment  for  beginning  hostilities. 
The  silence  of  Russia  toward  his  last  overtures  was  used  to 
represent  the  Czar  as  the  real  author  of  the  war,  and  this  be- 
came the  settled  conviction  in  the  workl  at  large.* 

*  Recent  attempts  to  make  this  view  a  part  of  histor\-  must  seem  a 
failure  to  any  one  who  has  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  aims  and  character 
of  Napoleon  It  is  only  necessary  to  read  what  Metternich  wrote  to 
Bubna  a  year  later,  May  13th,  1813 .  "  Napoleon  should  consider  the  efforts 
we  had  to  make  to  prevent  our  support  of  France  from  becoming  utterly 
odious.     We  attempted  the  impossible  to  prove  that  liusnia  was  break- 


522  At   the   Zenith  [isii 

It  was  indeed  a  gigantic  army  that  the  Imperator  proposed 
to  bring  into  the  field,  not  less  than  four  hundred  thousand 
strong  he  assured  the  Prussian  ambassador,  while  to  the  Russian 
he  made  it  half  a  milhon;  even  this  figure  was  finally  to  fall 
short  of  the  truth.  The  Repubhc,  too,  had  sent  forth  such 
masses  against  their  foes;  but  with  this  difference,  that  then 
the  enthusiasm  of  new-born  freedom  armed  the  might  of  the 
French  people,  whereas  now  only  the  iron  will  of  the  ruler 
called  the  reluctant  hosts  to  arms.  More  and  more  heavil}'' 
had  his  government  weighed  on  the  French  since  his  last  cam- 
paign. In  the  cities  the  least  sign  of  discontent  showing  its 
head  was  the  occasion  of  suspicion,  persecution,  and  punish- 
ment. After  1811  the  number  of  state  prisoners  rose  to  twenty- 
five  hundred.  They  were  arrested  at  the  mere  command  of 
the  Emperor  or  his  minister  of  police,  and  imprisoned  without 
a  trial,  one  "because  he  hates  Napoleon,"  another  "because 
he  has  ever  since  1811  been  expressing  opinions  hostile  to  the 
government  in  letters  to  his  brother,"  a  third  for  "religious 
views,"  etc.  In  February,  1810,  a  special  censorship  was  estab- 
lished in  Paris  \\dth  a  director-general,  several  auditors,  and 
fifteen  to  twenty  censors,  so  that  the  censorship  should  not  be 
in  the  hands  of  the  poUce.  With  most  officious  zeal  everything 
was  forbidden  or  altered  that  might  waken  even  the  appear- 
ance of  displeasure  in  the  all-powerful  ruler.  In  one  case,  for 
example,  a  passage  praising  the  English  Constitution  had  to 
be  cut  out  of  a  book;  in  another  a  title  must  be  changed  from 
"History  of  Bonaparte,"  which  was  not  obsequious  enough,  to 
"Memoirs  of  the  Campaigns  of  Napoleon  the  Great."  This 
diligence  of  the  assiduous  censors  extended  to  the  farthest  boun- 
daries of  the  Empire.  After  the  French  occupation  the  theatres 
of  the  Hanseatic  cities  were  no  longer  to  represent  Schiller's 
"Robbers,"  "Maria  Stuart,"  "Wilhelm  Tell,"  or  Goethe's 
"Faust."  As  for  the  newspapers,  two  of  the  four  independent 
Paris  papers,  the  "  Publiciste"  and  the  "  Mercure  de  France,"  were 
wholly  sup))ressed,  while  the  other  two  lost  th(nr  ca])ital  and  be- 
ing the  peace.  This  pnitext  is  lacking  to  us  in  tlie  year  1813." 
Oncken,  "Oestereich  u.  Preussen  ini  Befreiungskriege,"  II.  378. 


^T. 41]  Repressive  Measures  in  France  523 

camo  wholly  (lojiondoiit  on  tlio  govornniont.  A  special  huroau 
(Bureau  dc  1' Esprit  public)  furnisiied  them  with  reports  of  vic- 
tories from  Spain  or  with  articles  on  Italian  and  French  music,  in 
order  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  bored  Parisians,  while  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  were  arming  themselves  for  the  bloody 
struggle.  To  be  sure  Napoleon  tried  to  draw  the  veil  of  forget- 
fulness  over  his  harsh  measures  agaiast  the  press  by  conferring 
honours  on  scholars  and  artists.  He  decorated  them  with  the 
cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honour,  raised  the  Gros,  the  Gerards, 
Gu^rins,  Lagranges,  Monges,  and  Laplaces  to  the  baronage,  and 
regretted  that  Corneille  was  no  longer  alive  to  be  raised  to  the 
rank  of  prince. 

In  the  countr}^  not  less  than  in  the  cities,  the  government 
soon  was  obliged  to  support  its  authority  by  strict  measures. 
The  French  peasant  had  hitherto  proved  himself  the  most 
reliable  supporter  of  the  Emperor.  This  was  partly  due,  doubt- 
less, to  the  fact  that,  being  less  easily  moved  than  the  towns- 
folk, he  clung  longer  to  the  side  once  chosen,  and  the  General 
who  restored  order  had  once  been  his  man;  but  still  another 
reason  was  the  inclination  of  the  French  peasantry  for  military 
service,  for  in  any  case  it  gave  a  number  of  men  their  support, 
and  if  brave  men  could  give  themselves  the  proper  training 
it  raised  them  to  respectable  situations.  Napoleon  could  boldly 
say,  as  in  fact  he  did:  "WTiat  do  I  care  for  the  opinion  of  the 
salon  and  the  chatterers!  I  do  not  listen  to  it.  I  know  but 
one  opinion,  that  of  the  peasants.  The  rest  is  of  no  importance." 
But  even  that  inclination  to  military  service  had  its  hmits 
when  the  villagers  themselves  heard  more  and  more  often  of 
the  innumerable  victims  which  the  frightful  war  beyond  the 
Pyrenees  was  swallowing  up,  and  were  now  tokl  that  a  second  war 
was  to  begin  in  a  distant  land,  of  whose  terrors  the  veterans  of 
1807  had  told  many  a  story.  No  wonder  that  the  conscription 
of  the  ages  due  in  1811,  which  was  to  furnish  the  Emperor 
with  120,000  men,  met  with  no  enthusiasm  whatever.  Men  of 
means  paid  as  high  as  8000  francs  for  t:ubstitutes,  and  thou- 
sands of  the  poor  took  flight.  For  these  deserters  the  families, 
the  communes,  nay,  even  a  whole  district,  were  held   respon- 


^24  At  the  Zenith  [isii 

sible,  and  this  new  "  law  of  hostages "  was  most  strictly  en- 
forced by  flying  columns  (colonnes  mobiles). 

Even  more  heavily  than  on  France  did  the  hand  of  the  "Pro- 
tector" press  on  the  states  of  the  Rhenish  Confederation,  whose 
princes  received  orders  in  April,  1811,  to  hold  their  contingents 
ready.  Westphalia,  which  had  been  brought  to  the  veiy  brink 
of  financial  ruin  by  the  extravagance  of  its  king,  Jerome,  so  that 
increase  of  taxes  and  forced  loans  could  no  longer  delay  bank- 
ruptcy, was  nevertheless  compelled  to  raise  its  army  to  30,000, 
and  also  furnish  supplies  for  20,000  French  troops  with  their 
horses.  When  Jerome  remonstrated  he  was  told  that  he  was 
perfectly  at  liberty  to  step  down  from  the  throne.  It  was  much 
the  same  in  Bavaria;  she  had  been  rewarded  after  the  war  of  1809 
with  the  territory  of  the  diocese  of  Dalberg,  but  on  the  other  hand 
had  been  forced  to  cede  South  Tyrol  to  Italy  and  Illyria,  Ulm, 
and  other  lesser  territories  to  Wiirtemberg,  besides  assuming  a 
large  debt  for  the  treasury  of  the  Emperor  and  raising  30,000 
men  for  the  war.  Wiirtemberg  had  given  up  40,000  souls  to 
Baden  and  received  140,000  from  Bavaria.  Baden  had  to 
add  to  the  territory  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  in  return  for  her 
own  accessions.  The  Corsican  had  scattered  the  German  gov- 
ernments and  subjects  about  like  chaff.  To  make  up  for  the 
loss  of  Ratisbon,  the  territory  of  the  Prin(^e  Primate  was  en- 
larged by  the  addition  of  Fulda  and  Hanau  and  created 
the  "archduchy  of  Frankfort";  with  the  arbitrary  reserva- 
tion that  after  the  death  of  Dalberg  the  sovereignty  should 
fall  upon  Viceroy  Eugene,  who  had  lost,  as  a  con.sequence  of 
Napoleon's  remarriage,  all  prospects  of  succeeding  to  the 
Italian  throne.  Dalberg  may  have  feared  that  the  impatient 
despot  beyond  the  Rhine  might  some  day  overlook  this  proviso, 
and  recommended  himself  by  the  most  accommodating  servility, 
while  his  people  groaned  under  most  oppressive  taxes  and  his 
troops  were  called  up(m  to  serve  in  Spain  far  more  than  the 
treaty  required.  But  Saxony,  above  all,  armed  in  feverish  hate, 
especially  in  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  where  Napoleon  heaped  up 
immense  stores  f)f  war  materials.  All  who  were  liable  to  military 
service  were  called  in,  and  a  national  guard  was  established. 


vEt.  41]  The  Position  of  Prussia  525 

Thus  the  govcrninents  of  the  Rhenish  Confederation,  with  their 
troops,  were  absolutely  at  the  disposal  of  the  Emperor.  Woe 
to  them  if  they  disobeyed !  "  If  the  princes  of  the  Confederation," 
wrote  Napoleon  in  April,  1811,  to  Frederick  of  Wiirticmberg, 
"raise  in  my  mind  even  the  slightest  doubt  as  to  their  disposition 
to  arm  for  the  common  defence,  they  are  lost,  I  declare  it 
openly;  for  I  prefer  enemies  to  uncertain  friends."  * 

There  remained,  then,  oidy  the  two  German  powers  of  central 
Europe,  Prussia  and  Austria,  the  vanquished  at  the  battles  of 
Jena  and  Wagram,  to  be  summoned  to  their  duty.  As  far  as 
Prussia  was  concerned,  Nai)oleon  had  not  forgotten  that  he  had 
once  conquered  the  country  and  only  out  of  consideration  left  it 
free  from  Russia,  against  which  he  was  now  preparhig  to  fight; 
nor  had  he  forgotten  that  he  had  once  encamped  as  victor  by  the 
Niemen.  Might  he  not  gain  that  position  again,  perhaps,  by 
bringmg  Prussia,  like  Holland,  under  his  ijimiediatc  control? 
Such  a  plan  he  really  seems  to  have  contemplated  for  a  moment. 
A  forged  report  of  Champagny,  dated  in  November,  1810,  in 
which  the  minister  suggests  to  the  Emperor  the  partition  of 
Prussia  in  favour  of  Saxony  and  Westphalia, is  supposed  to  be 
based  on  reliable  information  on  the  part  of  the  forger.  At  the 
beginning  of  1811  Queen  Katharine  of  Westphalia  also  made  an 
entry  in  her  journal  in  reference  to  the  impending  partition  of 
the  reabn  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  Again,  about  the  same  time, 
the  rumour  was  current  in  Spain  that  the  rest  of  Prussia  was  to 
be  given  to  Berthier.f  IJut  the  plan  was  soon  abandoned.  It  was 
quite  possible  that  the  ab.sorption  of  Prussia  would  meet  as  much 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  people  as  did  that  of  Spain,  however 
great  the  difference  between  the  hot-blooded  southerners  and 
the  "sensible,  cold,  tolerant,  self-controlled  Germans,"  as  Napo- 
leon characterized  them.    The  wildest  reports,  in  fact,  came  to 

*  That  this  was  no  empty  threat  is  shown  by  a  passage  in  the  diary  of 
the  Queen  of  WestphaUa,  who  writes  in  her  journal  on  January  11th, 
1811:  "The  Emperor  is  much  displeased  with  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden; 
he  seems  to  be  among  the  princes  who  will  disappear  "  (Revue  histo- 
rique,  XXXVIII.  95). 

t  Cf.  my  essay,  "Stein  und  Gruner  in  Oesterreich"  in  the  "Deutsche 
Rundschau"  for  1888,  p.  137. 


526  At  the  Zenith  [I811 

Paris  as  to  the  secret  doings  of  the  "Tugendbund,"  as  the  sum 
total  of  German  enemies  of  France  were  styled.  No;  no  coup 
d'etat!  Would  not  Prussia  and  Spain  both  after  the  defeat  of 
Russia  fall  like  ripe  fruit  into  the  arms  of  the  ruler  of  Europe? 
It  were  far  wiser  to  make  the  considerable  auxiliary  forces  of 
Frederick  William  serve  his  purposes  by  peaceful  means  and  so 
assure  his  position  on  the  Niemen.  Such  was  the  plan  Napoleon 
finally  adopted;  and  he  was  successful,  owing  in  part  to  the 
unhappy  situation  of  Prussia,  whose  territories  were  threatened 
constantly  by  the  Rhenish  Confederation  on  the  one  hand,  by 
Warsaw  on  the  other,  and  finally  by  the  French  garrisons  in 
Stettin,  Kiistrin,  Glogau,  and  Danzig  ;  and  in  part  to  the 
unwilling  support  furnished  to  the  plans  of  the  conqueror,  as  in 
1805  and  1809  by  Frederick  William,  who  mistrusted  his  people 
and  was  firmly  convinced  of  the  invincibility  of  the  Corsican. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  spring  of  1811,  when  Napoleon  failed  to 
answer  Prussia's  proposals  for  an  alliance,  there  were  moments 
in  which  not  only  the  leaders  of  the  patriotic  party,  especially 
the  Minister  of  War,  Scharnhorst,  but  also  the  prime  minister, 
Hardenberg,  who  had  returned  to  his  post  in  1810,  admonished 
the  king  to  arm  and  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  Russia; 
and  in  fact  during  the  summer,  with  all  possible  secrecy,  the 
military  forces  were  increased  to  100,000  men.  In  the  autumn 
a  military  convention  was  concluded  with  the  Czar,  in  which  the 
latter  promised  to  meet  any  attack  on  Prussia  as  an  invasion 
of  his  own  land  and  to  push  forward  with  all  possible  haste  to  the 
Vistula.  But  by  that  tune  King  Frederick  William  was  already 
of  another  mind.  This  prince,  in  other  respects  so  clear-sighted, 
who  estimated  the  forces  of  Napoleon  more  correctly  than  the 
war  party,  was  very  deficient  in  that  courage  which  is  ready  to 
take  chances.  When  orders  came  from  Paris  to  discontinue  the 
annament,  he  complied  at  once;  and  when  Napoleon  returned  to 
Prussia's  proposals  of  alliance,  the  King  was  persuaded  by  a  court 
party,  which  saw  in  attachment  to  France  the  only  salvation 
of  the  state,  to  open  negotiations.  These  led,  on  February  24th, 
1812,  to  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  conqueror. 
But  on  what  terms!    At  the  time  when  Hardenberg  offered  the 


I 


Mt.  42]  Prussia   Humiliated  527 

Emperor  alliance  and  aid  from  Prussia,  he  did  so  with  a  reserva- 
tion which  was  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  country,  raise 
the  niilitarj'  power  of  I'russia,  restore  the  fortress  of  (llogau,and 
insure  some  acquisitions  of  territory.  No  mention  of  all  that 
now.  Napoleon  had  purposely  postponed  resuming  negotiations 
until  his  re-enforcejnents  iu  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder,  in  West- 
phalia and  Poland  had  reached  the  point  when  he  could  at  once 
give  the  greatest  emphasis  to  his  demand  that  Pnissia  should 
either  enter  the  Rhenish  Confederation  or  make  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance.  So  the  treaty  of  February  24th  was  for  Prus- 
sia an  unparalleled  humiliation.  It  provided  that  Prussia  should 
furnish  a  contingent  for  service  anywhere  in  Europe,  excepting 
Spain,  Italy,  and  Turkey.  She  was  to  raise  20,000  men  and  60 
guns  against  Russia  under  the  conunand  of  Napoleon,  about  one 
half  of  her  entire  armament  as  stipulated ;  the  other  half  was  to 
garrison  the  Silesian  forts,  Potsdam,  and  particidarly  Colberg 
and  Graudenz,  the  commandants  receiving  their  orders  from 
the  French  general  staff.  The  French  were  to  march  unopposed 
through  the  entire  Prussian  territory,  excepting  a  part  of 
Silesia;  their  generals  were  to  make  requisitions,  procure  pro- 
visions for  the  army,  and  preserve  order  and  safety.  The  vast 
amount  of  provisions  Prussia  must  furnish  was  to  be  taken  as 
part  payment  of  the  war-contribution  still  due.  Thus  the 
patriotic  revival  of  181 1  had  ended  in  submission,  in  return  for 
which  the  king  gained  nothing  but  vague  promises  of  increase  of 
territory  in  case  of  victor\',  promises  from  Napoleon,  who  had 
kept  saying  regretfully  ever  suice  1807,  "How  could  I  have  left 
s<:)  much  land  m  that  man's  possession!" 

The  resolution  of  the  Prussian  king  to  cling  to  France  in  the 
impendmg  war  was  not  a  little  influenced  by  the  attitude  of 
Austria.  He  felt  convinced  that  it  would  not  do  to  risk  that 
"game  of  chance,"  the  struggle  against  Napoleon's  superior 
genius  and  forces,  unless  both  Russia  and  Austria  were  ready 
for  a  united  exertion  of  all  their  strength.  As  early  as  December, 
1811,  Schamhoi-st  had  actually  been  in  Vienna  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain the  temper  of  the  Austrian  cabinet,  but  had  at  last  learned 
merely  that  Emperor  Francis  was  not  just  then  in  a  position  to 


528 


At  the  Zenith  [isii 


grant  any  aid.  The  truth  was  that  Austria  was  on  the  side  of 
France.  Metternich's  reports  to  his  sovereign  during  that  period 
disclose  the  fact  that  Vienna  pohtics  were  decidedly  hostile  to  the 
Czar.  The  action  of  Russia  against  Turkey  in  the  Danubian 
principalities  was  enough  to  separate  these  two  powers.  Then, 
again,  Alexander  had  in  the  first  months  of  1811  resumed  the 
plan  which  he  had  deliberated  on  with  his  confidant,  Adam 
Czartoryski,  before  the  war  of  1805,  i.e.,  to  restore  Poland  and 
rule  it  constitutionally  as  a  \mited  kingdom  under  Russian  suze- 
rainty. This  plan  also  gave  offence  in  Vienna,  for  it  involved  the 
cession  of  Galicia  by  Austria :  and  while  Russia  offered  in  exchange 
Servia  and  the  Danubian  principalities,  j^et  those  would  have  to 
be  conquered  first,  and  that  was  out  of  the  question  during  a  war 
with  Napoleon.  Of  course  Galicia  might  be  lost  to  Austria  even 
if  the  latter  adhered  to  the  French  Emperor;  for  he  was  doubtless 
himself  playing  off  united  Poland  against  Russia,  and  Napoleon 
and  Metternich  had  already  had  some  talk  of  it  in  the  summer  of 
1810.  But  in  the  first  place  Napoleon  offered  Austria,  which  was 
so  impoverished  since  the  last  war,  the  important  province  of 
lUyria  with  its  seacoast  as  an  equivalent  for  the  Polish  territory, 
and  again  as  an  additional  reward  for  Austria's  co-operation 
in  the  war  he  promised  further  acquisitions  proposed  by  her  in 
Bavaria  and  Piaissian  Silesia,  extending  her  border  to  the  river 
Inn.  For  the  dismemberment  of  Prussia,  no  matter  which  side 
she  espoused,  was  for  Metternich  as  much  an  assured  fact  as  the 
victory  of  the  French  in  the  war  with  Russia.*  The  policy  of 
Vienna  nmst  then  in  any  case  wholly  depend  upon  that  of  Napo- 
leon, but  even  in  this  dependent  position  Metternich  wanted  to 
take  advantage  of  junctures  to  strengthen,  if  possible,  Austria 

*  "Prussia  is  no  longer  to  be  reckoned  among  the  powers,"  he  assured 
Emperor  Francis  at  the  beginning  of  ISll ;  and  in  a  speech  in  November 
of  the  same  year  he  said:  "Prussia  is  in  the  hopeless  state  of  fearing 
dismemberment  whichever  side  she  niaj^  espouse."  And  again  the  same 
document  contains  this  statement:  "The  antecedent  probabilities,  based 
on  former  expc^ricnce,  especially  that  of  recent  years,  are  undeniably  in 
favour  of  French  victory."  Metternich  at  that  time  estimated  the  French 
army  at  from  200,000  to  300,000  men.  How  clearly  he  must  have  felt 
confirmed  in  his  policy  when  he  heard  reports  of  double  that  number! 


JEt.42]  Alliance  with  Austria  529 

while  in  subjection,  as  long  as  she  could  not  be  free.  And 
Napoleon  did  not  oppose  the  wishes  of  his  father-in-law.  In 
December,  ISll,  he  declared  to  the  Austrian  ambassador:  'The 
first  mistake  which  Pnissia  makes  will  settle  the  Silesian  ques- 
tion." Nay,  more,  even,  if  Prussia  did  not  depart  from  the  line 
marked  out  for  her,  he  might  dispose  of  Silesia  in  favour  of  Aus- 
tria in  case  of  a  successful  war;  for  in  that  event  there  would  be 
plenty  of  means  of  compensation,  and  Frederick  William  would 
have  to  put  up  with  some  other  province,  whereas  Silesia  was  the 
only  one  that  could  round  out  the  domain  of  Austria.* 

Thus  it  was  that  the  Austrian  government  was  induced  to 
enter  an  active  alliance  with  France  that  offered  definite  ad- 
vantages. This  decision  had  already  been  made  and  announced 
at  Paris  when  Scharnhorst  came  to  Vienna.  It  is  obvious  that 
his  mission  was  foredoomed  to  failure;  nor  is  it  less  obvious 
why  Metternich,  inexcusable  as  it  may  seem,  advised  the  envoy 
of  a  state  which  he  regarded  as  done  for  to  join  Russia;  in 
other  words,  to  make  that  "first  mistake  "  which  would  settle 
the  Silesian  question  in  favour  of  Austria. f  It  would  seem  as  if 
the  mere  name  of  Silesia  had  called  to  mind  the  times  of  the 
great  empress  who  ventured  three  wars  for  the  lost  province; 
the  Franco- Austrian  treaty  of  alliance  of  1756  was  resurrected 
to  serve  as  a  model  both  in  its  stipulations  and  to  some  extent 
even  in  its  language  for  the  new  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance.    The  document  was  signed  by  Schwarzenberg  at  Paris 

*  Metternich's  "  Memoirs,"  II.  517.  Maret,  who  had  succeeded  Cham- 
pagny  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  proposed  that  Prussia  might  be  com- 
f)ensated  for  Silesia  by  the  BaUic  provinces  of  Russia. 

t  Schwarzenberg  had  the  decisive  audience  in  Paris  on  December  17th. 
Metternich  could  not  have  received  the  report  of  it  before  the  25th. 
Until  then  Scharnhorst  received  no  definite  answer.  On  the  26th  he  was 
received  with  the  statement  that  Austria  was  unable  to  help,  and  with 
the  hint  that  Priissia  would  fare  better  in  alliance  with  Russia  than  ■nith 
any  other  power.  See  Metternich's  "  Memoirs,"  II.  517,  and  Lehmann's 
"Scharnhorst,"  II.  434.  Duncker,  in  "Aus  der  Zeit  Friedrich  des 
Grossen  und  Friedrich  Wilhelm  III.,"  attributes  to  Metternich  the  further 
statement  to  the  ambassador  that  Austria  would  not  side  with  France 
but  remain  neutral,  but  there  is  no  trace  of  this  in  the  reports  of  Scharn- 
horst, so  Professor  Lehmann  kmdly  informs  me. 


530  At  the  Zenith  [I812 

on  March  14th  1812.  Austria  was  to  support  France  against 
Russia  with  30,000  men;  these,  however,  unhke  the  Prussian 
auxiliaries,  were  all  under  Austrian  officers,  were  to  take  no 
commands  from  any  French  general,  and  were  only  to  obey 
the  directions  of  Napoleon,  Upon  the  restoration  of  Poland 
Austria  was  to  retain  Galicia;  if,  however,  she  were  willing  to 
cede  a  portion  of  it,  she  was  to  receive  Illyria  in  compensation. 
The  integrity  of  Turkey  was  guaranteed,  i.e.,  Russia  was  to 
acquire  none  of  it  for  herself.  The  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
reads:  "The  Emperor  of  the  French  binds  himself,  in  case  the 
war  has  a  successful  issue,  to  procure  for  the  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria war-indemnities  and  accessions  of  territory  which  will  not 
only  counterbalance  the  sacrifices  made,  but  will  be  a  monu- 
ment to  the  close  and  lasting  ties  between  the  two  sovereigns." 
As  Illyria  had  already  been  spoken  of,  these  words  can  refer 
only  to  Silesia;  for  was  not  that  "the  only  province  that  could 
roimd  out  Austria"? 

Napoleon  in  such  ways  had  made  sure  of  the  central  Ger- 
man powers,  and  now  from  the  southern  extremity  of  Calabria 
to  the  Memel,  from  Cape  Finisterre  to  Bukovina,  the  Continent 
was  obedient  to  his  nod.  He  would  have  been  glad  indeed 
to  receive,  or  rather  firmly  hold,  Sweden  and  Turkey  also,  the  old 
enemies  of  Russia,  in  his  system,  in  order  that  they  might 
attack  the  foe  from  the  north  and  the  south,  while  he  dealt 
the  finishing  stroke  in  the  centre.  But  here  his  fortune  failed 
him.  When  the  ambassadors  of  France  and  Russia  were  out- 
bidding each  other  in  Stockholm,  Bernadotte  deemed  the  mo- 
ment favourable  for  endearing  himself  to  the  country  he  was  to 
rule  by  gaining  a  large  accession  of  territory.  The  Czar,  on 
the  one  hand,  offered  as  a  reward  for  Sweden's  support  his  con- 
sent to  the  annexation  of  Norway ;  to  this  Napoleon  would  not 
listen,  as  Norway  belonged  to  Denmark,  which  remained  loyal 
to  him.  He  himself,  on  the  other  hand,  offered  to  restore 
Finland  to  Sweden  after  the  defeat  of  Russia  if  Sweden  would 
march  against  Alexander  with  40,000  men  and  at  the  same 
time  prosecute  the  war  against  England  with  energy.  But  to 
be  involved  in  hostilities  with  Russia  and  the  British  empire 


A^T.  42]  Sweden   and  Turkey  5  3  i 

at  the  same  time  seemed  an  impossibility  to  the  Swedish  gov- 
ernment. "  We  did  not  hide  from  ourselves,"  we  read  in  a  sub- 
sequent report  of  the  Swedish  ministry  to  Charles  XIII.  dated 
January  7th,  1813,  "the  fact  that  a  war  with  Russia,  which 
must  of  necessity  bring  in  its  train  hostilities  with  England,  was 
too  great  a  task  for  Sweden;  that  an  English  fleet  in  the  Baltic 
Sea  during  the  summer  could  prevent  all  undertakings  against 
Russia;  that  the  coasts  of  Sweden  would  meantime  be  at  the 
mercy  of  the  English;  that  commerce  and  coastwise  naviga- 
tion would  cease  altogether  for  a  time  and  cause  great  distress; 
that  Sweden's  great  need  of  grain  demanded  continued  peaceful 
relations  with  these  very  powers,  Russia  and  England,"  etc. 
For  such  reasons,  supplemented  by  the  occupation,  especially 
imprudent  at  this  juncture,  of  Pomerania  by  the  French  to 
break  up  smuggling,  and  the  long-continued  variance  between 
Bernadotte  and  Napoleon,  the  French  offer  was  decUned,  and 
on  the  5th  of  April,  1812,  the  alhance  with  Russia  was  con- 
cluded. 

In  Turkey,  Sultan  Mahmud  would  gladly  have  taken  the 
hand  that  Napoleon  finally  held  out  to  him  in  the  first  months 
of  1812;  but  such  was  the  state  of  affairs  that  even  this  despot 
could  not  follow  his  inclination.  In  the  preceding  autumn  the 
Russians  had  rallied  their  forces  for  a  decisive  blow;  they  had 
gained  successes,  and  then  offered  peace  under  comparatively 
easy  terms,  for  the  express  purpose  of  closing  the  war  on  the 
Danube  before  the  great  conflict  with  France  began;  they  no 
longer  demanded  the  two  principaUties.  This  happened  at  a 
moment  when  the  Turkish  treasury  was  empty,  when  the  army 
was  in  a  deplorable  condition,  and  when  the  desire  of  the  peo- 
ple for  peace  and  rest  had  become  universal.  The  reckless 
Janizaries  alone  still  called  for  war.  Of  what  use,  then,  was 
Napoleon's  promise  to  give  back  the  Crimea,  Tartary,  and  all 
the  territory  Turkey  had  lost  in  the  last  forty  years,  if  she  could 
not  furnish  the  100,000  men  which  he  demanded  as  auxiliaries? 
Moreover,  England  threatened,  if  the  Sultan  accepted  the 
French  system,  to  force  the  Dardanelles  and  burn  Constanti- 
nople.    The  Divan  upon  being  consulted  by  Mahmud  declared 


532  At  the   Zenith  [I812 

for  peace  with  the  Czar,  and  the  treaty  was  concluded  at  the 
end  of  May,  1812,  with  the  provision  that  the  Pruth  should 
thenceforth  be  the  boundary. 

Naturally  Napoleon  felt  very  keenly  these  diplomatic  reverses 
at  Stockholm  and  on  the  BosphoriLs.  Yet,  after  all,  he  had 
under  his  command  an  overwhelming  force  when  he  took  the 
last  step  that  should  make  him  master  of  the  Continent.  Firmly 
resolved  as  he  was  on  this  step  (and  the  objections  raised  by 
his  ministers  did  not  make  him  waver),  Alexander  I.  was 
equally  firm,  for  the  popular  opposition  compelled  him  to  re- 
sist the  Napoleonic  dictatorship  which  interfered  so  impudently 
with  the  material  interests  of  Russia.  The  rupture  was  in- 
evitable ;  all  further  delay  was  due  to  purely  military  considera- 
tions. On  the  30th  of  April,  1812,  the  Russian  envoy  in  Paris 
at  last  delivered  the  ultimatum  of  the  Czar,  to  the  effect  that 
hs  would  negotiate  with  France  only  on  condition  that  the 
French  should  previously  evacuate  Prussia  and  Swedish  Pome- 
rania,  and  even  then  he  would  not  renounce  trade  with  neutrals. 
In  order  to  gain  time  Napoleon  did  not  answer  at  once,  but  sent 
his  adjutant-general,  Narbonne,  to  Alexander  with  instructions 
which,  although  sent  on  May  3d,  were  antedated  the  25th  of 
April,  as  if  the  Russian  ultimatum  were  yet  unknown.*  While 
the  envoy  was  on  his  way  to  Wilna,  Napoleon  journeyed  in 
May  to  Dresden  to  make  a  threatening  demonstration,  as  it 
were,  by  displaying  his  forces.  We  may  well  beUeve  that  he 
flattered  himself  it  would  again  overawe  the  foe. 

At  Dresden  there  assembled,  to  do  homage,  the  princes  of 
the  Rhenish  Confederation, over  whom  the  Corsican  now  exercised 
more  absolute  authority  than  any  Roman  Emperor  of  the  German 
nation  had  for  a  long  time.  The  last  of  these  Emperors,  Francis 
of  Austria,  was  present  also.  With  the  King  of  Prussia  and  the 
lesser  "  sovereigns"  he  stepped  dutifully  into  the  shadow  of  the 
mighty  upstart  who  had  obliterated  the  boundaries  between 
the  Roman  and  the  Teutonic  elements  in  Europe  and  had  united 
the  forces  of  both  for  the  decisive  struggle  over  the  fate  of  a  con- 
tinent.   To  be  sure,  it  was  the  motive  of  personal  ambition  and 

*  Ernouf,  "Maret,  Due  de  Bassano,"  p.  374. 


/Et.  42]    Historical  Significance  of  Napoleon       533 

of  boundless  lust  of  power  that  had  set  in  motion  these  masses; 
and  it  was  an  almost  intolerable  compulsion  that  held  them 
together.  And  yet  if  one,  accepting  the  guidance  of  genius, 
could  have  mounted  the  heights  where  details  are  lost  in  the  broad 
survey  of  the  whole,  he  might  well  fancy  he  beheld  a  league  of 
the  civilized  powers  of  Europe,  marshalled  under  the  leadership 
of  the  greatest  general  of  the  age,  to  spread  by  conquest  the 
civilization  of  the  West  over  the  East,  and  to  make  an  end  of 
international  strife  by  bringmg  all  nations  under  one  sway,"  and 
he  might  be  tempted  to  say  of  Napoleon  with  Goethe: 

"What  centuries  dark  have  long  been  groping  after. 
By  his  mind's  eye  is  seen  with  clearest  vision ; 
The  small  and  insignificant  has  vanished, 
The  Sea  and  Land  alone  remain  contending. 
When  from  the  Sea  her  shores  are  conquered, 
And  proud  waves  dash  themselves  in  vain  upon  them, 
Then,  under  guidance  wise,  through  mighty  conflict, 
Will  fall  the  fetters  from  the  prisoned  mainland."  * 

Or  are  these  words,  addressed  to  Marie  Louise,  merely  con- 
ventional homage,  the  tribute  offered  by  the  great  humanist  of 
the  century  to  the  Emperor  now  that  he  has  climbed  to  the 
highest  pinnacle  of  power?  No,  to  Goethe  Napoleon's  greatness 
was  beyond  question.  The  poet  perceived  exactly  what  consti- 
tuted his  historical  significance :  it  was  his  unconscious  devotion 
to  the  ideal.  "Napoleon,"  he  once  said,  "who  lived  wholly  in  the 
ideal,  could  not  consciously  grasp  it.  He  renounces  all  ideal 
considerations  and  denies  that  the  ideal  has  any  reality,  while  at 
the  same  time  he  is  striving  to  make  it  real."  The  poet  serenely 
looks  above  and  beyond  the  Impera tor's  base  conduct  and  his 
sordid,  selfish  aims.  Others  might  speak  of  the  horrors  of  war 
and  the  oppressive  yoke  of  the  tyrant;  his  eyes  were  fixed  on  the 
final  goal,  the  union  of  the  nations  in  a  higher  civilization.  And 
from  this  standpoint  Goethe  was  right  in  ranking  Napoleon  with 
the  great  men  of  history.  One  and  all,  their  only  claim  to  such 
title  is  that  the}'  worked  at  the  behest  of  great  ideas,  whatever 

*  From  Goethe's  poem  in  honour  of  the  Empress  Marie  Louise,  July, 
1812.  The  last  five  lines  refer  to  the  contest  with  England,  the  mistress 
of  the  sea,  and  the  Continental  blockade. — B. 


534  -^t  the   Zenith  [I812 

their  own  immediate  aims  were.  Alexander  of  Macedon,  to  be 
sure,  burst  the  narrow  bomids  of  his  petty  state  for  the  mastery 
of  the  world  and  carved  his  name  by  unrivalled  de^ls  in  the  mem- 
ory of  the  ages;  but  the  real  motive  power  behind  him  was  the  ex- 
pansive force  of  Greek  culture,  and  in  its  service  he  undertook  his 
eastern  expedition.  Charlemagne,  again,  established  a  mighty 
empire  with  his  sword;  but  only  as  the  submissive  instrument 
of  the  moral  ideas  of  Christianity,  which  thus  conquered  the  new 
nations  of  the  north.  Similarly,  when  we  see  Napoleon  treading 
the  same  path,  when  we  see  him,  too,  all  eagerness  to  raise  his 
own  person  to  the  very  summit  of  power  and  subdue  the  whole 
world  to  his  will,  this  very  will  is  in  large  part  not  his  own,  but 
only  the  instrument  of  that  civilization  of  humanity  whose  de- 
velopment requires  the  intellectual  efforts  of  centuries  before 
it  becomes  the  common  possession  of  the  entire  race.  This 
onward  march  is  through  streams  of  blood  in  any  case,  but,  after 
all,  it  is  in  blood  that  the  laws  of  humanity  are  written,  be  it  One 
who  sheds  it  on  the  cross,  or  millions  that  testify  Avith  their 
death.  Wherever  the  Emperor  of  the  French  had  conquered, 
there  we  see  the  impulse  to  a  new  social  order;  on  the  banks  of 
the  Manzanares,  as  well  as  on  the  Tiber,  on  the  Rhine  and  on  the 
Elbe,  in  Naples  and  in  Poland,  in  Prussia  and  in  Austria;  now 
directly  under  the  pressure  of  conquest,  and  again  indirectly 
because  resistance  to  the  man  of  might  seemed  possible  only  if 
he  were  met  with  his  own  weapons.  To  cite  but  one  instance, 
it  was  the  day  of  defeat  at  Jena  alone  that  changed  the  entire 
internal  system  of  the  Prussian  state.*  Thus  it  was  a  most 
important  case  in  the  interests  of  civilization  that  was  to  be 
tried  in  1812  at  the  outposts  of  civilized  Europe.  It  is  a  mere 
incidental  detail  that  the  prosecuting  attorney  who  conducted 
the  case  with  his  sword  demanded  for  his  fee  the  sovereignty 
of  the  world. 

*  "  It  is  in  any  case  remarkable  that  of  all  those  who  later  played  a 
prominent  part  in  the  reform  legislation  and  who  had  previously  been 
numbered  among  the  leading  men  of  the  old  r^'gime,  not  one,  before  that 
powerful  impulse,  had  in  any  way  propounded  plans  of  reform."  (E. 
Meier,  "Die  Reform  der  Verwaltungsorganisation  unter  Stein  und  Har- 
denberg,"  p.  133.) 


iET.  42]      The   Power   of  National   Feeling         535 

But  the  nations  of  Europe  occupied  no  such  lofty  point  of 
view.  They  did  not  inquire  after  tlie  ideal  mission  which 
Napoleon  was  unwittingly  fulfilling,  and  hence  could  find  no 
comfort  in  it  when,  spurred  on  obvi(;usly  by  personal  ambitions, 
he  threatened  their  independence,  forced  their  sons  into  the 
battlefield,  restricted  their  conunercc  and  industry,  and  waged 
war  upon  their  religious  dignitaries.  They  hated  him  bitterly. 
This  hostile  feeling  was  manifested  most  strongly  in  the  two 
nations  which  were  farthest  removed  from  the  spirit  of  the 
revolutionary  humanism  and  in  which  the  prunary  instincts  of 
reUgious  and  national  feeling  had  been  preserved  in  their  purest 
form:  Spain  and  Russia.  The  former  was  not  yet  subdued;  how 
would  it  fare  with  the  latter? 


CHAPTER  XVII 
MOSCOW 

While  Napoleon  was  displaying  his  magnificence  at  Dresden, 
his  columns  were  marching  to  the  Vistula.  Such  an  army  the 
world  had  never  seen  before.  Far  more  than  400,000  men 
stood  ready  to  march  into  Russia,  and  the  reserves  afterwards 
drawn  into  active  service  in  the  east  raised  the  army  of  the 
northern  campaign  to  a  total  of  at  least  600,000.  For  a  long 
time  and  with  great  energy  the  Emperor  had  been  making  his 
preparations;  he  had  put  off  the  enemy  till  the  last  minute  with 
negotiations;  and  he  had  made  unprecedented  demands  of  the 
nations,  until  at  last  he  hoped  by  reason  of  undoubted  superiority 
to  overmaster  the  enemy. 

Yet  he  was  not  without  his  misgivings.  Segur  relates  in  his 
Memoirs  that  during  the  time  of  the  preparations  in  Paris  he 
would  sometimes  start  from  his  thoughts  in  the  greatest  excite- 
ment and  exclaim  that  he  was  not  yet  sufficiently  prepared  for 
so  distant  a  war  and  needed  three  years  more.  Then,  again,  he 
remained  impervious  to  warnings  and  objections  ventured  by 
others  around  him  and  sought  eagerly  to  refute  them.  Foremost 
among  those  to  give  warning  was  Caulaincourt.  He  knew 
Russia  and  the  national  pride  of  the  Russian  people;  they  would 
never  think  of  peace,  so  he  believed,  as  long  as  a  single  foe  stood 
on  the  soil  of  the  fatherland.  He  pointed  to  the  doubtful 
loyalty  of  compulsory  allies,  to  the  hatred  of  the  German  popu- 
lation growing  out  of  the  French  system  of  plundering,  to  the 
inhospitable  theater  of  war  whose  horrors  the  campaign  of  1807 
hud  sufficiently  made  known.  Similarly  Poniatowski  described 
the  pathless  wastes  of  Lithuania,  portrayed  its  nobility  as 
already  half  Russian  and  its  people  as  cold  and  unresponsive, 
and  confidently  declared  that  no  great  results  were  to  be  expected 

536 


jet.42]  Dissuasion  is  in  Vain.  537 

from  setting  them  free.  Segur,  an  older  man,  would  then  recall 
the  thoughts  of  the  Emperor  to  France,  which  must  cease  after 
the  campaign  to  be  France  as  soon  as  it  was  expanded  into 
Europe.  The  end  would  then  be  that  in  the  place  of  the  mon- 
archsof  the  Continent  he  would  put  the  generals  of  the  Empire  as 
viceroys;  and  these,  more  ambitious  than  the  officers  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  would  not  wait,  perhaps,  for  the  death  of  their  sover- 
eign in  order  to  rule  on  their  own  account.  To  the  same  effect 
spoke  Duroc  also.  But  all  had  spoken  in  vain.  Of  the  allies, 
Napoleon  replied,  he  had  no  fears;  Prussia  had  her  hands  tied, 
and  the  south  German  courts  and  Austria  were  bound  to  him  by 
ties  of  family.  Moreover,  the  Germans  were  of  a  slow-going, 
methodical  nature,  and  he  could  always  find  time  to  attend  to 
them.  He  was  well  aware  of  the  ambition  of  his  generals;  but 
war  was  just  the  thing  to  divert  their  thoughts.  Peace  has  its 
dangers  no  less  than  war.  For  if  he  should  draw  back  his  armies 
into  the  interior  of  the  country,  the  rest  and  idleness  would  give 
rise  to  far  too  many  ambitious  interests  and  reckless  passions  for 
him  to  control.  Do  we  not  seem  to  be  listening  to  the  speakers 
of  the  Convention  and  the  radicals  of  the  Directory?*  Is  it  not 
the  dreamer  of  former  days  who  again  brings  forward  destiny  as 
the  final  argument?  "I  feel  myself  driven,"  said  he,  "to  a  goal 
that  I  know  not.  "VSTien  I  have  reached  it,  an  atom  will  suffice 
to  overthrow  me.  Until  then  all  the  efforts  of  men  avail  naught 
against  me." 

Having  thus  silenced  his  advisers,  he  turned  with  new  energy 
to  the  various  and  countless  cares  of  providing  for  the  immense 
army,  which  must  be  in  want  of  nothing.  And  truly  the  equip- 
ment was  complete  down  to  the  smallest  details.  Besides  the 
amnmnition-trahis  for  the  several  corps  there  were  reserve 
depots  containing  milUons  of  cartridges  at  Modlin,  Thorn, 
Pillau,  Danzig,  and  Magdeburg.  To  transport  some  1350  guns 
to  Russia  18,000  horses  were  in  readiness,  and  in  addition  siege- 
trains  were  ordered  sent  from  Danzig  and  Magdeburg  toward 
Dunaburg  and  Riga.  As  the  region  abounded  in  rivers,  two 
great  pontoon  bridges  were  taken  along,  besides  which  each  army 

*  a.  pp.  75  and  159. 


538  Moscow  [1812 

corps  had  its  own  pontoons  and  tools.  Prussia  had  to  provide 
supplies  of  horses  on  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder.  The  greatest 
task  was  to  furnish  food  for  such  vast  masses.  This  called  for 
the  closest  attention;  for,  as  Napoleon  repeatedly  assured  the 
generals  under  him,  such  a  great  host  of  men  so  close  together 
could  not  live  on  the  land.  Thousands  of  wagons  laden  with 
flour  and  rice  followed  the  French  army  corps,  some  drawn  by 
oxen  which  were  afterwards  to  be  slaughtered.  In  the  middle  of 
January  the  Emperor  made  arrangements  for  storing  provisions 
for  400,000  men  for  fifty  days  at  Danzig  and  in  the  cities  along 
the  Vistula  and  the  Oder.  Prussia  had  to  provide  for  twenty 
days  in  addition.  Two  great  transports  were  to  carry  flour  and 
biscuit  by  water  from  Elbing  to  Wilna.  Danzig,  Elbing, 
Warsaw,  Thorn,  Marienburg,  Bromberg,  and  Modlin  also  held 
immense  stores;  Danzig  alone  having  300,000  hundredweight  of 
flour  and  2,000,000  rations  of  biscuit.  In  order  to  avoid  carrying, 
in  addition  to  all  this,  fodder  for  150,000  horses,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  wait  for  a  season  that  would  cover  the  fields  and 
meadows  with  green  grass.  Thus  the  administration  of  the 
army  exercised  some  influence  on  politics:  it  delayed  the  cam- 
paign until  summer.*  The  Russians  did  not  take  advantage  of 
this  delay  and  assume  the  offensive  and  push  beyond  the  frontier, 
as  Napoleon  might  well  have  feared.  The  "last  act,"  as  he 
reassuringly  termed  his  Russian  expedition,  could  now  begin. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  May  28th,  the  Emperor  left  Dresden 
and  went  at  first  to  Posen,  arriving  on  the  31st;  thence  he 
proceeded  to  Konigsberg.  Narbonne  had  reported  as  the 
Czar's  answer  what  was  already  known:  the  demand  to  evac- 
uate Prussia.  Napoleon  now  took  up  the  gauntlet  without 
more  ado.  He  had  divided  his  "Grand  Army"  into  three 
parts,  commanded  respectively  by  himself,  Eugene,  and  Jerome. 
The  main  army  was  composed  of  select  troops,  embracing  the 

*  S6gur  (IV.  94)  relates  that  Napoleon  was  detained  in  France  two 
months  longer  by  a  scarcity  of  provisions  due  to  failure  of  crops  in  the  pre- 
ceding year.  Per  contra,  Maret,  in  a  speech  of  August  16th,  1811,  deahng 
with  the  entire  Russian  poUcy,  set  June  of  the  next  year  for  the  begin- 
rung  of  the  war.     (Ernouf,  "Maret,"  p.  304.) 


.Et.  42]  The  Grand  Army  539 

Guard,  a  strong  corps  under  Davout,  another  under  Oudinot, 
a  third  under  Ney,  who  also  commanded  two  Wiirttemberg 
divisions,  a  fourth  under  Macdonald,  to  whom  were  assigned  the 
Prussians  under  Grawert,  and  last  by  the  cavalry  reserve  under 
Murat  (two  corps),  in  all  250,000  men.*  To  the  second  part 
belonged,  under  the  Viceroy  of  Italy,  the  ItaUan  and  Bavarian 
corps,  and  also  a  French  corps  of  cavalry,  in  all  80,000.  The 
third  army,  under  Jerome,  included  the  Poles  under  Poniatowski, 
the  Saxons  under  Reynier,  the  WestphaUans  under  Vandamme, 
who  was  to  be  the  king's  adviser,  and  a  corps  of  cavalry  made  up 
partly  of  French  and  partly  of  Poles;  this  also  numbered  80,000. 
The  army  was  for  the  most  part  in  good  spirits,  proud  of  their 
leader,  who  knew  how  to  reward  generously  deeds  of  valour  and 
in  whose  genius  they  beheved  more  confidently  than  ever.  Al- 
though some  generals  felt  that  the  troops  were  too  young  to 
stand  the  hardships  of  war,  or,  like  Rapp,  openly  acknowledged 
that  they  would  rather  have  remained  in  Paris,  yet  there  were 
plenty  of  others  that  had  not  yet  received  any  fiefs  nor  had  a 
ducal  coronet,  and  who  could  tell  how  soon  another  opportunity 
would  come  to  win  either?  That  there  had  been  draft  riots  in  Hol- 
land and  Illyria,  that  thousands  of  French  fugitives  from  miUtary 
service  had  to  be  brought  back  in  fetters,  and  that  in  the  first 
few  days  a  bloody  encounter  broke  out  between  Prussians  and 
French  over  a  provision  train,  were  after  all  mere  incidental 
details. 

By  the  end  of  May  the  army  stretched  from  Konigsberg 
and  Elbing  up  the  Vistula  to  Novo  Alexandria,  while  "the  Aus- 
trians  under  Schwarzenberg  gathered  at  Lemberg.     This  wide 

*  Statements  of  the  strength  of  the  several  army  corps  are  not  wholly 
consistent.  The  table  in  F6zensac's  Souvenirs  estimates  the  Guard  at 
35,800,  while  according  to  authentic  sources  it  numbered  47,000.  It  was 
subdivided  into  the  di\ision  of  the  Old  Guard,  two  divisions  of  the  Young 
Guard,  one  of  the  Polish  Guard,  and  one  of  the  cavalry  Guard.  On  the 
strength  of  Davout's  corps  even  official  sources  disagree.  The  lists  of  the 
Minister  of  War  report  72,000;  Thiers,  who  claims  to  have  used  the  tables 
of  the  Emperor  himself  gives  97,000-99,000.  Approximately  the  last  num- 
ber is  named  also  by  Napoleon  in  conversation  with  Katharine  of  West- 
phalia.    (See  her  diary  for  1812  in  the  "Revue  Historique"  of  1888.) 


540  Moscow  [1812 

extension  of  the  allied  lines  left  the  Russians  in  doubt  whether 
Napoleon  would  advance  in  the  north,  at  Kovno  and  Grodno, 
or  in  the  south,  from  Warsaw.  They  had  to  be  prepared  at 
both  points  to  avoid  being  surprised,  and  to  this  end  divided 
the  forces  at  their  disposal  into  two  armies,  one  of  which  took 
its  position  to  the  north  about  Vilna  under  the  commander-in- 
chief,  Barclay  de  Tolly,  the  other  south  of  Pripet,  under  Bagra- 
tion.  Both  of  these  generals  had  distinguished  themselves  in 
the  campaign  of  1807.  A  third  division,  under  Tormassoff, 
destined  against  the  Austrians,  was  still  in  process  of  forma- 
tion in  Volhynia.  The  army  of  Barclay  numbered  127,000, 
that  of  Bagration  66,000;  but  when  the  latter  moved  north  to 
join  the  main  army,  he  had  to  leave  nearly  30,000  men  to  Tor- 
massoff. Thus  the  400,000  men  of  Napoleon  had  in  front  of 
them  at  first  not  quite  170,000  Russians,  and  divided  at  that. 
To  be  sure  there  was  yet  another  Rassian  army  in  Wallachia, 
and  a  third,  a  weaker  one,  in  Finland  against  the  Swedes;  but 
diplomacy  had  not  yet  left  these  free  to  act,  they  were  tied 
down  for  the  time  being.  Napoleon  had  no  suspicion  that  he 
had  such  a  superior  force.  He  estimated  the  enemy's  numbers 
at  a  much  higher  figure.*  Perhaps  it  was  this  error  that  proved 
more  fateful  than  any  other  to  him  and  to  his  army.  For  it 
led  him  to  draw  up  a  plan  which  perhaps  he  would  not  have 
formed  had  he  known  exactly  the  enemy's  strength,  and  the 
energetic  prosecution  of  which  exposed  his  troops  to  all  manner 
of  annoyances  that  a  more  methodical  campaign  might  have 
spared  them.  This  plan  was  to  march  upon  Vilna  by  way 
of  Kovno  with  the  first  army,  whose  left  wing,  under  Macdonald, 
was  to  move  across  the  Niemen  at  Tilsit,  and  thus  break  through 
between  the  divisions  of  Barclay  and  Bagration.  The  second 
and  third  armies,  disposed  in  echelon  to  the  right  of  the  first, 
were  to  follow  by  way  of  Grodno,  to  enter  in  like  a  mighty 

*  In  the  memoranda  of  two  officers  at  headquarters  are  found  the  evi- 
dences of  such  an  overestimate.  S<igur  gives  300,000  as  the  total  number 
of  the  Russians,  F6zensac  330,000.  The  latter  estimated  the  two  armies 
of  Barclay  and  Bagration  alone  at  230,000.  The  division  of  Bagration 
was  always  kept  at  its  original  figure  of  00,000. 


-€t.  42]      Napoleon  Baffled  by  the  Russians         541 

wedge,  as  it  were,  and  widen  tlie  distance  between  thcni;  so 
that  then  they  could  be  separately  surrounded  and  defeated. 
But  by  a  strange  fate  the  very  vastness  of  the  forces  at  his 
disposal  was  to  redound  to  his  disadvantage.  The  same  general 
who  in  1796  with  40,000  men  had  gained  unheard-of  victories 
over  a  far  superior  foe  was  destined,  now  that  he  had  ten  times 
that  force,  to  fail  of  mastering  a  far  weaker  enemy.  Paradox- 
ical as  it  may  sound,  this  was  the  natural  result.  For  Barclay 
did  not  dare  with  his  inferior  numbers  to  give  battle  to  the 
French  single-handed.  He  sought  by  retreating  to  restore  his 
lost  communication  with  Bagration.  But  as  the  distance  be- 
tween them  was  still  further  increased  b}'^  the  advancing  col- 
umns of  the  French,  they  could  not  be  united  (in  case  Bagra- 
tion escaped  the  threatened  investment  at  all)  except  after  a 
extended  detour.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that,  seeking  con- 
stantly to  effect  a  junction,  they  fell  back  before  the  French, 
refused  the  battle  which  Napoleon  longed  for  with  feverish 
impatience,  kept  the  enemy  in  hot  pursuit  after  them  through 
waste  lands  and  by  desolate  roads,  until  his  provisions  could 
no  longer  reach  him,  his  troops  broke  down  from  exhaustion, 
and  the  proud  army  melted  away  to  such  an  extent  that  no 
decisive  advantage  could  be  taken  of  the  victory  which  it  at 
length  painfully  secured.  Such  in  the  main  was  the  course  of 
subsequent  events  that  preceded  a  catastrophe  which  is  one  of 
the  most  appalling  in  history. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  in  this  cormection  that  while 
Napoleon  had  Moscow  clearly  in  mind  as  the  ultimate  goal  of 
his  expedition,  he  could  hardly  have  expected  to  reach  that 
goal  in  this  belated  campaign.  In  Paris  he  had  told  his  con- 
fidants that  his  plan  aimed  at  driving  Alexander  and  the  Rus- 
sian power,  weakened  by  the  loss  of  Poland,  back  beyond  the 
Dnieper.  In  Dresden  he  had  said  to  Metternich  that  the  cam- 
paign w'as  to  come  to  an  end  at  Minsk  and  Smolensk;  that  he 
would  make  a  halt  there,  fortify  both  places,  take  up  wnter 
quarters  at  ^'ilna,  organize  conquered  Lithuania,  and  feed  his 
army  at  the  expense  of  Russia.  If  tliis  should  not  result  in 
peace,  he  would  next  year  press  on  to  the  interior  and,  just  as 


542  Moscow  [1812 

patiently  as  in  the  first  campaign,  wait  for  the  submission  of 
the  Czar.  This  plan,  in  accordance  with  which  the  entire 
system  of  supphes  was  arranged,  \/as  still  in  force  when  Na- 
poleon led  his  army  over  the  Russian  frontier.  In  the  mani- 
festo issued  at  this  point  to  his  soldiers  he  called  the  war  he 
was  entering  upon  the  "second  Polish  war,"  and  at  Vilna  he 
assured  General  Sebastiani  that  he  would  not  cross  the  Diina, 
for  to  go  beyond  that  river  this  year  would  be  certain  destruc- 
tion. The  Poland  that  he  planned  to  wrest  from  Russia  meant 
the  widest  extent  which  that  kingdom  had  had  in  the  seventeenth 
century  when  Smolensk  also  belonged  to  it;  and  it  was  in  this 
city  that  he  planned  to  stay,  as  he  said  to  Jomini,  who  was  to 
oversee  the  transport  of  provisions.*  It  is  clear  that  originally 
he  had  by  no  means  planned  a  rapid  advance  into  the  heart  of 
Russia,  as  some  mihtary  writers  maintain,  and  it  was  certainly 
contrary  to  his  long  and  well-considered  purpose  to  arrive  at 
Moscow  so  soon.  It  was  the  enemy  that  forced  upon  him  this 
disastrous  speed.  But  let  us  now  proceed  to  the  events  them- 
selves. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  June  23d  the  Emperor,  accompanied 
by  only  one  general,  had  ascertained  the  most  favourable  point  for 
crossing  the  Niemen  southeast  of  Kovno.  The  passage  began 
about  midnight  over  three  bridges  and  lasted  several  days.  No 
enemy  was  in  sight;  no  one  opposed  the  French  on  the  opposite 
bank.  But  Napoleon  had  counted  on  resistance,  and  now  he 
hoped  to  meet  it  before  Vilna,  the  chief  city  of  Lithuania. 
Thither  he  directed  his  movements;  there  Alexander  was  waiting. 
The  Czar  had  repeatedly  extended  his  sympathy  to  the  Poles; 
now  he  intends  at  least  to  try  to  block  the  game  of  the  French 

*  Jomini,  "Precis  politique  et  militaire  des  campagnes  de  1812  k  1814," 
I.  75.  He  also  relates  a  table  conversation  in  Vilna  in  which  the 
Emperor  states  his  plans  exactly  as  he  had  to  Metternich  in  Dresden.  "If 
M.  Barclay  supposes  I  would  run  after  him  to  the  Volga,  he  is  mightily 
mistaken.  We  shall  follow  him  as  far  as  Smolensk  and  the  Dwina,  where 
a  good  battle  will  provide  us  with  cantoimients.  I  shall  return  with  head- 
quarters to  Vilna  to  spend  the  winter,  and  will  send  for  a  troupe  of  the 
Paris  Opera  and  the  Theatre  frangais.  The  next  May  the  business  will  be 
finished,  unless  we  make  peace  during  the  winter." 


^.T.  42]  Lithuania   Lukewarm  543 

Emperor.  In  this  he  seems  to  be  successful.  For  the  approach- 
ing French  army  hears  but  Httle  of  the  expected  enthusiasm  of 
the  Lithuanians  for  the  "hberator"  of  PoIj-.k!.  The  Czar  at 
last  had  to  evacuate  Vilna,  and  on  June  29th  Napoleon  entered  the 
city  with  his  own  men.  There  was  no  resistance;  it  was  child's 
play  to  drive  back  the  weak  Russian  posts.  Nor  was  there  in  the 
city  the  expected  enthusiasm,  nor  the  spirit  of  sacrifice  shown  in 
Warsaw;  no,  nor  the  many  thousands  of  fighthig  men  he  had 
counted  on,  nor  money,  nor  any  other  aid.  The  Emperor  was 
sorely  displeased.  The  failure  of  the  Warsaw  citizens  to  pay 
more  than  half  the  expense  of  the  70,000  men  they  furnished, 
thus  entailing  additional  burdens  on  the  French,  sufficed  to 
make  him  take  a  wholly  different  view  of  the  restoration  of  the 
old  Polish  repul)lic  from  that  taken  by  the  national  patriots. 
"I  cannot  understand,"  he  had  written  to  Davout  the  preceding 
December,  "how  this  country'  can  look  forward  to  becoming  a 
nation."  He  had  also  repeatedly  spoken  with  contempt  to  the 
Czar  of  this  desire  of  the  Poles;  and  when  Alexander's  ambas- 
sador, Balascheff  (who  was  minister  of  police  and  was  after 
information  rather  than  diplomatic  negotiations),  called  upon  him 
to  assure  him  that  the  Czar  would  not  think  of  treating  while  one 
enemy  stood  hi  his  empire,  he  said,  among  other  thmgs,  "Do  you 
think  I  care  anything  for  these  Polish  Jacobins?"  It  was  his 
real  thought  that  he  uttered  to  Narbonne:  "I  tolerate  the  Poles 
only  as  a  tlisciplhied  force  on  the  field  of  battle.  We  shall  have  a 
little  bit  of  a  diet  in  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  nothhig  more." 
But  when  this  bit  of  a  Warsaw  diet  sent  a  deputation  to  Vilna 
with  the  request  that  he  would  but  speak  the  word  now,  declaring 
that  the  kingdom  of  Poland  was  in  existence,  he  gave  an  evasive 
answer,  with  the  reminder  that  he  had  guaranteed  the  integrity 
of  Austria.  Such,  in  fact,  was  his  agreement  with  Francis  I.  in 
Dresden.*  Under  these  circunistances  it  was  no  wonder  that 
the  Lithuanians  were  wanting  in  a  spirit  of  sacrifice. 

*  The  truth  of  this  is  shown  by  a  letter  of  Francis  I.  to  his  governor  of 
Galicia,  Count  Goess,  dated  June  7th,  1812,  in  which  is  this  passage: 
"The  restoration  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland  will  probably  be  one  of  the 
first  results  of  the  war  between  France  and  Russia.   The  French  emperor 


544  Moscow  [1812 

But  there  was  another  special  reason  for  this.  The  "liber- 
ators" fell  upon  the  land  like  the  most  inveterate  enemies. 
Thousands  of  hungry  marauders  poured  through  the  villages, plun- 
dered the  castles,  and  ran  riot.  Nay,  even  in  the  suburbs  of 
Vilna,  under  the  very  eye  of  the  Emperor,  pillage  was  going  on. 
This  relaxation  of  discipline  among  both  the  French  and  their 
allies  arose  from  two  causes.  In  the  first  place,  the  troops,  after 
crossing  the  Niemen,  had  advanced  by  forced  marches  to  over- 
take the  enemy  over  roads  perfectly  sodden  by  continuous  rains; 
progress  became  painfully  difficult,  and  many,  especially  the 
tender  recruits,  not  being  equal  to  the  task  were  left  behind. 
Then,  agaui,  the  supplies  could  not  be  forwarded.  Wagons 
stuck  fast  in  the  mud;  the  oxen,  being  neglected,  fell  victims  to 
disease  and  perished.  Similarly  over  ten  thousand  horses  sick- 
ened and  died  in  the  first  few  days  from  eating  the  wet  grass.  The 
transports  with  their  great  cargoes  of  flour  got  as  far  as  the  Vilna 
to  be  sure,  but  in  that  shallow  river  they  ran  aground,  and  when 
wagons  at  last  brought  their  freight  to  Vilna,  the  army  was  no 
longer  there.  Great  distress  ensued.  Even  in  the  Young 
Guard,  as  its  leader,  Mortier,  reported  to  the  Emperor,  soldiers 
actually  perished  from  hunger;  others  in  despair  blew  out  their 
brains.  Napoleon  had  to  resort  to  the  Jews,  and  also  to  counter- 
feit paper  rubles  which  he  had  caused  to  be  struck  off  in  Paris  by 
the  million.  Thus  on  the  march  from  Kovno  to  Vilna  a  state  of 
disorder  had  already  grown  up,  for  which  there  was  later  no 
remedy.     It  was  the  shadow  of  the  coming  event. 

But  there  was  plenty  of  confusion  among  the  enemy  as  well. 
In  general  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  there  was  any  definite 
purpose   in   view  at  the   Russian   headquarters.     It  was  only 

will  take  only  an  indirect  part  in  this  event,  and  will  leave  it  to  the  assem- 
bled Polish  diet  and  the  fully  authorized  Warsaw  ministry  to  organize  the 
provinces  formerly  constituting  the  kingdom  of  Poland  but  now  under 
Russian  control.  To  the  deputation  of  the  diet  which  may  venture  to 
request  of  the  Emperor  the  restoration  of  the  kingdom  he  will  reply  that 
that  is  the  business  of  the  Poles  themselves,  but  he  must  explicitly  inform 
them  Poland  can  never  bs  understood  to  include  the  province  of  Galicia, 
now  in  the  possession  of  Austria,  since  ho  had  in  the  treaty  of  March,  1812, 
given  Austria  explicit  guarantees  for  ever."     (MS.) 


Mt.  42]  Hardships  of  the  March  545 

(luring  the  next  few  weeks  that  they  stuinl)led,  as  it  were,  upon 
the  right  way  of  destroying  the  foe.  For  the  moment  Barclay 
concentrated  the  six  corps  of  his  army  a  few  days'  march  beyond 
Vihia,  which  the  French  could  not  prevent;  then,  burning  all 
sU^res  and  magazines  behind  him  a  la  Wellington,  marche<l  hur- 
riedly to  Drissa,  where  a  fortified  camp  was  established  like 
Torres  Vedras.  Here  he  wanted  to  ^^•ait  for  Bagration,  who  was 
to  come  up  with  the  Cossack  hordes  of  Platoff  by  way  of  Novo- 
grudok  and  Vilika ;  but  Bagration  did  not  come.  He  found  the 
road  already  occupied  by  Davout,  whom  Napoleon  had  pushed 
rapidly  ahead  with  some  divisions  as  far  as  Minsk  to  meet  the 
second  Russian  army,  which  Jerome  was  driving  in  from  the  west. 
The  Russian  general  did  not  dare  to  fight  his  way  through,  as  he 
supposed  the  main  army  of  the  enemy  was  before  him,  and 
turned  to  the  south  to  join  Barclay  by  way  of  Bobrinsk  and 
Mohilev.  Jerome  had  not  hastened  his  advance  enough  to  inter- 
cept him.  Davout,  on  the  other  hand,  still  supposing  the  enemy 
was  70,000  strong  as  before,  waited  for  the  King  of  "Westphalia  to 
attack  before  he  pushed  forward;  so  Bagration  escaped.  Napo- 
leon, fairly  beside  himself  at  the  dilatoriness  of  his  brother,  gave 
the  chief  command  of  the  third  army  to  Davout,  and  Jerome  in 
chagrin  returned  to  his  kingdom. 

At  the  same  time,  about  the  middle  of  July,  the  Emperor 
sent  Murat,  Oudinot,  and  Ney  to  follow  the  main  Russian  army  to 
Drissa.  This  step  was  taken  too  late,  but  the  necessity  of  secur- 
ing supplies  had  detained  them  in  Vilna.  At  Drissa  they  were 
to  engage  Barclay  in  front,  while  Napoleon  with  the  Guards, 
three  divisions  of  the  army  of  Davout,  and  the  troops  of  Viceroy 
Eugene  would  turn  his  flank  and  so  cut  off  his  communications 
with  St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow.  But  this  plan  likewise  failed. 
The  Russians  received  word  that  Bagration  could  not  come  up, 
abandoned  their  ill-chosen  position  after  unimportant  skir- 
mishes with  the  French  vanguard  and  marched  to  the  east. 
The  right  wing  only,  under  Wittgenstein,  waited  to  cover  the  road 
to  St.  Petersburg,  and  was  watched  by  Oudinot  and  Saint-Cyr. 
For  the  second  time  Napoleon's  hope  of  forchig  the  enemy  to 
stand  had  vanished.     On  the  contrary,  the  Russians  persistently 


546  Moscow  [1812 

retreated.  What  a  terrible  loss  these  unsuccessful  manoeuvres 
had  already  involved!  The  more  they  hurried  forw^ard  the 
greater  were  the  sacrifices,  especially  on  the  roads  previously 
traversed  by  the  enemy.  Marauding  assumed  enormous  propor- 
tions, especially  as  during  the  advance  to  the  Dwina  the  July  sun 
was  intensely  hot  and  clouds  of  dust  made  it  difficult  to  breathe. 
General  Saint-Cyr,  who  commanded  the  Bavarians,  relates  that 
his  corps  lost  on  an  average  a  battalion  (800  to  900  men)  a  day 
from  the  ranks;  and  it  was  the  same  everywhere.  Those  who 
remained  in  the  ranks  had  a  terrible  struggle  with  want  and 
misery.  For  weeks  there  had  been  no  regular  supplies.  With 
meat  as  their  sole  food,  for  no  bread  and  vegetables  were  to  be 
had,  the  troops  became  so  sickly  that  they  broke  down  on  the 
march.  Finally  dysentery  broke  out  and  carried  off  thousands. 
The  cavalry  were  in  the  worst  plight.  Their  horses,  which  now 
had  nothing  to  eat  but  old  straw  from  the  thatched  roofs  of 
huts,  died  under  their  riders,  and  the  carcasses  lay  by  the  wayside, 
infecting  the  air.  Napoleon  himself  suffered  terrible  hardships. 
He  was  no  longer  the  same  man  that  had  enjoyed  such  health 
in  the  hard  winter  of  the  Polish  war.  A  painful  disease  (dysuria) 
had  developed  in  the  last  few  years;  it  was  especially  annoying 
now,  as  riding  was  distressing.  Besides,  the  daily  reports  about 
the  dwindling  of  his  army  and  the  unceasing  hunt  for  a  decisive 
battle  that  kept  eluding  him  were  a  tremendous  strain  on  his 
nerves.  He  seemed  to  lose  the  cahn  control  of  himself  and  of 
others  that  he  was  wont  to  display  in  the  field.  How  he  longed 
for  a  battle  to  put  an  end  to  the  agonizing  situation!  "After  we 
had  crossed  the  Niemen,"  wrote  the  artist  Albrecht  Adam,  who 
served  through  the  campaign  in  Prince  Eugene's  headquarters, 
and  who  seems  to  know  whereof  he  speaks,  "  the  Emperor  and  his 
entire  army  were  occupied  with  a  single  thought,  a  single  hope, 
a  single  wish — the  thought  of  a  great  battle!  Men  spoke  of 
a  great  battle  as  of  a  great  festival,  enjoyed  it  in  anticipation, 
and  hung  their  heads  whenever  they  were  disappointed  in  their 
expectation." 

Then  hope   smiled  again.     Barclay  was  marching  on   the 
right  bank  of  the  Dwina  towards  Vitebsk.     He  had  sent  orders 


JEt.  42]  Again   No    Battle  547 

to  Bagration  to  proceed  to  the  same  place  by  way  of  Mohilev  and 
Orcha.  Two  pobsihilities  now  lay  open  to  Napoleon:  either  he 
might,  by  marching  up  the  left  bank,  succeed  in  getting  such  a 
start  of  the  enemy  as  to  cross  the  river  at  Bechenkowiczi  and 
attack  the  Russian  flank;  or  Barclay  might  make  a  stand  at 
Vitebsk,  where  he  was  expecting  Bagration.  The  first  move 
was  frustrated  by  the  rapid  advance  of  the  enemy;  nothing 
remained  but  to  follow  him.  But  the  second  seemed  destined 
to  be  realized.  On  the  25th  of  July  Murat's  cavalry  for  the  first 
time  met  with  serious  resistance.  The  next  day  the  French  drove 
the  Russian  rear  back  to  \'itebsk,  and  there  on  the  27th  stood 
Barclay's  whole  army  hi  battle  array.  Eye-witnesses  describe  the 
joy  of  the  French  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  leader  at  this  sight. 
The  Russian  general  had  really  made  up  his  mind  to  fight;  for, 
knowing  that  Bagration  was  marching  up  from  the  south,  he 
could  not  let  him  fall  hito  Napoleon's  hands  without  support. 
But  again  something  intervened.  Davout  had  moved  eastward 
from  Minsk  to  Mohilev  and  anticipated  Bagration  at  the  latter 
place.  Bagration  then  tried,  on  July  2.3d,  to  force  his  way 
through,  was  repulsed,  and  once  more  turned  to  the  south  in 
order  to  reach  Smolensk  by  a  long  detour  and  wait  to  be  joined 
there  by  the  first  army.  News  of  this  movement  reached 
Barclay  on  the  night  of  July  26th  while  he  was  still  facing  the 
French  in  battle  array.  Now,  he  reflected,  there  was  no  sense 
in  fighting;  the  force  of  the  French  was  far  superior  to  his  own, 
and  it  was  among  the  possibilities  that  while  the  battle  was  going 
on  at  Vitebsk  Davout  would  march  upon  Smolensk  and  get 
there  before  him.  Of  course  if  Napoleon  attacked  him  he 
nmst  resist.  But  the  Emperor  contented  himself  with  insig- 
nificant skirmishes  on  the  26th  and  27th;  in  order  to  gather  as 
many  troops  as  possible  and  treat  the  enemy  to  an  "  Austerlitz" 
(as  he  said)  for  one  reason,  and  also  to  avoid  sending  his  soldiers 
worn  with  marching  into  battle  in  the  noontide  glare  of  a  ver\' 
hot  day;  perhaps  also,  as  some  have  conjectured,  because  his 
physical  and  mental  powers  had  been  under  too  hea\y  a  strain  to 
permit  of  his  making  a  sudden  resolution.  In  any  case  his 
hesitation  was  disastrous.     On  the  morning  of  July  28th  not  a 


548 


Moscow  [1812 


Russian  was  in  sight.  They  had  all  departed  during  the  night, 
and  a  thick  fog  that  did  not  clear  away  until  late  ui  the  day  so 
completely  veiled  their  retreat  that  there  was  no  indication  of  the 
direction  they  had  taken. 

It  was  a  tremendous  disillusion  for  the  French.  Almost  a 
third  of  the  Grand  Army  had  melted  away,  more  than  130,000 
names  had  to  be  struck  off  the  army  hsts,  and  nothing  accom- 
plished yet!  The  cavalry  was  so  near  exhaustion  that  General 
BeUiard  openly  assured  the  Emperor,  j^et  six  days'  march  and 
he  would  be  without  cavalry.  Besides,  they  were  too  far  from 
the  wings  of  the  army:  Macdonald  had  sent  the  Prussians  to 
Riga  and  was  marching  with  his  French  troops  on  Jakobstadt; 
Reynier  had  to  be  left  behind  to  watch  the  Russian  reserve 
under  Tormassoff  on  the  Pripet;  and  Schwarzenberg,  lastly, 
who  had  been  marching  toward  Minsk  to  join  the  main  army, 
had  turned  aside  at  a  summons  from  Reynier.  For  on  the 
same  day  that  Napoleon  was  getting  ready  for  a  battle  at 
Vitebsk,  July  27th,  a  Saxon  division  of  thirty-five  hundred  had 
been  captured  by  Tormassoff,  who  deserved  closer  attention 
than  the  Emperor  had  as  yet  given  him.  He  now  put  Reynier 
under  Schwarzenberg's  command,  and  deputed  the  latter  to 
defeat  the  Russian  and  "make  an  end  of  him."  A  like  com- 
mand was  given  Oudinot  with  regard  to  Wittgenstein,  whom 
he  was  to  drive  away  from  Drissa  and  hurl  northwards  into  the 
hands  of  Macdonald.  But  Wittgenstein  would  not  be  hurled, 
not  even  when  Saint-Cyr  brought  up  reinforcements;  at  the 
middle  of  August  he  was  still  before  Drissa. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  Napoleon  resolved  at  last  to 
give  his  troops  the  rest  they  so  urgently  needed,  to  bring  up 
ammunition,  and  to  restore  some  order  to  the  chaos  which  pre- 
vailed in  the  commissariat.  Fortunately  the  country  began 
to  be  more  productive  and  populous  about  Vitebsk,  and  the 
people  themselves  were  more  cleanly  and  well-to-do  than  the 
brutish  peasantry  of  Lithuania.  This  was  encouraging,  although 
it  was  during  this  very  period  of  rest  that  the  dysentery  claimed 
most  victims,  Davout  was  summoned  with  his  army.  It  is 
related  that  the  Emperor,  returning  from  his  search  for  the 


.Kt.  42]  Napoleon  Aims  at  Smolensk  549 

vanished  Russians,  excitedly  dashed  his  sword  on  the  table  and 
exclaimed  that  he  would  stay  there,  collect  his  forces,  and  organ- 
ize Poland;  that  the  campaign  of  1812  was  closed;  the  next 
one  would  look  after  what  still  remained  to  be  done.  To  the 
same  effect  he  expressed  himself  to  Murat,  who  was  for  ad- 
vancing; the  year  1813,  said  he,  would  see  him  in  Moscow, 
1814  in  St.  Petersburg;  the  Russian  war  would  require  three 
years.  And  this  was  practically  the  order  of  events  in  his 
original  programme.  Only  one  thing  was  yet  lacking,  the  most 
important,  to  be  sure — victory,  or,  as  he  had  said  to  Jomini, 
"a  good  battle."  The  French  army  did  indeed  lie  between 
the  Dnieper  and  the  D\\ina,  in  a  natural  gateway  that  formed 
the  entrance  to  the  Muscovite  empire,  the  goal  he  had  fixed 
for  his  first  great  movement.  But  the  Russian  territory  he 
occupied  had  been  bought  with  his  own  losses,  not  his  enemy's, 
making  an  uncertain  and  joyless  possession.  There  was  the 
rub.  He  fairly  suffered  torments  at  the  thought  of  his  shaken 
prestige.  Suddenl}^  he  broke  out:  he  would  leave  A'itebsk, 
too,  after  a  short  rest,  and  proceed  on  the  road  to  Moscow. 
The  enemy  was  before  Smolensk,  and  he  would  not  be  willing 
to  sacrifice  this  first  truly  Russian  city  without  a  fight  as  he 
did  barren  Poland,  especially  since  his  two  armies  were  united; 
there  a  battle  must  be  fought.  A  victory  at  Smolensk  would 
give  the  key  to  either  Moscow  or  St.  Petersburg.  ^loreover, 
with  the  Dnieper  as  a  protection,  a  stronger  position  for  ^^'inte^ 
quarters  could  be  found  there.  But  before  all  things  the  battle. 
"No  blood  has  flowed  as  yet,"  said  he  to  the  generals  opposing 
his  plan,  Berthier,  Duroc,  Mouton,  and  Caulaincourt.  "and 
Russia  is  too  important  to  yield  ^^^thout  a  struggle.  Alexander 
can  negotiate  only  after  a  great  battle.  I  shall  seek  this  battle 
and  van  it  before  the  holy  city  if  necessary." 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Czar  had  no  thought  of  negotiating; 
least  of  all  now  that  the  Sultan  had  ratified  the  treaty  of  peace 
and  the  ^Moldavian  army  could  come  north.  Napoleon  learned 
of  this,  and  it  was  a  severe  blow.  But  its  effect  on  him  was 
to  strengthen  his  resolution  in  seeking  a  quick,  final  decision. 
After  a  stay  of  two  weeks  he  broke  up  the  camp  at  ^'itebsk. 


550  Moscow  [1812 

His  plan  now  was  to  concentrate  to  the  south  of  that  city  the 
entire  army  lying  near  it,  about  190,000  men,  cross  the  Dnieper, 
and  then  march  forward  under  cover  of  the  river  along  its  right 
bank  to  the  east.  He  learned  that  the  enemy  had  assumed 
the  offensive  after  uniting  the  two  armies,  and  were  advancing 
by  the  direct  road  from  Smolensk  to  Vitebsk;  it  was  q\iito 
possible,  therefore,  to  reach  Smolensk  without  discovery,  turn 
the  left  flank  of  the  Russian  and  cut  him  off  from  the  road  to 
Moscow.  This  manoeuvre — resembling  that  against  Mack  in 
1805 — was  begun  on  the  10th  of  August  with  admirable  pre- 
cision; the  troops  passed  over  the  Dnieper,  and  on  the  14th 
crossed  the  old  Russian  frontier  at  Krasnoi.  The  informa- 
tion as  to  the  movements  of  the  Russians  proved  to  be  correct. 
The  Czar  had  been  forced  to  yield  to  the  strong  sentiment 
prevailing  in  the  army  and  among  the  people,  which  demanded 
that  the  soil  of  ancient  Muscovy  be  defended;  and  Barclay  had 
to  make  up  his  mind  to  fight.  To  avoid  altogether  losing  his 
communication  with  Wittgenstein  and  being  outflanked  on  the 
right  where  he  supposed  the  French  were  stronger,  he  chose  the 
northwest  as  the  direction  for  his  advance.  Only  as  a  precau- 
tion he  detached  one  division  across  the  river  to  the  left.  This 
division  it  was  that  Napoleon's  vanguard  met  on  August  16th 
and  drove  back  to  Smolensk  with  severe  loss.  But  meantime 
Bagration  had  been  informed  by  messenger,  and,  perceiving  the 
danger,  sent  back  a  corps  with  all  speed  to  the  city  to  ward  off 
the  first  attack.  He  himself  followed  as  fast  as  he  could  on  the 
16th,  having  first  sent  word  to  Barclay. 

On  the  morning  of  that  day  the  van  of  the  French  army 
arrived  at  Smolensk  and  at  once  began  an  assault  on  the  walls. 
This  was  repulsed,  and  thereby  Napoleon's  plan  was  thwarted 
at  the  start,  for  the  two  Russian  armies  in  the  mean  time  had 
hastened  up  and  were  again  in  possession  of  this  important  point 
and  of  the  road  to  Moscow.  No  less  an  authority  than  Clause- 
witz  has  blauK^l  the  Empcn-or  for  taking  the  right  bank  of  the 
Dnieper  instead  of  atta(tking  the  enemy  in  front,  beating  him 
and  so  gaining  Smolensk.  But  that  would  have  been  what 
Napoleon  was  wont  to    call  an  "ordinary    battle."     The  de- 


.-Et.  43]  Smolensk  5  5 1 

fcated  enemy  would  have  fallen  back  through  Smolensk  upon 
his  base,  and  that  was  just  what  he  wanted  to  prevent.  Now, 
to  be  sure,  there  was  nothing  else  to  do,  provided  the  Russian 
was  accommodating  enough  to  fight  at  all.  He  did  fight,  but 
only  in  covering  his  retreat.  Barclay  could  not  be  induced  to 
leave  the  city,  but  he  sent  Bagration,  who  was  eager  to  fight, 
along  the  road  to  Moscow,  while  he  kept  but  a  single  corps  to 
defend  Smolensk.  When  Napoleon  was  convinced  that  the 
enemy  had  no  intention  of  fighting  a  decisive  battle,  he  tried 
to  force  his  position  in  order  to  hold  him  fast  and  compel  him 
to  fight.  Time  after  time  he  stormed  the  city,  but  all  in 
vain.  The  veteran  officers  recalled  the  siege  of  the  Syrian 
fortress  Acre.  Nor  was  bombardment  any  more  successful. 
Again  the  French  fought  a  whole  day  with  all  their  superior 
force  the  rear-guard  of  the  retreating  foe,  until  the  latter  volun- 
tarily evacuated.  They  did  not  neglect  to  burn  the  maga- 
zines and  the  northern  quarter  of  the  city,  which  consisted 
mostly  of  wooden  houses  as  in  all  Russian  cities.  Smoking 
ruins  the  conqueror  found,  but  again  victory  had  eluded  him. 
If  he  had  only  gone  right  on  toward  Moscow!  Barclay,  in 
order  to  evade  the  French  batteries  beyond  the  Dnieper,  had 
described  a  long  arc,  the  chord  of  which  was  commanded  by 
Napoleon.  He  might  have  been  overtaken  easily  and  brought 
to  bay.  But  the  Emperor  did  not  know  the  situation  and 
merely  sent  forward  Ney  and  Murat,  who  in  turn  had  serious 
fighting  only  with  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy,  at  \'alutina 
Gora,  on  the  19th.  Barclay  was  at  liberty  to  march  on  unim- 
peded with,  the  main  army. 

What  was  to  be  done  now?  In  Drestlen  Napoleon  had  said 
to  Metternich  that  his  undertaking  was  one  of  the  kind  that 
depended  for  success  on  patience.  He  who  exercised  that  virtue 
best  would  have  victory  for  his  portion.  He  himself  sinned 
grievously  against  that  conviction.  Murat  himself,  before  the 
beginning  of  the  assault  upon  Smolensk,  had  advised  him  to 
pause,  since  it  had  become  manifest  that  the  enemy  would  not 
give  battle,  but  was  anxious  to  get  away.  The  ailvice  was  in 
vain.     Later,  after  he  had  become  master  of  the  ruined  city,  his 


552  Moscow  [1812 

generals  again  remonstrated.  Rapp,  who  had  come  from 
the  Niemen,  painted  the  distress  of  the  long  journey,  the  unnum- 
bered victims  of  typhus  and  dysentery;  the  thousands  of  marau- 
ders who  dragged  themselves,  half-dead  from  exhaustion,  to 
a  bush  to  die  unseen ;  the  thousands  of  deserters,  who  organized 
in  bands  and  ravaged  villages  and  castles  until  the  desperate 
people  killed  them.  And  what  was  Napoleon's  answer?  That 
he  knew  all  that  and  admitted  the  horrors  of  the  situation;  but 
for  that  very  reason  it  was  no  time  now  to  delay.  After  the 
first  victory  everything  would  be  all  right  again.  So  his  first 
aim  was  still  the  victory  over  the  main  force  of  the  enemy,  and 
that  was  to  be  gained  on  the  way  east,  on  the  road  to  Moscow. 
There  was  no  further  talk  of  remaining  in  Smolensk,  half-burned 
as  it  was. 

It  may  excite  remark  that  Napoleon  was  still  so  sure  of  his 
troops;  though,  of  course,  it  was  only  of  those  whose  robust 
physique  and  discipline  had  kept  them  in  the  ranks.  They 
murmured  indeed  as  they  had  in  1807,  but  they  marched  on, 
despite  the  frightful  heat  by  day,  despite  the  loss  of  sleep  since 
the  nights  had  to  be  given  up  to  foraging  in  the  surrounding 
villages,  despite  the  gloomy  prospect  of  not  being  able,  perhaps, 
to  endure  the  burden  of  the  next  day.  They  were  chosen  troops, 
vigorous  and  hardened  veterans,  those  157,000  men  with  whom 
he  left  Smolensk — especially  those  of  Davout.*  They  wanted 
to  be  on  hand  in  a  forward  movement,  for  behind  them  lay  the 
horrors  of  the  Polish  wastes,  while  before  them  was  battle  and 
victory  and  honour  and  reward,  and  they  must  at  last  reach  far- 
famed  Moscow. 

To  be  sure,  if  Napoleon  had  looked  into  the  matter  more 
closely  he  might,  perhaps,  have  remained  at  the  Dnieper  after 
all,  or  gone  back  to  Lithuania.  But  his  eye  was  as  dim  in 
Russia  as  it  had  been  in  Spain.  Here,  too,  he  saw  nothing  but 
an  army  before  him  that  was  yet  to  be  beaten,  and  a  cabinet  to 
which  he  wanted  to  dictate  terms:  this  and  nothing  more.     He 

*  In  Vitebsk,  Orchil,  Mohilev,  and  Smolensk  garrisons  of  about  14,000 
men  were  left.  About  an  ecjual  number  had  been  lost  in  the  recent  fight- 
ing and  on  the  march  from  Vitebsk. 


I 


iET. 43]  Russian  National  Feeling  553 

failed  to  see  the  new  enemy  that  faced  hiin  the  very  moment  he 
left  Polish  territory  at  Krasnoi  and  crossed  the  old  Russian 
frontier:  the  strong  national  histinct  of  the  Russians,  which 
joined  their  religious  fervour  and  their  barbarism  to  make  their 
resistance  unparalleled.  This  feeling  prevailed  everywhere:  in 
the  army,  whose  strength  and  courage  it  steeled  with  fanaticism; 
at  the  court  of  the  Czar,  who  could  not  escape  its  influence;  among 
the  masses  of  the  people,  who  armed  themselves  by  thousands 
and  shouted  to  their  ruler  before  the  Ivrendm,  "Let  us  conquer 
or  die !  "  Of  all  this  Napoleon  saw  nothing.  And  yet  there  was 
no  lack  of  umnistakable  signs.  Was  it  not  significant  that  a 
single  Russian  corps  resisted  a  large  army  for  two  whole  days, 
without  letting  them  take  a  single  prisoner?  Was  it  not  remark- 
able that  the  enemy  let  the  sacred  city  on  the  Dnieper  with  its 
holy  shrine  be  consmned  in  flames  before  it  was  suffered  to  fall 
into  the  invaders'  hands? 

Russian  chauvinism  was  already  demanding  a  victim  in  its 
own  camp;  it  was  Barclay  himself,  the  commander-in-chief. 
Being  a  Livonian,  he  seemed  a  foreigner  to  the  army;  at  the 
court  he  had  his  most  inveterate  enemies  in  the  Old-Russian 
party;  he  had  fallen  out  with  Bagration,  and  the  operations  of 
the  army  suffered  from  the  discord  between  its  leaders.  Only 
the  Czar  had  kept  him  thus  far,  and  now  even  he  could  do  so 
no  longer.  The  fact  that  he  had  not  defended  with  greater 
energ}'  the  city  of  the  Holy  Mrgin,  that  he  had  risked  no  battle 
before  its  walls,  was  reckoned  an  inexpiable  offence,  and  Alex- 
ander was  led  to  believe  that  such  a  battle  must  have  resulted  in 
his  favour.*  Barclay  was  removed  from  conmiand  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Kutusoff,  an  "Old  Russian,"  a  favourite  of  the  army, 
but  appointed  by  the  Czar  only  under  stress.  We  have  already 
met  him  in  1805.  His  prestige  permitted  him  to  fall  back  still 
farther  and  to  delay  offering  battle  until  he  arrived  at  the  broken 

*  That  is  what  the  Czar  wrote  subsequently  to  Admiral  Tchitchagoff 
who  was  leading  the  Moldavian  army  north.  The  letter  is  printed  in  his 
Memoirs.  Barclay's  justification  of  himself  was  that  he  was  preserving  the 
army  for  a  decisive  action  at  a  suitable  time;  he  also  pointed  out  that 
Napoleon  had  but  to  cross  the  Dnieper  lower  down  to  force  him  out  of  the 
city,  that  his  position  there  had  never  been  tenable. 


554  Moscow  [1812 

country  near  Borodino,  where  the  Kalotza  flows  into  the  Moskwa. 
The  "Sacred  Heath"  it  was  called,  and  the  legend  ran  that 
never  had  an  enemy  penetrated  beyond  it.  Here  a  battle 
had  to  be  fought  out,  for  Moscow  must  not  fall  without  a  blow 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Alexander  had  but  recently 
given  its  inhabitants  most  definite  promises  of  military  pro- 
tection. 

On  September  1st  Napoleon  had  arrived  at  Gjatsk,  where  he 
was  informed  that  his  vanguard  had  met  with  serious  resistance. 
Soon  doubt  was  no  longer  possible ;  the  enemy  really  was  about 
to  fight.  The  Emperor  collected  his  army  to  the  number  of 
130,000;  the  Russians  could  muster  only  120,000,  and  of  those 
10,000  were  raw  militia.  Kutusoff,  however,  occupied  a  chosen 
position.  He  occupied  both  sides  of  the  Moscow  road  behind  the 
Kalotza,  and.  had  thrown  up  earthworks.  The  most  westerly  of 
his  redoubts  was  captured  by  the  French  on  September  5th 
after  a  fierce  struggle :  this  pushed  the  left  wing  of  the  Russians 
back  from  the  Kalotza  against  the  other  lines,  so  that  they  were 
arranged  in  the  shape  of  an  elbow  with  the  angle  at  Borodino. 
Napoleon  at  once  formed  his  plan.  He  would  not  follow  Davout's 
good  advice,  i.e.,  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank;  such  a  threat- 
ening movement  might  deprive  him  of  the  chance  to  fight,  .He 
would  attack  with  a  strong  force  both  the  left  wing  and  the  centre 
successively,  bend  it  around  still  more,  turn  the  front  of  the 
Russians  thus  from  the  west  to  the  south,  then  hurl  them  across 
the  road  and  drive  them  to  the  Moskwa,  If  Kutusoff  would  only 
stand  firm,!  Napoleon  was  so  excited  by  this  question  that  he 
hardly  slept  that  night.  To  add  to  his  agitation  that  evening 
the  news  arrived  that  Wellington  had  defeated  Marmont  at 
Salamanca  on  July  22d,  That  loss,  also,  must  be  made  good.  His 
troops  too  could  get  little  sleep;  were  they  not  obliged  to  fetch 
food  for  themselves  and  their  horses?  But  they  all  came  back 
and  donned  their  best  uniforms,  for  the  long-desired  festival  was 
at  hand.  Nor  can  one  read  without  deep  emotion  how  the  sick 
Germans,  as  well  as  French,  crowded  into  the  ranks  of  the  fighting 
men. 

The  battle  began  on   the  right  wing,   followed   closely  l^y 


^Et.  43]  The  Battle  of  Borodino  555 

Davout's  assault  on  the  redoubts  of  the  left  wing  and  again, 
before  noon,  by  the  attack  of  Ney  and  Murat  on  the  fortified 
centre,  while  Eugene  was  gaining  the  village  of  Borodino  on  the 
left,  the  pivot  of  the  whole  movement.  The  fighting  was  fierce 
in  the  extreme,  and  the  historian  is  uncertain  whether  it  is  the 
attack  or  the  defence  that  deserves  the  meed  of  heroism.  The 
Russian  redoubts  were  carried,  soon  lost  again,  only  to  be  won 
anew  and  yet  again  lost.  The  exploits  of  Napoleon's  infantry 
and  horse,  in  particular  of  the  German  cavalry  regiments,  were . 
most  extraordinary;  and  so  at  last  he  became  master  of  the 
enemies'  position.  But  nothing  more  than  that.  The  Russians 
retired  indeed,  but  it  was  only  to  rally  again  in  a  now  position 
a  mile  or  so  away  and  offer  new  resistance.  But  the  shattered 
divisions  of  Murat  and  Ney  were  in  no  condition  to  renew  the 
attack.  This  was  the  moment,  before  the  enemy  had  recovered 
themselves,  for  a  strong  reserve  to  step  in  and  complete  the 
victory.  Such  a  reserve  was  in  readiness,  the  20,000  of  the 
Guard.  I\Iurat  urgently  pleaded  for  the  order  to  advance,  but 
Napoleon  refused  it.  "Suppose  another  battle  takes  place 
to-morrow,"  he  replied,  "what  shall  I  fight  with?"  He  alniost 
neglected  to  givp  the  order  to  cannonade  the  retreating  centre  of 
the  enemy.  The  generals  hardly  knew  him  for  the  old  Napoleon; 
they  laid  everything  to  the  infianunation  of  a  severe  cold  and  the 
constant  pain  he  was  suffering,  but  in  particular  to  his  over- 
strained nerves,  that  were  unequal  to  the  new  task  after  such 
wearing  excitement.*  It  was  only  a  battlefield  that  Napoleon 
had  won  on  that  September  day,  not  a  battle.  In  spite  of  their 
enormous  losses — 44,000  in  dead  and  wounded — the  Russians 
remained  overnight  in  their  last  positions,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  next  day  that  they  proceeded  on  the  road  to  Moscow.  Their 
general  managed  to  make  even  the  Czar  believe  that  they  were  the 
victors. 

*  Napoleon  has  been  condemned  by  almost  all  military  writers  for 
holding  back  his  Guard.  Jomini  alone  finds  a  word  of  excuse  for  him  and 
sees  his  mistake  rather  in  his  failure  to  press  the  Russians  from  the  very 
outset  with  utmost  energy  on  the  left  wing,  while  it  was  still  weak.  [To 
Jomini  add  Clausewitz.     See  Rose,  II.  236. — B.] 


556  Moscow  [1812 

During  the  fighting  Napoleon  had  not  moved  from  his  distant 
position.  It  was  the  first  time  he  did  not  intervene  in  person, 
quite  contrary  to  his  oft-expressed  conviction.  No  doubt  he 
was  in  distress.  But  what  was  his  discomfort  compared  to  the 
many  thousand  times  multipHed  agony  at  his  feet!  Eylau  was 
far  outdone  in  scenes  of  horror.  In  one  day  there  had  fallen  more 
than  70,000  men,  dead  or  wounded;  and  a  wound  here  meant  but 
too  often  certain  death.  Napoleon  declared  the  battle  was  the 
bloodiest  he  had  ever  seen,  and  the  most  hotly  contested.  He 
had  gained  this  one  point,  that  Moscow  was  now  open  to  him. 
"Moscow!  Moscow!"  he  is  said  to  have  ejaculated  repeatedly 
the  next  day  in  great  agitation.  But  beyond  Moscow  he  will 
find  an  army  of  whose  resisting  power  he  had  learned  by  expe- 
rience. It  will  receive  reinforcements.  From  the  south  another 
army  will  approach  which  has  succeeded  in  defeating  the  Turks. 
His  wings  and  his  line  of  retreat  will  be  menaced  by  superior 
hostile  forces.  It  had  not  been  a  victory  that  would  bring  the 
enemy  to  the  point  of  yielding.  There  must  be  more  fighting; 
will  his  army  be  equal  to  it?  Only  about  100,000  men  were  left 
to  him  after  the  slaughter.  Three  days  before  the  battle  rein- 
forcements of  30,000  men  under  Marshal  Victor  had  crossed  the 
Niemen;  the  Emperor  ordered  them  to  join  the  reserves  at 
Smolensk  and  march  forward  to  strengthen  the  main  army  at 
Moscow.  But  for  the  moment  that  is  all  he  can  command.  And 
yet  his  eye  kindles  when  on  September  14th  he  looks  down  from 
a  height  at  the  mighty  city  of  the  Muscovites.  He  had  reached 
his  goal. 

On  the  morning  of  September  14th  Kutusoff  entered  Mos- 
cow, but  in  the  afternoon  left  it  again  by  the  opposite  gate.  The 
dismay  of  the  inhabitants  remaining  after  the  rich  and  promi- 
nent had  taken  their  departure  was  unbounded.  They,  too, 
had  hoard  of  a  victory  at  Borodino,  and  now  the  triumphing 
general  was  retiring  and  abandoning  the  city  to  the  enemy! 
It  was  the  signal  for  a  general  flight,  so  that  the  army  could 
hardly  make  any  progress;  but  in  the  hurry  very  little  was 
saved.  Immediately  following  the  Russians  the  French  marched 
in,  Napoleon  waiting  until  the  next  day;    he  was  waiting,  it  is 


^T  43]  Moscow  557 

said,  for  a  deputation  from  tho  aiithoritios.  But  none  appeared. 
That  was  the  first  disappointment,  and  others  were  to  follow. 
The  city  was  deserted,  not  a  soul  on  the  streets;  all  who  re- 
mained hid  behind  window-shutters  in  fear.  "  It  seemed  to  us," 
Adam  says,  in  describing  the  entry  of  the  troops,  "as  if  good 
actors  were  to  play  to  an  empty  house."  The  Emperor  rode 
into  the  Kremlin  and  took  up  his  residence  there,  keeping 
the  Guards  in  the  city;  the  other  corps  had  to  find  shelter  in  the 
vicinity.  It  was  a  comfort  that  to  all  appearance  food  was 
plenty;  there  were  abundant  provisions  and  forage,  and  the 
soldiers  began  to  make  themselves  at  home  in  the  deserted 
dwellings,  enjoying  some  rest  at  last  from  the  unutterable  suffer- 
ings of  the  campaign. 

But  there  was  no  rest  to  be  found  in  Moscow.  Even  before 
the  entry  thick  columns  of  smoke  had  been  seen  rising  here 
and  there  in  the  distance,  but  such  a  common  spectacle  at- 
tracted no  further  attention.  In  every  city  stores  had  been 
burned  at  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  But  soon  they  paid 
closer  attention,  as  it  was  repeatedly  announced  at  the 
Kremlin  that  there  were  fires  at  various  points,  and  it  soon 
became  evident  that  they  were  occupying  a  doomed  city.  Lashed 
by  the  northeast  trade  wind,  the  element  burst  its  bonds  and 
spread  farther  and  farther.  At  noon  on  the  16th  of  September 
the  entire  city  was  in  flames,  sparks  flying  even  into  the  Krem- 
lin. At  last  that,  too,  was  reported  to  have  caught  fire,  and 
Napoleon,  who  had  scarcely  had  tune  to  take  one  astonished 
look  in  the  home  of  the  Czars,  was  forced  to  leave  the  palace 
in  haste;  with  difficulty  struggling  through  the  confused 
masses  on  the  streets,  he  reached  the  country-seat  of  Petrovs- 
koje.  There  he  beholds  the  city,  to  possess  which  had  been 
the  very  summit  of  his  ambition,  swallowed  up  in  a  sea  of 
flames.  And  if  anything  could  deepen  the  impression  of  this 
dread  spectacle  on  the  Emperor's  feelings,  it  was  the  certainty 
which  was  soon  felt  that  the  conflagration  was  not  the  result  of 
chance  or  thoughtlessness,  but  that  the  enemy  himself  had 
sacrificed  the  metropolis  to  prevent  its  stores  and  wealth  from 
falling  into   the   hands  of  foreigners,  and   to  make   it  impos- 


558 


Moscow  [1812 


sible  for  them  to  stay  there.*  Napoleon  had  a  commission  in- 
quire into  the  cause  of  the  fire,  and  a  number  of  incendiaries 
caught  in  the  act  were  shot.  But  the  fury  of  the  flames  was 
no  longer  to  be  checked.  Not  to  rob  the  soldiers  of  all  their 
hopes,  he  gave  permission  to  plunder.  The  havoc  wrought  was 
enormous,  but  little  was  secured.  Provisions  were  for  the  most 
part  burned.  The  flames  had  spared  the  cellars,  however,  and 
wine  and  brandy  was  found  in  abundance.  But  the  only  result 
was  to  carry  disorder  to  a  climax,  so  that  the  few  peasants  who 
ventured  into  the  city  with  provisions  were  robbed,  while  on 
the  other  hand  the  soldiers  fraternized  with  some  thousands  of 
Russian  marauders  and  let  them  come  and  go  as  if  the  war 
were  over. 

Most  earnestly  did  all  wish  it  were  ended;  Napoleon  by  no 
means  the  least.  By  September  20th  the  fire  at  length  subsided, 
but  three  fourths  of  the  city  lay  in  ashes.  The  inhabitants, 
still  numbering  10,000,  wandered  without  shelter  or  food  through 
the  streets.  A  battalion  of  the  Guard  had  saved  the  Kremlin, 
to  which  Napoleon  now  returned.  He  could  not  believe  that 
Alexander  would  leave  one  stone  unturned  to  regain  possession 
of  his  country.  Daily  he  expected  overtures  for  peace  negotia- 
tions, but  in  vain.  Then  he  tried  to  hasten  them  by  writing 
to  the  Czar  on  the  20th.  Moscow  was  burned,  he  said;  the 
calamity  might  have  been  avoided  if  Alexander  had  sent  him 
a  letter  either  before  or  after  Borodino;  he  hoped  his  letter 
would  be  kindly  received.  And  now  again  he  waited.  Soon 
September  is  past  and  the  winter  is  threateningly  near.  The 
army  can  be  fed  only  by  foraging  parties  that  have  to  go  farther 
each  day;  these  involve  great  danger  and  often  get  nothing. 
A  single  Russian  corps  gives  out  that  it  captured  3000  French- 
men within  three  weeks.  An  additional  source  of  danger  was 
the  peasant  militia,  who  hid  their  property  and  defended  their 

*  Even  Russian  historians  now  regard  it  as  proved  that  the  governor 
of  the  city,  Count  Rostopchin,  ordered  it  to  be  fired  before  he  left.  Un- 
questionably the  recklessness  of  the  soldiery  and  mob  license  may  have 
had  a  large  share.  The  sentiment  of  the  people  must  also  be  taken  into 
consideration.  Many  preferred  to  burn  their  houses  rather  than  see 
them  in  the  hands  of  the  French. 


/Et.  43]  Moscow   Not  the  End  559 

villages.  "You  are  the  nation  of  the  Russian  faith,"  their 
leaders  cried  to  them;  "die  for  your  faith  and  for  the  Czar. 
What  are  you  Christians  for  if  you  will  not  suffer  for  the  faith? 
What  are  you  orthodox  for  if  you  will  not  serve  the  Czar?" 
Rostopchin  denounced  Napoleon  as  unbaptized,  and  that  suf- 
ficed to  make  his  appeal  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Moscow 
government  futile.  At  Vereia  partisans  surprised  and  captured 
the  French  garrison.  The  highroad  to  Smolensk  had  already 
become  unsafe,  convoys  of  provisions  were  intercepted,  and 
regular  courier  service  was  interrupted.  The  generals  advised 
a  retreat  to  Poland;  but  Napoleon  could  not  yet  bruig  him- 
self to  acknowledge  his  defeat  before  the  world  of  which  he  ex- 
pected to  be  master  at  Moscow. 

"Imagine  Moscow  taken,"  he  had  said  to  Narbonne  before 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  "the  Czar  reconciled  or  sup- 
planted by  a  dependent  government;  then  tell  me  whether  an 
army  of  French  and  allies  cannot  push  on  from  Tiflis  to 
the  Ganges,  and  there  by  mere  contact  destroy  the  whole  fabric 
of  mercantile  greatness  in  India?  With  one  stroke  France  would 
have  conquered  the  independence  of  the  west  and  the  freedom 
of  the  seas.  Alexander  the  Great  had  as  long  a  journey  to  the 
Ganges  as  I  shall  have  from  Moscow."  So  it  was  Moscow, 
always  Moscow,  that  filled  his  thoughts.  As  the  picture  of 
Jerusalem  once  swayed  the  imagination  of  the  crusaders,  so  now 
the  holy  city  of  the  Russians  swayed  his.  The  story  sounds  alto- 
gether credible  that  was  told  later  in  the  circles  of  his  nearest 
relatives  and  intimates,  that  he  took  the  insignia  of  imperial 
dignity,  robe,  sceptre,  and  crown,  with  him  on  the  journey  to 
Russia,  in  order  that  after  he  had  dictated  peace  he  might  be 
proclaimed  in  the  Kremlin  on  the  Moskwa  "the  Emperor  of  the 
West,  Supreme  Head  of  the  European  Confederation,  Defender 
of  the  Christian  Religion."*  Now  all  that  was  gone  forever, 
peace  was  not  assured,  the  Grand  Army  which  was  to  have 

*  "Spectateur  militaire,"  1887,  vol.  38,  pp.  378  ff.  Robe,  crown,  and 
sceptre  have  never  been  seen  again ;  perhaps  they  were  lost  on  the  retreat 
m  the  hurry  of  leaving  Vilna.  Cf.  the  description  in  the  "M<5moriar'  of 
the  paymaster  Peyrusse,  p.  136,  and  in  Coignet,  p.  342. 


560  Moscow  [1812 

paved  his  way  to  supreme  power  had  dwindled  away,  and  its 
very  existence  was  in  jeopardy. 

For  while  Kutusoff  had  at  first  gone  farther  to  the  south  east, 
he  had  afterwards  turned  west,  had  occupied  an  excellent  posi- 
tion near  Tarentino,  south  of  Moscow,  that  threatened  the 
French  line  of  retreat,  and  was  constantly  strengthening  him- 
self. Moreover,  the  state  of  affairs  in  both  wings  was  wholly 
favourable  to  the  Russians.  On  the  Dwina  Wittgenstein's  force 
was  increased  to  40,000  as  against  the  17,000  of  Saint-Cyr.  In 
the  south  the  Russian  army  from  Moldavia,  under  Tchitchagoff, 
had  effected  a  junction  on  the  20th  of  September  with  the 
force  of  Tormassoff,  making  a  total  of  64,000,  which  exceeded 
Schwarzenberg's  corps  by  30,000.  And  still  no  answer  from 
St.  Petersburg !  Napoleon  was  beside  hhnself .  For  one  moment 
he  thinks  even  of  fetching  the  answer  in  person,  but  in  the 
next  the  impossible  project  is  abandoned.  Fmally  he  must 
reconcile  himself  to  making  the  overtures  himself,  and  on  the 
5th  of  October  he  sends  General  Lauriston  to  Kutusoff.  He 
replies  that  he  has  no  authority  and  can  only  report  to  the 
Czar.  Another  period  of  suspense  that  pretty  soon  ends  in  the 
conviction  that  this  step  was  equally  fruitless. 

Alexander  remained  firm,  even  though  Romanzoff  at  the 
head  of  a  court  party  friendly  to  France,  Grand  Duke  Constan- 
tine,  and  even  Alexander's  mother,  who  most  bitterly  hated 
Napoleon,  all  spoke  in  favour  of  peace,  the  Czar  still  stood  firm. 
Not  because  his  unstable  character  had  suddenly  in  the  stress  of 
invasion  fortified  itself;  no,  there  were  other  reasons  for  his 
steadfastness.  For  one  thing,  the  war  sentiment  among  the 
people,  especially  after  the  loss  of  the  rich  metropolis,  had 
increased  to  such  a  pitch  that  he  could  hardly  do  otherwise  than 
yield  to  it.  Then  again,  during  the  last  days  of  August,  at  Abo, 
in  Finland,  he  had  met  Bernadotte,  who  had  exhorted  him  to  be 
steadfast  and  had  given  him  back  the  corps  that  was  by  treaty 
to  help  conquer  Norway.  This  added  20,000  men  who  were 
hastening  to  join  Wittgenstein.  Lastly,  there  was  doubtless  no 
lack  of  energetic  men  about  Alexander  (one  thinks  involuntarily 
of  Baron  vom  Stein,  whom  he  had  summoned  in  May)  who 


Mt.43]  Facing   Disaster  561 

advised  him  to  persevere  and  who  may  have  lent  a  firm  support 
to  the  wavering  resohition  of  the  Czar.  So  the  decision  was 
for  war. 

Meantime  Napoleon  had  wasted  five  weeks  of  most  precious 
time  dallying  with  the  hope  of  peace,  until  at  length  the  inexorable 
truth  stood  clearly  before  him  that  he  must  leave  Moscow.  Who 
would  venture  to  paint  what  was  passing  in  the  mind  of  this  man 
when  he  saw  the  proud  structure  erected  by  him  to  his  own 
renown  breaking  down  piecemeal;  saw  it  with  his  far-sighted 
vision  that  descried  not  only  the  terrible  danger  immediately 
before  him,  the  death-dealing  \vinter,  when  the  summer  had 
already  melted  his  army  to  half  its  original  size ;  but  also  all  the 
remote  consequences:  the  uprising  of  his  compulsory  allies,  and 
an  endless  series  of  new  struggles,  and,  at  best,  the  task  of  con- 
quering all  over  again  what  but  a  few  weeks  ago  had  been  in  his 
possession !  In  vain  he  sought  to  banish  the  thought  of  his  lost 
prestige,  to  escape  being  alone  with  it.  We  are  told  that  he  pro- 
longed meals  beyond  the  usual  time,  something  he  had  never 
before  done;  that  he  had  a  company  of  French  actors  who  were 
in  Moscow  perform  pieces  before  him;  that  he  threw  himself 
eagerly  into  plans  for  a  new  organization  of  the  Theatre  frangais 
at  Paris,  and  the  like.  But  at  last  something  decisive  had  to  be 
done.  Above  all,  the  Emperor  had  to  become  a  general  once 
more.  The  source  of  the  whole  disaster  was  that  hitherto  he  had 
been  too  much  the  Emperor,  too  little  the  general.*  In  the 
latter  character  he  now  had  to  order  the  retreat.  In  the  midst 
of  preparations  for  it,  at  one  of  the  daily  reviews,  there  fell  upon 
him  the  tidings  that  the  Russians  had  assumed  the  offensive  on 
October  16th,  had  surprised  Murat,  who  had  been  sent  south  to 
watch  Kutusoff,  and  driven  him  back  toward  Moscow  with  very 
heavy  losses.  With  that  vanished  the  last  hope  of  peace,  and  it 
was  settled  beyond  recall  that  fighting  must  bo  renewed. 

Since  the  beginning  of  October  Napoleon  had  been  considering 
the  question  by  what  route  he  should  leave  the  imtenable  capital. 

*  "Moscow  is  not  a  military  position,  but  a  political  one,"  he  had  said 
to  Daru.  "People  always  see  in  me  here  only  the  military  leader,  whereas 
I  am  here  in  fact  as  Emperor." 


562  Moscow  [1812 

He  had  three  routes  before  his  mind :  one  the  road  by  which  he 
had  come,  another  leading  to  Smolensk  via  Kaluga,  the  third  to 
the  northwest  through  Bjeloi  to  Weliki-Luki,  which  would 
permit  him  to  threaten  St.  Petersburg.  At  the  outset  he  felt 
rather  inclined  to  choose  the  last,  because  it  had  less  the  appear- 
ance of  a  retreat;  but  he  soon  gave  it  up.  Nor  did  the  southern 
route  meet  with  his  full  approval.  In  the  notes  which  he  dic- 
tated we  read:  "Any  movement  on  Kaluga  is  advisable  only  if 
it  have  for  its  object  to  retreat  to  Smolensk.  But  if  we  are 
retreating  to  Smolensk  in  any  case,  is  it  wise  to  seek  the  enemy 
and  expose  ourselves  to  the  loss  of  some  thousands  of  men  in  a 
march  that  after  all  would  seem  to  be  a  retreat  before  an  army 
which  knows  well  its  country  and  has  many  secret  agents  and  a 
numerous  light  cavalry?"  In  an  affair  with  the  enemy,  he 
went  on  to  explain,  one  might  have  left  on  one's  hands  three  or 
four  thousand  wounded  with  which  it  would  be  necessary  to 
retreat  for  hundreds  of  miles ;  this  would  look  hke  a  defeat,  and 
in  pubUc  opinion  the  enemy  would  have  the  advantage  even  if 
he  had  been  beaten.  Therefore  he  would  prefer  to  take  the  road 
by  which  they  had  come  "We  should  not  have  the  enemy 
about  our  necks,  we  know  the  road  thoroughly,  and  it  is  five 
days'  march  shorter,  too."  The  army  would  carry  flour  for 
two  weeks,  and  could  stop  at  Viasma  and  find  provisions  and 
fodder."  These  notes  are  from  the  early  part  of  October.  Soon 
afterwards,  however,  he  had  decided  for  the  road  by  Kaluga, 
particularly  as  the  advance  of  the  Russians  made  it  necessary 
to  support  Murat.  But  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  the  force 
of  the  above  considerations. 

On  the  19th  of  October  the  "Grand  Army"  left  Moscow  in  a 
southwesterly  direction;  the  soldiers  were  burdened  with  booty 
whose  weight  soon  wearied  them  in  the  march ,  wagons  in  endless 
lines  were  loaded  with  the  plundered  splendour  of  the  holy  city, 
with  articles  useful  and  useless,  with  sick  and  wounded;  foreign 
famiUcs  fleeing  from  the  hatred  of  the  Russians  swelled  the 
numbers  of  the  camp-followers ;  the  whole  array  was  not  unlike  a 
migrating  tribe.  In  Moscow,  whore  Mortier  remained  with 
8000  men,  the  Emperor  spread  the  report  that  he  would  return 


iEr.  43]        The  Battle  of  Malojaroslavetz  563 

after  defeating  Kutusoff,  and  really  made  the  latter  believe  he 
was  coming  to  attack  him.  But  he  really  had  no  such  intention. 
He  planned  rather,  in  order  to  avoid  an  "affair"  and  the  thousands 
of  wounded,  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank  and  reach  Kaluga 
before  him  by  the  (new)  western  road,  or  at  least  to  get  to  Juchnov 
before  him  and  then  reach  Smolensk  by  way  of  Jelnia.  But 
Kutusoff  was  not  deceived  very  long.  Soon  after  Napoleon, 
covered  by  two  corps,  had  turned  off  to  the  west  towards  Borovsk 
with  the  bulk  of  his  army,  the  news  of  it  came  to  the  Russian 
headquarters,  and  at  once  the  Russian  general  started  for 
Malojaroslavetz,  where  the  two  roads  to  Kaluga  meet  at  the 
river  Luscha.  Perhaps  the  Emperor  might  have  carried  out  his 
plan  after  all  if  his  army  had  moved  forward  more  rapidly. 
But  what  with  the  heavy  burdens  of  the  infantry,  the  poor 
horses  for  the  cavalry,  the  lack  of  teams  for  the  600  cannon,  the 
immense  length  of  the  train,  and  besides  all  the  heavy  rains  and 
the  muddy  roads,  any  faster  advance  was  impossible.  The 
result  was  that  the  vanguard  under  Eugene  entered  Malojaro- 
slavetz only  a  little  before  the  Russians,  on  October  24th.  Here 
ensued  a  bitter  struggle  over  an  elevation  occupied  by  the 
enemy  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  The  Russians  lost  the 
position  and  regained  it  repeatedly,  until  at  length,  after  a 
frightful  loss  of  life,  it  was  finally  carried  and  held  by  the  Italians 
under  the  Viceroy.  But  that  was  all.  For  Kutusoff,  who  had 
come  up  meanwhile  with  the  whole  army,  held  the  road  to  the 
south,  and  the  question  now  was  whether  Napoleon  would  fight 
his  way  through  here  or  not. 

So  the  "affair"  had  come  off  after  all.  The  fighting  of  the 
24th  had  cost  the  French  5000  men  in  dead  and  wounded. 
Were  it  to  be  renewed  on  the  next  day  on  a  larger  scale,  then, 
with  the  resistance  the  Russians  were  making,  the  losses  would 
certainly  be  serious.  In  the  council  of  war  held  by  Napoleon 
.scarcely  more  than  one  vote  (that  of  Murat)  was  in  favour  of 
fighting;  the  great  majority  were  decidedly  against  it.  Even  the 
bold  Mouton,  who  in  May,  1809,  had  saved  the  situation  on  the 
Lobau,  advised  the  quickest  possible  retreat  to  the  Niemen,  and 
that,  too,  on  the  highroad  by  which  they  had  come  and  which 


564  Moscow  [1812 

they  knew  well.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  coincided  with  the 
Emperor's  opinion.  Perhaps,  too,  the  danger  he  had  been  in 
on  the  25th  of  being  captured  by  a  bold  band  of  Cossacks  while 
on  a  reconnoissance  may  have  made  an  impression  on  him. 
His  only  misgiving  arose  from  the  fear  of  "having  the  enemy 
about  their  necks"  if  they  retreated  to  the  north.  But  Kutu- 
soff  himself  solved  the  question  the  next  day  by  breaking  camp 
and  going  farther  south,  perhaps  with  the  object  of  luring  the 
Emperor  still  farther  from  his  base.  But  the  latter  took  advan- 
tage of  the  opportunity  thus  granted  to  turn  at  once  to  the 
north  and  gain  the  highroad  at  Moshaisk.  Mortier  had  already 
been  ordered  to  leave  Moscow  on  the  21st.  He  was  to  blow  up 
the  KremUn  first,  an  act  of  impotent  rage  that  was  only  partially 
successful.  On  the  27th  he  had  joined  the  army,  which  now 
proceeded  westward  by  forced  marches.  It  had  lost  a  week  of 
valuable  time  and  could  not  venture  now  to  stop  at  Viasma  if 
Kutusoff  understood  his  business.* 

What  now  follows  is  a  retreat  compared  to  which  the  march 
through  the  desert  after  the  futile  assault  on  Acre  seems  like 
child's  play.  Would  not  those  who  a  few  weeks  ago  had  not 
given  out  in  the  haste  of  pressing  forward  to  Moscow  now  lose 
their  strength  in  the  hurried  flight  of  the  retreat?  Would  not 
the  cold  now  carry  off  those  whom  the  heat  then  spared?  Would 
not  those  who  then  withstood  hardship  and  hunger  succumb  to 
them  all  the  more  surely,   now  that  they  were  the  pursued 

*  Reports  of  Napoleon's  attitude  during  these  days  are  meagre.  The 
fact  that  he  did  not  follow  the  receding  Russians  (who  might  later  come 
to  a  stand  and  give  battle  again)  is  nothing  surprising,  take  it  all  in  all. 
But  it  is  certainly  strange  that  he  did  not  take  the  shorter  road  from 
Malojaroslavetz  through  Medyni  to  Viasma.  He  gave  his  reasons  in  a 
letter  to  Junot  dated  October  26th :  the  cold,  and  the  necessity  of  disposing 
of  the  wounded  (in  fact  some  three  or  four  thousand),  led  him,  so  he  said,  to 
go  to  Moshaisk.  But  the  cold  had  not  yet  set  in.  Not  until  the  27th  did 
any  frost  appear  at  night,  while  otherwise  the  weather  was  fine  The 
winter  of  1812  came  later  than  usual  in  Russia.  So  the  second  point 
alone  must  have  been  decisive,  the  wounded,  to  which  Napoleon  had 
assigned  great  importance  in  his  notes  at  the  beginning  of  October  But 
the  blame  may  rest  partly  on  the  bad  maps  at  his  disposal  and  his  igno- 
rance of  the  roads. 


iET.43]  Flight  565 

instead  of  the  pursuers?  There  was  indeed  a  definite  goal 
before  them;  they  must  march  bravely,  it  was  said,  only  as  far 
as  Smolensk.  There  was  stationed  Victor's  corps;  there  were  to 
be  found  abundant  stores — at  least  they  had  been  ordered: 
there,  between  the  Dwina  and  the  Dnieper,  they  might  defy  the 
winter.  And  so  the  sadly  demoralized  army  retraced  the  same 
via  dolorosa  which  it  had  traversed  two  months  before;  past  the 
horrible  battlefield  of  Borodino,  where  the  dead  still  lay  unljuried ; 
past  the  hospitals,  caverns  of  horror,  from  which  they  longed  to 
take  away  all  who  were  still  hving;  past  the  burned  cities  and 
villages  and  all  the  places  given  over  to  gloomy  desolation. 
After  the  beginning  of  November  the  night  frosts  began  to  be 
felt  more  and  more  keenly.  Most  of  the  soldiers  were  too 
lightly  clad  and  suffered  not  a  little.  Hunger  began  to  pinch 
them,  too,  for  the  provisions  brought  from  Moscow  had  soon 
been  consumed,  and  it  was  impossible  to  supply  themselves 
by  foraging  as  formerly  they  had  done,  as  the  bands  of  armed 
peasants  prevented  it  and  the  enemy  was  appearing  again. 

Kutusoff,  thanks  to  the  excellent  service  of  his  light  horse, 
had  received  timely  notice  of  Napoleon's  departure;  he  turned 
about  and  followed  him  with  the  main  army  through  Silenki 
toward  Viasma,  while  the  Cossack  corps  of  Platoff  harassed  the 
rear-guard  commanded  by  Davout.  Napoleon  gave  orders  to 
march  as  they  had  done  in  Egypt,  with  the  baggage  in  the 
centre,  so  that  in  case  of  attack  they  could  make  front  and  fire 
in  every  direction.  So  they  proceeded  at  a  rapid  pace.  "The 
enemy  is  fleeing,"  Platoff  reported,  "as  never  army  fled  before." 
There  were  good  reasons  for  such  haste.  By  taking  the  shorter 
route  which  Napoleon  had  rejected,  Kutusoff  had  reached  the 
highroad  near  Viasma  by  November  3d  with  his  vanguard  and 
cut  off  the  French  rear.  The  only  thing  that  saved  Davout  was 
that  Eugene  sent  back  two  divisions  from  Viasma  for  his  support. 
Napoleon  was  already  far  beyond  that  city  with  the  Guard.  If 
Kutusoff  had  attacked  the  French  with  his  whole  army  on  that 
day,  he  would  have  struck  them  a  fatal  blow;  but  he  held  back. 
Though  he  displayed  desperate  energy  in  resistance,  he  was 
hesitating  in  attack,  and  was  rather  disposed  to  promote  his 


566  Moscow  [1812 

enemy's  flight,  supposing  that  the  latter  must  perish  in  the 
Russian  winter  even  without  his  assistance. 

The  fight  at  Viasma  had  cost  the  French  4000  in  dead  and 
wounded,  3000  had  been  taken  prisoners,  and  the  corps  of 
Davout  was  completely  disintegrated,  so  that  Ney  had  to 
assume  command  of  the  rear.  On  the  6th  of  November  the 
cold  increased  by  from  eight  to  twelve  degrees,  and  an  icy  north 
wind  brought  dense  snow.*  The  road  grew  slippery,  causing 
the  horses  to  fall  in  heaps,  and  thus  depriving  the  hungry  sol- 
diery of  their  only  anmial  food;  many  cannon  were  abandoned; 
long  lines  of  ammunition- wagons  were  blown  up;  the  cavalry  as 
they  lost  their  horses  had  to  march  afoot.  Discipline  was 
utterly  relaxed.  Every  one  thought  only  of  hmiself.  The 
wounded  of  the  last  fight  were  left  to  their  fate  and  died  by  the 
wayside;  likewise  thousands  who  because  of  cold  and  fatigue  had 
thrown  away  their  weapons  and  left  the  ranks.  Their  comrades 
drove  them  from  the  camp-fires  at  night ;  so  they  went  aside  and 
were  frozen  to  death  in  great  numbers.  In  this  way  it  is  said  that 
at  a  single  camping-place  three  hundred  perished  in  one  night. 
Many  a  one  waited  for  the  Russians,  to  beg  from  them  and 
lengthen  his  life  a  few  days;  but  with  the  disappearing  foe  would 
vanish  his  last  hope,  if  indeed  a  Cossack  lance  had  not  already 
taken  pity  on  the  doomed  man.  The  greatest  misery  was 
endured  by  the  rear-guard.  One  of  Ney's  officers  reports  of 
these  days:  "The  little  food  we  had  was  consumed,  the  horses 
were  falling  from  hunger  and  exhaustion  and  were  soon  devoured 
by  the  soldiers.  Whoever  departed  from  the  road  to  look  for 
food  fell  into  the  enemies'  hands.  So  our  men  would  rush  upon 
any  solitary  fugitive  and  take  his  provisions  from  him  by  force; 
lucky  for  hmi  if  they  left  him  his  clothing.  Thus,  after  wasting 
the  land,  we  were  brought  to  the  point  of  destroying  one  another." 

At  last  hope  seemed  to  beckon  to  the  exhausted  warriors 
from  the  rising  towers  of  Smolensk.     Of  the  hundred  thousand, 

*  In  some  accounts  (Bausset,  Guretzky-Cornitz,  Berthezene)  the  4th  of 
November  is  the  date  when  severe  cold  and  snowfall  began;  most  of  the 
others  (F6zensac,  Gourgaud,  Pcyrusse.  Coignet,  Napoleon  in  bulletin  29) 
give  the  6th.  [The  temperatures  are  probably  equivalent  to  14°  and  5° 
Fahr.— B.] 


iEx.  43]  Smolensk   Reached  567 

however,  who  had  started  out  from  Moscow  scarcely  fifty 
thousand  still  answered  the  roll-call,  including  five  thousand 
calvary  in  a  wretched  state.  For  this  last  Murat  was  not  a  little 
to  blame;  because  quite  unnecessarily  he  would  set  the  poor  men 
on  the  Cossacks,  by  which  means  they  lost  their  horses  and  then 
were  famished  on  foot.  Hence  they  named  him  the  "Butcher 
of  Cavalry";  of  the  other  leaders,  however,  the  Viceroy  in  par- 
ticular and  the  "undaunted"  Ney  were  held  in  highest  respect. 
And  one  who  follows  attentively  the  history  of  this  campaign 
must  here  give  his  unqualified  assent  to  the  general  opinion; 
Ney,  especially,  perfomied  on  this  retreat  wonders  of  courage, 
sagacity,  and  coolness  in  most  desperate  situations.  Xapoleon, 
on  the  other  hand,  roused  much  hard  feeling  among  the  other 
troops  by  his  favouritism  for  the  Guard,  which  had  been  displayed 
repeatedly  even  during  the  previous  summer.  And  now  in 
Smolensk,  where  he  entered  on  the  9th  of  November,  and  where 
the  arrangements  of  the  commissariat  were  far  below  his  expecta- 
tions, he  fu'st  of  all  provided  the  Guard  with  rations  for  two  weeks, 
in  consequence  of  which  the  other  troops,  who  had  rations  for  only 
one  week,  fell  into  all  manner  of  excesses.*  In  the  fire-swept  city 
but  few  houses  afforded  shelter  from  the  fierce  cold.  Most  of  the 
troops  had  to  pass  the  night  in  the  open  air,  and  piles  of  corpses 
lined  the  streets.     Was  this  a  place  to  go  into  winter  quarters? 

No,  the  line  between  the  Dwina  and  the  Dniei^er  had  already 
become  untenable.  While  yet  on  the  march  Napoleon  had 
received  news  from  Victor  that  sorely  troubled  him.  That 
general,  at  a  call  from  8aint-Cyr,  had  hastened  to  his  aid  against 

*  On  the  arrival  of  the  army  in  Smolensk  the  paymaster,  Peyrusse,  writes 
in  his  diar\'  on  November  10th:  "At  once  the  stores  were  broken  into,  no 
regular  distribution  was  possible,  everything  was  plundered.  All  power 
and  authority  of  officers  ceased  in  face  of  an  army  that  was  rendered  des- 
perate by  hunger  and  all  manner  of  misen,-.  The  soldiers  retained  pos- 
session of  the  stores.  Wine,  brandy,  rice,  biscuit,  vegetables,  everj-thing 
was  in  confusion  and  was  trampled  under  foot.  The  enormous  stock  of 
provisions  squandered  in  this  way  hardly  sufficed  for  two  divisions." 
Napoleon  later  charged  his  overseers  with  malfeasance  of  office  and  cor- 
ruption, but  it  wjis  only  to  avoid  the  admission  that  he,  the  lord  of  the 
world,  was  sometimes  not  master  of  his  own  army. 


568  Moscow  [1812 

Wittgenstein  with  about  18,000  men;  but  toward  the  end  of 
October  the  two  had  been  defeated  at  Tchatchniki  by  superior 
numbers  and  were  obUged  to  retreat.  This  exposed  the  army 
returning  from  the  north  to  serious  danger,  and  Napoleon  was 
in  the  utmost  anxiety.  He  ordered  Victor,  doing  it  with  an 
urgency  that  was  affecting,  to  make  a  new  advance  and  throw 
the  enemy  across  the  Dwina.  But  suppose  he  failed  to  execute 
that  command?  No,  there  was  no  tarrying  at  Smolensk.  And 
in  fact  he  remained  only  long  enough  for  Eugene,  who  was 
coming  up  by  a  painful  detour  through  Duchovchina,  to 
arrive,  before  collecting  his  army  after  a  fashion;  he  did  not  wait 
for  the  rear-guard.  On  the  13th  he  again  left  the  city  after 
issuing  orders  that  the  several  corps  should  march  a  day's 
journey  apart  from  each  other.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
Kutusoff,  during  the  four  days'  halt  at  Smolensk,  had  again 
overtaken  the  French  and  might  attack  the  army  at  any  moment 
on  the  line  of  march,  the  grounds  for  this  arrangement  are  not 
apparent.  The  conjecture  may  be  hazarded  that  he  did  not 
suppose  the  enemy  was  as  yet  so  near,  and  that  his  aim  was  to 
regulate  the  distribution  of  provisions  better  by  means  of  this 
separation  of  the  divisions.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  army  marched 
out  of  the  city  between  the  12th  and  the  17th  of  November.  Of 
the  30,000  stragglers  who  had  followed  the  army  into  Smolensk 
only  a  quarter  now  joined  the  rear-guard  under  Ney.  Of  the 
remainder,  some  had  perished  from  cold  and  hurger,  others 
stayed  behind  to  plunder.  They  were  cut  down  by  the  returning 
inhabitants,  thrown  into  the  flames,  or  drowned.  The  sick  and 
wounded  had  been  left  behind  in  the  hospitals.  Many  of  them 
had  lost  their  lives  when  at  Napoleon's  command  the  towers  of 
the  city  wall  were  blown  up.  It  was  a  chapter  of  horrors  unpar- 
alleled. 

During  the  very  first  days  after  the  exit  from  Smolensk  the 
bitter  cold  began  to  clahu  its  victims,  and  the  army  again  began 
to  disintegrate.  And  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand,  too.  When 
Napoleon  had  reached  Krasnoi  with  the  Guard,  the  Russian 
vanguard  seized  the  road  behind  him,  and  there  was  danger  that 
the  isolated  corps  would  be  successively  beaten  by  this  division, 


jp.T.  4.3]  Caution   of  KutusofF  569 

which  was  17,000  strong.  To  prevent  tliis,  Napoleon  halted 
and  waited  for  Eugene,  who  was  next  on  the  road.  He  hud 
only  15,000  with  him  (so  far  had  the  Guard  dwindled  away), 
while  Kutusoff,  who  was  only  one  day's  march  distant  from 
Krasnoi,  had  at  his  disposal  fully  three  times  as  many,  although 
in  his  hasty  march  through  the  deep  snow  of  the  country  roads  he 
had  been  obliged  to  leave  behind  at  least  a  half  of  his  infantry 
sick  and  incapacitated.*  Now  again,  as  at  Viasma,  the  Russian 
general  avoided  separating  Napoleon  from  the  rest  of  his  army 
by  advancing  his  main  force  and  then  overpowering  hmi,  as  he 
might  have  done.  He  adhered  to  his  system,  from  dread,  we  are 
told,  of  the  Emperor's  genius,  which  seemed  to  him  invincible 
even  in  these  straits.  Emboldened  by  this,  and  also  in  order  to 
protect  Davout  from  the  Russian  vanguard,  Napoleon  on  the 
next  morning  actually  assumed  the  offensive,  supposing  that 
Kutusoff  would  withdraw  his  vanguard  from  the  road  at  the 
prospect  of  a  general  engagement  and  so  leave  the  way  open. 
The  venture  was  successful — it  was  the  early  morning  of  the 
17th  and  the  cold  was  terrible— and  Davout,  too,  could  now 
come  to  Krasnoi.  But  now  a  new  danger  threatens  Napoleon, 
that  of  being  outflanked,  and  he  marches  on  to  Orsha,  leaving 
Ney  to  his  fate.  The  latter,  after  fighting  several  times  to  no 
purpose,  stole  over  the  Dnieper  by  night  with  3000  men,  but  on 
the  farther  side  fell  in  with  Platoff's  Cossacks  and,  after  untold 
hardships,  at  last  regained  the  highroad  near  Orsha  with  scarcely 
900  men. 

The  cold  now  began  to  moderate,  but  thawing  weather  with 
long-continued  rains  turned  the  roads  into  deep  mud,  so  that 
the  soldiers  found  it  still  more  painful  to  march,  having  for  the 
most  part  nothing  but  rags  on  their  feet.      Of  the  scarcely 

*  The  regular  Russian  troops  did  not  display  in  this  war  the  power  of 
endurance  that  was  to  be  expected.  Of  100,000  men  with  whom  Kutusoff 
began  the  parallel  pursuit  of  Napoleon,  48,000  lay  in  the  hospitals  by  the 
ibeginning  of  December,  although  they  were  clad  in  fur,  well  fed,  and  had 
not  moved  forward  so  rapidly  as  the  enemy.  In  the  middle  of  December 
only  40,000  of  the  200,000  men  in  the  Russian  arm\'  were  still  under  arms. 
Poles  and  Germans  seem  to  have  endured  the  cold  best.  (Bernhardi, 
Toll's  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  II.  352,  469.) 


5/0  Moscow  [1812 

25,000  men  still  remaining  the  majority  threw  away  their 
weapons,  and  even  the  Guard  began  to  waver.  Then  Napo- 
leon, who  in  the  cold  days  had  often  marched  on  in  front  of  his 
troops,  clad  in  a  cloak  of  Polish  fur  and  leaning  on  a  birch  staff, 
stepped  among  his  old  grenadiers  and  addressed  them  as  fol- 
lows: "You  see  the  disorganization  of  my  army.  A  wretched 
infatuation  has  led  most  of  the  soldiers  to  throw  away  their 
weapons.  If  you  follow  this  dangerous  example,  there  is  no 
hope  left.  On  you  depends  the  salvation  of  the  army."  At  a 
critical  moment  provisions  were  secured  in  Orsha  by  the  aid  of 
the  Jews,  and,  besides,  weapons  and  some  batteries  were  found, 
the  latter  being  drawn  by  horses  belonging  to  pontoon-trains. 
The  boats  were  abandoned,  as  it  was  supposed  they  would  not 
be  needed.  There  was  the  bridge  at  Borissov  held  by  the 
French;  and  once  let  that  river  be  behind  their  backs,  then  they 
thought,  there  was  no  further  obstacle  on  the  road  through 
Minsk  to  Vilna. 

But  the  cup  of  tribulation  was  not  yet  full.  On  the  22d  of 
November  Napoleon  received  word  that  Admiral  Tchitchagofif, 
who  had  drawn  up  a  part  of  his  army  facing  Schwarzenberg  and 
Reynier  on  the  Bug,  had  proceeded  with  the  rest  through  Minsk 
to  Borissov,  had  driven  the  French  from  that  point,  and  now 
commanded  the  bridge.  To  make  matters  still  worse  came  the 
tidings  that  Victor  and  Oudinot  had  been  wholly  unsuccessful  in 
their  operations  against  Wittgenstein  and  were  marching  south 
straight  for  the  highroad.  Now  indeed  the  doom  of  the  army 
seemed  sealed.  In  its  rear  was  Kutusoff,  to  the  south  and  in 
front  was  Tchitchagoff,  on  the  right  was  Wittgenstein.  If  the 
two  latter  effected  a  junction  and  opposed  the  French  at  the 
Beresina,  there  was  no  hope  of  escape.*  The  thaw  and  rains 
had  melted  the  ice,  the  river  was  high,  its  banks  were  like  swamps, 
and  the  pontoons  were  behind  them  at  Orsha. 

*  The  Russians  had  acted  on  an  excellent  plan  of  co-operation,  which 
had  been  communicated  to  the  leaders  of  the  two  wings  as  early  as  Sep- 
tember. Wittgenstein  was  to  drive  back  Oudinot  and  Macdonald, 
Tchitchagoff  was  to  do  the  same  to  Schwarzenberg,  and  then  the  two 
were  to  unit(^  at  Borissov  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  whom  Kutusoff 
was  expected  to  drive  toward  them. 


;Et.  43]     Napoleon's  Bearing  on  the  Retreat        571 

It  was  a  situation  to  bewilder  the  strongest  mind.  Napfileon, 
whom  we  have  seen  weak  and  nervous  on  the  march  to  Moscow 
in  view  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  outcome,  was  now  strong  and 
prudent  in  face  of  certain  faihire.  Since  he  had  become  the 
general  once  more,  he  threw  himself  into  the  character.  Even 
his  bodily  ills  seem  to  have  disappeared.  His  health  was  as 
good  as  in  the  winter  campaign  of  1807.  This  point  should  not 
be  overlooked  here.  His  mind  and  energy  in  these  days  of 
extreme  distress  and  embarrassment  were  as  powerful  as  of  old. 
"He  was  pale,"  says  one  in  his  escort, "but  his  countenance  was 
calm;  nothing  in  his  face  betrayed  his  mental  sufferings."  His 
eye  takes  in  the  entire  danger  at  a  glance  and  discerns  the  only 
means  of  safety,  if  safety  is  still  possible.  First  of  all  he  must 
have  those  troops  that  have  thus  far  faced  Wittgenstein,  as 
they  had  suffered  nothing  like  the  main  army.  Oudinot  ■v\ath 
Ids  8000  men  is  to  repel  the  di\4sion  which  Tchitchagoff  had 
sent  across  to  Borissov,  and  if  possible  regain  possession  of  the 
bridge,  while  Victor  with  11,000  men  marches  southwest  from 
Tchereja,  where  his  troops  are  stationed,  to  the  Beresina  and 
holds  Wittgenstein  in  check  as  long  as  possible.  Meantime 
Napoleon  got  rid  of  a  large  part  of  the  camp-followers  that  still 
clung  to  the  army,  and  sacrificed  half  of  his  wagons  at  Bobr  in 
order  to  have  horses  for  the  little  artillery  still  remaining.  Here 
he  learns  that  Oudinot  has  secured  Borissov  indeed,  but  that 
the  Russians  had  burned  the  bridge.  On  the  ver}^  day  before  he 
had  written  to  him:  "  If  the  enemy  should  get  control  of  the  head 
of  the  bridge  and  burn  it,  so  that  we  could  not  cross,  it  would  be  a 
great  misfortune."  And  now  this  was  a  reality,  and  a  reality 
which  involved  crossing  a  river  a  hundred  yards  wide  ^^^th 
marshy  banks  while  facing  two  superior  hostile  forces  and  while 
pursued  by  a  third. 

Had  the  Emperor  been  dealing  with  foes  that  were  but  half- 
way his  equals,  neither  he  nor  his  army  would  have  escaped. 
He  could  never  have  reached  the  frontier  as  he  did,  though 
with  but  a  small  remnant  of  officers  and  subalterns;  nor  could 
he  have  filled  up  these  rescued  cadres  to  form  a  new  army  and  so 
overrun  Europe  with  new  wars,  as  he  actually  did.     But  Kutu- 


^yi  Moscow  [1812 

soff's  only  thought  was  "not  to  appear  at  the  frontier  with  emaci- 
ated troops,"  and  his  pursuit  was  astonishingly  slow;  Wittgen- 
stein was  poorly  informed  of  the  desperate  situation  of  the 
enemy,  and  advanced  with  caution  instead  of  hastening  to  the 
upper  Beresina;  and  neither  of  these  nor  the  quite  incompe- 
tent Tchitchagoff  was  of  a  calibre  to  annihilate  the  greatest 
general  of  their  age.  The  third,  whose  task  it  should  have  been 
not  to  let  the  Emperor  slip  through,  fell  headlong  into  a  trap 
set  for  him  by  Oudinot,  who  had  been  ordered  to  seek  a  suitable 
spot  for  laying  a  bridge  and  after  this  had  been  found — a  Uttle 
north  of  Borissov,  at  Studjanka — to  give  the  enemy  the  false 
impression  by  a  feint  that  they  were  going  to  cross  south  of 
the  city.  The  deception  was  so  successfully  carried  out  and 
was  furthermore  so  effectively  re-enforced  by  Wittgenstein's  con- 
jecture that  this  was  the  intention  of  the  French,  of  which  the 
Admiral  heard,  that  Tchitchagoff  sent  only  a  weak  detachment 
north  and  took  his  main  army  a  day's  march  south  of  Borissov 
to  meet  the  French  army  in  case  it  sought,  as  he  supposed  it 
would,  a  junction  with  Schwarzenberg.  This  was  on  the  25th 
of  November,  the  same  day  on  which  Oudinot  led  his  command 
north  of  Borissov  to  Studjanka  and  there  began  the  construc- 
tion of  two  bridges,  which,  however,  were  not  finished  until  the 
following  afternoon.  How  they  lamented  now  the  lack  of  the 
})ontoons!  Frost  had  suddenly  set  in  again,  and  the  marshy 
banks  became  hard,  but  the  floating  ice  was  a  great  hindrance 
to  the  work  of  the  bridge-builders,  who  had  to  stand  breast-high 
in  the  water.  And  all  this  when  every  moment  was  precious. 
At  last  the  crossing  could  begin.  A  number  of  guns  that  had 
been  placed  on  the  heights  of  Studjanka  commanded  the  farther 
bank  and  kept  at  a  distance  the  Russian  detachment  stationed 
there.  Cavalry  swam  over  and  drove  them  away.  So  the  path 
was  open  and  remained  open  the  next  day.  Napoleon  directed 
the  march  over  the  bridge  until  at  noon  of  the  27th  he  himself 
passed  over  with  the  Guard.  At  Studjanka  there  was  now  only 
the  bulk  of  Victor's  corps,  whose  rear-guard  had  arrived  at 
Borissov  to  detain  the  advancing  force  of  Wittgenstein.  The 
entire    army    numbered   hardly    from   30,000    to    35,000    men 


4 


Mr.  43)  Crossing  the  Beresina  573 

under  arms.*  The  horde  of  stragglers  probably  amounted  to  as 
many  more.  A  large  part  of  these  poor  wretches  were  kept  in 
the  village  across  the  river  by  hunger  and  cold.  Many,  too,  of 
the  Moscow  fugitives  that  had  followed  the  camp  stayed  there, 
unwilling  despite  all  warnings  to  leave  their  wagons,  which  con- 
tained their  few  goods  and  last  remnant  of  food.  It  was  a 
scene  of  woe  unutterable! 

But  Napoleon  was  not  to  escape  in  this  way,  without  any 
hindrance  from  the  enemy.  On  the  very  evening  of  the  27th  Witt- 
genstein with  Platoff  came  upon  the  rear-guard  of  Victor,  about 
4000  men,  which  he  surrounded  and  compelled  to  surrender. 
Then  he  proceeded  unopposed  to  Studjanka,  and  held  the  mar- 
shal with  the  larger  part  of  his  forces  firmly  in  check.  At  the 
same  time  Tchitchagoflf,  who  had  been  informed  of  the  true 
state  of  things,  had  come  north  along  the  right  bank.  This 
compelled  the  army,  with  the  exception  of  the  shattered  corps 
of  Eugene,  Davout,  and  Junot,  which  had  passed  on  via  Sembin, 
to  fight  its  way  along.  The  two  Russian  leaders  had  agreed  at 
Borissov  to  co-operate,  and  so  on  the  28th  of  November,  amid 
icy  weather,  fighting  began  on  both  sides  of  the  river.  On  the 
east  side  Victor  with  about  7000  men  had  to  defend  himself 
against  several  times  as  many,  while  on  the  west  side  there  were 
only  17,000  to  repel  the  onset  of  26,000.  Yet  even  this  task 
was  performed  by  these  sorely-tried  troops,  most  of  whom  now 
were  non-French.  On  the  right  bank,  to  be  sure,  the  advance 
columns  at  first  gave  way  before  the  onslaught  of  the  Russian 
chasseurs;  and  even  the  Young  Guard  retired  toward  the  river. 

*  Accounts  differ  greatly,  varying  from  22,000  (S6gur)  to  50,000 
(F^zensac).  The  latter  figure  is  certainly  incorrect.  Moreover,  Napoleon 
himself  had  no  lists  before  him  now.  Clausewitz,  writing  from  Borissov  to 
Stein  November  30th,  speaks  of  "  about  40,000."  The  most  correct  estimate 
is  probably  that  of  Chambray,who  put  it  at  2fi,700  infantry  and  4000  cavalry 
on  the  26th  of  November  The  enumeration  in  Bogdanovitch  (III.  271) 
is  erroneous.  The  corps  of  Oudinot  and  ^'ictor  made  up  the  main  portion. 
The  Guard  had  shrunk  from  47,000  to  6000,  in  spite  of  special  care.  The 
great  corps  of  Davout,  once  numbering  certainly  more  than  70,000,  now 
was  reduced  to  1200;  while  of  the  30,000  men  that  stood  under  Key  at 
the  Niemen,  only  300  were  left. 


574  Moscow  [1812 

But  Ney,  who  took  the  place  of  the  wounded  Oudinot,  fired  liis 
men  on  to  a  new  advance  so  that  they  repulsed  the  enemy  and 
took  a  couple  of  thousand  prisoners.  Far  into  the  night  the 
struggle  lasted,  the  Russians  gaining  no  advantage  worth  men- 
tioning, and  the  Old  Guard  not  entering  the  fight.* 

Meanwhile  Victor,  supported  by  the  artillery  across  the  river, 
had  withstood  Wittgenstein's  feeble  attacks  until  evening,  when 
he  was  able  to  use  the  darkness  to  cross  the  river  with  the  rem- 
nants of  his  army,  after  having  helped  forward  a  large  nimiber 
of  non-combatants  over  the  bridge. f  But  he  was  no  longer 
able  to  cover  the  passage  of  all  the  stragglers  and  fugitives. 
On  the  very  morning  of  the  day  of  battle,  when  the  Russian 
artillery  began  to  play,  thousands  of  these  rushed  terror-struck 
for  the  bridge,  where  now  arose  a  wild,  inextricable  confusion 
of  wagons  and  carts  that  blocked  the  way,  of  frightened  horses 
that  trampled  the  sick  and  wounded  under  foot,  of  men  that 
fought  desperately  for  a  brief  span  of  life — all  these  raked  by 
the  enemies'  fire.  In  the  hand-to-hand  struggle  that  ensued 
many  were  hurled  over  into  the  water.  Many  more  of  their 
own  accord  in  an  agony  of  fear  entrusted  themselves  to  the  icy 
waves  or  the  floating  cakes  of  ice,  while  others  were  forced  into 
the  stream  by  the  pressure  of  the  throng  behind  them;  the 
great  majority  perished.  If  anything  could  surpass  these  scenes 
in  horror,  it  was  those  of  the  next  morning,  when  the  last  armed 
detachment  fought  its  way  over  the  wooden  structure  at  the 

*  Whether  Tchitchagoff  can  be  charged,  as  he  has  been  recently,  with 
intentional  neglect  is  as  yet  unsettled.  The  Russian  commanders  were  no 
heroes,  it  may  as  well  be  said,  and  the  French  army  with  ail  its  stragglers 
still  gave  the  impression  from  a  distance  of  a  host  of  C0,000  or  70,000. 
Tchitchagoff  hardly  commanded  half  that  number.  So  it  is  quite  intelligi- 
ble, although  not  very  much  to  his  credit,  that  after  at  last  getting  his 
bearings  he  did  not  hasten  to  the  place  of  crossing,  but  first  halted  (as 
Jomini  relates)  at  Borissov  to  bring  over  re-enforcements  on  a  rapidly  con- 
structed pontoon  bridge.  Wittgenstein,  too,  for  the  same  prudential 
reasons  advanced  to  the  Beresina  far  more  slowly  than  would  have  been 
requisite  for  a  complete  success. 

■)■  One  of  Wittgenstein's  generals  explains  the  timidity  of  thatleaderby 
the  presence  of  Napoleon:  "They  feared  him  like  the  lion  that  no  animal 
dares  to  approach."     (Historische  Zeitschrift,  62,  192.) 


JEt.  43]  The  Army   Fades  Away  5'75 

point  of  the  bayonet  and  then  set  it  on  fire.  With  a  frenzied 
roar  the  crowds  that  were  left  behind,  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren, flung  themselves  after  the  columns  right  into  the  flames, 
until  the  timbers  broke  and  cast  their  despairing  l)urden  into 
the  torrent.  Some  five  thoiLsand  of  them  still  were  left  behind, 
taken  prisoners  by  the  Russians.  When  Tchitchagoff,  after  the 
departure  of  Napoleon,  arrived  at  the  point  of  crossing,  he  found, 
as  he  himself  relates,  the  ground  covered  with  the  bodies  of  the 
slain  or  frozen  in  all  sorts  of  positions,  the  peasant  huts  of 
Studjanka  packed  with  corpses.  In  the  river  were  a\vful  heaps 
of  drowned  soldiers,  women,  and  children,  emerging  above  the 
surface  of  the  waters,  and  here  and  there  riders  rigid  in  death 
like  statues  on  their  ice-bound  horses.  The  governor  of  Minsk 
had  about  24,000  bodies  burned  here;  this  included  only  those 
picked  "up  on  the  battlefield  and  by  the"  banks  of  the  river. 
Even  ten  years  later,  islets  and  mounds  are  said  to  have  been 
visible  in  the  Beresina,  formed  of  the  victims  of  those  days, 
and  overgrown  with  forget-me-nots,  to  call  to  mind,  as  it  were, 
the  most  ghastly  spectacle  of  the  centiu'y. 

The  glorioas  passage  at  arms  on  the  28th  of  November,  by 
which  the  enemy's  plaas  were  brought  to  naught,  was  like  the 
last  fiickeriiig  of  life  in  an  organism  given  over  to  death;  after 
it  Napoleon's  military  force  crumbled  to  pieces.  He  no  longer 
had  an  army,  but  only  a  following  of  men  who  under  the  pres- 
sure of  terrible  cold  discarded  their  weapons;  half-crazed  or 
even  wholly  crazed  with  hunger  and  smitten  with  typhus,  they 
struggled  along  on  the  road  to  Vilna,  past  Sembin  and  ilolo- 
detchno.  On  the  3d  of  December,  the  thermometer  standing  at 
about  —3°,*  only  about  9000  men  still  had  their  weapons;  but 
before  long  even  they  were  unarmed,  when  the  temperature 
fell  to  22°  below  zero  on  the  6th,  and  to  35°  below  on  the  8th. 
Each  successive  night  claimed  hundreds  of  victims.  Napoleon 
had  clearly  seen,  the  day  after  the  battle  by  the  lieresina,  that 
nothing  more  was  to  be  done  with  these  troops.  "In  this  state 
of  affairs,"  he  wrote  to  Maret  at  Vilna,  ''it  is  possible  that  I 
may  consider  my  presence  in  Paris  necessary  for  France,  for 

*  These  temperature.s  are  expressed  in  Fahrenheit  degrees. — B. 


576  Moscow  [1812 

the  empire,  and  even  for  the  army."  That  settled  the  matter 
with  him;  and  there  were  excellent  reasons.  For  long  before 
reaching  Smolensk  he  had  received  news  from  the  French  capi- 
tal that  gave  him  no  little  anxiety.  A  general  of  repiibhcan 
opinions,  named  Malet,  who  had  already  become  involved  in 
1808  in  a  conspiracy  against  the  Emperor's  government  and 
had  since  then  been  detained  under  careful  guard  in  a  Paris 
maison  de  sante,  had  formed  a  plan  with  a  couple  of  royalist 
confidants  to  announce  the  death  of  Napoleon  and  to  forge 
a  Senatus  consultum  which  clothed  himself  with  the  command 
of  the  city  and  set  up  a  provisional  government  of  moderate 
republicans  and  constitutionalists  with  Moreau  and  Carnot  at 
their  head.  With  this  as  a  basis  they  proposed  to  win  over  the 
municipal  guard  and  the  national  guard  that  were  in  garrison 
at  Paris,  seize  the  persons  of  the  municipal  authorities  and  so 
overthrow  the  Empire.  For  two  weeks  no  news  had  come  of 
the  Emperor.  The  people  had  at  first  approved  the  expedi- 
tion to  Russia  as  the  last  decisive  step  in  establishing  a  per- 
manent peace;  but  the  persistent  advance  into  the  enemy's 
country  had  disturbed  their  minds,  and  the  burning  of  Moscow 
finally  dispelled  all  illusions  and  opened  up  a  prospect  of  endless 
war.  Malet  counted  on  all  this  when  he  went  to  work  early  in 
the  morning  of  October  23d.  A  regiment  of  national  guards, 
the  veteran  municipal  guard,  and  two  generals  whom  he  brought 
out  of  prison,  all  took  his  representations  for  the  truth  and 
obeyed  him.  They  helped  him  to  apprehend  Savary,  the  Minister 
of  Police,  and  the  prefect  of  the  Seine  was  so  thoroughly  con- 
vinced that  he  had  a  hall  made  ready  in  the  Hotel  de  ville  for 
the  sessions  of  the  provisional  government.  It  was  only  at  the 
commandant's  office  that,  thanks  to  the  presence  of  mind  of 
two  officers,  Malet  was  seized  with  two  companions  and  it  was 
proclaimed  to  the  troops  standing  below  that  the  Emperor 
was  alive.  "Vive  Tempereur!"  they  shouted  back,  and  the 
farce  was  at  an  end.  Malet  and  his  deluded  adherents  were 
soon  afterwards  tried  by  court-martial  and  shot. 

Such  was  the  news  that  Napoleon  received  on  the  march. 
What  struck  him  about  it,  and  what  remains  significant  even  for 


^T.  43]  Napoleon   Hastens  to  Paris  577 

history,  was  the  circumstance  that  of  all  those  who  so  easily 
believed  in  the  death  of  the  Emperor,  not  one  remembered  the 
dynasty,  but  each  one  took  for  granted  as  self-evident  that  a 
change  of  government  would  ensue.  "Wliat!"  he  exclaimed 
in  his  disappointment,  "my  wife,  my  son,  the  institutions  of  the 
Empire — no  one  has  a  thought  for  all  that!  "  But  even  this  was 
not  all.  If  such  a  plot  could  succeed  in  some  measure  as  long 
as  the  army  was  known  to  be  in  the  distance,  what  might  not  be 
attempted  if  it  became  known  that  the  army  no  longer  existed? 
Nor  could  its  fate  be  kept  secret.  Was  it  not  strange  that  he  had 
met  no  couriers  since  leaving  Smolensk?  No,  he  could  not  wait; 
he  must  go  on  and  reach  Paris  simultaneously  with  the  news  of 
the  complete  failure  of  the  expedition  and  of  the  loss  of  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  men  that  went  with  him,  in  order  to  counteract 
the  impression  with  the  overpowering  force  of  his  personality. 
At  the  Beresina  he  had  still  done  his  duty  as  general;  now  that 
the  army  was  crumbling  away  there  remained  nothing  for  the 
military  leader  to  do  except  to  get  help  for  it,  and  that  was 
possible  only  from  a  distance.  The  attitude  of  the  Germans  was 
an  added  source  of  anxiety.  Therefore,  as  soon  as  the  column 
had  once  reached  the  Vilna  road  at  Molodetchno,  he  would  leave 
it  and  hasten  home. 

On  the  5th  of  December  they  had  arrived  at  Smorgoni,  con- 
stantly fighting  the  enemy  in  the  rear,  who  captured  thousands 
of  unarmed  prisoners ;  here  he  gathered  his  marshals  about  him 
and  told  them  his  decision.  Murat  was  to  lead  the  army  beyond 
the  Niemen.  Before  Vilna  they  would  find  Bavarian  troops 
under  Wrede  and  a  fresh  division.  For  the  remnant  of  his  army 
as  well  as  for  France  his  presence  in  Paris  was  indispensable. 
From  no  other  point  could  he  hold  Austrians  and  Prussians  in 
check.  They  would  deliberate  well  before  declaring  war  against 
him  as  soon  as  they  saw  him  as  the  head  of  the  French  nation — 
he  was  at  this  moment  a  Frenchman  through  and  through — and 
beheld  a  new  army.  First  he  had  let  Eugene  read  aloud  to  them 
the  last  bulletin,  dated  at  Molodetchno  on  the  3d  of  December; 
it  was  No.  29  and  contained  hints,  though  by  no  means  the 
undisguised  truth,  as  to  the  ruin  of  the  Grand  Army.     The  whole 


S78 


Moscow  [1812 


truth  is  not  to  be  found  in  it,  and  to  one  that  knows  all  the 
woeful  story  it  must  seem  like  detestable  trifling  with  misfortune 
to  say:  "Men  whom  nature  did  not  harden  enough  to  make  them 
superior  to  all  vicissitudes  of  fate  and  fortune  lost  their  cheerful- 
ness and  good  humour  and  dreamed  of  nothing  but  mishaps  and 
defeats;  those,  however,  whom  she  created  superior  to  every- 
thing preserved  their  good  spirits  and  behaviour  and  beheld  new 
glory  in  the  hardships  which  they  had  to  overcome."  Nor  did 
the  bulletin  state  how  the  hundreds  of  thousands  perished; 
everything  was  laid  to  the  Russian  cold  winter.  Before  the  6th  of 
December  the  army,  it  was  implied,  was  still  proud,  splendid,  and 
victorious,  until  the  terrible  climate  of  the  north  weakened  and 
consumed  it.  That  he  himself  was  the  sole  cause  of  this  havoc 
the  imperial  author  did  not  betray  with  a  single  word.  Not  a 
word  was  said  of  his  mad  rush  forward  beyond  Vitebsk  and 
Smolensk  in  the  intense  heat  of  the  Russian  summer,  which  had 
caused  the  army  greater  losses  than  the  winter.  Nor  did  he  tell 
them,  if  the  cold  was  responsible  for  the  disaster,  that  he  had 
invoked  it  by  his  obstinate  waiting  in  the  burnt-out  capital. 
The  world  was  to  know  one  thing  first  of  all:  he  was  alive  and 
well.  "The  health  of  his  Majesty  has  never  been  better" ;  with 
these  words  the  bulletin  closed.  Then  he  took  leave  of  his 
ganerals  and  rode  away  with  three  companions:  Caulaincourt, 
whose  secretary  he  pretended  to  be,  Daru  and  Mouton.*     On  the 

*  Some  have  called  this  desertion;  but  this  is  just  as  incorrect  as  it 
was  when  Napoleon  left  the  army  of  the  Egyptian  expedition,  and  even 
more  so.  He  was  sovereign  and  could  command  the  army  in  person  or 
not  as  he  saw  fit,  and  hence  could  resign  the  command  when  he  would. 
And  he  would  be  in  a  much  better  position  to  procure  succour  for  the 
straitened  army  if  he  hastened  on  in  advance  of  it  than  if  he  stayed.  The 
peculiar  closing  passage  of  the  bulletin  has  also  often  been  censured  as 
being  cynical.  But  it  was  called  forth  by  some  remarks  in  the  letters  of 
his  confidential  correspondent,  state  councillor  Fi^vr^;  on  the  occasion 
of  the  Malet  fiasco  he  had  complained  that  the  bulletins  never  told  whether 
the  Emperor  was  alive,  "which  is  after  all  the  first  thing  we  want  to  know." 
In  a  previous  letter  of  October  23d  he  had  said:  "The  Emperor's  presence 
in  Paris,  provided  he  could  get  away  without  detriment  to  the  army, 
would  do  much  good."  Napoleon  was  wont  to  repose  rare  confidence  in 
this  adviser. 


Mr.  43  Napoleon    Reaches   Paris  579 

6th  he  met  Maret  at  Vilna;  on  the  10th,  the  French  plenipoten- 
tiary De  Pradt  at  Warsaw;  and  on  the  14th,  the  King  of  Saxony 
at  Dresden,  where  but  seven  months  before  he  had  graciously 
accepted,  in  the  full  splendour  of  his  power,  the  homage  of  half  the 
world.  With  incognito  preserved  he  reached  the  French  fron- 
tier, and  on  the  18th  of  December,  before  midnight,  he  entered 
Paris,  where  his  bulletin  had  preceded  him  by  a  day. 

Twice  on  the  journey  home  he  is  said  to  have  been  threatened 
with  an  assault  on  his  life.  The  first  time  was  on  Russian  soil,  at 
Osmiana,  where  he  met  the  combined  division  of  Loison,  and  a 
French  major  belonging  to  it  suggested  to  some  German  officers 
to  let  him  share  Wallenstein's  fate;  the  second  time  was  in 
Glogau.  The  statements  on  this  point  are  very  explicit  and 
leave  no  doubt  that  the  idea  was  entertained  and  discussed. 
But  in  neither  case  did  it  ripen  into  a  serious  purpose,  and 
Napoleon  escaped  unharmed.  Not  yet  was  his  star  to  disappear, 
but  it  was  beginning  to  sink  toward  the  horizon.  Ruddy  as  the 
orb  of  day  at  its  setting,  it  was  to  flood  Europe  once  more  with  the 
colours  of  fire  and  blood  ere  it  sank  forever  into  the  western 
ocean. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
LEIPZIG 

What  a  painful  awakening  for  Napoleon  from  his  dream  on 
the  way  to  Moscow  of  an  unlimited  dominion  over  states  and 
nations !  His  prestige,  won  by  such  a  long  series  of  astounding 
military  achievements,  was  shattered.  For.  although  he  had 
not  been  defeated  in  the  last  campaign,  yet  he  had  fled — whether 
from  want,  or  cold,  or  sure  destruction,  it  mattered  not,  he 
had  fled ;  and  the  impression  could  not  be  obhterated  which  this 
unheard-of  event  had  produced  on  Europe.  Of  the  "Grand 
Army,"  whose  best  elements  had  been  victorious  at  Austerlitz 
and  Friedland,  there  now  survived  only  insignificant  remnants. 
And  we  know  what  the  army  was  to  him.  "His  people,"  was 
the  apt  characterization  of  it  by  Jaucourt,  the  friend  of  Talley- 
rand. An  army,  to  be  sure,  was  still  under  arms  ready  to  serve 
his  will ;  but  in  size  it  was  not  to  be  compared  to  the  one  he  had 
lost,  and,  moreover,  it  was  in  the  field  against  the  English  and 
Spanish.  He  still  had  alUes,  of  course,  but  they  were  only  alUes 
of  his  good  fortune  and  his  might,  it  was  a  serious  question 
whether  they  would  continue  allies  of  his  weakness. 

Reviewing  the  Emperor's  aims  in  his  expedition  to  the  East, 
we  find  that  it  was  not  only  the  extension  of  his  continental 
power  over  Russia  that  he  sought,  but  also  to  shut  England 
entirely  out  of  Europe.  Thus  smitten  in  her  most  vital  interests, 
she  would  sue  for  peace,  withdraw  her  army  from  Spain,  and  open 
the  seas  to  the  world-wide  policy  of  the  concpieror.  Perhaps 
this  object  would  have  been  accomplished  if  Napoleon  had  halted 
at  Smolensk  according  to  his  original  plan,  and  then  liberated 
Lithuania.  He  would  in  that  case  have  collected  his  army  and 
swelled  it  with  re-enforcements;  he  would  have  established  a  well- 
regulated  commissariat;  then  with  an  imposing  show  of  strength 

580 


^h-. 43]  Events  in  Spain  and  America  581 

he  could  have  taken  up  a  position  threatening  both  Russian 
capitals,  and  one  not  without  influence  on  political  affairs  in  the 
world  at  large.  For  at  the  ver}^  time  that  he  crossed  the  Nicmen 
he  found  a  helper  in  his  struggle  with  England — the  United 
States,  which  had  declared  war  against  England  in  June,  1812. 
For  two  years  Napoleon  had  worked  for  this  result,  by  promising 
the  United  States  exemption  from  the  decrees  of  Berlin  and 
Milan  if  they  would  stop  trading  with  England  and  her  colonies 
and  secure  the  repeal  in  London  of  the  Orders  in  Council  of  1807. 
He  well  knew  that  the  EngUsh  would  not  consent  to  this,  at 
least  not  in  the  essential  points.  And  in  fact  they  not  only 
refused  when  repeal  was  proposed,  but  took  an  altogether  hostile 
attitude.  They  caused  all  American  vessels  to  be  searched  for 
British  seamen  in  order  to  press  them  into  the  English  navy,  and 
stirred  up  enemies  in  America  against  the  government  at  Wash- 
ington. This  led  them  in  1812  to  open  war,  which  at  the  outset 
cost  the  British  some  losses  at  sea.  This  new  complication, 
combined  with  the  constant  decHne  in  the  financial  condition  of 
the  island  kingdom  and  a  threatening  position  of  Napoleon  in 
Russia,  would  perhaps  have  operated  in  London  in  favour  of  a 
general  peace,  especially  as  the  year  had  closed  without  any 
great  results  for  England  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula.  For,  in  spite 
of  Wellington's  victory  at  Salamanca,  which  procured  for  him  the 
supreme  cormiiand  over  all  the  forces  arrayed  against  the  French 
and  raised  the  siege  of  Cadiz,  he  was  finally  forced  by  the 
blunders  and  selfishness  of  the  Spaniards  to  retire  to  the  Portu- 
guese frontier.  But  when  one  despatch  after  another  brought 
to  London  news  of  the  dwindling  away  of  the  Grand  Army,  of 
the  fruitless  slaughter  at  Borodino,  of  the  burning  of  Moscow,  of 
the  retreat  and  its  horrors :  then,  as  a  matter  of  course,  there  was 
no  longer  any  thought  of  peace  and  compromise  ^\ith  Napoleon. 
Nay,  rather,  the  war  sentiment  now  gained  undisputed  sway. 

Before  the  end  of  summer  Great  Britain  had  secured  a 
peaceful  settlement  with  Russia  and  at  the  same  time  had  been 
influential  in  bringing  about  a  treaty  betwen  Alexander  I.  and 
the  Spanish  Regency  (dated  respectively  July  18th  and  20th, 
1812);  so  that  while  the  fate  of  the  campaign  was  still  in  the 


582  Leipzig  [1812 

balance  there  already  existed  a  coalition,  directed  not  so  much 
against  France  as  a  nation,  as  against  that  predominance  achieved 
by  Napoleon  and  represented  in  his  ambitious  personality.  Now 
arose  the  question  whose  answer  would  decide  the  future  course 
of  events:  would  the  nations  within  the  magic  circle  of  Na- 
poleon's power,  in  view  of  the  great  losses  they  had  suffered, 
also  join  the  general  movement,  either  with  or  without  the 
consent  of  their  governments? 

Napoleon  does  not  seem  to  have  discerned  at  once  the  full 
significance  of  the  events  in  Russia.  After  his  departure  from 
the  army  he  had  still  hoped  that  it  would  be  easy  to  provision 
it  and  restore  it  to  order  at  Vilna,  that  the  division  approaching 
to  support  it  would  bring  new  strength  and  courage,  and  that 
Murat,  backed  by  Macdonald  with  the  Prussians  on  the  one 
side  and  by  Schwarzenberg  on  the  other,  could  maintain  his 
position  beyond  the  Niemen.  When  he  passed  through  War- 
saw he  assured  the  government  there  that  he  still  had  120,000 
men.  He  had  no  thoughts  of  giving  up  his  position  of  suprem- 
acy in  Europe;  not  even  when  fuially  he  heard  that  the  rem- 
nants of  the  "Grand  Army"  had  been  unable  to  keep  their 
position  at  Vilna,  but  that  after  infecting  the  newly-arrived 
fresh  troops  with  their  disorder  they  had  to  be  led  back  over 
the  Niemen  to  Konigsberg,  with  untold  sufferings  and  hourly 
losses  on  the  road,  and  that  the  Old  Guard  numbered  only 
400  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Guard  800  horse,  the  remainder  con- 
sisting of  a  chaotic  mass  of  several  thousand  officers  and  subal- 
terns. That  was  a  great  misfortune,  of  course,  but  not  so 
great  as  to  destroy  all  courage.  Napoleon  resolved  to  bring  a 
new  army  into  the  field  and  march  against  the  Russians  in 
the  spring.  Immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Paris  prepara- 
tions for  armament  were  initiated  on  a  large  scale,  the  plans 
for  which  he  had  very  likely  thought  out  carefully  during  the 
protracted  retreat. 

The  principal  thing  was,  of  course,  that  his  government  still 
had  a  strong  enough  i)()sition  in  France  itself  and  the  French 
people  did  not  refuse  to  follow  in  his  service.  The  authorities 
and    institutions,    as    was    to    be    expected,    taking   the    hint, 


jet.43]         Napoleon  Exalts  Civil  Loyalty  583 

showed  no  lack  of  devoted  homage  and  assurances  of  unwaver- 
ing loyalty.  In  his  answers  to  them  Napoleon  made  some 
reference  to  the  plot  of  Malet  and  to  the  attitude  of  the  gov- 
ernment organs.  "Timid  and  cowardly  soldiers,"  said  he  to 
the  deputation  of  the  Senate,  "may  cost  a  nation  its  inde- 
pendence, but  timid  officials  destroy  the  majesty  of  the  laws, 
the  rights  of  the  throne,  and  the  order  of  society.  The  noblest 
death  would  be  that  of  the  soldier  on  the  field  of  honour,  if  that 
of  the  official  who  falls  while  defending  his  monarch,  the  throne, 
and  the  laws  were  not  still  more  glorious."  In  his  reply  to 
the  address  of  the  Council  of  State  he  inveighed  against  those 
who  upheld  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights,  and  held  them  ac- 
countable for  the  insecurity  of  pubUc  institutions.  "Indeed," 
he  said,  "who  are  they  that  have  declared  the  principle  that 
revolt  is  a  duty?  that  have  flattered  the  people  by  ascribing  to 
them  a  sovereignty  which  they  are  incapable  of  exercising? 
Who  have  undermined  the  dignity  and  sanctity  of  the  laws  by 
making  them  dependent  not  on  the  hallowed  principles  of  jus- 
tice, on  the  nature  of  things  and  of  civil  rights,  but  simply  on 
the  will  of  a  collection  of  men  who  are  wholly  lacking  in  any 
understanding  of  civil  and  penal  law,  of  administration,  or  of 
military  and  political  statutes?  He  who  is  called  to  regenerate 
a  state  must  proceed  on  principles  diametrically  opposed  to 
these.  History  portrays  the  heart  of  man ;  in  its  pages  must 
we  seek  for  the  merits  and  defects  of  different  kinds  of  legisla- 
tion." Wliat  was  his  object  in  such  outbursts?  Nothing  but 
to  point  out  clearly  once  more  how  he  himself  had  once  saved 
the  state  from  the  anarchy  into  which  that  spirit  of  revolt  had 
plunged  it.  This  spirit  had  now  manifested  itself  again,  and 
the  state  would  certainly  be  ruined  by  it  if  the  Emperor  were 
to  be  forsaken  now  instead  of  being  sustained  with  might  and 
main ;  and  this  applied  equally  to  his  son,  the  heir  of  his  throne 
and  of  his  principles. 

It  now  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  people  of  France 
could  be  matle  to  share  that  conviction.  For  that  was  neces- 
sary if  Napoleon  was  to  succeed  in  recovering  with  a  new  army 
his  former  position. 


584  Leipzig  [1813 

On  his  return  home  all  the  recruiting  material  he  could 
command  consisted  of  the  conscription  of  1813,  say  140,000 
men,  most  of  whom  reported  at  the  military  stations  before  the 
end  of  December  and  were  listed  in  the  cadres.  Within  a  few 
months  they  would  be  sufficiently  drilled  for  active  service. 
Of  trained  soldiers  there  were  only  four  regiments  of  marine 
artillery,  3000  gendarmes,  and  two  battalions  of  the  Paris 
municipal  guard.  These  forces  would  not  by  any  means  be 
sufficient  for  the  Emperor  in  his  present  situation  and  with 
his  outlook  for  new  wars  and  new  victories.  He  must  have 
other  and  far  larger  forces.  There  were  the  cohorts  of  the 
national  guards,  80,000  strong;  but  then  they  were  not  avail- 
able outside  of  France,  and  most  of  their  leaders  were  officers 
who  had  been  either  invalided,  pensioned,  or  discharged. 

Some  remedy  was  required  in  this  situation.  In  the  first 
place  the  Senate  was  called  upon  to  pass  a  decree  that  the  co- 
horts, like  the  regular  line,  would  have  to  serve  in  foreign  wars; 
next,  the  "Grand  Army" — whenever  the  chaos  of  stragglers 
was  disentangled — must  send  on  all  available  generals,  staff- 
officers,  colonels,  and  subalterns.  Both  these  things  were  ac- 
complished. Nay,  more:  from  the  national  guard  itself  there 
came  in  individual  petitions  (by  order,  of  course)  for  the  privi- 
lege of  being  led  against  the  enemy,  whereupon  the  Senate  passed 
the  necessary  decree,  January  11th,  1813.  This  also  opened 
up  the  prospect  of  250,000  men  in  addition;  i.e.,  100,000  from 
the  last  four  age  classes,  which  had  hitherto  been  exempt  from 
the  levy,  and  150,000  of  the  conscription  of  1814,  which,  however, 
the  Emperor  would  not  call  to  arms  until  spring.  Thus  the 
material  for  the  new  army  was  provided,  and  if  some  squad- 
rons and  a  few  larger  bodies  of  troops  were  taken  in  from  the 
army  in  Spain,  a  very  respectable  army  could  be  put  into  the 
field.  But  Napoleon  was  not  satisfied  with  that;  in  April  he 
demanded  from  the  Senate  180,000  men  more,  national  guards 
and  recruits,  so  that,  taking  into  account  desertion,  incompe- 
tence, and  sickness,  he  might  have  at  his  disposal  an  army  of 
600,000  men  for  the  campaign  of  1813.  The  scarcity  of  horses 
he   sought  to   remedy  by  purchases  in  France    and  Hanover. 


^T.  43]  The  Struggle  for   Recovery  585 

Moreover,  the  suggestion  was  made  to  corporations  and  private 
parties  that  they  could  secure  special  consideration  by  vokin- 
tarily  offering  to  the  Emperor  horsemen  already  equipped. 

Napoleon  exhibited  in  January  of  1813  the  same  untiring 
activity  as  of  old,  the  same  knowledge  of  his  resources  do\vn  to 
the  smallest  detail,  all  held  ready  for  ase  by  a  prodigious  memory. 
It  is  with  increasing  astonishment  that  we  see  this  one  man,  no 
longer  aided  by  the  usual  carefully  prepared  lists  of  troops, 
under  circumstances  that  would  have  dimmed  the  vision  and 
disturbed  the  calm  of  any  other  human  being,  and  surrounded 
by  servants  that  were  of  assistance  only  in  subordinate  mat- 
ters, working  with  indefatigable  energy  to  rebuild  the  fabric 
of  his  power.  What  a  pity  that  this  great  genius  for  admin- 
istration, which  had  once  brought  order  and  strength  to  the 
state,  was  now  exhausting  itself  in  efforts  that  would  sap  the 
national  forces! 

But  for  these  new  sacrifices  which  he  demanded  it  was  not 
enough  to  have  gained  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  It  was  neces- 
sary also  to  gain  the  good-will  of  the  people,  or  at  least  overcome 
its  reluctance;  and  that  was  no  easy  task.  But  here  French 
patriotism  helped  him  out.  Not  only  the  Emperor  but  France, 
too,  had  forfeited  by  the  misfortune  of  the  last  year  her  com- 
manding position  in  foreign  affairs,  her  decisive  pre-eminence 
among  the  nations.  However  deeply  the  people  might  deplore 
the  unceasing  state  of  war  and  its  consequences,  they  neverthe- 
less had  no  desire  to  see  their  country  in  a  state  of  weak- 
ness. And  the  consequences  of  her  loss  of  power  were  already 
making  themselves  felt. 

This  was  true  to  begin  with  in  Prussia,  which  had  been  com- 
pelled to  join  sides  with  the  oppressor  only  by  a  menacing  show 
of  power.  The  people  there  regarded  the  destruction  of  the 
Grand  Army,  from  which  their  own  soldiers  had  escaped,  as  a  sort 
of  judgment  of  God,  and  as  a  sign  to  them  to  throw  off  at  last 
the  yoke  of  this  humiliating  alliance: 

"With  rider  and  horse  and  all, 
So  God  hath  caused  their  fall," 

as  a  poet  expressed  it.     The  oppressive  acts  of  the  troops  as 


586  Leipzig  [1813 

they  marched  through  the  country  had  kindled  the  rage  of  the 
people  against  the  foreigners  and  roused  an  undying  hatred  in 
their  bosoms  that  sought  for  expression  in  action.  One  incident 
may  serve  as  a  measure  of  the  sentiment  that  prevailed  in  the 
Prussian  corps  which  had  been  compelled  to  serve  the  enemy 
of  the  people.  Before  Riga  it  had  certainly  behaved  well.  But 
later  when  Paulucci,  the  Russian  commandant  of  the  fortress, 
by  authority  of  the  Czar,  sought  to  win  over  General  von 
Yorck  (who  was  in  command  in  place  of  Grawert,  then  sick)  to 
the  Russian  side,  and  exhibited  a  letter  in  which  Alexander  bound 
himself  solemnly  not  to  put  up  his  sword  until  Prussia  should 
occupy  again  her  position  of  1806;  and  when  in  December,  on  the 
retreat  back  to  the  south,  Yorck's  division  found  before  it  a 
Russian  division  under  Diebitsch,  who  confirmed  the  promise; 
when,  finally,  the  news  was  positively  confirmed  of  the  breaking 
up  of  the  Grand  Army :  then  the  Prussian  general  concluded  at 
Tauroggen  on  the  30th  of  December,  1812,  a  convention  declaring 
his  corps  to  be  a  neutral  body  and  binding  it  not  to  fight  against 
Russia  for  two  months,  even  though  the  King  should  repudiate 
the  agreement  and  command  them  to  join  the  French  again. 
That  was  a  momentous  act;  for  it  showed  that  even  a  man  of 
strictest  loyalty  and  most  conservative  convictions,  who  had  a 
profound  aversion  to  reformers  like  Scharnhorst  and  Stein,  was 
forced  to  give  way  before  the  weight  of  public  opinion.  In  1809 
such  men  as  Bliicher  and  Biilow  wanted  to  act,  "  with  the  king  or 
without,"  in  favour  of  Austria ;  now  even  a  man  like  Yorck  refused 
to  fight  against  the  Russians,  whether  the  King  approved  or  not. 
So  the  national  sentiment  won  the  day  even  over  the  monarchical. 
The  cabinet  of  Frederick  William  III.  began  to  be  uncertain  as  to 
its  forces;  it  must  needs  turn  about,  to  regain  full  control  over 
them.  But  the  encouragement  from  that  convention  at  Taurog- 
gen to  the  rest  of  Germany  was  indescribable.  "Those  whose 
memory  reaches  back  to  that  period,"  writes  Ranke,  "will  recall 
that  the  news  of  it  seemed  even  to  those  at  a  great  distance  like 
a  flash  of  liglitiiing  that  illumin(>d  and  transfigured  the  entire 
horizon.  While  still  under  the  l''r(>nch  yoke,  one*  could  feel  every- 
where the  unwonted  pulsations  of  the  national  consciousness." 


iEx.  13]       Throwing   the   Blame   on   Murat  587 

Tlie  impression  of  that  same  nows  on  Napoleon  \vas  deep  and 
lasting.  The  lessons  he  had  received  in  Kussia  and  was  still 
hourly  receiving  in  Spain  in  regard  to  the  power  of  a  national 
rising  had  at  last  opened  his  eyes,  so  that  he  did  not  delude 
himself  as  to  the  moral  significance  of  the  event.  But  in  addi- 
tion to  that  it  had  also  a  strategical  significance,  and  it  was  this 
aspect  that  proved  fatal  to  him.  For  after  the  desertion  of  the 
corps  of  allies  any  longer  stay  of  his  broken  army  at  Konigsberg, 
even  with  such  re-enforcements  as  were  sent,  was  out  of  the 
question.  Murat  had  to  retreat  before  the  pursuit  of  the  Rus- 
sians to  Posen  and  give  up  the  line  of  the  Vistula.  This  is  the 
point  to  which  Napoleon  directed  the  attention  of  the  French. 
"Immediately  after  I  had  heard  of  the  treason  of  Yorck,"  he 
writes  on  the  6th  of  January  to  Berthier,  who  had  remained 
with  the  army,  "I  resolved  to  make  a  communication  to  the 
nation,  to  be  issued  to-morrow,  and  order  extraordinary^  levies  of 
men."  The  response  was  the  Senatus  consultiun  of  the  11th 
mentioned  above,  which  was  nowhere  stubbornly  opposed,  so 
that  Maret  felt  quite  justified  in  explaining  to  the  ambassadors 
at  foreign  courts  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  French  people 
not  only  to  arm  itself  on  a  scale  corresponding  to  its  losses,  "but 
also  to  establish  its  prestige,  its  glory,  and  its  tranquillity  secure 
against  all  contingencies."  The  Emperor  assured  the  Prussian 
envoy  at  Paris,  Krusemarck,  that  the  French  would  follow  him 
unquestioningly,  and  that  if  need  be  he  would  even  arm  the 
women. 

But  if  the  people  were  to  offer  this  new  sacrifice  of  blood 
without  resistance,  then  the  prestige  and  renown  of  their  com- 
mander must  also  be  undimmed.  Hence  wherever  opportunity 
offered  positive  assurances  were  given  out  that  the  Emperor  had 
invariably  defeated  the  Russians,  that  it  was  only  the  fiendish 
cold  that  had  destroyed  the  army,  which  really  had  per- 
ished only  after  Murat  took  command.  There  has  been 
recently  published  a  conversation  between  the  Emperor  and 
one  of  his  higher  officials.  Count  Mole,  in  February,  1S13,  which 
shows  clearly  how  Napoleon  wished  to  be  judged.  On  this 
occasion  he  said:  "The  King  of  Naples  is  incapable  of  taking 


588  Leipzig  [1813 

supreme  command.  He  has  lost  me  an  army,  for  at  the  time  I 
left  I  still  had  one ;  now  I  have  one  no  longer.  After  my  departure 
the  King  lost  his  head;  he  did  not  know  how  to  awe  men  into 
obedience,  discipline  grew  extremely  lax,  in  Vilna  the  troops 
plundered  twelve  millions'  worth  of  property,  and  the  soldiers 
became  good  for  nothing." 

Another  means  of  overcoming  popular  dislike  of  these  new 
armaments  was  found  in  the  settlement  of  his  contest  with  the 
Pope.  In  that  way  he  would  win  over  the  millions  of  devout 
Catholics  who  had  been  offended  by  his  violent  measures  against 
Pius  VII.  Would  not  they,  too,  see  in  the  destruction  of  the 
army  a  visitation  of  God,  who  withheld  his  favour  from  a  leader 
who  was  under  the  ban?  Uncle  Fesch,  the  cardinal,  had  the 
courage  to  say  as  much  right  out;  that  was  something  that 
demanded  consideration.  In  1811,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Pope 
at  Savona  had  accepted  the  decree  of  the  national  council 
concerning  the  investiture  of  newly  appointed  bishops  only 
with  certain  reservations;  he  had  not  recognized  the  council, 
and  had  granted  the  privilege  of  confirmation  to  the  metropolitans 
in  case  of  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Pope  only  on  condition  that 
they  performed  the  rite  in  the  name  of  the  head  of  the  Church, 
whereas  the  Emperor  desired  the  new  bishops  to  be  invested 
in  the  name  of  the  Imperator.  Pius,  who  was  already  regretting 
his  action,  refused  his  consent  to  this,  whereupon  Napoleon  gave 
orders  to  bring  him  from  Savona  to  Fontainebleau ;  here,  with 
the  assistance  of  some  submissive  prelates,  new  negotiations 
were  begun,  which  the  Emperor  himself  then  brought  to  a  con- 
clusion. He  employed  against  his  prisoner  all  the  resources  of 
his  diplomatic  art  and  craft.  Now  he  would  make  demands 
without  serious  intent  and  only  with  a  view  to  dropping  them  for 
something  more  important;  again,  he  would  threaten,  become 
vehement,  taunt  His  Holiness  with  his  ignorance  in  ecclesiastical 
affairs;  and  then,  again,  he  would  spread  out  before  him  a 
glowing  prophetic  picture  of  the  extension  and  power  which  the 
Church  would  attain  by  his  aid — first  and  foremost,  the  recovery 
of  Germany  to  the  Catholic  fold — if  Pius  would  only  yield  to  his 
wishes,  renounce  temporal  sovereignty,  accept  the  decree  of  the 


.Et. 43]    The  New  Agreement  with  the  Pope      589 

council  Nvithout  ado,  and  establish  his  residence  in  Paris.  liut 
on  tills  last  point  the  Pope  was  not  to  be  moved;  he  chose 
Avignon,  which  was  not  expressly  mentioned,  to  be  sure,  in  the 
concordat;  that  read  as  follows:  "His  Holiness  will  exercise  the 
papal  authority  in  France  and  in  the  kingdom  of  Italy  in  the 
same  form  and  manner  £is  his  predecessors."  Having  yielded  this 
point,  Napoleon  did  not  insist  that  the  renunciation  of  the 
patrimony  of  St.  Peter  should  be  explicitly  set  down  in  the 
articles;  that  was  involved  in  the  provisions  of  the  agreement. 
The  new  concordat  was  signed  on  the  25th  of  January,  1813; 
the  decree  of  the  council  in  regard  to  the  investing  of  bishops  was 
included  word  for  word.  In  return  for  his  lost  lands  the  Pope 
was  to  be  maintained  with  an  annual  revenue  of  two  miUion 
francs ;  the  Emperor  pardoned  the  refractory  prelates.  Napoleon 
had  not  yet  secured  all  that  he  desired ;  he  wanted  to  be  the  head 
of  the  Church,  somewhat  like  the  Czar  in  his  own  country,  only  far 
higher  and  with  more  universal  sway  as  the  name  of  the  Cliurch 
indicated,  and  with  a  world-wide  mission  to  fulfil.  Still  the 
immediate  advantage  he  was  after  he  had  gained.  He  had 
made  his  peace  with  the  Pope,  and  the  world  could  hear  of  it 
none  too  soon.  Newspaper  articles  and  church  bells  proclaimed 
it  far  and  wide,  and  everywhere  they  sang  "  Te  deum  laudamus." 
And  although  Pius,  tormented  by  misgivings  and  remorse  and 
enlightened  by  his  old  advisers,  who  again  had  access  to  him,  as 
to  the  political  situation  of  Napoleon,  recalled  his  consent  two 
months  later,  yet  meantime  the  news  of  the  reconcihation  at 
Fontainebleau  had  its  effect,  and  the  war  preparations  were  then 
for  the  most  part  completed. 

But,  besides  the  faithful,  the  Emperor  had  to  win  over 
those,  too,  who  were  more  concerned  for  this  world's  goods  than 
for  those  of  the  next  world.  That  was,  of  course,  very  difficult; 
for,  since  he  had  undertaken  the  Russian  expedition  with 
the  expectation  that  it  would  bring  in  material  profit  and 
restore  order  to  the  finances  of  the  state,  like  the  wars  of  1805 
and  1807,  the  disappointment  was  tremendous.  And  now  the 
new  armaments  called  for  new  and  extraordinary  expenses.  A 
deficit  of  nearly  150,000,000  francs  was  expected  for  the  year 


590  Leipzig  [I813 

1813,  and  the  shortage  of  the  two  preceding  years,  over  82,000,000 
francs,  had  not  been  made  up.  Mollien,  Minister  of  the  Treasury, 
a  most  honourable  man,  who  had  followed  the  policy  of  the 
Emperor  with  undisguised  anxiety,  advised  him  to  increase  the 
direct  taxes.  But*  Napoleon  set  aside  that  suggestion  more 
positively  than  ever.  He  fought  shy  of  touching  the  personal 
property  of  individuals.  He  hit  upon  another  device:  he  would 
turn  the  communal  property  to  some  account.  Several  thousand 
communes  possessed  real  estate  that  was  not  used  for  public 
purposes,  but  was  leased.  These  lands  were  estimated  to  be 
worth  370,000,000  francs.  The  rentals  were  small,  amount- 
ing to  only  about  nine  millions.  But  nine  millions  of  interest 
would  represent  an  investment  of  135,000,000  in  the  five  per 
cents,  which  were  then  selling  at  75.  Now  if  the  communes  had 
their  nine  millions  of  yearly  income  assured  by  entering  for  them 
180,000,000  in  the  Great  Book  of  the  public  debt, then  by  selling 
the  lands  on  account  of  the  state  the  230,000,000  required  would 
be  obtained  and  the  deficit  covered.  The  sale  was  to  be  done  by 
the  "caisse  d'amortissement,*  which  in  the  interim  issued  redeem- 
able bonds  bearing  five  per  cent  interest,  with  which  the  minister 
paid  creditors  of  the  state,  contractors,  etc.,  this  being  easily 
managed  because  of  the  sure  interest.  Napoleon  himself  pur- 
chased 71,000,000  francs'  worth  from  the  treasury  of  the  Tuileries^ 
to  raise  the  value  of  this  paper.  Mollien  protested  long  against 
this  arbitrary  measure,  which  not  only  robbed  the  communes  of 
their  property,  but  also  limited  them  for  all  the  future  to  the 
above  small  revenue,  whereas  by  natural  processes  their  expenses 
would  go  on  increasing  and  could  be  met  only  by  increased 
assessments  which  would  fall  on  individuals  directly.  Hence  it 
was  in  appearance  only  that  for  the  moment  the  individual  with 
his  property  was  not  called  on  to  contribute.  But  for  Napoleon 
the  moment  was  all-important.  The  great  founder  of  national 
order  and  well-being  we  once  knew  is  hardly  to  be  recognized  in 
this  opportunist.  Regardless  of  everything,  now  as  during  the 
past  summer,  he  pushes  on  for  that  decisive  victory  which  is  to 

*  See  page  229. 


il^T.  43]  Napoleon's  Earlier  Constitutional  Plans   591 

lay  all  Europe  at  his  feet.     Then  will  he  restore  order  and  pros- 
perity, but  certainly  not  until  then. 

When  the  new  financial  law  had  been  discussed  in  council,  it 
passed,  in  accordance  with  the  constitution,  to  the  Corps  L^gis- 
latif.  Before  the  Russian  campaign  this  concession  was  no 
longer  made;  the  financial  law  for  1812  had  been  enacted  without 
consulting  the  deputies  of  the  legislature.  In  fact  Napoleon 
seems  to  have  cherished  the  firm  intention  to  dissolve  the  Corps 
L^gislatif  entirely  after  his  victories  over  Russia ;  he  said  of  it  to 
Metternich  at  Dresden  that  he  had  muzzled  it  and  brought  dis- 
credit upon  it,  and  now  only  needed  to  put  the  key  of  the  legis- 
lative chamber  into  his  pocket.  Then  he  had  a  new  programme 
in  mind.  "  France,"  said  he,  "  is  less  fitted  for  the  form  of  popular 
representation  than  many  countries.  In  the  Tribunate  there 
was  nothing  going  on  but  revolution ;  I  established  order  by  abol- 
ishing that  body.  However,  I  do  not  want  absolute  power;  I 
want  more  than  mere  forms.  I  want  something  that  will  conduce 
wholly  and  solely  to  order  and  public  prosperity.  I  shall 
reorganize  the  Senate  and  the  Council  of  State.  The  former  \vTill 
replace  the  upper  house;  the  latter,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  I 
shall  continue  to  appoint  all  the  senators ;  one  third  of  the  Council 
I  shall  permit  to  be  elected,  the  rest  I  shall  choose  myself. 
These  will  then  prepare  the  budget  and  discuss  all  bills.  Thus  I 
shall  have  a  real  representation  of  the  people,  for  it  will  consist 
only  of  experienced  men  of  affairs;  no  more  visionary  ranting, 
no  glittering  tinsel  of  theory.  Then  France  will  be  well  governed 
even  under  an  inactive  ruler — for  such  are  sure  to  come — and 
the  usual  method  of  educating  princes  will  entirely  suffice."  This 
speech  had  the  definite  aim  of  showing  Metternich  and  the  world 
clearly  that  his  work,  the  Empire,  did  not  rest,  was  not  dependent 
upon  a  single  life.  He  would  see  to  it  that  it  should  remain 
unshaken  even  under  those  emperors  of  his  dynasty  who  were 
not  endowed  with  his  genius  and  energy.  So  far  so  good. 
But  the  fact  that  he  expected  national  salvation  only  at  the 
hands  of  bureaucrats  shows  that  his  own  mind  was  not  with- 
out its  Umitations;  for  he  failed  to  grasp  the  great  truth  that 
only  by  the  working  together  of  theory  and  practice,  only  when 


592  Leipzig  [1813 

thinking  shapes  public  poUcy  and,  conversely,  when  political 
experience  guides  thinking,  does  a  state  develop  a  healthy  life; 
whereas  he,  by  his  one-sided  reliance  on  the  practical  factors  of 
government,  fell  into  as  barren  an.  extreme  as  the  radical  doc- 
trinaires that  had  preceded  him  in  governing  France.  Had 
not  the  very  things  which  he  recognized  as  the  foundations  of  the 
modern  state  and  which  he  was  spreading  throughout  the  world 
with  his  armies,  his  officials,  and  his  codes  of  laws  once  been  the 
dream  of  just  such  visionaries  as  he  detested  so  bitterly?  His 
judgment  of  them  might  be  never  so  contemptuous,  and  yet 
but  for  them  and  the  fruit  of  their  thinking  his  name  might 
never  have  gone  down  to  posterity. 

But  these  plans  formed  by  the  Imperator  in  the  days  of  his 
highest  glory  had  through  subsequent  events  become  impracti- 
cable. He  now  had  no  intention  of  altering  the  constitution.  He 
did  not  lock  up  the  hall  of  the  Corps  L6gislatif ,  but  rather  opened 
its  sessions  on  the  14th  of  February,  1813,  with  a  speech  which 
he  wished  to  be  regarded  and  publicly  announced  as  a  communi- 
cation to  the  nation.  This  last  remnant  of  popular  representa- 
tion was  now  a  most  welcome  means  of  arriving  at  an  under- 
standing. He  referred  them  to  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  for 
the  evidence  that  at  no  time  had  commerce  and  trade  been  so 
flourishing  in  France  as  at  that  hour.  He  then  painted  the 
course  of  the  Russian  war  in  the  well-known  colours,  only  that 
here  for  the  first  time  mention  was  made  of  the  "premature 
appearance  of  the  winter's  cold,"  which  has  since  managed  to 
maintain  itself  for  decades  in  history  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Napoleonic  legend.  Besides  that,  he  spoke  of  his  peace  with  the 
Pope,  of  the  English,  who  had  again  been  obliged  to  evacuate 
Spain,  where  the  "French  dynasty"  was  now  dominant  and 
would  continue  dominant.  He  said  he  was  satisfied  with  the 
attitude  of  the  allies;  he  would  abandon  none  of  them  and  he 
would  maintain  the  integrity  of  their  governments.  That 
meant  that  he  proposed  to  hold  fast  to  Poland,  the  Rhenish  Con- 
federation, and  Italy,  in  brief,  the  entire  sphere  of  power  that 
was  his  the  previous  year;  to  hold  and  keep  it  undiminished 
just  as  if  no  miserable  war  had  weakened  his  forces  by  the  loss 


^T.  43]        Napoleon's  Appeal  to  his  Allies  593 

of  a  tried  army  of  400,000  men.  But  the  world  luid  accustomed 
him  to  making  extraordinary  plans,  and  for  him  it  was  in  itself 
a  sufficient  sacrifice  that  he  had  to  defer  his  intentions  to  master 
the  world,  for  the  Continental  blockade  could  no  longer  be 
maintained.  England  continued  imhindered  her  commerce  in  the 
North  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  with  Cadiz  and  tlie  Levant,  and  the 
Indian  project  was  vanishing  into  the  remote  future.  He  must 
first  conquer,  ^vin  victories  unparalleled,  if  he  was  to  take  up  that 
thread  where  he  had  dropped  it. 

But  supposing  that  Napoleon  should  be  able  to  obtain  from 
the  French  another  armament  for  a  new  military  expedition, 
the  next  question  was:  could  he  also  have  at  his  disposal  the 
military  strength  of  all  his  allies,  as  in  the  last  campaign?  On 
the  18th  of  January,  1813,  he  had  w'ritten  to  the  princes  of  the 
Rhenish  Confederation  and  called  upon  them  for  new  contingents. 
To  encourage  them,  he  declared  that  the  Russians  had  fought 
poorly  and  only  the  Cossacks  had  proved  themselves  effective 
fighters  after  their  fashion.  The  Grand  Army  of  Germany,  with 
the  corps  of  Schwarzenberg,  still  amounted,  he  declared,  to 
200.000  men  (!),  and  these  he  would  swell  before  March  by  the 
national  guards  and  new  levies  in  Italy  to  such  a  point  that  he 
might  have  dispensed  with  further  help  from  "his  nations,"  but 
for  Yorck's  defection  with  20,000  Prussians.  That  had  obliged 
the  army  (an  army  of  200,000,  it  is  to  be  remembered)  to 
retreat  before  the  Russians  (who  fought  so  poorly)  beyond  the 
Vistula,  and  so  the  war  had  approached  the  vicinity  of  Germany. 
He  would  be  ready,  indeed,  with  all  his  forces  to  defend  the 
Rhenish  states,  but  they  must  also  feel  the  necessity  of  taking 
their  share  in  that  task. 

The  answer  to  this  appeal  was  entirely  satisfactory,  although 
the  several  contingents  diminished  in  size  in  proportion  to  the 
distance  from  France.  The  Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
was  the  only  Rhenish  prince  who  openly  deserted  Napoleon; 
all  the  rest  were  loyal.  The  most  compliant,  far  more  so  than 
the  Emperor's  own  brother  Jerome,  was  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Frankfort,  who  at  once  began  most  eagerly  to  equip  two  bat- 
talions in  order  to  give  Napoleon  "opportunity  for  new  glory." 


594  Leipzig  [isis 

An  oppressive  excise  law  furnished  the  requisite  funds.  The 
King  of  Wiirttemberg,  whose  army  corps  of  14,000  had  shrunk 
to  173  officers  and  143  soldiers,  hastened  to  assure  him  that 
immediately  after  he  had  become  acquainted  with  the  29th 
bulletin  he  had  busied  himself  in  the  effort  to  replace  his  con- 
tingent. Jerome  of  Westphalia  again  complained  to  his 
brother  of  the  financial  distress  in  his  state — he  himself  had 
invested  nineteen  millions  in  France — ^but  his  brother's  peremp- 
tory rebuke  induced  him  to  agree  to  furnish  20,000  men  and 
send  provision  for  15,000  more  to  Magdeburg.  As  no  money 
was  on  hand,  he  simply  made  requisitions.  Bavaria,  which  had 
lost  no  less  than  28,000  men,  had  to  furnish  an  entire  army, 
which  was  possible  only  with  several  conscriptions  in  1813. 
Such  sacrifices  seemed  too  great  to  the  Court  of  Munich,  and 
the  authorities  reflected  for  a  moment  whether  they  should  not 
take  a  neutral  position;  but  finally,  intimidated  by  the  mighty 
armaments  of  Napoleon,  they  consented  willingly  to  send  one 
division.  The  rest  of  the  contingent  was  gathered  in  a  camp 
near  Munich  under  Wrede.  The  Saxon  court  wavered  even 
more  than  the  Bavarian,  as  it  saw  Poland  in  the  hands  of  the 
Russians  and  its  own  land  threatened  by  a  Russian  invasion. 
Its  policy  was  wholly  dependent  on  that  of  its  two  German 
neighbours,  Austria  and  Prussia. 

And  that  brings  up  the  principal  question:  would  the  two 
chief  German  powers  maintain  the  alliance  with  France  or  not? 
On  the  answer  to  this  everything  at  first  depended. 

Even  before  he  wrote  to  the  Rhenish  states.  Napoleon 
had  made  the  proposal  to  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna 
that  they  reinforce  their  contingents.  Then  followed  the  defec- 
tion of  Yorck.  Could  that  be  the  answer  of  Frederick  William 
III.?  Napoleon,  with  his  usual  distrust,  might  well  suspect  this, 
but  he  nevertheless  accepted  the  assurances  of  the  Prussian 
envoy  that  the  King  had  nothing  to  do  with  that  step,  which 
was  in  fact  the  case.  He  not  only  had  not  conmianded  it;  he 
actually  felt,  rather,  that  his  policy  had  been  disturbed  by  the 
high-handed  act  of  his  general.  For,  if  the  reports  were  true 
which  trustworthy  messengers  had  brought  to  Berlin  ever  since 


-tEt.  43]  The   Situation   of  Prussia  595 

November,  1812,  as  to  the  fate  of  the  Grand  Army,  the  conse- 
quence would  surely  be  that  the  Russians  would  hasten  to 
take  every  advantage  of  such  an  unexpected  opportunity.  But 
the  aversion  to  what  was  called  the  "  preponderance  of  Russia  " 
was  just  as  pronounced  in  Berlin  as  the  desire  to  rid  themselves 
of  the  French  yoke.  They  did  not  venture  even  remotely  to 
think  of  recovering  Prussian  territory  beyond  the  Elbe,  and 
the  part  of  Poland  lost  in  1807  would  doubtless  now  be  appro- 
priated by  Russia.  But  Poland  had  been  the  very  goal  of 
Hardenberg's  thoughts  of  late;  he  had  even  fancied  Napoleon 
would  bestow  that  kingdom  on  Frederich  William,  which  would 
make  a  bulwark  against  Russia.  So  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1812  the  Court  of  Berlin  was  rather  disposed  to  reach  an  under- 
standing with  Austria,  when  also  there  was  a  strongly  hostile 
feeUng  against  Russia,  and  a  confidential  agent  of  the  King 
repaired  to  Vienna.  Just  at  that  time  came  the  proposal  of- 
the  Czar  that  Prussia  should  separate  from  France  and  join 
his  party,  that  he  would  restore  Prussia  to  the  position  she  held 
in  1806;  should  the  King,  however,  adhere  to  his  alliance  with 
Napoleon,  this  would  be  regarded  as  a  declaration  of  war,  in 
which  case  Russia  claimed  the  right  to  partition  Prussia. 

That  was  no  empty  threat.  At  the  time  of  Alexander's  com- 
pact with  Bemadotte  at  Abo  the  annexation  of  Prussia  as  far 
as  the  Vistula  was  talked  of,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden  agree- 
ing to  accept  it  in  lieu  of  Norway,  which  had  been  promised  him. 
And  even  now  a  strong  party  in  the  Czar's  court  were  insisting 
on  making  the  Vistula  frontier  a  condition  of  peace  with  Na- 
poleon. This  party,  which  included  Kutusoff  and  Romanzoff, 
did  not,  however,  prevail.  Alexander  adopted  another  view 
which  a  young  diplomat,  Nesselrode,  successfully  ^.dvocated. 
Russia,  said  the  latter,  is  in  need  of  a  long  and  secure  peace; 
this  is  not  to  be  obtained  unless  the  preponderance  of  France  is 
destroyed  by  decisive  defeats  and  the  old  balance  of  the  powers 
is  restored.  Russia  alone  is  not  equal  to  this  task  and  needs  the 
support  of  the  central  powers.  This  shaped  the  overtures  made 
to  Prussia.  The  Czar  gave  up  all  claims  to  East  Prussian 
territory ;  that,  of  course,  did  not  include  the  duchy  of  Warsaw, 


596  Leipzig  [1813 

which  he  was  just  entering.     We  learn  that  he  was  again,  as  in 

1811,  ardently  considering  the  project  of  a  united  Poland  under 
his  rule,  i.e.,  in  a  personal  miion  with  Russia.  As  he  wrote 
to  Czartoryski  on  the  13th  of  January,  1813,  only  regard  for 
public  opinion  at  home,  which  was  unfavourable  to  the  Poles, 
and  for  Austria  and  Prussia,  hindered  him  from  bringing  forward 
that  project  now.  Such  a  plan  necessarily  stood  in  the  way 
of  an  understanding  with  Frederick  William  III.,  and  it  was 
now  a  question  of  the  utmost  importance  whether  the  latter's 
envoy,  Knesebeck,  would  find  in  Vienna  what  he  was  looking 
for,  namely,  willingness  to  join  Prussia  in  an  armed  interven- 
tion with  the  twofold  object  of  profiting  by  the  weakness  of 
France  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  guarding  against  the  threatened 
preponderance  of  Russia  on  the  other. 

Nowhere  was  there  greater  astonishment  over  the  issue  of  the 
Russian  campaign  than  at  the  court  of  Francis  I.  As  late  as 
October,  Metternich,  who  had  seen  fit  to  approach  Hardenberg 
after  the  Franco-Prussian  alliance  had  been  concluded,  wrote  to 
him  confidentially  that,  judging  from  the  way  the  Russians 
conducted  their  war  operations,  he  regarded  their  existence  as  a 
European  state  virtually  forfeited ;  and  as  the  necessity  of  peace 
was  being  felt  also  in  England,  he  purposed  to  agitate  a  general 
pacification.  Such  was  in  fact  his  intention.  But  in  order  to 
be  able  to  play  the  role  of  mediator  with  dignity,  the  minister 
felt  that  what  little  army  the  impoverished  state  on  the  Danube 
had  must  be  spared  as  far  as  possible,  and  this  had  been  his 
constant  effort  throughout  the  campaign.     As  early  as  April, 

1812,  he  had  told  Stackelberg,  the  Russian  envoy  at  Vienna,  the 
ostensible  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France  and 
assured  him  that  Austria  would  certainly  not  raise  more  than 
30,000  auxiliary  troops;  beyond  that  she  would  arm  only  in  her 
own  defence.  Russia,  to  whom  security  along  the  Austrian 
frontier  was  as  welcome  as  the  same  condition  on  the  Russian 
frontier  was  to  Austria,  answered  readily  that  in  case  of  victory 
she  would  not  act  contrary  to  the  interests  of  tlio  Court  of  Vienna. 
So  a  sort  of  unwritten  agreement  was  arrived  at  between  these 
two    declared    enemies,   and    their    diplomatic    relations    were 


jEt.  43]  Metternich's   Diplomacy  597 

only  outwardly  broken  off.  This,  however,  was  very  far  from 
being  an  understanding  directed  against  Napoleon.*  AiLstria 
gained  the  point  that  she  could  strengthen  herself  without  any 
interference  on  the  part  of  Russia.  Hence  she  was  not  making 
a  mere  show  of  fighting  in  the  war  against  Russia,  but  was  acting 
simply  as  a  power  that  spares  what  little  force  it  has  because  it 
is  absolutely  necessary.  When,  however,  Napoleon,  after  the 
campaign,  demanded  that  his  father-in-law  should  double  his 
contingent  (which  had  gone  back  to  Warsaw  with  the  Saxons 
under  Reynier  and  with  a  French  division),  so  that  the  Russians 
might  be  kept  busy  while  he  was  raising  new  armies,  this  demand 
was  so  directly  contrary  to  the  plans  of  Austria  that  consent  was 
impossible.  Yet  the  refusal  could  not  be  expressed  abruptly 
and  outright,  lest  suspicion  be  roused.     What  was  to  be  done? 

Metternich  found  an  expedient  in  resuming  in  real  earnest  his 
plan  of  pacification;  he  assured  Napoleon  through  a  special  envoy 
(General  Bubna)  that  only  a  universal  peace  on  a  broad  basis 
could  heal  the  wounds  of  the  last  campaign  and  establish  the 
new  French  dynasty.  At  the  same  time  he  urged  the  British 
government  to  conclude  peace.  Napoleon  did  not  reject  this 
Austrian  effort  at  intervention ;  but  his  utterances  to  Bubna  left 
little  or  no  prospect  of  peace.  Spain,  he  said,  would  remain  in 
the  possession  of  his  family,  only  his  troops  should  leave  the 
country;  but  that  only  on  condition  that  the  British  evacuated 
Sicily.  Murat  would  keep  Naples.  He  himself  would  not  give 
up  one  of  the  countries  annexed  to  France  by  Senatus  consultum 
(Piedmont,  Rome,  Tuscany,  Holland,  Vallais,  the  Hanseatic 
territory,  Oldenburg,  etc.).  On  the  other  hand,  if  Francis 
doubled  his  contingent,  he  would  furnish  subsidies.  His  very  life 
was  in  the  tiiought  of  renewing  war.  As  soon  as  this  certainty 
was  reached,  Metternich  turned  all  his  efforts  toward  keeping  the 
clash  of  arms  far  from  Austria.  He  refused  Napoleon's  demand 
for  a  doubled  contingent,  yet  by  no  means  joined  sides  with  his 
enemies.     He  shielded  himself  behind  his  role  as  a  preacher  of 

*  At  that  very  time  the  Austrian  envoy  at  Stockholm,  Neipperg,  tried 
to  break  the  alliance  between  Sweden  and  Russia,  and  this  was  known  in 
St.  Petersburg.     (Martens,  "Recueil,"  III.  86.) 


598  Leipzig  [1813 

peace,  yet  carefully  avoided  proposing  definite  conditions  of 
peace  which  he  might  have  to  defend ;  for  Austria  was  in  no  fit 
condition  for  war  either  financially  or  in  military  resources.  He 
encouraged  Hardenberg  to  join  the  party  of  Russia  publicly, 
because  that  would  keep  the  war  in  the  north ;  but  he  would  not 
exert  himself  to  secure  from  Russia  the  cession  of  Warsaw  to 
Prussia,  which  made  Knesebeck's  mission  a  failure.  To  avoid 
all  chance  of  collision '  he  sent  the  auxiliary  corps,  not  from 
Warsaw  to  Kalisch,  as  Viceroy  Eugene,  who  had  relieved  Murat 
as  commander  of  the  broken  army,  had  demanded,  but  to 
Cracow  after  the  close  of  a  truce  with  the  Russians,  "  in  order  to 
save  it  for  the  coming  campaign,"  as  he  assured  the  Emperor  at 
Paris.  This  was  not  as  yet  defection  from  Napoleon,  but  it 
was  "the  first  step  in  that  direction":  so  the  French  Emperor 
himself  termed  it.  He  saw  at  once  all  the  disadvantages  of  this 
measure,  which  would  force  Eugene,  by  depriving  him  of  his 
support,  to  recede  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Oder.  The  Russians 
would  get  an  open  road  for  their  advance. 

But  that  advance  in  turn  brought  pressure  to  bear  on  the 
negotiations  with  Prussia  and  would  hasten  their  settlement. 
Frederick  William  III.  felt  keenly  hurt  at  the  exclusively 
Austrian  policy  of  Metternich.  That  King  was  still  of  the  same 
mind  as  in  the  crisis  of  1805,  1809,  and  1811;  he  was  still  strongly 
convinced  (and  not  without  good  reason)  that  Napoleon  was  to 
be  overcome  only  by  a  coalition  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria, 
and  it  was  only  with  reluctance  that  he  was  induced  to  negotiate 
separately  with  Russia.  He  had  disavowed  the  defection  of 
Yorck,  and  yet  the  same  messenger  who  announced  his  discharge 
to  that  general  was  commissioned  to  hold  out  secretly  to  the 
Czar  a  prospect  of  alliance,  provided  the  latter  would  protect  him 
from  Napoleon  by  a  rapid  advance  and  also  restrict  his  Polish 
schemes.  When  Alexander  gave  a  reassuring  answer — he  wrote 
that  letter  to  Czartoryski  on  the  same  day— the  King  consented 
to  go  away  from  Potsdam  to  Breslau  in  order  to  get  away  from 
the  French,  who  still  occupied  Berlin  (this  was  on  the  22d  of 
January,  1813).  In  spite  of  that,  he  left  Napoleon  an  oppor- 
tunity of  again  securing  Prussia  for  his  own  interests  by  paying 


^T.  43]  The  Uprising  of  the  Prussian  People       599 

her  debt  of  90,000,000  francs  incurred  by  the  immense  army  sup- 
plies, or  by  guaranteeing  to  Prussia  new  territory.  Napoleon 
did  neither  one  thing  nor  the  other;  he  contented  himself  with 
speaking  to  the  Prussian  envoy  quite  carelessly  about  parts  of 
the  duchy  of  Warsaw  and  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia,  without 
binding  himself  in  the  least,  and  so  facilitated  the  quest  of 
Alexander.  On  the  day  when  the  envoy's  report  arrived  at 
Breslau,  Hardenberg,  who  was  already  favourable  to  Russia, 
persuaded  the  King  to  create  a  military  commission,  of  which 
Scharnhorst  was  made  a  member  (January  28th).  Yet  Frederick 
William  had  no  thought  as  yet  of  fighting  side  by  side  with  the 
Czar.  When  he  mobilized  the  troops  of  the  line  in  Silesia  and 
Pomerania  (February  12th),  he  aimed  only  at  guarding  against  a 
possible  attack  by  the  French,  perhaps  from  Berlin,  where  a 
division  under  Grenier  had  arrived ;  and  when  he  sent  Knesebeck 
to  Alexander  to  negotiate  for  a  treaty  of  alliance,  his  immediate 
object  was  only  to  propose  to  Napoleon,  with  Russia  to  support 
him,  a  truce  that  should  keep  the  French  troops  on  the  left  side 
of  the  Elbe  and  the  Russian  on  the  right  of  the  Mstula,  and  so 
serve  as  an  introduction  to  a  peace,  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
peace  of  Lun^ville,  perhaps,  or  of  Amiens.  For  the  time  he  had 
not  the  remotest  intention  of  waging  a  war  of  extinction  against 
Napoleon. 

But  that  w^as  the  intention  of  his  people.  Although  this 
sentiment  was  not  strong  enough  in  the  year  1809  to  carry  the 
King  with  it,  now  it  was  to  succeed.  In  memorials,  in  peti- 
tions and  addresses,  in  letters  from  devoted  generals,  it  was 
impressed  on  the  King  that  every  Prussian  regarded  war  against 
France,  whose  oppression  had  been  so  deeply  and  painfully  felt, 
as  a  holy  war.  And  it  was  seen  how  much  in  earnest  the  people 
were  when  the  military  commission  on  the  3d  of  February  called 
upon  the  well-to-do  and  the  intelligent  to  enter  the  amiy  as 
volunteer  chasseurs,  and  a  few  days  later  set  aside  all  exemp- 
tions from  service  between  the  ages  of  17  and  24,  thus  declaring 
liability  to  service  universal.  They  came  in  throngs,  fired  with 
enthusiasm  and  the  martial  spirit,  and  eagerly  seized  the 
weapons  that  were  offered,  while  others,  who  could  not  fight  with 


6oo  Leipzig  [1813 

them,  sacrificed  almost  their  last  possessions  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  resisting  the  French — certainly  for  no  other  purpose,  whatever 
the  King's  decision  might  be.  There  was  a  revolutionary  im- 
pulse in  the  Prussian  people,  just  as  there  had  been  four  years 
before,  when  Frederick  William  hesitated,  only  it  was  still 
stronger.*  Moreover,  they  felt  themselves  to  be  not  merely 
Prussians,  but  Germans  first  of  all,  and  ."constituted  them- 
selves a  nation"  as  the  Austrians  had  done  in  1809,  while  the 
King  and  his  confidential  advisers  still  adhered  to  provincial  par- 
ticularism. This  national  German  movement  among  the  people 
favoured  the  Czar  to  this  extent,  that  it  laid  infinitely  less  stress 
on  the  possession  of  Polish  territory  than  did  the  policy  of  the 
Berlin  cabinet,  and  Alexander  had  but  to  give  it  active  support 
to  pave  the  way  for  his  secret  designs  with  regard  to  Warsaw. 
Accordingly  he  sent  Stein  with  full  powers  to  Konigsberg,  to 
assemble  the  provincial  estates  and  secure  from  them  appro- 
priations and  military  preparations;  the  same  Stein  who  was 
looked  up  to  as  the  head  of  the  national  party  that  looked  far 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  petty  German  states  to  a  united 
Germany.  "I  have  but  one  fatherland,"  he  had  written  in 
December,  1812,  "that  is,  Germany;  in  this  moment  of  great 
development  I  am  utterly  indifferent  to  dynasties."  He  ac- 
complished his  object  in  Konigsberg  completely.  The  diet 
gladly  acceded  to  Torek's  demand  that  his  corps  be  filled  up, 
passed  a  militia  law  drafted  by  Clause witz,  calling  for  about 
40,000  men  all  told,  and  opened  the  East  Prussian  ports.  All 
this  was  quite  independent  of  the  court,  and  just  as  if  their  King 
had  already  definitely  taken  sides  with  Russia. 

But  that  was  far  from  the  case.  The  negotiations  between 
Knesebeck  and  Alexander  at  Kalisch  came  to  a  halt,  because 
the  former  went  beyond  his  instructions  and  demanded  more 
persistently  than  they  called  for  that  all  former  possessions  of 
Prussia  in  Poland  be  returned  to  her;  to  this  the  Czar  would 
not  listen.  Not  until  the  Czar  at  the  suggestion  of  Stein,  utterly 
ignoring  the  troublesome  envoy,  had  a  treaty  presented  directly 

*  See  page  457. 


^T.  43]  Prussia   Declares  War  60 1 

at  Breslau  did  matters  finally  reach  a  settlement  (February 
27th),  and  then  it  was  under  the  pressure  of  the  growing  ex- 
citement among  the  people  and  the  army.  On  the  next  day 
the  convention  was  also  signed  at  Kalisch.  It  was  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance,  with  the  object  of  liberating  Europe  and 
primarily  of  restoring  Prussia  to  the  position  she  occupied 
in  1806.  Russia  guaranteed  to  her  ally  the  possession  of  old 
Prussia,  Frederick  William  gave  up  his  quondam  Polish  prov- 
ince and  contented  himself  with  a  strip  of  land  which  joins 
East  Prussia  and  Silesia.  Both  powers  were  to  make  efforts 
to  win  Austria  to  their  cause,  and  Russia  agreed  to  support 
Prussia's  efforts  to  secure  subsidies  from  England.  In  order  to 
restore  the  former  power  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern,  con- 
quests in  North  Germany  were  fixed  upo"n, — Hanover,  only, 
being  excepted  on  account  of  England.  In  Article  III.  the  King 
pledged  himself  to  add  to  his  war  forces  by  calling  out  the 
Landwehr,  and  on  the  17th  of  March,  1813,  appeared  the  neces- 
sary decree,  accompanied  by  a  ringing  appeal  ''  To  my  people," 
summoning  them  to  a  war  of  liberation  from  the  long-endured 
oppression  of  foreign  tyranny.  On  the  same  day  Hardenbcrg 
handed  to  the  French  ambassador,  Saint-Martin,  the  declaration 
of  war. 

Thus  at  Breslau  the  German  national  party  had  won  the  day 
over  the  local  Prussian  party,  and  soon  the  national  trend  of  the 
Russo-Prussian  alliance  found  expression  in  a  new  treaty  of 
March  19th,  1813.  In  a  proclamation  to  all  Germans  of  the 
Rhenish  Confederation  the  liberation  of  Germany  from  the 
dominating  influence  of  France  was  held  up  as  an  object  for 
which  all  should  work  together.  Any  prince  who  failed  to 
respond  to  the  appeal  within  a  given  time  was  threatened  with 
the  loss  of  his  territory.  A  few  days  later  a  proclamation  of 
Kutusoff  "To  the  Germans"  was  published  in  which  the  threat 
was  still  more  plainly  uttered  against  those  princes  who  "would 
be,  and  remain,  false  to  the  cause  of  Germany " ;  they  were 
declared  to  be  "ripe  for  annihilation  by  the  power  of  public 
opinion  and  the  might  of  arms  in  a  just  cause."  A  central 
commission  of  administration  of  four  members  with  full  powers, 


6o2  Leipzig  [I813 

appointed  by  Russia  and  Prussia, — Stein  at  their  head, — was  to 
administer  affairs,  make  requisitions,  raise  a  militia,  etc.,  in  the 
territories  occupied.  This  was  aimed  in  the  first  instance 
against  Saxony,  whither  the  viceroy  Eugene  had  gone  from 
the  Oder  by  way  of  Berlin;  only  to  leave  it  again,  however, 
in  March  at  the  express  special  command  of  Napoleon,  and  to 
take  up  a  strong  position  at  Magdeburg.  Alexander  had  said 
to  Knesebeck  and  other  confidential  agents  that  Saxony  was 
much  better  situated  than  Poland  for  an  addition  to  Prussian 
territory,  and  that  may  have  had  some  weight  at  Breslau. 
King  Frederick  Augustus  had  gone  with  two  regiments  of  cavalry 
to  Ratisbon,  and  his  minister  Senfft  thought  the  best  way 
out  of  the  difficulty  was  to  withhold  the  Saxon  troops  in  Toi-gau 
both  from  the  French  and  the  allies,  and  to  conclude  a  secret  alli- 
ance with  Austria  which  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  her  (Sax- 
ony's) German  possessions  and  granted  an  indemnity  for 
Warsaw,  in  return  for  which  Saxony  would  support  the  pacifi- 
cation scheme  of  Emperor  Francis  with  30,000  men  (April 
20th,  1813).  The  Saxon  people  failed  to  rise  and  join  Prussia, 
as  the  allies  may  have  hoped,  although  the  populace  in  Dresden, 
embittered  by  the  blowing  up  of  the  stone  bridges  at  the  orders 
of  Davout  as  he  was  retiring,  welcomed  the  two  monarchs  with 
great  demonstrations  of  joy  on  their  entry  into  the  city  on  the 
23i  of  April. 

While  the  appeal  to  national  feeling  proved  a  failure  here, 
in  other  places  there  were  uprisings  which  had  no  lasting  effect 
owing  to  the  presence  of  the  French,  e.g.  in  Hamburg,  where  a 
Cossack  patrol  appeared  about  the  middle  of  March  and  was 
enthusiastically  welcomed;  in  Oldenburg  and  other  coast  cities, 
where  rash  acts  of  violence  against  the  French  tax-collectors 
and  gendarmes  led  later  to  cruel  reprisals,  when  the  Russians 
had  to  retire  again  and  a  P>ench  flying  column  appeared  in 
their  stead.  If  the  King  of  Prussia  had  only  changed  his  sys- 
tem and  joined  the  national  })arty  two  months  earlier,  when 
everybody  was  still  fresh  from  the  impression  of  the  catastrophe 
that  befell  the  Grand  Army,  he  would  have  succeeded  in  win- 
ning a  great  following  in  the  west  German  states  and  the  appeal 


Mt.  43]    Treaty  between  Prussia  and  England      603 

to  the  nation  might  have  found  an  echo  everywhere.*  Now, 
indeed,  when  Napolon  had  conjured  a  new  army  out  of  the 
earth  and  had  attached  his  vassals  beyond  the  Rhine  anew  to 
his  interests,  this  result  could  no  longer  be  secured.  The  allies, 
if  they  wanted  to  conquer,  had  only  themselves  and  the  help 
of  outside  powers  to  rely  on. 

The  Treaty  of  Breslau  of  February'  27th  was  to  be  communi- 
cated to  Sweden  and  England  as  well  as  Austria.  Those  two 
nations  were  now  brought  into  closer  relations  through  the  good 
offices  of  Russia,  which  had  been  allied  with  them  for  a  year. 
England  guaranteed  to  Crown  Prince  Carl  John  the  future  acqui- 
sition of  Norway,  and  promised  him  the  island  of  Guadaloupe 
and  corresponding  subsidies  if  he  would  enter  the  Continental 
war  against  France  with  30,000  men.  Napoleon,  who  may  have 
foreseen  something  of  the  kind,  had  made  yet  one  more  effort, 
sending  a  secret  messenger  at  the  end  of  February,  1813,  to 
effect  a  reconciliation  with  Bernadotte;  but  as  he  again  did  not 
offer  Norway,  but  only  Pomerania  and  indefinite  lands  between 
the  Elbe  and  the  Oder — the  well-known  partition  of  Prussia — 
the  negotiations  came  to  nothing.  On  the  3d  of  March  the 
Swedish-British  treaty  was  concluded,  and  on  the  23d  the  Crown 
Prince  sent  a  public  letter  to  his  former  sovereign  renouncing  his 
allegiance.  Prussia  also,  which  had  hitherto  been  at  war  with 
England,  now  naturally  entered  into  a  treaty  with  that  power, 
which  promised  Frederick  William  the  necessary  subsidies. 
And  in  order  to  hold  that  monarch  to  the  project  of  war  and  so 
keep  Russia  on  the  offensive,  the  government  in  London  gave  up 
the  scheme  of  founding  a  Guelph  kingdom  under  a  British  prince 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Scheldt.  Pitt's  plan  came  to  life  again, 
namely,  in  this  struggle  against  the  preponderance  of  France  to 
restore  the  balance  of  the  powers  and  so  reopen  the  old  markets 
for  British  exports.  The  old  map  of  Europe  which  he  had 
ordered  to  be  rolled  up  was  brought  out  again ;  for  now  it  was  to 
be  restored.     This  was  not  at  all  the  sentiment  which  Metternich 

*  On  the  29th  of  Januarj'  Prince  Hatzfeldt  said  to  Xapoleon  in  Paris  that 
if  the  fire  were  now  kindled  in  Prussia,  it  would  inflame  all  Germany,  and 
the  Emperor  agreed  with  him. 


6o4  Leipzig  [1813 

looked  for  on  the  Thames  when  he  offered  the  English  govern- 
ment his  good  offices  toward  securing  a  universal  peace,  in  which 
England  was  to  induce  Napoleon,  by  concessions  beyond  the 
seas,  to  restrict  himself  on  the  Continent  and  keep  the  peace. 
The  London  Cabinet  rejected  that  altogether  now.  The  passage 
in  Napoleon's  speech  from  the  throne  dealing  with  the  future  of 
Spain  was  enough,  they  said,  to  show  that  such  a  step  had  no 
prospect  of  success. 

This  naturally  reacted  on  the  policy  of  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment. If  Austria  was  to  hold  fast  to  the  role  of  peace-maker, — 
which  was  desirable  both  for  her  own  independence  and  in  order 
to  cut  loose  from  the  French  alliance, — she  must  lay  before  the 
French  Emperor  the  proposed  restrictions  without  being  able  at 
first  to  offer  anything  in  compensation;  and,  as  he  would  hardly 
enter  willingly  into  the  plan,  she  must  be  armed,  in  order  that 
the  emphasis  of  powerful  resources  might  be  lent  to  the  proposals. 
In  other  words,  Austria  had  to  exchange  the  role  of  unarmed 
mediation  for  that  of  armed  intervention.  To  have  the  requisite 
strength,  Metternich  made  the  compact  with  Saxony,  and  tried 
to  win  Murat,  Bavaria,  and  even  Jerome  (it  is  stated)  to  his 
party  of  neutral  mediation.  This  change  in  policy  was  adopted 
in  March,  1813,  at  the  very  time  that  Napoleon  had  sent  a  new 
ambassador.  Count  Narbonne,  to  Vienna,  to  hold  forth  there  the 
prospect  of  a  partition  of  Prussia  and  the  acquisition  of  Silesia, 
if  his  father-in-law  would  fight  again  on  his  side  with  100,000  men, 
Metternich  declined,  and  when  the  envoy  requested  that  at 
least  the  auxiliary  forces  sh(nild  terminate  the  truce  concluded 
in  January,  he  replied  that  the  Russians  had  already  served 
notice  to  that  effect ;  but  he  shrewdly  concealed  the  fact  that  they 
had  done  so  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  after  the  convention  of 
March  29th,  in  order  that  the  corps  might  retire  before  superior 
forces  to  Galicia  and  from  there  to  Bohemia,  where  a  new  force 
was  being  armed  for  the  purposes  of  the  policy  of  mediation. 
Would  that  army  ever  see  active  service?  That  depended  on 
whether  Napoleon  were  "reasonable,"  as  Francis  I.  called  it,  i.e., 
whether  he  would  forego  his  oppressive  preponderance  in  Europe. 
The  situation  was  well  described  by  Talleyrand  in  Paris  in  the 


iEr.  43]    War  Takes  the  Place  of  Diplomacy       605 

following  words  addressed  to  Prince  Schwarzenberg  on  liis  return : 
"The  moment  has  come  when  tlie  Emperor  Napoleon  must  be 
King  of  France."  That  penetrating  mind  knew  well  enough 
that  this  utterance  gave  expression  to  an  antagonism  of  interests 
that  could  never  be  reconciled. 

It  had  originally  been  Napolon's  plan  not  to  open  hostilities 
until  May.  As  late  as  the  middle  of  March  he  speaks  of  it  in 
letters  to  Eugene,  saying  that  he  proposed  to  cross  the  Elbe 
north  of  Magdeburg,  having  with  him  not  only  the  army  com- 
manded ])y  the  Viceroy,  but  also  a  second  to  be  collected  in 
Mainz  and  Erfurt;  then  by  forced  marches  he  w'ould  advance 
by  way  of  Stettin  to  Danzig,  where  Rapp  was  w'aiting  with 
30,000  men  to  be  relieved.  He  thought  he  could  command  by 
that  time  300,000  men  for  that  movement,  enough  to  bring  the 
lower  Vistula  under  his  control.  Then  the  Russians  would 
have  to  recede,  and  Prussia  would  fall  into  his  hands ;  and  we  have 
already  seen  how  he  divided  up  the  state  of  the  HohenzoUerns  in 
his  proffers  to  other  governments.  It  was  a  grand  conception, 
but  very  far  from  being  a  plan  of  war.  Soon,  even  in  a  few  weeks, 
it  was  dropped.  The  alliance  of  the  northern  powers,  together 
with  their  insurrectionary  tendencies,  the  threatened  loss  of 
Saxony,  but  especially  the  increasingly  manifest  uncertainty  of 
Austria,  led  to  a  change  of  plan.  Napoleon  arrived  at  the  con- 
viction that  the  sooner  he  cut  the  web  of  diplomacy  with  his 
sharp  sword  the  better,  in  order  to  bring  the  wavering  to  his  side 
by  the  mandate  of  the  conqueror  and  to  gain  control  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  vanquished.  Hence  he  resolved  on  beginning  the  war 
earUer  than  he  had  intended.  On  the  15th  of  April,  1813,  he 
left  St.  Cloud,  and  two  days  later  he  was  in  Mainz. 

The  preparations  he  saw  there  and  soon  afterwards  in  Erfurt, 
and  the  troops  he  passed  in  review,  could  not  exactly  inspire  him 
with  confidence.  His  new  army  was  to  embrace  twelve  corps 
besides  the  Guard,  but  at  first  he  had  only  seven  of  these  at  his 
disposal.  Of  the  seven,  the  first  was  stationed  in  Hanover  under 
Davout  to  command  the  lower  Elbe,  and  so  could  not  be  counted 
on  for  the  offensive.  Eugene  conmianded  two  others  (number- 
ing 47,000),  and  the  rest,  nmnbering  about  135,000  under  the 


6o6  Leipzig  [1813 

Emperor  himself,  took  up  the  march  for  Saxony  by  the  end  of 
April.*  Hence  there  were  in  all  only  a  little  over  180,000 
instead  of  the  300,000  men  on  which  he  had  counted  a  month 
before;  and  as  the  campaign  began  earlier  than  he  had  foreseen, 
their  equipment  left  much  to  be  desired.  Above  all,  there  was 
a  great  lack  of  cavalry.  The  entire  anny,  excluding  the  corps  of 
Davout,  had  only  10,000  horse,  and  the  recruits  of  that  body 
had  hardly  had  time  to  become  accustomed  to  their  mounts. 
The  infantry  were  late  in  getting  their  weapons,  and  had  not  been 
able  to  drill  until  they  were  on  the  march.  The  best  artillery 
had  been  lost  in  Russia  or  was  beyond  the  Pyrenees.  They  had 
to  bring  out  old  unwieldy  cannon  that  had  been  discarded.  But 
in  other  respects  there  was  deficiency  everywhere.  Especially 
was  the  need  of  officers  felt ;  and  though  many  were  recalled  from 
Spain,  yet  there  were  not  enough.  The  corps  of  staff  officers  was 
particularly  weak.  The  corps  of  Oudinot  and  Marmont  had  none 
at  all.  The  sanitary  corps  was  short  of  men,  and  the  army 
administration  was  wretched.  All  in  all,  it  was  a  poorly  equipped 
mass  of  recruits  that  was  now  to  renew  the  gigantic  struggle 
for  the  mastery  of  the  world.  What  a  contrast  from  the  year 
before!  Napoleon  felt  doubtless  that  he  must  throw  the  whole 
weight  of  his  personal  genius  into  the  fight  if  he  would  conquer. 
"I  shall  conduct  this  war,"  said  he,  "as  General  Bonaparte,  not 
as  Emperor." 

However,  one  advantage  he  still  had :  he  was  far  superior  to 
his  enemies  in  point  of  numbers.  Such  an  early  opening  of 
hostilities  caught  the  allies  in  the  midst  of  their  preparation, 
Schamhorst,  WTiting  on  the  2d  of  April,  said  that  the  Prussian 
army  would  not  be  able  to  do  anything  until  the  end  of  May; 

*  The  most  thorough  investigations  on  the  French  army  in  1813  have 
recently  been  pulilished  in  the  "  Jahrbiicher  fiir  die  deutsche  Armee  und 
Marine,"  1888;  the  figures  there  given  have  been  accepted  here.  They 
gain  in  authority  by  their  approximate  agreement  with  the  estimates  of 
Jomini  ("  Pr<'>cis  des  campagnes,"  etc.,  I.  237).  He  assigns  140,000  men 
to  the  Emperor  and  40,000  to  the  Viceroy,  exchiding  the  divisions  of  Davout 
and  Victor.  The  figures  of  Thiers  are  too  high,  those  of  Camille  Rousset 
too  low  The  estimates  in  the  contemporary  German  works  of  Clausewitz, 
Odeleben,  and  Muffling  are  altogether  mistaken. 


JEt.  43]  The   Battle  of  Liitzen  607 

before  that  much  (Icpcndod  on  fortiino.  The  Russians,  after 
the  losses  of  the  last  campaign  and  after  investing  the  fortresses 
still  occupied  by  the  French  along  the  \'istida  and  the  Oder,  had 
scarcely  more  than  50,000  men  ready  for  open  war;  these,  to- 
gether with  the  somewhat  stronger  Prussian  army,  were  advancing 
under  Wittgenstein,  Bliicher,  and  Tormassoff  (the  latter  re- 
placing Kutusoff,  who  was  sick,  and  who  died  the  last  of  April), 
It  was  only  in  cavalry  that  the  allies  were  stronger,  having  twice 
as  many  as  the  French — an  advantage  that  was  destined  to  have 
some  influence  on  the  progress  of  the  war.  When  Napoleon  now 
moved  from  Erfurt  upon  Leipzig,  these  armies  joined  their  forces 
between  the  Elster  and  the  Pleisse;  and  Wittgenstein,  on  whom 
the  supreme  command  devolved,  determined  to  attack  the  flank 
of  the  enemy  while  on  the  march,  near  Pegau  in  the  direction  of 
Liitzen  (May  2d). 

The  French  Emperor  had  no  expectation  of  such  a  sudden 
offensive  movement,  although  he  had  heard  of  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  hostile  forces  and  their  position  near  Pegau.  His 
plan  was  rather  to  come  into  touch  with  Eugene  and  then 
from  Leipzig  to  fall  upon  the  right  wdng  and  the  rear  of  the 
enemy.  On  the  first  of  May  he  had  come  upon  the  Russian 
vanguard  at  Liitzen  and  had  driven  it  back  eastward.  Then 
Ney's  corps  had  taken  a  position  east  of  that  town,  while 
Eugene  was  advancing  from  Markranstadt  to  Leipzig,  and  the 
remaining  corps  of  Marmont,  Bertrand,  etc.,  were  approaching 
singly  between  Naumberg  and  Liitzen.  Napoleon  had  just 
arrived  at  Leipzig  the  following  morning,  w'here  a  division  of 
the  enemy  offered  some  resistance  and  led  him  to  believe  that 
he  had  a  strong  body  in  front  of  him,  when  suddenly  a  fierce 
cannonade  in  his  rear  undeceived  him.  He  realized  that  Ney's 
troops  had  been  attacked  by  superior  forces.  He  inmiediately 
decided  to  halt  the  army  thus  surprised  while  on  the  march, 
to  have  Eugene  advance  south  from  Markranstadt  and  Marmont 
eastwards  to  the  right  of  Ney,  and  to  support  Ney  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Liitzen  with  the  Guard  as  a  reserve.  Meantime  Ber- 
trand on  the  right  of  Marmont  could  threaten  the  left  wing  of 
the   enemy,  while  a  corps  of  Eugene's  army  under  Lauriston 


6o8  Leipzig  [1813 

took  possession  of  Leipzig.  This  was  all  thought  out  and 
ordered  in  a  flash.  The  only  question  was  whether  Ney's  re- 
cruits would  stand  the  attack  of  the  enemy  until  the  other 
divisions  could  enter  the  line  of  battle.  But,  though  he  had 
scarcely  dared  to  hope  for  it,  they  were  firm.  The  young,  un- 
drilled,  ill-fed  men,  who  had  followed  the  Emperor's  call  reluc- 
tantly and  sullenly,  now  fought  with  the  greatest  stubbornness 
against  the  valour  of  the  Prussians,  and  it  was  not  until  afternoon, 
after  long  and  bloody  struggles,  that  they  were  driven  out  of 
the  villages  they  had  occupied — Gross-Gorschen,  Klein-Gor- 
schen,  Rahna,  and  Kaja — and  thrown  into  confusion.  In  the 
meanwhile,  however,  Marmont  had  been  able  to  engage  in  the 
battle,  and  Bertrand  to  make  a  threatening  demonstration ;  and 
when  finally  Napoleon,  in  the  centre,  pushed  forward  the  Guard 
in  order  to  recover  Kaja  and  the  other  positions,  and  a  corps 
of  the  Viceroy  under  Macdonald  attacked  the  right  flank  of 
the  enemy,  the  latter  had  to  yield  before  superior  forces,  and 
the  battle  of  Liitzen,  or  Gross-Gorschen,  was  won  by  the  French. 
Napoleon  had  exposed  himself  more  than  ever  that  day,  in  order 
to  fire  his  new  troops.  As  a  reward  he  heard  from  the  lips 
of  the  youngest  recruits,  nay,  even  from  the  wounded  and 
mangled,  the  enthusiastic  "Vive  TEmpereur!"  of  his  old 
troopers. 

To  be  sure,  the  victory  was  not  so  complete  as  he  had 
thought  to  make  it  by  surrounding  the  enemy  at  Leipzig ;  and 
it  was  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the  allies  to  go  back  at  once 
that  night  across  the  Elster  and  thence  on  to  the  Elbe.  Na- 
poleon, who  may  have  had  about  120,000  men  in  the  battle, 
had  suffered  heavier  losses  than  the  enemy;  more  than  20,000 
men  were  dead  or  wounded,  and  among  them  many  officers, 
whom  he  could  ill  spare.  No  prisoners  had  been  taken,  no 
cannon  captured.  The  lack  of  cavalry  and  the  poor  staying 
qualities  of  the  raw  recruits  made  it  impossible  to  follow  up 
the  victory  effectively,  and  the  skirmishes  of  the  next  few  days 
amounted  to  nothing.  Nevertheless  the  victory  was  not  wholly 
without  influence  on  the  political  situation,  for  it  brought  Sax- 
ony back  to  Napoleon's  side.     On  the  8th  of  May  the  Emperor 


JEt.  43]  Austria's   Demands  609 

entered  Old  *  Dresden,  antl  from  there  sent  word  to  the  King, 
who  was  staying;  at  Prague,  to  declare  himself  cither  as  friend 
or  foe.  At  this,  Frederick  Augustus,  despite  his  convention 
with  Austria,  chose  the  former  and  offered  Napoleon  his  cavalry- 
guard  and  the  entire  garrison  of  Torgau.  Ney  started  for  that 
fortress  with  three  corps,  both  to  take  up  the  Saxon  forces,  and 
then  by  crossing  the  Elbe  to  force  the  allies  near  Dresden  back 
from  that  river.  On  the  11th  of  May  they  did  actually  leave 
the  New  City,  and  the  Prusso-Russian  army  did  not  come  to 
a  stand  again  until  it  was  beyond  the  Spree. 

But  the  most  important  question  had  not  been  settled  by 
this  incomplete  victory  of  Liitzen,  as  Napoleon  hoped  it  would 
be;  Aastria  ke[)t  right  along  on  the  course  she  had  entered. 
Hardly  had  the  news  reached  Vienna  when  Metternich  sent 
Count  Philip  Stadion,  the  Minister  of  War  in  1809,  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  allies  to  announce  Austria  as  an  armed  mediator, 
and  to  state  the  conditions  which  the  Court  of  Vienna  would 
endeavour  to  enforce  with  all  its  powers.  The  minimum  re- 
quirements were  as  follows:  the  duchy  of  Warsaw  was  to  be 
dismembered.  Napoleon  was  to  give  up  the  departments  beyond 
the  Rhein  (Holland,  Oldenburg,  the  Hanseatic  cities)  and  his 
protectorate  over  the  Rhenish  Confederation,  Prussia  was  to 
be  restored  and  Illyria  and  Dalmatia  ceded  to  Austria,  which 
was  also  to  have  a  new  frontier  toward  Bavaria.  New  suc- 
cesses of  the  enemy  might  of  course  moderate  these  conditions, 
but  they  could  not  change  the  political  attitude  of  Austria. 
They  were  the  same  conditions  which  Metternich  had  hoped 
to  make  acceptable  to  Napoleon,  in  case  he  had  succeeded  in 
persuading  England  to  yield  some  colonies.  As  we  have  seen, 
England's  refusal  thwarted  this  plan. 

How  far  the  battle  was  from  bringing  the  Emperor  Francis 
back  to  the  dependent  alliance  of  the  previous  year  became 
clear  to  Napoleon  when  Count  Bubna  made  his  appearance  at 
headquarters  in  Dresden  to  unfold  the  programme  of  Austria  in 
the  following  terms:  a  general  peace  was  possible  only  through 

*  The  Old  City  is  on  the  south  or  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  and  the  New 
Oty  on  the  north  bank. — B. 


6io  Leipzig  [isn 

cessions  on  the  part  of  the  Empire,  for  which  England  should 
give  compensation ;  but  as  that  country  refused  at  present,  the 
Emperor  must  make  a  beginning;  then  the  island  kingdom, 
being  isolated  by  the  peace  of  the  Continent,  would  in  turn  sub- 
mit. Must  not  this  last  remark  have  sounded  hollow  in  the  ears 
of  Napoleon,  the  man  who  for  years  had  in  vain  exhausted  all 
his  resources  to  bring  about  such  an  isolation?  He  came  to 
the  conviction  that  Austria  was  already  in  closer  touch  with 
the  allies  than  with  him,  and  at  once  decided  upon  his  measures. 
He  wrote  to  Francis  that  no  one  was  more  anxious  for  peace 
than  himself,  that  he  was  ready  to  have  a  congress  in  which 
even  the  representatives  of  the  Spanish  insurgents  might  find 
seats,  that  he  also  favoured  the  idea  proposed  by  Bubna  of  a 
truce  pending  negotiations;  yet  he  would  not  make  himself 
ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  England ;  rather  than  that  he  would  die 
at  the  head  of  all  high-spirited  Frenchmen.  At  the  same  mo- 
ment he  directed  the  Viceroy,  who  had  gone  to  Italy,  to  gather 
a  new  army  by  the  end  of  June  at  the  latest,  which  could  keep 
the  60,000  or  80,000  Austrians  in  check  in  the  south;  the  news 
of  this  was  to  be  industriously  spread  in  Vienna,  so  as  to  in- 
timidate the  government. 

But  as  he  always  had  several  strings  to  his  bow,  he  at  the 
same  time  made  an  effort  to  reach  an  understanding  with  the 
Czar  directly,  without  the  intrusive  mediation  of  Austria,  which 
demanded  sacrifices  of  him.  Caulaincourt  was  to  go  to  the 
hostile  camp  with  the  proposals  for  a  congress  and  a  truce,  get 
permission  for  an  interview  with  Alexander  I.,  who  was  with 
the  army,  and  open  up  to  him  the  opportunity  "to  take  a 
splendid  revenge  for  Austria's  foolish  diversion  in  Russia"  (as 
his  instructions  read).  And  what  did  the  Duke  of  Vicenza 
have  to  offer?  Poland  to  begin  with.  The  grand  duchy  of 
Warsaw  and  the  republic  of  Danzig  were  to  be  ceded,  not 
indeed  to  Russia,  but  to  Prussia,  excepting  a  narrow  strip 
that  would  indemnify  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg.  In  return  Fred- 
erick William  would  have  to  cede  his  territory  west  of  the  Oder, 
i.e.,  Brandenburg  with  Berlin,  and  that  part  of  Silesia  marked 
off  by  a  line  drawn  from  Glogau  to  the  Bohemian  frontier.     In 


Mr.  43]       Napoleon's  Proposals  to   Russia  6 1 1 

this  way  Prussia,  whose  capital  would  be  in  Warsaw,  Konigsberg, 
or  Danzig,  would  come  absolutely  under  the  influence  of  Russia. 
Brandenburg  was  destined  for  the  King  of  Westphalia,  and  the 
Krossen  district  evidently  for  Saxony.  Napoleon  had  no 
desire,  it  was  said,  to  return  to  the  Tilsit  agreement  against  Eng- 
land, as  his  aim  now  was  to  pave  the  way  for  a  general  peace; 
and  the  Czar  must  hereafter  find  some  other  method  of  enforcing 
respect  for  his  flag.*  By  these  concessions  Napoleon  hoped  to 
break  up  the  coalition.  If  Poland  were  abandoned  and  the 
Continental  blockade  dropped,  would  not  Russia  be  content? 
Were  not  those  the  principal  points  at  issue  in  the  dispute  of 
1812?  Six  years  ago  he  had  gained  what  he  now  aimed  at  by 
the  splendid  victory  of  Friedland.  Now,  again,  a  second  Fried- 
land  should  secure  a  hearing  for  him.  His  envoy  was  still  wait- 
ing in  vain  for  the  requested  interview  when  the  die  was  cast 
again  for  war. 

On  the  18th  of  May — the  same  day  that  Caulaincourt  was 
dismissed — Napoleon  sent  orders  to  Ney,  whom  he  knew  to  be 
at  Luckau  with  the  corps,  to  move  in  haste  in  the  direction  of 
Drehsa  east  of  Bautzen;  on  the  next  day  he  himself  hastened 
from  Dresden  to  the  vicinity  of  Hartha,  where  Wittgenstein 
had  decided  to  risk  another  battle.  The  Russian  general  had 
been  reinforced  by  new  troops  brought  by  Barclay  and  the 
Prussian  General  Kleist,  and,  entrenched  in  an  excellent  position 
that  had  become  famous  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  he  was  ready 
to  receive  Napoleon  if  ho  came  from  the  west.  But  when  it 
was  learned  at  the  headquarters  of  the  allies  that  hostile  forces 
were  also  approaching  from  the  north, — as  was  indeed  the  case, 
since  Ney,  acting  on  the  advice  of  his  chief  of  staff,  Jomini,  had 
set  out  in  a  southerly  direction  even  before  he  received  the 
orders  of  Napoleon, — Alexander,  instead  of  attacking  Napoleon 
with  a  superior  force,  sent  Barclay  and  Yorck  against  Ney. 

*  Only  a  part  of  these  instructions  have  found  a  place  in  the  corre- 
spondence of  Napoleon.  The  real  peace  overtures  have  been  given  by 
Lefebvre  ("  Histoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe,"  V.  331),  while  the  giving  up 
of  the  Continental  blockade  is  mentioned  only  by  Jomini  ('' Precis  poli- 
tique et  militaire  des  campagnes  de  1812  k  1814,"  I.  2G1),  who  quotes  the 
proposal  verbatim. 


6i2  Leipzig  [i8i3 

Some  skirmishing  ensued  on  May  19th  near  Weissig  and  Konigs- 
wartha,  which  caused  the  French  about  as  much  loss  as  it  did 
the  allies.  But  it  had  as  a  consequence  that  the  French  Em- 
peror himself  opened  the  attack  on  the  20th  of  May,  in  order 
to  draw  off  the  allies  from  Ney  and  leave  him  free  to  advance. 
With  four  corps  and  the  Guard  he  made  the  attack  from  the 
west  about  noon,  crossing  the  Spree  at  several  points  and  driving 
back  the  vanguard  of  the  enemy  to  Bautzen.  By  evening  he 
succeeded  in  getting  a  strong  position  on  the  other  side,  and 
meantime  Ney  had  also  arrived  via  Klix,  leaving  only  Reynier 
still  to  come.  The  next  day  was  to  decide  matters,  and  the 
prospects  were  certainly  not  in  favour  of  the  allies,  whose  num- 
bers were  now  inferior. 

The  Emperor's  plan  was  to  pash  Ney  against  Barclay,  who 
formed  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy  and  was  next  to  Bliicher, 
who  formed  the  centre,  and  so  gain  control  of  the  enemies'  line 
of  retreat,  while  he  himself  attacked  the  Russians  in  front  and 
deceived  them  as  to  his  real  object  by  his  personal  presence 
there  and  by  deploying  a  stronger  force.  He  kept  at  work 
until  early  morning,  and  at  once  gave  orders  for  the  action  to 
begin  on  the  right  as  a  sign  for  Ney  to  advance;  not  until  then 
did  he  lay  himself  to  rest  a  few  hours  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Had  Alexander  seen  his  great  antagonist  sleeping  so  quietly, 
he  would  hardly  have  disregarded  Wittgenstein's  remonstrances 
and  sought  the  decisive  action  at  this  place,  as  he  really  did 
by  leaving  Barclay's  weak  division  without  any  reinforcements. 
The  latter  was  in  fact  driven  back  after  a  few  hours  far  beyond 
Gleina,  and  Bliicher's  flank  exposed  to  serious  danger.  But  in- 
stead of  boldly  pushing  right  into  Bliicher's  rear, — as  Jomini 
says  he  advised, — Ney  for  the  first  time  became  cautious.  He 
could  not  of  course  conjecture  that  the  enemy  would  leave 
his  right  wing  so  unpardonably  weak,  and  so  he  waited  for  Rey- 
nier's  arrival.  When  Reynier  appeared  at  Klix  he  advanced 
again  but  no  longer  directly  upon  Hochkirch — for  the  favour- 
able moment  was  gone — but  on  the  right  against  Bliicher,  who 
was  already  turning  his  artillery  upon  him.  That  movement 
left  the  road  to  Gorlitz  open,  and  the  mass  of  the  allies,  now 


jet.4:'.]       Results  of  the   Battle  of  Bautzen        613 

vigorously  pressed  by  Napoleon,  were  able  in  the  nick  of 
time  to  extricate  themselves.  They  lost  the  battle,  as  they 
deserved  to,  but  they  saved  their  army,  which  was  on  the  brink 
of  destruction  had  not  the  boldest  marshal  of  the  Empire  be- 
lied his  reputation  on  that  day.  In  vain  did  Napoleon  press 
after  the  enemy.  He  lacked  here  as  at  Liitzen  the  necessary 
cavalr}%  and  his  youthful  columns  were  exhausted  with  fighting. 
On  the  next  day,  the  22d  of  May,  when  he  rode  in  person  to 
the  vanguard  to  fire  their  ardour  against  the  obstinate  resistance 
of  the  Russian  rear,  he  lost  three  able  generals  of  his  staff, 
among  them  his  trusted  Duroc,  whom  he  sincerely  mourned. 

Was  that  such  a  battle  as  Napoleon  expected  by  which  to 
force  his  proposals  on  the  Czar?  Far  from  it.  The  political 
effects,  in  turn,  were  on  a  par  with  the  military.  Caulaincourt 
was  not  granted  an  interview  with  Alexander,  but  merely  noti- 
fied that  the  mediation  of  Austria  had  been  accepted  and  further 
proposals  would  be  received  only  through  that  power.  The 
allies  did,  however,  entertain  the  idea  of  a  truce,  and  accord- 
ingly Stadion  wrote  to  Berthier  that  they  were  ready  to  come 
to  negotiations  on  that  head  between  the  lines  of  the  armies. 
The  question  now  was  whether  Napoleon  was  in  earnest  about 
the  truce. 

In  the  mean  time,  however,  he  had  followed  close  upon  the 
enemy,  constantly  fighting.  He  had  left  only  Oudinot  behind  at 
Bautzen,  whence  he  was  directed  to  proceed  to  Berlin  by  way 
of  Hoyerswerda.  The  allies  had  finally  turned  off  to  the  right 
from  Liegnitz  and  Jauer  toward  Schweidnitz,  having  abandoned 
Breslau.  They  were  not  agreed  as  to  the  continuation  of  the 
war.  Barclay,  who  replaced  Wittgenstein  as  commander-in- 
chief,  was  in  favour  of  retiring  to  Poland  with  his  disorganized 
Russians  and  Poles,  to  reorganize  them  there  and  provide  them 
with  ammunition,  which  was  already  running  short.  If  he  were 
to  remain  in  Silesia,  he  needed  six  weeks'  rest.  This  considera- 
tion, in  view  of  Austria's  preparations,  settled  the  point  for 
the  allies,  since  Frederick  William  III.  regarded  with  the  greatest 
anxiety  a  possible  separation  of  the  two  armies.  If  Napoleon 
had  been  aware  of  this  critical  situation  of  his  enemies,  he 


6i4  Leipzig  [isi.i 

would  hardly  have  done  what  he  himself  later — and  others  as 
well — termed  the  greatest  mistake  of  his  life.  He  knew  nothing 
of  it,  and  so  consented  to  the  armistice.  Of  course  he  had  his 
own  reasons  for  wishing  it.  In  a  letter  to  the  Minister  of 
War,  Clarke,  dated  June  2d,  he  gives  two  of  them:  his  lack  of 
cavalry,  which  prevented  him  from  striking  a  decisive  blow, 
and  the  hostile  attitude  of  Austria.  But  those  were  not  all. 
In  his  own  army  there  was  but  too  much  confusion.  The 
heavy  loss  of  officers  in  both  battles  made  itself  keenly  felt. 
The  young  infantry  broke  down  from  the  exertion  of  constant 
marching;  most  of  the  corps  had  a"  third  of  their  men,  and 
that  of  Ney  more  than  half,  in  the  hospitals.  Owing  to  the 
distress  arising  from  defective  administration  thousands  deserted, 
while  others  scattered  in  unrestrained  marauding  in  order  to 
find  food.  Consequently,  in  spite  of  re-enforcements,  the  army 
had  soon  shrunk  to  120,000  men.*  Besides  hostile  bands  of 
guerillas  did  much  damage  in  the  rear,  cutting  off  convoys,  cap- 
turing two  trains  of  artillery,  and  the  like.  It  seemed  to  Na- 
poleon foolhardy  to  build  hopes  of  a  third  victory  on  such 
conditions  for  a  foundation;  for  it  could  not  be  followed  up 
any  more  than  the  preceding,  and  the  losses  it  would  involve 
would  only  give  Austria  a  new  advantage.  One  thing  more. 
Reports  poured  in  from  Paris  told  of  the  most  ardent  longings 
for  peace.  Even  men  whose  tried  complaisance  seldom  troubled 
the  Emperor  with  unwelcome  truth,  the  Marets  and  the  Sava- 
rys,  urgently  requested  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  take  some  account  for  the  moment  of  public  opin- 
ion in  France.  So  on  the  4th  of  June,  when  the  army  had 
pushed  on  to  Breslau  and  Oudinot  stood  facing  Biilow  by  the 
Elster,  while  Davout  had  occupied  Hamburg,  the  armistice  was 
signed  at  Poischwitz.  According  to  its  terms  the  French  were 
to  retire  beyond  the  Katzbach,  and  the  allies  beyond  a  line 
that  leads  from  the  Bohemian  frontier  by  Landeshut,  Striogau, 
and  Canth  east  of  Breslau  to  the  Oder.  The  Oder  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Katzbach  north,  the  Saxon  frontier,  and  then 

*  Lefebvre  (V.  348),  who  managed  to  secure  information  from  the 
war  archives  at  Paris,  gives  this  figure  for  the  time  before  the  armistice. 


^T.  43]  Austria's   Conditions  615 

the  Elbe  to  the  North  Sea,  bounded  the  territory  to  be  occu- 
pied by  the  French  army.  HostiUties  were  to  cease  until  the 
20th  of  June. 

If  it  had  been  Napoleon's  purpose  to  break  up  by  a  sudden 
attack  the  game  of  diplomacy,  and  in  particular  to  tear  in  pieces 
the  web  spun  by  Metternich,  then  his  spring  campaign  was  a 
failure.  Nor  had  he  succeeded  any  better  in  separating  Russia 
and  Prussia,  nor  in  bringing  Austria,  like  Saxony,  over  to  his 
side.  Rather,  by  his  separate  negotiation  with  the  Czar,  had 
he  put  in  the  hands  of  the  latter  a  lever  which  he  was  not  slow 
to  bring  to  bear  on  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Great  was  the  conster- 
nation of  the  Austrian  government  at  the  news  of  the  second 
defeat,  the  repeated  appearance  of  Caulaincourt  at  the  camp 
of  the  allies,  and  the  negotiations  for  a  truce.  It  was  feared 
that  Napoleon  might  now  turn  upon  Austria  and  compel  her 
to  join  him;  or  that  Russia  might  give  up  the  fight,  as  in  1805 
and  1807.  It  seemed  necessary,  therefore,  to  approach  the 
allies  by  some  overt  act  and  bind  them  to  the  cause.  Hence 
Francis  I.  repaired  early  in  June  with  his  minister  to  Castle 
Gitschin  in  Bohemia,  to  be  nearer  to  them.  Thither  came 
Count  Nesselrode,  sent  by  Alexander  to  induce  Austria  to  join 
the  alliance  formally.  He  found  the  Emperor  greatly  disin- 
clined to  enter  the  war  with  his  poorly  equipped  troops  as  long 
as  the  possibility  still  remained  of  securing  peace  through 
negotiations.  But  he  did  obtain  from  Metternich  a  statement 
of  sLx  conditions  which  he  declared  to  be  essential  for  peace, 
and  the  first  four  of  which  Austria  was  willing  to  enforce  by 
a  resort  to  arms  in  case  Napoleon  rejected  them:  (1)  the  dis- 
memberment of  the  duchy  of  Warsaw;  (2)  the  consequent  en- 
largement of  Prussia,  to  which  Danzig  was  to  be  restored;  (3) 
restitution  of  lUyria  to  Austria;  (4)  independence  of  the  Hanse- 
atic  towns;  (5)  dissolution  of  the  Rhenish  Confederation;  (6) 
restoration  of  Prussia  to  her  position  in  1806  as  far  as  possible*. 
These  first  four  conditions  by  no  means  contained  what  Aus- 
tria had  previously  proposed  as  the  "niininunn."  and  in  so  far 
the  victory  at  Bautzen  had  after  all  influenced  the  power  011 
the  Danube.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  allies  now  felt  sure 


6 1 6  Leipzig  [I813 

that  Austria  would  under  certain  circumstances  fight  against 
Napoleon,  but  never  against  the  allies.  The  latter  had  indeed, 
as  early  as  the  16th  of  May,  agreed  at  Wurschen  on  a  much 
wider-reaching  programme,  including  in  addition  to  the  above 
points  the  separation  of  Holland  from  France,  the  restoration 
of  the  Bourbons  in  Spain,  the  restoration  of  Austria  to  her  posi- 
tion in  1805,  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  beyond  the  Rhine, 
and  the  liberation  of  Italy.  But  the  certainty  of  Austria's 
co-operation,  which  Metternich  claims  to  have  guaranteed  in  per- 
son to  Alexander  I.  at  the  Bohemian  castle  Opocno,  made  them 
ready  to  negotiate  with  the  French  in  regard  to  a  peace  even 
on  those  conditions.  For  it  seemed  as  good  as  settled  that 
Napoleon,  if  victorious,  would  not  consent  to  such  terms.  This 
peace  was,  to  be  sure  to  serve  only  as  a  preliminary  arrange- 
ment, and  was  to  be  followed  by  negotiations  looking  to  a 
definitive  pacification  that  could  not  be  brought  about  without 
the  participation  and  assent  of  England.  To  this  Russia  and 
Prussia  had  to  pledge  themselves  in  June  when  they  arranged 
with  the  London  government,  by  treaty  for  subsidies,  to  supply 
them  the  funds  for  carrying  on  the  war.  On  the  27th  of  June, 
1813,  then,  at  Reichenbach,  the  headquarters  of  the  allies,  the 
three  powers  signed  a  secret  treaty  the  provisions  of  which 
had  already  been  formulated  at  Opocno  and  included  the  four 
indispensable  articles  of  Austria  together  with  her  solemn 
promise  to  declare  war  on  France  at  once  if  Napoleon  should 
not  have  accepted  these  provisions  by  the  20th  of  July.*  In 
that  event,  indeed,  the  three  powers  were  to  wage  the  war  no 
longer  for  that  modest  reward,  but  for  the  entire  comprehensive 
programme  of  May  16th;  that  is  to  say,  France  was  to  be  driven 
back  and  confined  within  her  natural  boundaries.  Moreover, 
the  powers  bound  themselves  to  allow  no  separate  negotiations 
on  the  part  of  Napoleon  with  any  one  of  them. 

Napoleon  had  been  made  uneasy  by  Metternich's  journey  to 
Alexander  and  was  not  satisfied  with  Bubna's  report;    so  he 

*  Th(!  (ivacuation  of  the  fortressos  along  the  Vistuhi  and  Oder  by  the 
French  was  also  included  among  the  essential  demands  binding  Austria 
to  open  war. 


iEr.  43J  Napoleon   and   Metternich  617 

invited  the  Austrian  minister  to  meet  him  at  Dresden.  Met- 
ternich came,  after  explaining  the  situation  to  Nesselrode,  and 
on  the  26th  stood  in  the  palace  Marcolini  in  the  presence  of  the 
Imperator.  In  an  interview  lasting  nine  hours,  during  which 
Napoleon  lost  his  temper  more  than  once, — going  so  far,  in  fact, 
as  to  call  his  second  marriage  a  piece  of  stupidity  and  to  charge 
Metternich  with  venality, — he  tried  to  confine  Austria  to  the 
attitude  of  armed  neutrality ;  but  Metternich  stubbornly  held  to 
armed  intervention.  This  interview  has  become  celebrated  in 
history  because  it  was  supposed  to  mark  the  decisive  turn  in 
the  policy  of  Austria  and  in  the  fate  of  Napoleon.  But  such  a 
view  of  it  is  incorrect.  The  Vienna  Court  had,  rather,  been 
yielding  to  pressure  from  Russia  for  some  time,  and  any  pause 
in  its  movement  was  hardly  conceivable  at  this  point;  so  Na- 
poleon was  not  so  far  wrong  when  he  said  of  Metternich,  "  He 
thinks  he  moves  everybody,  and  everybody  moves  him." 
Everybody  but  Napoleon;  for  the  last  word  he  uttered  to  the 
minister  at  the  close  of  the  interview  was  not  to  be  fulfilled: 
*"  You  certainly  will  not  declare  war  on  me." 

The  interview  in  Dresden  resulted  in  the  Emperor's  meet- 
ing Austria  half  way;  he  not  only  declared  the  alliance  of  1812 
dissolved,  but  even  accepted  the  armed  intervention  of  Austria. 
There  might  be  cause  for  wonder  in  this  determination  of  Na- 
poleon, did  we  not  find  an  explanation  of  it  in  a  convention 
signed  on  the  30th  of  June  by  Maret  and  the  Austrian  minister 
providing  that,  in  the  interests  of  the  peace  negotiations  to  be 
carried  on  at  a  congress  to  meet  at  Prague,  the  truce  should 
last  until  the  10th  of  August,  and  that  Austria  was  to  prevail 
on  the  allies  to  accept  the  proposal.  Metternich  had  already 
made  this  proposal,  as  a  reward  for  the  acceptance  of  Austria's 
mediation,  in  the  great  interview  of  June  26th ;  which  proves  that 
at  that  time  he  was  still  really  in  earnest  about  securing  peace.* 

*  The  question  whether  Napoleon  or  Metternich  was  the  first  to  pro- 
pose a  longer  truce  was  long  a  matter  of  dispute.  Since  the  publication 
of  the  authentic  report  which  the  minister  prepared  for  Francis  I.  in  1820 
the  question  seems  decided  in  favour  of  Metternich.  In  this  document 
we  have  the  answer  Metternich  claims  to  have  made  to  Napoleon's  request 


6 1 8  Leipzig  [isis 

Nor  did  Napoleon  desire  war  at  any  price.  He,  too,  would 
perhaps  have  been  ready  to  conclude  peace,  though  he  would 
have  preferred  it  to  be  a  general  one,  that  would  put  an  end  to 
all  hostilities  and  secure  repose  to  the  French  people.  A  mere 
Continental  peace  that  left  the  war  with  England  open  and  the 
French  colonies  in  English  hands  he  cared  much  less  for  and 
would  accept  only  under  two  conditions:  either  after  a  series 
of  crushing  victories  that  assured  the*  preponderance  of  the 
Empire  for  some  time  to  come,  or  in  consequence  of  a  separate 
convention  with  Russia,  similar  to  that  of  Tilsit.  Now  in  order 
to  strike  crushing  blows  he  needed  time  for  extensive  prepara- 
tions, a  period  which  he  had  reckoned  at  three  months  in  his 
instructions  to  Caulaincourt  on  the  26th  of  May.  The  armistice 
of  June  4th  fell  far  short  of  that.  Now  the  desired  increase  of 
time  was  within  reach,  and  at  once  the  Emperor  seized  it. 
But  at  the  same  time  he  hoped  to  find  an  opportunity  at  the 
congress  to  reach  a  separate  understanding  with  the  Czar. 
Hence  he  planned  to  send  to  Prague  not  only  Narbonne,  who 
was  accredited  to  Austria,  but  also  Caulaincourt.  Of  course 
not  at  once.  He  kept  back  the  marshal  until  the  26th  of 
July,  when  the  extension  of  the  armistice  was  confirmed  by  the 
signatures  of  the  various  negotiating  parties  at  Neumarkt. 
Why  was  that?     Did  he  hope  to  find  some  way  of  approaching 

that  Austria  remain  neutral:  "  Emperor  Francis  has  offered  the  powers  his 
mediation,  not  neutrality.  Russia  and  Prussia  have  accepted  it ;  it 
remains  now  for  you  to  decide.  Either  you  accept,  in  xvhich  case  we  shall 
fix  a  period  for  the  duration  of  the  negotiations,  or  else  you  decline,  in  which 
case  my  sovereign  will  deem  himself  wholly  free  in  his  plans  and  acts." 
That  is  to  say,  if  Napoleon  accepts  the  mediation,  Austria  proposes  to 
allow  for  the  necessary  negotiations  a  time  mentioned  in  the  conditions  of 
the  truce.  The  extension  of  the  armistice  was  advantageous  for  Austria's 
war  preparations,  but  it  was  far  more  so  to  the  French.  If,  then,  Metter- 
nich  made  such  a  high  bid  to  secure  Napoleon's  acceptance  of  mediation, 
he  must  have  been  very  much  in  earnest  in  seeking  a  peace  that  would 
save  his  country  from  invasion.  He  himself  told  Hardenberg  early  in  July 
that  Emperor  Francis  was  convinced  that  the  whole  burden  of  the  war 
would  fall  on  Austria,  that  it  would  bring  the  greatest  calamities  to  the 
monarchy,  and  that  to  prevent  this  he  would  renounce  all  acquisition  of 
territory.     (Oncken,  "Preussen  im  Befreiungskriege,"  II.  399.) 


JEt.  43]  The   Congress  of  Prague  6 1 9 

Russia  even  at  Ncumarkt?  Or  was  ho  unwilling:  to  appear 
at  Prague  under  the  fresh  impression  of  the  n(>\\s  from  Spain 
that  WeUington  on  the  21st  of  June  had  totally  defeated  the 
French  army  at  Vittoria,  far  north  of  the  Ebro,  and  put  them 
to  flight,  that  only  a  few  positions  were  left  them  beyond  the 
Pyrenees,  and  that  after  those  fell  immediate  danger  would 
threaten  France  herself?  No  doubt  he  was  anxious  to  extricate 
himself  with  honour  in  the  east;  and  so  Caulaincourt  received 
instructions  "to  conclude  a  peace  that  would  be  glorious."  * 

In  the  capital  of  Bohemia  Caulaincourt  was  soon  convinced 
that  there  was  no  prospect  of  fulfilling  his  sovereign's  wishes. 
Anstett,  the  representative  of  Russia,  was  a  confirmed  hater 
of  Napoleon,  and  moreover  he  had  agreed  with  Metternich  to 
conduct  the  negotiations  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  congress 
of  Teschen  in  1779;  i.e.,  not  to  express  their  views  in  open 
conference,  but  only  in  writing  through  the  mediating  power. 
Metternich  had  chosen  this  method  in  order  to  preclude  all 
chance  of  secret  understandings  behintl  his  back,  and  the  allies 
had  adopted  it  in  order  that  Austria  might  more  surely  com- 
promise herself  with  France.  Under  these  circumstances  Cau- 
laincourt found  nothing  to  do,  and  Napoleon  had  to  give  up 
his  idea  of  a  separate  agreement  with  the  Czar.  The  news  that 
Alexander  and  Frederick  William  had  conferred  with  Berna- 
dotte  at  the  Silesian  castle  of  Trachenberg  on  a  plan  of  cam- 
paign completely  shut  off  any  further  thought  of  peace.  At 
the  end  of  July  Napoleon  left  Dresden  to  meet  the  Empress 
Regent  and  the  minister  in  Mainz,  to  receive  their  repoils, 
give  them  tlirections  for  the  time  of  his  absence  on  the  next 
campaign,  and  to  inspect  the  divisions  of  two  new  army  corps. 

*  Emouf,  "Maret,"  p.  574.  The  statement  that  Napoleon  was  not 
at  that  time  averse  to  a  general  peace  is  confirmed  by  Metternich  in  a 
letter  of  June  28th  from  Dresden  to  Francis  I."  .  convinced  that  the 
question  of  a  general  peace  would  be  nmch  more  easily  fought  to  an  issue 
than  that  of  a  Continental  peace."  (Oncken,  11.  395  )  Maret  even 
handed  him  an  outline  of  the  scheme.  (Emouf,  p.  565.)  The  positive 
statement  of  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  that  at  Dresden  he  wished  for  a 
general  peace  has  been  made  known  in  Montholon's  "  History  of  the 
Captivity  of  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena." 


620  Leipzig  [1813 

Then  on  the  5th  of  August  he  returned  to  Saxony.  Only  five 
days  remained  before  the  close  of  the  congress,  and  it  had  not 
got  beyond  formalities.  This  was  perfectly  natural,  for  nobody 
was  now  anxious  for  peace.  The  allies  had  never  expected  it  as 
a  result  of  Austria's  mediation,  but  had  accepted  her  offices 
only  in  order  to  build  for  her  "a  bridge  across  the  chasm"; 
and  Metternich  himself  had  assumed  quite  a  warlike  mood  at 
the  news  of  events  in  Spain.  His  only  wish  now  was  to  con- 
vince his  wavering  master  that  reconciliation  with  Napoleon 
was  impossible,  and  he  finally  succeeded.*  Fouche,  who  during 
those  days  passed  through  Prague  as  the  newly-appointed 
governor  of  lUyria,  had  told  the  allies  a  good  deal  about  the 
precarious  situation  of  the  Emperor  and  the  despondent  feel- 
ings of  his  people.  Even  in  Austria  the  people  were  in  a  fer- 
ment and  the  minister  had  to  reckon  with  them.  Broglie, 
Narbonne's  secretary,  says  in  his  memoirs,  "We  could  no  longer 
cross  the  street  without  being  insulted." 

But  the  most  important  thing  was  that  Napoleon  became 
convinced  at  last  that  he  had  been  mistaken  about  Austria's 
future  attitude  when  he  expressed  himself  so  confidentially  to 
Metternich.  The  reports  of  Caulaincourt,  and  especially  the 
Austrian  army  lists  which  the  French  had  managed  to  get  hold 
of  at  Prague,  led  him  to  consider  more  seriously  than  before 
the  possible  effects  of  a  declaration  of  war  from  that  quarter. 
He  suddenly  saw  hinxself  face  to  face  with  a  more  powerful 
coalition  than  had  ever  confronted  him,  and  that,  too,  of  powers 
which  he  had  hitherto  supposed  to  be  irreconcilable  in  their 
interests.  He  made  one  last  effort  to  break  it  up.  Hardly  had 
he  returned  to  Dresden  when  he  iastructed  Caulaincourt  to 
sound  Metternich  secretly  as  to  "how  Austria  understood  the 
peace,  and  whether,  in  case  Napoleon  accepted  her  conditions, 
she  would  make  common  cause  with  him,  or  else  remain  neutral." 
But  he  was  too  late.  As  his  answer  Metternich  brought  forward 
not  only  the  four  indispensable  articles  for  which  Austria  had 

*  Wellington  could  therefore  assert  with  some  show  of  reason,  after  all, 
that  his  victory  at  Vittoria  drove  Napoleon  out  of  Germany.  (Historical 
Review,  1887,  p.  598.) 


iET.  43]   Napoleon  Rejects  Austria's  Demands     621 

bound  herself  to  fight,  but  the  two  additional  ones  for  wiiieh 
she  desired  to  negotiate,  i.e.,  he  demanded  also  the  dissolution 
of  the  Rhenish  Confederation  and  the  restoration  of  the  old 
Prussian  state.  All  this  was  to  make  sure  that  Napoleon  would 
refuse.  His  definite  answer  to  these  conditions,  yes  or  no,  was 
to  arrive  at  Prague  not  later  than  midnight  of  Augast  10th. 
They  were  doubtless  anxious  hours  that  Metternich  spent  after 
sending  off  his  ultimatum.  "Wliat  if  Napoleon  declared  out- 
right and  in  season  that  he  accepted?  What  an  embarrassment 
for  Austria!  Yet  Metternich's  calculation  was  sound.  The  vic- 
tor at  Liitzcn  and  Bautzen  could  not  accept  a  programme  that 
disputed  his  control  of  the  German  troops  and  bade  him  vacate 
the  fortresses  on  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder.  "  Do  they  want  me  to 
dishonour  myself?  "  he  said  to  the  minister  in  Dresden.  "  Never! 
Your  sovereigns  born  to  the  throne  can  suffer  defeat  twenty 
times  and  yet  each  time  return  to  their  capital.  But  I  am  a 
child  of  fortune;  I  shall  have  ceased  to  reign  on  the  day  when 
I  have  ceased  to  command  respect."  He  was  now  indignant 
at  the  demands  of  Austria,  which  he  exaggerated  in  his  letters 
to  Jerome  and  Cambaceres  as  including  even  the  restitution  of 
Venice,  and  just  to  propose  something  on  his  part  he  offered 
the  following  terms:  dismemberment  of  the  duchy  of  Warsaw, 
the  independence  of  Danzig,  and  the  restoration  of  Illyria  with 
the  exception  of  Trieste.  These  were  communicated  to  Bubna 
at  Dresden  on  the  evening  of  the  9th,  and  he  reported  them  in 
good  time  at  Prague.  But  Napoleon's  official  answer  did  not 
arrive  there  until  the  11th,  when  the  representatives  of  France 
already  had  in  hand  their  passports  and  also  Austria's  declara- 
tion of  war.  The  congress  was  closed;  a  new  terrible  struggle 
was  about  to  begin.* 

*  Napoleon  did  not  so  quickh'  throw  up  the  game  of  diplomacy.  Hos- 
tilities could  not  commence  until  after  a  week's  notice.  This  interval  he 
used  to  announce  his  acceptance  of  Austria's  ultimatum,  for  no  other  pur- 
pose, surely,  than  to  throw  the  odium  of  the  aggressor  on  other  shoulders. 
But  he  accomplished  nothing  by  it.  On  the  16th  of  .\ugust,  .\lexander  and 
Frederick  William  having  come  to  Prague,  his  envoy  received  a  negative 
answer  and  his  dismissal.  In  the  year  1814  the  Emperor,  then  dethroned, 
said  to  the  Austrian  General  Koller:  "As  to  the  congress  of  Prague,  I  con- 


622  Leipzig  [I813 

Wo  cannot  be  expected  here  to  describe  at  length  the  battles 
in  which  the  nations  and  governments  of  Europe,  forgetting 
their  individual  quarrels,  made  a  united  resistance  to  the  oppres- 
sive preponderance  of  imperial  France.  We  can  mention  only 
the  most  important  steps  in  the  progress  of  events,  and  those 
only  briefly. 

During  the  armistice  Napoleon  had  made  the  best  possible 
use  of  his  time.  The  army  with  which  he  now  confronted  the 
enemy  is  estimated  at  440,000  men.  Of  cavalry,  the  lack  of 
which  he  had  lamented  so  bitterly  a  few  weeks  before,  he  now 
had  a  superabundance;  nor  was  there  any  longer  a  deficiency 
of  artillery.  And  although  his  forces  were  made  up  of  the 
youngest  of  the  youth  of  France  and  the  states  of  the  Rhenish 
Confederation  available  for  service,  yet  we  have  seen  these 
striplings  at  Liitzen  and  Bautzen  fight  like  veterans.  They 
would  do  their  duty  again,  and  do  it  even  gladly  and  eagerly  were 
not  the  treasury  at  so  low  an  ebb,  and  did  but  the  commissary 
officials  have  a  little  more  sense  of  honour.  But  money  for 
the  men's  pay  was  scarce,  and  the  corruption  was  incredible; 
so  that  the  young  warriors  suffered  excessively  from  hunger, 
which  sent  many  thousands  to  the  hospitals.*  Moreover,  there 
was  still  a  great  scarcity  of  officers  and  subalterns;  the  latter 
doubtless  because  the  Emperor  took  the  best  material  for  his 
Guard,  which  had  now  grown  to  58,000  (normal  strength  80,000) 
and  was  cared  for  with  the  same  solicitude  as  before.  It  almost 
looked  as  if  the  Imperator,  who  was  free  from  national  ties, 
meant  to  make  a  personal  army  of  this  host  within  a  host. 
Besides  this  body  there  were  fourteen  army  corps.  One  corps 
of  the  division  under  Davout,  on  the  lower  Elbe,  had  been  de- 

fess  to  have  been  deceived  in  you ;  I  took  you  still  to  be  what  I  had  learned 
to  know  you  on  former  occasions,  and  you  had  in  the  mean  time  changed 
to  your  own  advantage." 

*  The  li.sts  show  no  less  than  90,000  men  sick,  exclusive  of  the  440,000 
at  which  the  army  was  reckoned  in  Germany  Corruption  extended  to 
the  immediate  circle  of  the  Emperor.  An  eye-witness  relates  how  the  pay- 
master Peyrusse  put  into  his  pocket  1000  francs  out  of  4000  that  the 
Emperor  had  set  aside  for  a  monument  to  Duroc,  remarking  that  such 
was  the  custom.     (Odeleben,  "  Napoleon's  Feldzug  in  iSachsen,"  p.  255.) 


JErr.43]  The  Strength  of  the  Allies  623 

tachod  and  sont  to  Dresden  under  Vandammc.  A  second  was 
brought  from  Franconia  and  put  under  Saint-Cyr.  Poniatovvski 
had  brought  12.000  unarmed  Poles  through  Austria,  and  in 
addition  there  were  five  reserve  corps  of  cavalry  under  Murat, 
the  Emperor  manifestly  intending  in  this  way  to  bring  this 
general  out  of  his  political  A-aciilation  and  bind  him  to  himself. 
The  entire  force  was  stationed  for  the  most  part  between  Dres- 
den and  Liegnitz;  only  three  corps  under  Oudinot  were  north 
of  Kottbus  and  Kalau,  facing  Biilow,  who  was  to  cover  Berlin. 

The  allies,  too,  had  been  making  mighty  preparations  during 
the  last  few  months.  Alexander  I.  had  organized  the  recruiting 
system,  so  that  troops  could  arrive  from  all  ports  of  the  Russia 
empire,  to  say  nothing  of  the  great  reserves  in  Poland.  Prussia, 
thanks  to  the  warlike  enthusiasm  of  her  people,  had  done  won- 
des.  "  We  now  have  an  army,"  wrote  Gneisenau  as  early  as  on 
July  11th  to  Stein,  "such  as  Prussia  never  had  before,  even  in 
her  most  glorious  days."  Austria,  likewise,  had  made  all  con- 
ceivable exertions. 

As  to  the  plans  for  the  proper  utilizing  of  these  forces  (reck- 
oned at  480,000)  against  the  dreaded  Caesar,  a  provisional 
agreement  had  been  reached  even  in  Jime  at  Gitschin,  when 
Francis  I.  first  suggested  the  possibility  of  his  co-operation  with 
the  other  powers.  The  plans  were  further  discussed  and  set- 
tled at  Trachenbcrg,  in  concert  with  the  Prince  Royal  of  Sweden. 
There  were  to  be  three  armies  in  the  field.  The  main  army 
was  to  occupy  Bohemia,  out  of  regard  for  Austria,  which  had 
been  so  courted  and  now  feared  a  new  invasion  from  the  north 
and  the  occupation  of  Vienna  by  the  enemy;  re-enforcements 
from  Silesia  raised  it  to  the  desired  size,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
armistice  it  numbered  230,000  men.  Then  a  northern  army 
under  Bernadotte  (156,000,  over  40,000  of  which,  however, 
were  detached);  and  finally  a  Silesian  army  under  Bliicher  (of 
95,000).  The  fundamental  plan  of  strategy  adopted  for  the 
campaign  was,  that  if  the  enemy  threw  himself  with  his  main 
body  on  any  one  of  these  armies,  it  should  fall  back  while  the 
other  two  advanced  to  the  attack. 

Napoleon  had  received  no  information  of  such  a  plan.     He 


624  Leipzig  [1813 

became  aware  of  it  quite  late  from  the  march  of  Russian  troops 
toward  Bohemia.  He  himself  had  never  formed  the  purpose 
of  marching  on  Vienna  which  was  ascribed  to  him  in  the  enemies' 
camp.  His  plan  was  quite  different;  he  wanted  Davout  from 
Hamburg  and  Oudinot  from  the  south  to  co-operate  in  an  offen- 
sive movement  on  Berlin,  which  he  thought  would  be  successful, 
for  he  far  underestimated  the  northern  army  and  judged  that 
to  be  the  weakest  point  in  the  enemies'  lines.  To  form  a  con- 
necting link  between  those  two  generals  a  division  under  Girard 
was  to  proceed  east  from  Magdeburg.  After  the  Prussian  capital 
had  been  occupied,  Kiistrin  and  Stettin  were  to  be  relieved  at 
once  and  so  the  left  wing  of  the  entire  French  line  would  be 
pushed  towards  the  east.  In  the  mean  time  the  Emperor  meant 
to  cover  this  movement  by  a  vigorous  defence  against  the  other 
two  armies,  leaving  the  enemy  to  take  the  offensive.  From 
what  point  the  attack  would  be  made  he  was  not  certain.  To 
prepare  for  any  emergency  he  took  a  temporary  position  at 
Gorlitz  with  the  Guard,  supposing  that  the  united  forces  of  the 
Russians  and  Prussians  might  advance  from  Bohemia  by  way 
of  Zittau.  He  tried  to  secure  Dresden  from  being  surprised  by 
means  of  earthworks  and  palisades,  and  entrusted  the  defence 
to  Saint-Cyr,  though  he  himself  could  take  part  in  it  within  a 
few  days. 

But  the  expected  offensive  movement  of  the  enemy  at  Zittau 
did  not  take  place.  On  the  contrary,  Bliicher  had  already  com- 
menced hostilities  on  the  16th  of  August  and  had  driven  four 
French  corps  under  Ney,  which  were  immediately  in  front  of 
him  at  Liegnitz,  over  the  Bober.  Napoleon  wanted  to  retrieve 
the  loss  and  strike  Bliicher  a  fatal  blow.  But  the  latter  at 
once  became  aware  of  his  presence  by  the  very  behaviour  of 
the  French  troops,  if  not  by  the  resounding  cry  of  "Vive  I'Em- 
pereur!  "  and  discerning  the  purpose  of  a  decisive  movement, 
he  did  what  had  been  agreed  upon,  and  retired  fighting  beyond 
the  Katzbach.  The  Emperor  failed  to  see  that  this  retreat  was 
intentional,  and  so  pushed  on  eagerly  after  him,  until  a  call  for 
help  from  Saint-Cyr  unexpectedly  overtook  him:  Dresden  was 
most  seriously  threatened  by  the  advance  of  a  hostile  army 


jet.  u]  The   Battle  of  Dresden  625 

from  the  Erzgcbirge.  So  the  issue  was  to  be  determined  in 
quite  a  different  quarter  from  what  Napoleon  had  supposed. 
He  left  Macdonald  with  three  corps  in  front  of  Bliichcr  and  set 
out  with  the  remainder  to  the  west  on  the  23d  of  Augast.  After 
extraordinary  forced  marches  for  three  days  the  troops  arrived 
in  the  vicinity  of  Dresden.  The  Emperor  now  conceived  the 
daring  plan  of  crossing  the  Elbe  below  the  enemy,  who  was 
already  near  the  city,  so  as  to  bring  the  hostile  army  between 
himself  and  Saint-Cyr,  and  thus  cut  off  its  line  of  retreat. 
But  he  was  obliged  to  drop  the  brilliant  conception  at  once; 
Saint-Cyr  was  too  weak  to  make  any  lasting  resistance,  and  the 
defensive  works  were  still  incomplete,  so  he  had  to  choose  the 
safer  way  and  advance  upon  the  enemy  from  Dresden.  All  he 
did  was  to  send  Vandamme  with  40,000  men  to  Pirna  and 
Konigstein,  while  he  himself  entered  the  city  on  the  forenoon 
of  the  26th  of  August  with  the  Guard,  which  had  marched 
from  Lowenberg  in  three  days,  over  eighty -five  miles.  The 
corps  of  Marmont  and  Victor  were  still  on  the  way.  It  was 
fortunate  for  him  that  at  the  enemy's  headquarters,  where 
Schwarzenberg  was  commander-in-chief,  though  with  constant 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  three  monarchs  and  their  ad- 
visers, the  favourable  moment  for  attack  the  next  morning  was 
allowed  on  trifling  grounds  to  slip  by,  and  the  assault  on  the 
city  was  postponed  until  the  afternoon.  Not  until  about  four 
o'clock  did  the  allies  advance  in  a  semicircle  broken  by  the 
dechvities  near  Plauen.  But  being  without  means  for  storming, 
and  without  re-enforcements  on  account  of  the  scattered  state 
of  their  forces,  they  were  unable  in  spite  of  desperate  valour  to 
gain  any  lasting  success,  but  just  threw  away  their  lives  in  the 
futile  attempt  to  get  possession  of  the  suburbs.  In  the  evening 
Napoleon  himself  issued  from  the  gates  to  the  attack  and  drove 
the  Russians  back  on  the  left  far  beyond  Striesen,  the  Austrians 
on  the  right  to  Lobtau  and  Cotta,  and  the  Austrians  and  Prus- 
sians in  the  centre  to  the  heights  of  Racknitz.  The  battle  was 
won  without  the  corps  of  Marmont  and  Victor,  which  arrived 
during  the  night  and  greatly  strengthened  the  French  army. 
On  the  next  day  the  Emperor  at  once  assumed  the  offensive. 


626  Leipzig  [1813 

He  engaged  the  enemy's  right  wing  and  centre,  while  Murat 
with  his  corps  of  cavalry  pushed  through  between  the  centre 
and  the  left  wing,  which  he  out  off,  surrounded,  and  routed, taking 
an  Austrian  division  prisoners.  The  enemy's  mistake  in  leaving 
his  cavalry  inactive  in  the  centre  greatly  aided  the  victory  of 
the  French.  Meantime  Vandamme  also  had  crossed  the  Elbe 
and  engaged  a  weak  corps  of  the  enemy  at  Konigstein.  Threat- 
ened in  their  rear,  and  with  their  left  wing  severely  crippled, 
the  allies  retired.  In  those  two  days  they  had  lost  nearly  a 
third  of  their  forces  in  dead,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  while  the 
enemy,  being  well  protected  by  their  position,  had  much  smaller 
losses  to  report  and  could  boast  of  another  proud  victory. 
If  Napoleon  had  followed  it  up  with  the  same  skiU  with  which 
he  won  it,  the  main  army  of  the  allies  would  have  been  over- 
taken by  catastrophe  that  no  successes  of  the  other  two  armies 
could  have  retrieved.  He  did  not  do  so.  Primarily  because, 
although  he  was  certain  of  victory,  he  did  not  feel  sure  that  the 
enemy,  whose  main  forces  in  the  centre  and  left  wing  had  been 
but  little  engaged,  would  not  renew  the  battle  the  next  day. 
The  commands  he  issued  that  evening  leave  no  doubt  that  he 
expected  yet  a  third  day  of  fighting.  And  in  fact  the  plan 
of  retiring  with  the  whole  army  to  the  heights  of  Dippoldiswalde 
and  renewing  the  battle  there  was  discussed  at  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  allies  far  into  the  night.  Finally,  Schwarzenberg  urged 
that  the  Austrians  were  poorly  armed,  and  so  ordered  a  retreat. 
Not  until  the  next  morning  did  Napoleon,  riding  forward  to 
the  line  of  battle  of  the  preceding  day,  learn  this  decision  when 
he  saw  the  enemy's  columns  disappearing  in  the  valleys  on  the 
road  to  Dippoldiswalde  and  Maxen.  As  Vandamme  with 
40,000  men  held  the  Pirna  highroad  that  led  by  Peterswalde  to 
Teplitz,  it  was  the  Emperor's  conviction  that  the  allies  would 
seek  to  reach  Teplitz  by  shorter  though  less  convenient  roads. 
He  ordered  Saint-Cyr  and  Marmont  to  follow  them  on  the  road  past 
Sayda  Victor,  while  Murat  was  to  march  to  Frcyberg  and  Frauen- 
stein  and  threaten  their  flank  and  rear.  On  the  28th  he  wrote 
to  Vandamme,  whose  position  near  Pirna  was  now  taken  by 
Mortier,  that  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  started  in  the  direc- 


iEx.  44]  French    Defeats  627 

tion  of  Altenberg,  and  that  he  prevent  their  making  connections 
with  Teplitz  and  especially  do  great  damage  to  their  baggage- 
train.*  He  himself  by  no  means  deemed  the  eneni}-  conquered, 
having  just  expected  him  to  renew  the  battle,  and  evidently  re- 
garded it  as  a  great  success  that  he  had  victoriounly  repulsed 
the  assault  of  the  main  army.  If  he  had  any  inkling  of  the  de- 
jection in  the  other  camp,  the  ill-feeling  of  the  Austrians,  the 
poor  order  on  the  retreat,  the  confused  marching  of  the  col- 
umns so  that  40,000  Prussians  under  Kleist  had  to  turn  aside 
and  climb  the  hills  to  make  any  progress  at  all,  he  would  not 
have  wavered  for  a  moment,  but  compieted  his  victory  by  a 
crushing  blow.f 

But  there  was  another  circumstance.  During  the  last  few 
days  the  Emperor  had  been  notified  of  a  calamity  that  had 
befallen  the  army  of  Oudinot:  it  had  been  defeated  at  Gross- 
Beeren  on  the  23d  of  August  by  Biilow  and  forced  to  retreat 
to  Wittenberg.  And  as  if  that  were  not  enough,  just  now,  as 
he  was  about  joining  the  pursuing  corps,  the  news  arrived  of  a 
brilliant  victory  by  Bliicher  on  the  26th  at  Wahlstatt  on  the 
Katzbach  over  Macdonald,  whereby  the  eastern  army  of  the 
French  lost  20,000  men  and  was  driven  back  into  the  Lausitz. 
Under  these  circumstances  could  he  still  afford  to  go  into  Bo- 
hemia? He  weighed  this  question  and  answered  it  in  a  series 
of  notes  in  the  negative.     For  it  had  been  his  main  plan  origi- 

*  This  letter  of  Berthier's  to  Vandamme  is  quoted  by  all  historians, 
even  the  military  ones,  with  the  meaningless  clerical  error  "Annaberg" 
instead  of  "Altenberg,"  which  alone  is  possible.  Neither  the  contents  of 
the  letter  nor  Napoleon's  letter  to  Murat  on  the  following  day  leave  any 
doubt  on  this  point.  The  latter  contains  this  sentence:  "Toute  I'arm^e  se 
retire  par  Altenberg  sur  Toeplitz." 

t  An  indisposition  that  came  upon  him  on  the  28th  at  noon  while 
breakfasting  on  the  road  to  Pima  is  said  to  have  hindered  him  from 
advancing  and  forced  him  to  return  to  Dresden.  So  runs  the  legend. 
But  the  illness  must  have  been  of  very  short  duration,  though  it  may  have 
a  basis  of  truth;  for  he  was  seen  riding  back  to  Dresden  "very  cheerful 
and  merry,"  and  there  a  messenger  from  the  Katzbach  found  him  in  the 
best  of  health.  He  himself,  to  be  sure,  in  1815,  in  speaking  to  some  gen- 
erals sought  by  means  of  this  petty  accident  to  draw  a  veil  over  his  great 
mistake  as  to  the  extent  of  his  victory  at  Dresden, 


628  Leipzig  (1813 

nally  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  the  south  and  make  an 
offensive  movement  only  in  the  north.  Hence  the  Dresden  affair 
he  regarded  as  merely  a  defensive  victor}^  at  a  time  when  his 
scheme  of  an  attack  on  Berlin  and  the  Oder,  where  the  garri- 
sons could  hold  out  no  longer  than  October  according  to  his 
reckoning,  was  on  the  point  of  miscarrying.  That,  therefore, 
must  be  the  direction  of  his  next  movement  with  stronger 
forces  and  in  person,  whereas  Dresden  he  merely  put  into  a 
better  defensive  position.  And  now  it  was  the  politician  in 
him  that  joined  the  strategist  and  led  him  astray;  "  I  can  suc- 
ceed thereby  in  separating  the  Russians  from  the  Austrians.  for 
I  can  bring  to  bear  upon  Austria  my  regard  for  her  in  not  having 
carried  the  war  into  Bohemia."  It  was  his  plan  within  the 
next  two  weeks  to  take  Berlin, — supposing  Macdonald  to  check 
Billow, — provision  Stettin,  destroy  the  Prussian  defences,  and  dis- 
organize the  landwehr.     The  pursuit  into  Bohemia  was  given  up. 

It  must  be  left  to  military  experts  to  criticise  the  strategic 
aspect  of  this  plan.  Hitherto  they  have  condemned  it.  And 
as  if  the  very  events  themselves  were  to  put  the  Emperor  in 
the  wrong,  Vandamme  in  his  advanced  and  isolated  position 
met  in  front  on  the  29th  of  August  resistance  from  a  superior 
force  of  Russians  and  Austrians  at  Kuhn,and  finally,  on  the  30th, 
was  attacked  in  the  rear,  as  well,  by  Kleist,  who  had  got  behind 
him  on  the  Peterswalde  road.  His  corps  was  annihilated  with 
the  exception  of  a  small  remnant,  which  sought  safety  in  flight 
over  the  mountains. 

Nor  was  the  enterprise  against  Berlin  destined  to  be  carried 
out.  The  commands  for  it  had  indeed  already  been  issued 
early  in  September,  when  a  gloomy  report  came  from  Macdonald 
summoning  the  Emperor  to  Bautzen  with  the  auxiliary  corps. 
He  repaired  thither,  intending  to  reinforce  the  threatened  army 
with  the  corps  of  Marmont  and  a  corps  of  cavalry,  thus  to 
defeat  the  impetuously  advancing  Bliicher,  and  then  move  "  in 
great  haste"  on  Berlin.  An  excellent  plan,  l^ut  suppose  no 
battle  ensued?  Suppose  Bliicher,  whose  vehement  energy  was 
guided  and  held  in  check  by  the  superior  intellect  of  his  chief- 
of-staff,  Gneisenau,  learns  again,  as  once  before,  in  August,  of 


.ah-.  44]  Napoleon  at   Dresden  629 

the  Emperor's  presence  and  retires,  luring  his  foe  after  him 
into  the  wasted  country?  That  waK  just  what  took  place. 
Bliicher  fell  back  from  Hochkirch  to  Gorlitz,  fighting  constantly. 
This  time,  however.  Napoleon  discerned  his  aim  and  stopped 
the  pursuit.  He  was  now  obliged  to  move  against  Bernadotte 
without  having  defeated,  as  he  had  hoped,  the  Silesian  army. 
He  gave  orders  to  that  effect,  when  news  comes  from  Dresden 
of  a  new  offensive  movement  of  the  Bohemian  army.  In  any 
case,  he  would  have  been  too  late  in  the  north  for  the  present; 
for  the  impetuous  energy  of  Biilow  and  the  valour  of  the  Prus- 
sian landwehr,  for  which  Napoleon's  contempt  knew  no  bounds, 
had  inflicted  such  a  decisive  defeat  on  Ney  (now  in  Oudinot's 
place)  at  Dennewitz  on  the  6th  of  September  that  he  had  to 
take  flight  far  beyond  Torgau.  "Your  left  flank  is  exposed," 
wrote  the  defeated  marshal  to  the  Emperor  on  the  next  da}', 
"take  care.  I  think  it  is  time  to  leave  the  Elbe  and  retire  to 
the  Saale."  * 

Before  receiving  this  letter  Napoleon  had  already  arrived 
at  Dresden,  and  in  a  reconnoissance  beheld  the  heights  of  the 
mountain  roads  to  Bohemia  occupied  by  the  enemy.  For  the 
allies,  thoroughly  elated  by  their  own  victory  at  Kuhn  and  the 
successes  of  the  other  two  armies,  as  soon  as  they  learned  of 
Napoleon's  advance  against  Bliicher,  undertook  a  double  diver- 
sion in  favour  of  the  latter.  A  division  of  60,000  Austrians  was  to 
cross  the  Elbe  and  fall  on  the  flank  of  the  advancing  enemy  at 
Rumburg,  while  the  remainder  of  the  main  army  held  in  check 
the  forces  left  at  Dresden.  Napoleon  was  aware  of  the  intended 
diversion  at  Rumburg.  He  sought  to  seize  the  moment  to 
drive  the  enemy  back  to  Peterswalde  and  there  venture  an  ad- 
vance into  Bohemia  if  circumstances  favoured.  He  succeeded 
in  doing  the  first,  but  the  nature  of  the  country  frustrated  the 

*  As  to  the  other  divisions  that  were  to  operate  against  the  northern 
army  of  the  allies:  Girard's,  on  hearing  of  the  affair  at  Gross-Beeren,  had 
turned  about  and  hud  been  routed  on  the  retreat  to  Magdeburg;  Davout, 
on  the  other  hand,  whose  corps  consisted  more  than  half  of  Dutch  and 
South  Germans,  the  least  reliable  elements  of  the  whole  army,  could  risk 
nothing  but  a  weak  demonstration,  which  was  given  up  again  after  the 
defeat  of  Oudmot. 


630  Leipzig  [1813 

latter  intention,  and  on  the  12th  of  September  the  Emperor 
was  again  in  Dresden.  When  the  allies,  who  had  recalled  all 
but  one  division  of  the  Austrian  corps  at  the  first  news  of  his 
presence,  soon  afterwards  advanced  anew  over  the  mountains 
to  mask  Schwarzenberg's  march  northwest  in  the  direction  of 
Leipzig,  Napoleon  thwarted  the  scheme  by  making  another 
sally  as  far  as  Kuhn.  The  enemy's  position  seemed  to  him 
still  too  strong  for  a  successful  attack,  as  he  himself  was  obliged 
by  the  difficulty  of  procuring  supplies  to  send  two  corps  to  the 
north  to  protect  convoys  on  the  Elbe.  He  had  to  content  him- 
self with  a  "system  of  hither  and  thither"  with  Schwarzenberg. 
Here  again  he  longed  earnestly  to  be  attacked,  but  in  vain. 
The  enemy  evades  the  commander-in-chief  and  defeats  his 
generals. 

But  he  cannot  afford  to  remain  idle  long,  as  the  circle  of 
the  hostile  forces  keeps  drawing  closer  around  him  and  he  can 
provide  for  the  masses  of  his  troops  in  the  restricted  space  only 
with  daily-increasing  difficulty.  Ney,  who  had  crossed  again 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  reported  that  the  army  of  Berna- 
dotte  and  Biilow  were  planning  to  cross  that  river  and  were 
making  preparations  for  it  in  the  vicinity  of  Dessau,  and  that 
one  division  of  Bliicher's  army  was  approaching  from  the  south- 
east. In  the  face  of  this  danger  of  having  his  flank  turned, 
Napoleon  ordered  a  retreat  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe  and 
abandoned  the  right. 

Ever  since  he  had  neglected  the  decisive  moment  after  the 
battle  of  Dresden,  his  ^vill-power  seemed  broken,  and  he  himself 
to  have  become  but  a  plaything  of  his  enemies,  tossed  back  and 
forth, — the  people,  on  account  of  his  repeated  trips  to  Bautzen, 
jocularly  called  him  the  "  Bautzen  Messenger, " — until  at  last  his 
advance  position  was  wholly  untenable.  Besides,  the  army  was 
in  a  most  uncomfortable  condition,  on  every  hand  were  dis- 
content and  bitterness,  especially  among  the  higher  officers. 
Even  strangers  could  not  help  taking  notice.  The  Wiirttem- 
])erg  General  Trancquemont  wrote  to  his  king  on  the  10th  of 
September:  "The  French  generals  and  officers  seem  to  me  dis- 
gasted  with  the  war,  and  only  the  presence  of  the  Emperor  can 


/Et  44]  Conditions   in   the   Army  6-^1 

animate  the  soldiers."  In  fact,  when  his  eye  was  not  resting 
on  them,  they  threw  aside  their  duty  hke  a  heavy  burden,  fre- 
quently got  rid  of  their  weapons  and  left  the  columns  or  stole 
away  among  the  slightly  wounded  by  maiming  themselves. 
Hardly  a  month  had  passed  since  hostilities  reopened,  and 
already  over  60,000  men  and  nearly  300  cannon  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  while  companies  of  hundreds,  nay, 
thousands,  of  unarmed  men  were  bound  for  the  west.  What 
drove  these  from  the  ranks  was  the  terrible  distress  that  set  in 
when  the  harried  lands  of  Silesia  and  Saxony  had  gi\-en  up  their 
last  potatoes,  and  the  convoys  from  the  Elbe  found  it  almost 
impossible  to  get  through,  now  that  Ney  had  retired.  "M.  le 
Comte  de  Daru,"  wrote  Napoleon  hinxself  on  the  23d  of  Sep- 
tember to  the  director  of  the  commissariat,  "the  army  is  no 
longer  being  fed.  It  would  be  an  illasion  to  take  any  other 
view  of  it."  But  he  could  not  help  matters,  and  he  was  fnr 
from  knowing  all  the  WTetchedness  which  eye-service,  forgetful 
of  duty,  carefully  tried  to  conceal  just  as  it  knew  how  to  deceive 
him  as  to  the  truth  of  unpleasant  facts.*  Under  such  circum- 
stances it  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that  of  the  400,000  men 
at  the  Emperor's  disposal  at  the  middle  of  August,  scarcely 
250,000  answered  the  roll-call  at  the  end  of  September.  These 
were  ill  supplied  with  clothing  and  shoes,  and  soon  ammimition 
began  to  fail  as  the  transports  from  the  west  were  captured  by 
hostile  bands  with  increasing  frequency.  Wliile  the  allies  were 
reinforced  by  a  corps  of  50,000  Russian  and  Polish  reserves 
under  command  of  Bennigsen,  Augereau  brought  only  16,000 
French  troops  to  Leipzig.  To  be  sure,  orders  were  issued  at 
Paris  on  the  27th  of  September  for  160,000  conscripts  of  1815 
and  120,000  men  of  the  last  seven  age  classes;  but  although 
the  Senate  at  once  enacted  the  proper  decree,  the  new  recruits 
would  be  of  no  use  in  the  immediate  future,  evidently  so  critical. 

*  Especially  Bertrand,  a  devoted  favourite  without  much  talent  or 
merit  and  notorious  by  reason  of  his  breach  of  faith  in  1805  in  the  war 
with  Austria,  sought  to  curry  favour  by  such  reports.  It  may  have  been 
his  accounts  of  the  battle  of  Gross-Beeren  that  led  Napoleon  to  withhold 
reinforcements  from  the  northern  army,  thus  facilitating  its  second  defeat 
by  the  Prussians. 


632  Leipzig  [1813 

■  In  this  serious  situation  at  the  close  of  September,  while  "  his 
game  of  chess  was  growing  puzzling,"  as  the  Emperor  said  to 
Marmont,  he  made  another  effort  at  diplomacy.  We  possess  a 
letter  of  his  to  Francis  I.  which  he  sent  on  the  25th  by  the 
hand  of  Adjutant  Flahault  to  the  Austrian  General  Bubna, 
whose  division  was  attached  to  Bliicher's  army.  The  proposed 
surrender  of  the  Polish  fortress  Zamsoc  was  made  a  pretext  in 
this  letter  for  speaking  of  peace.  The  envoy  had  in  addition 
verbal  instructions  to  give  assurances  that  his  master  was  now 
especially  solicitous  to  conclude  a  peace,  and  was  ready  to 
make  great  sacrifices  to  Prussia  and  Austria,  "if  they  were 
willing  to  listen  to  him."  But  Francis  I.,  on  the  9th  of  Sep- 
tember, at  Teplitz,  had  changed  his  position  with  reference  to 
Russia  and  Prussia  from  that  of  a  mere  companion-in-arms  to 
that  of  a  firm  ally,  and  he  now  stood  by  his  pledges.  Moreover, 
he  was  to  conclude  on  the  5th  of  October  a  subsidy  treaty  with 
England,  and  five  days  later  negotiations  with  Bavaria,  at  Ried, 
were  to  lead  to  the  formal  accession  of  that  state  to  the  coalition. 
So  diplomacy  fails  the  Emperor  of  the  French  and  everything 
now  depends  on  his  military  genius:  that  must  counterbalance 
the  loss  of  allied  troops,  the  want  of  enthusiasm  among  his 
forces,  the  lack  of  courage  and  self-denial  in  his  army.  Will  it 
be  equal  to  the  task? 

In  September,  even.  Napoleon  had  determined  to  await 
Bliicher  in  a  firm  position  behind  the  Elbe,  between  Konigstein 
and  Meissen.  "In  this  position,"  he  writes  to  Murat  on  the 
23d,  "  I  shall  follow  the  enemy  with  my  eyes,  and,  if  he  leaves 
the  way  open  for  attack,  shall  rush  upon  him  so  that  he  cannot 
evade  a  battle,"  But  he  waited  in  vain.  More  than  a  week 
passed  without  any  attack  by  Bliicher.  What  was  the  reason? 
Bliicher  had  deceived  Macdonald  by  marching  off  as  early  as 
the  26th  from  Bautzen  past  Kamonz  in  the  direction  of  War- 
tenburg,  where  Yorck  then  forced  a  passage  in  spite  of  Bertrand 
on  the  3d  of  October.  At  the  same  time  the  Russian  reserve 
army  under  Bcnnigsen  had  arrived  at  Teplitz,  having  come 
through  Silesia  and  Bohemia,  Bernadotte  had  crossed  the  Elbe 
at  Dessau,  and  the  main  army  had  assumed  the  offensive  in  the 


.*:t.  44]  Napoleon   Falls  Back  633 

direction  of  Leipzig.     Napoleon  learned  nothing  of  this  until 
quite  late.     Even  on  the  4th  of  October  he  asked  Macdonald 
where  Bliicher's  army  was.     When  he  finally  knew  the  facts  he 
was  profoundly  astonished;    he  had  not  credited  the  enemy 
with  such  great  enterprise.     Now  that  it  was  the  enemy's  mani- 
fest plan  to  effect  a  junction  in  his  rear,  the  Elbe  line  could  not 
be  held  any  longer,  nor  could  he  stay  in  Dresden.     On  the  5th 
of  October  he  conceived  the  plan  of  forming  two  armies;  one 
under  Murat,  with  three  or  four  corps,  he  would  station  between 
the  army  of  Schwarzenberg  and  Leipzig  with  orders  to  maintain 
a  strictly  defensive  attitude  and  gradually  to  retire  before  the 
superior  forces  toward  that  city.     The  other  he  would  himself 
lead  with  haste  through  Meissen  and  Wurzen  to  the  support  of 
Ney,  then  together  with  him  push  between  Leipzig  and  the  Sile- 
sian  army,  defeat  and  rout  the  latter,  and  then  join  Murat  in 
opposing  the  main  army  of  the  enemy.     He  deviated  from  this 
plan  later  only  in  the  one  point  of  leaving  Dresden  occupied  by 
two  corps  under  Saint-Cyr.     Was  his  object  to  keep  more  of 
Schwarzenberg's  army  in  Bohemia?  or  was  the  protector  of  the 
Rhenish  Confederation  unwilling  to  leave  the  capital  city  of  the 
most  loyal  of  its  princes  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  so  im- 
pair his  prestige?     However  that  may  be,  in  the  decisive  battle 
he  had  occasion  to  mourn  bitterly  the  absence  of  30,000  men. 
Bliicher  and  Bernadotte,  who  had  joined  their  forces  and 
determined  to  march  together  toward  Leipzig,  heard  nothing 
for  a  long  time  of  Napoleon's  approach.     Then  the  news,  when 
they  supposed  him  to  be  at  a  distance,  overthrew  their  plans. 
Bernadotte,  who  had  hitherto  allowed  the  Prussians  to  win  iiis 
victories  for  him  and  guarded  his  Swedish  corps  most  anxiously 
from  all  losses,  at  once  talked  of  retreating  over  the  Elbe  and 
tried  to  urge  this  course  on  Bliicher,  but  at  last  declared  his 
willingness  to  stay  on  this  side  and  to  march  south  from  Aken ; 
but  Bliicher  then  proposed  to  evade  the  enemy  by  crossing  the 
Mulde,  and  then  in  junction  with  the  northern  army  to  cross 
the  Saale.     The  consequence  of  this  bold  plan  was  that  Na- 
poleon, who  had  now  confidently  counted  on  a  pitched  battle, 
again  confronted  a  retiring  foe.     Accordingly  it  was  in  the  worst 


634  Leipzig  [1813 

conceivable  state  of  mind  that  he  passed  the  four  days  from  the 
11th  to  the  14th  of  October  at  Diiben.  As  he  could  not  lay- 
hold  of  Bliicher,  the  plan  occurred  to  him  to  operate  against 
the  Silesian  and  northern  armies,  which  had  effected  a  junction 
in  his  rear,  i.e.,  against  Wartenburg  and  Dessau;  then,  having 
forced  them  back,  defeated  them,  and  driven  them  over  the 
Elbe,  to  threaten  Berlin,  and  finally  to  move  up  stream  to  Dres- 
den, take  the  garrison  with  him  and  attack  the  main  army. 
Such  extensive  schemes  he  had  to  invent  if  he  was  to  hold  fast 
his  purpose  to  beat  the  enemy  separately.  At  first  he  knew 
nothing  of  Bliicher's  march  to  the  Saale,  where  the  latter  was 
seeking  to  come  into  touch  with  the  main  army.  He  actually 
ordered  an  advance  to  the  Elbe,  and  as  the  corps  of  Tauenzien, 
left  behind  at  that  river  by  Bernadotte  when  he  set  out  for 
Connern,  was  forced  to  cross  over,  he  lulled  himself  in  the  delu- 
sion that  Bernadotte  was  over  the  river  again  with  all  his  troops. 
On  the  morning  of  the  12th  he  learned  something  of  Bliicher's 
real  movements,  only  he  did  not  suppose  he  was  yet  at  Halle. 
And  as  Schwarzenberg  kept  approaching  Leipzig  more  threat- 
eningly, the  most  urgent  step  seemed  to  be  thoroughly  to  defeat 
that  general  southeast  of  the  city  before  he  had  an  opportunity 
to  join  Bliicher.  But  was  it  not  already  too  late?  Had  he  not 
tarried  too  long  at  Diiben,  waiting  for  favourable  news  ere  he 
acted?  One  who  saw  him  there,  as  Odeleben  saw  him  whiling 
away  his  time,  "  waiting  for  news  from  the  Elbe,  on  a  sofa  in 
his  room,  sitting  absolutely  idle  before  a  large  table  on  which 
lay  a  sheet  of  white  paper  that  he  filled  with  large  scrawling 
letters" — one  who  thus  saw  him,  the  most  active  man  in  the 
world,  might  well  say  with  Marmont,  "  No  one  would  recognize 
Napoleon  during  tliis  campaign."  As  matters  were,  no  further 
manoeuvre  could  prevent  the  co-operation  of  the  enemies' 
forces.  Strategically  he  was  concpiered,  and  his  last  sole  hope 
lay  in  the  decisive  battle  whicii  he  must  now  venture  against 
enormous  odds,  200,000  to  300,000. 

The  Emperor  did  not,  indeed,  regard  his  situation  as  so  pre- 
carious on  the  14tli,  when  he  left  Diiben  and  proceeded  toward 
Leipzig.     While  he  had  heard  by  this  time  that  Bernadotte 


Mt.  44]         The  Situation   before  Leipzig  635 

was  not  on  the  other  side  of  the  Elbe,  he  yet  believed  himself 
safe  from  attack  on  the  north  and  west,  and  that  in  the  next 
action  he  would  have  only  Schwarzenberg  to  deal  with.  That 
would  have  been  his  fortune  if  he  had  not  delayed  so  long. 
Nowhere  near  all  of  the  main  army  had  as  yet  arrived  south 
of  the  city  in  face  of  Murat;  Bennigsen  with  the  reserves  and 
one  corps  that  had  been  watching  Dresden  but  was  now  ordered 
to  report,  about  65,000  men  in  all,  was  still  a  day's  march 
distant  on  the  16th.  Moreover,  Bernadotte,  who  as  usual  kept 
himself  out  of  range,  had  not  moved  his  60,000  men  forward  in 
junction  vAth.  Bliicher,  and  hence  the  latter,  advancing  ^\^th 
great  caution,  had  got  no  farther  than  Schkeuditz  by  the  15th. 
Besides  that  Schwarzenberg  had  taken  a  position  broken  by 
the  Elster  and  Pleisse  rivers  and  the  Leipzig  Ratsholz;  so  that 
if  Napoleon  had  arrived  only  one  day  earlier  he  would  have 
confronted  with  superior  forces — he  had  at  hand  170,000  men — 
a  poorly  situated  enemy  and  might  have  overthrown  him.  But 
the  Guards,  the  troops  of  Mortier  and  Oudinot,  and  the  divisions 
of  cavalry  did  not  join  Murat  until  the  15th,  the  latter  with 
three  corps  (Poniatowski's,  Victor's,  and  Lauriston's)  holding  the 
line  between  the  Pleisse  and  Liebertwolkwdtz.  Macdonald  did 
not  come  up  on  the  left  wing  until  the  next  day  during  the  bat- 
tle. Marmont  had  to  stay  north  of  the  Parthe  and  try  to  main- 
tain his  position  at  Mockern  against  greater  numbers,  for  Bliicher 
had  arrived  after  all.  Reynier  was  still  back  in  Diiben.  The 
Emperor  is  again  in  the  most  important  position,  south  of  the 
city,  facing  the  enemy  with  a  powerful  force;  but  the  situa- 
tion in  the  north  is  highly  critical. 

On  the  16th  of  October  the  allies  opened  the  attack  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon  about  the  villages  of  Markkleeberg, 
Wachau,  and  Liebertwolkwitz,  and  the  battle  raged  for  two 
hours  with  the  greatest  stubbornness.  Meantime  Macdonald 
and  the  cavalry  corps  of  Sebastian!  had  arrived,  and  Napoleon 
then  took  the  offensive;  he  planned  to  break  the  centre  of  the 
enemy  between  Wachau  and  Liebertwolkwitz  by  an  artillery 
fire  from  150  guns,  and  then  pierce  it  by  a  powerful  cavalry 
charge  while  Macdonald  turned  liis  left  flank  at  Seiffertshaya 


636  Leipzig  [1813 

This  would  throw  the  enemy  westwards  into  the  rivers  and 
separate  them  from  their  reserves.  The  cannonade  opened  not 
far  from  noon,  then  followed  the  cavalry  charges,  which  did 
throw  the  centre  beyond  Gossa.  But  the  infantry  failed  to 
push  into  the  gap  quickly  enough,  the  cavalry  itself  fell  into 
disorder,  and  was  repulsed  by  the  Russian  reserves  hastily 
summoned  from  Magdeborn  and  a  corps  of  Austrians  which 
Schwarzenberg  ordered  from  across  the  Pleisse.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  availed  little  that  Victor,  reinforced  by  Oudinot, 
pushed  on  as  far  as  Auenhayn,  and  that  Macdonald  turned  the 
right  flank  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  Gross-Possnau ;  or  that  an 
ill-considered  attack  of  Merveldt's  Austrian  corps  utterly  failed. 
For  this  very  attack  checked  the  last  assault  of  the  Guards  by 
drawing  it  aside.  A  decisive  victory  was  not  therefore  gained, 
only  a  part  of  the  field  was  won.  But  a  decisive  victory  with 
a  rout  of  the  enemy  was  just  what  Napoleon  had  to  win  if  his 
cause  was  to  escape  a  total  wreck.  For  Marmont  had  mean- 
time been  driven  back  by  Bliicher  after  obstinate  resistance 
from  Mockern  and  Widderitsch  beyond  Gohlis  and  Eutritzsch 
to  the  Parthe.  Hence,  despite  the  gain  of  some  ground  at 
Wachau,  the  day  as  a  whole  was  lost  for  Napoleon,  as  the 
next  day  would  bring  Bernadotte  and  Bennigsen  with  strong 
re-enforcements . 

Although  a  reconnoissance  on  the  morning  of  the  17th 
showed  him  his  desperate  situation  and  the  necessity  of  retreat- 
ing, there  were  many  obstacles  in  the  way  of  doing  so  at  once. 
In  the  first  place  Reynier's  corps  was  still  behind,  likewise 
Maret  with  the  Foreign  Office  clerks.  He  had  to  wait  for  them. 
Again,  would  it  not  be  a  confession  of  defeat  to  sound  the  call 
for  retreat  at  once?  We  have  seen  how  jealously  Napoleon 
guarded  appearances.  Finally,  the  troops  that  had  fought  so 
splendidly  the  day  before  were  so  worn  out  that  they  could  not 
begin  the  march  at  once,  especially  as  it  would  have  to  be  hotly 
contested.  He  needed  time;  he  must  gain  it.  The  Emperor 
summoned  Merveldt,  who  had  been  captured  in  the  affair  at 
Dolitz,  gave  him  back  his  sword  on  parole,  and  sent  him  to 
the  headquarters  of  Francis  with  proposals  of  peace,  the  first 


Mt.  44]  The   Battle  of  Leipzig  637 

object  of  which  was  to  secure  a  truce.  He  said  to  the  Aus- 
trian: "I  will  retire, if  desired, beyond  the  Saale;  let  the  Rus- 
sians and  Prussians  retire  beyond  the  Elbe,  you  Austrians  to 
Bohemia,  and  let  poor  Saxony  be  neutral."  He  threw  out  some 
hints  as  to  how  much  of  his  position  in  Europe  he  was  ready  to 
give  up:  Hanover  to  England,  the  German  coast  on  the  North 
Sea,  all  states  of  the  Rhenish  Confederation  that  voluntarily  de- 
serted him,  also  Poland,  Spain,  and  Holland,  the  last  only  on 
condition  that  its  independence  of  England  was  guaranteed. 
Italy,  however,  was  not  to  return  to  its  former  dependence  on 
Austria;  it  would  harmonize  better  with  the  European  system 
if  united  under  a  ruler  of  its  own.  This  last  clause  robbed 
Merveldt's  mission  of  all  prospect  of  success.  For  the  suzerainty 
over  Italy  was  the  very  object  for  which  Austria  had  been 
fighting  for  ten  years,  and  it  needed  an  Austerlitz  to  make  her 
forego  that  claim.  Hence  the  allies  were  soon  unanimous  in 
leaving  the  proposal  without  an  answer.  The  resumption  of 
fighting  was  postponed  until  the  next  forenoon,  in  order  to 
await  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements.  An  attack  by  Bliicher's 
army,  pushing  the  French  beyond  Gohlis  and  the  Parthe,  was 
soon  abandoned. 

After  waiting  in  vain  until  late  in  the  evening  for  Merveldt's 
return,  Napoleon  began  to  make  arrangements  for  the  retreat. 
He  ordered  Bertrand,  who  had  held  Lindenau  on  the  16th 
against  a  Russian  corps,  to  go  on  the  Liitzen  road  the  next 
morning  as  far  as  Weisscnfels  and  secure  that  road;  the  young 
Guard  relieved  him  at  Lindenau.  But  that  was  all  for  the 
time  being,  and  the  historian  is  at  a  loss  to  explain  to  himself 
or  others  why  the  Elmperor  did  not  commence  the  retreat 
through  Leipzig  with  all  energy  as  soon  as  night  came  on,  when 
Reynier  had  already  arrived,  when  the  troops  had  rested,  and 
his  own  repute  as  a  military  leader  was  no  longer  in  danger. 
Did  he  dread  the  confusion  of  the  night  march  through  the 
city  and  over  the  one  bridge?  For  the  building  of  others  hail 
been  neglected.  "The  17th  passed  quietly,"  says  Marmont  in 
his  Memoirs;  the  enemy  was  awaiting  re-enforcements.  We, 
on  our  part,  were  busy  in  restoring  order  among  our  troops. 


638  Leipzig  [1813 

Yet  we  ought  to  have  begun  our  retreat  on  the  instant,  or  at 
least  made  preparations  for  it  so  as  to  effect  it  when  night  came 
on.  But  a  certain  carelessness  on  the  part  of  Napoleon,  which 
cannot  be  explained  and  only  with  difficulty  be  described,  filled  the 
cup  of  our  woes."  Not  until  after  midnight  did  the  Emperor  draw 
the  army  a  little  closer  to  Leipzig,  but  he  kept  it  in  position  for 
fighting.  He  now  resolved  to  secure  by  fighting  a  retreat  through 
Leipzig,  difficult  as  it  was,  and  to  engage  the  entire  army  of  the 
enemy  to  the  east  and  check  its  advance  at  every  village,  in 
order  thus  to  make  sure  for  one  corps  after  another  a  safe  re- 
treat to  the  west.  Hence  his  task  for  the  next  day  was  merely 
a  retreating  battle,  as  it  has  rightly  been  termed,  yet  after  all 
the  grandest  known  in  history.  After  Reynier's  arrival  and 
Bertrand's  departure  he  still  had  about  146,000  men;  the  allies 
had  more  than  double  that  number,  Bernadotte  having  at  last 
come  forward,  after  Bliicher  had  magnanimously  loaned  him 
30,000  of  his  troops,  and  declared  himself  ready  to  fight. 

On  the  18th  the  French  army  was  stationed  along  a  line 
drawn  from  Connewitz  up  the  Pleisse  to  Dolitz,  passing  from 
there  past  Dosen  to  Zuckelhausen  and  Holzhausen,  and  then 
running  northwards  to  Schonfeld  and  along  the  Parthe  to  the 
suburbs  of  Halle.  Napoleon  himself  took  his  position  by  a  tobacco- 
mill  on  the  Colditz  road  near  Stotteritz.  The  allies  opened 
the  attack  at  eight  o'clock.  The  Austrians  on  the  left  succeeded 
in  pushing  beyond  Dolitz,  Dosen,  and  Lobnitz;  the  Russians 
in  the  centre  in  conquering  Zuckelhausen  and  Lossinitz;  and 
finally  the  Prussians  under  Bernadotte,  who  had  crossed  the 
Parthe  at  Taucha  with  50,000  men  and  was  advancing  thence 
in  the  afternoon  in  touch  with  Bennigsen,  drove  the  enemy 
back  to  the  villages  Anger,  Krottendorf,  and  Volkmarsdorf. 
Darkness  put  an  end  to  the  bloody  struggle.  The  allies,  as 
may  be  seen,  had  not  won  the  overwhelming  victory  naturally 
to  be  expected  from  such  enormous  odds,  for  the  French  still 
had  possession  of  Connewitz  and  o(  the  centre  at  Probstheida 
and  Stotteritz.  But  the  danger  threatening  his  left  wing, 
where  a  Saxon  division  and  a  Wiirttemberg  cavalry  brigade 
had  deserted  to  the  enemy,  forced  Napoleon  finally  to  abandon 


^T.  44]  The   Retreat  639 

those  positions  also  and  thus  acknowledge  his  defeat.  By  noon 
he  had  already  ordered  the  train  to  retreat,  and  three  cavalry 
corps  followed  in  tlie  afternoon;  as  nigiit  came  on  the  great 
artillery  train  passed  through  the  city,  and  the  Emperor  then 
dictated  to  Berthier  the  order  for  a  general  retreat.  Odeleben 
tells  us  that  "a  wooden  stool  was  brought  to  him  and  on  this, 
exhausted  by  the  exertions  of  the  preceding  days,  he  sank  in 
slumber.  His  hands  rested,  carelessly  folded,  in  his  lap;  during 
these  moments  he  looked  like  any  other  mortal  man  succumbing 
to  the  burden  of  misfortune.  The  generals  stood  about  the 
fire,  gloomy  and  silent,  and  the  retreating  troops  marched  by  at 
a  little  distance."  Then  Napolon  repaired  to  Leipzig,  where 
he  spent  the  night  at  the  Hotel  de  Prusse. 

It  was  long  after  midniglit  before  the  vaUant  defenders  of 
Probstheida  and  Stotteritz  entered  the  suburbs.  A  rear-guard 
only  was  left  behind  to  keep  the  enemy  away  from  the  city  until 
the  next  noon.  If  a  general  assault  followed,  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  last  corps  entering  Leipzig  to  hold  it  if  possible  until 
midnight.  But  the  actual  events  were  different.  In  the  night 
and  on  the  next  morning  the  troops  kept  pouring  in  at  three 
gates,  and  as  they  all  had  to  pass  out  of  one,  the  resulting 
confusion  was  well-nigh  inextricable.  In  the  forenoon  the  un- 
expected advance  of  a  detachment  of  Russian  chasseurs  from 
Rosenthal  so  deceived  the  corporal  of  grenadiers  posted  at  the 
high  bridge  over  the  Elster  as  to  the  real  situation  that  he 
blew  up  the  bridge  and  so  sacrificed  the  entire  corps  of  the  rear- 
guard. There  was  nothing  left  for  those  troops  but  to  surrender. 
Their  leaders  sought  to  escape.  It  was  here  that  Macdonald 
saved  himself  by  swimming  across  the  river  with  his  horse; 
while  Poniatowski,  the  noblest  of  the  marshals  of  the  Empire 
and  one  of  the  bravest,  was  drowned.  The  others,  Reynier  and 
Lauriston,  both  of  whom  were  wounded,  were  captured.  Ney, 
Macdonald,  Marmont,  Latour-Maubourg  and  Sebastiani,  as  well 
as  others,  were  also  wounded.  Five  division  generals  lay  dead 
on  the  field.  The  two  days,  the  18th  and  19th,  had  cost  Na- 
poleon more  than  60,000  men.  Rather  heavy  for  a  fight  of 
the  rear-guard.    But  that  was  not  all:  the  retreat  to  the  Rhine 


640  Leipzig  [1813 

which  had  now  become  an  absolute  necessity,  meant  the  aban- 
donment of  the  fortresses  on  the  Elbe,  Oder,  and  Vistula,  i.e. 
about  150,000  men.  And  yet  another  sacrifice  was  imposed  by 
the  war:  his  Majesty  Frederick  Augustus  of  Saxony,  to  whom 
Napoleon  had  pretended  before  his  departure  that  he  was 
leaving  the  city  only  to  manoeuvre  in  the  open  field  and  that 
he  would  relieve  it  in  a  few  days.*  The  King  went  to  Berlin  as 
a  prisoner,  and  Stein,  as  president  of  the  administrative  com- 
mission, became  the  executive  head  of  the  Saxon  government 
in  the  name  of  the  three  allied  monarchs. 

When  Napoleon  sought  to  restore  some  order  to  his  retreating 
army  at  Weissenfels  he  still  had  about  120,000  men.  But  as 
soon  as  they  were  across  the  Saale  and  out  of  sight  of  the  pursuing 
enemy,  thousands  left  the  ranks  every  day.  Some  of  them 
threw  away  their  weapons  and  deserted,  others  roamed  about 
as  marauding  bands  of  "fricoteurs,"  others  were  left  behind 
exhausted.  The  typhus  brought  on  by  hunger  raged  among 
the  ranks  and  became  thenceforth  the  constant  companion  of 
the  army.  Not  until  they  arrived  at  Erfurt,  where  the  dilatory 
pursuit  of  the  enemy  allowed  them  a  two-days'  rest,  was  it 
possible  to  procure  supplies  or  rally  the  army.  But  beyond 
the  Thuringian  forest,  around  which  the  Emperor  had  gone 
at  Eisenach  so  as  to  pass  through  Fulda  and  Hanau  on  his 
way  to  Frankfort  and  Mainz,  the  army  was  already  reduced 
to  hardly  more  than  60,000  rank  and  file.  And  even  these 
had  to  fight  their  way  to  the  Rhine;  for  on  the  30th  of  October 
Wrede,  with  a  Bavarian  corps  of  35,000  men,  hastily  marched 
from  the  Inn  and  confronted  them.  Bliicher  had  marched 
after  Napoleon  almost  as  far  as  Fulda;  if  he  had  kept  on  the 
same  road,  the  French  army  would  have  been  in  a  desperate 
strait,  provided  Wrede  stood  firm.  But  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  monarchs  the  view  had  prevailed  that  the  common  enemy 
would  push  for  the  Rhine  not  by  way  of  Fulda  and  Hanau,  but 
via  Alsfeld  and  Giessen,  and  accordingly  Bliicher  and  Wrede 
were  both  instructed  to  take  the  latter  road.     Wrede,  there- 

*  Frederick  Augustus  himself  reported  Napoleon's  misrepresentation 
of  facts  to  several  persons,  the  Russian  Toll  and  the  Prussian  Natzmer. 


^T.  44]  Napoleon   Returns  to   Paris  641 

fore,  supposed  on  the  30th  that  he  would  not  be  engaging  the 
entire  French  army,  and  made  a  vifforous  attack.  Perceiving 
his  error,  he  still  persisted  from  political  grounds;  "our  friend- 
ship is  too  young,"  said  he,  "for  as  not  to  exercise  our  good- 
will with  all  earnestness."  On  that  day  Napoleon  himself  did 
not  have  more  than  35,000  men  at  hand,  including  the  Guards, 
the  rest  having  followed  at  a  considerable  distance.  At  first  he 
wanted  to  wait  for  them,  but  yielded  reluctantly  to  Macdonald's 
advice  to  attack  with  the  Guards.  The  movement  was  suc- 
cessful. The  artillery  general  Drouot  managed  to  bring  a  large 
number  of  guas  to  bear  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  Wrede 
lost  the  battle  after  a  stubborn  resistance.  The  way  to  Mainz 
was  now  open. 

On  the  2d  of  November  Napoleon  arrived  at  that  city  and 
after  a  few  days'  stay  continued  his  journey  to  Paris.  Of  the 
half  a  million  armed  men  who  had  crossed  the  Rhine  in  obedience 
to  his  command  scarcely  90,000  returned,  many  without  their 
weapons  and  with  the  poison  of  a  deadly  disease  in  their  blood, 
which  raged  ^vith  terrible  fury  in  the  Rhine  city  and  gave  a 
sombre  notoriety  to  the  "typhus  de  Mayence."  An  eye- 
witness speaks  as  follows:  "The  mass  of  men  that  filled  all  the 
houses  and  streets  was  indescribable;  one  saw  here  the  half- 
dead  soldiers  utterly  forsaken,  suffering  the  torments  of  hun- 
ger, lying  on  hard  stones  under  the  open  sky  in  the  rain  and 
cold  and  waiting  longingly  for  death.  They  died  by  the  hun- 
dreds every  day,  and  they  often  lay  unburied  on  the  streets 
for  several  days."  The  world  saw,  and  the  Emperor,  too, 
whenever  he  looked  over  the  square  from  the  windows  of  his 
palace,  saw,  how  the  second  of  his  great  armies  was  perishing. 
What  must  have  been  his  feelings  at  the  spectacle!  Before  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  he  had  declared  to  Count  Mole  at  Paris, 
"  Do  not  think  that  I  do  not  possess  a  heart  that  feels  like  others ; 
I  am  a  very  kind-hearted  man.  But  since  my  earliest  child- 
hood I  have  accustomed  myself  to  silence  that  chord  of  my 
nature,  and  now  it  is  dumb."  He  expressed  himself  quite  dif- 
ferently in  his  inter\iew  with  Metternich  at  Dresden.  The 
latter  had  asked  him:   "  Wlien  the  generation  of  Frenchmen 


642  Leipzig  [1813 

which  you  have  levied  before  their  time  shall  have  disappeared, 
shall  you  then  appeal  to  the  next  generation?"  Napoleon,  ex- 
cited by  this  embarrassing  question,  answered:  "You  are  not  a 
soldier  and  do  not  know  what  a  soldier's  soul  is.  I  have  become 
great  in  camp,  and  a  man  like  me  cares  little  for  the  lives  of 
a  million  men."  Almost  that  number  his  two  last  campaigns 
had  cost  him.  And  if  he  now  cared  for  the  sick  and  wounded 
at  M^inz,  it  was  not  out  of  humanity  so  much  as  with  the 
thought  of  being  able  to  use  them  again.  For  all  his  activit}- 
was  ruled  by  the  one  idea  expressed  shortly  before  at  Erfurt,  "  By 
May  I  shall  have  an  army  of  250,000  fighting  men  on  the  Rhine." 


CHAPTER  XIX 

ELBA 

A  SECOND  year  of  war  had  thus  closed  wdth  enormous  losses 
for  Napoleon.  The  national  resistance  of  the  Russians  had 
forced  him  out  of  the  Czar's  realm  by  a  "via  dolorosa"  without 
a  parallel;  the  national  enthusiasm  of  the  Germans  had  driven 
him  back  over  the  Rhine.  The  statecraft  of  princes  and 
their  cabinets  vanished  entirely  before  this  elemental  impulse 
of  the  national  heart  for  independ(>nce  of  foreign  tyranny. 
Vain  was  the  resolution  of  Frederick  William  III.,  the  wavering 
deliberation  of  his  diplomats;  he  had  to  enter  upon  a  war 
against  his  former  ally.  In  vain  had  Metternich  conceived  of 
a  separate  neutral  position  for  his  master,  fortified  by  alliances; 
Francis  I.  had  to  give  it  up  and  draw  the  sword  against  his 
own  son-in-law.  In  vain  did  Frederick  Augustus  of  Saxony 
exhibit  his  loyalty  to  the  founder  of  his  throne;  his  regiment 
deserted  to  the  enemy  and  left  him  to  his  fate.  So  also  the 
Westphalian  troops,  the  Wiirttemberg  cavalry,  and  the  infantry 
of  Baden  had  all  gone  over  to  the  enemy  long  before  Jerome  left 
his  country,  the  last  week  in  October,  or  King  Frederick  I.  and 
Grand  Duke  Charles  joined  the  allies.  Soon  the  entire  Rhenish 
Confederation  was  arrayed  against  its  protector.  And  as 
among  the  Gemians,  so  among  other  peoples  who  had  furnished 
contingents,  the  national  party  gained  the  ascendency.  This 
was  the  case  with  the  Italians,  on  whom  the  "miso  gallo"  of 
Alfieri  had  made  no  little  impression.  Murat  had  taken  leave 
of  Napoleon  with  his  Neopolitan  troops  even  before  the  battle 
of  Hanau,  on  the  pretext  that  the  state  of  affairs  in  his  king- 
dom demanded  his  return.  But  his  thoughts  were  wider;  he 
aimed  not  only  to  retain  the  crown  of  Naples,  but  also  win  the 
crown  of  all  Italy — provided  that  the  power  on  the  Danube 

643 


644  ^^^^  ^^^^^ 

did  not  resume  its  old  rights.  By  the  end  of  October,  1S13,  the 
Austrians  under  Hiller  had  already  driven  the  troops  of  Viceroy 
Eugene  beyond  the  Adige  and  taken  possession  of  Trieste  and 
the  Dalmatian  fortresses.  The  Dutch  revolted  openly  against 
Napoleon  in  Amsterdam  about  the  middle  of  November  and 
declared  themselves  in  favour  of  the  ancient  House  of  Orange. 
And  while  all  these  things  were  happening  the  Spanish  national 
war  had  resulted  under  the  help  and  leadership  of  England  in 
new  successes  over  the  French.  In  September  the  coast  fortress 
San  Sebastian,  and  in  October  Pampeluna,  had  fallen  into  Wel- 
lington's hands.  This  opened  the  road  all  the  way  to  Bayonne, 
and  the  British  commander,  after  hearing  of  Napoleon's  losses, 
at  once  set  out  and  kept  advancing  persistently,  contesting 
every  step  with  Soult.  Suchet  at  the  same  time,  to  avoid 
having  his  communications  with  France  cut  off,  retired  from 
Catalonia  over  the  Pyrenees. 

Thus  did  the  foreign  nations  rid  themselves  of  the  French 
ascendency  which  weighed  so  heavily  upon  them,  and  Na- 
poleon's most  unique  creation,  the  international  Empire,  fell  to 
pieces  under  the  energetic  resistance  of  the  people.  His  own 
fate  now  was  in  the  balance.  Was  that  nation,  whose  land  and 
strength  he  had  used  as  the  fulcrum  of  his  universal  sovereignty, 
at  last  wearied  with  his  rule  that  squandered  her  wealth  and 
blood  without  stint  in  his  unresting  ambition?  This  time  he 
could  not  do  as  he  did  the  year  before,  and  accuse  the 
opposing  elements  of  nature  as  his  conquerors  and  as  the  de- 
stroyers of  the  second  mighty  army — a  host  that  had  been 
given  in  his  charge  in  the  hope  of  victory  and  peace.  His  pres- 
tige, too,  which  he  regarded  as  the  real  basis  of  his  power,  was 
profoundly  shaken.  Could  he  a  third  time  secure  the  meana 
for  a  new  war? 

The  Senate,  indeed,  had  with  its  usual  devotion  granted  him 
280,000  men,  even  before  the  decisive  blow  on  the  plains  of 
Leipzig.  But  how  little  that  was  in  a  war  with  Europe!  The 
Convention  had,  to  be  sure,  engaged  the  entire  Continent,  but 
that  was  when  their  forces  were  fresh,  and  inspired  with  the 
enthusiasm  of  newly-acquired   freedom.      Since  then  twenty 


JEr.Ai]    The    Financial   Situation   in    France       645 

years  of  almost  uninterrupted  warfare  had  passed,  the  nation 
had  lost  her  liberties  again,  and  her  enthusiasm  for  the  man 
who  restored  order  and  gave  her  glory  had  vanished,  since  his 
own  glory  was  dimmed,  and  in  place  of  the  long-desired  rest 
and  peaceful  enjoyment  there  kept  coming  up  new  feuds  and 
greater  sacrifices.  For  the  time  was  long  gone  by  when  the 
Emperor  could  lay  province  after  province  at  the  feet  of  the 
French  people  and  assure  them  that  all  these  wars  would  cost 
them  next  to  nothing.  In  this  last  year  he  had  been  able  to 
stop  up  the  great  gaps  in  the  budget  by  laying  a  bold  hand  on 
the  national  domain,  i.e.,  by  ordering  the  sale  of  the  communal 
lands.  Now  it  appeared  that  this  experiment  had  had  little 
success,  and  that  only  a  small  fraction  of  the  lands  could  be 
turned  into  ready  money.  So,  just  when  the  state  was  in  the 
direst  condition,  the  necessary  material  resources  were  lacking. 
Where  were  they  to  be  found,  when,  as  a  consequence  of  the  ter- 
rible tax  on  human  life,  the  fields  lay  fallow,  industries  were 
idle,  and  trade  at  a  standstill?  By  imposing  higher  tariffs? 
But  importations  were  insignificant.  Or  was  it  by  increasing 
the  land  tax  (about  30  per  cent),  the  tax  on  doors  and  windows, 
the  tax  on  patents  and  salt,  and  the  indirect  taxes?  This  is 
what  the  Senate  decreed  on  the  11th  of  November.  But  the 
income  from  these  would  not  suffice.  In  January,  1814,  the  land 
tax  was  raised  50  per  cent,  and  others  in  proportion ;  equally 
in  vain.  The  revenue  from  taxes  showed  a  falling  off  for  that 
year  of  50  per  cent.  The  national  securities  fell  to  50;  the 
shares  of  the  French  Bank,  which  had  once  been  worth  1400 
francs,  now  sold  for  but  little  over  700  francs.  There  are  no 
buyers,  for  nobody  has  money  to  spare.  The  wine-growers 
keep  their  produce  in  their  cellars,  the  warehouses  of  factories 
are  filled  to  overflowing.  If  Napoleon  decides  to  arm  anew,  he 
will  have  nothing  at  hand  for  the  moment  but  his  treasure  in 
the  Tuileries,  and  of  the  65,000,000  francs  of  this  the  next  few 
weeks  will  use  up  the  larger  part. 

But  men,  as  well  as  money,  were  scarce.  The  conscriptions 
of  October  met  with  passable  results,  to  be  sure,  for  the  enemy 
stood  at  the  borders  and  patriotism  called  with  loud  voice.     The 


646  Elba  [1813 

people  had  in  defence  of  the  fatherland  no  other  general  in  whom 
they  could  trust  in  the  same  degree  as  in  the  genius  of  the 
Emperor.  Hence  the  mass  of  the  French  people,  as  is  shown  by 
police  reports,  were  still  good  imperiahsts.  Only  in  the  northern 
provinces,  exposed  to  the  English  and  Bourbon  influences,  such 
as  Flanders,  Artois,  and  Normandy,  and  in  the  southern  prov- 
inces of  Guyenne,  Gascony,  and  Provence,  the  population  was 
either  indifferent  to  invasion  or  even  opposed  to  the  Empire. 
In  the  other  sections  of  the  country  the  peasant  gave  up  his  last 
remaining  son  with  resignation;  and  not  until  a  second  Senate 
decree,  November  15th,  1813,  ordered  a  newlevy  of  300,000  men 
from  the  age  classes  of  the  years  1803-1814,  which  had  already 
served,  i.e.  summoned  heads  of  families  and  married  men,  were  the 
obstacles  insurmountable.  Those  who  were  summoned  failed  to 
appear,  or  fled  to  the  woods;  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  new 
year  not  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  300,000  men  had  been  re- 
cruited. And  the  results  of  trying  to  create  a  new  national 
guard  were  equally  poor ;  the  Senate — and  what  did  this  Senate 
not  consent  to! — on  December  17th  ordered  450  cohorts  to  be 
raised.  But  the  peasant  knew  from  the  experience  of  the  last 
campaign  that  the  Emperor  made  no  difference  between  militia 
and  regulars  when  he  needed  soldiers.  He  was  ready  to  defend 
his  farm,  but  not  to  leave  farm  and  wife  and  child  in  the  lurch 
and  go  to  the  army.  Not  20,000  men  were  collected  at  the  re- 
cruiting stations.  And  even  for  these  few  that  responded  to 
the  new  levies  there  was  great  scarcity  of  accoutrements,  uni- 
forms, and  weapons. 

In  truth  it  was  a  rather  gloomy  prospect  for  the  continuation 
of  the  war  with  allied  Europe,  even  though  the  temper  of  the 
French  people  still  favoured  the  Emperor  and  liberal  agitation 
against  him  found  no  foothold  in  the  lower  orders,  and  though 
the  Bourbons  with  their  following  of  haughty  aristocrats  were 
still  sure  to  find  the  same  rooted  aversion.  If  only  France  had 
not  been  obliged  to  face  both  sides  at  once,  east  and  south,  and 
if  the  troops  of  Suchet  and  Soult  could  be  used  against  the 
allies.  Napoleon  kept  that  in  mind,  and  therefore  he  deter- 
mined to  release  Ferdinand  VII.  of  Spain,  give  him  back  his 


^T.  44]  Napoleon   and   the   Pope  647 

country,  and  conclude  peace  with  him.  The  treaty  was  con- 
cluded at  Valengay  on  the  8th  of  December.  But  instead  of 
sending  the  king  home  at  once,  which  Wellington  declared  was 
the  only  means  of  making  war  impossible  for  the  English,  Na- 
poleon was  induced  by  an  intrigue  of  Talleyrand's,  who  was 
now  trying  with  all  the  secret  devices  of  poUtics  to  undermine 
the  Emperor's  position,  to  stipulate  that  the  treaty  be  first 
laid  before  the  Cortes  in  Madrid.  The  latter  refased  to  accept, — 
Tallyrand  had  been  sure  of  it, — negotiations  were  prolonged 
until  January,  and  the  armies  of  the  south  could  not  be  with- 
drawn. 

There  was  still  another  prisoner  whom  the  Emperor  must 
think  of  releasing:  the  Pope.  By  the  collapse  of  the  Empire 
Napoleon's  plans  with  regard  to  supremacy  over  the  Church 
were  also  undermined.  How  much  he  had  promised  himself 
from  his  power  over  the  Holy  Father!  "From  this  moment," 
he  said  later,  "  I  would  have  exalted  the  Pope  again,  surrounded 
him  with  pomp  and  homage,  and  made  an  idol  of  him ;  nor  would 
he  even  have  missed  his  temporal  possessions.  I  would  have 
held  my  church  sessions  like  the  legislative  sessions.  My 
councils  would  have  been  the  representatives  of  Christendom, 
the  Pope  presiding;  I  would  have  opened  them  and  closed 
them,  approved  and  announced  their  decrees,  just  as  Constantino 
and  Charlemagne  did.  How  fruitful  this  would  have  been  of 
great  events!  The  Pope's  influence  over  Spain,  Italy,  the 
Rhenish  Confederation,  and  Poland  w^ould  have  drawn  closer 
the  ties  of  alliance  throughout  the  great  Empire,  while  the  in- 
fluence exerted  by  the  Head  of  the  Church  over  believers  in 
England  and  Ireland,  Russia  and  Prussia,  Austria,  Bohemia, 
and  Hungary,  would  have  become  the  inheritance  of  France." 
But  the  great  Empire  was  tottering  and  its  influence  on  neigh- 
bouring lands  was  gone.  It  was  restricted  to  the  boundaries  of 
France,  and  its  sovereign  could  no  longer  think  of  combining 
with  it  the  international  universal  system  of  the  papacy.  At 
the  very  beginning  of  the  last  war,  Pius^'II.  had  renounced  the 
Concordat  of  Fontainebleau,  and  later,  when  the  congress  of 
Prague  was  in  session  and  Francis  I.  separated  himself  from 


648  Elba  [1813 

Napoleon,  the  Pope  had  appealed  to  His  Apostohc  Majesty 
of  Austria  for  support.  Now  the  Emperor  proposed  to  release 
him,  but  again  only  in  consideration  of  a  treaty  which  should 
permanently  cede  the  territory  of  the  old  papal  state  to  the 
kingdom  of  Italy.  But  the  Pope  rejected  all  negotiations  most 
positively,  for  they  could  not  be  conducted  in  Paris,  but  only 
in  Rome.  At  that  Napoleon  kept  him  a  prisoner,  but  did  not 
thereby  improve  his  political  position,  rather  complicated  it. 

There  were  only  two  courses  open  whereby  to  retain  his 
position:  either  to  defeat  with  reduced  forces  an  enemy  many 
times  his  superior,  or  conclude  peace  with  him  before  he  could 
cross  the  Rhine — the  peace  for  which  France  had  longed  for 
many  years  and  now,  after  all  her  losses,  longed  for  more  ar- 
dently than  ever.  But  could  peace  be  obtained?  Would  the 
powers,  who  had  just  advanced  victoriously  to  the  Rhine,  halt 
there  and  listen  to  proposals?  And  if  they  did,  what  terms 
would  they  demand?  Napoleon  learned  the  answer  to  these 
questions  about  the  middle  of  November,  1813,  when  a  French 
diplomat.  Baron  de  Saint- Aignan,  came  to  Paris  from  Frank- 
fort, the  headquarters  of  the  allied  monarchs.  Saint- Aignan  had 
hitherto  represented  the  French  government  at  the  courts  of 
Gotha  and  Weimar;  he  had  been  in  Leipzig  after  the  battle, 
and  was  taken  by  the  allies  to  Frankfort,  where  they  assigned 
him  a  role  similar  to  that  recently  assigned  by  Napoleon  to 
Merveldt.  Metternich,  in  the  presence  and  with  the  formal 
consent  of  Nesselrode  and  of  the  English  plenipotentiary.  Lord 
Aberdeen,  announced  to  him  that  the  powers  were  disposed  to 
make  peace  if  Napoleon  would  accept  the  natural  boundaries 
of  France,  i.e.,  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  as  a 
basis  for  it,  and  summon  a  congress  for  the  purpose  of  a  general 
pacification.  To  be  sure,  to  this  offer  was  attached  the  limiting 
clause  that  pending  negotiations  war  would  continue;  but  it 
was,  after  all,  a  peace  that  was  in  prospect,  and  whoever  sincerely 
wished  the  Emperor  well  must  advise  him  to  accept  at  once; 
for  it  was  a  fact,  as  the  report  of  Saint-Aiguan  said,  "that  Na- 
poleon could  save  much  evil  to  humanity  and  many  dangers  to 
France  if  he  would  not  put  off  negotiations  a  single  day."    What 


Mt.  44]  The   Chance  of  Peace  649 

led  the  allies  to  pause  and  offer  such  terms  has  not  yet  been  fully 
explained.  It  was  asserted  that  the  soHcitude  of  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  for  the  fate  and  safety  of  his  daughter  prevailed  over 
other  considerations.  Metternich  himself  was  of  the  opinion, 
as  he  wrote  Caulaincourt  in  a  private  letter  handed  to  the  ne- 
gotiator, that  the  step  would  have  no  results.  Was  that  an 
indirect  hint  to  Napoleon  to  accept  at  once?  Everything  de- 
pended on  his  decision. 

He  recognized  his  situation  exactly.  "My  situation,"  he 
remarked  to  his  brother  Joseph  at  this  time,  "allows  me  no 
longer  to  think  of  sovereignty  over  any  foreign  nation;  and  1 
shall  esteem  myself  fortunate  if  I  can  keep  the  territory  of  old 
France  by  means  of  the  peace.  Everything  about  me  threatens 
ruin.  My  armies  are  annihilated  and  the  losses  they  have  suf- 
fered can  be  made  good  only  with  extreme  difficulty.  Holland 
is  irrevocably  lost  to  us;  Italy  is  wavering;  the  demeanour  of 
the  King  of  Naples  makes  me  uneasy.  The  re-enforcements  for 
the  Viceroy  Eugene  fail  to  arrive,  though  his  need  is  pressing; 
the  Austrians  are  pushing  him,  and  the  Italians  under  his  com- 
mand waver.  Belgium  and  the  Rhine  provinces  give  tokens  of 
discontent.  The  Spanish  frontier  is  in  the  power  of  the  enemy. 
In  such  a  crisis  how  can  one  think  of  foreign  thrones?  How 
can  one  demand  of  France,  when  she  can  scarcely  defend  herself, 
sacrifices  for  any  other  cause  than  her  own  preservation,  when 
at  best  one  can  count  only  on  such  sacrifices  as  are  indispen- 
sable for  the  protection  of  her  own  territory?"  *  And  yet  Na- 
poleon did  not  accept  the  proposal  of  peace  outright.  Such, 
indeed,  had  been  his  intention  at  the  outset,  and  Maret  had 
already  drawn  up  the  official  despatch;  but  he  bethought  him- 
self of  something  else,  and  in  order  to  gain  more  time  for  his 
armaments,  so  that  he  should  not  be  obliged  defenceless  to  ac- 
cept the  dictation  of  his  enemies,  he  sent  a  letter  on  the  16th  of 

*  Miot  de  Melito,  M^moires,  III.  309.  Of  course  we  must  not  for- 
get that  these  words  of  the  Emperor  formed  a  prelude  to  the  demand  that 
Joseph  should  throw  up  his  hopes  of  the  Spiinisli  crown,  and  hence  are 
more  sombre  than  his  situation  really  seemed  to  Napoleon.  Still  they 
correspond  exactly  to  the  actual  facts. 


650  Elba  [1813 

November  in  which  he  made  no  mention  of  the  basis  of  peace, 
but  only  proposed  Mannheim  as  the  seat  of  the  congress.  He 
deceived  himself.  Metternich  took  advantage  of  this  procrasti- 
nating reply  of  the  Emperor  by  using  it  in  a  manifesto  of  the 
monarchs  to  the  French  people.  "The  allied  powers/'  it  was 
declared,  "are  not  in  war  against  France,  but  against  that 
loudly  proclaimed  ascendency  which  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
has  so  long  exercised  beyond  the  boundaries  of  his  realm,  to 
the  detriment  of  Europe  and  of  France.  Victory  has  brought 
the  allied  armies  to  the  Rhine,  The  first  use  which  their  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Majesties  made  of  the  fact  was  to  offer  peace 
to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  French."  The  terms  of 
peace  were,  to  be  sure,  no  longer  the  Rhine,  the  Pyrenees,  and 
the  Alps,  as  a  first  draft  of  the  proclamation  by  Metternich 
still  read.  It  went  on:  "The  allied  sovereigns  wish  France  to 
be  great,  strong,  and  happy";  and  then,  farther  on,  "The 
powers  guarantee  to  the  French  Empire  an  extension  of  terri- 
tory such  as  France  never  enjoyed  under  her  kings."  Thus  did 
the  cabinets  of  old  legitimate  Europe  appeal — and  this  fur- 
nishes new  evidence  how  strongly  they  were  influenced  by  the 
current  of  public  opinion  at  this  moment — from  the  monarch  to 
the  sovereign,  from  the  Emperor  to  the  nation,  from  the  ruler  of 
an  international  empire  to  the  French  people.  In  this  separation 
of  prince  and  people,  in  this  appeal  to  the  latter  as  the  higher 
authority,  lay  the  whole  force  of  the  proclamation,  which  in 
other  respects  was  rather  weak,  and  it  could  not  fail  of  effect. 
Napoleon  was  made  aware  of  this  in  different  ways ;  the  reports 
of  the  prefects,  for  example,  moved  him  to  send  senators  and 
Councillors  of  State  into  the  provinces  in  order  to  rouse  sentiment 
and  make  it  more  favourable  to  the  imperial  government;  he 
could  not  even  afford  to  disdain  appealing  to  the  old  revolu- 
tionary spirit,  and  the  long-neglected  Marseillaise  was  ground 
out  of  hand-organs  on  the  strec^ts  once  more.  But  the  extent 
to  which  the  French  were  finally  distinguishing  between  him 
and  themselves  appearetl  most  clearly  when  the  Legislative  Body 
met  on  the  19th  of  December,  1813. 

Napoleon  iiad  postponed  o})ening  its  sessions  until  that  day 


] 


^T.  44]    Napoleon   to   the   Legislative   Body       651 

in  order  not  to  face  its  monibors  without  any  ovidonco  of  his 
love  of  peace.  When  he  had  sacrificed  Man't,  in  whom  puhhc 
opinion,  misled  by  Savary,  beheld  an  adversary  of  peace,  by 
removing  him  from  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  and  appoint- 
ing in  his  stead  Caulaincourt,  Duke  of  Vicenza.  who  was  re- 
garded as  an  advocate  of  pacification;  when  he  luid  ordered 
the  latter  on  the  2d  of  December  to  write  to  Metternich  that  he 
now  accepted  the  proposed  basis  of  peace,  and  the  Atistrian 
minister  replied  that  nothing  stood  in  the  way  of  opening  the 
congress  and  that  England  would  be  notified  at  once  in  order 
that  she  might  send  her  representative:  then,  and  not  until 
then,  did  Napoleon  think  he  possessed  enough  material  to  play 
the  part,  as  he  had  in  former  years,  of  a  peaceable  man,  whose 
good  intentions  were  interfered  with  by  wicked  Europe.  This 
correspondence  was  laid  before  the  deputies,  and  only  this — not 
the  overtures  of  Saint-Aignan  and  the  first  procrastinating 
answer  which  had  as  good  as  destroyed  all  chance  of  peace. 
The  Emperor,  however,  in  the  speech  from  the  throne,  assured 
them  that  all  the  original  documents  to  be  found  in  the  port- 
folio of  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  would  be  transmitted  to 
the  Chamber.  The  close  of  his  message,  which  appealed  to  the 
national  honour,  contained  the  usual  demand  for  sacrifices,  "for 
nations  act  with  confidence  only  when  they  bring  out  all  their 
forces."  But  the  deputies  did  not  see  matters  in  that  light. 
A  report  of  a  committee  presented  by  Laine  of  Bordeaux 
defined  the  situation  in  clear  and  bold  language:  "All  means 
of  resistance  would  be  effective  only  in  case  the  French  were 
convinced  that  the  government  were  really  concerned  for  the 
glory  of  peace  alone,  and  that  their  blood  would  be  shed  only 
in  defence  of  the  fatherland  and  her  protecting  laws."  The 
last  clause  was  an  intimation  that  the  French  were  no  longer 
disposed  to  fight  for  an  arbitrary  ruler.  Hence  the  Emperor 
was  to  be  requested  "to  care  for  a  full  and  consistent  execution 
of  the  laws  which  guarantee  to  all  Frenchmen  the  rights  of 
liberty  and  security  of  property,  and  to  the  nation  the  undi- 
minished exercise  of  her  political  privileges."  Tliis  report  was 
greeted  in  the  committee  of  the  whole  with  a  storm  of  applause 


652  Elba  [1813 

and  accepted  by  a  large  majority.  The  partisans  of  the  govern- 
ment worked  hard  to  get  the  wording  of  the  report  changed, 
which  was  rather  outspoken.  Enough  remained  for  the  Em- 
peror in  a  rage  to  forbid  its  publication.  He  closed  the  Legisla- 
tive Body,  and  told  its  members  to  their  faces  in  a  public 
audience  that  they  were  factious  and  that  he  would  have 
them  under  surveillance. 

The  dissolution  of  the  Legislative  Body  roused  intense  indig- 
nation, especially  in  the  provincial  towns;  and  it  seems  almost 
as  if  nothing  but  the  war  just  then  thundering  at  the  country's 
gates,  with  its  train  of  privations  and  excesses,  saved  Napoleon 
and  his  government  from  an  internal  crisis  that  was  already 
drawing  nigh.  Now,  in  the  hour  of  need,  he  was  not  so  much 
a  sovereign  to  the  French  people  as  a  military  leader,  certainly 
the  ablest  of  them  all  and  in  this  case  the  most  earnest,  for  he 
fought  for  his  throne.  It  will  be  no  surprise  to  us  to  behold  once 
more  all  the  marvels  of  his  genius. 

The  allies  had  made  no  pause  in  the  war,  as  Metternich 
had  informed  Saint-Aignan  they  would  not.  During  the  first 
week  in  November  they  had  already  agreed  on  prosecuting  it  im- 
mediately, despite  the  objections  of  a  few  old-fashioned  military 
men  like  the  Austrian  General  Duka.  He  proposed  taking  up 
a  fortified  position  along  the  Rhine,  and  once  even  brought 
Francis  I.  to  the  point  of  threatening  Radetzky,  who  preached 
the  offensive,  with  court  martial.  In  regard  to  the  plan  of  opera- 
tions opinions  were  for  a  time  divided.  Gneisenau  had  pro- 
posed with  good  reason  an  offensive  movement  through  Belgium. 
Schwarzenberg,  on  the  other  hand,  insisted  that  only  30,000 
men  under  Biilow  should  proceed  to  Holland,  but  that  the 
main  army  must  try  to  penetrate  France  through  Switzerland, 
which  must  be  won  to  the  cause  of  the  allies  and  should  by  no 
means  be  left  on  the  flank,  and  thence  gain  the  plateau  of  Lan- 
gres.  In  that  way,  he  thought,  they  would  be  nearer  to  the 
Austrians  advancing  through  upper  Italy  and  to  Wellington. 
Bliicher's  army  should  go  across  the  middle  Rhine  and  so  cover 
the  right  flank.  It  was  a  methodical  plan,  which  involved  a 
loss  of  time  and  aimed  more  at  gaining  a  position  than  at  a  vie- 


^T. 44]  The  Objects  ot  the  AlHes  653 

tory  over  the  enemy.  Yet  the  statement  is  incontestable  with 
which  Radetzky  advocated  it:  "All  the  south  of  France,  where 
now  not  a  soldier  is  to  be  found,  will  be  prevented  from  organ- 
izing, and  the  Emperor  Napoleon  will  lose  a  coasiderable  portion 
of  his  resources." 

For  this  was  the  principal  object  of  the  allied  leaders,  to 
prevent  by  breaking  into  France  the  arming  of  the  enemy,  to 
make  him  by  this  means  incapable  of  lasting  resistance  and  to 
dispose  him  more  to  peace.*  To  annihilate  him  or  banish 
him  was  b}^  no  means  their  purpose.  And  they  did  in  fact 
succeed  in  so  far  that  when  the  two  armies  at  the  end  of  the 
year  crossed  the  Rhine  and  (during  the  first  half  of  January) 
entered  France,  more  than  a  third  of  the  country  was  checked 
in  the  midst  of  its  preparations,  while  Napoleon's  new  army 
was  in  the  first  stages  of  formation.  The  troops  of  the  former 
army  under  Macdonald,  Marmont,  and  Victor,  which  had  been 
left  at  the  Rhine,  and  those  that  Ney  and  Mortier  gathered  at 
Nancy  and  Langres,  had  amountetl  to  little  over  50,000,  for  at 
least  as  many  more  had  died  from  typhus  in  December.f  These 
forces,  retiring  before  superior  numbers,  marched  during  January, 
1814,  in  the  direction  of  Vitry  on  the  Marne.  Gerard  with 
a  few  thousand  reserves  and  Lefeb\Te  with  the  Guards  added 
only  about  10,000  to  their  numbers.  The  effort  at  a  "  levee  en 
masse  "  was  a  total  failure,  and  the  decree  of  January  3d  author- 
izing it  was  without  effect. 

Napoleon's  original  plan,  when  he  heard  of  the  advance  of 
the  aUies,  was  to  let  them  approach  near  the  capital,  where  he 
in  the  mean  time  would  have  stationed  and  built  up  his  new 
army,  and  then  to  unite  all  his  available  forces  there  and  seek 
to  decide  matters  in  a  battle.  But  to  prevent  the  allies  from 
seizing  too  much  French  soil  with  all  its  supplies  he  gave  up 

*  The  "military  operations,"  writes  Gentz  on  the  19th  of  December 
from  Freiburg  to  the  Princess  of  Wallachia,  after  speaking  of  the  negotia- 
tions, "will  be  continued  nevertheless  with  greater  emphasis,  because 
the  allies  hope  in  this  way  to  prevent  the  reorganization  of  the  army  in 
the  interior  of  France,  and  so  confirm  all  the  more  the  peaceful  mood  of 
Napoleon." 

t  Houssaye,  "1814,"  p.  59,  now  gives  the  official  figures. 


654  E^^^  f^^^"^ 

this  plan  and  determined  to  fight  between  the  Seine  and  the 
Marne,  though  he  had  at  first  nothing  but  the  remnants  of  the 
last  army.  His  purpose  in  this  was  to  strike  the  separate  de- 
tachments of  the  enemy  before  they  effected  a  junction,  and, 
both  for  strategic  as  well  as  political  reasons,  to  turn  first  upon 
Bliicher,  who  was  moving  rapidly  on  Saint-Dizier,  while  the 
main  army  was  slowly  advancing  by  way  of  Montbeliard  and 
Langres.  There  was  a  variety  of  reasons  for  this  delay.  In 
the  first  place,  Alexander,  influenced  by  Laharpe,  Jomini,  and 
other  Swiss,  had  long  been  opposed  to  the  march  through  Switzer- 
land; then  again,  in  sentimental  memory  of  the  passage  over 
the  Niemen  on  New  Year's  Day,  he  had  waited  until  the  Russian 
New  Year  (January  13th)  before  crossing  the  Rhine  at  Basel; 
and  finally  Metternich  had  directed  Schwarzenberg  on  the  8th 
of  January  to  advance  "discreetly,"  as  he  hoped  soon  to  bring 
to  a  close  the  great  peace  negotiations.  For  Caulaincourt  was 
waiting  at  Luneville  for  the  congress  to  be  opened  and  com- 
plained of  the  delay,  as  his  Emperor  had  surely  given  the  strongest 
evidence  of  his  hearty  desire  for  the  establishment  of  a  universal 
peace  by  sending  his  minister  of  foreign  affairs  with  full  powers.* 
Another  thing  hampered  the  operations  of  the  main  army. 
At  Abo  Alexander  had  held  out  hopes  to  Bernadotte  of  getting 
the  French  throne,  and  the  latter  had  accordingly  shown  him- 
self very  sparing  toward  the  French  throughout  the  campaign. 
Now  this  project  of  the  Czar  stood  revealed  and  cooled  Austria 
off  still  more,  whose  ardour  was  none  too  great  at  best. 

On  the  26th  of  January  Napoleon  left  Paris  and  on  the  next 

*  See  "  Oesterreich's  Teilnahme,"  etc.,  p.  790.  Metternich  states  in 
his  letter  from  Freiburg  on  the  9th  of  January  addressed  to  Schwarzenberg 
that  he  had  sent  to  Caulaincourt  the  official  answer  referring  him  to  definite 
explanations  in  the  immediate  future,  and  a  few  lines  in  private  besides. 
The  latter  have  never  been  published.  It  would  be  most  interesting  to 
see  them.  Metternich's  view  of  the  situation  before  the  arrival  of  Eng- 
land's minister,  Castlereagh,  at  headquarters  is  also  defined  in  a  second 
letter  to  Schwarzenberg  dated  January  13th.  "To  make  an  end,  and 
an  honourable  one,  to  obtain  what  is  desirable  and  advantageous  without 
going  to  Paris,  or  to  go  to  Paris  if  it  is  not  otherwise  to  be  obtained:  that 
is  the  whole  of  my  policy." 


I 


.Et. 44]    The  Allies   Increase   their   Demands      655 

morning  arrived  at  Chalons.  Bliichcr  was  on  the  road  bctwcon 
Saint-Dizier  and  Brienne  on  that  day,  his  object  being  to  come 
closer  to  the  main  army.  After  sending  Yorck's  corps  toward 
the  Moselle  and  leaving  that  of  Langeron's  (all  but  one  division) 
to  watch  Mainz,  he  had  only  about  30,000  men  at  hand.  Na- 
poleon thought  he  had  still  less,  and  determined  to  attack  him 
although  he,  too,  had  no  more  than  40,000.  He  supposed 
Bliicher  to  be  still  at  Saint-Dizior,  but  found  only  the  rear-guard 
there;  he  hastened  on  after  him  toward  Brienne,  leaving  Mar- 
mont  behind.  There  an  engagement  took  place  which  compelled 
Bliicher,  who  was  just  on  the  point  of  proceeding  westward,  to 
turn  south  toward  Tranncs. 

Meantime  at  the  headquarters  of  the  allies  some  memorable 
resolutions  were  reached.  The  English  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Lord  Castlereagh,  had  arrived  there  on  the  25th,  and 
had  at  once  begun  to  exercise  a  dominant  influence.  First  of 
all  he  had  demanded  "the  uninterrupted  prosecution  of  mili- 
tary operations,"  and  at  the  same  time  he  had  given  encour- 
agement for  a  conference  of  ministers  who  should  determine 
the  political  course  to  be  pursued.  And  so  on  the  29th  it  was 
agreed  that  at  the  congress  to  be  opened  presently  at  Chatillon 
the  "old  boundaries  of  France"  were  to  be  proposed  to  Caulain- 
court  as  a  basis  of  peace.  That  is  to  say,  the  conditions  once 
given  to  Saint-Aignan,  which  Napoleon  did  not  accept  speedily 
enough,  were  retracted,  and  France  was  to  be  circumscribed  no 
more  by  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees,  but  by  the 
boundaries  she  had  at  the  beginning  of  the  wars  of  the  Revolu- 
tion in  1792,  when  a  legitimate  king  still  sat  on  the  throne.  In 
favour  of  this  proposition  they  urged  the  successes  of  the  allies 
since  November:  their  invasion  of  France,  the  conquest  of 
Holland,  and  the  desertion  of  Murat,  who  had  entered  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  with  Austria  on  the  Uth  of  January. 
By  this  decision,  denying  to  France  her  gains  through  the  Revo- 
lution and  restricting  the  state  to  its  former  territory,  the 
powers,  assuming  that  they  fought  out  their  programme  with  all 
their  resources,  undermined  the  revolutionary  monarchy,  whose 
principle  had  been  unlimited  extension  of  boundaries  and  of 


656  Elba  [1814 

influence.  Hence  it  was  but  consistent  that  at  Langres  the 
restoration  of  the  old  dynasty  of  the  Bourbons  had  already 
been  in  view.  The  clause:  "in  case  it  [the  dynasty]  should 
be  recalled  by  an  act  of  the  nation  itself,"  laid  much  less  stress 
on  the  sovereign  people  than  the  appeal  from  Frankfort  had 
done. 

These  wide-reaching  resolutions  were  to  be  emphatically 
supported  by  a  victory  over  Napoleon  during  the  next  few 
days.  He  had  followed  Bliicher  to  the  vicinity  of  Trannes, 
ever  hoping  to  strike  him  a  blow  before  Schwarzenberg  arrived. 
He  was  disappointed.  Schwarzenberg,  after  much  crying  out 
upon  those  who  could  not  get  quickly  enough  to  Paris  and  upon 
Metternich,  who  had  not  yet  secured  peace,  had  determined 
to  support  Bliicher  and  sent  him  two  corps  that  increased  his 
force  to  60,000,  while  Napoleon  had  only  40,000.  Wrede's 
corps  also  hastened  from  Joinville,  so  that  the  dreaded  Em- 
peror of  the  French  might  be  confronted  with  more  than  double 
odds.  What,  therefore,  Napoleon  had  thought  to  prevent 
had  been  done  after  all.  The  stubbornness  with  which  Bliicher 
held  his  position  at  Trannes  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  proximity 
of  the  main  army.  He  had  even  given  orders  on  the  1st  of 
February  to  march  west,  when  Bliicher  took  the  offensive  at 
La  Rothiere.  The  entire  afternoon  the  French  troops  held 
out  against  great  odds,  until  towards  evening  their  line  on  the 
left  wing  near  Chaumesnil  was  broken  by  the  onslaught  of 
Wrede,  and  the  reserves,  led  by  Napoleon  himself,  were  unable 
to  repair  the  damage.  The  village,  and  with  it  the  battle,  was 
lost. 

It  was  a  brilliant  victory  for  the  allies,  and  it  might,  per- 
haps, have  been  definitive  if  it  had  been  followed  up  by  an 
energetic  pursuit.  But  this  was  neglected.  The  alHes  deemed 
Napoleon  incapable  of  further  resistance.  On  the  very  evening 
after  the  battle  Bliicher  wrote  that  "it  had,  as  it  were,  decided 
everything,"  and  in  eight  days  they  would  be  in  Paris.  Con- 
sequently they  neglected  to  push  rapidly  after  the  beaten  foe, 
and  thus  allow  him  no  time  to  restore  order  to  his  confused 
troops.     Napoleon,  too,  felt  the  whole  weight  of  the  blow  he 


iET.  44]  Negotiations   Fail  657 

had  received,  Maret,  who  was  with  liiin  at  Troycs  durinp;  the 
gloomy  days  after  the  engagement  and  who  assumed  the  office 
of  secretary  of  state,  relates  in  his  Memoirs  that  the  Emperor 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  the  extreme  of  compliance  and  that 
he  gave  carte  blanche  to  Caulaincourt  when  the  latter  requested 
definite  instructions  for  the  congress  to  be  opened  on  the  5th 
of  February,  "The  Duke  of  Bassano,"  we  read  in  the  Memoirs, 
"handed  Napoleon  the  letter  (from  Caulaincourt)  and  conjured 
him  to  yield.  The  Emperor  at  first  scarcely  seemed  to  be 
listening  to  him,  then  he  pointed  to  a  passage  in  Montesquieu, 
whose  pages  he  had  been  turning  abstractedly.  'Read  it,* 
said  he,  'read  it  aloud.'  The  words  were:  *I  know  nothing 
more  magnanimous  than  the  determination  of  a  monarch  of 
our  time  to  bury  himself  under  the  ruins  of  his  throne  rather 
than  accept  terms  that  no  king  should  listen  to,'"  "But  I  know 
something  far  more  magnanimous,"  exclaimed  Maret,  "that 
you  make  a  sacrifice  of  your  glory  and  thereby  fill  up  the  abyss 
which  will  otherwise  swallow  up  France  and  you  together." 
"Well,  then,  gentlemen,  make  peace;  Caulaincourt  shall  con- 
clude it,  and  shall  sign  everything  that  can  bring  it  about;  I 
will  bear  the  shame.  Only  do  not  ask  me  to  dictate  my  own 
humiliation."  So  Maret  wrote  to  the  minister  that  the  Em- 
peror gave  him  carte  blanche  to  bring  the  negotiations  to  a  happy 
conclusion,  to  save  the  capital  and  to  prevent  a  battle  in  which 
the  very  last  hopes  of  the  nation  would  be  at  stake.  When 
Caulaincourt,  frightened  by  the  weight  of  responsibility  laid 
on  him,  asked  on  the  6th  of  February  for  definite  instructions 
as  to  how  far  he  could  go,  Maret  finally  brought  the  Emperor, 
who  had  gone  back  to  Nogent  on  the  7th,  to  the  point  of  actu- 
ally "dictating  his  humiliation"  during  the  night.  "It  was 
settled,"  the  Memoirs  proceed  to  relate,  "that  for  the  sake  of 
peace  Belgium  and  even  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  must  be 
given  up,  and  the  instructions  read  that  the  plenipotentiary 
should  first  offer  Belgium,  and  then,  if  it  was  indispensable,  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  as  well,  Italy,  Piedmont,  Genoa,  nay, 
even  the  colonies,  were  to  be  sacrificed  first  of  all.  Napoleon 
intended  to  sign  the  new  instructions  the  next  morning.     But 


658  Elba  ii8i4 

before  the  break  of  day  tidings  came  that  upset  everything, 
and  when  Maret  appeared  in  the  cabinet  with  the  document 
he  found  his  master  bending  eagerly  over  his  maps,  "1  am 
concerned  with  wholly  different  matters,"  the  Emperor  shouted 
to  him;  "I  am  just  on  the  point  of  dealing  Blucher  a  blow." 
And  nothing  further  was  said  about  signing  the  order.  Talley- 
rand was  right:  he  could  not  be  King  of  France  as  long  as  he 
was  the  Emperor  Napoleon.* 

Shortly  after  the  battle  of  La  Rothiere,  when  the  allies  had 
agreed  to  move  on  Paris,  they  had  separated  the  two  armies. 
Schwarzenberg  held  the  road  to  Troyes  and  Fontainebleau, 
and  Bliicher  marched  north  at  first,  later  turning  west  past 
Fere  Champenoise.  He  was  to  send  for  Yorck,  who  was  march- 
ing from  Chalons  along  the  Marne  after  Macdonald,  and  for 
certain  re-enforcements  that  were  following  along  from  Germany 
under  Kleist  and  Kapzevitch.  That  meant  slow  progress  for 
his  division,  and  in  fact  Schwarzenberg,  too,  advanced  but 
cautiously.  Then  Bliicher  quite  suddenly  conceived  the  plan 
of  pushing  hastily  forward  northwest  by  Montmirail  with  two 
Russian  divisions  (Sacken  and  Olssufief),  blocking  Macdonald's 
road  on  the  Marne,  cutting  him  off  from  Napoleon  and  crushing 
him  between  his  own  force  and  Torek's.  He  did  not  now  wait 
for  re-enforcements,  which,  besides,  had  gone  in  the  wrong  direc- 
tion by  command  of  Emperor  Alexander,  and  he  divided  his 
army  into  three  widely  separated  colunuis.  Napoleon  had 
learned  of  this  when  he  refused  to  sign  the  document  for  Maret 
on  the  8th.  He  was  going  to  follow  the  plan  recommended  by 
Marmont  and  overpower  in  detail  the  "  best  army  of  the  allies, " 
as  he  called  Bliicher 's  forces.  He  left  Oudinot,  Victor,  and 
Gerard  behind  at  Montereau  with  not  quite  40,000  men  to  watch 
Schwarzenberg,  and  hastened  with  nearly  30,000  (Marmont,  Ney, 
and  the  Guards)  by  Sezanne  north  to  Champaubert.  At  this 
point  the  corps  of  Olssufief  was   marching  by  on  the  10th  of 

*  Even  though  Maret's  story  be  true,  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that 
Napoleon  had  been  following  Bliicher's  movements  for  several  days,  and 
on  the  evening  of  February  7th  he  wrote  to  Joseph :  "  In  this  state  of  affairs 
we  must  show  confidence  and  adopt  bold  measures." 


Mt.  44]]  The  Allies   Repulsed  659 

February,  while  Sacken  had  already  gone  ahead  to  Montmirail, 
Bliicher  had  rejected  Gneisenau's  advice  to  recall  all  the  corps. 
So  Olssufief  was  on  that  day  nearly  annihilated,  and  Napoleon, 
leaving  Marmont  behind,  rushed  on  after  Sacken,  who  met  him 
at  Montmirail.  Here,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  11th,  the  Emperor 
advanced  his  troops  under  cover  of  a  splendid  artillery  fire, 
that  prevented  the  enemy  from  breaking  through.  Then  he 
purposely  weakened  his  left  wing  to  draw  Sacken's  attack  in 
that  direction,  while  he  pressed  the  latter's  left  with  superior 
forces.  That  made  it  impossible  for  Sacken  to  join  Yorck, 
who  was  advancing  from  Chateau-Thierry;  the  latter  was  driven 
back  and  Sacken  meantime  totally  defeated.  Both  generals 
then  retreated  after  great  losses,  while  those  of  the  French 
were  insignificant,  to  Chateau-Thierry,  whither  the  Emperor 
followed  them  on  the  12th,  but  where  Macdonald  failed  to 
intercept  them.  He  sent  the  latter  general  with  reinforce- 
ments to  Montereau  on  the  Seine.  He  himself  did  not  turn 
and  move  at  once  on  Schwarzenberg,  for  he  had  heard  that 
Bliicher,  with  the  corps  of  Kleist  and  Kapzevitch,  was  ad- 
vancing in  person  on  Montmirail,  to  which  point  Marmont  was 
retiring  before  him.  He  therefore  paused  in  his  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  defeated  in  the  last  few  days  and  turned  rapidly  south 
from  Chateau-Thierry,  to  treat  this  third  column  to  the  fate 
of  the  other  two.  At  Vauchamps  on  the  14th  of  February,  at 
noon,  the  French  encountered  the  vanguard  of  the  enemy  and 
dislodged  them,  whereupon  Bliicher  resolved  to  retreat.  He 
was  able  to  effect,  it  however,  only  at  the  cost  of  constant 
fighting  w^ith  heavy  losses,  especially  when  Napoleon  sent 
a  corps  of  cavalry  under  Grouchy  in  a  wide  circuit  to  intercept 
the  retreating  colunm  at  Etoges.  The  vaUant  troops,  retiring 
in  the  best  order,  succeeded  in  breaking  through,  but  only  with 
great  sacrifice  of  life.  They  then  retreated  to  Chalons,  where 
Yorck  and  Sacken  also  met  with  the  remnants  of  their  forces. 
These  rapidly  succeeding  actions  at  Champaubert,  Mont- 
mirail, and  Vauchamps  have  been  compared  with  the  first  vic- 
tories of  Napoleon  as  a  young  general;  and  in  fact  there  was 
the  same  fire,  the  same  bold  energy,  the  same  force  of  genius 


66o  Elba  [I814 

now,  indeed,  refined  by  a  rich  experience.  But  would  all 
that  suffice  to  bring  such  an  unequal  contest  to  a  tolerable  con- 
clusion? And  supposing  the  general  does  his  share,  will  not  the 
Emperor  interfere  as  he  has  so  often  in  the  last  two  years? 
After  the  third  victory  gained  within  the  last  five  days,  he 
could  no  longer  afford  to  follow  up  the  Silesian  army.  It  was 
high  time  to  turn  and  move  on  Schwarzenberg.  vSo  Marmont 
alone  was  left  behind  to  face  Bliicher,  with  orders  to  retreat, 
at  the  latter's  first  offensive  move,  slowly  past  Montmirail,  and 
get  into  communication  with  Napoleon  again.  The  Emperor 
supposed  the  main  army  of  the  enemy  to  be  already  far  beyond 
the  Seine  above  Montereau.  He  therefore  took  the  troops  of 
Ney  and  Gerard  and  the  Guards  and  marched  with  incredible 
speed  to  Guignes  on  the  Yeres,  where  he  also  found  Macdonald, 
Oudinot,  and  Victor,  and  so  had  his  entire  army  together  with 
the  exception  of  Marmont's  corps.  His  hopes  had  risen  to  the 
highest  pitch;  perhaps  he  could  succeed  with  the  second  gen- 
eral as  well  as  he  had  with  the  first;  perhaps  the  columns  of 
Schwarzenberg  could  be  defeated  in  detail.  Appearances  favoured 
his  hopes.  Pushing  forward  from  Guignes  towards  Nangis, 
Napoleon  met  at  Mormant  the  advance-guard  of  the  enemy's 
right  wing  under  Wittgenstein,  who  was  moving  from  Nogent  and 
Provins  on  Paris,  and  annihilated  it.  And  if  Victor  could  only 
have  advanced,  as  he  was  ordered  to,  on  the  same  day  over  the 
Seine  at  Montereau,  the  Austrian  corps  of  Bianchi,  which  had 
reached  Fontainebleau  and  was  now  hastily  •  recalled,  might 
possibly  have  been  cut  off  like  Sacken  at  Montmirail.  But  this 
advance  could  not  be  undertaken  until  the  next  day,  and  then 
Napoleon  led  it;  but  Schwarzenberg  had  managed  by  that 
time  to  retire  beyond  the  Seine  and  the  Yonne  with  all  his 
forces. 

The  commander-in-chief  of  the  allied  forces  had  been  cha- 
grined at  Bliicher's  ill  fortune  and  was  now  in  sheer  despair. 
"To  avoid  being  beaten  in  detail,"  he  wrote  from  Bray  to  Met- 
ternich,  who  had  remained  with  his  Emperor  at  Troyes,  "  I  shall 
limit  myself  to  defending  resc^lutely  ["  serieusement "]  the  bridges 
of  Bray  and  Nugent  and  uniting  my  forces  behind  the  Seine 


MT.4i]  Divisions  Among  the  Allies  661 

and  Yonne."  He  was  beside  himself  with  rage  because  Alex- 
ander had,  on  the  9th  of  February,  called  his  plenipotentiary  away 
from  the  congress  at  Chatillon,  and  because  the  proposal  of 
Caulaincourt,  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  the  "ancient  boun- 
daries" provided  a  truce  were  allowed,  was  not  accepted.  He 
now  set  out  to  make  good  this  neglect,  and  got  authority  from 
the  Czar  and  King  Frederick  William  to  write  to  Berthier  on 
the  17th.  In  this  letter  he  himself  suggested  a  cessation  of 
hostilities,  as  the  plenipotentiaries  at  Chatillon  had  received 
instructions  to  close  preliminaries  on  the  basis  of  Caulaincourt's 
proposal,  and  should  have  done  so  on  the  16th.  The  last  state- 
ment was  but  a  ruse,  and  it  was  at  once  detected  by  Napoleon. 
He  perceived  the  enemy's  ill-concealed  embarrassment ,  and  his 
spirits  rose  high.  "According  to  the  latest  news,"  he  wrote  to 
Joseph  on  the  18th,  "everything  is  different  with  the  allies. 
The  Emperor  of  Russia,  who  but  a  few  days  ago  had  broken 
off  negotiations  because  he  wanted  to  impose  on  France  still 
worse  terms  than  the  'ancient  boundaries,'  *  now  wants  to  resume 
them;  and  I  hope  that  I  shall  secure  a  peace  on  the  basis  of 
the  Frankfort  terms,  the  minimum  that  I  can  treat  for  with 
honour.  If  I  had  (before  the  last  operations)  signed  a  peace 
on  the  '  ancient  boundaries '  basis,  I  would  have  taken  up  arms 
again  two  years  later  and  toldthe  nation  that  that  was  no 
peace,  but  a  capitulation.  In  the  new  state  of  affairs  I  could 
no  more  say  that,  as  my  good  fortune  has  returned  and  I  am 
master  of  my  own  terms."  In  a  similar  strain  he  had  sent  word 
to  Caulaincourt  through  Bassano  after  the  victory  of  Mont- 
mirail:  "There  is  no  reasonable  peace  except  on  the  terms  of 
Frankfort ;  any  other  is  a  mere  armistice."  f  Caulaincourt's  full 
powers  were  limited  accordingly  on  the  17th,  and  Eugene  re- 
ceived orders  to  bestir  himself  in  Italy. 

*  This  was  true.  Alexander,  who  wanted  the  whole  of  Poland,  wished 
to  indemnify  Austria  for  the  loss  of  Galicia  by  giving  her  Alsace.  His 
neighbour  would  thus  get  into  a  dispute  with  France,  and  very  likely  with 
Prussia  as  well,  on  account  of  encroachments  on  Germany.  Russia  would 
thus  have  her  hands  free  in  the  Orient.  (Cf.  Oncken  in  Raumer's  Hist. 
Ta-schenbuch,  1886,  p.  34.) 

t  Houssaye,  "1814,"  p.  103. 


662  '  Elba  [1814 

Napoleon  was  right :  ' '  everything  was  different . "  At  the  very 
time  when  he  was  fighting  Bliicher  sharp  antagonisms  had  arisen 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  alhes.  Alexander  had  come  forward 
with  the  plan  to  conclude  no  peace,  but  to  move  with  utmost 
speed  on  Paris, put  the  capital  under  a  Russian  governor,  and  then 
let  the  nation  decide — of  course  under  Russian  patronage  — 
the  question  of  a  ruler,  be  it  Bernadotte,  the  republic,  or  Na- 
poleon again.  Manifestly,  any  head  of  the  French  nation  thus 
confirmed  would  be  the  devoted  ally  of  Russia.  These  plans 
were  opposed  by  Austria  in  particular,  which  hoped  rather  for 
an  understanding  with  the  Bourbons,  who  had  conceded  during 
the  last  century  her  powerful  position  in  Europe  and  her  ascend- 
ency in  Italy.  It  was  these  dissensions  that  caused  the  dila- 
tory operations  of  the  main  army.  Not  until  they  felt  the  pres- 
sure of  Napoleon's  victories  over  Bliicher  did  they  begin  to 
act  a  little  more  in  unison,  and  by  the  middle  of  February 
Alexander  had  yielded  to  the  requirements  of  the  other  powers. 
Negotiations  were  resumed  at  Chatillon,  and  the  proposals  of 
Caulaincourt  were  to  be  the  basis.  So  when  Schwarzenberg 
retired  to  Troyes — after  Napoleon  had  defeated  a  Wiirttemberg 
corps  at  Montereau  on  the  18th — he  felt  that  he  had  made  way 
for  peace,  rather  than  for  his  conquering  foe.  And  when  he 
summoned  Bliicher,  who  had  rapidly  recovered  himself,  to 
come  up  from  Chalons,  it  was  only  in  case  of  emergency.  He 
would  not  risk  a  battle,  although  the  allies  certainly  had  150,000 
men,  while  Napoleon,  who  was  boldly  moving  on  Troyes,  could 
only  command  70,000.  On  the  23d  of  February  he  actually 
retired  to  Bar  sur  Aube,  and  even  had  thoughts  of  receding  to  the 
plateau  of  Langres  if  the  dreaded  foe  should  follow  him  farther. 
But  his  hopes  of  peace  were  not  destined  to  be  fulfilled.  The 
powers  at  Chatillon  demanded  as  conditions  of  a  preUminary 
peace  the  boundaries  of  1792,  and  as  a  guarantee  the  evacua- 
tion not  only  of  all  fortresses  outside  of  France,  but  also  of  the 
French  ones  of  Belfort,  Besangon  and  Hiiningen.  When  Cau- 
laincourt reported  this  he  received  from  Napoleon  the  following 
answer:  "I  am  so  irritated  by  this  project  that  I  feel  myself 
dishonound   by  the  mere  proposal."     He  himself  would  send 


iEr.  44]  Bliicher   Moves  on   Paris  663 

an  ultimatum.  But  he  omitted  to  do  so;  the  campaign  ab- 
sorbed all  his  energies.  For  things  had  just  taken  a  decisive 
turn.  Bliicher,  who  did  not  want  to  join  the  ignominious 
retreat,  had  accepted  the  advice  of  Grolmann,  Kleist's  chief-of- 
staff,  and  obtained  permission  of  the  monarchs  to  march  to 
the  right,  effect  a  junction  with  Biilow  and  Winzingerode,  who 
were  coming  from  Belgium,  and,  thus  re-enforced,  to  move  right 
on  Paris. 

That  was  a  momentous  determination.  For  who  knows 
what  would  have  happened  if  Bliicher,  too,  had  joined  the 
retreat?  Under  the  heavy  burden  of  invasion  the  people  had 
been  roused  to  an  intense  bitterness  of  feeling,  so  that  every- 
where the  peasants  sought  to  defend  themselves  from  the 
foreign  oppressor,  especially  since  Napoleon  had  regained  some 
of  his  lost  prestige  by  means  of  the  recent  victories.*  The 
popular  enthusiasm  for  the  conqueror  of  the  foreign  invaders 
increased  daily;  and  though  in  December  the  Emperor  had 
not  succeeded  with  his  levee  en  masse,  he  would  certainly  suc- 
ceed in  part  in  March,  at  least  in  the  eastern  half  of  France. 
Now  Bliicher's  forward  movement  put  a  stop  to  that  and 
drew  Napoleon,  who  was  anxious  about  his  capital,  away  from 
Schwarzenberg.  The  latter,  to  be  sure,  was  to  be  kept  ignorant 
of  his  absence,  for  his  personal  presence  was  equal  to  an  army  and 
often  kept  the  enemy  from  bold  attacks. f  He  now  hoped  that 
Marmont  and  Mortier,  whom  he  had  left  to  oppose  Bliicher, 
would  succeed  in  checking  his  advance,  while  he  himself  pressed 
him  from  behind  and  so  brought  him  between  two  fires — and 
all  that  before   Schwarzenberg   found  out  that  he  was  gone 

♦Since  Houssaye  in  "1814"  has  collected  authentic  data  on  this 
point,  Napoleon  can  no  longer  be  charged  with  exaggeration  in  his  letters. 
Even  the  general  quartermaster  of  Bliicher's  army  wrote  to  Gneisenau 
"The  officers  scarcely  dared  say  anything  more  to  the  troops."  And 
Schwarzenberg  was  of  the  opinion  that  "in  order  to  prevent  excesses 
among  these  nationalities  in  so  long  a  line,  we  would  have  to  station 
another  army  behind  the  troops  in  operation."  However,  the  French 
themselves  were  by  no  means  guiltless. 

t  "I  have  50,000  men,"  he  once  said  to  General  Poltaratzky,  "and 
myself,  that  makes  150,000." 


664  Elba  [I814 

Three  corps,  amounting  to  40,000  men,  were  left  under  Mac- 
donald  to  watch  the  Austrian. 

But  events  did  not  turn  out  just  as  Napoleon  wished.  On 
the  28th  Marmont  and  Mortier  did  indeed  block  Bliicher's  road 
east  of  Meaux  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Marne  and  dislodge  his 
advance-guard.  But  Napoleon  was  prevented  by  a  late  start 
and  the  bottomless  mud  in  the  roads  from  sharing  in  the  fight 
on  that  day.  The  Silesian  army  managed  to  escape  north  to 
Soissons;  the  two  corps  of  Biilow  and  Winzingerode  had  just 
arrived  at  that  important  point  and  had  forced  the  town  to 
surrender.  This  was  very  opportune,  for  Bliicher  had  now  not 
only  escaped  the  fate  prepared  for  him  by  Napoleon,  but  had 
swelled  his  forces  to  100,000.  And  now  the  Emperor's  situa- 
tion had  in  turn  become  extremely  difficult.  If  he  turned 
back  from  the  Marne  to  face  Schwarzenberg,  who  had  again 
advanced  and  defeated  a  corps  under  Oudinot  at  Bar  sur  Aube, — 
and  he  actually  thought  of  that, — then  Bliicher  would  put  Mar- 
mont and  Mortier  to  flight  and  seize  Paris.  He  wanted  to  be 
easy  on  that  head,  and  so  gave  his  first  attention  to  this  foe. 
On  the  7th  of  March  a  Russian  corps  in  an  advanced  position 
at  Craonne  was  driven  back  at  a  heavy  cost,  and  two  days  later 
Bliicher  stood  ready  in  a  strong  position  at  Laon  to  offer  battle. 
Napoleon  had  gained  control  of  the  road  to  Soissons,  while 
Marmont  was  approaching  from  Berry  on  the  Rheims  road; 
so  that  the  army  was  now  moving  on  Laon  in  two  divisions 
between  which  it  was  difficult  to  keep  up  communication, 
because  the  land  between  the  roads  was  marshy  and  moreover 
Cossack  patrols  intercepted  the  couriers.  Hence  on  the  9th 
Napoleon,  who  had  twice  over  gained  possession  of  the  neigh- 
bouring villages  of  Semilly  and  Ardon,  did  not  learn  all  day 
that  Marmont  did  not  arrive  before  Laon  until  afternoon  in- 
stead of  in  the  morning  and  was  unable  to  capture  the  village 
of  Athies  until  evening,  and  then,  when  he  supposed  the  bloody 
work  to  be  finished,  as  it  was  dark,  he  was  driven  out  from  it 
by  the  enemy  and  his  troops  fled  precipitately  along  the  road 
they  had  come  by  as  far  as  Corb6ny.  Fortunately  the  enemy's 
pursuit  was  impeded  by  the  intervention  of  a  few  thousand 


jEt.44]         The  Ultimatum  of  the  Allies  665 

men  who  had  been  sent  out  under  Fabvier  to  seek  a  junction 
with  Napoleon  and  were  on  their  way  back.  Of  all  this  the  Em- 
peror heard  nothing  until  about  midnight,  as  his  own  right 
wing  had  been  driven  out  of  Ardon  again  and  so  communica- 
tion with  Marmont  had  grown  more  difficult.  He  was  beside 
himself  at  the  latter  for  behaving  "like  a  lieutenant."  Of 
course  he  could  not  divine  that  the  Duke  of  Ragusa  had  given 
up  his  master's  cause  as  lost  ever  since  the  fall  of  Soissons  and 
the  re-enforcement  of  Bliicher,  and  hence  did  only  what  was 
most  necessary,  and  not  always  even  that.  Napoleon  saw 
nothing  of  this,  but  only  that  he  had  to  preserve  from  a  destruc- 
tive pursuit  an  important  part  of  his  army  now  in  disorder. 
Therefore  he  continued  boldly  standing  in  battle  array  against 
great  odds  on  the  10th,  and  actually  secured  an  orderly  retreat 
on  the  part  of  Marmont.  Not  until  then  did  he  turn  upon 
Soissons,  and  then  only  on  the  second  day  after  to  hasten  thence 
toward  Rheims  to  drive  out  a  detached  Russian  corps  which 
meantime  had  occupied  that  city.  That  was  accomplished  on 
the  evening  of  March  14th,  and  at  that  place  he  gave  his 
jaded  troops  a  few  days  of  rest. 

The  allied  powers  had  in  the  meanwhile  adopted  a  new  reso- 
lution, not  of  military  strategy,  but  of  diplomacy.  This  was 
necessitated  by  the  fact  that  Caulaincourt  had  neither  accepted 
the  offer  of  February  17th  nor  made  a  counter-proposal,  and 
that  Napoleon  himself  had  in  a  letter  to  Francis  I.  on  the  21st 
designated  the  Frankfort  programme  as  the  ultimatum  for  him- 
self and  France.  The  greatest  activity  in  securing  the  resolution 
was  displayed  by  Castlereagh,  who  was  at  last  anxious  to  know 
what  England  was  spending  her  money  for.  On  the  28th  of 
February,  at  the  fourth  session  of  the  congress  of  Chatillon, 
the  envoy  of  Napoleon  was  notified  that  he  had  until  March 
10th  at  the  farthest  to  make  counter-proposals,  but  that  these 
must  agree  in  all  essential  points  with  its  proposals  of 
February  9th.  The  required  communication  failed  to  appear, 
and  on  the  9th  of  March  the  four  great  powers,  England,  Aus- 
tria, Prussia,  and  Russia,  concluded  a  treaty  at  Chaumont  that 
bound  Great  Britain  to  pay  five  million  pounds  aimually  to 


666  Elba  [I814 

the  Continental  powers,  and  bound  the  latter  to  carry  out  by 
force  of  arms  the  programme  proposed  at  Chatillon,  i.e.,  the  re- 
striction of  France  to  the  boundaries  of  1792,  and  the  full  inde- 
pendence of  Holland,  Italy,  Spain,  Switzerland,  and  Germany, 
though  it  should  require  twenty  years  to  accomplish  it.  Each 
of  the  allied  Continental  powers  agreed  to  contribute  150,000 
men.  The  treaty  was  antedated  March  1st;  but  it  came  into 
full  force  only  after  the  victory  at  Laon.  For  Schwarzenberg, 
after  having  driven  back  Oudinot  at  Bar  sur  Aube  and  ad- 
vanced to  Troyes  on  the  4th  of  March,  had  there  remained 
stationary;  so  that  the  Czar  and  the  King  of  Prussia  thought 
that  Emperor  Francis  had  not  only  forbidden  him  to  strike, 
but  had  even  ordered  him  to  retreat  to  the  Rhine  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  sacrificing  Bliicher.*  At  Bliicher's  headquarters  the 
same  opinion  was  held,  and  it  was  determined,  as  they  had  no 
wish  to  be  sacrificed,  to  proceed  more  deliberately.  Not  until 
Schwarzenberg  heard  of  the  battle  on  the  9th  of  March  with  its 
favourable  issue  did  he  decide  to  make  a  further  advance. 
During  these  days  the  peace  congress  was  also  dissolved  with- 
out any  results,  as  Napoleon  had  made  no  counter-proposals 
and  as  the  suggestions  which  Caulaincourt  offered  on  his  own 
initiative  were  so  wide  of  the  programme  of  the  allies  that  the 
latter  broke  off  negotiations. 

Napoleon's  unyielding  attitude  might  seem  incomprehen- 
sible if  the  only  thing  at  stake  were  his  sovereignty  over  France, 

*  This  view  of  the  case  has  also  passed  into  the  works  of  historians. 
Perhaps  it  will  be  dislodged  by  the  recently  published  correspondence 
between  Schwarzenberg  and  Metternich  during  those  days.  Although 
Radetzky  in  a  memorial  of  November,  1813,  makes  mention  of  the  Prus- 
sians in  these  terms:  "for  whom,  as  they  now  show  themselves,  the  fewest 
possible  troops  are  to  be  desired  in  case  of  peace,"  that  of  itself  is  no  suffi- 
cient basis  for  charging  the  commander-in-chief  with  the  intentional  sacri- 
fice of  an  entire  army  four  months  later.  The  military  incompetence  of 
Schwarzenberg,  his  constant  dread  of  starvation,  his  fear  of  the  lev6e  en 
masse,  which  he  sees  in  fancy  about  to  be  organized,  fully  explain  his 
behaviour.  Add  to  that,  finally,  that  he  was  confirmed  in  his  course  by 
Metternich,  who  told  him  "to  see  safety  not  in  battle  but  in  the  military 
attitude,"  and  no  further  suspicion  is  needed,  especially  as  it  has  no  valid 
grounds.     (See  "  Oesterreichs  Teilnahme,"  etc.,  p.  814  ff.) 


^T.  44]        Renewed   Efforts  of  Napoleon  667 

and  not  rather  a  great  principle  which  he  represented  and 
which  was  confronted  by  an  opposite  principle  in  the  camp  of 
the  alhes.  It  was  impossible  for  the  representative  of  a  cos- 
mopolitan revolution,  who  was  reaching  out  in  every  direction 
without  regard  to  boundaries  between  states  and  social  classes, 
to  adapt  himself  to  the  pre-revolutionary  system  of  a  balance 
of  power;  and  it  was  perfectly  logical  to  regard  a  peace  on  the 
basis  of  the  limited  territory  of  the  old  Bourbon  state  only  in 
the  light  of  a  capitulation.  The  fact  that  the  idea  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  its  inevitable  consequence  of  boundless  expansion 
had  long  been  incarnated  in  this  one  personality,  while  the 
French  people,  on  the  contrary,  had  already  returned  perforce 
to  the  path  of  a  national  life,  gave  rise  to  a  conflict  that  had 
to  come,  finally,  to  a  settlement.  At  the  capital  the  victories  of 
February  had  restored  some  of  the  old  confidence;  but  when 
March  brought  reports  only  of  the  retreat  of  Macdonald  and 
of  the  defeat  of  Soult  by  Wellington  at  Orthez  on  the 
27th  of  February,  and  no  reports  of  Napoleon,  government 
securities  fell  to  51,  and  anxiety  and  concern  reigned  anew. 
Joseph,  who  was  at  the  side  of  Marie  Louise  as  regent,  kept 
writing  incessantly  for  peace. 

But  Napoleon  at  Rheims  thought  of  nothing  but  how  to 
gain  yet  another  favourable  chance.  He  considered  whether 
he  should  not  in  junction  with  Macdonald  intercept  the  main 
army  of  the  enemy  at  Meaux,  in  order  to  contest  its  march 
towards  the  capital;  but  he  formed  another  and  far  bolder  plan. 
Leaving  Macdonald  in  front  of  Schwarzenberg,  whom  he  sup- 
posed to  be  across  the  Seine  above  Nogent  with  the  most  of  his 
army,  he  proposed  himself  to  operate  with  22,000  men  in  his 
rear  on  Mery  or  Troyes.  Mortier  and  Marmont  remained  in 
and  near  Rheims  facing  Bliicher.  He  set  out  southward  on 
the  17th,  and  on  the  19th  was  at  Plancy,  while  a  detachment 
marched  on  Arcis  sur  Aube.  The  Austro-Russian  army  retired 
from  that  point  at  the  command  of  the  commander-in-chief,  who 
wished  to  collect  his  army  between  Troyes  and  Lesmont  in 
order  to  advance  with  united  forces  against  his  weaker  enemy. 
Napoleon  looked  for  no  offensive  movement  after  this  retreat, 


668  Elba  [1814 

but  supposed  the  enemy  was  retiring  to  Brienne;  so  on  the 
morning  of  the  20th  he  made  up  his  mind  to  extend  his  original 
plan  still  farther;  i.e.,  to  march  upon  Vitry  and  win  it  back 
from  the  enemy  that  occupied  it,  to  concentrate  at  that  point 
the  forces  of  Marmont  and  Mortier  and  the  garrisons  of  Metz 
and  Nancy,  with  Macdonald  following  by  way  of  Arcis,  and  so 
with  a  compact  force  of  90,000  men  to  fall  upon  the  communi- 
cations of  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  He  himself  planned  to  take 
the  road  from  Plancy  through  Arcis  to  make  more  sure  of  keep- 
ing Schwarzenberg.  But  a  bitter  disappointment  was  in  store 
for  him. 

On  the  forenoon  of  the  20th  peasants  announced  to  the 
French  advancing  east  by  Arcis  the  approach  of  large  masses  of 
the  enemy.  Napoleon  refused  to  believe  it.  He  sent  out  his 
orderly  to  reconnoitre,  and  he  not  riding  far  enough  to  see  the 
hostile  columns,  confirmed  the  Emperor  in  his  error.  The  army 
was  thus  attacked  while  on  the  march  by  a  superior  force,  and 
a  portion  of  it  was  driven  in  wild  confusion  to  Arcis.  There, 
at  the  bridge,  an  officer  with  drawn  sword — such  is  the  story — 
stood  in  their  way  and  cried:  "Who  dares  to  cross  before  me?" 
They  recognized  Napoleon  and  submitted  to  being  led  back 
against  the  enemy.  At  the  same  time  the  vanguard,  under 
Ney,  was  attacked  near  Torcy.  That  general  held  the  place 
against  great  odds,  and  at  Arcis,  too,  the  troops  fought  with 
desperate  valour,  so  that  the  enemy  were  unable  to  accom- 
plish anything  worth  mentioning,  particularly  because  only 
Schwarzenberg's  right  wing  had  been  engaged,  while  the  left 
was  on  the  march  from  the  west.  Napoleon  was  misled  by 
this  partial  engagement  of  the  enemy's  forces  into  taking  the 
whole  affair  for  a  rear-guard  battle,  which  confirmed  his  opinion 
that  the  bulk  of  the  enemy  was  on  the  retreat.  He  accordingly 
persisted  in  the  direction  already  planned,  and  in  all  good  faith 
advanced  on  the  forenoon  of  the  21st  against  the  supposed 
rear-guard  of  the  enemy,  until  suildenly  he  saw  himself  con- 
fronted by  the  entire  main  army.  Now  it  is  his  turn  to  com- 
mand a  retreat  over  the  Aube,  and  nothing  but  Schwarzen- 
berg's slow  movements  enabled  him  to  bring  the  larger  part 


/Et.  44]  The   Allies   Move   on    Paris  669 

of  his  troops  with  comparatively  Uttle  loss  to  the  opposite 
bank.  Then  indeed,  when  the  100,000  men  finally  attacked 
the  30,000,  the  remainder  could  not  escape  without  heroic 
fighting.     The  battle  of  Arcis  was  lost. 

His  error  as  to  the  enemy's  intention  had  cost  the  Em- 
peror 3500  men.  He  now  had  to  continue  his  march  to  Vitry 
on  the  other  bank  of  the  Aube,  but  he  did  it  so  rapidly  that 
the  allies  soon  knew  nothing  of  his  real  whereabouts.  Mac- 
donald,  who  had  not  taken  part  in  the  battle,  also  marched  on 
the  other  bank  of  the  Aube  to  the  northeast  and  escaped  with 
a  rear  skirmish.  At  this  juncture,  on  the  23d  of  March,  a 
courier  was  captured  by  the  Austrians  bearing  a  letter  of  Ber- 
thier  to  the  marshal,  with  the  information  that  the  Emperor 
was  in  the  rear  of  the  army  between  Vitry  and  Saint-Dizier,  and 
that  his  cavalry  had  already  pushed  on  to  Joinville.  About 
the  same  time  some  Cossacks  waylaid  a  second  messenger  who 
had  a  letter  from  Napoleon  to  the  Empress  at  Paris  which 
initiated  her  into  his  plan  to  move  nearer  to  the  Marne  and 
his  fortesses  in  the  east  "in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  away 
from  the  capital."  These  letters  and  some  others  from  the 
capital  picturing  the  hopeless  state  of  feeling  that  prevailed 
there  and  the  inability  of  the  city  to  defend  itself;  the  news 
that  on  the  12th  of  March  the  English  had  occupied  Bordeaux 
and  the  inhabitants  had  declared  themselves  for  the  Bourbons; 
and,  finally,  the  reported  march  of  Bliicher  past  Rheims  to 
Chalons — all  these  put  together  led  the  alHes  to  abandon  entirely 
the  pursuit  of  Napoleon  and  to  move  in  junction  on  Paris.  A 
manifesto  to  the  French,  dated  the  25th  of  March,  again  laid 
all  the  blame  for  the  bloody  war  on  the  Corsican  with  his  in- 
satiable ambition,  and  at  the  same  time  attacked  the  principle 
he  represented.  "France,"  it  reads,  "has  only  her  own  govern- 
ment to  hold  responsible  for  the  ills  she  endures.  Peace  alone 
can  close  the  wounds  made  by  a  spirit  of  universal  conquest 
unequalled  in  the  annals  of  the  world.  This  peace  will  be  the 
peace  of  Europe;  any  other  is  inadmissible.  It  is  time  at 
last  that  princes  should  be  enabled  to  watch  over  the  weal 
of  their  peoples  without  external  interference  or  influence,  that 


6/0  Elba  [1814 

nations  should  respect  their  mutual  independence,  and  that 
social  institutions  should  be  protected  against  daily  assaults, 
that  property  be  secure  and  commerce  free." 

If  the  French  people  gave  ear,  they  would  be  turning  their 
backs  on  the  political  programme  of  the  Revolution,  and  the 
man  who  had  fought  for  it  hitherto,  with  the  whole  force  of 
his  genius  and  his  ambitious  will,  would  be  annihilated. 

Napoleon's  course  in  pursuing  his  eastward  march,  after  the 
second  day  of  fighting  at  Arcis,  when  he  must  have  been  con- 
vinced of  the  enemy's  offensive  purposes,  has  been  severely 
censured.  He  should,  it  is  hold  have  hastened  west  toward 
the  capital  with  all  available  troops ;  this  would  have  given  him 
a  good  start  of  his  enemy,  and  time  to  adopt  measures  for 
defence.  But  however  correct  this  reasoning  may  be,  the 
Emperor's  plan  also  had  great  advantages  if  chance  did  not 
thwart  him.  He  had  passed  on  from  Vitry  by  Saint-Dizier  and 
reached  Doulevent,  where  he  waited  during  the  25th  of  March 
and  tried  to  get  news  of  the  enemy,  of  whose  movements  he  was 
ignorant.  The  only  definite  information  was  that  a  strong 
corps  had  made  its  appearance  in  the  vicinity  of  Saint-Dizier. 
Had  the  enemy  divided  and  scattered?  In  that  case  he  might 
perhaps  be  defeated,  as  at  Champaubert  and  Montmirail. 
Napoleon  at  once  advanced  against  this  corps,  and  on  the  26th 
put  it  to  flight.  It  consisted  of  10,000  men  under  Winzingerode 
which  the  allies  had  left  behind  to  oppose  the  Emperor.  The 
latter  thought  it  strange  that  the  prisoners  brought  in  were  not 
Schwarzenberg's  soldiers,  but  Bliicher's,  and  his  uncertainty  was 
increased.  He  hastened  back  to  Vitry  to  secure  reliable  infor- 
mation and  found  it;  all  statements  agreed  that  the  enemy  was 
on  his  way  to  Paris  in  full  force.  What  was  he  to  do  now?  It 
was  no  longer  possible  to  forestall  their  arrival  at  the  capital; 
they  had  a  three  days'  start  of  him.  Should  he  turn  east 
collect  the  garrisons  and  call  upon  the  militia?  Perhaps  this 
last  would  have  been  successful,  for  the  peasants  in  the  entire 
east  were  ready  for  resistance;  they  were  traversing  the  land 
and  bringing  in  prisoners  to  headquarters.  Hence  Macdonald 
was  disposed  to  carry  the  war  into  Alsace  and  Lorraine;  and  it 


iET.  441  The   Allies   Capture   Paris  671 

has  been  conjectured,  not  without  reason,  that  this  idoa  seemed 
to  the  Emperor  more  feasible  than  the  other,  urged  liy  Caulain- 
court,  Maret,  Bertliier,  and  others  about  him,  to  save  the  capital 
at  all  hazards.  He  spent  hours  of  extreme  suspense  shut  up  in 
his  closet  at  Saint-Dizier,  trying  to  decide  one  way  or  the  other. 
But  finally  he  determined  to  go  to  Paris  by  way  of  Bar,  Troyes, 
and  Fontainebleau.  The  troops  were  set  in  motion  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  28th.  They  marched  with  speed,  and  yet  it  seemed 
slow  to  the  Emperor.  On  the  evening  of  that  day  he  received  a 
letter  from  his  former  adjutant,  Lavalette,  now  postmaster- 
general;  his  presence,  said  the  letter,  was  absolutely  necessary 
at  Paris,  and  he  must  not  delay  an  instant  if  he  would  not  lose 
his  capital.  He  learned  soon  after  that  the  enemy  had  already 
arrived  at  Meaux,  had  defeated  Marmont  and  Mortier  at  Fere 
Champenoise  and  were  now  driving  them  toward  Paris.  His 
impatience  rose  to  a  feverish  pitch;  arrived  at  Troyes,  he  could 
hardly  sleep.  He  gave  over  the  command  to  Berthier  and  rode 
on,  accompanied  only  by  the  squadrons  of  his  body-guard;  at 
Villeneuve-sur-Vannes  he  left  even  that  escort,  and  flinging  him- 
self vvdth  Caulaincourt  into  a  carriage,  sped  on  at  a  furious  pace. 
Meantime  the  allies  had  arrived  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Paris,  and  on  the  29th  Marie  Louise  fled  with  the  King  of  Rome 
to  Blois.  The  councillors  of  the  regency  had  urged  her  to  stay, 
but  an  exphcit  order  of  Napoleon's  on  no  account  to  expose 
his  son  to  the  fate  of  Astyanax,  required  his  removal.*  The 
impression  this  produced  in  Paris  was  profound;  for  the  large 
numbers  of  wounded  constantly  coming  in,  the  peasants  fleeing 
from  their  homes,  and  the  terrible  prophecies  of  the  officious 
press  bureau  as  to  the  impending  doom  of  the  city,  all  this  kept 
the  population  in  a  fever  of  suspense.  Government  securities 
fell  to  45.  Joseph,  the  Regent,  who  remained  behind,  did  not 
know  how  to  inspire  confidence.  His  proclamation  to  the 
Parisians  to  resist  the  enemy,  as  the  Emperor  was  at  his  heels, 
roused  no  enthusiasm;  and  if  it  had,  means  of  resistance  and 

*  "I  would  prefer  that  mj'  son  were  strangled  rather  than  to  see  him 
growing  up  at  Vienna  as  an  Austrian  prince,"  Napoleon  wrote  to  Joseph  on 
the  8th  of  February, 


672  Elba  [1814 

weapons  for  volunteers  were  wanting.  The  fortifications  were 
not  completed.  There  were  hardly  more  than  30,000  national 
guards  in  Paris.  These  did,  indeed,  fight  heroically  on  the  30th 
of  March  in  conjunction  with  the  troops  of  Marmont  and 
Mortier  before  the  walls  of  the  city.  Not  until  late  in  the  after- 
noon, when  the  superior  force  of  the  enemy  had  captured  Mont- 
martre  and  planted  there  a  large  number  of  guns,  did  the  fighting 
cease.  Authorized  by  Joseph,  who  had  fled  at  noon,  Marmont 
concluded  at  evening  the  capitulation  which  delivered  the  city 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  At  the  same  time  Mortier  ordered 
one  of  his  generals  to  ride  in  a  southerly  direction  and  arrange 
quarters  for  the  columns  retreating  from  Paris.  At  the  posting 
station,  La  Cour  de  France,  the  messenger  came  in  the  darkness 
upon  some  travellers  who  were  waiting  for  a  change  of  horses, 
and  was  hailed  by  one  of  them.  It  was  the  Emperor,  who  thus 
learned  of  the  loss  of  his  capital.  He  was  beside  himself  with 
indignation  at  Joseph  and  Clarke,  the  Minister  of  War,  unjustly 
laying  this  loss  at  their  door;  he  wanted  to  go  straightway  on  to 
Paris,  and  would  not  be  convinced  that  it  was  too  late  until  the 
fires  of  Mortier's  vanguard  appeared,  and  General  Flahault, 
whom  he  had  sent  to  Marmont,  arrived  with  a  letter  from  the 
latter  which  told  him  that  the  Parisians  were  wholly  averse  to 
further  resistance.  Thereupon  he  betook  himself  to  Fontaine- 
bleau  again. 

The  next  morning,  the  31st  of  March,  the  Czar  and  Frederick 
William  III.  made  their  formal  entry  into  the  conquered  city. 
Emperor  Francis  had  stayed  behind  at  Dijon.  They  were 
greeted  by  a  small  but  intensely  active  band  of  royalists  with 
cheers  for  Louis  XVIII.,  and  were  completely  deceived  thereby 
as  to  the  feelings  of  the  population.  The  latter  had  grown 
wholly  indifferent  to  the  Boorbons;  they  scarcely  gave  them  a 
thought,  and  least  of  all  were  disposed  to  recall  them.  The  old 
dynasty  could  count  on  devotion  and  sympathy  nowhere  save 
in  the  circle  of  the  Faubourg  St.  Germain,  where  regret  for  for- 
feited privileges  and  narrow-minded  aversion  to  all  other  classes 
of  men  dreamed  of  bringing  back  the  good  old  times  with  the  old 
court.     In  vain  had  Napoleon  striven  to  win  to  his  side  these  old 


^T.  44]  Activity   of  the   Royalists  673 

nobles  of  France.  Only  a  very  few  of  them,  who  discerned  with 
clear  vision  the  trentl  of  public  affairs,  acknowledged  and  re- 
spected his  work  of  reform;  all  the  rest  plotted  for  liis  ruin. 
More  than  one  submitted  to  be  the  tool  of  the  Emperor's  intriguing 
enemies,  who  for  years  had  looked  forward  to  the  downfall  of  the 
insatiable  conqueror.  They  now  managed  to  masquerade  before 
the  foreign  sovereigns  as  the  true  representatives  of  public  senti- 
ment, and  since  Tallyrand,  who  entertained  the  Czar,  led  their 
cause,  it  soon  gained  the  day.  Alexander  merely  mentioned 
timidly  and  dubiously  the  name  of  Bernadotte,  but  learned  at 
once  from  his  host  that  France  had  no  wish  for  another  soldier. 
"  If  we  wanted  one,  we  would  keep  the  one  we  have ;  he  is  the  first 
soldier  in  the  world.  After  him  any  other  would  surely  not  draw 
ten  men  to  himself."  It  was  either  Napoleon  or  Louis  X\' III. ; 
there  was  no  third  possibility.  The  Czar  assented:  In  a  proc- 
lamation which  the  allies  sent  to  the  Senate  on  the  31st  of  March 
by  the  hand  of  the  Prince  of  Benevento,  and  which  at  once  was 
posted  on  the  walls  of  Paris  in  thousands  of  places,  it  was  declared 
"that  they  would  no  longer  negotiate  with  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
or  with  any  member  of  his  family.  And  the  Senate — the  same 
body  that  but  a  few  weeks  before  had  so  slavishly  served  its 
master  and  creator — first  decreed,  on  April  1st,  its  own  continued 
existence  to  be  indispensable,  and  then  proceeded  to  pronounce 
the  deposition  of  the  Emperor  and  released  the  nation  and  army 
from  its  oath  of  loyalty.  The  nation  had  no  objections  to  offer; 
the  Legislative  Body  confirmed  the  vote  of  the  Senate,  and  the 
high  imperial  offices,  the  cour  des  comptes  and  the  cour  de  cas- 
sation, passed  over  to  the  royalist  camp.  But  would  the 
army,  too,  his  faithful  instrument,  submit  to  being  wrenched 
from  the  hands  of  its  leader,  the  master  artist  of  war  and  battle? 
Wliile  still  at  La  Cour  de  France  Napoleon  had  sent  Caulain- 
court  to  Alexander  and  given  him  full  powers  for  a  peace  such  as 
the  allies  had  desired  at  Chatillon.  Now  the  envoy  returned  to 
Fontainebleau  and  brought  as  the  answer  of  the  enemy  the  sub- 
stance of  Napoleon's  own  words,  that  peace  with  him  was 
nothing  but  an  armistice,  and  that  he  stood  even  in  the  way  of 
his  son's  recognition  by  the  allies.     Yet  Alexander  did  not  strip 


674  Elba  [1814 

the  messenger  of  all  hope  with  regard  to  the  regency;  only  the 
Emperor  must  first  abdicate.  The  latter  had  no  thought  of  so 
doing;  he  was  defeated,  but  by  no  means  vanquished.  He  still 
had  troops.  There  was  Marmont  with  12,000  men  at  Corbeil 
and  Essonnes,  beyond  him  Mortier  with  8000 ;  by  the  1st  of  April 
the  head  of  the  troops  defeated  at  Arcis  had  arrived,  on  the  2d 
the  Guards,  while  the  rest  were  already  on  the  march  thither 
from  Troyes.  Ere  long  he  could  collect  nearly  60,000  men  there; 
and  he  needed  only  to  reckon  in  the  100,000  to  which  his  own 
personality  was  equivalent,  according  to  his  own  statement,  and 
the  experiences  of  this  campaign,  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  was  no  need  of  throwing  up  all  hope.  And  besides,  Maison 
had  a  detachment  in  the  north,  Augereau,  who  had  indeed  given 
up  Lyons  in  unnecessary  haste,  was  in  the  south,  and  Soult  and 
Suchet  were  facing  the  English  and  Spanish.  And  the  soldiers 
and  their  officers  were  all  enthusiastic  over  liim.  He  could  see 
that  at  a  review  of  the  Guards  on  the  3d  of  April,  when,  in  answer 
to  his  speech,  they  impetuously  shouted:  "To  Paris!  *'  Not  so, 
however,  the  leaders.  There  were  indeed  fiery  partisans  of  the 
Emperor  even  among  them,  ready  for  any  emergency,  hke 
Mortier,  Drouot,  Gerard,  and  others.  But  the  most  of  those  who 
were  second  in  command,  the  marshals,  dukes,  princes,  and 
counts,  whose  services  and  rewards  were  alike  magnificent,  had 
prosecuted  the  war  of  the  previous  year  only  with  vexation  of 
spirit,  seeing  no  end  to  the  business  and  yet  longing  so  earnestly 
to  enjoy  in  peace  the  fruits  of  their  valiant  labours.  To  go  on 
fighting  now  seemed  to  them  utterly  hopeless.  Suppose  they 
did  conquer;  look  at  the  sacrifices!  And  would  there  be  peace 
even  then?  How  easily  a  civil  war  might  be  kindled!  The 
return  of  the  Bourbons  of  course  they  were  bitterly  opposed  to, 
but  there  was  another  way.  Caulaincourt  had  brought  back 
from  Paris  the  idea  of  the  Emperor's  abdicating  in  favour  of  his 
son,  and  Napoleon  had  talked  of  it  with  his  immediate  circle. 
The  marshals  heard  of  it  as  they  had  heard  of  the  Senate's 
decree  of  deposition  and  the  proclamation  of  the  allies,  and  saw 
in  it  the  only  means  of  saving  the  present  system  and  with  it 
their  own  position  and  prestige,  without  exposing  themselves  to 


.Et.  41]  Abdication  675 

new  toils  and  trouble.  On  the  4th  of  April,  after  the  parade, 
they  plucked  up  courage.  Ney,  Lefebvrc,  Oudinot,  and  Mac- 
donald  appeared  before  the  Emperor  as  representatives  of  the  rest 
and  broached  the  subject.  Inasmuch  as  the  Senate  had  decided 
against  him,  they  urged,  and  the  peace  had  been  lost  by  neglect, 
nothing  remained  but  for  him  to  abdicate.  Napoleon  is  said  to 
have  disputed  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  deprive  him  of  the 
crown,  to  have  pointed  out  the  poor  position  of  the  enemy, 
enumerated  his  owii  forces,  unfolded  his  plan  of  attack;  but  all 
in  vain.  He  was  forced  to  yield,  and  signed  the  required  docu- 
ment. It  reads  as  follows :  "The  allied  powers  having  declared 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  to  be  the  sole  obstacle  to  the  re-establish- 
ment of  peace  in  Europe,  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  faithful  to 
his  oath,  declares  that  he  is  ready  to  descend  from  the  throne, 
to  leave  France,  and  even  to  lay  down  his  life  for  the  good  of  the 
country,  which  is  inseparable  from  the  rights  of  his  son,  from 
those  of  the  Empress's  regency,  and  from  the  laws  of  the 
Empire."  * 

When  Napoleon  made  up  his  mind  to  this  step  he  did  not,  to 
be  sure,  entirely  banish  the  thought  that  the  allies  might  reject 
this  conditional  abdication.  He  wished  outright  that  they 
would,  for  then  he  could  convince  those  who  had  urged  him  to 
abdicate  that  they  hatl  no  alternative  but  Louis  XVIII.,  and 
then  they  would  no  longer  refuse  him  their  support.  It  was 
merely  following  out  this  line  of  thought  when,  instead  of  sending 
Caulaincourt  alone  to  Paris  with  the  abdication,  he  had  Ney  and 
Macdonald    accompany   him.     Alexander   received    them    and 

*  It  is  not  without  interest  to  read  the  first  draft  of  this  document, 
which  the  Emperor  wrote  with  his  own  hand,  and  from  which  he  afterwards 
struck  out  certain  passages.  It  read  as  follows :  "The  allied  powers  having 
declared  the  Emperor  Napoleon  to  be  the  sole  obstacle  to  the  establish- 
ment of  peace  in  Europe,  and  since  the  Emperor  cannot  assuredly  without 
violating  his  oath  surrender  any  one  of  the  departments  which  were  united 
with  France  when  he  ascended  the  throne,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  declares 
himself  ready  to  abdicate  and  leave  France,  even  to  lay  down  his  life  for 
the  welfare  of  his  country  and  for  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  his  son 
the  King,  of  the  Empress-regent,  and  of  the  laws  and  institutions,  which 
shall  be  subject  to  no  change  until  the  definite  conclusion  of  peace  and 
while  foreign  armies  stand  upon  our  soil." 


676  Elba  [1814 

seemed  even  on  the  point  of  wavering,  especially  when  Macdonald 
assured  him  that  the  army  could  look  forward  only  with  abhor- 
rence to  the  return  of  the  monarchy,  which  had  remained  a 
stranger  to  its  warlike  deeds  and  to  its  glory.  But  scarcely  were 
the  words  out  of  his  mouth  before  they  were  most  strikingly 
refuted.  An  officer  sent  by  Schwarzenberg  reported  something 
to  the  Czar  in  the  Russian  tongue,  whereupon  the  latter  turned 
to  the  marshals  and  said:  "Gentlemen,  you  base  your  request 
for  the  regency  on  the  unswerving  fidelity  of  the  troops  to  the 
imperial  government.  Well,  Napoleon's  vanguard  has  just 
deserted  him  and  is  now  within  our  lines."  It  was  indeed  true. 
When  Marmont  had  to  give  over  the  defence  of  the  capital,  he 
yielded  to  Talleyrand's  solicitations.  "The  army  and  people," 
he  wrote  to  Schwarzenberg,  "have  been  released  from  their  oath 
of  fidehty  to  Napoleon  by  the  decree  of  the  Senate.  I  am  ready 
to  help  in  securing  such  a  good  understanding  between  people 
and  army  as  shall  make  a  civil  war  with  new  shedding  of  blood 
impossible."  His  subordinate  general  Souham  with  12,000  men 
marched  under  cover  of  night,  on  the  pretext  of  leading  them 
against  the  enemy,  right  into  the  midst  of  the  Austrian  lines. 
When  morning  broke,  the  valiant  troopers  saw  with  gnashing 
of  teeth  what  their  leader  had  done.  On  hearing  this  from 
Alexander  I.,  Ney  and  Macdonald  also  gave  up  the  cause  of  the 
Empire  for  lost.  Doubtless  persuasion  and  promises  left  their 
traces  on  their  minds.  On  the  way  back  they  concluded  a  truce 
with  Schwarzenberg  without  Napoleon's  knowledge. 

In  the  mean  time  Napoleon  heard  of  Marmont's  desertion,  and 
as  his  position  north  of  the  Loire  had  become  wholly  untenable, 
he  had  issued  orders  to  march  to  Pithiviers  and  Orleans  on  the 
5th  of  April.  At  the  same  time  he  is  reported  to  have  spoken  of 
throwing  himself  into  Italy,  joining  Eugene,  supporting  the  cause 
of  Italian  unity  with  an  army  and  with  the  force  of  his  genius, 
and  so  gaining  in  place  of  France,  which  had  fallen  away  from 
him,  a  new  basis  for  his  political  aims,  now  without  a  country. 
But  the  French  soldiers  were  not  yet  without  a  country,  and  on 
that  rock  such  plans  must  be  wrecked.  Accordingly  the  only 
authentic  order  was   to   march  to  the   Loire.     The  returning 


I 


Mr.  II]  Exile  677 

marshals  refused  quite  openly  to  obey  it,  and  on  April  6th  they 
made  a  statement  that  nothing  but  the  ruins  of  an  army  was 
now  available,  that  these  were  surrounded,  and  that  even  if 
escape  beyond  the  Loire  were  possible,  nothing  but  civil  war 
would  result.  They  advised  the  Emperor  to  abdicate  now 
unconditionally.  In  place  of  France  they  brought  him  from 
Paris  the  offer  of  the  island  of  Elba,  which  Alexander  wished  to 
concede  to  him.  Napoleon  again  hesitated.  But  that  same  day 
the  Senate  proclaimed  Louis  XVIIL  king;  and  then,  deserted  by 
his  captains,  he  wTote  out  a  new  form  of  abdication  in  which  he 
"for  himself  and  his  heirs  renounced  the  thrones  of  Italy  and 
France." 

With  this  new  declaration  in  their  hands,  Caulaincourt  and 
the  two  marshals  again  repaired  to  Paris,  and  there  concluded  on 
this  basis  a  treaty  with  the  allies.  It  provided  that  Napoleon 
with  the  title  of  Emperor  should  be  sovereign  ruler  of  Elba,  should 
have  a  revenue  of  two  million  francs  and  a  body-guard  of  four 
hundred  of  his  Guards,  while  the  Empress  Marie  Louise  was  to 
have  the  Itahan  duchy  of  Parma.  Alexander  had  insisted  on 
Elba  despite  the  warning  protests  of  Talleyrand  and  Metternich. 
Even  Emperor  Francis  felt  that  the  nearness  of  the  dethroned 
Caesar  would  be  a  source  of  anxiety.  And  so  it  was  not  without 
strenuous  opposition  that  to  the  former  dictator  of  a  continent 
this  little  crumb  of  land  was  tossed,  more  in  mockery  of  the  idea 
of  sovereignty  than  to  show  in  what  narrow  compass  it  could  be 
confined.  On  the  night  of  April  10th  the  Treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau  was  signed  by  Ney,  Caulcaincourt,  Macdonald,  and  the  four 
ministers  of  the  allied  powers.  Soon  afterwards  Napoleon  set  his 
name  to  it,  and  so  made  his  renunciation  complete.  What  must 
have  been  his  feelings !  Was  it  a  resignation  without  any  ray  of 
hope  that  filled  his  mind?  Or  did  his  energetic  spirit  still  find 
somethhig  in  reserve  to  set  over  against  his  fate?  Did  he  feel 
himself  thoroughly  conquered, — or  only  defeated, — in  his  life  as 
well  as  on  the  field  of  battle?  Some  of  his  suite,  who  gave  him 
their  unquestioning  devotion  under  the  spell  of  his  personality, 
could  not  understand  how  their  master  could  keep  on  living.  They 
thought  him  bent  on  suicide,  and  removed  his  pistols.     But 


678 


Elba  [1814 


those  not  immediately  under  his  spell,  who  did  not  exalt  him 
above  all  criticism,  like  Metternich,  Fouche,  and  others,  did  not 
credit  him  with  such  thoughts.  And  however  positively  the 
story  is  told  that  the  Emperor  took  poison  on  the  night  of  the 
12th  of  April,  the  historian  will  not  be  easily  convinced  of  its 
truth.  It  seems  so  absolutely  out  of  accord  with  the  whole 
character  of  the  man,  who  even  on  St.  Helena  did  not  regard 
his  role  in  the  world  as  ended,  that  one  is  much  more  disposed  to 
explain  what  happened  as  one  of  those  attacks  of  sickness  with 
which  the  mortal  disease  already  coming  upon  him  announced 
itself  as  it  had  done  once  before,  after  the  battle  of  Dresden  at 
Pirna,  and,  again,  on  the  journey  to  Elba.  One  thing  is  sure, 
on  the  next  day  he  had  entirely  recovered,  and  was  soon  full  of 
new  courage,  full  of  confidence,  full  of  hope,  and  anxious  about 
only  one  thing,  his  life.* 

*  Napoleon's  secretary,  Fain,  was  the  first  to  speak  of  this  attempt  at 
suicide,  in  his  "Manuscrit  de  1814,"  published  after  the  Emperor's 
death;  it  is  treated  more  in  f ull  in  Segur's  "  Histoire  et  Memoires"  (VII. 
196  flf.).  Segur  even  claims  to  have  his  information  directly  from  the 
Emperor's  physician  Ivan,  who,  after  putting  his  master's  life  out  of  danger, 
would  no  longer  be  responsible  for  it,  and  then,  fearful  of  being  suspected, 
"lost  his  head"  and  ran  away.  But  Segur's  own  account  is  not  free  from 
inconsistencies;  moreover,  Fain's  story  differs  with  regards  to  the  sup- 
posed poison.  Only  the  day  before  Napoleon  had  told  Bausset,  who  brought 
him  a  letter  from  Marie  Louise,  how  he  escaped  death  on  the  battlefield  of 
Arcis  sur  Aube,  and  then  added:  "If  I  should  seek  death  by  an  act  of 
despair  it  would  be  a  piece  of  cowardice.  Suicide  neither  accords  with 
my  principles  nor  with  the  rank  I  occupy  in  the  world."  To  the  same 
messenger  he  seemed  "filled  with  an  indifference  masked  under  the  guise 
of  philosophy,  and  with  a  strange  confidence  in  destiny  that  regulates 
everything  and  which  none  can  escape"  (Herisson,  "Cabinet  noir,"  p. 
299).  It  was  a  similar  impression  that  he  conveyed  to  the  foreign  officers 
who  later  escorted  him  to  Elba.  To  the  Austrian  General  KoUer  he  said 
before  his  departure:  "There  are  those  who  would  blame  me  for  being 
able  to  survive  my  own  fall ;  but  they  are  in  the  wrong.  I  see  nothing  great 
in  ending  one's  life  like  a  man  who  has  gaml)led  away  his  money."  (Hel- 
fert,  "Napoleon  I.  Fahrt  von  Fontainebleau  nach  Elba,"  p.  81.)  This  is 
hardly  the  language  of  a  man  who  a  week  before  wanted  to  kill  himself. 
Meneval  in  his  work  on  Napoleon  and  Marie  Louise  (II.  115  ff.)  says 
that  Ivan  had  thrown  away  on  the  day  before  a  part  of  the  opiate  which 
Napoleon  had  carried  on  his  person  ever  since  the  Russian  campaign 


jet.u]  Farewell   to   the   Guards  679 

Even  before  the  abdication  the  palace  of  Fontainoblcau  had 
lost  many  of  its  miUtary  guests ;  soon  the  fallen  Emperor  was 
almost  wholly  deserted.  Even  Berthier  took  his  leave,  never  to 
return.  Only  a  few  faithful  ones  remained  until  the  20th  of  April, 
when  Napoleon,  escorted  by  commissioners  of  the  allies, — partly 
as  a  guard,  partly  for  protection, — left  the  spot  whence  he  had  so 
often  made  known  his  will  to  Europe.  Before  mounting  into 
the  carriage  he  bade  the  Old  Guard  farewell.  He  thanked  them 
first  of  all  for  the  noble  zeal  they  had  displayed.  Although  a 
part  of  the  army  had  betrayed  him,  he  might  have  continued  the 
war  for  two  or  three  years  behind  the  Loire  or  with  the  aid  of  his 
fortresses.  But  civil  war  would  then  have  raged  on  the  soil  of 
France;  and  ever  since  this  had  become  clear  to  him,  he  had  sacri- 
ficed all  his  personal  rights  and  interests  to  the  welfare  and  glory 
of  the  fatherland.  He  admonished  them  to  persevere  in  the  path 
of  duty  and  of  honour,  and  to  serve  faithfully  the  sovereign  chosen 
by  the  nation.  He  might  have  ended  his  existence,  but  he  wanted 
to  live,  he  told  them,  in  order  to  write  and  proclaim  to  posterity 
the  feats  of  his  warriors.*  Then  he  kissed  General  Petit ,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  Guards,  kissed  their  flag,  shouted  a  final 
greeting  to  his  "old  growlers,"  and  rode  away.  "Nothing  but 
sobbing  was  heard  in  all  the  ranks,"  Coignet  writes  in  his  journal, 
"and  I  can  say  that  I  too  shed  tears  when  I  saw  my  Emperor 
depart." 

On  the  4th  of  May,  1814,  the  "Undaunted"  cast  anchor  in  the 
harbour  of  Portoferrajo,  and  the  dethroned  Imperator  stepped 
ashore.     No  sooner  had  he  received  a  deputation  of  the  inhabit- 

(S6gur  says  since  the  Spanish),  and  that  the  Emperor  tried  to  poison  him- 
self with  what  was  left.  Is  it  not  a  reasonable  supposition  that  he  used  it 
as  a  means  of  allaying  violent  cramps  of  the  stomach,  and  that  this  led  to 
the  suspicion  of  suicide?  As  to  his  anxiety  in  regard  to  his  own  life  there 
is  positive  evidence  in  Helfert,  op.  cit.,  p.  82,  and  Campbell,  "Napoleon  at 
Fontainebleau,"  p.  199. 

♦The  text  of  the  address  as  officially  edited  by  Fain, "  Manuscrit  de  1814," 
has  been  included  in  the  "Correspondance."  The  words  actually  uttered 
have  been  appended  by  the  commissioners  Koller  (Austrian"),  Truchsess- 
Waldbvn-g  (Prussian),  Campbell  (English),  to  their  reports  and  later  pub- 
lished. 


68o  Elba  [i8i4 

ants  of  his  miniature  realm  with  the  statement  that  he  would 
give  them  the  loving  care  of  a  father,  than  he  mounted  a  horse 
in  order  to  inspect  the  fortifications  of  the  island.  He  seemed  to 
be  not  wholly  dissatisfied,  but  thought  certain  improvements 
were  necessary;  and  in  fact  very  soon  he  gave  orders  to  equip 
the  island  of  Pianosa  on  the  south  with  two  batteries.  He  did 
not  feel  safe  enough.  His  journey  through  the  south  of  France 
had  made  a  profound  impression  on  him,  that  left  him  uneasy  for 
a  long  time.  And  in  fact,  despite  the  escort  of  the  foreign 
commissioners,  that  journey  had  been  full  of  danger,  such  was 
the  fierce  animosity  of  the  people  in  Provence.  Only  by  chang- 
ing his  seat  in  the  carriage,  donning  an  Austrian  uniform,  and 
wearing  the  white  cockade  of  the  Bourbons  was  he  able  to  evade 
the  fury  of  his  former  subjects.  More  than  once  those  about  him 
saw  tears  of  faint-hearted  terror  in  his  eyes  and  all  the  signs  of 
fear  in  his  words  and  gestures.  Royalist  agents,  he  had  been 
informed,  had  roused  the  people  against  him;  and  he  would  not 
give  up  the  conviction  that  the  provisional  government  had  a 
hand  in  it.  Not  until  the  English  corvette  bore  him  from  Frejus 
— the  same  Frejus  where  he  had  once  before  landed  on  his  arrival 
from  Egypt — past  Corsica  to  Elba,  did  he  recover  a  sense  of 
security  and  some  equanimity.  He  consented  quite  readily  to  the 
stay  of  Campbell,  the  British  plenipotentiary,  at  Portoferrajo; 
three  weeks  later  came  the  400  grenadiers  of  the  Old  Guard  for 
whom  he  had  stipulated  in  the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau.  These 
together  with  a  paid  battalion  of  foreigners  and  the  native 
soldiery  made  up  a  little  army  of  over  a  thousand  men,  on  which 
the  Emperor — he  had  retained  this  title  as  his  right — now 
bestowed  the  same  eager  attention  that  had  once  been  claimed 
by  the  immense  hosts  of  his  world-wide  wars. 

Yet  this  and  his  care  for  his  httle  flotilla  did  not  absorb  all  his 
energies.  The  restless  man,  who  had  to  be  busicil  about  some- 
thing every  moment,  entered  into  the  smallest  details  of  his  little 
government.  Here,  too,  he  had  his  Council  of  State,  to  which 
lie  called  Generals  Drouot  and  Bc^-trand  and  a  dozen  of  the 
inhal)itants.  Its  decrees  were  concerned  at  first  with  increasing 
the  yield  of  the  iron-mines  and  salt-works,  in  both  of  which  it 


JRt.45]  Life  at   Elba  68 1 

was  successful.  Then  new  roads  were  built,  mulberry-trees 
planted  beside  them,  sanitary  and  police  measures  were  adopted, 
etc.  But  Napoleon  also  administered  his  own  household  in 
detail,  so  that  he  knew,  for  example,  far  better  than  his  steward, 
Bertrand,  how  many  mattresses,  sheets  and  bedsteads,  etc.,  he 
possessed.  In  money  affairs  he  was  most  painfully  accurate' 
and  not  \vithout  reason.  The  four  million  francs  he  had  saved 
from  his  private  treasure  of  the  Tuileries  would  not  last  long,  and 
Louis  XVIII.  did  not  pay  the  two  millions  of  allowance  stipulated 
in  the  treaty.  Who  can  find  fault  with  him,  then,  for  collecting 
the  taxes  of  his  tiny  realm  without  leniency?  He  even  had  to 
cut  down  the  reduced  pay  of  his  beloved  grenadiers.  In  the  year 
1812,  when  he  met  de  Pradt  in  Warsaw  on  the  retreat  from 
Russia,  he  jested  about  his  desperate  condition,  saying:  "It  is 
but  one  step  from  the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous."  At  that  time 
the  remark  was  not  pertinent;  now  it  would  be  much  more  to 
the  point. 

When  the  summer  heat  made  it  uncomfortable  to  stay  at 
Portoferrajo,  Napoleon  withdrew  to  the  heights  of  Marciana, 
where  he  lived  with  his  company  in  tents.  It  was  a  beautiful 
spot,  shaded  by  old  chestnut  trees;  from  there  the  eye  could 
sweep  the  ocean,  look  over  to  Bastia  on  Corsica,  and  to 
Livorno  in  Tuscany,  an  outlook  quite  after  his  heart.  Here  he 
received  a  visit  from  the  Countess  Walewska,  with  whom  he  had 
become  acquainted  in  Poland  in  1807  and  had  since  kept  up 
intimate  relations.  She  came  with  a  boy,  his  son.*  The  pro- 
found mystery  in  which  this  visit  was  veiled  led  to  the  co  mmon 
opinion  that  it  was  the  Empress.  The  latter,  however,  did  not 
come.     Her  father  had  induced  her  to  return  to  Austria,  and 

*  Count  Alexander  Florian  Walewski,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  under 
Napoleon  III.,  was  born  on  the  4th  of  May,  1810.  He  was  not  the  only 
son  of  the  Emperor  born  out  of  wedlock.  We  know  certainly  of  the  fol- 
lowing: a  Count  L^'on,  born  in  1806,  whose  mother,  Frau  Revel,  belonged 
in  the  suite  of  Princess  Caroline;  also  a  certain  Devienne,  born  in  1802  at 
Lyons;  and  finally  the  son  of  the  housekeeper  at  St.  Helena,  who  after- 
wards married  a  Mr.  Gordon.  Gordon-Bonaparte  died  in  1886  at  San 
Francisco  as  a  watchmaker.  (On  this  point  see  the  periodical  "Le 
Curieux,"  no.  8  of  1884  and  no.  40  of  1887.) 


682  Elba  [1814 

had  cut  off  all  communication  with  her  husband.  She  sub- 
mitted to  it  with  indifference.  Seven  years  later,  after  the 
death  of  Napoleon,  she  wrote  once  to  a  friend  that  she  never 
had  cherished  a  warmer  feeling  for  him,  and  yet  she  would 
gladly  have  given  him  yet  many  a  year  of  happiness,  "provided 
that  he  stayed  at  a  distance."  Napoleon  tried  to  console  him- 
self at  Elba,  although  he  often  thought  of  the  little  King  of  Rome 
and  sorely  missed  receiving  letters  from  his  wife,  though  that  may 
have  been  for  political  reasons.  After  the  short  stay  of  Countess 
Walewska  came  Pauline  Borghese,  who  is  said — on  evidence 
claimed  to  be  found  in  her  own  confidential  correspondence — to 
have  been  even  more  than  a  sister  to  the  dethroned  Caesar.  No 
other  member  of  his  family  came,  excepting  only  his  mother, 
Laetitia,  who  wanted  to  be  near  her  son^  and  came  over  to  Elba 
to  live. 

Not  that  the  Emperor  gave  up  all  communication  with  his  rela- 
tives. The  secret  police  of  Livorno,  particularly  the  French 
consul  there,  Mariotti,  and  his  agents  on  the  island,  claim  to 
have  had  information  of  a  very  active  correspondence,  especially 
with  Murat.  The  latter  in  his  uncertainty  whether  the  powers 
would  accord  him  the  reward  of  his  defection  from  Napoleon,  his 
sovereignty  over  Naples,  resumed  intercourse  with  him.  It  is 
difficult  to  ascertain  what  was  the  nature  of  their  negotiations 
and  arrangements  in  detail,  the  more  so  that  their  correspondence 
must  have  been  largely  oral  through  trusted  messengers.  Was 
it  their  purpose  to  support  a  plan  of  insurrection  in  Italy,  such 
as  was  sent  to  Napoleon  in  May,  1814,  by  a  number  of  conspira- 
tors? Or  was  it  still  the  other  idea,  of  rising  again  to  his  former 
state  in  France?  We  cannot  say.  At  any  rate,  Napoleon 
received  at  Portoferrajo  many  Italians  during  the  autumn,  who 
doubtless  took  little  pains  to  conceal  their  dissatisfaction  with 
the  re-instated  Austrian  rule  and  of  the  hopes  they  had  fixed  on 
him.  It  is  quite  possible  that  he  did  not  altogether  repel  them. 
The  memory  of  what  he  passed  through  in  Provence  may 
have  shak(ui  his  confidence  in  a  reaction  in  France  and  given 
another  direction  to  his  thoughts.*     But  if  this  plan  was  ever 

♦  Livi  in  his  "Napoleone  all'  isola  d'Elba"  has  recently  advocated  this 


iEx.  45]  Life  at   Elba  683 

anything  more  than  a  passing  thought,  it  certainly  fell  into  the 
background  completely  when  secret  information  and  public 
prints  no  longer  left  it  in  doubt  that  the  French  people  were 
undergoing  a  change  of  mind  which  could  not  fail  to  be  favourable 
to  himself. 

In  fact  the  government  of  Louis  XVIII.  was  growing  more 
distasteful  to  the  people  every  day.  On  the  .30th  of  May  the  Kng 
had  concluded  peace  with  the  powers,  including  England,  which 
gave  up  all  the  colonies  conquered  during  the  war;  a  few  days 
later  he  also  made  a  sort  of  compromise  with  the  Revolution  by 
giving  France  a  constitution,  the  Charte.  Despite  various  faults 
and  defects,  this  document  was  after  all  a  valuable  concession, 
and  certainly  left  the  people  more  of  a  share  in  legislation  than 
Napoleon  had  ever  granted.  The  King,  moreover,  was  a  man  of 
discretion,  who  was  disposed  to  adapt  himself  to  the  changed 
conditions ;  only  he  was  old,  obtuse,  and  sickly,  and  not  capable 
of  checking  all  the  reactionary  elements  that  highly  disapproved 
his  compact  with  insurrection.  Chief  among  these  was  his  own 
brother,  the  Count  of  Artois,  the  head  of  an  ultra-royalist  party  of 
emigres,  who  were  striving  to  restore  the  old  order.  They  com- 
promised the  government  and  turned  the  people  against  it  com- 
pletely, for  there  was  no  such  thing  as  any  great  sympathy  for 
the  Bourbons,  of  whom  Wellington  truly  said  that  they  were  as 
great  strangers  to  the  land  as  though  they  had  never  reigned 
over  it.  The  mere  fact  that  they  ascended  the  throne  under  the 
protection  of  foreigners  was  enough  to  discredit  them.  A  carica- 
ture had  sho^\Ti  Louis  XVIII.  mounted  on  a  horse  behind  a 

view  of  the  case.  But  his  acceptance  of  the  speech  of  Napoleon  reported 
in  the  anonymous  pamphlet,  "La  v^ritd  sur  les  Cent  Jours,"  p.  218,  as 
entirely  authentic  is  to  be  questioned.  For  if  Napoleon  there  really  spoke 
of  a  united  Italian  kingdom  with  Rome  as  the  capital,  he  must  have  wholly 
forgotten  what  he  had  said  in  the  previous  December  to  La  Besnardiere- 
about  Murat,  who  was  pursuing  the  same  plan;  viz.,  "Does  not  this  simple- 
ton see  that  nothing  but  my  predominance  in  Europe  can  keep  the  Pope- 
away  from  Rome?  It  is  the  wish  and  interest  of  Europe  that  he  should 
return  there."  (Pallain-Ballieu,  "Talleyrand's  Brief wechsel  mit  Konig 
Ludwig  XVIII.,"  p.  163.)  Moreover,  a  plan  that  took  in  the  whole  of  Italy 
would  sever  all  relations  with  Austria,  while  such  relations  would  be  of 
great  weight  in  case  of  Napoleon's  return  to  France. 


684  Elba  [1814 

Cossack  riding  over  the  corpses  of  French  warriors.  It  was  not 
wise  on  the  part  of  the  monarch  to  keep  reiterating  to  his  friend 
George,  prince  regent  of  England,  his  gratitude  for  the  protection 
accorded  him ;  and  it  was  equally  unwise  to  raise  barriers  between 
himself  and  the  people  by  an  antiquated  ceremonial.  And  this 
was  by  no  means  all.  The  very  fact  that  the  new  constitution 
was  represented  as  a  gift  of  the  king  violated  the  principle  of 
popular  sovereignty  which  had  had  its  roots  struck  deep  into  the 
vanity  of  the  people.  Now,  while  the  constitution  guaranteed 
to  the  owners  of  national  land  undisturbed  possession  of  their 
property,  one  of  the  ministers  nevertheless  expressed  in  the 
lower  house  the  hope  of  its  restoration  to  its  "rightful"  owners, 
i.e.,  the  einigres.  These  now  laid  stress  on  their  loyalty,  and  as 
they  were  for  the  most  part  incapable  of  official  duties  they 
accepted  as  a  reward  peerages,  sinecures,  and  pensions ;  enough  to 
make  all  employed  in  the  service  of  the  state  wish  the  preceding 
regime  back  again.  The  money  for  such  large  benefactions  was 
secured  by  adding  the  "extraordinary  domain"  of  Napoleon 
arbitrarily  to  the  civil  list.  And  in  spite  of  such  rewards  the 
returning  nobles  persistently  strove  to  regain  their  old  estates, 
in  which  project  they  received  important  support  from  the  hke- 
minded  clergy.  The  latter  not  infrequently  misused  the  confes- 
sional to  move  dying  men  to  make  restitution,  by  raising  scruples 
as  to  their  rights.  Favoured  by  a  devout  court  party,  the  clergy 
recorded  still  further  successes.  The  abolished  office  of  Grand 
Almoner  was  restored,  and  it  hampered  the  efforts  of  the  Ministry 
of  Public  Worship ;  a  police  ordinance  forbade  labour  on  Sundays 
and  holidays  with  penalties,  although  the  Charte  had  guaranteed 
freedom  of  worship  and  although  the  French  people  had  for  a 
long  time  observed  only  the  holidays  appointed  in  the  Concordat 
of  1801.  Processions  moved  again  through  the  streets.  The 
reaction  even  went  so  far  that  a  favourite  actress  of  the  Paris 
Theatre  Frangais  was  refused  Christian  burial.  This,  indeed, 
gave  rise  to  a  public  riot. 

While  such  arbitrary  acts  created  disaffection  among  the 
bourgeois,  the  treatment  of  the  army  was  characterized  by  a 
colossal  stupidity.     Not  only  did  the  old  nobility,  with  the 


iET.  45]  Growing   Disaffection  63  5 

•princes  in  the  lead,  make  sport  of  the  new  nobility  of  the  mar- 
shals and  generals,  but  the  entire  army  was  alienated.  The 
prisoners  of  war  and  garrisons  of  eastern  fortresses,  together 
with  the  Spanish  and  Italian  armies,  made  up,  on  their  return  to 
France,  00  inconsiderable  number.  Wholesale  reductions  were 
made,  the  pay  of  the  Old  Guard  was  cut  down,  and  thousands  of 
officers  were  put  on  half-pay,  and  they  had  even  that  only  as 
long  as  they  behaved  like  good  Catholics.  There  would  not  have 
been  many  objections  to  this  if  several  thousands  of  royalists  had 
not  been  appointed  in  their  stead,  a  new  Royal  Guard  created  of 
Emigres  and  nobles  with  splendid  appointments,  and  a  new 
military  school  established  for  nobles.  All  this  not  only  entailed 
great  expense,  but  also  threatened  to  restore  the  old  inequality 
between  officers.  And  when  they  went  so  far  as  to  abolish  the 
institutions  for  the  education  of  the  orphans  of  the  members  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour,  indignation  knew  no  bounds,  even  among 
those  not  directly  concerned.  What  wonder  was  it,  under  such 
circumstances,  that  the  army  was  wholly  Bonapartist,  and  that  a 
conspiracy  was  formed,  especially  among  some  young  generals, 
which  accomplished  nothing,  indeed,  yet  was  well  enough  known 
to  keep  the  exile  of  Elba  informed  as  to  the  state  of  public  senti- 
ment? What  wonder,  too,  that  his  credit  rose  higher  every  day? 
"The  French,"  says  a  contemporary,  Fleury  de  Chaboulon, 
"disposed  by  nature  to  change  their  opinions  and  sentiments, 
passed  from  their  former  prejudice  against  Napoleon  to  out- 
bursts of  enthusiasm  in  his  favour.  They  compared  the  condi- 
tion of  disorder  and  humiliation  into  which  France  had  sunk 
under  the  King  with  her  exaltation,  her  power  and  imity  of 
administration  under  Napoleon;  and  Napoleon,  whom  they  had 
before  denounced  as  the  author  of  all  their  woes,  now  seemed  to 
them  a  great  man,  a  hero  in  misfortune."  Of  course  no  one  had 
any  desire  to  recall  him,  but  they  began  to  excuse  him  and  hated 
his  successors. 

There  were  not  wanting  far-sighted  men  who  discerned  the  dan- 
ger hidden  in  this  change  of  feeling.  One  of  the  keenest,  Talley- 
rand, was  not  in  Paris  at  that  time,  but  was  staying  at  the  great 
Congress  of  Vienna  as  the  plenipotentiary  of  Louis  X\TIL, 


686  Elba  [1816 

where  questions  unsolved  by  the  war  of  the  nations  were  awaiting 
settlement.  His  sharp  eye  saw  on  Elba  the  glimmer  of  the  spark 
that  might  kindle  to  another  destructive  conflagration  the  com- 
bustible material  accumulating  in  I  ranee  and  he  determined  to 
stamp  it  out.  His  first  thought  was  to  have  Napoleon  secretly 
abducted.  Mariotti.  his  trusted  agent  in  Ijivorno,  declared  that 
to  be  very  difficult,  and  possible  only  if  the  captains  of  one  of  the 
Emperor's  four  ships  could  be  won  over.  This  is  said  to  have 
been  attempted,  and  to  have  been  thwarted  by  Napoleon's 
vigilance.*  Talleyrand  then  turned  to  the  powers  in  the  Con- 
gress and  proposed  to  them  (in  October,  1814)  to  remove  the 
exile  to  the  Azores,  five  hundred  miles  from  the  mainland,  an  idea 
that  Louis  XVIIl.  thought  "excellent."!  But  the  powers  had 
weightier  matters  on  hand.  Russia's  sole  anxiety  was  as  to 
how  she  could  secure  her  Polish  prize*  undivided,  Prussia  wanted 
to  take  in  the  whole  of  Saxony ;  and  each  so  positively  opposed 
the  other's  plans  that  a  general  conflict  seemed  imminent. 
France  wanted  to  break  up  the  coalition,  regain  her  lost  prestige, 
and  at  the  same  time  help  out  Saxony  for  kindred's  sake  (the 
mother  of  Louis  XVIIL  had  been  a  princess  of  Saxony) ;  Erg- 
land  was  working  against  a  preponderance  of  Russia;  and  to 
Austria  the  growing  power  of  her  neighbours  was  a  thorn  in  the 
flesh.  These  three  powers  accordingly  signed,  on  January  3d, 
1815,  a  treaty  binding  them  to  extreme  measures  if  necessary. 

*  See  Jung,  "  Memoires  de  Lucien  Bonaparte,"  III.  222,  and  Pellet, 
"Napoleon  h  I'ile  d'Elbe,"  p.  62.  Jung  says  that  Captain  Taillade  was 
dismissed ;  but  over  against  this  is  the  statement  of  several  authorities 
that  Taillade  remained  in  service  and  afterwards  commanded  the 
Emperor's  brig  on  the  voyage  to  France. 

•j-  In  December  the  minister  wrote  to  the  King  that  he  must  make  haste 
to  get  rid  of  the  man  of  Elba,  and  of  Murat ;  Castlereagh  had  already  been 
won  over  and  only  Metternich  still  remained  opposed  to  it.  But  this  zeal 
of  Talleyrand's  cooled  off  perceptibly  whenever  Murat's  chances  at  the 
Congress  rose ;  for  the  latter  had  held  up  to  the  avaricious  diplomat  pros- 
pects of  a  favourable  sale  of  his  princedom  of  Benevento.  At  such  moments 
he  could  even  answer  Pozzo  di  Borgo  wh(>n  urged  by  him  to  lay  before  the 
Congress  the  arrest  of  Napoleon:  "  Say  nothing  of  that,  pray;  he  is  a  dead 
man"  (M.  Lehman,  "Tagebuch  des  Freih.  v.  Stein,"  in  Histor.  Zeit- 
schrift,  N.  F.  XXIV.  446.) 


^T.  45]  Napoleon  Plans  to  Return  687 

While  this  remained  a  secret  for  a  time,  the  differences  between 
the  powers  were  but  too  pubHc  for  Napoleon  to  fail  of  being 
informed  not  only  of  that,  but  also  of  the  secret  plan  to  remove 
him  to  a  distance  from  Europe.  He  had  learned  of  the  latter 
as  early  as  December,  and  had  already  prepared  for  a  siege, 
impro\ang  his  defences  and  letting  his  cannoniers  practise  firing 
shells.  He  would  have  liked  best  of  all  to  leave  Elba  at  once, 
but  at  that  time  it  would  have  been  foolhardy  presumption. 
Now,  indeed,  the  complications  in  the  Congress  and  the  change 
in  France  lent  some  support  to  the  idea.  It  wanted  but  the 
fitting  opportunity.  In  his  interview  with  Fleury  de  Chaboulon, 
who  came  to  Portoferrajo  in  February  as  Maret's  secret  messen- 
ger, he  mentioned  the  1st  of  April  as  the  probable  date  of  his 
departure  for  the  mainland.  By  that  time,  he  thought,  the 
princes  would  have  left  the  Congress,  probably  in  anger,  and 
once  at  home  they  would  have  no  desire  to  plunge  anew  into  a 
war.  Only  as  long  as  they  were  still  together  was  it  to  be  feared 
that  they  would  make  it  a  point  of  honour  to  resist  him.  This 
much,  at  least,  he  felt:  that  Europe  would  not  look  on  vdih  a 
quiet  conscience  while  he  violated  the  treaty  and  his  oath  and 
instigated  others  to  do  likewise,  as  he  now  contemplated  doing. 

However,  shortly  afterwards,  before  the  end  of  February,  he 
made  up  his  mind  to  set  to  work.  What  led  him  to  it  so  early 
has  not  been  explained.  Had  he  heard  of  the  provisional  agree- 
ment of  the  powers  on  the  Polish  and  Saxon  questions  on  the  8th 
of  February,  of  Castlereagh's  departure,  and  of  the  preparations 
of  the  sovereigns  to  leave  the  Congress?  Did  he  think  the  right 
moment  had  arrived?  Or  was  he  in  ignorance  as  to  that  settle- 
ment, and  merely  wanted  to  take  quick  advantage  of  the  dis- 
sensions prevailing?  We  cannot  say.  We  know  little  more  than 
that  on  the  24th  of  February — Campbell,  the  British  plenipoten- 
tiary, who  also  represented  England  at  the  court  of  Tuscany, 
having  just  gone  to  the  mainland — Napoleon  issued  orders  to 
his  troops  to  be  in  readiness  to  depart,  while  he  meantime  laid 
an  embargo  on  all  vessels  at  the  island  in  order  to  prevent  any 
news  from  reaching  the  Continent.  On  the  same  evening  he 
received  deputations  of  the  authorities   who  expressed  their 


688  Elba  [1815 

regrets  at  his  departure.  On  the  26th,  a  Sunday,  1100  men  with 
some  cannon  embarked  on  seven  vessels ;  and  when  darkness  came 
on.  Napoleon  himself  went  on  board,  after  bidding  his  mother 
and  sister  farewell.  Both  of  the  latter  approved  his  plan;  some 
of  his  courtiers,  like  Bertrand,  had  hailed  it  with  enthusiasm,  as 
also  had  the  troops.  Only  the  honest  Drouot  made  no  effort  to 
conceal  his  misgivings.  But  who  could  have  held  back  the  fool- 
hardy gamester  when  about  to  make  his  last  desperate  throw? 

On  the  voyage  they  met  a  French  cruiser  steering  for  Livorno 
to  put  itself  under  the  direction  of  the  consul  Mariotti.  Its 
mission  was  to  keep  an  eye  on  Elba;  but  it  had  come  too  late. 
Mariotti  afterwards  deplored  this  delay  and  said  he  would  have 
hindered  Napoleon's  escape  if  he  had  had  that  ship,  but  that  is 
a  gross  exaggeration.  Far  more  correct  is  the  answer  Castle- 
reagh  made  in  the  British  Parliament  to  the  charge  that  he  had 
let  the  Emperor  slip;  he  reminded  his  audience  that  Napoleon 
was  not  on  Elba  as  a  prisoner,  and  that  any  restraint  on  him 
would  have  been  a  violation  of  the  treaty;  moreover,  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  keep  him  under  surveillance,  as  the  whole 
English  navy  would  not  suffice  to  prevent  the  escape  of  one  man 
from  the  island.* 

*  See  Pellet,  "Napoleon  h  I'ile  d'Elbe,"  p.  84.  The  author  seems  fully- 
convinced  of  Campbell's  secret  connivance,  nay,  even  England's,  and  that 
was  at  the  time  a  widespread  opinion.  A  few  days  before  Napoleon's  de- 
parture the  secret  agent  of  Mariotti  had  written  to  his  employer:  "The 
departure  of  Napoleon  under  favour  of  the  English  will  take  place  very 
soon  "  But  who  would  accept  the  correctness  of  the  statement  with- 
out further  evidence?  Let  any  one  compare  with  that  what  Napoleon 
said  to  Maret's  messenger:  "You  surely  will  not  believe  that  the  police 
know  everything?  The  police  invent  much  more  than  they  discover.  Mine 
were  certainly  as  good  as  those  of  these  people,  and  yet  they  very  often 
knew  only  what  they  learned  two  or  three  weeks  later  by  luck,  stupidity,  or 
treachery."  It  is  a  fact  that  he  represented  his  enterprise  to  be  favoured 
by  Great  Britain,  as  he  also  claimed  to  be  on  good  terms  with  Austria; 
but  in  both  his  aim  was  to  mislead.  The  actual  attitude  of  England  is  to 
be  gathered  from  the  intimate  relations  obtaining  between  that  govern- 
ment and  Louis  XVIIL,  and  from  the  diplomatic  course  of  Castlereagh, 
who  saw  in  the  Bourbons  the  surest  guarantee  that  the  Netherlands,  lying 
so  near,  just  across  the  Channel  from  England,  would  not  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  French  again. 


iET.  45]  Napoleon  Arrives  in  France  689 

On  the  1st  of  March  the  flotilla  cast  anchor  in  the  Gulf  of 
Jouan,  between  Cannes  and  Antibes,  and  Cambronne  brought  the 
Guards  to  land.  Soon  Napoleon  again  stood  on  French  soil. 
While  still  on  board  he  gave  his  followers  some  explanations 
about  the  enterprise ;  he  told  them  that  he  counted  on  the  surprise 
of  the  population,  on  public  opinion,  on  the  love  of  his  soldiers, 
in  short  on  all  the  Napoleonic  elements  in  France,  but  above  all 
on  the  consternation  that  such  a  great  novelty  ("  une  grande 
nouveaute  ")  must  produce,  and  on  the  perplexed  hesitation  of  all 
minds  under  the  impression  of  such  an  unexpected  and  audacious 
deed.  But  he  had  to  take  other  things  into  account  as  well.  He 
knew  that  public  opinion  had  not  turned  against  the  new  regime 
everywhere  in  France;  that  if,  for  example,  he  proceeded  now 
on  the  highroad  from  Cannes  leading  north  through  Aix  and 
Avignon,  his  venturesome  enterprise  would  be  wrecked  on  the 
rocks  of  the  invincible  loyalty  of  royalist  Provence.  Hence  he 
could  not  afford  to  shun  the  hardship  incident  to  a  march  over 
the  still  snow-covered  roads  of  the  Maritime  Alps;  he  must  leave 
behind  the  cannon  he  had  brought,  and,  passing  through  Grasse 
and  Sisteron,  try  to  reach  Dauphine,  where  the  peasants  were 
thoroughly  disaffected  toward  the  priests  and  emigres,  and 
were  desirous  of  keeping  undisturbed  possession  of  their  farms, 
most  of  which  had  come  out  of  the  public  domains.  And  in  fact 
the  inhabitants  of  the  valleys  on  the  way  to  Gap  and  beyond  were 
exceedingly  friendly  and  gave  all  possible  help  to  the  jaded 
soldiers.  But  the  main  question  for  Napoleon  was,  after  all, 
whether  the  troops  w^hom  they  should  meet  on  the  way  would 
join  him,  as  he  hoped,  or  would  be  loyal  to  the  oath  of  allegiance 
to  Louis  XVni.,  which  he  himself  had  admonished  them  the 
preceding  year  to  take.*  If  they  chose  the  latter  course,  then  he 
was  lost.  At  La  Mure,  near  Grenoble,  a  battalion  of  General 
Marchand  advanced  upon  him,  and  the  officers  seemed  more 

*  "  Serve  faithfully  the  sovereign  whom  the  nation  has  chosen. "  These 
were  his  words  to  his  grenadiers,  according  to  the  report  of  the  Austrian 
plenipotentiary.  The  later  officially  revised  version  of  his  address  in  the 
palace  courtyard  at  Fontainebleau  changed  this  to  read  as  follows."  "Con- 
tinue to  serve  France." 


690  Elba  [1815 

inclined  to  obey  tlieir  orders  than  tlieir  sympathies.  The 
decisive  moment  had  come.  Napoleon  discerned  it.  He  ap- 
proached within  range,  opened  his  gray  overcoat  and,  offering 
his  breast,  shouted,  "Who  among  you  would  fire  on  his  Em- 
peror? "  At  that  the  soldiers  took  off  their  caps,  put  them  on 
their  bayonets,  and  shouted  "Vive  I'Empereur!"  They  then 
mingled  with  the  retinue  from  Elba  and  marched  enthusiastic- 
ally after  the  beloved  leader.  The  officers  had  to  follow  the 
revolutionary  lead  of  their  troops,  and  they  were  far  from  un- 
willing. 

At  Grenoble,  the  chief  city  of  Dauphin^,  where  there  was 
a  strong  garrison,  Napoleon  meantime  had  caused  to  be  circu- 
lated secretly  a  manifesto  to  the  French  army.  "  Soldiers,"  it 
began,  "we  have  not  been  conquered.  Two  men  from  our  ranks 
(Marmont  and  Augereau)  have  betrayed  our  laurels  and  their 
country  to  the  princes  their  benefactors.  And  now  shall  those 
whom  we  have  seen  for  twenty-five  years  roaming  through 
Europe  to  raise  up  enemies  against  us,  who  have  spent  their  lives 
in  fighting  in  foreign  armies  against  us  and  in  cursing  our  fair 
France — shall  they  now  claim  to  hold  command  and  carry  our 
eagles,  into  whose  eyes  they  never  could  look?  Your  rank,  your 
possessions,  your  glory,  and  the  rank,  possessions,  and  glory  of 
your  children  have  no  more  bitter  enemies  than  these  princes 
whom  foreigners  have  forced  upon  us.  Their  tokens  of  honour, 
their  rewards,  and  their  favour  are  reserved  for  those  only  who 
have  served  them  in  fighting  against  the  fatherland  and  against 
us.  Soldiers!  Come  and  rally  under  the  banner  of  your  leader. 
His  existence  depends  wholly  on  yours ;  his  rights  are  but  the 
nation's  and  yours ;  his  interests,  his  honour,  his  glory,  are  your 
interests,  your  honour,  your  glory.  Gomel  Then  will  victory 
march  on  in  double-quick  step,  and  the  eagle  with  the  national 
colours  shall  fly  from  spire  to  spire  on  to  Notre-Dame."  These 
and  many  other  things  he  said  to  the  soldiers  of  France,  and  they 
listened  with  enthusiasm.  That  was  the  same  language  that 
had  so  often  thanked  them  for  their  victories  and  announced 
new  triumphs ;  the  language  of  the  man  who  estimated  his  soldiers 
at  their  full  value,  highly  prized  them,  though  it  were  but  as 


jet.45]  Napoleon  Wins  the  Army  691 

instruments  of  his  greatness;  whereas  the  protege  of  England 
regarded  them  only  as  a  burden,  if  he  considered  them  at  all. 
So  the  garrison  of  Grenoble,  the  regiment  of  Colonel  Lab6doy6re, 
went  over  to  him;  likewise  the  battalion  of  La  Mure.  These 
men  of  iron  yielded  to  the  spell  of  that  one  man,  just  as  the 
children  of  Hamelin  were  drawn  by  the  Pied  Piper,  He  was 
already  advancing  with  7000  men  toward  Lyons,  certain  now  of 
complete  success.  He  could  understand  why  his  marshals,  the 
Macdonalds,  Oudinots,  and  others,  whose  careers  were  behind 
them  and  who  loved  the  peace  for  which  they  had  fought  so  long 
and  so  valiantly,  did  not  join  his  cause.  But  others,  like  Mas- 
s^na  at  Marseilles,  and  Ney,  who  had  even  promised  boldly  to 
bring  the  newcomer  bound  to  the  King,  could  not  withstand 
the  tide  of  sentiment  in  the  army ;  they,  too,  became  imperialists 
again. 

The  army,  then,  was  his;  particularly  after  he  had  assured 
them  that  he  certainly  would  make  no  more  wars,  for  the  army 
had  no  desire  for  war.  And  he  declared  the  same  purpose  still 
more  emphatically  on  every  occasion  to  the  citizens  of  the  towns, 
who,  especially  the  well-to-do,  despite  much  sympathy  for  him 
and  all  their  aversion  to  the  arrogance  of  the  aristocrats,  saw  peace 
endangered  by  his  reappearance.  He  had  used  the  ten  months 
of  exile,  he  said  at  Grenoble,  in  reflecting  on  the  past;  the  dis- 
grace that  had  been  his  lot,  far  from  embittering  him,  had  but 
instructed  him;  he  saw  what  France  needed;  peace  and  liberty 
were  the  imperative  demand  of  the  times,  and  he  would  hence- 
forth make  them  the  rule  of  his  conduct.  Similar  was  also  the 
tenor  of  his  addresses  in  Lyons,  where  he  arrived  on  the  10th  of 
March,  and  w'as  welcomed  with  cheers  by  the  people.  It  was 
his  task  now  (such  was  the  purport  of  his  words)  to  protect  the 
principles  and  interests  of  the  revolution  from  the  ^migr^s,  to 
restore  her  glory  to  France  without  involving  her  in  war,  w^hich  he 
hoped  to  avoid ;  for  he  accepted  the  treaties  arranged  with  the 
European  powers  and  would  live  in  peace  with  them,  provided, 
of  course,  they  did  not  interfere  in  French  affairs.  The  French 
people  must  content  themselves  with  being  the  most  important 
nation,  without  making  any  claim  to  rule  over  the  others. 


692  Elba  [1815 

Here  at  Lyons  he  was  already  once  more  completely  the 
monarch.  He  dissolved  the  Chambers  and  summoned  an 
imperial  assembly  to  meet  at  Paris  to  be  made  up  from  the 
former  electoral  colleges;  to  this  he  gave  the  Carolingian  name 
**  Champs  de  Mai."  It  was  to  change  and  amend  the  constitu- 
tion and  participate  in  the  coronation  of  the  Empress  and  of  his 
son.  This  was  to  intimate  that  on  the  part  of  Austria,  at  least, 
no  danger  threatened  his  enterprise,  nay,  even  an  understanding 
was  to  be  hoped  for — a  gross  deception,  as  he  himself  later 
admitted  to  some  intimates.  A  second  decree  banished  all  the 
emigres  that  did  not  return  until  1814,  and  confiscated  their 
estates.  In  addition  Napoleon  abolished  the  old  aristocracy, 
proscribed  Talleyrand,  Marmont  and  Augereau,  the  Duke  of 
Dalberg,  and  others,  as  betrayers  of  France  to  her  enemies,  de- 
posed all  the  emigres  that  Louis  XVIII.  had  appointed  as  officers, 
and  dissolved  the  King's  guard,  the  so-called  "maison  miUtaire" 
of  the  King. 

The  threatened  court  at  Paris  was  at  first  disposed  to  look 
upon  this  enterprise  of  the  "Man  of  Elba"  as  an  adventure  which 
must  necessarily  fail.  It  was  firmly  believed  that  all  he  wanted 
was  to  seek  a  way  over  the  mountains  into  Italy,  in  order  to 
rouse  the  people  there  into  revolt;  and  for  some  time  false 
reports  were  printed  in  the  "  Moniteur  "  of  his  impending  downfall, 
even  after  he  had  already  won  the  hearts  of  the  army.  In  the 
Chambers  the  King  found  some  support  among  the  Liberals,  the 
Frondeurs  of  1800,  led  by  Benjamin  Constant,  and  those  of  1813, 
led  by  Laine.  But  nothing  was  done  aside  from  making  high- 
sounding  speeches.  For  all  decrees — for  example,  that  declaring 
property  in  the  national  lands  inalienable  and  any  attack  upon 
it  punishable  with  imprisonment — were  too  late  and  inspired  no 
confidence  because  they  were  dictated  by  the  need  of  the 
moment.  As  late  as  March  18th,  when  Napoleon  had  got  as  far 
as  Fontainebleau,  Louis  wrote  with  his  own  hand  a  manifesto  to 
the  army,  wherein  he  referred  to  his  word  which  had  been 
pledged  for  their  loyalty,  to  civil  war  in  the  land,  to  the  struggle 
with  foreigners  that  again  was  threatened;  but  all  in  vain.  A 
reserve  army  south  of  the  cajiital  likewise  joined  Napoleon. 


JEt  46]  Napoleon  Arrives  at  Paris  693 

The  King  had  to  tliink  of  liis  own  safety  at  last,  and  left  the 
capital  on  the  next  day. 

On  the  evening  of  March  20th  Napoleon,  leaning  on  the  arm  of 
one  of  his  most  loyal  adherents,  ascended  the  steps  of  the  Tuileries. 
In  the  streets  of  the  capital  the  conmianding  positions  had  been 
occupied  mostly  by  the  military  element,  who  now  were  in 
exclusive  possession.  In  the  rest  of  the  population  there  was 
more  resignation  than  interest;  no  trace  appeared  of  the  enthusi- 
asm with  wliich  Paris  had  welcomed  Napoleon  in  1799  or  1806. 
"Everyone  was  gloomy,"  lijoglie  says,  "quiet, indifferent. w^ith- 
out  complaining,  without  hoping,  yet  not  without  anxiety." 
And  the  Emperor  himself,  who  was  listening  most  attentively 
to  the  voice  of  the  nation,  received  a  like  impression.  "They 
let  me  come,"  said  he  to  Mollien,  "as  they  let  the  others  go." 


CHAPTER  XX 

WATERLOO 

"Peace  and  Liberty,"  so  ran  the  motto  with  which  Napoleon 
now  sought  to  commend  himself  to  the  French  and  to  overcome 
the  distrust  which  met  him  everywhere  in  civilian  circles. 
"Peace  " !  How  often  had  he  promised  it,  and  how  often  broken 
it!  "Liberty"!  In  what  various  ways  had  he  suppressed  it! 
If  he  promised  now  to  give  it  and  protect  it,  would  he  be  be- 
lieved? On  the  very  day  of  his  arrival  at  Paris  he  assured  his 
faithful  followers,  Maret,  Cambaceres,  Davoat,  and  others  who 
had  come  to  the  Tuileries,  that  he  was  not  proposing  to  renew 
the  programme  of  the  past;  one  must  learn  to  profit  by  the  ene- 
mies* mistakes  and  one*s  own ;  that  he  knew  now  what  was  to  be 
avoided  and  what  was  desirable ;  he  had  loved  power  only  as  long 
as  he  was  planning  to  found  a  mighty  empire — it  was  indispen- 
sable for  that  purpose;  but  to-day  that  was  no  longer  in  his 
thoughts.  And  they  all  trusted  his  words,  Maret  again  accepted 
the  office  of  Secretary  of  State,  Davout  was  persuaded  to  take 
the  Ministry  of  War,  Cambaceres  declared  his  readiness  to  conduct 
the  business  of  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Gaudin  and  Mollien  again 
had  the  portfolios  of  Finance  and  of  the  Treasury,  and  Decres  that 
of  the  Navy.  But  that  was  no  difficult  task,  to  win  back  those 
who  were  more  or  less  thrown  on  him  anyway.  The  most  im- 
portant thing  was  to  offer  the  people  guarantees  that  he  returned 
as  an  entirely  different  man.  And  here  words  were  of  no  avail. 
No  matter  how  solemnly  he  declared  to  the  various  deputations 
in  audience  that  he  would  forget  that  France  had  ever  been  the 
mistress  of  the  world;  that  he  had  long  since  renounced  the  idea 
of  a  universal  empire,  and  that  he  thought  only  of  the  welfare 
and  strengthening  of  the  French  Empire,  that  he  no  longer  sought 
for  absolute  rule,  but  only  for  respect  of  personal  rights,  protection 

694 


JEr.45]  Napoleon  to  Constant  695 

of  property,  and  free  expression  of  opinion,  for  princes  were  but 
the  first  citizens  of  the  state:  it  did  not  suffice.  They  wanted 
the  evidence  of  deeds;  and  Napoleon  gave  that,  too.  First  of 
all  he  accepted  Fouch6  as  Minister  of  Police,  a  man  in  whose 
past  record  the  liberal  circles  saw  a  certain  guarantee.  Then 
he  abolished  the  censorship  of  the  press,  which  had  been  a  source 
of  great  bitterness  of  feeling  against  the  Bourbons.  This  cost 
him  but  little  effort,  for  he  rightly  reasoned  that  after  what  the 
press  had  written  against  him  for  a  year  past  it  could  do  nothing 
more  to  hurt  him,  but  it  might  say  much  yet  about  his  enemies. 
But  far  more  effective  than  that  measure  was  his  winning  over 
in  his  old  age  the  honourable  Carnot,  whose  genius  had  defended 
the  Republic,  to  become  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  Benjamin 
Constant,  the  leader  of  the  party  of  constitutional  monarchy 
which  "had  vainly  opposed  him  at  the  time  of  the  Consulate,  as 
a  member  of  the  reorganized  Council  of  State. 

Only  a  short  time  before  the  Emperor's  return,  Constant  had 
made  a  violent  attack  upon  him  in  the  "Journal  des  Debats," 
which  was  already  one  of  the  leading  daily  papers,  comparing 
him  with  Gengis  Khan  and  Attila,  and  declaring  in  the  name  of 
the  friends  of  liberty  that  he  would  never  have  any  connection 
with  him.  Napoleon,  acting,  it  is  said,  on  the  advice  of  his 
brother  Joseph,  invited  him  to  court  and  spoke  to  him  so  openly 
and  confidentially  that  the  hostile  tribune  was  won  over  and 
even  undertook  to  serve  the  Empire.  The  nation,  said  the 
Emperor,  had  now  enjoyed  twelve  years  of  calm  from  internal 
political  storms,  and  had  been  resting  for  a  year  from  war;  this 
rest  had  awakened  a  need  of  active  life.  She  was  now  again 
desirous  for  assemblies  and  public  discussion,  which  she  had  not 
always  wanted.  "She  threw  herself  at  my  feet  when  I  came 
to  power;  you  must  remember  that,  as  you  were  then  of  the 
opposition.  Where  was  your  support,  your  strength?  You 
found  none.  T  took  less  power  than  was  given  to  me.  To-day 
all  is  different.  The  taste  for  constitutions,  debates,  and  speecht  s 
seems  to  have  returned,  after  a  weak  government  hostile  to 
national  interests  has  called  forth  criticisms  on  authority.  But, 
after  ail,  it  is  only  the  minority  that  wants  these  things;  make  no 


696  Waterloo  [I815 

mistake  on  that  head.  The  people,  or,  if  you  will,  the  masses, 
want  only  me.  You  have  not  seen  how  they  crowded  about  me, 
rushed  down  from  the  mountain  heights  to  call  me,  seek  me 
and  hail  me.  I  am  not  a  soldier's  emperor,  as  has  been  said; 
I  am  the  emperor  of  the  peasants  and  the  common  people  of 
France.  This  is  why  you  see  the  people  coming  to  me  despite 
all  that  has  happened.  There  is  a  community  of  feeling  between 
us.  I  have  risen  from  the  ranks  of  the  people,  they  hear  my  voice. 
I  have  had  about  me  Montmorencys,  Rohans,  Noailles,  Beau- 
vans,  Mortemarts,  but  there  was  no  sympathy  between  us. 
Look  at  these  conscripts,  these  sons  of  peasants;  I  have  not 
flattered  them,  have  even  dealt  harshly  with  them,  and  yet  they 
flocked  around  me  and  shouted, '  Vive  I'Empereur ! '  They  regard 
me  as  their  mainstay,  their  deUverer  from  the  nobility.  One 
sign  from  me,  and  the  nobles  in  all  the  provinces  would  be 
murdered.  But  I  would  not  be  king  of  a  peasant  war.  Hence, 
if  it  is  possible  to  rule  with  a  constitution,  very  well,  so  be  it. 
Because  I  wanted  universal  empire  I  needed  unlimited  power  on 
which  to  found  it.  And  who  in  my  place  would  not  have  lusted 
for  mastery  of  the  world?  Did  not  sovereigns  and  subjects  vie 
with  each  other  in  hastening  to  put  themselves  under  my  sceptre? 
I  met  more  resistance  from  a  few  unknown  and  unarmed  French- 
men in  France  than  from  all  the  kings,  who  are  so  proud  to-day 
because  no  one  from  the  people  is  their  equal.  I  am  no  longer 
a  conqueror,  cannot  be  one ;  for  I  know  what  is  possible  and  what 
is  not;  and  in  order  to  rule  France  alone,  perhaps  a  constitution 
is  better.  Do  you  then  consider  what  seems  to  you  practicable 
and  lay  your  plans  before  me;  public  discussions,  independent 
elections,  responsible  ministers,  free  press — I  accept  it  all. 
Along  with  these  I  desire  peace;  and  I  shall  secure  it  by  my 
victories.  I  would  raise  no  false  hopes  in  you.  Although  I  give 
out  the  report  that  negotiations  with  the  powers  are  in  process, 
there  are  no  negotiations.  I  look  forward,  rather,  to  a  difficult 
and  tedious  war.  If  I  am  to  hold  my  own,  the  nation  must  sup- 
port me.  In  return  she  will  demand  liberty;  she  shall  have  it." 
Thus  spoke  the  ^]mi)eror  to  C-onstant,  who  has  liimsclf  reported 
the   words   that   captivated   him.     The   frank   way   in   which 


A'lT.  15]  The  News  Reaches  Vienna  697 

Napoleon  characterized  his  situation  made  an  impression  on  him. 
He  declared  his  readiness  to  prepare  the  outline  of  a  constitution. 

Not  "Peace  and  Liberty,"  therefore,  as  it  was  posted  on  the 
walls  in  every  comer  of  France,  but,  at  the  best,  "War  and 
Liberty."  And  so  it  was,  indeed,  to  be.  No  one  could  have 
less  reason  than  the  Man  of  Elba  to  expect  the  European  powers 
to  look  on  quietly  while  he  was  breaking  the  treaties  he  had 
made,  and  seizing  again  the  sovereign  power  over  one  of  the  most 
restless  nations  of  the  earth,  which  had  kept  Europe  busy  with 
war  for  twenty  years.  Was,  then,  the  great  expenditure  of 
wealth  and  blood,  whereby  the  old  legitimate  system  of  a  balance 
of  power  among  the  states  had  been  restored,  to  have  been  in 
vain,  just  because  a  single  man  was  not  inclined  to  be  content 
with  the  sovereignty  of  Elba?  No  one  had  called  him,  no  con- 
spiracy worthy  of  mention,  even  in  the  French  army,  had  desired 
his  return;  he  had  come  unexpectedly  in  order  to  conquer  by  a 
"bluff,"  and  his  personal  magnetism  was  needed  to  rouse  the 
army  to  revolt.  No;  the  European  powers  could  not  tolerate 
this  bold  intrusion  upon  the  treaty  rights  that  bound  them.  In 
the  last  declaration,  made  in  March,  1814,  they  had  solemnly 
pledged  themselves  never  to  conclude  peace  with  Bonaparte, 
and  he  on  Ids  part  had  promised  at  Fontainebleau  to  renounce 
sovereignty  over  France  forever.  He  knew  well  that  they 
would  resist  his  efforts.  Therefore  he  knew  also  that  by  seiz- 
ing again  the  crown  of  France  he  was  creating  anew  for  that 
country  enemies  superior  in  resources  and  was  conjuring  up 
a  new  and  frightful  war.  It  was  this  which  made  his  conduct 
a  wanton  outrage  for  which  there  could  be  no  expiation. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  March  the  news  of  Napoleon's 
departure  from  Portoferrajo  had  reached  Vienna,  where  the 
Congress  had  by  no  means  dissolved,  as  he  had  hoped,  for  the 
princes  and  diplomats  were  still  present  almost  to  a  man. 
Under  the  profound  impression  of  that  event,  Russia  and  the  two 
German  powers  agreed  in  the  determination  to  meet  the  "adven- 
turer," as  Emperor  Francis  called  him,  with  united  front.  Since 
his  destination  at  first  was  uncertain,  and  Talleyrand  had  men- 
tioned Italy  as  probable,  the  Austrian  field-marshal,  Bellegarde, 


698  Waterloo  [isis 

in  command  there,  was  ordered  to  "attack  him  at  once  and 
crush  him."  Castlereagh  had  gone  away,  but  WelUngton,  who 
represented  him,  was  authorized  to  sign  such  an  agreement. 
The  two  main  questions  that  divided  the  Congress,  the  PoHsh 
and  the  Saxon,  had  already  reached  a  settlement;  one  through 
the  enforced  moderation  of  Alexander  I.,  the  second  at  the 
expense  of  the  King  of  Saxony,  who  had  to  consent  to  cede  a  half 
of  his  territory  to  Prussia,  while  Frederick  William  III.  yielded 
his  claims  to  the  other  half.  And  so  Napoleon's  reckoning  on 
the  dissensions  of  the  Congress  proved  to  be  mistaken.  On  the 
contrary,  they  all  had  an  interest  now  that  united  them  in  turn- 
ing unanimously  against  him,  England  was  concerned  for  the  new 
kingdom  of  the  Netherlands;  Prussia  equally  uneasy  about  her 
Rhine  province;  the  Czar  of  Russia  wanted  to  offset  the  reproach 
of  having  brought  the  Corsican  to  Elba  by  a  show  of  energetic 
hostility  to  him;  and  Austria's  monarch  wished  to  avoid  all 
appearance  of  interest  in  the  son  of  the  Revolution.  On  the 
13th  of  March  the  Congress  issued  a  proclamation  declaring 
Napoleon  an  outlaw  and  giving  him  over  to  pubUc  vengeance 
as  "the  enemy  and  disturber  of  the  world's  peace."  On  the 
25th  the  four  great  powers  renewed  their  treaty  of  Chaumont 
by  pledging  themselves  to  furnish  150,000  men  apiece  (Eng- 
land giving  an  equivalent  in  money),  and  "not  to  lay  down 
their  arms  until  Napoleon  is  rendered  wholly  incapable  of  dis- 
turbing peace  again  and  of  renewing  his  efforts  to  seize  the 
supreme  power  in  France."     The  other  states  fell  into  Une. 

Thus  Napoleon  was  proscribed  by  the  Continent  which  he  had 
once  seen  at  his  feet.  He  did  his  very  best  now  to  weaken  the 
unfavourable  impression  which  tliis  judgment  of  the  world  could 
not  fail  to  make  on  the  French  people,  or  perhaps  to  secure  some 
milder  statement  in  Vienna  itself.  In  vain  did  he  represent  the 
declaration  of  March  13th  as  the  contrivance  of  the  agents  of 
Louis  XVIII.;  the  truth  soon  became  public  property,  when  the 
foreign  diplomats  demanded  their  passports  and  left  the  country. 
In  vain  he  assured  the  world  that  he  would  respect  the  Paris 
peace  of  May  30th,  1814,  and  wrote  on  April  4th  to  all  the  sov- 
ereigns that  it  was  his  dearest  wish  to  make  the  imperial  throne 


^T.  45]     The  Allies  Unite  Against  Napoleon       699 

of  France  a  bulwark  for  the  peace  of  Europe;  the  only  answer 
was  that  the  powers,  which  had  not  yet  put  their  armies  on  a  peace 
footing,  mobilized  them  in  the  direction  of  France.  It  did  no 
good  for  him  to  ask  Emperor  Francis  to  send  back  his  wife  and 
son,  whose  coronation  he  had  held  in  prospect  to  the  French; 
child  and  wife  remained  far  away;  nay,  Marie  Louise  even  sent 
a  written  communication  to  the  foremost  representatives  of 
the  powers  that  no  power  on  earth  could  ever  induce  her  to  live 
with  Napoleon  again.  Nor  did  it  do  any  good  to  reveal  to 
Alexander  the  secret  offensive  alliance  of  January  3d,  in  order 
to  sow  new  discord  among  the  allies;  nor  again  to  seek  com- 
munication with  TallejTand,  who  had  just  heard  of  his  pro- 
scription and  naturally  was  not  to  be  found.  The  princes  did 
indeed  consider  the  question  whether  the  fact  of  France's  toler- 
ating Napoleon  should  lead  to  a  different  procedure  from  that 
agreed  upon.  But  they  decided,  in  a  protocol  signed  by  all  the 
plenipotentiaries,  that  if  such  were  the  fact,  it  could  make  no 
difference  in  their  plans:  "The  powers  are  not  authorized  to  give 
France  a  government,  but  they  would  never  forego  the  right  to 
prevent  anything  under  the  title  of  'government'  from  producing 
there  a  centre  of  disorder  and  danger  for  the  other  states."  The 
offer  of  the  Emperor  to  respect  the  peace  of  Paris  was  rejected, 
for  they  had  signed  that  peace  with  a  government  that  furnished 
sufficient  guarantees  for  the  peace  of  the  Continent,  and  would 
never  have  made  similar  conditions  with  Bonaparte.  Fouch6, 
who  had  been  led  at  once  by  seeing  the  European  powers  arrayed 
against  Napoleon  to  begin  intriguing  against  him,  and  who  was 
secretly  in  touch  with  Vienna,  had  word  from  Metternich  as 
follows:  "The  powers  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  him.  They 
will  wage  w^ar  on  him  to  the  uttermost,  but  they  do  not  wish  to 
fight  against  France."  So  again  the  old  essential  question  arose 
whether  it  was  possible  to  discriminate  between  the  two 
Napoleon  and  France. 

It  was  not  long  before  all  Frenchmen  discovered  that  the 
Emperor's  pretence  of  negotiations  with  Austria  and  other  states 
was  empty  deception,  and  that  a  war  was  imminent  wiiich  must 
be  laid  to  his  account  alone  and  was  due  to  nothing  but  his 


700  Waterloo  [1815 

reappearance.  The  impression  of  this  on  the  people  was  one 
of  deep-seated  disaffection  and  was  finally  determinative  of 
Napoleon's  destiny;  no  other  construction  can  be  put  on  the 
facts.  The  public  securities,  that  had  risen  on  the  basis  of  his 
representations,  fell  from  83,  where  they  were  at  the  beginning 
of  March,  to  51  in  April,  and  this  alienated  all  property  owners, 
particularly  the  mass  of  small  stockholders.  And  he  estranged 
not  only  the  purses  of  the  French,  but  also  their  hearts.  For  a 
decade  they  had  looked  forw^ard  with  longing  to  peace,  and  found 
it  only  when  the  Empire  fell.  It  was  now  re-established,  and 
already  the  necessity  of  more  bloodshed  threatened  all  families 
who  would  be  affected  by  the  dangers  of  war.  "I  cannot  con- 
ceal from  you  " — so  ran  the  report  of  State  Councillor  Miot  de 
Melito,  whom  Napoleon  had  sent  into  the  northern  depart- 
ments as  commissioner — "that  the  women  are  everywhere 
your  avowed  enemies,  and  in  France  such  a  foe  is  not  to  be 
despised."  The  Emperor  had  to  admit  that  he  heard  the  same 
from  other  messengers.  An  Englishman  wrote  to  Castlereagh 
from  Paris,  "Everybody  is  a  prey  to  dejection." 

In  view  of  this  change  of  public  opinion  it  was  of  small  account 
that  Napoleon  was  successful  in  suppressing  forcibly  Bourbon 
movements  in  the  south,  where  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Angou- 
leme  gathered  a  few  faithful  adherents,  and  in  forcing  the  Duke 
to  capitulate  and  his  wife  to  take  flight.  That  wrested  France 
from  the  Bourbons,  but  it  by  no  means  won  it  for  the  Bonapartes. 
Carnot  had  foreseen  this  weeks  before  when  he  asked  Napoleon 
whether  he  really  had  any  assurances  from  Austria ;  on  receiving 
a  negative  answer,  he  added:  "Then  you  still  have  more  to  do 
than  you  have  already  done."  The  army  alone  retained  its 
unwavering  loyalty  to  its  leader,  but  this  was  true  only  of  those 
actually  under  arms.  There  was,  indeed,  by  this  time  abundant 
material  in  the  land,  in  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  veterans 
that  had  returned  home  from  imprisonment  and  from  the  Italian 
and  Spanish  armies,  only  to  be  for  the  most  part  discharged  by 
Louis  XVIII.  Would  they  not  all  hasten  with  enthusiasm  when 
the  hero  of  Austerlitz  and  Friedland  set  up  his  eagles?  They  did 
not,  or  at  least  only  a  few  did ;  not  more  than  60,000  answered  the 


JEt.45]  Opposition   to  War  701 

appeal  to  the  old  soldiers,  j-nd  Napoleon  had  counted  on  four 
times  that  number.  It  was  a  natural  result.  Even  the  most 
hardened  warriors  at  last  longed  for  rest,  and  they  had  but  just 
begun  to  enjoy  its  pleasures  when  the  Emperor's  voice  gave  the 
alarm.  Castlereagh's  emissary  at  Paris  reports  some  soldiers  as 
saying :  "We  love  our  * P^re  Violette '  (i.e.  Napoleon)  much  better 
than  the  'Gros  Papa'  whom  we  don't  know  (Louis  XVIII.); 
but  we  are  sick  of  war,  and  if  we  have  got  to  fight  all  Europe 
again,  we  prefer  to  take  back  the  'Gros  Papa.'  "  So  the  Emperor 
could  soon  discover  that  while  he  had  plenty  of  officers  and  the 
complete  skeleton  of  an  army,  there  was  a  great  lack  of  men  to  fill 
the  ranks.  One  day  he  asked  the  paymaster  Peyrusse  in  confi- 
dence whether  people  in  Paris  were  convinced  that  he  would 
gather  a  large  army.  "Your  majesty  will  not  stand  alone."  was 
the  reply.  "I  am  almost  afraid  I  shall."  was  Napoleon's  rejoinder. 
Added  to  all  this  was  the  circumstance  that  the  national 
guards  in  most  of  the  cities  were  mostly  revolutionists  and  took 
sides  with  the  Imperator  only  if  he  yielded  to  their  radical 
desires.  We  have  no  reason  to  be  surprised  that  Napoleon  was 
slow  about  arming  them  and  did  not  count  on  them  for  open  war. 
He  was  very  anxious,  as  Mole  assured  Lord  Holland,  lest  the 
repubhcan  party  should  get  the  upper  hand,  and  deplored  the 
impossibility  of  bringing  France  to  the  point  of  war  without 
resorting  to  expedients  that  he  had  always  repudiated;  he  is 
even  reported  to  have  openly  admitted  to  his  suite  that  he  would 
never  have  left  Elba  if  he  had  had  any  anticipation  of  being 
obliged  to  make  such  concessions  to  the  democrats.*  All  these 
things  filled  him  with  gloom.  One  of  liis  councillors  describes 
him  as  follows:  "He  was  full  of  anxiety;  the  self-confidence 
that  used  to  be  heard  in  his  utterances,  the  tone  of  authority,  the 
lofty  flight  of  thought,  all  had  disappeared;  he  seemed  already 
to  feel  the  weight  of  the  hand  of  misfortune  which  was  soon  to 
be  laid  on  him  so  heavily,  and  no  longer  counted  on  his  star." 
Others  speak  of  him  as  in  suffering  and  exhausted;  due,  as  some 
thought,  to  the  frequent  hot  baths  he  took,  and  according  to 

*  Reminiscences  of  H.  R.  Lord  Holland,  p.  166  of  the  German  edition. 


702  Waterloo  [1815 

others  to  a  secret  disease;  he  felt  the  need  of  more  sleep.  All 
thought  him  changed.* 

Two  things  first  of  all  claimed  close  attention:  foreign  nations 
must  not  discover  what  slight  results  came  from  his  appeal  to 
the  disciplined  soldiers  of  France,  nor  how  strongly  the  people 
were  opposed  to  the  thought  of  war.  Hence  Napoleon  could  not 
make  up  his  mind  to  intrust  to  a  representative  assembly  the 
care  of  drawing  up  the  new  constitution  which  was  to  make  good 
his  promise  of  a  free  government.  What  debates  would  ensue! 
And  after  all,  there  was  the  danger  that  the  representatives  of 
the  people  might  stay  his  hand  and  wrest  from  his  grasp  the  onl}'' 
expedient  from  which  he  could  expect  safety — victory  over  the 
foreign  foe.  No :  a  constituent  assembly  would  not  do.  Rather 
a  dictatorship,  suggested  Maret.  But  gladly  as  he  would  have 
adopted  this  way  out,  he  now  rejected  it.  He  had  gone  too  far 
in  his  promises,  public  speeches,  and  manifestoes  to  turn  back. 
He  had  to  seek  some  other  means,  and  thought  he  had  found  it 
in  the  plan  of  having  the  proposed  concessions  which  he  must  soon 
make  drawn  up  by  his  councillors  in  the  shape  of  a  "novella" 
[supplementary  enactment]  to  the  former  constitutions  issued 
during  his  reign,  which  the  "sovereign"  people  would  simply 
adopt.  That  was  what  he  had  called  Constant  for,  and  the  latter 
now  set  to  work. 

On  the  22d  of  April  the  work  was  finished,  and  after  being 
submited  to  a  committee  of  the  Council  of  State  and  finally  to 
the  full  Council,  it  was  published  under  the  title  "Additional 
Act  to  the  Constitutions  of  the  Empire."  It  is  reported  to  have 
been  Constant's  own  judgment  to  give  an  entirely  new  constitu- 
tion, which  would  have  disavowed,  as  it  were,  all  previous  legis- 
lation of  the  Empire;  but  Napoleon  would  not  consent  to  that. 
He  wished  to  explain  and  justify  his  former  dictatorial  pro- 
cedure, and  it  is  interesting  historically  to  see  how  he  did  it,  for 
the  reason  that  he  sought  to  represent  the  blind  impulses  of 
his    ambition    as    something   premeditated,    as    a    deliberately 

*  In  regard  to  his  disease,  see  among  other  authorities  the  statement 
of  the  Austrian  General  KoUer  in  Helfert,  "Napoleons  Fahrt  von  Fon- 
tainebleau  nach  Elba,"  p.  39. 


jet.  45]  The  Additional   Act  703 

chosen  policy,  destined  for  the  highest  good  of  the  world.  In 
the  preamble  to  the  new  "Act"  we  read  as  follows:  "Our  aim 
at  that  time  was  to  establish  a  great  European  federal  system, 
which  we  had  adopted  as  in  accord  with  the  spirit  of  the  age  and 
as  favouring  the  progress  of  civilization.  For  the  purpose  of 
making  it  complete  and  giving  it  all  possible  extension  and  sta- 
bility, we  delayed  meantime  the  establishment  of  certain  insti- 
tutions that  were  intended  to  guarantee  the  liberty  of  citizens. 
Henceforth,  however,  our  sole  aim  is  to  promote  the  welfare  of 
France  by  safeguarding  her  public  liberties.  Hence  arises  the 
necessity  of  important  changes  in  the  constitutions,  senatus 
consulta,  and  other  documents  by  which  this  Empire  is  gov- 
erned." Universal  empire  had  not  been  Napoleon's  goal,  then? 
And  yet  he  had  admitted  it  repeatedly,  and  but  recently  to 
Benjamin  Constant  himself.  Of  course  what  he  wanted  was  a 
federation  of  states;  but  they  were  to  be  subject  to  the  absolute 
power  of  one  man,  who  at  will  wiped  out  of  existence  individual 
members  of  the  federation,  if  it  was  to  his  advantage;  for 
example,  Piedmont,  the  Papal  States,  Holland,  the  Hanseatic 
cities,  Oldenburg,  Hanover,  the  northern  departments  of  Spain, 
and  the  Vallais.  Who  knows  what  others  he  had  in  mind?  Of 
course  it  was  a  federation,  and  far  be  it  from  him  to  absorb 
Europe  into  France;  but  that  it  should  culminate  in  Napoleon  I. 
was  his  aim  real.  Perhaps  some  still  recalled  his  article  pub- 
lished in  the  "Moniteur"  in  1806,  admonishing  his  nephew,  the 
young  crown  prince  of  Holland,  that  he  always  regarded  the 
duties  of  the  regents  to  the  Emperor  as  first  in  importance. 
And  when  he  wanted  to  induce  Lucien  to  accept  a  crown,  had  he 
not  announced  for  his  guidance  "that  soldiers,  laws,  taxes,  in 
short  everything  in  the  country  he  ruled,  was  solely  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  imperial  throne"?*  We  must  grant  that,  along 
with  all  the  mischief  wrought  by  the  ambitious  career  of  this 
man  of  world-wide  aims  and  unparalleled  energy,  there  came 
valuable  contributions  to  the  development  of  the  European 
world ;  it  would  be  rank  injustice  to  deny  it.  But  to  say  that  the 
object  at  which  he  now  professed  to  aim  had  always  hovered 
*  Lucien,  "M6moires"  (ed.  Jung),  III.  Ill,  326. 


704  Waterloo  ti8i5 

before  his  mind  as  an  ideal  was  but  to  devise  for  the  occasion 
specious  pretences  and  a  lie.* 

This  preamble  had  the  subordinate  aim  of  proving  to  the 
foreign  nations  in  the  most  solemn  way  that  the  Empire  had 
finally  ended  its  conquering  career.  It  was  followed  by  sixty- 
seven  articles  containing  the  new  constitution.  The  principles 
of  "Uberty"  appeared  in  the  last  of  these;  no  one  was  to  be 
denied  fair  trial  by  law,  no  one  was  to  be  prosecuted,  imprisoned, 
or  banished,  except  by  due  process  of  law;  freedom  of  worship 
and  liberty  of  the  press  were  both  granted,  the  latter  being  left 
subject  only  to  suits  for  libel;  all  legally  acquired  property  was 
protected ;  right  of  petition  accorded  to  everybody ;  government 
could  declare  martial  law  only  in  case  of  invasion.  The  former 
Corps  legislatif  was  transformed  into  a  representative  chamber 
of  629  members  chosen  by  the  electoral  colleges  of  the  depart- 
ments; and  the  Senate  into  a  chamber  of  peers,  appointed  by 
the  Emperor,  except  such  as  had  a  seat  and  vote  as  princes  of  the 
reigning  family;  the  peerage  was  made  hereditary.  The  great 
privileges  possessed  by  the  former  Senate  were  not  transferred  to 
the  chamber  of  peers.  Both  chambers  were  to  have  their  ses- 
sions in  public.  Both  had  the  right  to  initiate  legislation  and  to 
approve  the  budget.  The  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  the  special 
representative  of  the  industrial  interest.  The  ministers  were 
made  responsible  and  could  be  impeached  by  the  Chamber ;  in  that 
case  the  peers  acted  as  judges.  The  right  of  interpreting  laws, 
formerly  possessed  by  the  Senate,  reverted  to  the  deputies.  A 
final  article  excluded  the  Bourbons  forever  from  ruHng  in  France. 

Before  submitting  Jiis  first  draft  to  the  Council  of  State,  Con- 
stant had  had  long  discussions  with  Napoleon  on  two  points. 
In  the  first  place,  an  hereditary  peerage  would  not  fail  to  aggrieve 
the  liberal  and  democratic  elements,  which  it  was  desirable  to 
conciliate.  But  the  Emperor  who  would  not  forego  the  advan- 
tages of  an  aristocracy,  thought  that  after  two  or  three  victories 
the  old  French  nobility  would  rally  to  him  again,  and  then  they 
would  find  a  more  suitable  field  of  public  activity  in  the  higher 
Chamber  than  they  could  in  a  Senate.  A  second  difference  grew 
*  See  above,  p.  534. 


Mr.  45]  The  Act  is  Coldly  Received  705 

out  of  Constant's  proposal  to  deny,  in  one  article,  the  right  of 
confiscation  to  the  head  of  the  state.  Here  again  Napoleon 
opposed  him;  he  could  not  afford,  he  said,  to  be  defenceless 
against  political  factions;  he  was  no  angol,  but  a  man,  who  was 
not  accustomed  to  suffer  attack  with  impunity.  The  article 
was  omitted.  Both  of  these  points  were  noticed  after  the  pub- 
lication of  the  constitution,  which  was  presented  to  the  French 
people  for  acceptance  just  as  the  laws  of  1802  and  1804  had  been. 
But  above  all,  the  title  "  Acte  Additionnel"  made  a  bad  impres- 
sion. 80  then  the  old  despotic  government,  said  the  people, 
was  back  again;  constitutions  were  drawn  up  by  officials  like 
administrative  decrees,  and  then  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the 
people  in  order  that  all  possible  pressure  might  be  brought  to 
bear  and  a  simple  "yea"  or  "nay"  secured,  without  the  possi- 
bility of  debates  or  amendments.  All  France  was  stirred  with 
indignation.  "  No  notice  was  taken  of  the  wise  and  lil^eral 
features  of  the  new  constitution,"  says  Broglie;  "enough  that  it 
was  imposed  upon  them,  a  'charte  octroyee,'  a  new,  revised,  and 
improved  edition  of  the  constitutions  of  the  Empire ;  what  more 
was  needed  to  set  loose  the  clamours  of  a  public  that  was  little 
concerned  about  the  real  siibstance  of  things?" 

•So  the  new  constitution  failed  on  its  publication  to  produce 
the  effect  which  the  Emperor  had  anticipated.  "Liberty"  did 
not  counterbalance  "war."  This  was  especially  manifest  in 
the  voting.  While  3,500,000  had  voted  for  the  Consulate  for  life 
in  1802  and  for  the  Empire  in  1804,  Napoleon  now  secured  but 
1,300,000  votes,  not  counting  244,000  votes  of  the  army.  More 
than  a  half  of  the  voters  sullenly  stayed  away  from  the  polls. 
This  was  a  defeat  that  could  not  be  concealed  no  matter  what 
theatrical  pomp  of  scenery  was  employed  at  the  "Champ  de 
Mai,"  held  at  Paris  on  June  1st,  where  the  result  was  announced. 

An  enormous  concourse  of  people  thronged  the  Champ  de 
Mars  on  that  day;  there  were  thousands  of  voters  from  the 
departments,  national  guards,  regular  troops,  and  a  vast  multi- 
tude of  curious  spectators.  After  solemn  mass  had  been  cele- 
brated, the  speaker  for  the  representatives  of  the  electoral  colleges 
addressed  the  Emporor,  saying  that  he  might  expect  from  them 


7o6 


Waterloo  [I815 


everything  that  a  hero  and  founder  of  order  could  ever  expect 
from  a  nation  that  was  loyal,  energetic,  and  unalterable  in  its 
desire  for  liberty  and  independence.  That  had  a  very  loyal  ring, 
but  these  words  were  offset  by  a  reservation.  "Trusting  your 
promises,"  it  was  said,  "our  deputies  will  revise  our  laws  with 
mature  deliberation  and  wisdom  and  bring  them  into  accord 
wdth  the  constitutional  system."  This  meant  that  the  task  of 
framing  a  constitution  was  by  no  means  finished,  and  that  the 
people  would  take  its  due  share  in  making  up  its  bill  of  rights- 
Foreign  relations  were,  however,  touched  upon  with  true  patriot- 
ism. "What  do  these  monarchs  want,"  it  was  asked,  "who  are 
moving  upon  us  with  such  mighty  engines  of  war?  How  have 
we  provoked  their  attack?  Have  we  violated  the  treaties  since 
peace  was  declared?  Every  Frenchman  is  a  soldier;  victory  will 
again  accompany  your  eagles,  and  our  enemies  who  reckoned 
on  our  dissensions  will  regret  having  challenged  us."  To  these 
and  other  utterances  Napoleon,  after  announcing  the  result  of 
the  popular  vote,  signing  the  constitution  and  taking  the  oath, 
replied  in  a  confident  tone:  What  did  the  foreigners  want? 
They  would  like  to  enlarge  the  Netherlands  by  making  the 
strongholds  of  northern  France  her  boundary;  to  divide  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  among  themselves.  That  must  be  resisted.  Then, 
when  this  has  been  done,  a  solemn  law  shall  combine  the  various 
scattered  provisions  of  our  constitutions  in  accordance  with  the 
spirit  of  the  "  Acte  Additionnel."  By  thus  representing  the  latter 
as  something  transitory  Napoleon  thought  he  could  yet  over- 
come the  general  disaffection.  He  even  touched  another  and 
very  delicate  point.  The  report  had  been  circulated  that  he  was 
about  to  abdicate  in  view  of  the  imminent  war.  This  was  the 
work  of  the  arch-plotter  Fouche,  bringing  his  mighty  instrument, 
the  police,  into  play  against  the  Emperor.  Alluding  to  this 
rumour.  Napoleon  said  that  he  would  gladly  offer  his  life  a  sacri- 
fice to  the  foreign  kings,  as  they  seemed  so  embittered  against 
him,  but  that  he  saw  they  were  aiming  at  the  fatherland.  In 
other  words,  people  were  mistaken  in  taking  him  alone  for  the 
stone  of  stumbling. 

But  all  his  words  failed  to  calm  men's  minds;  while  other 


jet.  45]  Disaffection  707 

things  even  gave  offence.  To  show  his  independent  authority 
he  had  appeared  not  in  the  uniform  of  the  national  guard,  but  in 
a  dazzling  and  fanciful  costume  of  royalty.  This  made  an  im- 
pression as  adverse  as  did  his  using  the  expressions  "my  people," 
"my  capital,"  in  his  speech.  The  people  never  liked  such 
phrases  from  the  son  of  the  Revolution;  and  least  of  all  now. 
Even  the  most  zealous  Bonapartists  could  not  help  noticing 
that  the  ciuestion  shouted  by  tlie  Emperor  to  the  National  (luards, 
whether  they  were  ready  to  defend  their  eagles  with  their  blood, 
failed  to  call  forth  an  enthusiastic  response.*  Only  the  Imperial 
Guards  took  the  oath  with  any  show  of  feeling.  "As  they  defiled 
past  the  Emperor,"  says  an  eye-witness  "  their  eyes  flashed  with  a 
deep  fire;  one  seemed  to  read  on  their  lips, '  Morituri  te  salutant.'  " 
So  the  solemnities  of  the  new  government  had  not  only  profited 
nothing,  but  they  had  rather  intensified  the  opposition.  On 
one  only  of  the  spectators  did  they  make  the  full  and  lasting 
effect  of  grandiose  power  and  splendour.  It  was  a  boy  of  seven. 
History  knows  him  as  Napoleon  III. 

The  strained  relations  between  people  and  ruler  came  to  light 
most  clearly  when  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  assembled, 
June  3d.  Napoleon  had  supposed  originally  that  he  could 
sufficiently  recommend  himself  to  the  nation  as  a  liberal  mon- 
arch by  the  "  Acte"  and  the  solemn  oath  on  the  Champ  de  Mars. 
But  when  the  disaffection  persisted  and  was  nourished  still  more 
by  the  press,  now  free  from  all  restraint,  he  was  obliged  at  last 
to  yield  to  the  universal  demand  for  a  session  of  the  deputies. 
He  called  it  with  tlie  greatest  reluctance,  for  he  clearly  foresaw 
the  most  uncomfortable  debates  and  discussions,  which  would 
surely  reveal  the  internal  dissensions  and  insecurity  of  his  posi- 
tion to  foreign  nations.  If  it  had  only  been  possible  to  guide 
and  influence  the  assembly;  but  even  this  expedient  failed  on 
the  very  first  day.  The  Emperor  had  had  his  brother  Lucien 
appointed  deputy,  having  become  reconciled  ^nth  him  again — 
a  still  further  public  pledge  of  his  liberal  intentions — and  wisheil 

*  Coignet  says:  "The  oaths  were  given  without  energy,  the  enthusiasm 
was  weak.  Those  were  not  the  shouts  of  Austerlitz  and  Wagram.  The 
Emf>eror  perceived  it  clearly." 


708  Waterloo  [I815 

him  to  be  chosen  president.  But  no  sooner  was  this  known  than 
the  deputies  hastened  to  show  their  constituents  how  independent 
they  were ;  Lucien  did  not  receive  a  single  vote,  and  they  elected 
as  president  Lanjuinais,  one  of  the  opposition  minority  in  the 
old  Senate,  and  one  who  had  once  voted  against  the  Empire. 
Thus  management  of  the  lower  chamber  was  out  of  the  question, 
and  the  only  thing  left  was  to  make  a  counter-check  of  the  upper 
house,  to  which  Napoleon  now  proceeded  to  appoint  members. 
He  included  his  three  brothers  still  in  Paris,  Joseph,  Lucien  and 
Jerome,  Uncle  Fesch,  Eugene  Beauharnais,  his  Ministers,  the 
loyal  marshals  Davout,  Suchet,  Ney,  Brune,  Moncey,  Soult, 
Lefebvre,  Grouchy,  Jourdain,  Mortier,  a  considerable  number  of 
generals  headed  by  Bertrand  and  Drouot,  several  former  senators, 
but  only  Monge  and  Chaptal  of  the  savants,  some  representatives 
of  the  old  noblesse,  among  whom  was  his  master  of  ceremonies, 
S^gur,  Councillors  of  State,  financiers,  etc.  Even  Sieyes  was 
not  wanting.  On  the  7th  of  June  the  Emperor  opened  the 
sessions  of  both  houses  with  a  speech  from  the  throne  in  which  he 
omitted  all  the  objectionable  expressions  of  June  1st,  and  which 
therefore  made  a  better  impression.  He  and  the  army  would  do 
their  duty,  he  said.  Thereupon  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  an 
address  of  June  11th  put  all  the  forces  of  the  land  at  his  disposal 
for  its  defence ;  but  only  for  purposes  of  defense.  "For,"  it  said, 
"not  even  the  will  of  the  sovereign  is  in  a  position  to  draw  the 
nation  on  beyond  the  limits  of  self-defence."  And  such  was 
their  distrust  in  the  conqueror  of  old  that  even  the  loyal  majority 
of  the  House  of  Peers  referred  to  the  new  institutions  of  France 
as  "furnishing  Europe  with  the  guarantee  that  the  French  gov- 
ernment can  never  be  carried  away  by  the  seductions  of  victory." 

This  anxiety,  however,  was  vain.  The  great  general,  who 
departed  to  the  army  on  the  12th  of  June,  1815,  with  troubled 
mind,  as  his  suite  noticed,  was  to  return  in  nine  days,  conquered 
as  never  before,  his  power  annihilated  forever. 

The  unfavourable  foreign  and  domestic  conditions  under 
which  Napoleon  began  his  new  reign  had  this  consequence,  that 
he  could  not  command  at  the  beginning  of  June  the  forces  which 
he    had    doubtless    counted    on.     To    avoid    appearing   before 


iEx.  45]  Preparations  of  the  Allies  709 

Europe  and  France  as  the  aggressor,  he  had  delayed  war  prepara- 
tions for  weeks,  and  then  called  them  defensive,  fortifying  Paris 
and  Lyons.  Out  of  regard  for  public  opinion,  and  to  avoid 
demanding  sacrifices  that  had  roused  hatred  against  him,  he  had 
deferred  the  conscription  of  1815  until  the  last  moment.  The 
result  of  this,  combined  with  the  partial  failure  of  his  appeal  to 
the  old  soldiers,  was  that  when  finally  hostilities  commenced  he 
had  little  more  than  200,000  men  available  for  open  war.  To 
be  sure  he  might  have  delayed  still  more,  gained  time  and 
strengthened  himself;  but  instead  of  doing  that,  after  exhausting 
the  resources  of  diplomacy,  he  assumed  the  defensive.  And 
good  reason  he  had. 

The  allies  of  the  25th  of  March  had  not  put  the  war  against 
Napoleon  into  operation  as  early  as  they  had  resolved.  Prussia 
alone  had  mobilized  her  army  rapidly,  sent  a  corps  stationed  on 
the  lower  Rhine  to  Belgium  at  Wellington's  request,  followed  it 
with  three  others,  and  soon  after  the  middle  of  April  had  an  army 
of  120,000  men  in  the  field,  ready  for  battle.  Bliicher  with  his 
faithful  Gneisenau  again  took  command.  At  the  same  time 
Wellington  also  had  gathered  an  army  of  95,000,  composed  of 
EngHsh,  Dutch,  and  Germans,  from  Bruns^v'ick,  Hanover,  and 
Nassau,  destined  particularly  for  the  defence  of  Brussels  and 
Ghent.  The  two  generals  wanted  to  take  the  offensive  in  order 
to  leave  no  time  for  Napoleon  to  prepare ;  but  their  counsels  did 
not  prevail  at  Vienna.  The  plan  of  war  there  adopted  was  based 
on  great  masses  of  troops;  it  contemplated  advancing  with  the 
greatest  possible  assurance  of  victory,  and  hence  required  much 
time,  as  the  Russians  moved  west  very  slowly  and  Alexander 
was  hungering  for  the  leading  role  he  had  before  played,  which 
the  Austrians  were  perfectly  willing  to  assign  to  him  on  account 
of  events  in  Italy.  For  in  that  country  Murat,  just  as  the  \'ienna 
Congress  was  on  the  point  of  granting  him  the  kingdom  as  a 
reward  for  his  joining  the  coalition  against  Napoleon,  had  struck 
a  blow  for  his  brother-in-law.  He  pushed  rapidly  on  to  the  Po, 
but  then,  the  expected  national  support  failing,  he  retired  before 
the  Austrians,  and  was  defeated  by  them  on  May  2d  and  3d  at 
Tolentino.     Nothing  was  now  left  for  him  but  to  fly  to  France. 


71  o  Waterloo  [I815 

Under  the  pressure  of  all  these  circumstances,  the  powers  at  last 
postponed  the  opening  of  the  great  co-operative  movement  until 
the  27th  of  June,  when  they  expected  to  push  it  through  with 
some  700,000  or  900,000  men. 

Should  Napoleon  now  await  the  attack  of  the  enemy?  Wait 
until  the  several  armies  had  reached  points  equally  distant  from 
Paris,  and  then  were  invading  France  on  converging  lines,  the 
English  and  Prussians  from  the  northeast,  the  Russians  and 
Austrians  from  the  east  and  southeast?  His  precarious  position 
and  the  unwillingness  of  the  French  to  fight  would  not  permit 
him  to  bring  on  his  country  the  burden  of  an  invasion  without 
taking  some  step  to  prevent  it.  Now,  as  the  mobilizing  of  the 
hostile  armies  was  not  equally  rapid  everywhere,  so  that  the 
English  and  Prussian  armies  stood  ready  while  those  of  Austria 
and  Russia  were  only  in  process  of  formation,  the  possibility 
was  apparent  of  defeating  the  former  by  a  vigorous  onslaught 
before  the  latter  arrived.  And  what  might  not  be  the  political 
consequences  of  such  a  victory!  Could  the  powers  have  for- 
gotten so  completely  and  quickly  their  late  dissensions  and  the 
consciousness  of  their  conflicting  interests,  which  had  recently 
almost  led  to  open  hostility?  Napoleon  certainly  was  well 
aware  that  Bourbon  stock  had  fallen  in  Vienna  and  that  the 
allies  were  by  no  means  vmited  as  to  the  future  of  the  throne  of 
France.  Under  such  circumstances  he  made  up  his  mind,  con- 
trary, it  is  said,  to  Carnot's  advice,  to  go  north  and  take  the 
offensive,  striking  the  first  blow  in  Belgium.  To  be  sure  his 
entire  army  was  not  available  for  this  purpose;  20,000  men  were 
necessary  in  the  Vendee  to  quell  a  revolt  which  the  royalists  had 
kindled  on  the  old  field  of  their  agitations;  and  besides  that  three 
corps  under  Suchet,  Rapp,  and  Lecombe  must  try  to  cover  the 
eastern  district  from  the  Rhone  to  the  Meuse,  so  that  only  about 
125,000  were  left  him  for  the  attack.  But  they  seemed  to  him 
enough.  He  stationed  them  in  all  secrecy  south  of  the  Sambre, 
between  Beaumont  and  Philippeville;  there  were  21,000  Guards, 
five  corps  under  Drouet,  Reille,  Vandanmie,  Clerard,  and 
Mouton,  and  four  corps  of  cavalry  under  Grouchy  as  a  reserve. 
On  the  14th  he  himself  arrived  in  Beaumont;  he  gathered  with 


iEx.  45]  The  Plan  of  Campaign  7 1  i 

his  own  peculiar  skill  all  these  troops  close  by  the  border,  oppo- 
site Charleroi,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  began  oper- 
ations. 

Wellington  and  Bliicher  had  not  remained  in  ignorance  of  the 
small  forces  at  the  enemy's  command,  and  had  therefore  not 
looked  for  so  rapid  an  attack.  Wellington  supposed,  even  when 
he  heard  of  movements  of  the  enemy  and  of  Napoleon's  arrival, 
that  only  defensive  measures  were  being  taken.  The  corps  of 
both  the  allied  armies  were  widely  scattered:  the  English,  because 
their  leader  wanted  to  "cover  everything,"  were  stationed  from 
Binche,  on  the  French  frontier,  west  and  north  as  far  as  Brussels 
and  Oudenarde,  with  a  line  of  retreat  past  Brussels  to  the  sea; 
the  Prussian  line,  on  account  of  difficulty  in  procuring  supplies, 
stretched  east  from  Binche  and  Charleroi  beyond  Liege,  and 
their  line  of  retreat  was  through  that  town  to  the  Rhine.  Char- 
leroi, then,  the  meeting-point  of  the  roads  from  Brussels  on  the 
one  hand  and  Liege  on  ihe  other,  was  the  junction  of  the  two 
armies,  and  it  was  here  that  Napoleon  proposed  to  break  through. 
Just  as  in  his  first  campaign  in  Italy  he  had  broken  through 
from  Savona  over  the  mountain  and  separated  the  Piedmont 
troops  from  the  Austrians,  so  now  he  planned  to  separate  the 
two  armies;  he  hoped  thus  to  defeat  Wellington  and  Bliicher 
singly,  as  he  had  then  defeated  Colli  and  Beaulieu  and  driven 
them  back  on  their  diverging  lines  of  retreat.  On  the  loth  he 
occupied  Charleroi  with  Uttle  difficulty,  as  the  Prussians  had 
neglected  to  fortify  the  line  of  the  Sambre,  and  thought  that  by 
so  doing  he  had  already  succeeded  in  surprising  the  enemy  and 
piercing  his  line.  But  in  this  he  was  deceived.  He  would  have 
had  to  advance  much  farther  north  to  the  Namur-Nivelles  road, 
which  formed  the  line  of  communication  between  the  two 
armies,  in  order  to  encounter  the  Prussians,  who  were  in  the  act 
of  concentrating  at  Sombreffe.  Wellington,  far  from  supposing 
his  colleague  to  be  really  threatened,  was  dominated  by  the  idea 
that  Napoleon  would  approach  on  the  west,  try  to  turn  his  right 
flank  and  cut  off  his  retreat  from  the  sea — a  strategic  blunder,  by 
the  way,  of  which  his  great  antagonist  would  never  have  been 
guilty.  He  therefore  neglected  to  concentrate  liis  troops  on  the  left 


712  Waterloo  [1815 

on  the  15th,  and  so  the  Emperor  might  have  struck  the  Prussians 
alone  if  he  had  hastened  forward.  Nay,  he  might  even  have  done 
it  on  the  following  day,  if  he  had  made  haste.  For  Bliicher  was 
in  so  far  surprised  that  he  was  unable  on  the  16th  to  bring  up  a 
distant  corps  in  time ;  and  it  was  only  when  Wellington,  learning 
of  the  enemy's  movements,  promised  to  be  at  NiveUes  the  next 
morning  with  his  army  and  to  support  him  in  case  of  attack, 
that  he  finally  ventured  to  await  Napoleon  at  Sombreffe. 

But  Napoleon,  still  under  the  delusion  of  having  completely 
surprised  his  two  enemies,  neglected  to  use  on  the  16th  the 
advantage  he  had  let  slip  the  day  before.  That  he  might  engage 
the  whole  Prussian  army  near  by  he  had  no  thought;  he  sup- 
posed Bliicher  was  on  his  way  east  to  gather  his  forces  together 
there.  He  therefore  divided  his  army,  sent  Ney  in  command  of 
50,000  men  along  the  road  to  Brussels,  and  gave  Grouchy  charge 
of  a  division  of  about  the  same  size  which  was  to  follow  the 
Prussians.  He  kept  a  reserve  with  himself,  ready  to  strike  here 
or  there  at  need.  Making  a  reconnoissance  about  noon  at  Fleurus, 
to  which  point  he  had  followed  the  Prussians  on  the  preceding 
day,  he  noticed  to  his  astonishment  that  they  were  holding  their 
ground.  Still  he  thought  it  was  only  a  corps  of  Bliicher's,  until 
at  last,  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  he  perceived  from 
Ligny  that  a  whole  army  was  facing  him.  Then,  indeed,  he 
deeply  regretted  having  detached  Ney.  He  recalled  him  with 
earnest  messages,  saying  that  the  fate  of  France  was  in  his  hands 
and  urging  him  not  to  hesitate  a  moment,  but  turn  the  right  flank 
of  the  enemy  and  attack  him  in  the  rear.  But  this  command 
could  not  be  obeyed ;  for  in  the  first  place  it  was  given  too  late, 
and  then,  secondly,  Ney  had  long  since  been  engaged  in  fighting 
Wellington  much  farther  north  at  Quatre-Bras,  where  some  of 
the  English  troops  were  stationed.  Only  one  of  the  corps  as- 
signed to  him  (Drouet  d'Erlon)  was  persuaded  by  the  adjutant 
who  brought  the  order  to  turn  about  and  march  to  Ligny.  It  was 
of  no  use  there,  however,  while  Ney  without  its  aid  was  unable 
to  gain  any  advantage  besides  that  of  keeping  Wellington  away 
from  Bliicher.  In  consequence  Bliicher  lost  the  battle,  which  he 
began  only  on  the  expectation  of  help  from  the  English  general. 


jEt.  45]  The  Battle  of  Ligny  713 

And  yet  he  was  himself  partly  to  blame.  For,  as  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  Prussian  troops  was  not  favourable  for  taking 
advantage  of  the  promised  aid  of  Wellington, — along  a  re-entering 
angle  from  St.  Amand  to  Ligny,  Sombreffe,  and  Tongrinne, — 
the  situation  required  that  the  battle  be  fought  entirely  on  the 
defensive  until  the  ally  arrived  on  the  scene,  and  to  be  maintained 
on  the  defensive  if  he  failed  to  appear.  But  that  was  not  in  ac- 
cordance with  Bliicher's  temperament,  and  besides  he  had  great 
odds  over  the  enemy.*  After  the  battle  had  been  hotly  contested 
several  hours  near  St.  Amand  and  especially  about  Ligny,  during 
which  the  Prussians  suffered  much  more  heavily  than  the  old 
veterans  of  Napoleon,  the  gray-headed  marshal  undertook  to  as- 
sail the  right  wing  of  the  French  with  the  reser\'es  from  his  centre. 
The  French  parried  the  assault.  But  the  Emperor  had  already 
noticed  the  weakening  of  the  enemy's  centre.  He  pierced  it 
at  once  and  drove  the  enemy  in  flight  back  to  Brye.  In  the 
tumult  at  the  close  of  the  battle  Bliicher  fell  with  his  wounded 
horse,  and  was  given  up  for  lost;  Gneisenau  had  to  give  orders  as 
to  the  direction  of  retreat.  Unshaken  by  the  adverse  fate  of  the 
day,  full  of  hope  in  a  more  glorious  future,  this  General  held  fast 
to  the  idea  of  co-operating  with  the  English,  and  gave  Wavre, 
to  the  north,  as  the  destination  of  the  retiring  army.  That  com- 
mand was  to  decide  the  campaign. 

Napoleon  now  perceived  the  full  extent  of  his  mistake  in  sup- 
posing the  Prussians  to  have  been  surprised  in  their  concentra- 
tion and  to  have  retired  on  their  line  of  operations.  The  battle 
of  the  16th  opened  his  eyes.  Well,  he  had  won  it  and  put  the 
enemy  to  flight.  All  was  well  again,  and  this  time  surely  there 
was  no  doubt  that  Bliicher  was  marching  along  his  line  of  retreat 
to  rally  his  forces,  say  at  Namur.  General  Pajol,  sent  along  that 
road  in  pursuit  with  two  di\'isions,  ran  across  many  fugitives 
hastening  eastward, — 5000  according  to  report, — ^and  that  fact 
fully  confirmed  the  Emperor  in  his  opinion  that  he  had  at  last 
rid  himself  thoroughly  of  the  Prussians  and  could  now  move  on 

*  The  Prussians  had  86,000  men,  the  French  08,000,  in  the  battle.  Ten 
thousand  of  the  latter  stayed  behind  and  took  no  part;  while  of  the  Prus- 
sians, on  the  other  hand,  20,000  on  the  left  wing  were  but  little  engaged. 


714  Waterloo  [1815 

Wellington  without  being  annoyed  by  them  in  the  least  and  with- 
out any  special  need  of  haste.*  During  the  forenoon  of  the  17th 
he  allowed  his  brave  soldiers,  who  were  fagged  out  by  the  battle, 
to  rest,  and  not  until  about  noon  did  he  order  Grouchy  with  33,- 
000  men  to  hunt  up  Bliicher  and  ascertain  where  he  was  rallying, 
whether  he  had  already  evacuated  Namur,  and  in  general  what 
were  his  purposes.  "March,"  the  order  read,  "with  all  the 
forces  assigned  you  to  Gembloux."  This  shows  plainly  Napo- 
leon's confident  opinion  that  the  Prussians  had  gone  back  to 
Namur,  but  he  might  have  rallied  quickly — he  knew  Bliicher  of 
old — and  might  soon  be  on  the  point  of  marching  either  on  the 
highroad  leading  to  Louvain,  or  on  some  other  road  in  a  north- 
westerly direction  towards  the  English.  In  that  case  Grouchy's 
orders  were  to  go  on  beyond  Gembloux  until  he  overtook  him, 
and  hold  him  in  check  while  Wellington  was  crushed.  All  that 
called  for  considerable  time,  for  Napoleon  had  not  the  faintest 
inkling  that  the  routed  Prussian  troops  could  be  brought  to  order 
again  on  a  single  day  on  the  march,  and  yet  that  is  just  what 
was  accomplished.  So  completely  was  he  under  the  dominion 
of  this  error  that  he  could  not  even  entertain  any  other  idea; 
least  of  all  the  truth,  that  the  Prussians,  who  had  suffered  a  loss  of 
20,000  in  dead,  wounded,  and  missing,  had  been  able,  summoning 
their  utmost  energy,  to  march  straight  from  the  field  of  battle 
towards  their  ally,  to  prevent  his  defeat  in  the  arduous  struggle 
that  was  imminent,  and  to  help  him,  rather,  to  conquer.  He 
did  not  credit  his  enemies  with  such  magnificent  courage. 

When  Grouchy  started  for  the  east  the  other  French  troops 
were  already  on  the  march  to  Quatre-Bras  to  join  Ney  and  follow 
Wellington.  The  English  commander  had,  at  the  news  of  the 
Prussian  defeat,  withdrawn  north  to  Mont  Saint-Jean  and  fixed 
his  headquarters  at  Waterloo.  Here  the  French  found  him  in 
battle  array  on  the  17th  of  Jime.  His  course  in  taking  and  hold- 
ing this  position,  showing  he  (Ud  not  share  Napoleon's  conviction 
that  he  would   be  forced  from  it   in   the  end,  was  based  on 

*  On  the  noxt  morning  Soiilt,  who  now  took  Borthior's  phico,  wrote  to 
Ney,  saying  among;  other  things:  "The  Prnssian  army  has  suffered  defeat; 
General  Pajol  is  pursuing  it  on  the  road  to  Namur  and  Li6ge." 


JEt.  45]  The  Morning  of  Waterloo  715 

assurances  received  from  Bliicher,  Avho  liud  already  gathered 
and  drawn  up  his  entire  army  at  \Va^Te,  that  he  would  support 
the  English  with  all  the  forces  at  his  command  if  there  should  be 
a  battle  the  next  day.  This  state  of  things  was  very  far  from 
Napoleon's  thoughts,  even  on  the  next  day,  w^hen  he  made  up  his 
mind  to  attack  the  English  and  rout  them  as  he  had  the 
Prussians.  Grouchy  did  indeed  mention  in  his  reports  that  a 
Prussian  column  had  without  doubt  advanced  to  Wavre;  but  it 
was  only  one  column,  the  marshal  was  following  it  and  was  equal 
to  handling  it  while  Wellington  was  being  crushed.  So  little 
danger  did  Napoleon  apprehend  that  on  the  18th  he  did  not  even 
begin  the  attack  the  first  thing  in  the  morning,  as  his  custom 
was,  but  loft  time  for  the  ground  to  dry  again  after  the  long, 
soaking  rain,  so  that  the  guns  could  operate  more  effectively. 
Could  he  but  have  guessed  that  Billow's  corps  was  toiling  pain- 
fully along  through  the  same  clayey  soil  by  unbeaten  routes,  "SAith 
the  columns  defeated  at  Ligny  behind  him,  all  advancing  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  down  upon  him  such  a  catastrophe  as  has 
seldom  so  swiftly  befallen  the  great  men  of  earth,  how  he  would 
have  hastened  to  fight  and  win  the  victory! 

At  eleven  in  the  forenoon  Napoleon  rode  from  Caillou,  where 
he  had  spent  the  night,  past  Plancenoit  on  the  Brussels  road, 
until  he  reached  the  farm  La  Belle  Alliance.  Here  the  road 
slopes  gradually  into  a  shallow  vale,  and  a  little  less  than  a  mile 
farther,  beyond  the  farm  La  Haye  Sainte,  it  ascends  the  hill  that 
lies  across  it  and  on  whose  gentle  northern  slope  lies  the  village 
of  Mont  Saint-Jean.  Wellington  had  picked  out  this  hill  for  his 
defensive  position;  and  he  meant  to  remain  on  the  defensive 
only,  on  account  of  his  inferior  forces,  if  for  no  other  reason. 
He  had  but  68,000  men,  and  *was  not  aware  that  a  third  of  the 
enemy's  army  was  still  at  a  distance.  In  excess  of  caution  he 
had  detached  19,000  men  to  Hal  to  avoid  being  surprised  from 
the  west.  In  reality  Napoleon  was  stronger  by  only  about 
4000  cavalry  and  artillery.  To  be  sure,  they  were  his  best 
troops,  which  had  long  been  under  his  command.  As  it  was 
their  own  cause  they  were  fighting  for,  they  would  fight  with 
ardour  and  let  \ictory  be  "WTested  from  their  grasp  only  by  tlirest 


7i6 


Waterloo  [1815 


necessity.  The  Emperor  disposed  them  in  three  lines.  Two 
corps  were  stationed  at  the  southern  hne  of  the  vale  above 
mentioned  on  both  sides  of  La  Belle  AlUance,  resting  on  the 
Nivelles  road  to  the  left  and  on  the  chateau  of  Frichemont  to 
the  right,  with  Ney  in  command.  Behind  these  in  the  second 
line  were  two  corps  of  cavalry  on  the  wings,  and  in  the  centre  as 
a  first  reserve  along  the  highway  two  divisions  of  infantry  and 
cavalry.  And  finally  in  the  third  line  were  the  Guards  as  a 
second  reserve,  the  heavy  and  light  horse  on  both  sides  of  the 
road,  and  the  Old  Guard  in  the  centre.  On  arriving  at  La  Belle- 
Alliance,  Napoleon  made  a  reconnoissance.  He  could  not  obtain 
a  full  view  of  the  enemy's  lines,  and  saw  only  the  front  that  held 
the  rising  ground.  This  eminence  not  only  shut  off  his  view, 
but  also  enabled  Wellington  to  move  his  divisions  concealed 
and  unnoticed  during  the  action  and  thus  transfer  them  to  any 
point  where  the  onset  of  the  enemy  called  for  greater  resistance. 
The  Emperor  then  rode  down  the  front  lines,  to  inspire  his  men 
by  his  glance  and  words  and  also  to  show  the  Englishman,  who 
commanded  a  full  view  of  the  French  army,  what  he  had  to  cope 
with.  He  knew,  perhaps,  that  a  goodly  part  of  Wellington's 
troops  were  not  very  reliable,  although  that  commander  may 
have  exaggerated  when  he  called  it  "the  worst  army  that  ever 
stood  on  legs."  Finally,  at  noon,  he  ordered  the  battle  to  begin. 
What  an  advantage  the  allies  reaped  from  this  delay! 

Napoleon's  principal  aim,  founded  on  the  general  plan  of  the 
whole  campaign,  which  contemplated  a  complete  separation  of 
the  two  armies,  was  to  force  the  left  wing  and  then  the  centre 
of  the  enemy,  and  thereby  drive  him  away  from  the  Prussians 
and  from  Brussels.  (The  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Brussels 
was  printed  and  ready  to  be  scattered.)  To  accomplish  this  he 
made  a  strong  attack  with  his  left  wing  on  the  chitteau  of  Hougo- 
mont,  which  the  enemy  held,  to  attract  Wellington's  attention 
away  from  his  own  left;  the  "main  attack"  was  expected  to 
follow  at  one  o'clock.  But  this  very  first  calculation  was  upset. 
The  enemy  had  transformed  the  chateau  into  a  citadel,  and  de- 
fended it  with  unexampled  coolness  against  ever-renewed  assaults, 
until  at  last  an  entire  corps  of  the  French  front  line  melted  away 


yET.45]  The  Battle  717 

without  accomplishing  anything.  And  as  Hougomont  hold  its 
own  without  the  necessity  of  support  that  might  weaken  the  left 
and  centre,  the  French  had  to  undertake  their  main  attack 
against  an  undiminished  enemy.  But  as  if  that  were  not 
enough,  just  as  they  were  making  ready  to  advance,  the  Emperor 
learned  from  a  captUT'ed  letter  that  he  would  have  to  deal  with 
the  Prussians  as  well,  that  Billow  was  going  to  fall  on  his  right 
flank;  and  as  if  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  doubt,  masses  of 
troops  began  to  appear  on  the  riglit,  near  the  chapel  of  St. 
Lambert,  a  mile  distant,  which  an  adjutant  recognized  as 
Prussians.  There,  suddenly  and  close  at  hand,  was  a  danger 
that  he  had  not  reckoned  with  in  the  least;  uithin  two  hours 
Biilow  might  strike.  To  avoid  exposing  his  flank,  the  larger 
part  of  the  reserve  under  Mouton  had  to  be  sent  against  him 
northeast  of  Plancenoit;  those  forces  could  not  therefore  join  in 
the  decisive  blow  that  was  to  rout  Wellington.  If  Biilow  were 
but  advancing  alone!  If  Grouchy  were  only  holding  the  rest  of 
the  Prussians  in  check!  Better  yet,  if  he  were  on  the  spot  and 
could  drive  Biilow  back!  "Delay  not  a  moment  to  come  and 
join  us,"  was  the  message  Napoleon  now  sent  him.  But  would 
the  order  ever  reach  him?  And  suppose  it  did,  could  he  get  away 
from  the  enemy,  whom  in  fact  he  had  been  told  to  keep  in  check? 
Vain  hopes.  Grouchy  was  at  Wavre,  having  arrived  by  a  long 
detour  from  the  east,  and  \vas  engaged  with  a  much  weaker 
Prussian  corps,  while  two  others  had  long  since  followed  Biilow 
on  the  way  to  join  Wellington,  and  were  advancing  slowly, 
indeed,  on  account  of  heavy  roads,  yet  inexorably. 

Napoleon  was  not  aware  of  his  full  danger  when  he  determined 
to  dispose  of  the  enemy  in  front  with  all  possible  haste  before  the 
first  cannon  was  fired  on  the  right.  It  was  explained  to  the  army 
that  it  was  Grouchy  approaching  on  the  right,  and  that  victory 
was  no  longer  in  doubt.  Then  four  divisions  in  closed  columns 
advanced  against  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy  on  La  Haye  Sainte, 
Papelotte  and  Smohain.  The  first  point  was  stormed,,  but  could 
not  be  held  as  the  subsequent  assault  on  the  heights  was  repulsed, 
and  the  divisions  had  to  fall  back  before  the  onslaught  of  the 
English  cuirassiers.     Then,  while  fighting  was  still  in  progress 


71 8  Waterloo  [i8i5 

on  the  right,  Napoleon,  who  was  now  at  La  Belle  Alliance,  tried  to 
pierce  the  enemy's  centre  by  a  cavalry  charge  on  the  grandest 
scale.  This  was  the  culminating  point  of  the  battle.  Milhaud's 
corps  of  cuirassiers  hurled  themselves  on  the  squares  of  the 
English,  but  with  little  success,  for  the  British  shot  well  and 
stood  firm.  Welhngton,  too,  saw  the  danger  coming  and 
strengthened  his  centre,  which  was  an  easy  task,  as  the  left  wing 
had  already  repulsed  the  attack  there,  and  Hougomont  on  the 
right  still  held  out.  A  new  charge  was  made  with  three  times 
the  number,  thirty-six  squadrons.  A  very  sea  of  horsemen 
poured  over  the  ground  and  thundered  in  terrible  billows  about 
the  enemy's  battalions.  Many  of  the  latter  were  overwhelmed, 
many  crumbled  away,  but  others  stood  firm  as  a  rock.  And  as 
Napoleon  neglected  to  throw  infantry  into  the  gaps  opened  by 
the  cavalry,  this  charge,  too,  failed  of  its  intended  effect.  In 
fact  the  Emperor  had  exhausted  his  reserves,  all  but  the  Old 
Guard;  and  he  would  not  now  risk  them,  because  at  about  five 
o'clock  Bulow's  batteries  had  begun  to  play  and  had  driven 
Mouton  back  to  Plancenoit.  1  hat  point  must  be  held  at  every 
cost,  otherwise  the  enemy  would  fall  upon  the  line  of  retreat  and 
a  catastrophe  would  be  the  result.  For  these  reasons  Napoleon 
held  back  the  Guard  at  the  one  moment  when  it  might  have 
turned  the  tide  in  his  favour.  For  the  position  of  the  EngHsh 
was  by  that  time  so  sorely  shaken,  especially  when  Ney  at  six 
o'clock  recaptured  La  Haye  Sainte,  that  General  Miiffling  of 
Wellington's  suite  hastened  toward  the  Prussian  corps  of  Zieten 
and  shouted:  "The  battle  is  lost  if  the  corps  do  not  press  on  at 
once  and  support  the  English  army."  Meantime  the  Guard 
was  busy  in  driving  back  Bliicher,  who  with  Billow's  troops  had 
captured  Plancenoit  at  last.  This  it  accomplished  at  about 
seven  o'clock.  Carried  away  by  this  success.  Napoleon  again 
ordered  a  general  advance  all  along  the  line.  He  gathered  the 
last  5000  Guards  still  left  for  a  final  blow  at  the  British  centre. 
It  was  the  act  of  a  man  in  despair,  for  strictly  speaking  he  had  lost 
the  battle  when  the  cavalry  charge  failed,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
retire  while  the  loophole  at  Plancenoit  still  stood  open.  But  if 
he  did  so  he  was  conquered,  and  what  was  he  good  for  if  he  was 


jet.45]  The  Crash  719 

conquered?  Therefore  he  staked  everything  that  offered  even  a 
chance  of  salvation.  With  shouts  of  "  \'ive  I'Empereur!"  the 
triarii  of  his  host  dashed  forward.  And  as  if  fate  wanted  to 
deceive  her  spoiled  favourite  of  old  up  to  the  last  moment,  on  the 
right  two  important  positions  were  actually  WTested  from  the 
Enghsh,  and  the  Guards  pushed  on  to  the  very  last  line  of  the 
enemy.  But  here  at  last,  their  ranks  decimated  by  a  well- 
directed  fire,  they,  too,  weakened,  fell  into  disorder  and  retired. 
Moreover,  the  corps  of  Zieten  had  just  then  arrived  and  joined 
in  the  battle.  The  already  exhausted  French  troops  were  driven 
from  the  captured  positions;  and  thus  supported,  Wellington's 
army,  sadly  shrunken  as  it  was,  even  ventured  to  assume  the 
offensive.  It  was  now  eight  o'clock.  Half  an  hour  later,  after 
the  arrival  of  the  third  Prussian  corps,  Plancenoit  was  retaken, 
and  so  any  orderly  retreat  on  the  part  of  the  French  was  out  of 
the  question.  The  road  was  soon  impassable,  as  the  Prussian 
bullets  were  already  raking  it,  and  so  the  disorganized  host 
swept  in  wild  haste  to  the  west. 

Only  two  reserve  squares  of  the  Guard  still  held  together;  in 
one  of  these,  when  the  crash  came,  the  Emperor  took  refuge  in 
front  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  where  he  had  awaited  the  issue  of  the 
last  charge,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  English  guns.  It  escorted 
him  back  to  the  heights  of  La  Belle  Alliance.*  From  this  point 
he  tried  in  vain  to  stem  the  tide  of  fugitives  ^\^th  the  aid  of  his 
adjutants.  He  soon  had  to  think  of  his  o^\•n  safety,  and  as  his 
carriage  at  Caillou  could  no  longer  be  reached,  he  rode  across  the 
fields  to  Genappe,  guarded  only  by  grenadiers  a  cheval.  But  so 
vigorous  was  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  that  it  was  impossible  to 
halt  there;  and  Napoleon,  who  was  wont  to  suffer  pain  even  from 
a  short  ride,  had  to  stay  in  the  saddle  until  five  o'clock  in  the  morn- 

*  One  of  the  two  squares  was  broken  up.  The  second  escaped,  but 
Cambronne,  its  commanding  general,  was  forced  to  surrender.  It  has  long 
been  proved  that  he  neither  uttered  the  words  tliat  have  been  put  into  his 
mouth,  "The  Guard  dies,  but  never  surrenders,"  nor  demonstrated  their 
truth.  Bertrand  claimed  while  at  St.  Helena  to  have  heard  the  same 
words  from  General  Michel.  But  who  would  believe  Bertrand?  More- 
reliable  witnesses  than  he  ascribe  to  General  Michel  a  much  shorter  and 
more  pungent  expression. 


720  Waterloo  [\8\5 

ing,  when  he  found  a  vehicle  at  last  that  brought  him  to  Philippe- 
ville.  Then  only  could  he  give  himself  a  few  hours  of  rest.  He 
then  issued  orders  to  the  corps  not  engaged  in  the  campaign  of 
Waterloo,  wrote  the  bulletins  on  Ligny  and  Mont  Saint-Jean, 
as  he  called  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and  dictated  to  Joseph  a 
letter  which  shows  that  this  man  would  give  up  hope  only  with 
his  very  last  breath.  Everything  was  not  yet  lost,  he  declared. 
If  he  could  only  succeed  in  uniting  all  forces  at  his  disposal,  he 
would  still  have  150,000  men,  nay,  300,000  with  the  national 
guards  and  the  battahons  in  regimental  depots.  If  Grouchy 
were  not  captured,  for  he  had  heard  nothing  from  him,  it  was 
possible  to  gather  50,000  men  on  the  spot  and  hold  the  enemy 
in  check  until  Paris  and  France  had  done  their  duty.  His 
brother  must  see  to  it  that  the  Chambers  give  the  Emperor  the 
proper  support.  He  himself  closed  the  letter,  adding  in  his  own 
hand,  "Courage,  constancy] '* 


CHAPTER  XXI. 
ST.  HELENA 

Ever  since  the  Emperor  set  out  for  the  army,  Paris  had  been 
anxiously  waiting  for  news.  It  is  enough  to  show  the  burden  of 
anxiety  that  weighed  on  the  people  to  remember  that  they  feared 
the  success  of  the  war-lord  almost  as  much  as  the  defeat  of  his 
army.  And  tliat  not  only  because  in  case  of  victory  he  would  be 
the  unlimited  ruler  again  as  of  old,  and  rid  himself  of  the  bonds 
he  had  imposed  upon  liimself,  but  also  that  a  victory  was  but 
the  real  beginning  of  the  war,  and  who  knew  when  it  would  end? 
Long  ago  they  had  felt  the  violent  contrast  between  their  military 
glory  and  their  distress  as  a  nation.  And  had  not  even  that 
glory  been  strangely  dimmed  during  the  last  yeare  of  Napoleon's 
reign?  Yet  on  the  18th  of  June  the  cannon  before  the  Hotel  des 
Invalides  proclaimed  a  new  first  victory,  just  as  the  thunders  of 
artillery  were  rolling  over  Mont  Saint-Jean ;  it  W'as  the  battle  of 
Ligny.  So  the  war-god  still  showered  upon  his  favourite  the 
marks  of  his  favour.  Those  who  could  rejoice  at  the  news 
rejoiced;  they  were  the  revolutionists  and  excited  masses  of 
Paris,  glad  because  the  advocates  of  legitimacy  and  the  Bourbons 
were  humiUated,  and  the  Bonapartists,  who  rejoiced  at  the 
triumph  of  their  idol.  But  only  two  days  later  the  picture  was 
wholly  changed.  Dull  rumours  were  in  the  air  of  a  dreadful 
defeat,  and  the  cannon  were  now  silent.  On  the  21st  all  doubt 
seemed  removed;  the  army  -svas  a  wreck,  the  Emperor  in  full 
flight.  It  was  even  said  that  he  was  in  Paris.  What!  had  he 
left  the  army,  then,  instead  of  rallying  it  and  opposing  the 
enemy's  march  on  the  capital?  Men  were  beside  themselves  at 
the  thought. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Napoleon  had  been  in  Paris  ever  since  the 
early  morning  of  June  21st,  at  the  Ely  see,  where  he  had  formerly 

721 


722  '  St.  Helena  [I8ir^ 

lived.  At  Laon  he  had  discussed  with  the  officers  of  his  suite 
the  next  steps  to  be  taken,  and  had  decided  to  go  to  the  capital. 
He  supposed  Grouchy  to  be  a  prisoner  of  war,  and  now  took  in  the 
full  consequences  of  the  fateful  battle  of  Sunday.  It  had  cost 
the  French  more  than  30,000  men.  The  rest  were  scattered  to 
the  four  winds,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  a  few  thousand 
could  be  rallied  here  and  there.  And  how  easily  he  might  have 
avoided  this  and  have  conquered  a  second  time  if  he  had  only 
pursued  the  Prussians  without  delay  after  the  battle  of  Ligny 
and  then  hurled  his  army  on  the  English,  just  as  he  had  done  in 
Italy  in  1796 !  The  most  dangerous  opponent  was  already  beaten, 
and  the  other,  who  was  unwieldy  in  face  of  the  new  military 
tactics,  and  massed  his  forces  poorly,  was  isolated  and  virtually 
lost.  And  then?  Would  it  not  have  been  possible  for  diplomacy 
to  follow  close  before  arms,  and  dissolve  the  alliance  of  the  powers 
before  they  had  gained  a  victory?  "In  all  history  there  is  no 
more  decisive  battle  than  that  of  Waterloo,"  wrote  Gneisenau 
to  Hardenberg  on  June  22d;  "decisive  both  in  its  effect  on  the 
battlefield  itself,  and  in  its  moral  effect.  Had  it  been  lost,  what 
would  have  become  of  the  coalition  with  all  its  memories  of  the 
Congress?"  But  not  on  the  enemies  alone;  on  France,  too,  the 
issue  of  the  battle  of  June  18th  could  not  fail  to  have  a  powerful 
effect.  The  end  had  not  been  expected  so  suddenly.  Even  the 
sly  intriguer  Fouche,  whom  Napoleon  did  not  dare  to  set  aside, 
although  he  saw  through  him,  had  given  him  a  little  longer  time 
in  which  to  meet  his  fate;  he  had  said  to  an  aristocrat:  "This 
man  has  returned  madder  than  he  went.  He  is  making  a  mighty 
stir,  but  it  will  not  last  three  months."  Napoleon  now  saw  a 
storm  brewing  within  the  country  that  might  but  too  easily 
sweep  him  aside,  unless  he  could  lull  it  at  the  last  moment. 
Hence  he  had  hastened  to  Paris,  and  for  the  same  reason  he  now 
sat  in  company  with  his  brothers  and  ministers  considering  ways 
and  means,  although  himself  extremely  exhausted  and  nervous. 
He  seemed  to  have  found  what  he  needed.  He  tried  to  paint 
the  situation  as  regards  defensive  forces  in  the  brightest  colours, 
and  then  came  to  the  final  point:  he  needed  a  temporary  dictator- 
ship in  order  to  save  the  fatherland;  he  could  simply  assume  it 


.i:t. 45]  Facing   the   Inevitable  723 

himself,  yet  it  would  be  more  expedient  and  dignified  for  the 
Chamber  to  invest  liim  with  the  office.  But  he  had  scarcely 
made  this  suggestion  when  one  of  his  most  devoted  followers, 
Regnauld  de  Suint-Jcan  d'Angely,  announced  that  the  Cliamber 
no  longer  deemed  it  his  mission  to  save  the  fatherland,  and  that 
he  must  lay  his  abdication  before  them  as  a  sacrifice.  And  such 
was,  in  fact,  the  situation.  Lucien,  indeed,  spoke  eagerly  of 
seizing  the  power,  of  proroguing  parliament  and  proclaiming  a 
state  of  siege;  and  Napoleon,  too,  began  to  favour  this  idea. 
But  Davout,  the  Minister  of  War,  positively  refused  to  permit  the 
army  to  be  put  to  such  a  use.  A  message  now  arrived  from 
the  second  Chamber,  which  had  been  in  session  since  morning 
and  had  secret  information  of  the  councils  at  the  Elysee,  to  the 
effect  that  it  had  declared  itself  en  permanence,  that  it  held  every 
effort  to  prorogue  it  an  act  of  high  treason,  and  would  prosecute 
any  one  guilty  of  the  crime;  further,  the  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  of  the  Interior,  of  War,  and  of  Police  were  summoned 
before  the  deputies.  This  w^as  a  coup  d'etat  from  beneath,  in- 
tended to  parry  the  coup  feared  from  above,  i.e.,  from  Napoleon. 
The  deputies  of  the  people,  with  Lafayette  at  their  head,  revolted 
against  Napoleon's  law  and  will,  for  the  new  constitution  conceded 
him  the  privilege  of  dissolving  the  Chambers.  "I  see  but  one 
man  alone,"  exclaimed  the  republican  Lacoste,  "between  us  and 
peace.  Let  him  go,  and  we  are  sure  of  peace."  So  powerful 
was  this  current  of  feeling  that  it  invaded  the  upper  Chamber, 
and  the  peers  adopted  the  resolution  of  the  deputies.  What 
was  to  be  done?  Napoleon,  still  sitting  with  his  ministers,  had 
forbidden  them  to  obey  the  call  of  the  rebellious  Chamber,  when 
news  came  that  the  latter  was  on  the  point  of  putting  the  motion 
for  the  deposition  of  the  Emperor.  Then  Napoleon  yielded.  He 
sent  the  ministers  and  Lucien  to  the  deputies  with  the  message 
that  he  had  created  a  commission  consisting  of  Caulaincourt, 
Carnot,  and  Louche,  to  open  negotiations  with  the  enemies  and 
to  end  the  war,  so  far  as  that  was  compatible  with  the  honour 
and  independence  of  the  fatherland;  that  he  counted  on  the 
patriotism  of  the  parliament.  But  this  did  not  satisfy  the 
Chamber.     The  powers,  they  said,   had  proscribed  him,  they 


724  St.  Helena  [I815 

would  not  negotiate  with  him;  hence  his  commission  was  useless, 
and  parliament  itself  must  negotiate;  and  he  must  abdicate,  or 
else  he  would  be  deposed.  Then  the  deputies  elected  from  their 
own  number  five  commissioners  who,  together  with  five  peers 
and  the  ministers,  were  empowered  to  consider  means  of  saving 
the  state. 

So  passed  by  the  21st  of  June.  On  the  next  day  the  situation 
had  grown  still  more  acute,  even  his  brothers  now  advising  him  to 
abdicate.  The  deputies  waited  long  for  a  message  to  that  effect, 
but  in  vain;  finally  one  of  them  made  the  motion  that  the 
Emperor  be  requested  to  withdraw  in  the  name  of  the  public 
Welfare.  Napoleon  delayed  answering.  He  walked  up  and 
down  before  his  ministers  in  the  Elysee,  denouncing  the 
''Jacobins"  with  trembling  voice  and  distorted  features.  His 
judgment  wrestled  with  his  ambition  in  a  terrible  struggle.  He 
remained  stubborn,  as  if  he  would  cling  to  the  very  last  moments 
of  his  sway,  until  President  Lanjuinais  sent  the  commandant  of 
the  Palais  Bourbon,  where  the  sessions  were  being  held,  with  the 
demand  that  he  should  abdicate,  as  the  Chamber  would  wait 
no  longer,  and  would  declare  him  an  outlaw.  "Hors  la  loi!" 
That  was  the  shout  that  had  greeted  him  on  the  18th 
Brumaire,  when  he  was  seizing  the  reins  that  were  now 
slipping  from  his  hands.  At  that  time  he  had  coerced  the 
Chamber;  now  the  tables  were  turned.  With  that  threat  in  his 
ears  he  dictated  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22d  of  June  his  abdication 
in  favour  of  his  son  Napoleon  II.  Would  the  deputies  take  any 
notice  of  this  last  clause?  For  the  time  they  merely  expressed 
to  the  Emperor  through  a  deputation  their  thanks  for  the 
magnanimous  sacrifice  he  had  made,  and  at  once  proceeded  to 
appoint  Carnot,  Fouche,  and  Grenier,  and  the  peers  Caulaincourt 
and  Quinette,  members  of  a  provisional  government.  It 
seemed  as  if  the  circle  of  events  was  to  be  comjjlete,  when 
Napoleon  saw  rising  before  him  this  copy  of  the  Directory  of 
Five,  which  he  had  once  displaced.  Even  the  indifferent  public 
was  not  wanting  to  complete  the  parallel;  it  looked  on  now  as  it 
had  then,  without  any  sliow  of  deep  interest.  An  eye-witness  says : 
"Absolute  quiet  prevailed  in  the  city  and  was  not  disturbed  for 


iET.  45]        The  End  of  the  Hundred  Days  725 

a  moment.  Tossed  from  government  to  government,  back  and 
forth,  the  people  neither  cared  for  the  man  they  had  lost  nor  for 
the  man  who  was  to  come.  They  slept,  expecting  to  be  told  on 
awaking  whether  they  were  to  obey  Napoleon  II.  or  Louis 
XVIII."  Under  no  circumstances,  however,  Napoleon  I.  His 
reign  of  a  "Hundred  Days"  was  at  an  end. 

Of  the  population  only  the  lowest  elements,  and  that  mainly 
from  the  suburbs,  appeared  occasionally  before  the  palace  in 
groups,  shouting  for  a  dictatorship  and  cheering  the  Emperor. 
Whether  it  was  such  utterances,  or  in  general  the  embarrassment 
the  provisional  government  felt  in  having  the  discarded  Impera- 
tor  still  in  the  capital,  especially  after  news  came  that  Grouchy 
had  saved  his  corps,  that  the  troops  in  the  Vendee  were  returning 
victorious,  and  that  hence,  together  with  the  rallied  fragments 
from  Waterloo,  an  army  of  over  60,000  might  be  gathered,  all 
clamouring  for  their  leader:  whatever  the  grounds  may  have 
been,  he  was  urged  to  leave  Paris.  Davout  finally  succeeded 
in  persuading  him  to  this  step,  though,  it  is  said,  only  by  means 
of  threats.  For  Napoleon,  too,  had  learned  of  tiie  presence 
of  the  army,  and  while  he  left  the  capital  on  the  25th  of  June, 
it  was  only  to  repair  to  the  not  distant  palace  of  Malmaison 
and  there  await  the  course  of  events.  Did  he  hope  to  be  re- 
called? A  part  of  France  was  still  devoted  to  him,  though  it  was 
but  the  smallest  part  by  far.  Or  did  he  wait  for  the  army  to 
come  in  search  of  its  leader?  Be  that  as  it  may,  he  spent  the  next 
few  days  there,  apparently  absorbed  in  reminiscences  of  the  time 
when,  as  Consul,  he  conceived  in  these  same  rooms  the  plans  of 
his  universal  dominion,  and  in  weighing  the  project  of  settling 
in  the  United  States  if  France  really  thrust  him  out.  But 
meantime  the  enemy,  Bliicher's  Prussians  in  advance  of  the 
English,  had  kept  drawing  nearer,  and  soon  Malmaison  would  not 
be  safe.  Then,  at  the  last  moment,  on  June  29th,  just  after  a 
couple  of  French  regiments  had  marched  past  with  shouts  of 
"Vive  I'Empereur,"  he  determined  to  offer  his  services  to  the  pro- 
visional government  as  a  simple  general,  for  the  sole  purpose,  he 
said,  of  saving  the  capital  and  beating  the  enemy  while  his  forces 
were  separated.     Fouche,  the  leader  of  the  Five,  who  had  long 


726  St.  Helena  [I815 

since  been  in  secret  correspondence  with  a  confidential  agent  of 
Louis  XVIII.,  answered  this  rather  naive  message  by  saying  that 
Napoleon  was  entirely  mistaken  if  he  thought  the  members  of 
the  government  so  crazy  as  to  accept  his  proposal.  He  could 
give  him  only  this  advice,  to  depart  at  once,  as  the  government 
could  no  longer  be  responsible  for  his  safety.  Nor  was  that 
untrue.  We  know  to-day  that  a  Prussian  detachment  had 
received  direct  orders  to  secure  his  person  and  shoot  him.  No 
sooner  did  the  messenger  return  to  Malmaison  than  Napoleon 
gave  the  signal  for  departure.  He  took  off  his  soldier's  coat 
and  drove  aw'ay  in  civihan  garb  with  Bertrand,  Savary,  and 
Generals  Becker  and  Gourgaud. 

He  directed  his  journey  through  Tours  to  the  port  of  Roche- 
fort,  where  two  French  frigates  stood  ready  to  take  him  to 
America,  provided  it  was  possible  to  escape  the  English  cruisers. 
They  proceeded  slowly,  making  several  long  stops,  more  slowly, 
in  fact,  than  was  directed  in  the  instructions  of  General  Becker, 
"who  was  delegated  by  the  government  to  conduct  Napoleon  out 
of  the  country.  But  Napoleon  could  not  even  yet  grasp  the 
thought  that  his  part  had  now  been  played  to  the  end.  From 
Niort,  where  two  cavalry  regiments  had  once  more  cheered  him 
enthusiastically,  he  even  entered  into  a  correspondence  with 
Generals  Clauzel  and  Lamarque,  who  were  in  command  in 
Bordeaux  and  the  Vendee,  with  regard  to  the  idea  of  marching 
to  Paris  against  the  traitorous  government;  but  at  once  gave  it 
up  as  impossible.  On  the  3d  of  July  the  party  at  last  reached 
Rochefort.  Here  there  were  new  delays.  Until  the  8th  Napoleon 
spent  his  time  in  long  daily  consultations  with  his  suite,  which 
included  Councillor  of  State  Count  Las  Cases,  the  young  Montho- 
lon.  General  Lallement,  and  others,  as  to  the  best  means  of 
eluding  the  English.  Various  feasible  plans  were  proposed. 
Some  were  for  escaping  in  small  ships.  But  he  rejected  all  such 
proposals.  Becker  induced  him  with  great  difficulty  to  cross  over 
to  the  Isle  d'Aix;  here  his  brother  Joseph  came  and  said  he  had 
secured  secret  passage  for  himself  at  Bordeaux  on  an  American 
ship.  He  offered  to  let  Najioleon  take  his  (Avn  berth,  and  j)ro- 
posed    to    act   the   part    of   his   brother   at    Rochefort.      But 


^T.  45]  Seeking  Refuge  in  England  727 

Napoleon  would  not  accept  that  either.  At  last  news  from  Paris 
abruptly  put  an  end  to  all  further  procrastination.  On  the  8th 
of  July,  one  day  after  the  entry  of  the  Prussians  into  Paris, 
Louis  XVIII.  had  returned  under  England's  protection,  and  two 
days  later  the  allied  monarchs  arrived.  All  further  hesitation 
must  now  prove  fatal  to  Napoleon.  He  entered  into  correspond- 
ence with  the  captain  of  the  English  ship  Bellerophon  that  was 
blockading  the  harbour,  and  on  receiving  his  assurance  that  he 
should  be  taken  to  England  if  he  desired,  he  determined  to  imitate 
that  Athenian  who,  being  condenmed  and  banished  bj'  his 
countrymen,  sought  and  found  a  refuge  among  the  Persians, 
whom  he  had  fiercely  fought.  He  had  ended  his  career,  he  wrote 
to  the  Prince  Regent  of  England ;  he  was  coming  like  Themisto- 
cles  to  sit  at  the  hearth  of  the  British  people,  and  placed  himself 
under  the  protection  of  their  laws.  And  with  that  he  went  on 
board  the  enemy's  vessel  on  July  15th. 

Had  Napoleon  forgotten  that  the  representative  of  Great 
Britain  did  not  lag  behind  when  the  Vienna  Congress  pro- 
claimed him  an  outlaw?  The  admiral  to  whose  fleet  the  Bellero- 
phon belonged  had  long  had  strict  orders  to  seize  his  person  and 
bring  him  to  Plymouth.  What  was  he  counting  on,  then? 
For  he  certainly  was  counting  on  something.  Now  his  mes- 
sengers, after  their  second  interview  with  Captain  Maitland,  had 
reported  his  statement  that  the  Emperor  would  be  treated  with 
attention  in  England,  that  in  that  country  the  monarch  and  his 
ministers  exercise  no  arbitrary  power,  and  the  generosity  of  the 
people  and  their  liberal  opinions  stand  above  sovereignty.  This 
is  what  he  was  counting  on.  But  his  calculations  were  fallacious. 
As  soon  as  he  left  French  soil  he  was  no  longer  the  guest,  but  the 
prisoner  of  the  power  against  which  he  had  most  eagerly  waged 
war. 

And  in  what  a  plight  he  was  leaving  the  country  to  which  his 
unconquerable  ambition  had  brought  him  back!  Conquered  in 
the  field,  overrun  by  enemies,  torn  by  parties  which  his  return 
had  definitely  arrayed  against  each  other:  such  was  France  after 
the  day  of  Waterloo.  No  sooner  had  the  news  of  the  lost  battle 
reached  Provence  than  the  royalist  fury  broke  loose  and  began 


728  St.  Helena  [1815 

a  slaughter  among  the  Bonapartists,  repubUcans,  and  Protestants 
of  Marseilles,  Nimes,  Avignon,  Toulouse  and  Toulon,  which  did 
not  fall  behind  the  infamous  scenes  of  the  Jacobin  Terror. 
Below  raged  the  mob ;  above,  the  Camarilla ;  their  victims  were 
all  who  had  yielded  to  the  seductions  of  the  Corsican,  The 
names  of  those  faithful  to  him  were  collected  in  proscription 
lists,  and  all  who  could  not  escape  were  executed.  So  perished 
Labedoyere,  who  had  brought  his  regiment  to  Napoleon  at 
Grenoble ;  so  also  Ney,  whom  death  had  passed  by  at  Waterloo, 
though  he  sought  it  in  his  despair.  And  the  family  whose 
various  members  had  filled  the  thrones  of  Europe  as  long  as  the 
all-embracing  sceptre  of  the  greatest  of  them  intimidated  the 
world,  who  now  in  Plymouth  roads  was  a  spectacle  for  the 
gaping  EngUsh,  w^as  now  soon  scattered  in  every  direction, 
homeless  as  when  it  had  been  obliged  to  take  flight  from  Ajaccio 
twenty-two  years  before. 

On  the  night  of  June  25th  the  Bellerophon  put  out  to  sea,  and 
on  the  next  morning  reached  the  coast  of  England.  The  ship 
was  kept  here  under  strict  surveillance  a  few  days,  until  the  gov- 
ernment at  London  should  determine  the  fate  of  the  prisoner. 
They  would  have  much  preferred  to  see  him  fall  into  the  hands  of 
Louis  XVIII.,  to  be  executed  as  a  rebel,  as  the  British  premier 
Liverpool  wrote  to  Castlereagh  July  20th.  But  Napoleon  had 
escaped  that  fate,  and  whether  they  would  or  no  they  must  take 
up  the  question  of  his  future.  Their  decision  was  announced  to 
him  on  the  30th.  As  it  would  be  incompatible  with  their  duties 
to  England  herself  as  well  as  to  the  allies  of  her  king — so  ran  the 
announcement— if  "General  Bonaparte"  still  had  the  means  or 
opportunity  of  again  disturbing  the  peace  of  Europe,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  limit  his  personal  freedom.  Accordingly  the  island  of 
8t.  Helena  had  been  appointed  to  be  his  future  abode;  the 
climate  was  healthy  and  the  isolation  of  the  island  would  permit 
of  his  being  treated  with  greater  consideration  than  would  be 
possible  elsewhere  on  account  of  necessary  precautions.  He 
was  allowed  to  take  with  him  three  officers,  a  physician,  and 
twelve  servants,  who  could  not,  however,  leave  the  island  again 
except  by  permission  of  the  English  government.    This  was  the 


iET.  45]  A   Prisoner  729 

sentence.  It  could  have  been  no  great  surprise  to  Napoleon, 
for  the  name  of  St.  Helena  had  come  up  in  the  negotiations  of 
the  Congress;  and  his  mind  must  have  been  prepared  for  the 
removal  from  Europe,  as  he  had  been  threatened  with  it  while 
still  at  P]lba.  80  that  when  he  now  protested  against  the  violence 
done  him,  when  he  appealed  to  the  fact  that  he  had  come  without 
constraint  on  to  an  English  ship,  and  was  therefore  England's 
guest  and  not  her  prisoner,  he  could  have  had  but  one  purpose, 
i.e.,  to  impress  public  opinion  in  that  country  in  his  favour  and 
to  exercise  an  influence  upon  it  that  might  at  no  distant  date,  if 
not  immediately,  loosen  his  fetters.  We  shall  see  him  continue 
to  live  and  act  with  this  thought  constantly  before  him.  It  was 
in  vain,  of  course.  The  situation  was  not  so  simple  as  all  that; 
it  was  not  England  alone  that  fixed  his  destiny.  At  the  same 
time,  August  2d,  1815,  a  treaty  was  signed  in  Paris  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  allies,  declaring  Napoleon  to  be  a  prisoner  of 
all  the  four  powers  which  had  concluded  the  agreement  of  the 
25th  of  March.  To  England  W'as  conceded  only  the  task  of 
guarding  him  and  the  choice  of  a  place  of  confinement;  the 
other  goA'ernments  reserved  the  right  to  send  commissioners  to 
his  destination  to  make  sure  of  his  presence  there. 

On  the  7th  of  August  Napoleon  embarked  in  the  ship  of  the 
line  Northumberland  which  was  to  bear  him  to  St.  Helena. 
He  had  chosen  as  companions  Bertrand,  Las  Cases,  and  Mon- 
tholon,  but  General  Gourgaud  also  managed  to  gain  permission 
to  sail  with  him.  They  took  their  families  along.  Besides 
these,  O'Meara  ship's  surgeon  of  the  Bellerophon,  accom- 
panied the  Emperor.  His  farewell  from  Savary,  whose  com- 
pany had  been  expressly  denied  him  by  the  British  govern- 
ment, is  described  as  deeply  touching.  "You  see,  my  lord," 
said  Las  Cases  to  the  British  admiral,  "those  who  stay  behind 
are  weeping."  Three  days  later,  on  August  10th,  the  North- 
umberland with  her  escort  of  two  frigates  had  left  the  Eng- 
lish Channel,  and  the  coast  of  Europe  vanished  from  the  gaze  of 
the  exile. 

On  the  loth  of  October  the  gloomy  island,  with  its  walls  of 
rock  rising  almost  perpendicularly  from  the  sea,  came  in  sight. 


73°  St.  Helena  [1815 

In  its  solitary  harbour,  Jamestown,  the  Northumberland  cast 
anchor.  The  destined  home  of  Napoleon,  the  farm-house 
of  Longwood,  was  on  an  elevated  plateau  with  somewhat 
cooler  climate;  but  it  was  not  ready  for  occupancy,  and  mean- 
time he  found  shelter  in  the  neighbouring  villa  of  "The  Briars" 
belonging  to  the  merchant  Balcombe.  Here  he  was  on  most 
friendly  terms  with  the  inmates,  played  with  the  children  and 
good-humouredly  put  up  with  their  jokes.  Not  until  December 
did  he  change  his  residence  to  Longwood.  There,  at  some 
distance  from  the  house,  a  military  cordon  was  established, 
within  which  his  movements  were  perfectly  free;  if  he  left  it, 
an  English  officer  was  to  accompany  him.  But  this  was  not 
allowed  when  ships  came  in  sight;  at  such  times  neither  he 
nor  any  of  his  suite  could  hold  any  intercourse  with  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  island.  All  letters  addressed  to  Longwood  or 
written  there  were  subject  to  inspection  by  the  Governor.  This 
officer  was  not  appointed  in  1815,  and  Admiral  Cockburn  who 
was  stationed  in  these  waters,  temporarily  acted  in  that  capac- 
ity. In  November  Napoleon  entered  a  protest  through  his 
"master  of  the  horse,"  Bertrand,  against  these  precautionary 
measures,  but  it  was  returned  to  him  because  an  "Emperor" 
Napoleon  was  referred  to  in  it,  whereas  the  admiral  knew  onl}' 
of  a  "General"  Bonaparte.  This  was  the  signal  for  a  petty 
Warfare  between  the  colony  of  prisoners  and  the  authorities, 
which  only  grew  more  bitter  after  the  arrival  of  the  new  Gov- 
ernor, Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  who  began  to  administer  office  with 
a  pedantic  strictness  that  was  unnecessary.  He,  too,  disre- 
garded the  title  of  emperor,  and  this  course  was,  strictly  speak- 
ing, not  incorrect.  For  England  had  never  acknowledged 
Napoleon's  imperial  dignity  during  his  reign,*  and  had  done  so 
only  temporarily  while  he  was  at  Elba.  She  was  now  under  no 
obligations  whatever  to  acknowlcMlge  it  after  the  violation  of  the 
treaty. t    Lowe  had  once  defended  Capri  against  the  French,  how- 

*Cf.  Rose,  II.  490.— B. 

j-  The  question  came  up  once  ut  the  end  of  1816  between  Napoleon  and 

Admiral  Malcolm  (who  replaced  CV)ckl)urn).  When  the  admiral  informed 
Napoleon  that  \ui  could  no  longer  be  treated  as  a  sovereign,  he  replied: 


/Et. 46]  Napoleon   at  Longwood  731 

ever,  and  in  the  war  of  liberation  had  been  assigned  to  Bliicher's 
headquarters.  There  he  was  very  likely  to  hear  reports  not 
highly  flattering  to  him  who  was  now  entrusted  to  his  k  eping. 
In  any  case  he  did  his  duty  as  governor,  although  with  a  moody 
reserve,  without  waste  of  words,  always  punctilious  about  his 
office,  yet  without  the  malignity  that  was  ascribed  to  him  in 
Long^vood. 

In  this  low  one-storied  farm-house  the  company  had  estab- 
lished itself  after  a  fashion.  Napoleon  had  a  rather  plain  bed- 
room with  a  bath,  a  salon  with  billiard-table  on  which  he  liked 
to  play,  a  dining-room,  and  an  apartment  that  was  called,  in 
memory  of  old  times,  the  "topographical  cabinet."  In  the 
same  building  lived  also  the  two  Las  Cases,  father  and  son, 
Montholon  and  his  wife,  and  General  Gourgaud;  Bertrand  and 
his  family  occupied  a  second  house  at  some  distance.  As 
far  as  circumstances  permitted  the  appearance  of  court  life 
was  zealously  maintained,  the  ladies  appearing  at  table  in  full 
dress,  the  Emperor  wearing  the  great  cross  of  the  Legion  of 
Honour.  He  divided  his  time  between  working  on  his  memoirs, 
often  dictating  for  hours  without  weariness  to  Las  Cases,  Gour- 
gaud, or  Montholon ;  billiards,  chess,  reading  the  English  papers, 
which  he  had  just  learned  to  read  for  himself,  and  new  books 
that  were  sent  him.  In  the  evening  he  would  read  aloud 
from  Voltaire  or  Corneille,  the  Odyssey  or  the  Bible,  and  was 
not  exactly  edified  when  one  or  another  of  the  listening  ladies 
quite  disrespectfully  fell  asleep.  No  little  time  was  taken  up 
by  the  feud  with  Lowe.  Napoleon  sometimes  indulged  in  a 
fit  of  unjust  rage  at  that  officer.  Once  he  threatened  to  blow 
out  the  brains  of  the  first  man  that  crossed  his  threshold  with- 
out his  consent;  another  time  he  called  the  governor  his  execu- 
tioner. Finally,  the  latter  showed  himself  no  more,  but  simply 
took  the  English  officer's  report  as  to  Napoleon's  presence. 

"Why  not?  In  my  present  situation  these  honours  should  he  left  me  for 
my  enjoj'ment.  What  harm  can  it  do  on  this  cliff?"  When  asked,  how- 
ever, whether  they  were  to  term  him  Emperor,  he  had  to  answer  with  a 
negative,  since  he  had  abdicated,  adding,  however,  that  he  had  not  been 
General  since  leaving  F^gypt.  He  proposed  simply  "Napoleon,"  and  the 
Governor  also  finally  adopted  that. 


732  St.  Helena  [1815-21 

In  general  it  may  be  said  that  Napoleon  was  pursuing  a 
definite,  systematic  line  of  action  based  on  the  hope  of  his  ulti- 
mate deliverance.  He  would  not  flee,  nor  be  set  free  by  vio- 
lence. The  opportunity  for  the  latter  was  repeatedly  held  up 
to  view;  in  particular,  some  of  his  faithful  followers  who  had 
escaped  to  America  and  taken  part  in  the  revolt  of  Brazil  against 
Portugal  thought  they  might  risk  an  attack  on  St.  Helena 
from  that  (|uarter,  and  sent  word  to  the  prisoner  by  means  of 
insertions  in  cipher  in  the  English  paper  "  The  Anti-Gallican," 
But  that  was  no  part  of  Napoleon's  plan.  He  was  too  much 
concerned  about  his  personal  safety  for  that.  "I  could  not 
be  in  America  six  months,"  he  said  to  Montholon,  "without 
being  attacked  by  the  murderers  which  the  royalist  committees 
that  returned  to  France  in  the  train  of  Count  d'Artois  have 
hired  against  me.  In  America  I  see  nothing  but  murder  and 
obUvion,  so  I  prefer  to  stay  on  St.  Helena."  "  Murder  and 
oblivion":  he  dreaded  the  one  as  much  as  the  other.  But  that 
did  not  betoken  any  resignation;  no,  he  rather  looked  with 
confidence  for  deliverance  through  the  victory  of  the  English 
Opposition,  or  through  the  exile  of  the  B  urbons  from  France. 
When  Lowe  shortly  after  his  arrival  offered  to  have  a  new  house 
erected  for  him  within  two  years,  he  replied:  "Ah!  in  two  years' 
time  there  will  be  a  change  of  ministry  in  England  or  else  a 
new  government  in  France,  and  I  shall  not  be  here  any  longer."  * 
This  conviction  is  in  full  accord  with  his  twofold  aim  of  creat- 
ing, on  the  one  hand,  a  sentiment  among  the  English  in  his 
favour,  and  of  winning  again,  on  the  other,  the  lost  confidence 
of  the  French. 

He  thought  the  former  would  be  accomplished  if  he  succeeded 
in  discrediting  the  official  of  the  Tory  ministry  and  represent- 
ing himself  as  the  victim  of  unexampled  arbitrariness.  Hence 
every  one  of  the  regulations  had  the  taint  of  suspicion  thrown 
upon  it,  and  its  effect  was  exaggerated.     The  regulation  for- 

*  Lowe  gave  the  French  commissioner  Montchenu  his  word  of  honour 
that  Napoleon  had  uttered  these  words,  although  the  latter  subsequently 
denied  uttering  them.  The  new  house  was  begun  after  all,  and  was  com- 
pleted in  1820. 


^T. 4fi-5i]  His  Relations  with  Lowe  733 

bidding  long  "walks  except  under  escort  of  an  English  officOT 
was  met  with  the  determination  to  forego  exercise  entirely; 
the  evil  consequences  of  this  course  on  his  health  were  then 
laid  at  the  door  of  the  Governor,  who  was  thus  depriving  him 
of  free  movement,  and  of  the  government  which  permitted  his 
health  to  be  ruined  in  such  a  baleful  climate.  Once  when 
Lowe,  none  too  gently,  perhaps,  touched  on  the  question  of 
provisions.  Napoleon  ordered  some  of  his  silver  plate  to  be 
broken  up  and  sold  in  order  to  get  some  money;  but  his  chief 
aim  in  so  doing  was  to  show  to  what  sacrifices  he  was  reduced 
by  the  parsimony  of  this  regime.  All  this  had  to  be  speedily 
made  known  to  the  public.  This  was  accomplished  by  the 
"Letters  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,"  which  either  he  dic- 
tated or  directed  Las  Cases  to  compose.  They  presented  a 
long  list  of  the  sins  of  Lowe  and  the  sufferings  of  those  under 
his  protection.  They  were  sent  secretly  to  London,  and  ap- 
peared there  in  1817,  ostensibly  as  the  production  of  an  Eng- 
lishman.* The  climate  is  there  represented  as  baleful,  the 
temperature  hot  and  cold  in  sudden  changes.  And  yet  Na- 
poleon himself  had  said  once  to  his  suite  confidentially  that  if 
one  must  live  in  exile,  St.  Helena  was  after  all  the  best  spot; 
the  weather  in  fact  was  monotonous  and  not  very  healthy, 
but  the  temperature  was  mild  and  pleasant. f  And — so  ran 
the  letters — what  makes  the  climate  still  more  pernicious  in 
its  effects  is  the  restraint  on  his  movements  and  his  intercourse 
with  others  which  the  new  Governor  imposed  on  the  prisoner; 

*  The  "Letters  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  in  reply  to  M.  Warden, 
'  Letters  written  from  Saint  Helena'"  (London,  Piccadilly,  1817),  have  been 
included  in  a  retranslation  into  French  as  "Lettres  du  Cap  de  Bonne  Es- 
p^rance,"  with  the  collected  works  of  Napoleon  in  the  last  volume  of  his 
officially  edited  correspondence  (Vol.  XXX).  They  are  addressed  to  a 
Lady  C.  and  connect  themselves  with  a  book  published  in  1816  by  Warden, 
ship's  surgeon  on  the  Northumberland.  Lady  C.  manifestly  means 
that  Lady  Clavering,  a  Frenchwoman,  to  whom  Las  Cases  wanted  to  send 
secretly  a  servant  picked  up  on  the  island.  The  latter,  however,  revealed 
the  plan  and  so  brought  on  the  arrest  of  Las  Ca.ses  and  his  separation  from 
Napoleon.     (Schlitter,  "Stiirmers  Berichte,"  p.  49.) 

tLas  Cases,  "Memorial,"  Feb.  1,  1816. 


734  St.  Helena  Im5-^1 

and  yet  he  is  really  no  prisoner,  as  he  voluntarily  put  himself 
under  England's  protection  when  it  was  still  in  his  power  to 
place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  army  and  carry  on  the  war. 
"It  was  the  mistaken  ideas  Napoleon  had  formed  of  the  influ- 
ence of  a  great,  free,  and  generous  people  on  its  own  government 
that  led  him  to  prefer  the  protection  of  the  EngHsh  laws  to 
that  of  a  father-in-law  or  of  an  old  friend"  (Alexander  I.). 
This  was  intended  for  the  same  address  as  the  closing  sentences 
in  which  one  can  hardly  fail  to  recognize  Napoleon's  style. 
"This  spectacle  of  persecution  and  injustice  has  always  roused 
my  indignation.  Judge  of  my  feelings  when  I  saw  so  basely 
tortured  a  man  who  had  been  victor  in  sixty  battles,  and  once 
was  the  ruler  of  so  many  nations  and  kings.  Then  I  said  to 
myself:  'I  honour  thee  still  more  with  the  thorny  crown  that 
foreign  power  has  pressed  on  thy  brow  than  with  the  many 
diadems  that  once  adorned  it.'  " 

But  this  appeal  proved  fruitless.  For  as  early  as  March, 
1817,  when  Lord  Holland  of  the  opposition  brought  Napoleon's 
charges,  drawn  up  in  a  written  statement  by  Montholon,  before 
the  upper  house,  the  Lords  supported  the  Ministry;  and  even 
some  of  Holland's  own  party  voted  against  his  motion  to  lay 
the  correspondence  with  Lowe  before  Parliament  for  judg- 
ment. This  disposed  of  Napoleon  for  the  time  being,  and  the 
"Letters  from  the  Cape"  fell  flat.  For  although  the  Whigs 
urged  in  his  favour  that  he  alone  of  all  men  would  be  in  a  posi- 
tion at  the  head  of  France  to  hold  the  balance  on  the  Continent 
against  Great  Britain's  growing  rival,  Russia,  yet  the  country 
was  so  tired  of  all  hostilities  that  this  reason  for  releasing  the 
prisoner  was  given  no  weight.*  On  the  contrary,  the  Liverpool- 
Castlereagh  cabinet  joined  the  Continental  powers  at  the  Con- 

*  Cf.  Schlitter,  "Kaiser  Franz  I.  und  die  Napoleoniden,"  p.  32.  It  is 
a  striking  coincidence  that  Napoleon,  too,  in  conversation  with  Englishmen 
who  visited  him  with  passes  from  the  governor  and  whom  he  never  failed 
to  greet  in  the  most  cordial  manner,  brought  up  the  same  point.  For 
instance,  in  the  summer  of  1817  he  said  to  Lord  Amherst:  "Russia  is  the 
power  that  is  now  most  to  be  feared.  France  and  England  are  the  only 
nations  for  whose  interest  it  is  to  oppose  her  plans."  (Scott,  Life  of 
Napoleon,  Vol.  IX,  Appendix  IX.) 


-SIt.  46-51]  The  End  Approaches  735 

gress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  an  a^reoniont  "concorninjz;  the  ru- 
mours, started  in  England  and  repeated  in  other  parts  of  Europe, 
as  to  the  treatment  accorded  the  man  whose  ominous  renown 
has  not  yet  ceased  to  agitate  the  world."  And  the  representa- 
tives of  Russia,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Englantl  declared  in  a  pro- 
tocol issued  on  November  30,  1818,  "that  the  stricter  instruc- 
tions of  the  British  government  to  Hudson  Lowe  meet  with  the 
unanimous  approval  of  all  the  signatory  powers";  further, 
"  that  all  correspondence  with  the  prisoner,  any  sending  of  money 
or  other  communication,  which  is  not  submitted  to  the  inspec- 
tion of  the  governor,  must  be  regarded  as  an  attack  on  the 
public  safety  and  punished  accordingly." 

Thus  did  the  Continent,  hand  in  hand  with  England,  Rus- 
sians side  by  side  with  the  British,  bring  to  naught  Napoleon's 
hope  of  a  favourable  turn  of  affairs.  So  far  he  himself  had 
reaped  nothing  but  disadvantages.  For  Lowe,  ha\'ing  discov- 
ered the  secret  correspondence  ^^^th  Europe  and  America,  felt 
obliged  to  double  his  precautions.  Las  Cases  had  been  arrested 
and  sent  away  from  the  island  as  early  as  November,  1816,  and  a 
year  and  a  half  later  O'Meara  was  treated  in  the  same  way. 
Perhaps  both  of  these  had  counted  on  their  removal  in  order 
to  work  as  missionaries  in  the  cause  of  the  Exile.*  In  his  petty 
warfare  with  the  Governor  Napoleon  had  imposed  restrictions 
on  himself  that  actually  began  to  result  in  injury  to  his  health; 
in  particular,  he  omitted  all  exercise.  He  became  seriously  ill. 
The  symptoms  of  a  disease  inherited  from  his  father,  cancer  of 
the  stomach,  manifested  themselves  in  frequent  shooting  pains 
and  nausea.  He  himself  was  not  unconscious  of  his  condition, 
and  the  less  so  when  he  heard  later  that  his  oldest  sister  had 
died  of  the  same  disease.  As  he  refused  the  ser\'ices  of  the 
physicians  recommended  by  the  Governor,  Fesch  managed  to 
send  to  St.  Helena  an  Italian  named  Antommarchi,  a  surgeon 
of  Corsican  descent,  who  arrived  in  September,  1819.  Acting 
on  his  advice,  Napoleon  changed  his  manner  of  life,  cultivated  a 
garden  in  w^hich  he  worked  every  day,  took  rides  on  horseback, 

*  Gourgaud,  too,  left  him,  ostensibly  on  account  of  a  quarrel  \\nth 
Montholon.      (Schlitter,  "Sturmers  Berichte,"  pp.  122,  127.) 


736  St.  Helena  [I821 

and  even  made  a  sort  of  truce  with  the  Governor.  The  latter 
on  his  part  met  him  half-way,  by  extending  to  a  range  of  thir- 
teen miles  the  territory  on  which  his  prisoner  was  free  to  come 
and  go  without  a  guard.  Of  what  use  would  the  feud  be  now? 
Public  opinion  in  England  remained  unresponsive,  and  mean- 
time Napoleon's  condition  had  become  incurable  and  was  grow- 
ing worse  every  day  in  spite  of  his  change  of  regimen. 

On  the  last  night  of  the  year  1820  he  for  the  last  time  talked 
in  a  confidential  way  of  past  events.  Thenceforward  his  dis- 
ease had  a  rapid  course.  The  restless,  ever-busy  man  became 
faint  and  weary,  lay  in  his  easy  chair,  and  had  no  more  relish 
for  any  occupation,  although  he  forced  himself  to  dictate  now 
and  then  and  to  arrange  his  papers.  With  difficulty  could  he 
be  persuaded  to  go  into  the  open  air.  He  lost  flesh  perceptibly, 
as  he  could  not  retain  any  nourishment.  His  pulse,  which  had 
never  been  higher  than  sixty  to  sixty-five,  now  became  feverish. 
Antommarchi  having  made  an  incorrect  diagnosis,  the  patient 
was  not  satisfied  and  asked  for  an  older  and  more  experienced 
physician  from  the  Paris  Clinic.  But  before  his  wish  could 
reach  the  Continent  he  had  ceased  to  live.  On  the  15th  of 
April,  after  an  English  army  surgeon  had  perceived  the  critical 
condition  of  the  prisoner,  he  dictated  his  testament  to  Montho- 
lon.  In  this  he  distributed  among  his  most  faithful  followers 
the  six  million  francs  which  had  been  deposited  with  the  Paris 
banker  Laffitte  before  his  departure  from  Malmaison;  also 
various  relics.  Soon  after,  the  fits  of  vomiting  grew  so  fre- 
quent that  death  was  to  be  looked  for  at  any  moment  as  a  con- 
sequence of  a  sudden  failing  of  strength.  On  the  3d  of  May 
his  mind,  which  had  remained  clear  until  then,  began  to  wander. 
Two  days  later  began  the  death-struggle,  and  on  the  evening  of 
the  5th  of  May,  1821,  at  ten  minutes  before  six  o'clock,  he  died. 
After  the  autopsy,  which  was  performed  at  his  own  request,  the 
body  was  embalmed  and  clad  in  the  uniform  which  the  Emperor 
had  been  wont  to  wear;  he  was  then  buried  not  far  from  Long- 
wood.  The  cannons  of  St.  Helena  saluted  the  dead  enemy, 
and  Great  Britain's  officers  stood  in  profound  reverence  about 
his  fresh  grave. 


Mr.  51]  Shaping   History  737 

The  historian  of  Napoleon  I.  is  not  yet  at  liberty  to  lay  aside 
his  pen,  now  that  the  eyes  of  that  extraordinary  man  have  lost 
forever  their  fires  of  genius.  He  has  still  to  reckon  with  a  wealth 
of  literary  remains  on  which  he  must  pass  judgment,  especially 
as  they  constitute  an  appeal  to  the  memory  of  coming  genera- 
tions. For  only  the  last  struggle  with  death  put  an  end  to  his 
unceasing  efforts  to  establish  his  prestige;  and  nowhere,  per- 
haps, was  he  more  indefatigable  in  these  efforts  than  on  the 
rocky  island  in  the  Atlantic.  We  have  seen  how  constantly 
he  busied  himself  in  trying  to  turn  opinion  in  England  in  his 
favour.  This  was  the  purpose  of  the  "Letters  from  the  Cape," 
and  every  conversation  with  English  visitors  had  the  same 
end  in  view.  But  we  have  also  seen  him  pursuing  another  goal : 
the  French,  and  they  above  all,  should  recover  their  faith  in 
him  when  they  had  once  throwii  off  the  yoke  of  the  Bourbons. 
To  gain  this  end  he  was  untiring  in  his  activity  from  the  moment 
he  set  foot  on  the  Northumberland.  The  works  wiiich  he  dic- 
tated, on  board  ship  and  afterwards  at  The  Briars  and  Long- 
wood,  sometimes  with  excessive  haste  as  if  to  make  up  for  lost 
time,  and  the  interviews  with  his  faithful  followers,  whose  duty 
it  w'as  to  give  widest  publicity  to  his  words — all  these  served  this 
one  end.  First  of  all  his  fame  as  a  general  must  be  regarded 
as  without  a  blemish.  Hence  he  rubbed  and  scrubbed  away  at 
the  blot  of  Waterloo,  until  he  made  it  appear  that  it  was  not 
Napoleon  who  lost  that  battle  but  Grouchy,  who,  although 
sent  after  the  Prussians  to  Wavre  ( ! ),  rendered  the  success  of 
Ligny  nugatory  by  his  poorly  conducted  operations.  And  the 
fact  that  that  success  was  not  more  decisive,  so  that  Bliichcr 
was  ready  to  fight  again  two  days  later,  was  not  all  Napoleon's 
fault;  it  was  the  fault  of  Ney,  w^ho  did  not  advance  rapidly 
enough  on  the  16th  of  June  despite  urgent  orders.  No  wonder 
that  the  brilliant  plans  of  the  Emperor  came  to  naught  under 
such  circumstances !  *    This  was  what  Napoleon  dictated,  and 

*  Compare,  e.g.,  with  the  facts  now  established,  as  stated  briefly  in 
the  foregoing  chapter,  the  following  passage  in  Napoleon's  "Campagne 
de  1815" :  "Marshal  Grouchy  started  away  with  the  cavalry  of  Excelman 
and  Pajol,  the  third  and  fourth  infantry  corps,  and  Teste's  division  of  the 


738  St.  Helena  [I82i 

Ms  officers  wrote  it  do\\Ti.  This  was  the  reward  of  his  valiant 
followers:  of  Grouchy,  who  was  racking  his  brains  in  America, 
thinking  how  he  could  free  his  master  from  captivity;  of  Ney, 
who,  almost  ere  his  body  was  under  the  sod,  was  thus  calum- 
niated by  the  very  man  for  whom  he  suffered  death.  The 
manuscript  of  the  "Campagne  de  1815'"  was  smuggled  into 
Europe  as  secretly  as  the  "Letters  from  the  Cape,"  and  was 
published  in  1818  Gourgaud  was  named  as  the  author,  yet 
every  line  betrays  the  true  author.  Well,  it  accomplished  its 
end,  and  did  it  so  completely  that  even  several  decades  later 
historians  of  distinction  accepted  blindly  the  representations 
of  the  captive.  But  other  failures  of  his  on  the  battlefield  had 
to  be  glossed  over.  In  Russia,  the  war  agains-t  which  grew  "out 
of  a  misunderstanding,"  he  told  O'Meara,  the  premature  cold 
was  to  blame  for  the  misfortune  of  liis  army.  He  had  made  a 
careful  examination  of  the  weather  records  for  fifty  years  back, 
and  found  that  the  severest  cold  never  began  before  the  20th  of 
December,  that  is,  twenty  days  later  than  in  1812.  With  the 
thermometer  at  —18°  Reaumur*  30,000  horses  perished  in  a 
single  night.  The  artillery,  ammunition,  and  provisions  could  no 
longer  be  transported,  no  reconnoissances  were  possible;  as  a 
consequence  the  troops  fell  into  disorder.  In  the  battle  on  the 
Moskwa  he  fought  with  90,000  men,  the  Russians  with  250,000; 
in  the  burning  metropolis  he  risked  his  life  in  the  flames,  scorched 
his  hair  and  eyebrows  and  clothes,  etc.  All  this  was  received 
and  written  down  with  credence,  and  soon  afterwards  given 
to  the  world  as  the  truth  of  history. 

By  the  way,  Napoleon  also  dictated  various  other  matters: 
the  narrative  of  the  beginnings  of  his  military  career,  his  share 
in  the  siege  of  Toulon  and  in  the  Itahan  wars,  his  expedition 
into  Egypt,  the  campaign  of  1800;  in  short,  all  his  achievements 

sixth.  His  orders  were  to  follow  on  the  heels  of  the  Prussian  army  and 
prevent  its  rallying,  and  he  was  explicitly  charged  to  keep  himself  always 
between  the  Charleroi-Brussels  road  and  Marshal  Bliicher,  in  order  to  be 
in  constant  touch  with  the  army  and  ready  at  any  time  to  join  it.  It  was 
probable  that  Marshal  Hliicher  would  retire  to  Wavre;  he  was  to  be  there 
at  the  same  time."  Was  there  ever  a  bolder  perversion  of  the  truth? 
*  About  9°  below  zero,  Fahrenheit. 


^T.  51]  The   Napoleonic   Legend  739 

ill  the  service  of  the  Revolution.  But  nothing  else.  Why  was 
this?  Why  not  relate  his  great  exploits  at  Austerlitz  and  Jena, 
at  Friedland  and  in  Bavaria?  Did  death  cut  short  the  thread 
of  his  narrative?  Not  that,  for  we  know  that  in  the  last  years 
he  composed  works  on  military  history  in  which  he  passed 
judgment  on  the  deeds  of  Csesar,  Turenne,  and  Frederick  the 
Great,  and  all  of  which  are  preserved.  What  could  have  de- 
terred him  from  telling  more  and  still  greater  deeds  of  his  own? 
A  simple  line  of  reasoning,  which  had  already  been  his  guide 
when  he  escaped  from  Elba:  it  was  the  Revolution  which  was 
to  expel  the  Bourbons,  and  he  was  the  man  of  the  Revolution; 
just  see  how  he  fought  for  it;  none  better.  Not  a  word,  there- 
fore, of  the  time  when  he  himself  ruled  France  as  an  autocrat; 
not  a  word  of  the  wars  of  conquest  on  which  he  was  to  found 
his  universal  empire  and  which  roused  all  Europe  against  him. 
Everything  was  Liberty  and  universal  Peace,  that  was  the  trend 
of  his  labours  To  be  sure,  occasionally  a  discordant  note 
might  steal  in;  as,  for  example,  when  IMontholon  reports  a  con- 
versation with  an  English  officer  in  which  Napoleon  said  that 
the  less  liberty  monarchs  wished  to  give,  the  more  assiduously 
they  must  speak  of  it,  for  the  iron  rod  with  which  men  are 
ruled  must  be  gilded.  But  such  slips  were  rare.  In  general 
a  single  theme  monopolizes  all  these  conversations:  the  Bour- 
bons will  be  driven  away,  because  they  represent  only  a  royalty 
of  the  nobles  and  the  priests,  not  of  the  people,  but  the  latter 
cannot  afford  to  snatch  at  rule  for  itself,  France  is  secured  from 
such  a  step  by  her  memories  of  the  Terror  under  the  Convention 
and  of  the  pitiable  failure  of  the  Directory;  her  only  safety  lies 
in  a  popular  monarchy.  "Under  a  monarchical  system  of  gov- 
ernment," said  Napoleon  to  his  suite  in  the  summer  of  1816, 
"the  rule  of  my  dynasty  can  alone  furnish  guarantees  for  the 
true  interests  of  the  people,  for  it  is  the  creation  of  the  people." 
When  he  said  this  he  was  still  full  of  hope  for  himself.  Five 
years  later,  but  two  weeks  before  his  death,  he  gave  utterance 
to  the  same  thought;  but  this  time  it  was  only  in  the  interest 
of  his  son.  "The  Bourbons/'  he  said,  "will  not  hold  out.  After 
my  death  a  reaction  in  my  favour  will  set  in,  even  in  England. 


740 


St.  Helena  [is2i 


After  some  civil  disturbances  my  son  will  come  to  the  throne. 
Great  things  are  accomplished  in  France  only  when  one  leans 
on  the  masses.  My  son  must  be  a  man  of  the  new  ideas  and 
represent  the  cause  I  made  to  prevail  everywhere;  he  must 
carry  out  everywhere  the  new  ideas,  which  obliterate  the  traces 
of  the  feudal  system,  make  secure  the  dignity  of  man  and  develop 
the  seeds  of  happiness  that  have  been  lying  dormant  for  ages; 
he  must  bestow  upon  the  people  at  large  what  has  hitherto  been 
the  privileged  possession  of  the  few;  he  must  unite  Europe  in 
the  bonds  of  an  indissoluble  federation  and  spread  the  benefits 
of  Christian  civilization  in  all  the  still  uncivilized  portions  of 
the  globe.  That  must  be  the  goal  of  all  my  son's  thoughts, 
that  is  the  cause  for  which  I  die  a  martyr.  Let  him  take  the 
hate  with  which  oligarchs  pursue  me  as  a  measure  of  the  sacred- 
ness  of  my  cause." 

His  works,  dictations,  and  judgments  were  intended  to  raise 
his  image  above  the  rude  reaUty  of  facts  into  an  ideal  sphere, 
and  it  was  the  same  result  that  he  sought  to  accomplish  also 
by  his  testament,  always  looking  forward  to  the  future  of  his 
dynasty  in  France  and  always  with  the  same  contempt  for 
truth.  In  that  document  we  read:  "I  wish  my  ashes  to  rest 
on  the  banks  of  the  Seine,  in  the  midst  of  the  French  people 
that  I  have  so  dearly  loved."  And  farther  on:  "I  recom- 
mend to  my  son  never  to  forget  that  he  is  a  born  French  prince, 
and  never  to  permit  himself  to  be  used  as  a  tool  in  the  hands  of 
the  three  rulers  who  are  oppressing  the  nations  of  Europe.  He 
must  never  fight  against  France,  never  injure  her  in  anyway;  he 
must  adopt  my  motto:  'Everything  for  the  French  people.'" 
Nay,  more:  to  avoid  hurting  any  of  the  feelings  sacred  to  the 
people,  he,  the  unbeliever,  sent  for  priests  to  come  to  St.  Helena 
and  pray  by  his  bier;  and  in  his  testament  he  wrote:  "I  die 
in  the  apostolic  and  Roman  religion  in  which  I  was  born  more 
than  fifty  years  ago."  *     But  if  there  were  any  Frenchmen  who 

*  We  are  told  that  on  the  night  of  the  21st  of  April  he  received  the 
sacrament,  and  even  that  he  confessed,  as  Beaviteme  declares  in  his  book, 
"Sentiments  religieux  de  Napol^>on";  but  the  testimony  for  this  is  not 
authentic.     He  did  indeed  ask  for  the  Abbe  Vignali  about  one  o'clock  in  the 


iEr.  51]  Napoleon's  Injunctions  to  Historians      741 

found  the  execution  of  the  Duke  d'Enghien  incompatible  with 
the  principles  of  religion,  they  were  to  learn  from  the  testament 
of  St.  Helena  "that  it  was  necessary  for  the  safety,  tiie  in- 
terest, and  the  honour  of  the  French  people  at  a  time  when 
the  Count  d'Artos  had  on  his  own  confession  sixty  assassins 
in  his  pay,"  the  same  Count  d'Artois  who  was  afterwards  to 
become  king  of  France  as  Charles  X. 

Such  was  the  intellectual  legacy  of  the  Emperor,  his  ambi- 
tion resorting  on  the  very  verge  of  the  tomb  to  means  of  gratify- 
ing itself  that  are  not  permissible.  And  it  was  abundantly 
successful.  When  the  reign  of  Louis  XVIII.  ended  and  that  of 
his  brother  began,  of  which  every  honest  Frenchman  was 
ashamed;  when,  later,  a  new  revolution  only  resulted  in  replac- 
ing a  policy  of  folly  with  one  of  self-seeking  commercialism: 
then  the  seed  sown  at  St.  Helena  in  the  soil  of  France,  deeply 
furrowed  as  it  was  by  hatred  and  dissatisfaction,  suddenly 
sprouted.  The  best  poets  of  the  nation  clothed  the  legend,  still 
young,  in  the  garb  of  verse,  and  so  powerfully  did  the  memory 
of  the  glorious  days  of  a  greater  ruler  thrill  all  hearts  that  even 
the  historian  ^^^th  his  serious  mission  was  carried  along  by  the 
current.  It  really  seemed  as  if  historians  of  his  reign  had  fol- 
lowed Xapoleon's  own  precept.  "A  French  historian  who 
desires  to  depict   the  empire,"  he   said  once   in  1816, — and  Ms 

morning  of  the  21st ;  in  this  agree  the  only  two  sources  we  have  for  the  last 
days,  the  diaries  of  Montholon  and  Antommarchi.  But  the  physician  was 
present  at  the  interview  with  the  priest,  in  which  Xapoleon  only  said  that 
he  wanted  to  perform  the  duties  prescribed  in  the  Cathohc  religion,  and  to 
receive  its  consolations;  he  then  requested  him  to  read  mass  in  the  next 
room  daily  (it  was  read  only  on  Sundays  up  to  that  time),  to  elevate  the 
Host,  to  celebrate  the  mass  at  the  head  of  his  body  when  dead,  and  perform 
all  the  other  customary  ceremonies.  On  the  3d  of  May,  as  his  mind 
began  to  wander,  ^'ignali  when  alone  \\nth  him  gave  him  extreme  unction, 
and  reported  the  act  to  the  others  waiting  in  the  adjoining  room.  That  is 
all  that  can  be  ascertained  with  some  definiteness ;  unless,  indeed,  a 
remark  of  Xapoleon's  to  Antommarchi  be  cited  as  evidence  that  he  had 
abandoned  his  former  sceptical  views.  "Not  even*'  one  is  an  atheist  who 
would  like  to  be  one,"  is  his  reported  rebuke  of  the  doubter.  But  these 
words  are  preserved  for  us  only  by  Montholon  and  not  by  the  man  to  whom 
they  were  addressed. 


742  St.  Helena  [i82i 

words  went  over  the  world, — "will,  if  he  is  courageous,  give 
full  credit  to  the  good  I  have  done.  I  closed  the  crater  of  an- 
archy and  brought  order  out  of  chaos.  I  purified  the  Revolution 
of  its  defilement,  ennobled  the  peoples,  and  established  the  kings. 
I  have  awakened  all  ambitions  everywhere,  rewarded  all  merit, 
and  enlarged  the  borders  of  glory.  That  is  something,  surely. 
And  at  what  point  can  I  be  attacked  without  the  historian 
finding  means  to  defend  me?  In  my  aims?  There  he  knows 
enough  to  acquit  me.  Or  in  my  despotism?  Then  he  will 
show  that  the  dictatorship  was  a  necessity.  Should  it  be  said 
that  I  impeded  liberty,  he  will  point  out  that  license,  anarchy, 
and  disorder  were  still  at  the  door.  Should  I  be  accused  of 
having  loved  war  too  much,  he  will  demonstrate  that  I  was  never 
the  aggressor.  Should  I  be  censured  for  desiring  universal 
empire  for  myself,  he  will  show  that  that  was  the  product  of  cir- 
cumstances and  how  my  enemies  drove  me  to  it  step  by  step. 
Or,  finally,  is  my  ambition  the  culprit?  Well,  he  will  doubtless 
find  plenty  of  it  in  me,  but  it  is  of  the  highest  and  most  exalted 
character,  the  ambition  to  establish  and  to  consecrate,  in  short 
the  reign  of  reason  and  the  free  exercise  of  all  human  capacity. 
And  the  only  regret  of  the  historian  will  be  that  such  an  ambi- 
tion failed  of  its  full  realization."  * 

That  was  the  watchword  for  the  historian,  and  so  resolutely 
rang  out  the  words  of  command  of  the  immortal  general  that  he 
was  obeyed  for  whole  decades  after  his  death.  The  time  came — 
it  was  in  1840 — when  his  body  was  brought  in  triumph  to  Paris 
and  deposited  under  the  dome  of  the  Invalides;  and  a  minister 
of  Louis  Philippe  spoke  of  him  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  the 
following  terms:  "He  was  emperor  and  king,  the  legitimate 
sovereign  of  this  land;  as  such  he  might  rest  in  Saint-Denis. 
But  he  is  entitled  to  more  than  the  usual  burial-place  of  kings." 
Nay,  the  hour  came  when  the  legend  of  St.  Helena  itself  mounted 
the  throne  of  France;  but  when  the  rule  of  Napoleon  HI,  proved 
incapable  of  maintaining  what  the  carefully  fostered  Bonaparte 
tradition  had  so  lavishly  promised,  then,  and  not  until  then, 
did  the  science  of  history  at  last  come  into  its  rights. 

♦  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  May  1,  1816. 


JEt.  51]  The  Truth  of  History  743 

Among  the  precepts  vvliich  the  prisoner  at  ix)ngwood  left  for 
the  guidance  of  him  for  whom  he  thought  to  prepare  the  way, 
and  whose  early  end  he  did  not  divine,  is  the  following:  "May 
my  son  often  study  liistory  and  reflect  on  it,  for  it  is  the  only 
true  philosophy." 

To  be  sure,  but  only  when  it  is  true  history. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


PREFATORY    NOTE 

In  preparing  this  bibliography  the  French  edition  of  Foumier's  work 
has  been  followed  for  the  first  two  volumes  (all  that  has  appeared),  aa 
it  contains  many  titles  not  mentioned  in  the  German  original.  So  far 
as  has  been  practicable"  the  existence  of  English  translations  of  works  in 
French  and  German  has  been  indicated  by  the  editor.  The  titles  in 
the  sections  appended  to  Foumier's  lists  have  been  compiled  ma'nly  from 
Kircheisen,  Bibliograph}^  of  Napoleon,  Leipzig  and  London,  1903.  A 
list  of  the  principal  memoirs,  etc.,  published  since  Foamier  wrote  follows 
the  bibliography  to  Chapter  XXI. 

E.  G.  B. 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Bonapartes  in  Corsica.  Napoleon's  Birth  and  Early  Training 

Among  the  earlier  works  on  the  j-outh  of  Napoleon  three  may  be 
mentioned  in  which  the  authors  have  drawn  from  the  sources:  Coston, 
Biographic  des  premieres  ann^es  de  Napoleon-Bonaparte,  Paris,  1840; 
Libri,  Sou\enirs  de  la  jeunesse  de  Napoleon,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes 
'  de  1842;  Nasica,  Memoires  sur  I'enfance  et  la  jeunesse  de  Napolton  P', 
jusqu'£l  I'age  de  23  ans,  1851.  These  writers  are  all  somewhat  prepos- 
sessed in  Napoleon's  favour.  Of  those  hostile  to  Napoleon,  Lanfrey 
may  be  named,  Hi.stoire  de  Napoleon  I'^'"  [Eng.  tr.].  On  the  early 
years  he  is  not  sufficiently  thorough.  The  first  attempt  to  give  some- 
thing new  was  made  by  Boehtlingk  in  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  seine  Jugend 
und  sein  Emporkommen  bis  zum  13.  Vend(''miaire,  Jena,  1877;  2d  edition, 
not  revised,  Leipzig,  1883.  Next  comes  Jung  in  his  Bonaparte  et  .«on 
temps,  1769-1799,  d'apres  les  documents  in^dits,  Paris,  1880-81  [2d 
ed.,  1880-1883].  The  autlior  furnislies  authentic  data,  taken  from  the 
archives  of  the  war  department,  and  in  many  respects  restores  to  order 
the  chronological  disorder  that  prevails  in  Coston  and  the  authors  who 
follow  him.  For  the  genealogy  of  the  Bonapartes  consult:  Reumont, 
Beitrage  zur  italienischen  Geschichte,  IV.     The  schoolmates  of  Napoleon 

745 


746  Bibliography 

whom  we  mention  are  Bourrienne,  who  speaks  of  the  stay  at  Brienne 
in  his  M6moires,  1st  vol.  [in  English  in  many  editions.  Latest  ed. 
b}'  Phipps,  London,  1893],  and  a  writer  signing  himself  C.  H.,  who  pub- 
lished in  London  in  1797  "Some  account  of  the  early  years  of  Bonaparte 
at  the  militarj-  school  of  Brienne."  The  same  work  appeared  in  French 
trans,  by  Bourgoing:  Quelques  notices  sur  les  premieres  ann^es  de 
Bonaparte,  Paris,  an  VI.  Read  also:  Traits  caracteristiques  de  la  jeu- 
nesse  de  Bonaparte,  Leipzig,  1802.  The  M^moires  of  Lucien  Bonaparte 
(published  by  Jung,  Paris,  1882,  volume  first)  give  some  details  of  the 
childhood  of  Napoleon ;  S6gur,  in  Histoire  et  M^moires,  speaks  of  the  stay 
at  the  military  school.  For  what  Napoleon  himself  reported  about  the 
years  of  his  youth,  see  among  others;  Mme.  de  R6musat,  M^moires.  I.  p. 
267  and  following  [Eng.  tr.  1894],  the  memoranda  of  Las  Cases  [Eng. 
tr.  1823,  many  eds.],  and  of  Montholon  [Eng.  tr.  1846]  at  St.  Helena, 
and  Antommarchi,  Les  derniers  moments  de  Napoleon.  Some  letters 
relating  to  this  period  will  be  found  in  Du  Casse,  Supplement  h  la  corre- 
spondance  de  Napoleon  I*^"",  Paris,  1887.  Napoleon's  early  writings  are 
found,  in  part,  in  Paul  Lacroix,  Oiluvres  politiques  et  littcraires  de  Napo- 
leon P"",  Paris,  1840,  in  Kermoysan,  Napoleon,  1853,  and  Martel,  Q^uvres 
litteraires  de  Napoleon  I<^^  1st  vol.,  1888. 

As  to  the  date  of  Napoleon's  birth,  it  was  asserted  while  he  was  still 
alive  that  he  made  himself  out  a  year  younger  than  he  was  (.see  the 
article  Bonaparte  in  the  "Biographic  universelle"  byMichaud).  Boeht- 
lingk  has  repeated  the  assertion  without  furnishing  sufficient  proofs. 
Jung  was  the  first  to  raise  serious  objections  to  the  date,  August  15, 
1769.  He  in  fact  produced  a  certificate  from  the  records  of  civil  status  of 
Corte,  according  to  which  one  Nabulione  Buonaparte  was  baptized  the 
8th  of  January,  1768.  The  same  document  reappears  almost  identi- 
cally— there  is  no  difference  but  the  name  of  Joseph,  hardly  Italian, 
placed  before  Nabulione; — in  the  archives  of  Ajaccio,  as  being  the  cer- 
tificate of  baptism  of  Joseph  Bonaparte.  Finally,  Jung  quotes  Napo- 
leon's marriage  certificate,  in  which  the  bridegroom  is  entered  as 
having  been  born  the  5th  of  February,  1768.  Relying  on  these  proofs, 
he  tries  to  show  that  Napoleon  was  the  eldest  of  the  children  of  Charles 
Bonaparte,  having  been  born  in  1768,  and  that  the  father  produced, 
not  the  certificate  of  his  baptism,  but  that  of  Joseph,  to  prove  that  he 
was  not  more  than  ten  years  old,  the  age  limit  for  entrance  at  the  school 
of  Brienne.  There  are  a  good  many  objections  to  this:  first,  there  is 
in  the  archives  of  the  war  department,  at  Paris,  a  certificate  of  baptism 
drawn  up  on  the  21st  of  July,  1771,  to  the  effect  that  that  day  a  son  of 
Carlo  Bonaparte,  bom  the  15th  of  August,  1769,  was  baptized  and  received 
the  name  of  Napoleone.  Second,  in  Jul}',  1776,  Charles  Bonaparte,  in 
his  petition,  asked  for  a  scholarship  in  one  of  the  royal  schools  for  hie 
two  eldest  sons.  He  must  have  indicated  exactly  the  age  of  the  children, 
and  nnist  have  addcid  to  his  petition  the  certificates  of  bapti  m,  and  in  fact 
there  is  in  the  archi\'es  of  the  war  department  a  certified  extract  from  the 


Bibliography  747 

certificate  of  baptism,  witncpspd  Juno  23, 177(),of  Napoleon,  horn  "August 
15,  1769."  The  consideration  of  this  request  lasted  years;  the  minister  of 
war  had  inquiries  made,  demanded  proofs  of  nol)ility  and  other  things 
of  that  kind;  at  last,  in  1779,  in  accordance  with  the  rules,  a  scholarship 
was  granted  to  one  of  the  children,  the  one  who  was  bom  in  1709.  How 
could  the  father,  while  his  petition  and  all  the  documents  relating  to  it 
were  in  the  minister's  portfolios,  get  a  chance  to  substitute  the  certifi- 
cate of  Napoleon's  baptism  for  that  of  Joseph — that  is,  falsify  both  the 
documents?  But  pre\iously,  at  the  time  of  sending  in  the  request,  in 
1776,  there  was  no  reason  for  making  this  substitution.  Finally,  at  the 
ministry,  reh-ing  on  the  certificat'Cs  of  baptism,  they  gave  the  scholar- 
ship to  the  younger  of  the  two  children,  who  alone  could  claim  it,  and 
they  kept  the  record  that  fixed  the  date  of  his  birth.  This  younger  son 
was  Napoleon,  and  that  is  why  the  extract  from  the  certificate  of  his 
birth  is  still  preserved  in  the  documents  of  the  ca.se  in  Paris. 

In  the  official  list — of  January  23,  1779 — of  young  Corsicans  who 
were  in  the  military  schools,  is  found,  with  regard  to  the  school  at  Tiron, 
in  which  Napoleon  was  to  have  been  put  at  first,  this  statement:  "  Napo- 
Idon  de  Buonaparte,  born  August  15,  1769.  He  was  accepted  at  the  nomi- 
nation of  the  31st  of  last  December  and  was  not  to  be  received  until  he 
should  have  given  proofs  of  his  nobility."  Archives  historiques,  artis- 
tiques  et  litteraires,  December  1,  1889.  It  can  no  longer  be  maintained 
that  Napoleon  was  born  in  the  year  1768,  without  admitting  that  it 
was  not  only  the  certificate  of  Joseph's  birth,  but  also  Joseph  himself 
that  was  substituted.  This  hypothesis  has  found  some  defenders,  see 
Jung,  I.  p.  50,  H^risson,  Le  Cabinet  noir,  p.  123,  only  the  objection  will 
undoubtedly  be  made  that  it  was  scarcely  possible  that  such  a  substitu- 
tion could  have  taken  place  in  the  house  of  the  representative  of  the  Cor- 
sican  nobility  at  which  the  royal  governor  was  a  visitor  every  day.  If 
it  be  urged  that  later  Charles  Bonaparte's  sons  furnished  incorrect  cer- 
tificates of  baptism,  the  answer  to  be  made  is  that  this  happened  be- 
tween 1793  and  1796,  and  that  at  that  time  it  was  not  possible  for  any 
one  to  procure  extracts  from  the  Corsican  registers,  for  the  island  was 
at  war  with  the  mother  country,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  be  satis- 
fied with  the  somewhat  vague  testimony  of  some  fellow  countrymen. 
See  also,  on  the  subject  of  Joseph's  seniority,  the  recollections  of  M^ne- 
val,  in  his  book  Napoleon  et  Marie-Louise,  II.  p.  194  [Eng.  trans,  by 
Sherard,  London,  1894],  and  the  2d  volume  of  the  Mcmoires  de  Lucien 
Bonaparte  published  by  Jung.  Jung,  however,  has  not  stated  his  hypoth- 
esis witho\it  making  certain  reservations. 

[The  most  important  general  biographies  of  Napoleon  that  have 
appeared  in  English  since  Foumier  wrote  are :  W.  M.  Sloane,  Life  of  Napo- 
leon Bonaparte,  4  vols..  New  York,  1896,  and  J.  H.  Rose,  Life  of  Napo- 
leon I.,  2  vols.,  London  and  New  York,   1902. 

On  Napoleon's  birth  and  early  training:  A.  Chuquet,  La  Jeunesse  de 
Napol<''on,  Paris,  1897,  vol.  I.,  Brienne.      F.    Masson,    Napol(^on   inconnu. 


748  Bibliography 

Paris,  1895.  Contains  all  the  authentic  early  writings  of  Napoleon.  F. 
Masson,  Napoleon  et  sa  famille,  2  vols.,  1769-1804,  Paris,  1897-98.  Larrey, 
Mme.  Mere  (Napoleonis  mater),  essai  historique,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1892. 
Tschudi,  The  Mother  of  Napoleon,  trans,  fr.  the  Norwegian,  London, 
1930.  J.  Colin,  L'Education  mihtaire  de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1900.  A. 
Founder,  Zur  Textkritik  der  Korrespondenz  Napoleons  I.,  Vienna,  1903.] 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Revolution.     Napoleon's  Corsican  Adventures.     1789-1793 

On  Napoleon's  activities  in  Corsica,  principally  Jung,  Napol6on  et  son 
temps,  and  Lucien  Bonaparte  et  ses  memoires,  1775-1840,  Paris,  1882, 
1st  and  2d  volumes.  What  he  says,  moreover,  will  serve  to  rectify  cer- 
tain details  of  the  elaborate  discussion  of  Boehtlingk.  Next,  Bianchi, 
Lettere  inedite  de  P.  Paoli,  1790-1795,  in  the  "Rassegna  Settimanale, " 
December,  1881,  eleven  letters  addressed  to  Baretti,  consul  at  Leghorn.  In 
the  very  short  biography  of  Pozzo  di  Borgo  in  the  "Russ.  hist.  Sbornik," 
II.  p.  158  ff.,  one  finds  very  little  information,  and  the  dates  in 
it  are  not  exact.  See  besides  the  earlier  works  mentioned  before, 
especially  Coston.  In  the  years  following  there  was  obviously  a  de- 
sire to  pass  over  the  Corsican  period  of  Napoleon's  life  in  silence.  In 
a  Histoire  de  Bonaparte,  Premier  Consul,  depuis  sa  naissance  jusqu'a  la 
paix  de  Luneville,  a  work  obviously  inspired,  that  appeared  in  1802,  we 
read,  for  example,  on  the  twentieth  page:  "All  the  time  that  passed  from 
the  dawn  of  the  Revolution  to  the  famous  epoch  of  the  siege  of  Toulon, 
m  December,  1793,  was  devoted  by  Napoleon  to  instructing  himself  in 
military  tactics,  which  he  studied  in  peace  and  in  obscurity,  for  until 
the  siege  of  Toulon  he  lived  so  to  speak  unknown." 

[Masson,  Napoleon  inconnu;  Chuquet,  La  jeunesse  de  NapoU^on,  vol.  II, 
La  revolution,  Paris,  1898;  Baron  J.  du  Teil,  Napoleon  Bonaparte  et  les 
g^neraux  Du  Teil,  1788-1894,  L'ecole  d'artillerie  d'Auxonne  et  le  siege 
de  Toulon,  Paris,  1897.  General  works:  Lavisse  et  Ram  baud,  Histoire 
g^n^rale  de  I'Europe,  vol.  VIII,  "La  Revolution  frangaise";  Aulard, 
L'Histoire  politique  de  la  Revolution  frangaise,  Paris,  1901.] 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Siege  of  Toulon  and  the  Defence  of  the  Convention.   1793-1795 

From  this  point  the  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  I.,  published  under 
the  auspices  of  Napoleon  III.,  becomes  an  important  source.  It  begins 
with  some  Icstters  written  in  the  late  autimm  of  1793,  before  the  siege 
of  Toulon.  Napoleon's  correspondence,  as  we  know,  was  subjected  to 
a  thorough  sifting  before  its  publication,  and  since,  that  is  to  say  from 
1856,  there  have  been  constant  rumours  of  papers  of  the  first  emperor 
that  are  said  to  have  been  destroyed.  * 


Bibliography  749 

The  gaps,  however,  in  the  Corrcspondanoe  may  be  filled  in  part  by 
turning  to  the  Menioires  de  .Joseph  lionaparte  pul)li.shed  Ijy  Du  ('asse 
[Eng.  tr.  of  the  letters  in  these  M^>moires  as  (Confidential  C-'orrespondence 
of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  with  his  brother  Joseph,  etc.,  New  ^'ork,  1S5G], 
to  those  of  Bourrienne,  and  to  the  official  documents  furnished  by  Coston 
and  by  Jung.  Other  sources  are:  the  (Kuvres  de  Napoleon  in  the  Cor- 
respondance,  XXIX;  the  Memoires  attributed  to  Robespierre's  sister; 
those  of  Marmont,  which  give  (I.  p.  120)  Dugommier's  report  of  the  siege 
of  Toulon;  of  Doulcet  de  Pont^coulant;  of  Hyde  de  Neuville,  and  those  of 
the  Duchess  d'Abrantfes  (wife  of  Junot)  [Eng.  tr.  Familiar  Memoirs,  Lon- 
don, 1835].  Upon  the  different  pha.ses  of  party  politics  the  following 
may  be  consulted  with  profit:  Louis  Blanc,  Histoire  de  la  Revolution 
frangaise,  vols.  XI,  XII;  Sybel,  Geschichte  der  Revolution.szeit  [Eng.  tr. 
by  Perry,  London,  1807];  Mortimer-Temaux,  Histoire  de  la  Terreur; 
H.  Taine,  Les  origines  de  la  I*>ance  contemporaine,  la  R(^'volution,  III 
[Eng.  tr.  by  Durand];  H^lie,  Les  Constitutions  de  la  France;  C.  Rousset, 
Les  volontaires  de  1791-1794.  La  Correspondance  de  Mallet  du  Pan 
avec  la  cour  de  Vienne,  1794-1798  (2  volumes),  published  by  Andr6 
Michel,  contains  nothing  with  regard  to  Napoleon  at  the  time  of  the  13th 
of  Vend^miaire,  except  a  very  short  notice  to  the  effect  that  he  was  a  "  Cor- 
sican  terrorist."  It  would  seem  from  this  that  it  was  not  till  the  Italian 
campaign  that  his  name  became  known  to  the  general  public.  A  reminis- 
cence of  Mme.  de  R^musat  further  confirms  us  in  our  supposition.  She 
says  (Memoires,  I.  p.  142):  "I  know  that  my  mother  was  astonished  that 
the  widow  of  M.  de  Beauhamais  should  have  married  a  man  so  little 
kno\vn." 

[P.  Cottin,  Toulon  et  les  Anglais  en  1793,  d'apres  des  documents 
inedits,  Paris,  1898;  Chuquet,  La  jeunesse  de  Napol(^on,  vol.  Ill,  Toulon, 
Paris,  1899;  Spencer  Wilkinson,  Napoleon,  the  First  Phase,  Owens  Col- 
lege Historical  Essays,  London,  1902;  the  text  of  the  Constitution  of 
1795  in  English  in  Rcelker,  The  Constitutions  of  France,  Boston,  1848.] 


CHAPTER  IV 

Josephine.     1796 

On  society  and  the  salons  after  the  Terror,  see :  Goncourt,  Histoire  de 
la  Soci6t6  frangaise  sous  le  Directoire,  and  especially  the  works  of  a  German 
scholar,  Adolph  Schmidt,  Taljleaux  de  la  Ri'-volution  fran^aise  and  Pariser 
Zustiinde  wiihrend  dcr  Revolutionszeit,  remarkable  volumes  upon  which 
are  ba.sed  a  large  number  of  French  books  that  are  at  present  under- 
mining the  revolutionary  legend.  On  Napoleon  before  his  marriage,  see 
the  Mdmoires  of  Joseph,  of  Bourrienne,  the  picture  that  Stendhal  makes 
of  the  year  1795  in  his  ^'ie  de  Napoleon,  and  last  Hochschild,  Desir^, 
reine  de  Sridde,  1889.  On  Josephine:  Napoleon  I  et  Josephine,  lettres 
authentiques  [for  Eng.  trans,  see  Hall,  below],  2  vols.,  Paris,  1833;   then 


750  Bibliography 

the  M^moircs  sur  Jos^-phino  et  ses  contemporains  by  Mile.  Ducrest,  the 
memoirs  of  Dufort  de  Chevemy  and  of  Mme.  de  R6musat;  Aubenas, 
Histoire  de  rimp^ratrice  Josephine,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1858-59  (an  apology). 
It  was  on  the  basis  of  this  publication  and  of  original  documents 
published  later  that  Imbert  de  Saint-Amand  wrote  his  Jeunesse  de 
I'imperatrice  Josephine,  Paris,  1884.  This,  however,  is  the  work  of 
a  literary  man  and  essayist  rather  than  of  an  historian.  We  mention 
also  the  article  Josephine  in  the  "  Biographie  universelle"  by  Michaud. 
The  Memoires  of  Josephine,  which  appeared  in  1827,  are  apocryphal 
[Eng.  tr.  by  J.  M.  Howard,  Phil.,  1848].  The  letters  in  which  Napoleon 
complains  of  the  unfaithfulness  of  Josephine  do  not  appear  in  the  Cor- 
respondance.  The  letter  to  Joseph,  mentioned  by  us,  does  not  appear 
except  as  an  extract  from  Coston  and  in  the  M(^moires  du  roi  Joseph.  It 
has  not  been  published  in  full  except  by  Pertz  in  the  "  Abhandlungen  der 
Berliner  Akademie,"  1861,  p.  221,  and  in  Du  Casse,  Les  rois  freres  de 
Napoleon,  p.  8. 

[J.  Turquan,  La  generale  Bonaparte — L'imperatrice  Josephine,  2  vols., 
Paris,  1895,  1896,  Josephine  de  Beauharnais,  1763-1796;  F.  Masson,  Jose- 
phine de  Beauharnais,  1763-1796 — Josephine,  imperatrice  et  reine,  2  vols., 
Paris,  1899,  1900;  H.  F.  Hall,  Napoleon's  Letters  to  Josephine,  1796- 
1812,  for  the  first  time  collected  and  translated,  London,  1901;  J.  S.  C. 
Abbott,  Confidential  Correspondence  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  and  the 
Empress  Josephine,  etc.,  etc.,  New  York,  1856;  F.  Masson,  Napol(5on  et 
les  femmes,  vol.  I,  Paris,  1893,  Eng.  trans.,  London,  1894;  A.  L^vy, 
Napoleon  intime,  Paris,  1893,  Eng.  trans,  by  Simeon  as  Private  Life  of 
Napoleon,  London,  1894;  Bondois,  Napoleon  et  la  societe  de  son  temps, 
Paris,  1895.] 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Campaigns  in  Italy  and  the  Peace  of  Campo  Formio.    1796-1797 

For  the  history  of  the  campaigns  of  1796-1797  the  chief  source  from 
which  we  have  drawn  is  the  Correspondance,  both  the  official  edition 
of  the  letters  and  the  earlier  edition,  Correspondance  inedite,  officielle  et 
confidentielle  de  Napoldon  Bonaparte  [ed.  by  Beau vais,  Paris,  1809-1820]. 
To  complete  it,  several  important  documents  may  be  found  in  HueflFer, 
Ungedruckte  Briefe  Napoleons  aus  den  Jahren  1796  et  1797  (Archiv 
fvjr  o(  sterreichische  Geschichte,  XLIX)  [Vienna,  1872],  which  relates  es- 
pecially to  the  diplomatic  negotiations  of  the  summer  of  1797.  [In  English 
there  is  "A  Selection  from  the  Letters  and  Despatches  of  the  First  Napo- 
leon," D.  A.  Bingham,  3  vols.,  London,  1884.]  Further,  the  memoires  of  Mar- 
mont,  Mass6na,  Landrieux  (those  last  in  the  Revue  du  cercle  militaire, 
1887),  Desgenettes.  Consult  also  the  earlier  technical  writings  of  Clause- 
witz,  Jomini  [Eng.  tr.  by  Halleck,  New  York,  1S64],  Ruestow,  Lossau,  and 
the    recent    book    by    Yorck    von   Wartenburg,    Napoleon   als  Feldherr, 


Bibliography  751 

first  vol.,  Berlin,  18S5  [Eng.  tran  .,  London,  1902],  and  Malachowski's 
pamphlet,  t  ber  die  Entwicklung  der  leitenden  Gedanken  zur  ersten  ("am- 
pagne  Bonaparte^.  Vortrag,  Berlin,  1884,  and  Hans  Delbrueck,  Lbcr 
den  Unterschied  der  Strategie  Friedrichs  des  Grosscn  und  Napoleons 
historische  und  politische  Aufs;itze,  1887.  Up  to  the  present  time  we 
ha\e  no  complete  history  of  the  events  of  the  war  during  those  years, 
written  after  a  thorough  study  of  the  documents  of  the  archives  of  the 
war  department  [vet  see  below].  Certain  episodes  have  been  treated 
by  Pellet,  Bonaparte  en  Toscane  en  1790,  Ile%ue  bleue,  1887;  Pierron, 
Les  m<>thodes  de  guerre  actuelles,  appendix  Litta  Biumi,  Delia  battaglia 
de  Montenotte,  Milano,  184G;  Corte,  Battaglia  di  S.  Michele  et  Mondovi, 
Torino,  1846;  Sforza,  Sull'  occupazione  di  Massa  di  Lunigiano  da  Fran- 
zesi  nel  1796,  lettere  d'un  giacobino,  Lucca,  1880;  Kappelin,  Bataille  de 
Castiglione;  the  same,  Bataille  de  S.-Georges,  Paris,  1843;  and  Relation 
de  la  bataille  d'Arcole,  Paris,  1810;  von  Rothenburg,  Die  Schlacht  bei 
Rivoli,  Leipzig,  1845;  Belloc,  Bonaparte  ct  les  Grecs,  Paris,  1826;  Anto- 
nopoulos,  Bonaparte  et  la  Grece,  '' XouvcUe  Revue,"  1889.  On  Venice: 
Romanin,  Storia  documentata  di  Venezia;  Dandolo,  La  caduta  della 
republica  di  Venezia,  1855;  Bonnal,  La  chute  d'une  r(!'publique,  Paris, 
1885.  The  memoirs  of  Manin,  last  doge  of  \'enice,  are  deposited  in  the 
archives  of  that  city.  For  the  events  of  which  Paris  was  the  theatre  and 
which  are  connected  with  those  of  the  war,  see  the  memoirs  of  Camot, 
of  Lar^vellifere-Lepeaux,  Paris,  1895,  the  recollections  and  the  corre- 
spondence of  Mallet  du  Pan,  the  memoirs  of  Bourrienne,  of  Mathieu 
Dumas  [Eng.  tr.,  London,  1839],  and  of  Hyde  de  Neuville;  then  the  reports 
of  Bayard,  October,  1796,  on  the  internal  condition  of  France,  in  Bail- 
leu,  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  1795-1797,  I;  Barb^Marbois,  Journal  d'un 
deports ;  Dufort  de  Chevemy,  Memoires;  Lacretelle,  Dix  aus  d'epreuves; 
Barante,  Souvenirs;  also  the  newspapers,  the  "  Moniteur"  and  the  "Rc- 
dacteur"  (organ  of  the  Directory).  Among  the  narrative  histories  the 
following  are  authorities:  Von  Sybel,  Geschichte  der  Revolutions/cit, 
IV,  fourth  edition;  Jung,  Bonaparte,  etc.,  IH,  gives  some  new  informa- 
tion; Boehtlingk,  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  2d  vol.,  and  Taine,  Les  originrs 
de  la  France  contemporaine.  La  Revolution,  III  [Eng.  tr.  by  Durand]. 
new  points  of  view.  On  the  foreign  policy  .see :  H.  Hiiffer,  Osterreich  und 
Preussen  gegeniiber  der  franzosischen  Revolution  bis  zum  Friedea  von 
Campo-Formio,  and  the  articles  b}'  A.  Sorel,  in  the  "  Revue  historique," 
especially  in  the  17th  and  ISth  volumes  and  in  the  number  for  Novem- 
ber, 1885.  For  certain  special  subjects:  Sciout,  Le  Directoire  et  la  Repub- 
lique  Romaine  ("Revue  des  questions  historiques,  1886");  the  same, 
Pie  VI,  le  Directoire  et  le  grand  due  de  Toscane  (ibidem) ;  the  same.  La 
Rdpublique  fran^-aise  et  la  Republique  de  Genes  (ibid.,  1889) ;  Boulay  de 
la  Meurthe,  Quelques  lettres  de  Marie  CaroUne,  Reine  des  Deux-Siciles 
(Revue  d'histoire  diplomatique,  1888);  and  Amtliche  Sammlung  von 
Akten  aus  der  Zeit  der  helvetischen  Republik,  vol.  I,  1SS{». 

[H,  H.  Sargent,  Napoleon  Bonaparte's  First  Campaign,  London,  1895; 


y^2  Bibliography 

A.  Sorel,  Bonaparte  et  Hoche  en  1797,  Paris,  1896;  A.  Sorel,  L'Europe 
et  la  Revolution  francjaise,  V^""^  partie.  Bonaparte  et  le  Directoire, 
1795-1799,  Paris,  1903;  J.  Colin,  Eludes  sur  la  campagne  de  1796-97  en 
Italie,  Paris,  1S97;  F.  Bouvier,  Bonaparte  en  Italie,  1796,  Paris,  1899; 
G.  Fabry,  Histoire  de  Tarmee  d'ltalie,  1796-97,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1900, 
1901,  pub.  under  the  supervision  of  the  historical  section  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff;  J.  H.  Rose,  ed.,  Col.  T.  Graham's  Despatches  on  the  Italian 
Campaign  of  1796-97,  "  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,"  vol.  XIV,  111-124,  321-331  ; 
Kuhl,  Bonapartes  erster  Feldzug,  der  Ausgangspunkt  moderne  Krieg- 
fiihrung,  Berlin,  1902;  L.  Sciout,  Le  Directoire,  Paris,  1895,  2  vols.; 
C.  Tivaroni,  Storia  del  risorgimento  Italiano,  vol.  II ,  2  parts.  L'ltalia 
durante  il  dominio  francese  1789-1815,  Turin,  1889-1890;  P.  Gaffarel, 
Bonaparte  et  les  r^publiques  italiennes,  1796-1799,  Paris,  1894;  E. 
Gachot,  Histoire  Militaire  de  Massena,  1st  vol..  La  premiere  campagne 
d'ltalie,  1795  a  1798,  Paris,  1901;  M.  Herbette,  Une  Ambassade  Turque 
sous  le  Directoire,  Paris,  1902;  The  Dropmore  Papers,  vol.  Ill,  Eng. 
Hist.  MSS.  Com.,  Report  on  the  MSS.  of  J.  B.  Fortescue,  Esq.,  preserved 
at  Dropmore,  London,  1899.] 

CHAPTER  VI 
Egypt.    1798-1799 

Upon  the  attitude  maintained  by  Napoleon  during  the  winter  of 
1797-1798  until  his  departure  for  Toulon  our  information  is  still  inade- 
quate. There  are  the  Memoires  of  Barras,  ed.  by  G.  Duruy,  4  vols., 
Paris,  1895-1896  [Eng.  tr.  by  C.  E.  Roche,  4  vols.,  London,  1895-96];  the 
Memoires  of  Talleyrand,  ed.  by  the  Due  de  Broglie,  5  vols.,  Paris,  1891- 
92  [Eng.  tr.  by  A.  Hall,  5  vols.,  London,  1891-92].  Those  of  Lar€vel- 
lifere-Lepeaux  are  not  very  trustworthy. 

In  addition  there  are  the  recollections  of  Mathieu  Dumas  [Eng.  tr. 
1839],  Thibaudeau,  Miot  de  M^ito  [Eng.  tr.  New  York,  1881],Bourrienne 
[Eng.  tr.],  the  Considerations  sur  la  Revolution  fran^aise  by  Mme.  de 
Stael  (II)  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1821],  the  reports  of  the  Prussian  envoj^  to 
Paris,  Sandoz  RoUin,  published  lately  by  Bailleu;  and  the  correspond- 
ence already  mentioned  of  Mallet  du  Pan  with  the  court  of  Vienna,  furnish 
many  interesting  data.  See  also  Barant2,  Histoire  du  Directoire,  III. 
HUffer,  in  Der  Rastatter  Kongress,  vol.  2;  Jung,  in  Bonaparte  et  son 
temps,  vol.  3;  and  Boehtlingk,  in  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  vol.  2,  have  tried,  by 
making  researches  in  the  archives,  to  fill  up  the  gaps  that  exist  in  spite 
of  these  publications.  Boehtlingk  especially  has  taken  hold  of  it  with 
a  great  deal  of  penetration,  but  on  many  points  he  has  gone  much  far- 
ther than  sound  criticism  can  justify.  This  applies  especially  to  one 
of  his  theses;  he  maintains  that  it  is  not  the  fact  that  Bonaparte,  to  ad- 
vance his  personal  interests,  simply  took  advantage  of  the  policy  of  con- 
quest of  the  Directory,  a  policy  which  undermined  the  principle  of  Euro- 
pean balance,  and  founded  his  ambitious  aims  upon  it;  but  that  he  him- 


Bibliography  753 


self  was  the  author  of  tliis  policy  and  roiisequcntly  the  real  promoter 
of  the  war  of  1799.  Boehtlingk  pretends,  moreover,  that  Bonaparte, 
working  with  Bernadotte,  arranged  the  \  ierma  affair.  He  gives  no 
proof  of  it,  any  more  tlian  he  does  of  his  hypothesis  that  the  murder  of 
the  French  ambassadors  at  Rastatt  was  the  Avork  of  this  same  Bona- 
parte who  enjoys  complicating  and  entangling  everything.  See  Wegele, 
Zur  Kritik  der  neuesten  Litteratur  iiber  den  Rastatter  Gesandtenmord 
in  the  "  Historische  Zeitschrift,"  1881,  and  Boehtlingk,  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte und  der  Rastatter  Gesandtenmord,  Leipzig,  1883.  For  the  Egyp- 
tian expedition,  the  most  important  pul)lications  are  first  of  all  the  Cor- 
respondance  de  Napoleon  I  (4th  and  5th  vols.),  the  Correspondance  in^dite, 
officielle  et  confidentielle,  de  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  1819,  5th  and  6th 
vols.,  and  the  Letters  from  the  Army  of  Bonaparte  in  Egypt,  London, 
1798-1799.  In  addition,  the  memoirs  of  Bourrienne  (which  one  should 
not  consult  without  comparing  them  with  A.  B.,  Bourrienne  et  ses  erreurs), 
those  of  Marmont,  of  Savary  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1828],  Lavalette,  Beau- 
harnais  (Napoleon's  stepson,  who  was  with  him  in  the  Egyptian  cam- 
paign), of  Miot,  Mme.  de  R^musat,  and  the  recollections  and  notes  of  a 
French  superior  officer  of  which  Gopcevic  has  made  use  for  his  article 
in  the  "Jahrl)ucher  fiir  die  deutschen  Armee  und  Marine,"  1880,  35th 
and  36th  vols.  See  also  the  Correspondance  secrete  d'un  chevalier  de 
Malte  sur  les  causes  qui  ont  rendu  les  Fran^ais  maitres  de  I'lsle,  Paris, 
1802;  Doublet,  Memoires  historiques  sur  I'invasion  et  I'occupation  de 
Malte  en  1798,  published  bj^  Panisse-Pastiz  (hardly  a  conclusive  justifi- 
cation); Gall^,  L'armee  fran(jaise  en  Egypte,  from  the  specifications  of 
Captain  Vertray,  of  the  division  Regnier,  Paris,  1883,  La  cour  de  la  Gar- 
diolle,  Quatre  Lettres  sur  I'expedition  d'Egypte;  Richardot,  Nouveaux 
m<?moires  sur  l'armee  fran^aise  en  figypte,  et  en  Syrie,  Paris,  1848;  Niel- 
losargy,  Memoires  secrets  sur  I'expedition  d'Egypte,  published  by  Beau- 
champ,  Paris,  1825;  Pelleport,  Souvenirs,  I;  and  the  Despatches  and  Let- 
ters of  Nelson,  published  by  Nicolas  [London,  1844-46].  Historical  works: 
besides  those  already  mentioned  of  Sybel,  Hiiflfer,  Jung,  Boehtlingk, 
we  will  mention  specially:  Mathieu  Dumas,  Les  campagnes  d'figypte 
et  de  Syrie;  Besancenet,  Le  general  Dommartin;  Martin,  Histoire  de 
I'expedition  franyaise  en  figypte,  vol.  II,  Paris,  1815,  1816;  Boulay  de  la 
Meurthe,  Le  Directoire  et  I'expedition  d'Egypte,  1885  (a  publication  that 
deprives  Meneval  of  all  authority) ;  Sur  le  retour  du  General  Bonaparte 
d'Egypte,  "Spectatcur  militaire,"  1840,  loth  of  May.  Further,  Wilson, 
Historical  account  of  the  British  expedition  to  Egypt,  London,  1803; 
Payol,  Kleber,  sa  vie,  sa  correspondance,  1877;  Emouf,  La  vie  de  Kl^ber, 
1867;  Jomard,  Souvenirs  sur  Gaspard  Monge  et  ses  rapports  avec  Napo- 
leon, Paris,  1853;  Pongerville,  G.  Monge  et  I'expedition  d'Egypte,  Paris, 
1860.  As  to  the  Arabian  historians,  we  should  mention  Gabarti  and  Na- 
coula  el  Turc,  whose  works  have  been  translated  into  French.  The 
scientific  results  of  the  expedition  are  recorded  in  the  voluminous  Descrip- 
tion de  I'Egypte,  2d  edition,  1821-1830. 


754  Bibliography 

[H.  Htlffer,  Der  Rastatter  Gesandtenmord,  mit  bisher  ungednickten 
Archivalien  und  Nachwort,  Bonn,  1896,  Fr.  trans,  in  Rev.  Hist.,  vol.  61; 
K.  T.  Heigel,  Zur  Geschichte  des  Rastatter  Gesandten-Mordes  am  28. 
April,  1799,  "  Hist.  Vierteljarhschr.,"  1900,  478-499  (further  refs.  in  Kirch- 
eisen,  p.  50);  Thoumas,  ed.,  L'Agenda  de  Malus,  souvenirs  de  I'exp^ 
dition  d'Egypte,  1798-1801,  Paris,  1892;  Guitry,  L'Arm^e  de  Bonaparte 
en  Egypte,  1798-99,  Paris,  1898;  E.  de  Villiers  du  Terrage,  Journal  ct 
souvenirs  sur  I'expedition  d'Egypte,  1798-1801,  Paris,  1899;  C.  de  La 
Jonquifere,  L'Exp^dition  d'figypte,  1798-1801,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1900-1901, 
under  the  supervision  of  the  historical  section  of  the  General  Staff; 
F.  Rousseau,  Les  Successeurs  de  Bonaparte  en  Egypte,  Kleber  et  Menou. 
"Rev.  des  quest,  hist.,"  vol.  67,  554-599,  Paris,  1900;  Thurman,  Capt., 
Bonaparte  en  ^Igypte,  Souvenirs  du  Capitaine  Thurman,  publ.  par.  Comtc 
Fleury,  Paris,  1902;  Constance  H.  D.  Giglioli,  Naples  in  1799:  An  Account 
of  the  Revolution  of  1799  and  of  the  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Parthenopean  Re- 
public, London,  1903;  A.  Sorel,  L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  frangaise,  Y" 
partie:  Bonaparte  et  le  Directoire,  1795-1799,  Paris,  1903;  Rousseau, 
Kleber  et  Menou  en  Egypte  depuis  le  depart  de  Bonaparte,  aout  1799- 
septembre  1801,  Documents,  Paris,  1900.] 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Coup  d'etat  and  the  Consulate.    1799 

On  French  politics  in  1799:  Sybel,  Geschichte  der  Revolutionszeit, 
vol.  2  [Eng.  trans.];  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  Le  Directoire  et  I'Exp^dition 
d'fegypte;  Lanfrey,  Histoire  de  Napoleon  I,  vol.  2  [Eng.  tr.  London, 
1871-72];  the  despatches  of  Sandoz  Rollin  in  P.  Bailleu,  Preussen  und 
Frankreich  von  1795-1807,  I;  the  letters  of  the  Swedish  envoy,  Brink- 
mann,  in  L6ouzon-Leduc,  Correspondance  diplomatique  du  Baron  dc 
Stael-Holstein  et  du  Baron  Brinkmann,  Paris,  1881.  On  the  internal  con- 
dition of  France:  Taine,  Les  origines  de  la  France  contemporaine.  La 
revolution.  III  [Eng.  tr.];  F^lix  Rocquain,  L'^tat  de  la  France  au  IS 
brumaire,  Paris,  1874;  Thiers,  Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  1' Empire,  I 
[Eng.  tr.  by  Campbell].  On  the  Coup  d'Etat:  the  Mdmoires  of  Lucien 
in  Jung's  edition  (Lucien  Bonaparte  et  ses  M^moires,  I  and  III)  (where,  on 
page  90  ff.,  Lucien  reviews  the  events  of  the  19th  of  Bnmiaire) ;  those  of 
Gohier,  of  Marmont,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  Bourrienne  (consult  A.  B.,  Bour- 
rienne  et  ses  erreurs);  the  Memoires  of  Hyde  de  Neuville,  of  Mme.  de 
R^musat  [Eng.  tr.];  the  Memorial  de  Sainte-H^l^ne  of  Las  Cases  [Eng. 
tr.  New  York,  1823,  frequently  repuh.];  the  "Moniteur"  for  the  year  VIII; 
Duvergier  de  Hauranne,  Histoire  du  gouverncmcnt  parlementaire ;  the 
notes  published  by  Ludovic  Lalanne  and  attributed  to  the  scholar  Fau- 
riel,  on  Les  derniers  jours  du  consulat,  Paris,  1886  [Eng.  tr.,  London, 
1885],  1st  part,  entitled  Esquisse  historiquc  des  pronostics  de  la  destruc- 
tion de  la  Rd'publique  a  dater  du  18  Brumaire;  the  text  of  the  constitu- 


Bibliography  755 

tion  in  Hflie,  Les  constitutions  do  la  Franco  [Eng.  tr.  of  Constitution  of 
1799  in  Roelker.  Tho  Constitutions  of  France,  Boston,  1848]. 

[A.  Vandal,  L'Avoneinent  do  Xapoldon,  Paris,  1902;  Aulard,  Histoire 
politique  de  la  R^'volution  fran(,aise,  Paris,  1901;  Aulard,  ed.,  llegistre 
des  d(^'Iib6rations  du  Consulat  provisoiro,  pub.  by  the  Soci6t6  de  I'his- 
toire  de  la  Revolution,  Paris,  1894;  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  Hist.  g^n.  de 
I'Europe,  vol.  IX,  Napoleon,  Paris,  1897;  A.  Aulard,  Paris  sous  le  consulat, 
T.I,  Paris,  1903;  A.  Sorel,  L'Europe  et  le  Directoire,  V«  partie,  Paris, 
1903;  E.  Gachot,  Les  Campagnes  de  1799,  Souvarow  en  Italie,  Paris,  1903.] 

CHAPTER  VIII 

War  .\nd  Pe.\ce.     1800-1802 

On  the  campaign  of  1800:  La  correspondance  de  Napoleon  1",  volume 
6,  the  memoirs  of  Grenerals  Kellerman,  Victor,  Marmont,  and  Mass^na; 
the  recollections  of  a  soldier  in  the  Cahiers  du  capitaine  Coignet,  Paris, 
1883  [Eng.  tr.  by  Mrs.  Carey  as  Narrative  of  Captain  Coignet,  New  York]. 
General  narratives  are  to  be  found  in  Sybel,  V;  Jomini,  Histoire  des 
guerres  de  la  Revolution;  Yorck,  Napoleon  F""  als  Feldherr  [Eng.  tr. 
London,  1903].  On  the  battle  of  Marengo,  see  the  narrative  in  the 
"  Osterreichische  militiirische  Zeitschrift"  of  1823  and  the  article  Zum 
80.  Jahrestag  der  Schlacht  bei  Marengo  in  the  Jahrbiicher  fiir  die 
deutsche  Armee  und  Marine,  36th  vol.  For  the  immediate  consequences 
of  the  battle,  see  the  article  by  A.  Fournier,  Die  Mission  des  Grafen 
Saint-Julien  im  Jahre  1800  in  "  Histori-^che  Studien  und  Skizzen," 
pp.  179-209,  1885.  On  the  battle  of  Hohenlinden,  see:  Tessier,  La 
bataille  de  Hohenlinden  et  les  premiers  rapports  de  Bonaparte  avec 
le  general  Moreau  in  the  "Re\'ue  historique,"  IX  (from  the  memoirs 
of  General  Decaen,  who  took  part  in  it),  and  A.  Schleifer,  Die  Schlacht 
bei  Hohenlinden,  Erding,  1885.  For  the  diplomatic  history  consult  espe- 
cially Du  Casse,  Histoire  des  n^gociations  diplomatiques  relatives  aux 
traites  de  Mortfontaine,  de  Lun^ville  et  d'Amiens,  Paris,  1855,  3  volumes; 
also  the  account  of  the  negotiations  in  Lefebre,  Histoire  des  cabinets  de 
I'Europe,  I;  Sybel,  V;  Lanfrey,  III;  Thiers,  II  and  III.  For  certain 
points  of  detail:  Bemhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands  im  19.  Jahrhundert, 
II ;  E.  Daudet,  Les  Bourbons  et  la  Russie  pendant  I'emigration,  "  Re^Tje 
des  deux  mondes,"  1885;  Tatischeff,  Paul  I  et  Bonaparte,  "Nouvelle 
RexTie,"  1887;  E.  Paul,  Das  Projekt  einer  Occupation  Indiens  in  Jahre 
1800,  "Deutsche  Revue,"  1888;  Tratchevski,  L'empereur  Paul  et  Bona- 
parte, "Re^'ue  d'histoire  diplomatique,"  1889;  the  same.  Relations  diplo- 
matiques entre  la  Russie  et  la  France  i  I'epoque  de  Napoleon  h'',  I, 
1800-1802,  "Recueil  de  la  Society  ru.sse";  Baumgarten,  Geschichte 
Spaniens,  I;  Bernhardi,  Napoleons  I.  Politik  in  Spanien,  "Hist.  Zeit- 
schrift," vol.  40;  Noorden,  Der  Riicktritt  des  Ministeriums  Pitt,  1801, 
"Hist.  Zeitschrift,"  vol.  9;  Larsson,  Sveriges  deltagande  i  den  vapnade 
neutraliteten,  1800,  pub.  1888. 


J  f^^b  Bibliography 

Among  the  abundant  literature  on  the  Concordat  may  be  mentioned; 
d'Haussonville,  L'Eglise  romaine  et  le  premier  Empire,  vol.  I;  Theiner, 
Histoire  des  deux  concordats  conclus  en  1801  et  en  1803;  Cretineau- 
Joly,  Memoires  du  Cardinal  Consalvi;  Ranke's  essay  on  Consalvi  in  vol. 
40  of  his  works;  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  La  Negociation  du  Concordat, 
"Le  Correspondant,"  1881,  1882;  Lucien  Bonaparte,  Memoires,  vol.  2,  ed. 
Jimg.  Some  other  titles  may  be  found  in  Lacombe,  Essai  d'une  biblio- 
graphie  des  ouvrage';  relatifs  h.  I'histoire  religieuse  de  Paris  pendant  la 
revolution  1789-1802,  Paris,  1884. 

[H.  Hiiffer,  Quellen  zur  Geschichte  des  Zeitalters  der  franzosischen 
Revolution,  2  vols.,  Leipzig,  1900;  H.  H.  Sargent,  The  Campaign  of 
Marengo,  London,  1897;  E.  Gachot,  La  deuxienie  campagne  d'ltalie,  1800, 
Paris,  1898;  De  Cugnac,  Campagnes  de  I'armee  de  reserve  en  1800,  2 
vols.,  Paris,  1900-01,  under  the  supervision  of  the  historical  section  of 
the  General  Staff;  H.  M.  Bowman,  The  Preliminary  Stages  of  the  Peace 
of  Amiens,  Toronto,  1900;  M.  Philippson,  La  paix  d'.^miens  et  la 
politique  g^nerale  de  Napoleon  P'',  "  Revue  hist.,"  vols.  75  and  76; 
A.  Sorel,  La  paix  d' Amiens,  "  Rev.  des  Deux  Mondes,"  1  and  15  of  Aug. 
and  of  Sept.  1902;  L.  M.  Roberts,  The  Negotiations  preceding  the  Peace 
of  Lun^ville,  1801,  Trans,  of  the  Royal  Hist.  Soc,  New  Ser.,  vol.  15;  The 
Paget  Papers:  Diplomatic  and  other  correspondence  of  the  Right  Hon. 
Sir  Arthur  Paget,  1794-1807,  vol.  II,  London,  1896  (Sir  Arthur  Paget 
was  the  English  Ambassador  at  Vienna) ;  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  Docu- 
ments sur  la  negociation  du  Concordat  et  les  autres  rapports  de  la 
France  avec  le  Saint-Siege  en  ISOO-'Ol,  5  vols.,  Paris,  1891-97;  L.  S€ch€, 
Les  origines  du  concordat,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1894;  Debidour,  Histoire  des 
rapports  de  I'eglise  et  de  I'etat  en  France,  1789-'70,  Paris,  1898;  A.  Aulard, 
Paris  sous  le  consulat,  Paris,  1903;  Mathieu,  Le  Concordat  de  1801,  ses 
origines,  son  histoire  d'apres  des  documents  inedits,  Paris,  1903.] 

CHAPTER    IX 

The  New  France  and  Her  Sovereign.     1802 

On  the  political  reorganization  as  a  whole;  Felix  Rocquain,  L'^tat 
de  la  France  au  18  brumaire;  Thiers,  Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  I'Em- 
pire,  vols.  I-III  [Eng.  tr.].  On  Thiers,  see  Barni,  Napoleon  et  son 
historien,  M.  Thiers,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1869;  Lanfrey,  Histoire  de  Napoleon  I^"", 
vol.  2  [Eng.  tr.];  A.  E.  Blanc,  Napoleon  I*"",  ses  institutions  civiles  et  ad- 
ministratives,  Paris,  1880,  a  eulogy  exhibiting  only  the  good  side  of 
things,  yet  useful  as  a  general  survey;  Taine,  Les  origines  de  la  France 
contemporaine,  "  La  regime  moderne,"  I,  Paris,  1890  [Eng.  tr.  by  Durand], 
a  very  brilliant  analysis  of  the  creative  work  of  the  Consulate,  finely 
conceived,  but  dominated  exclusively  by  a  single  point  of  view  as  regards 
NapolcoM.  Extracts  from  the  Memoires  of  Pasquier  and  of  Chaptal  are 
an  important  feature  of  the  work.     [Pasquier,    Histoire   de  mon  temps, 


Bibliography  757 

M^moires,  6  vols.,  Paris,  1894-95,  aoI.  I;  Eng.  tr.  by  Roche  of  first  three 
vols.,  London,  1893:  Chaptal,  Mes  Souvenirs  sur  Napolton,  Paris,  1893.] 

Among  the  contemporary  accounts  may  be  mentioned;  Jullien,  Entre- 
tiens  politiques  sur  la  situation  actuelle  de  la  France,  Paris,  an  VIII 
[1800];  Frankreich  iin  Jalire  1800,  Bri-fe  deutscher  Manner  in  Paris, 
Altona,  1800;  Panckoucke,  La  ropublique  considerr^-e  dans  ses  divers 
gouvemements  comme  elle  est,  apres  ce  qu'elle  a  6t<5,  1801;  Gabriac, 
Voyago  de  la  duohesse  de  Guiehe  en  France,  ISOl,  "  Re\'ue  d'hi.stoire 
diplomatique,"  1889;  Peuchet,  Essai  d'une  statistique  generaie  de  la 
France,  Paris,  an  IX  [ISOl].  On  the  organization  of  the  system  of 
administration:  Locr^,  Proccs-verbaux  du  Conseil  d'Etat,  I;  Aucoc,  Le 
Conseil  d'Ktat,  avant  et  depuis  1789;  Pelet  de  la  Lozfere,  Opinions  de 
Napoleon  au  Conseil  d'Etat.  In  addition  the  Memoires  of  Roederer, 
III;  of  Thibaudeau;  of  Broglie,  I  [Eng.  tr.].  See  also  Emouf,  Marct,  due 
de  Bassano.  On  the  financial  reform,  the  Memoires  of  Gaudin,  due  de 
Gai'te;  also  Gaudin's  Notice  historique  sur  les  finances  de  la  France, 
1800-1814,  written  before  the  Memoires;  Mollien,  Memoires  d'un  ministre 
du  trdsor  public;  Bosse,  Ubersicht  der  franzosischen  Staatswirthschaft, 
1806-1807;  Stourm,  Les  finances  de  I'ancien  regime  et  de  la  Revolution, 
2  vols.,  Paris,  1885;  A.  Wagner,  Die  franzosische  Besteuerung  seit  1789, 
in  his  "  Finanzwissenschaft, "  vol.  IV,  1888;  Ch.  Nicolas,  Les  budgets 
de  la  France  depuis  le  commencement  du  XIX**  siecle;  Vuhrer,  His- 
toire  de  la  dette  publique  en  France,  2  vols. ;  Poinsard,  Le  credit  public  et 
les  emprunts  soas  le  Consulat  et  I'Empire,  in  "  Annales  de  I'Ecole  libre  des 
sciences  politiques,"  1890. 

On  the  reforms  in  the  administration  of  justice:  Schaflfner,  Geschichte 
der  Rechtsverfassung  in  Frankreich;  S^vin,  Etude  sur  les  origines  r6vo- 
lutionnaires  des  Codes  Napoleon,  new  ed.,  Paris,  1879;  Troplong,  De 
I'esprit  democrat ique  dans  le  Code  CiWl  (extracts  from  this  will  be  found 
in  S6vin) ;  Rehberg,  U ber  den  Code  Napoleon  und  seine  Einf iihrung  in 
Deutschland;  Th^zard,  De  I'influence  des  travaux  de  Bigot  de  Preameneu; 
P^rouse,  Napoleon  et  les  lois  civiles. 

On  the  reforms  in  public  instruction:  Hahn,  Das  Unterrichtswesen 
in  F'rankreich,  mit  einer  Geschichte  der  Pariser  Universitiit,  I,  Breslau, 
1848;  Alb.  Duruy,  L'instruction  publique  et  la  Revolution;  Liard,  L'en- 
seignement  superieur  en  France  de  1789  k  1889,  I,  1888;  Beauchamp, 
Recueil  des  lois  et  rdglements  sur  I'enseignementsuperieur;  P.  Dupuy, 
L'6cole  normale,  in  "Revue  Internationale  de  I'enseignement  sup^rieur," 
1883. 

On  the  legislative  opposition  and  the  purging  of  the  Chambers: 
Thibaudeau,  Memoires  sur  le  Consulat;  Mme.  de  Stael,  Considerations 
sur  la  revolution  fran^aise,  3  vols.  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1818]:  Fauriel,  Les 
derniers  jours  du  consulat,  ed.  by  Lalanne  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1885];  Camille 
Jordan,  Le  Consulat  h  vie;  Mme.  de  G^rando,  Lettres;  Ste.-Beuve,  Ca- 
mille Jordan,  "Lundis,"  XII;  Laboulaye,  Benjamin  Constant;  K^Ue, 
Les  Constitutions  de  la  France. 


758  Bibliography 

On  the  censorship  of  the  press:  Welschinger,  La  censure  sous  le 
premier  empire,  Paris,  1882. 

On  the  conspiracies:  Fescourt,  Histoire  dela  double  conspiration de  1800; 
Destrem,  Documents  sur  les  deportations  du  Consulat  in  the  "Revue 
historique,"  vol.  VIII;  Gaffarel,  L'opposition  militaire  sous  le  Consulat, 
in  "La  Revolution  fran(;aise,"  1887,  pp.  10-12;  and  the  Memoires  of 
General  Rapp.  The  Memoires  of  Fouch6,  Paris,  1828-29,  although  not 
authentic,  are  not  without  value,  since  their  author,  A.  de  Beauchamp,  made 
vise  of  authentic  documents  [cf.  P.  J.  Proudhon,  Commentaires  sur  les 
Memoires  de  Fouche,  ed.  by  Rochel,  Paris,  1900]. 

[R.  Stourm,  Les  Finances  du  Consulat,  Paris,  1902;  E.  Jac,  Bonaparte 
et  le  code  civil,  "  De  I'influence  personelle  exercee  par  le  premier  Consul 
sur  notre  legislation  civile,"  Paris,  1898;  E.  Daudet,  La  Police  etles  Chouans 
sous  le  consulat  et  I'empire,  Paris,  1893;  E.  Guillon,  Les  conspirations  raili- 
taires  sous  le  consulat  et  I'empire,  Paris,  1894;  P.  Corr^ard,  La  France 
sous  le  consulat,  Paris,  1899;  A.  Aulard,  Paris  sous  le  consulat,  Paris, 
1903.] 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Last  Years  of  the  Consulate.     The  Emperor.     1802-1804 

On  the  internal  condition  of  France — A.  Impressions  and  reports  of 
foreigners  who  visited  France  and  Paris:  Hase,  Briefe  und  Tagebiicher 
von  1801  und  1802  in  the  "Deutsche  Revue,"  1881;  F.  J.  L.  Meyer, 
Briefe  aus  der  Hauptstadt  und  dem  Innern  Frankreichs,  geschrieben 
im  J.  1801,  2  Theile,  Tubingen,  1802;  J.  F.  Reichardt,  ^'ertraute 
Briefe  aus  Paris,  geschrieben  in  den  Jahren  1802  und  1803,  Hamburg, 
1805;  Une  anii(5e  d'une  correspondance  de  Paris,  ou  lettres  sur  Bona- 
parte, reprinted  from  the  "Courrier  de  Londres,"  London,  1803; 
A.  V.  Kotzebue,  Erinnerungen  aus  Paris  im  Jahre  1804,  Berlin,  1804; 
Schlabrendorf,  Napoleon  Bonaparte  u.  d.  Franz.  Volk  unter  seineni 
Consulate,  "Germanien,"  1814  [ed.  by  Reichardt];  J.  G.  Rist's  Lebenserin- 
nerungen,  herausgegeben  von  G.  Poel,  Gotha,  1880.  B.  French  sources: 
the  "  Moniteur,"  the  official  organ  after  1799;  the  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon  I,  vol.  VII  [Eng.  tr.  of  selections  by  Bingham];  Fauriel,  Les 
demiers  jours  du  Consulat,  ed.  by  Lalanne,  Paris,  1885  [Eng.  tr.  1885]; 
the  M(5moires  of  Bourrienne  [Eng.  tr.];  (down  to  1802  they  are  more 
trustworthy  than  after  that  date);  those  of  Lucien  in  Jung's  edition, 
which  is  unfortunately  very  deficient  in  critical  spirit;  Thibaudeau, 
M6nioires  sur  le  Consulat;  the  Memoires  of  Mme.  de  R^musat  [Eng. 
tr.];  the  Memoires  of  Miot  De  M^lito  [Eng.  tr.];  the  Consid(!'rations  sur 
hi  revolution  franeaisc  di;  Mme.  de  Stael  [Eng.  tr.];  the  letters  of  P. 
L.  C.'urier,  written  in  1804,  in  his  (louvres  complc^tes.  Further,  Mont- 
galllard,  De  la  France  et  de  I'Europe  .sous  gouvernement  de  Bonaparte, 


Bibliography  759 

Paris  e\,  Lyon,  an  XII  (1804);  Fomeron,  I.es  •''migrfe  ot  laSocietf''  fran^aise 
sous  Napok'on  P"",  Paris,  1890;  Gaflfarel,  L'opposition  inilitaire  sous  le 
Consulat,  in  "la  Revolution  Fran^aisf,"  sixth  year,  \o.  10;  Debidour, 
Le  general  Fabvier,  in  the  "  Annales  de  TEst,"  January,  1887,  bastd  on 
Fabvier's  letters;  L'opposition  litt^raire  sous  le  Consulat  in  "  La  Nouvelle 
Revue,"  1889;  Doinel,  Les  conspirations  dans  le  Loiiet  sous  le  Consulat, 
in  "La  R(5volution  Fran^aisi-,"  1888;  Welschinger,  La  censure  sous  le 
premier  Empire,  1882;  Thiers,  Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  I'Empire,  vols. 
Ill  and  IV  [Eng.  tr.];  Lanfrey,  Napoleon  I,  vols.  II  and  III  [P^ng.  tr.]. 

On  Foreign  Relations:  A.  In  general,  in  addition  to  the  treaties  in  De 
Clercq,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus  par  la  France  (the  first  vol.  stops 
with  the  year  1803)  and  the  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  P"",  vol.  VIII, 
the  very  important  work  of  Lefebvre,  Histoire  des  cabinets  de  I'Europe. 
B.  With  Italy:  Botta,  Storia  d'ltalia  dal  1789  al  1814  [Eng.  tr.  Lon- 
don, 1828];  Castro,  Storia  d'ltalia  dal  1799  al  1814,  Milan,  ISSl;  the  .same, 
Milano  durante  la  dominazioue  napoleonita,  1880;  Francesco  Melzi  d'Eril, 
Memorie,  Documenti  e  lettere  inedite  di  Napoleone  I  e  Beauharnais,  ed. 
Giov.  Melzi,  2  vol.,  1865;  Bonacossi,  Bourrienne  et  ses  erreurs;  Dejob, 
Mme.  de  Stael  et  I'ltalie,  with  a  bibliography  on  the  influence  of  France 
on  Italy,  1796-1814,  Paris,  1890.  C.  With  Svvitzeriand :  Vuillemin,  Histoire 
de  la  Confederation  suisse;  Muralt,  Hans  von  Reinhard,  Ziirich,  1839 ;  ibid., 
Bonaparte,  Talleyrand  et  Stapfer,  Zurich,  1869;  Luginsbul,  Stapfer,  1887. 
D.  ^^■ith  Germany:  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  ^\ith  full  notes 
from  the  literature  of  the  subject;  Ranke,  Hardenberg  und  der  preus- 
sische  Staat,  works,  vol.  47;  Martens,  Rocueil  des  traitfe  conclus  par  la 
Russie,  first  section  (Austria);  vol.  II;  Foumier,  Gentz  u.  Cobenzl,  Ge- 
schichte der  osterreichischen  Diplomatie  von  1801  bis  1805.  E.  With 
Spain:  Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Spaniens  seit  dem  Ausbruch  der  franz. 
Revolution,  I ;  Bemhardi,  Napoleon  I  und  Spanien  in  the  "  Historische 
Zeitschrift,"  vol.  XL. 

On  the  constitutions  of  the  Italian  States,  of  Holland,  and  of  Switzer- 
land:  Poliz,   EuropiiLsche  Verfa.ssungen. 

On  Napoleon's  colonial  policy :  H.  Adams,  "  Napoleon  at  St.  Domingo," 
in  his  Historical  Essays ;  Tessier,  Le  general  Decaen  aux  Indes,  "  Re%'ue 
historique, "  XV.  On  Toussaint  I'Ouverture  the  "Revue  de  I'Agenais," 
1884,  contains  documents;  Schoelcher,  La  vie  de  Toussaint  I'Ouverture. 

On  the  strained  relations  with  England  (besides  the  Correspondance, 
VII,  and  the  "Moniteur"  for  1803):  Browning,  England  and  Napoleon 
in  1803,  London,  1887,  with  Lord  Whitworth's  despatches;  Lord  John 
Russell,  Memorials  and  Correspondence  of  Ch.  J.  Fox,  vol.  3;  The  Annual 
Register,  or  A  View  of  the  History,  etc.,  for  the  year  1803;  the  Letters  and 
Despatches  of  Lord  Castlereagh,  vol.  V;  Stanhope,  Life  of  Pitt,  IV:  Ash- 
ton,  English  Caricature  and  Satire  on  Napoleon  I.,  London,  1885;  Max 
Duncker,  "  Die  Landung  in  England"  in  his  Abhandlungen  aus  der  ntuen 
Geschichte;  Seeley,  A  Short  History  of  Napoleon  I.,  1886;  Ompteda,  Die 
Ueberwaltigung  Hannovers  durch  die  Franzosen,  Hanover,   1866.       On 


760  Bibliography 

the  Channel  flotilla:  Chevalier,  Histoire  de  la  marine  frangaise  sous  le 
Consulat  et  le  premier  Empire,  1886.  On  the  conspiracy  of  Georges  and 
his  associates  the  documentary  material  will  "he  found  in  "  Proces  instruit 
par  la  cour  de  justice  criminelle  contre  Georges,  Pichegru,  Moreau,  etc.," 
8  vols.,  Paris,  1804;  further,  the  work  of  Desmarest  (one  of  the  directors 
of  the  police),  Quinze  ans  de  haute  police  sous  Napoleon;  the  recollections 
of  Fauriel  in  his  Last  Days  of  the  Consulate  (to  be  used  with  caution) ;  the 
Memoires  of  Miot,  and  of  Hyde  de  Neu villa.  On  Georges  in  particular: 
G.  de  Cadoudal,  Georges  Cadoudal  et  la  chouannerie,  Paris,  1887 — the 
last  two  chapters  are,  naturally  enough,  not  impartial.  On  the  affair  of 
the  Due  d'Enghien:  Nougarfede  de  Fayet,  Recherches  historiques  sur  le 
proces  du  due  d'Enghien,  Paris,  1886;  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  Les  der- 
nieres  annees  du  due  d'Enghien,  Paris,  1886,  an  exhaustive  survey  of 
the  literature  of  the  subject;  Fournier,  in  the  "  Revue  historique,"  October, 
1887,  a  review  of  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe;  Welschinger,  le  due  d'Enghien, 
Paris,  1888;  Hyde  de  Neuville,   Memoires,  I. 

On  the  establishment  of  the  Empire:  Thiers,  vol.  V;  Miot  de  M^lito, 
II;  Mme.  de  R^musat;  the  "Senatus  Consultum"  of  May  18,  1804,  in 
H^lie,  Les  constitutions  de  la  France;  Rocquain,  Notices  sur  Napoleon 
I*^'"  in  the  "Revue  de  France,"  March,  1880;  Napoleon's  conversations 
with  the  ship's  surgeon  of  the  "Northumberland"  in  1815,  recently 
published  by  H^rrisson,  "  Le  Cabinet  Noir,"  1886.  Among  the  accounts 
of  foreigners,  those  of  Lucchesini  are  especially  important.  They  have 
been  published  by  Bailleu  in  his  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  1795- 
1807,  vol.  II,  1877 ;  in  addition,  the  despatches  of  the  Envoy  of  Hesse, 
Malsburg,  in  the  "Deutsche  Revue,"  Oct.,  1884.  The  satirical  com- 
ments of  the  Parisians  were  derived  from  an  unpublished  letter  of  the 
Swede,  Brinckmann,  to  Count  Philip  Stadion. 

[Hase,  Briefe  von  der  Wanderung  und  aus  Paris,  Leipzig,  1894;  P. 
MUller,  L'espionnage  militaire  sous  Napoleon  I*"":  C.  Schulmeister,  Paris, 
1896;  L.  Pingaud,  Iln  agent  secret  sous  la  revolution  et  I'Empire,  le  Comte 
d'Antraigues,  Paris,  1903;  J.  Turquan,  Le  monde  et  le  demi-monde  sous 
le  consulat  et  I'empire,  Paris,  1897;  A.  T.  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  the 
Sea  Power  on  the  French  Revolution  and  the  Empire,  1793-1812,  Boston, 
1892;  E.  Desbrifere,  Projets  et  tentatives  de  debarquement  aux  lies  britan- 
niques,  1793-1805,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1901;  J.  Leyland,  Ed.  Despatches  and 
Letters  relating  to  the  Blockade  of  Brest,  1803-1805,  Navy  Records  Soc, 
London,  1899;  P.  Marmottan,  Bonaparte  et  la  republique  de  Lucques, 
Le  royaume  d'Etrurie,  Paris,  1896;  P.  Schweizer,  Gcschichtc  der  Schwei^ 
zerischen  Neutralitiit,  Frauenfeld,  1893-'95;  W.  Oechsli,  Die  Schweiz  in 
den  Jahren  1798  und  1799,  Zurich,  1S99;  K.  T.  Heigel,  Deutsche  Geschichte 
vom  Tode  Fricdriclis  dcs  Gr.  bis  zur  Aufhisung  des  alten  Reichcs,  vols. 
I  and  II,  Stuttgart,  1899;  H.  A.  L.  Fisher,  Studies  in  Napoleonic  States- 
manship: (Jermany,  Oxford,  1903;  E.  Denis,  L'AUcmagtie,  1789-1810,  Fin 
de  I'ancienne  Allemagne,  Paris,  ISOO;  G.  Roloff,  Die  Kolonialpolitik 
Napoleons  I.,  Munich,    1899;   H.   Froidevaux,   La   politique   coloniale   d 


I 


Bibliography  761 


Napoldon  P'',  "Rev.  des  questions  historiques,"  April,  1901 ;  W.  M.  Sloane, 
Napoleon's  rlans  for  a  Colonial  System,  "Am.  Hist.  Rev.,"  April,  1H99; 
H.  de  Poyen,  Les  guerres  des  Antilles  de  1793  k  '15,  Paris,  1890;  H.  Adams, 
"Napoleon  at  St.  Domingo,"  Historieal  Essays,  New  York;  H.  Adams, 
History  of  the  United  States,  vols.  I  and  II,  New  York;  G.  Roloff,  Zur 
Napoleonischen  Politik  v.  1803-1805,  "Hist.  Vierte]j;)hrs(hr.,"  V.  1902; 
M.  M.  P.  Dorman,  A  History  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  first  vol.  1793-1805,  London,  1902;  G.  S.  Ford,  Hanover 
and  Pru.ssia,  1795-1803;  A  Study  of  the  Prussian  Neutrality  System, 
Columbia  Univ.  Pub.,  New  York,  1903;  S.  B.  Fay,  The  E.xecution  of 
the  Due  d'Enghien,  "American  Historical  Review,"  July  and  October, 
1898.] 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  War  of  1805 

On  the  preliminarj'  history  of  the  war  of  1805,  besides  the  letters  of 
Napoleon  in  the  Correspondance,  vols.  8,  9,  and  10,  and  the  Lettres  in- 
^dites  de  Talleyrand  a  Napoleon,  1800-1809,  published  by  P.  Bertaud, 
there  are  the  Memoires  of  Miot  de  M^lito,  one  of  the  most  important 
and  most  trustworthy  sources  for  this  period;  the  Memoires  of  Mme. 
de  R6musat,  of  Savary,  due  de  Rovigo,  of  Hulot  in  the  "  Spectateur  mili- 
taire"  for  1883;  the  correspondence  of  Villeneuve  in  Jurien  de  la  Gravifere, 
Guerres  maritimes.  On  the  project  to  invade  England,  the  article  of  Max 
Duncker,  mentioned  above  under  Chap.  X,  which  is,  however,  not  con- 
clusive. On  Pius  VII.  in  Paris,  the  Memoires  of  Consalvi,  Cr^tineau-Joly, 
and  the  great  work  of  Haussonville,  I'Eglise  romaine  et  le  premier  Empire; 
also,  "  Paris  zur  Zeit  der  Kaiserkronung,"  extracts  from  the  letters  of  an 
eye-witness,  Cologne,  1805.  On  the  formation  of  the  third  coalition: 
Martens,  Recueil  des  Traites,  I;  Neumann,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus 
par  I'Autriche;  Martens,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus  par  la  Russie,  II  and 
VI;  Tatistchefif,  Alexandre  et  Napol<''on  d'apres  leur  correspondance 
in^dite,  from  the  archives  of  St.  Petersburg,  published  in  "  La  Nouvelle 
Revue,"  1890;  in  addition,  the  correspondence  of  Adam  Czartoryski  with 
Alexander  I.,  published  by  de  Mazade,  1SG5;  the  Memoires  of  Czartoryski, 
1887  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1888];  the  recollections  of  Rasumovski  in  his 
biography  by  Wassiltchikow,  in  Russian,  1887;  and  the  reports  sent  from 
Paris  by  Markow,  in  the  "  Archiv  Worontzova,"  XIII,  XIV,  1879;  also 
the  memoirs  of  Hardenberg,  edited  by  Ranke;  the  reports  of  Lucchesini  in 
Bailleu,  II;  the  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Lord  Castlereagh,  V;  Cobbett, 
"  Parliamentarj^  Debates,"  vol.  VI,  London,  180G;  the  "Annual  Reg- 
ister," 1803-1805. 

General  works:  Lefebvre,  Ilistoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe;  Ranke, 
Hardenberg  und  die  Geschichte  des  preussischen  Staates  von  1793-1813; 


762  Bibliography 

the  critical  essay  by  Max  Duncker,  Graf  Haugwitz  und  Freiherr  von 
Hardenberg  in  the  "  Abhandlungen  a.  d.  neueren  Geschichte,"  and  his 
review  of  Ranke's  work  in  the  "  Mittheilungen  a.  d.  historischen  Littera- 
tur,"  sixth  year;  Bernhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands  im  19.  Jahrhundert, 
II;  Beer,  Zehn  Jahre  osterreichischer  Politik;  Foumier,  Gentz  und  Co- 
benzl,  Geschichte  der  osterreichischen  Diplomatic  von  1801-1805;  Stan- 
hope, Life  of  Pitt,  vol.  IV.  On  the  war  of  1805,  besides  the  correspond- 
ence of  Napoleon  and  the  correspondence  of  Talleyrand  with  Napoleon, 
mentioned  just  above,  the  Memoires  of  Marmont,  Rapp,  S^gur,  Savary, 
and  F^zensac;  Piou  des  Loches,  Mes  campagnes,  1792-1815,  the  cahiers  of 
Capitaine  Coignet  [Eng.  tr.  as  "Narrative"  of,  etc.];  Correspondence 
of  Davout,  pub.  by  de  Mazade,  1885,  4  vols.,  and  Mont6gut,  Le  marechal 
Davout,  Paris,  1882;  in  addition  the  Memoires  of  Czartoryski  [Eng.  tr.], 
and  his  account  of  the  month  of  April,  1806,  in  his  "  Correspondence  with 
Alexander";  the  memoirs  of  de  Maistre  (cf.  von  Sybel's  article  in  the 
"Historische  Zeitschrift,"  1859),  Matcriaux  pour  servir  k  I'histoire  de 
la  bataille'd'Austerlitz  recueillis  par  un  militaire,  1806,  with  a  very  in- 
structive map ;  Stutterheim,  La  bataille  d' Austerlitz,  par  un  militaire  t6moin 
de  la  journee  du  2  decembre  1805,  Hamburg,  1806;  the  Recollections  of 
Radetsky  in  the  "Mittheilungen  des  k.k.  Kriegsarchivs,"  1887;  Bernhardi, 
Denkwiirdigkeiten  des  Generals  Toll,  2d  ed.,  Leipzig,  1865;  further,  Michai- 
lowski-Danilevski,  La  campagne  de  1805;  Angeli,  Ulm  und  Austerlitz,  in 
"Streffleur's  Militarische  Zeitschrift,"  1877,  1879;  Einsiedel,  Der  Feldzug 
der  Osterreicher  in  Italien  1805,  Weimar,  1812.  Details  drawn  from  the 
papers  of  the  Archduke  Charles  are  given  in  Wertheimer,  Geschichte 
Osterreichs  und  LTngarns  im  ersten  Jahrzehnt  des  19.  Jahrhunderts,  vol. 
I,  a  work  of  no  value  as  regards  the  great  international  diplomatic 
questions;  Yorck,  Napoleon  als  Feldherr,  vol.  I  [Eng.  tr.];  Mack's  owti 
defence  in  the  "  Historische  Taschenbuch  "  of  Raumer,  1873 ;  Dieffenbach, 
K.  L.  Schulmeister,  der  Hauptspion,  Parteigiinger,  Polizeiprafekt  und  ge- 
heime  Agent  Napoleon  I,  1879.  On  the  attitude  of  Prussia:  Die  preus- 
sischen  Kriegsvorbereitungen  und  Operationsplane  1805  in  the  "  Kriegs- 
geschichtlichen  Einzelschriften,"  part  I,  Berlin,  1805;  Bailleu,  Preussen 
und  Frankreich  1795  bis  1807,  vol.  II;  M.  Lehmann,  Scharnhorst;  Bail- 
leu, Prinz  Louis  Ferdinand  in  the  "  Deutsche  Rundschau,"  1883  On 
South  Germany  among  other  things  the  Denkwiirdigkeiten  of  Montgelas, 
1887;  Perthes,  Politische  Zustiinde  u.  Personen  in  Deutschland  zur  Zeit 
d.  franz.  Herrschaft. 

[The  works  mentioned  above  of  Desbrifere,  p.  7(i0;  of  Dorman, 
p.  761 ;  of  Mahan,  p.  700;  the  Paget  Papers,  p.  750;  H.  Ulmann,  Russisch- 
prcussische  PoHtik  miter  Alexander  I.  und  Friedrich  Wilhelm  III.  bis 
1806,  urkimdlich  dargestellt,  Leipzig,  1890;  A.  T.  Mahan,  The  Life  of 
Nelson,  the  Embodiment  of  the  Sea  Power  of  Great  Britain,  Bo.ston,  1897; 
G.  Rolofif,  Zur  Napoleoiii.scheii  Politik  v.  1803-1805,  "  Hi.stor.  Viertel- 
jahrschrift,"  1902;  P.  C.  AUombert  and  J.  Colin,  La  Campagne  de  1805  eu 
AUemagne,  vols.  I  and  II,  Paris,  1903.] 


Bibliography  763 


CHAPTER  XII 

Napoleonic  Creations.     Breach  with  Prussia 

On  public  opinion  in  France  in  1805  and  1806:  the  reports  of  Lucchesini 
and  the  letters  of  Hauterive  to  Talleyrand  in  Bailleu,  Preussen  und  Frank- 
reich,  vol.  II;  MoUien,  Souvenirs  d'vui  niinistre  du  tr^sor  [new  ed.  by 
Gomel,  1898];  the  Memoires  of  Mme.  de  R^musat;  the  Souvenirs  of  Ba- 
rante.  On  France  and  Naples:  Helfert,  Konigin  Karoline  von  Neapel; 
Boulay  de  la  Meurthe,  Quelques  lettres  de  Marie  Caroline,  Reine  des 
Deux-Siciles,  in  the  "  Revue  d'histoire  diplomatique,"  1888;  Coletta,  His- 
toire  du  royaume  de  Naples,  3  vols.;  the  M(''moires  of  King  Joseph,  ed. 
by  Du  Casse;  the  Memoires  of  Miot  de  M€Iito  [Eng.  tr.]  On  the  relations 
with  the  Pope:  in  addition  to  the  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  P"",  the 
M^'-moires  of  Consalvi;  d'Haussonville,  LYglise  romaine  et  le  premier 
Empire;  Artaud,  Histoire  du  Pape  Pie  VII.  On  the  establishment  of 
the  kingdom  of  Holland :  King  Louis's  Documents  historiques  et  reflexions 
sur  le  gouvernement  de  la  HoUande,  Paris,  1820;  further.  Alb.  Reville, 
La  Hollande  et  le  Roi  Louis,  in  the  "  Re^^ue  de  Deux  Mondes,"  1870; 
F61ix  Rocquain,  Napoleon  I''"'  et  le  Roi  Louis.  On  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine:  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  vol.  II,  and  the  literature 
given  by  Dahlmann,  Quellenkunde  zur  Deutschen  Geschichte;  in  ad- 
dition, Perthes,  Pol.  Zustiinde  ;md  Personen  zur  Zeit  der  franz  Herr- 
schaft,  2  vols. ;  J.  G.  v.  Pohl,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  aus  meinem  Leben  und 
aus  meiner  Zeit,  1840;  the  Memoirs  of  Montgelas;  the  letters  of  a  secret 
agent  of  Austria  in  1806  in  Foumier,  Historische  Studien  und  Skizzen; 
Schlossberger,  Briefwechsel  der  Konigin  Katharina  u  d  Konigs  Jerome, 
I;  the  same,  Politische  Correspondenz  Napoleons  u  Konig  Friedrich  I. 
V.  Wiirtemberg  (it  contains  little  that  is  new  and  important) ;  Gocke, 
Das  Grossherzogthum  Berg  unter  Joachim  Murat  1877;  Baulieu-Mar- 
connay,  K  F.  v  Dalberg,  2  vols  ;  in  addition,  Bailleu,  Fiirstenbriefe  an 
Napoleon  I.  in  the  "  Historische  Zeitschrift,  '  1887;  Strippelmann,  Beitriigo 
zur  Geschichte  Hes.sen-Kassels,  part  II,  Marburg,  1878;  Baader,  Streif- 
lichter  auf  die  Zeit  der  tiefsten  Emiedrigung  Deutschlands,  oder  die 
Reichstadt  Niirnberg  von  1801-1806,  Nurnberg,  1878;  Mejer,  Zur  Ge- 
schichte der  nimisch-deutschen  Frage  On  the  French  Army  in  South 
Germany:  among  others,  the  Souvenirs  militaires  de  F^zensac  and  the 
Correspondance  de  Napoleon  P""  On  the  strained  relations  witli  Eng- 
land: Lord  John  Russell,  Life  and  Times  of  Fox,  1859;  Cobbett,  Parlia- 
mentarj^  Debates,  \T;  Sir  G.  Jackson,  Diaries  and  Letters,  I;  Lefebvre, 
Histoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe,  III  On  the  negotiations  with  Rus- 
sia: Bignon,  Thiers,  Bemhardi,  and  Martens,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus 
par  la  Russie,  VI.  The  origin  of  th(>  I'rench-Pru.ssian  ^^'ar  is  not  yet 
adequately  explained,  since  Haugwitz  burned  up  the  documents.  Still 
some  of  the  mo.st  essential  documents  are  in  the  second  volume  of  Bailleu, 


764  Bibliography 

Preussen  und  Frankreich  von  1795-1807.  See  further  the  Memoirs 
of  Hardenberg  edited  by  Ranke  and  the  critical  remarks  of  M.  Lehmann 
in  the  "Historische  Zeitschrift,"  Neue  Folge,  vol.  Ill;  Lombard,  Mat^- 
riaux  pour  servir  h  I'histoire  des  armees  1805,  1806,  1807;  the  letters  of 
Gentz  to  Starhemberg  in  the  "  Mittheilungen  d.  Instituts  f.  osterr.  Ge- 
schichtsforschung,"  7th  year;  in  addition,  Ranke,  Hardenberg  und  der 
preussische  Staat;  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  I;  Hoppner,  Geschichte 
des  Krieges  von  1806  und  1807;  M.  Lehmann  Schamhorst,  I;  Bailleu, 
Prinz  Louis  Ferdinand  in  the  "Deutsche  Rundschau,"  1887. 

[The  works  above  mentioned  of  Heigel,  p.  760 ;  Fisher,  p.  760 ;  Denis,  p. 
760;  Roloff,p.  762;  Ulmann,  p.  762;  Marmottan,  p.  760;  Desbrifere,  p.  760; 
L.  de  Lanzac  de  Laborie,  La  domination  frangaise  en  Belgique,  Directoire — 
Consulat— Empire,  1795-1814,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1895;  S.  Balau,  La  Belgique 
sous  I'Empire  et  la  defaite  de  Waterloo,  1804-15,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1894; 
L.  Wichers,  De  regeering  van  Koning  Lode\\djk  Napoleon,  1806-10, 
Utrecht,  1892;  E.  Barone,  Studi  suUa  Conduta  della  guerra  1806  in  Ger- 
mania,  2  vols.,  Torino,  1900;  J.  Strickler,  Amtliche  Sammlung  der  Acten 
aus  der  Zeit  der  Helvetischen  Republik,  Berne,  1895;  H.  v.  Zwiedineck- 
Siidenhorst,  Deutsche  Geschichte  von  der  Auflosung  des  alten  bis  zur 
Errichtung  des  neuen  Kaiserreichs,  vol.  I,  "  Die  Zeit  des  Rheinbundes 
und  die  Griindung  des  deutschen  Bundes,  1806-15,"  Stuttgart,  1897; 
A.  Bonnefons,  Un  allie  de  Napoleon:  FrM^ric  Augusta,  premier  roi  de 
Saxe  et  grand-due  de  Varsovie,  1763-1827,  Paris,  1902.] 


CHAPTER  XIII 
From  Jena  to  Tilsit 

On  the  campaign  in  Thuringia:  primarily  the  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon  I'^'';  the  military  writings  of  Clausewitz-Lossau,  Charakteristik 
der  Kriege  Napoleon  I.,  vol.  2,  "an  eye-witness  of  the  battle  of  Auer- 
stadt";  Math.  Dumas,  Precis  des  ev^nements  militaires,  vol.  18;  Hopf- 
ner,  Geschichte  d.  Krieges  von  1806  u.  1807;  P.  Foucart,  La  campagne  de 
Prusse  en  1806,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1887  and  1890;  C.  v.  d.  Goltz,  Rossbach 
und  Jena,  1883;  Yorck,  Napoleon  I.  als  Feldherr,  vol.  I  [Eng.tr.];  Heimann, 
Der  Feldzug  v.  1806  in  Deutschland ;  Dechend,  Beitrjige  zur  Geschichte 
des  Krieges  von  1806-1807;  Lettow-Vorbeck,  Der  Krieg  von  1806  und 
1807,  1st  vol.  2d  ed.  1899  up  to  the  battle  of  Auerstiidt  [vols.  II-IV,  Berlin, 
1892-1896,  carry  the  narrative  through  to  Tilsit];  in  addition,  Riihle  von 
Lilienstern,  Bericht  eines  Augenzeugen  vom  Feldziige  1806  (written  under 
the  influence  of  Massenbach,  an  officer  of  Hohenlohe's  .staff,  whose  ideas 
were  far  from  clear);  Massenbach,  Geschichtliche  Denkwiirdigkeiten 
(confused  and  unreliable);  Muffling,  Der  Operationsplan  der  preussLsch- 
sJichsischen  Armce  18()(),  Weimar,  1806;  Muffling,  Aus  meinem  Leben, 
1851,  unreliable;  Plotho,  Tagebuch  wiihrend  der  Kriegsoperationen,  1806, 


Bibliography  765 

und  1807,  Berlin,  ISll;  Ledebur,  Erlel>nisso  aus  den  Kriegsjahrcn  ISOG 
und  1807,  Berlin,  lS.5o;  Borcke-Leszczynski,  Kriegsleben  des  Johann  v. 
Borcke,  1806-1815,  lierlin,  1888;  Erinnerungen  aus  deui  Leben  des  (len- 
eral-Feldniarsehalls  Hermann  v.  Boyen,  vol.  I,  Leipzig,  1889;  Gentz, 
"Tagebuch  im  preussisehen  Hauptquartier,"  in  his  colleeted  works  ed. 
by  Schlesier;  Tiedemann,  Denk\\urdigkeitcn;  Gentz  and  Mayer  von 
Heldenfeld,  Beriohte  iiber  die  Schlacht  bei  Jena  in  the  "  Mitthcilungen  des 
k.  k.  Kriegsarchivs,"  1882;  Burckhardt,  Aus  den  Tagen  der  Schlaeht 
bei  Jena,  "Neues  Ajchiv.  fiir  Siichs.  Gesch.,"  IV.  See  also  the  later  judg- 
ment in  retrospect  of  Schamhorst  on  this  campaign,  which  has  been 
published  by  Lehmann  in  the  "  Histor.  Zeitschrift,"  Neue  Folge,  XXIV; 
the  Correspondence  of  Davout  and  the  judgment  of  Mont^gut  on  Davout 
in  S6gur,  Histoire  et  m^moires,  vol.  3  [Eng.  tr.  by  Patchett-Martin, 
London,  1895];  F^zensac,  Souvenirs  militaires;  Piou  des  Leches,  Mes 
Campagnes;  Coignet,  Cahiers  [Eng.  tr.  as  "Narrative"];  Pertz,  Gneise- 
nau,  vol.  I;  Lehmann,  Scharnhorst,  vol.  I.  On  the  war  in  Poland,  in 
addition  to  the  works  just  mentioned:  Foucart,  LaCampagne  de  Pologne, 
Paris,  1882;  R.  T.  Wilson,  Brief  Remarks  on  the  Character  and  Composi- 
tion of  the  Russian  Army,  and  a  Sketch  of  the  Campaigns  in  Poland,  1806- 
1807;  the  Memoires  of  Count  Oginski,  of  Eugen  von  Wiirtemberg,  of  Ben- 
ningsen  in  the  anonymous  "  Beitriige  zur  Geschichte  des  Kriegs  von  1806 
und  1807,"  Breslau,  1836;  Grolmann,  Tagebuch  liber  d.  Feldzug  d.  Erb- 
grossherzogs  von  Baden,  1887.  On  Napoleon's  policy  during  this  war: 
Bertrand,  Lettres  in^dites  de  Talleyrand;  Lefebvre,  Histoire  des  Cabi- 
nets de  I'Europe,  vol.  3  in  the  second  edition,  where  there  is  an  admirable 
exposition  of  the  extremely  complicated  situation  of  affairs,  needing  only 
slight  corrections;  Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  P"",  vol.  I,  De  Tilsit 
k  Erfurt,  Paris,  1891;  Tatistcheff,  Alexandre  1"  et  Napoleon  in  the 
"Nouvelle  Re\'ue,"  1888;  Bailleu,  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  vol.  II; 
Beer,  Zehn  Jahre  osterreichischer  Politik;  Thiers,  \o\.  VII;  Ranke, 
Hardenberg  und  Preus.sen,  vol.  Ill;  Bernhardi,  Geschichte  Russ- 
lands,  vol.  II;  "The  Annual  Register  for  the  Year  1807";  Diaries  and 
Letters  from  the  Peace  of  Amiens  to  the  Battle  of  Talavera,  London, 
1872;  De  Maistre,  Memoires  politiques,  letters  written  in  the  spring  of 
1807;  Czartoryski,  Memoires  [Eng.  tr.],  vol.  II;  Bernhardi,  Denkwiir- 
digkeiten  Tolls;  the  Memoires  of  Savary  [Eng.  tr.]  become  more  reliable 
for  this  period;  Barante,  Souvenirs,  vol.  I;  Gagem,  Mein  Anteil  an  der 
Politik,  vol.  I;  Countess  Voss,  Neunundsechzig  Jahre  am  preussisehen 
Hof,  1876;  Hardenberg's  Memoirs,  ed.  by  Ranke,  especially  vol.  V 
with  the  documents;  the  Tagebuch  of  Schladen;  G.  Horn,  Das  Buch  v.  d. 
Konigin  Luise,  1883;  Martens,  Recueil  des  traitC'S  conclus  par  la  Russie, 
vol.  VI;  Emouf,  Maret,  due  de  Bassano;  Meneval,  Napoleon  et  Marie 
Louise  [new  ed.  as  Memoires,  Paris,  1894,  Eng.  tr.  London,  1894];  Boppe, 
La  mission  de  I'adjutant-commandant  Meriage  :\  Widdin,  1807-1809, 
in  the  "Annales  de  I'Ecole  politique";  Gardane,  La  mission  du  g6n6ral 
Gardane  en  Perse  sous  le  premier  Empire,   Paris,    1865.     For  further 


766  Bibliography 

details  on  the  relations  of  Napoleon  to  the  Shah  Feth-Ali,  see  Gaffarel,  in  the 
"Revue  politique  et  litt^raire,"  1878.  On  the  treaties  of  Tilsit  see  Dc 
Clercq,  Recueil  des  trait^s  de  la  France,  vol.  II;  Garden,  Histoire  g^n^rale 
des  trait^s  de  paix,  vol.  X;  Bignon,  Histoire  de  France,  vol.  VI;  Lefebvre, 
Histoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe,  vol.  Ill;  Thiers,  Consulat  et  Em- 
pire [Eng.  tr.],  vol.  VII;  Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  I^':  this  work 
and  also  the  articles  of  Tatistcheff  in  the  "Nouvelle  Revue,"  1890,  con- 
tain the  authentic  text  of  the  secret  treaty  of  alliance  which  was  first 
published  by  me.  [It  will  be  found  in  the  German  and  French  editions 
at  this  place,  but  is  omitted  here. — B.] 

[The  works  above  mentioned  of  Heigel,  p.  760;  Denis,  p.  760;  Fisher, 
p.  760;  Zwiedeneck-Siidenhorst,  p.  760;  H.  v.  Treuenfeld,  Auerstadt  and 
Jena,  Hanover,  1893;  Lewal,  La  veill^e  d'J^na,  fitude  de  strat^gie  de 
combat,  Paris,  1899;  E.  Leydolph,  Die  Schlacht  bei  Jena,  2d  ed.,  Jena, 
1901;  E.  Driault,  Napoleon  k  Finkenstein  (avril — mai  1807)  d'apres  la  cor- 
respondance  de  I'empereur,  les  archives  du  minist^re  des  affaires  ^tran- 
geres,  les  archives  nationales,  "  Rev.  d'histoire  diplomatique,"  vol.  XIII, 
Paris,  1899 ;  F.  Loraine  Petrie,  Napoleon's  Campaign  in  Poland,  1806-07, 
London,  1903.] 


CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Situation  of  Affairs  in  France 

For  the  internal  conditions  in  France  see  the  references  given  for 
Chapter  IX;  in  ad  ii;ion,  Thiers,  vols.  VI- VIII,  with  Bami,  Napoleon 
I"  et  son  historian  M.  Thiers;  Lanfrey,  vols.  III-IV  [Eng.  tr.];  Taine, 
Le  regime  moderne  [Eng.  tr.];  "Le  Moniteur,"  la  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon  I",  vols.  XIII-XVII;  the  M^moires  of  Mme.  de  R^musat 
[Eng.  tr.];  the  M^moires  of  Mme.  Avrillon  (who  was  lady's  maid  to 
the  Empress  Josephine);  the  M(5moires  of  Beugnot  [Eng.  tr.];  Souvenirs 
of  the  Due  de  BrogUe  [Eng.  tr.];  V^ron,  M^moires  d'un  bourgeois  de 
Paris,  vol.  I;  Faber,  Notices  sur  I'int^rieur  de  la  France;  the  Considera- 
tions of  Mme.  de  Stael,  vol.  II  [Eng.  tr.];  the  despatches  of  Mettemich, 
in  the  second  vol.  of  the  "  Nachgelassene  Papiere "  [Eng.  tr.  as  "Me- 
moirs"]; Pelet  de  la  Lozfere,  Opinions  de  Napol<?on  au  Conseil  d'Etat; 
the  M6moirt's  of  Vitrolles,  vol.  II,  p.  443  ff.;  Welschinger,  La  Censure 
sous  Napok'on  I";  Sainte-Beuve,  Chateaubriand  et  son  groupe  litt^raire, 
2  vols.;  Merlet,  Tableau  de  la  litterature  fran^-aise,  1800-1815,  Paris, 
1877;  B.  Jullien,  Histoire  de  la  po^sie  k  I'^poque  imp^riale;  Vauthier, 
Lemercier;  Nodier,  Souvenirs;  Bninetifere,  Etudes  critiques  sur  I'histoire 
de  la  litterature  franraisc,  1880;  Boissonade,  La  critique  litt^raire  sous 
le  premier  Empire;  Fauchille,  La  question  juive  sous  le  premier  Empire, 
1886;  Taine,  "Napoleon  Bonaparte"   in  his  Le  r6gime  moderne,  vol.  I. 

On  the  relations  with  the  Powers  in  general:  Lefebvre,  Histoire  dea 


Bibliography  767 

Cabinets,  vol.  Ill  of  the  serond  ed.,  Paris,  1866-69;  Vandal,  Napoleon  et 
Alexandre  I*"",  vol.  I,  a  work  l)ased  on  the  documents  in  the  archives  of 
St.  Petersburg  and  Paris  and  the  notes  of  the  most  distinguished  diplo- 
matists, in  which  the  author  sets  forth  in  detail  the  situation  in  1807  and 
1808  The  only  criticism  to  be  made  is  that  the  author  takes  too  literally 
some  of  the  documents  in  the  archives.  In  addition,  Tatistcheff,  Alex- 
andre I*"""  et  Napol<'>on;  Talleyrand,  Memoires,  ed.  by  Broglie  [Eng.  tr.], 
London,  1891-92,  vol.  1;  Mi'moires  of  Field-Marshal  Count  von  Stedinck, 
Swedish  Minister  to  Russia;  Bemhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands  im  19. 
Jahrh.,  vol.  II.  2.  On  the  relations  with  Pnissia:  G.  Hassel,  Geschichte 
der  Preuss.  Politik,  1807-1808,  vol.  I;  and  the  article  of  Duncker,  "  Preus- 
sen  wiihrend  der  franzosischen  Occupation"  in  his  Aus  der  Zeit  Fried- 
richs  des  Grossen  imd  Friedrich-Wilhelm,  III.  3.  On  the  relations  with 
Austria;  Beer,  Zehn  Jahre  osterreich.  Politik,  and  the  same,  Die  oriental- 
Ische  Politik  Osterreichs  seit  1774;  the  Memoirs  and  reports  of  Mettemich 
in  the  second  vol.  of  his  "  NachgelassenePapiere  "  [Eng.  tr.  as  "  Memoirs"]. 
4  With  the  Pope  and  Italy  in  general:  Haussonville  and  the  writers 
previously  mentioned;  in  addition,  Mayol  de  Lup^,  Un  pape  prisonnier 
In  the  "Correspondant,"  1884  and  1885;  Castro,  Storia  politica  moderna 
d'ltalia  dal  1799  al  1814;  Corracini,  (La  Folic)  Histoire  de  I'administra- 
tion  du  royaume  d'ltalie;  Sclopis,  La  domination  fran^-aise  en  Italic,  pub. 
by  the  Academic  des  sciences  morales  et  politiques,  1861 ;  Castro,  Milano 
durante  la  dominazione  napoleonita.  5.  With  Spain:  Baumgarten, 
Geschichte  Spaniens,  vol.  I — all  the  Spanish  memoir  literature  is  mentioned 
in  it;  Bemhardi,  Napoleon  I.  Politik  in  Spanien,  "  Histor.  Zeitschrift," 
vol.  40.  The  most  important  general  history  is  Lafuente,  Historia  general  de 
Espana.  Especially  instructive  is  Rehfues,  L'Espagne  en  'OSou  recherches 
sur  I'Etat  de  I'administration,  de^  Sciences,  etc.,  etc.,  faites  dans  un  vovage 
k  Madrid  en  I'ann^e  '08,  Paris,  1811;  in  addition,  the  Memoires  of  Joseph 
and  those  of  Miot  de  M61ito,  vol.  Ill;  Escoiquiz,  Exposition  sincere  des 
raisons  et  des  motifs  qui  engagerent  S.  M.  C.  le  roi  Ferdinand  VII  k  faire 
le  voyage  de  Bayonne  en  '08,  trad,  de  I'espagn.  par  J.  M.  de  Carnero, 
Toulouse,  1814;  the  letters  of  Murat  to  Savary,  from  Madrid,  1808,  "  Mit- 
theilungen  des  Instituts  f.  osterr.  Geschichtsforschung,"  1880;  Southey, 
Historj'  of  the  Peninsular  War,  London,  1823;  Thiers,  vol.  VIII,  needing 
correction  in  many  details.  On  the  interview  at  Erfurt,  besides  the 
works  already  mentioned  on  the  foreign  relations  of  France:  Hausser, 
Deutsche  Geschichte,  vol.  Ill;  the  memoirs  of  the  Germans,  Muffling, 
F.  de  Miiller,  and  Steffens;  the  memoirs  of  Mettemich,  particularly  for 
the  part  played  by  Talleyrand  in  vol.11  of  his  '"  Nachgela-ssene  Papiere" 
[Eng.  tr.  "  Memoirs"];  Talleyrand, Memoires,  vol.  I;  Count  Choiseul-Gouffier, 
Reminiscences  sur  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  P"";  Meneval,  Napoleon  et 
Marie-Louise,  3d  vol.  [Eng.tr.  as  "  Memoirs"];  Emouf,  Maret,  due  de  Bas- 
sano;  the  Memoirs  of  Montgelas;  Bittard  des  Fortes,  Les  preliminaires 
de  rentre\'ue  d'Erfurt,  "Revue  d'histoire  diplom.,"  1890;  Descrip- 
tion des  fetes  donnas  k  LL.  MM.  les  empereurs  Napoleon  et  Alexandre 


768  Bibliography 

par  Charles  Auguste,  due  de  Saxe-Weimar,  1809;  Souvenirs  de  I'entrevue 
d'Erfurt  par  un  page  de  Napoleon,  the  "  Correspondant,"  63d  aoI. 

[V'*'  de  Broc,  La  Vie  en  France  sous  le  premier  Empire,  Paris,  1895; 
A.  Lemoine,  Napoleon  I®'"  et  les  Juifs,  Paris,  1900;  J.  L^mann,  Napo- 
leon et  les  Israelites,  La  preponderance  juive,  2™*^  partie,  son  organi- 
sation, 1806-15,  Lyon,  1894;  Ph.  Sagnac,  Les  Juifs  et  Napoleon, 
1806-1808,  Rev.  d'hist.  mod.  et  contemp.,  vols.  II  and  III,  3  arts.;  A. 
Fischer,  Goethe  und  Napoleon,  eine  Studie,  Frauenfeld,  1899;  Le  Lieut.- 
Col.  Clerc,  La  Capitulation  de  Baylen — Causes  et  Consequences,  Paris, 
1903;  J.  Jordan  de  Urries,  Mcmorias  dal  Marques  de  Ayerbe  sobre  la 
estancia  de  don  Fernando  VJI  en  Valen^ay  y  el  principio  de  la  guerra  de 
la  independencia,  Saragossa,  1896.] 


CHAPTER  XV 

Thk  Campaigns  in  Spain  and  Austria.     Marie  Louise.     1808-1810 

On  the  campaign  in  Spain  see  the  works  mentioned  for  Chapter  XIV, 
and  in  addition  the  Corre.^pondance  of  Napoleon,  vols.  XVII  and  XVIII; 
Ducasse,  Les  rois  freres  de  Napoleon,  I;  Yorck,  Napoleon  als  Feldherr, 
vol.  II;  Napier,  History  of  the  War  in  the  Peninsula;  the  Correspondance 
of  Davout;  souvenirs  of  Fezensac;  the  cahiers  of  Captain  Coignot  [Eng. 
tr.  as  "Narrative"];  the  "Letters  from  Spain  by  German  Sole i^rs"  in 
Bemays,  Die  Schicksale  des  Grossherzogtums  Frankfurt  u.  s.  Truppen. 
On  the  expedition  against  Sir  John  Moore :  A  Narrative  of  the  Campaign 
of  the  British  Army  in  Spain  commanded  by  Sir  John  Moore,  London, 
1809.  On  the  causes  of  the  war  with  Austria:  Metternich,  Nachgelassene 
Papiere  [Eng.  tr.  as  "  Memoirs"] — the  despatches  of  vol.  II  are  often  at  vari- 
ance with  the  recollections  in  vol.  I,  cf.  Bailleu,  DieMemoirenMetternichs 
in  the  "  Histor.  Zeitschrift,"  Neue  Folge,  vol.  VIII;  the  reports  of  Fred. 
Stadion,  sent  from  Bavaria  from  1807  to  1809,  "Archiv  fiir  osterr.  Ge- 
schichtc,"  63d  vol.;  the  Denkwiirdigkeiten  of  Montgelas;  in  addition, 
Thiers;  Bignon;  Bf>er,  Zohn  Jahre  osterr.  Politik;  Wertheimer,  Geschichte 
Osterreich-!  u.  Ungarns  im  ersten  Jahrzehnten  des  19.  Jahrh.,  vol.  II, 
based  on  the  memoranda  of  Archduke  Charles  and  following  them  too 
closely;  Albert  Jager,  Zur  Vorgeschichte  des  Kriegcs  von  1809,  "  Sitz- 
ungslx-richte"  of  the  Menna  Academy.  On  the  attitude  of  Russia: 
Bernhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands,  vol.  II;  Mazade,  Alexandre  I'""  et  le 
Prince  Czartoryski;  Czartoryski,  Correspondance  in  vol.  II  of  his  M6- 
moires  [Eng.  tr.];  the  Souvenirs  of  de  Maistre.  On  the  attitude  of  Prussia: 
Hassel,  Gesch.  der  preuss.  Politik  scit  1807,  vol.  I;  the  articles  of  Max 
Duncker,  "  Preussen  wiihrend  der  franz.  Okkupation"  and  "Eine 
MiUiarde  Kriegsentschiidigung,  welche  Preussen  an  Frankrei(  h  gezahlt 
hat,"  in  his  "Aus  der  Zeit  Iriedrich  d.  Grossen  u.  Friedr.  Wilhelm  III., 
vol.  I;  Max  Duncker,  "Friedr.  Wilhelm  im  Jahre  1809"  in  his  Abhand- 


Bibliography  769 

lungen  aiis  dor  nouercn  Goschiclitc ;  Ranke,  "Hardcnbcrg  und  die-  Gc- 
schichte  dcs  prcussistlicn  StaiiU-.s  von  1793-1813,"  Siiinintl.  Wcrko,  vol. 
48;  A.  Stem,  Abhaudlungcii  und  Aktenstiicke  zur  Gi'.schichle  dcr  prcus- 
sischen  Refornizeit ;  M.  Lehmann,  Scharnhorst,  2d  vol.;  Boyen,  Erinne- 
rungen,  1st  \ol.;  Martens,  Ri'cueil  des  traitos  conclus  par  la  Kussk-,  Gtli 
vol.;  H.  V.  Kleist,  Politische  Schriften  und  andore  Nachtrage  zu  sei^en 
Werkon,  cd.  by  R.  Kopke,  Berlin,  18G2.  On  the  campaign  in  Bavaria  and 
in  Austria,  in  addition  to  the  military  works  which  have  been  mentioned 
before:  1.  French  authorities:  the;  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  !*='"; 
Pelet,  M(;^moire  sur  la  guerre  de  1809  en  Allcniagne,  4  vols.,  1825;  Cadet 
de  Gassicourt,  ^'oyage  en  Autriche,  1818;  S^gur,  Histoire  et  Menioires, 
3d  vol.;  Marmont,  Memoires,  3d  vol.;  Rapp,  Menioires;  in  addition,  the 
Correspondance  of  Davout  and  the  Menioires  et  Correspondance  of  Prince 
Eugene,  vol.  IV.  2.  Austrian  authorities:  Stutterheim,  La  Guerre  de  1809 
entre  rAutricheetla  France;  in  addition,  Der  Feldzug  des  Jahics  1809  in 
Siiddeutschland  in  Streffleur's  "  Osterr.  niilit.  Zeitsehrift,"  1862.  Stutter- 
heim is  continued  by  Welden,  Der  Krieg  von  1809  zwischen  Osterreich  und 
Frankreich  von  Anfang  Mai  bis  zum  I'riedensschlus,  1872.  On  the  battle 
of  Aspcrn  or  Essling  in  particular:  Schels,  Die  Schlacht  bei  Aspern  am 
21.  u.  22.  Mai  1809  in  Streffleur's  "Zeitsehrift,"  1843;  Angeli,  Wagram, 
Novelle  zur  Geschichte  von  1809  (Mittheilungen  des  k.  k.  Ivriegsarchi\s, 
1881);  Vamhagen,  Die  Schlacht  bei  Wagram,  in  his  Memoirs;  Ruble 
von  Lilienstern,  Reise  eines  Malers  mit  der  Armee  im  Jahre  1809,  vol.  Ill, 
also  his  art.  in  "Pallas,"  1810;  Hormayr,  Lebensbilder  a.  d.  Befreiungs- 
Kriegen,  3  vols.;  Hormayr,  Kaiser  Franz  und  Metternich ;  Archduke  John, 
Das  Heer  von  Innerosterreich;  F.  de  Gentz,  Tagebiicher,  1st  vol.  The 
reports  of  Count  Hardenberg  in  the  archives  of  Hanover  are  pretty  nearly 
in  accord  with  Gentz's  diary.  Some  extracts  from  them  will  be  found 
in  Oncken,  Diis  Zeitalter  der  Revolution,  des  Kaiserreichs  u.  der  Befrei- 
ungs-Kriege,  2d  vol.  The  diary  of  Mayer  de  Heldensfeld,  which  is  in  the 
archives  of  the  war  department  at  \'ienna,  is  not  accessible  to  scholars. 
The  Erinnerungen  of  Radetsky  in  "  Mittheil.  des  k.  k.  Kriegsarchivs," 
1887;  Radetsky,  Denkschrift  iiber  die  osterr.  Armee  nach  der  Schlacht 
bei  Wagram,  "Mittheil.  des.  k.  k.  Kriegsarchivs,"  1884;  in  addition, 
the  very  instructi\e  report  of  an  Austrian  officer  on  Die  Armee  Napoleon  I. 
im  J.  1809,  mit  vergleiclieiiden  Riickblic  ken  auf  das  osterreichi.sche  Heer 
(ibid.  1881);  Wertheimer's  Geschiclile  Usterrichs  und  Ungarns  im  eisten 
Jahrzehnt  des  19.  Jahrh.,  ba.sed  on  the  memoranda  of  Archduke  Charles, 
is  not  impartial.  Interesting  details  from  the  papers  of  Archduke  John 
■will  be  found  in  Krones,  Geschichte  Osterreich  im  Zeitalter  der  fran- 
zosischen  Kriege,  Gotha,  1886;  and  in  Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst,  Erzherzog 
Johann  im  Feldzug  1809,  Graz,  1892.  In  his  review  of  Krones  in  the 
"Histor.  Zeitsehrift,"  1887,  Foumier  has  published  the  letters  of  Arch- 
duke Charles  after  the  battle  of  Essling  (Aspern).  The  letters  of  Stadion 
to  his  wife  which  are  referred  to  in  the  text  are  still  unpublished.  Others 
of  his  letters  may  be  found  in  Thurheim,  Ludwig,  Fiirst  Starhemberg, 


7/0  Bibliography 

Graz,  1889.  On  the  agitation  which  prevailed  in  Germany  at  this  time, 
in  addition  to  the  works  mentioned  above  on  the  attitude  of  Prussia, 
see  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  3d  vol.,  where  the  literature  is  indi- 
cated in  detail,  and  also  Steindorff's  edition  of  the  Quellenkunde  of 
Dahlmann-Waitz,  Gottingen,  1894.  On  the  uprising  in  the  Tyrol  and 
the  literature  of  it:  Egger,  Geschichte  Tirols,  3d  vol.,  and  C.  Clair,  Andre 
Hofer  et  I'insurrection  du  Tyrol  en  1809,  Paris,  1880.  On  the  Peace 
of  Schonbrunn,  the  works  of  Thiers  and  of  Bignon,  both  of  whom 
made  use  of  the  memoranda  of  Champagny;  Ernouf,  Maret,  due  de  Bas- 
sano,  based  on  Maret's  recollections;  Beer,  Zehn  Jahre  osterreichischer 
Politik;  K^linkowstrbm,  Aus  der  alten  Registratur  der  Staatskanzlei ; 
Gentz,  Tagebiicher,  1st  vol.;  Fournier,  Gentz  und  der  Friede  von  Schon- 
brunn, "Deutsche  Rundschau,"  1886;  Krones,  Zur  Geschichte,  etc.,  and 
Foumier's  review  in  the  "Histor.  Zeitschrift. "  Mettemich's  Memoirs 
are  quite  unreliable.  The  private  correspondence  of  Prince  Johann 
Lichtenstein  for  this  year  was  burned  after  his  death.  On  Staps'  attempt 
at  assassination:  Fr.  Staps,  erschossen  zu  Schonbrunn  bei  Wien  auf 
Napoleons  Befehl  im  Oktober  1809,  eine  Biographie  a.  d.  hinterlassenen 
Papieren  seines  Vaters,  Berlin,  1843;  in  addition,  the  Memoires  of  Rapp 
and  the  Memorial  of  the  treasurer,  Peyrusse.  On  Marie  Louise :  Helfert, 
Marie  Louise;  Correspondance  de  Marie  Louise,  1799-1847,  Lettres 
intimes,  1887;  the  despatches  of  Metternich  in  vol.  II  of  his  "Nachge- 
lassene  Papiere"  [Eng.tr.  as  "  Memoirs"];  Mettemich's  letters  to  his  friends 
among  the  diplomats  in  Hormayr,  Lebensbilder  a.  d.  Bef reiungskriegen ; 
Vandal,  Projet  de  mariage  de  Napoleon  I'^'"  avec  la  grande  duchesse  Anne 
de  Russie,  in  the  "  Correspondant,"  1890;  Wertheimer,  Die  Heirat  der 
Erzherzogin  Marie  Luise  mit  Napoleon,  "  Archiv  f.  osterr.  Geschichte," 
64th  v.;  Welschinger,  Le  divorce  de  Napoleon,  Paris,  1889.  Both  these 
works  are  deficient  i'n  their  treatment  of  the  political  causes.  Also,  Duhr, 
Ehescheidung  und  2.  Heirath  Napoleon  I.,  "Zeitschrift  fi'ir  katholische 
Theologie,"  1888;  Lefebvre,  Histoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe,  5th  vol.; 
Ernouf,  Maret,  due  de  Bassano;  Barante,  Souvenirs,  1st  vol.;  Broglie, 
Souvenirs,  1st  vol.  [Eng.  tr.];  Montgelas,  Denkwiirdigkeiten. 

[C.  Oman,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  vols.  I-II,  London, 
1903;  Balagny,  Campagne  de  I'Empereur  Napoleon  en  Espagne  1808- 
1809,  par  le  Commandant  brevets  Balagny,  Paris,  1902,  vol.  I;  J. 
Gomez  de  Arteche,  Guerra  de  la  Independencia,  Historia  mili- 
tar  de  Espafia  de  1808-1814,  14  vols.,  Madrid,  1903;  Marshal  Jour- 
dan,  M(''moires  militaires  (guerre  d'Hspagne)  Merits  par  lui-meme, 
publ.  par  le  manuscrit  orig.  par  le  Yi'"  de  Grouchy,  Paris,  1899; 
W.  Tomkins,  Diary  of  a  Cavalry  Officer  in  the  Peninsular  and 
Waterloo  Campaigns,  London,  1894;  H.  de  Jomini,  Guerre  d'Espagne, 
Extrait  des  Souvenirs  inedits  (1808-14),  pub.  par  F.  Lecomte,  Lausaime, 
1892;  E.  Guillen,  Les  Guerres  d'Espagne  sous  Napol(:^on,  Paris,  1902;  Pardo 
de  Andrade,  Los  guerrilleros  gallegos  de  1809:  cartas  y  rolaciones  escrilas 
por  testigos   oculares,  2  vols.,  Cormua,  1893;  Geoffrey  de  Grandmaison, 


i 


Bibliography  771 


Sa  vary  en  Espagne,  1808,  "Rev.  des  quest,  hist.,"  vol.  G7, 1900;  the  same, 
Talleyrand  et  les  affaires  d'Espagne  in  1808  d'aprds  des  documents  iiu'dits, 
ibid.,  vol.  68,  1900;  L.  Lecestre,  La  guerre  de  la  P<''ninsule  d'apres  de  la 
correspondance  in(:;'dite  de  Napol^'on,  ibid.,  April,  1890;  Saski,  Campagne 
de  '09  en  Allemagne  et  en  Autriche  et  en  Hongrie,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1899-1902, 
pub.  under  the  supervision  of  the  historical  section  of  the  General  Staff; 
A.  Menge,  Die  Schlacht  von  Aspern  am  21.  und  22.  Mai  1809,  Berlin, 
1000;  A.  Strobl,  Aspern  und  Wagram:  Kurze  DarstcUung,  etc.,tWien,  1897; 
H.  Schmolzer,  A.  Hofer  und  seine  Kampfgenos.sen,  Innsbruck,  1900;  F. 
Masson,  Josephine  imp6ratrice  et  reine,  Paris,  1900;  Calmet  de  Santerre, 
Le  divorce  de  I'Empereur  et  le  code  Napoleon,  Paris,  1894;  Vandal, 
Napoleon  et  Alexandre  I^"",  vol.  II,  1809,  Le  second  manage  de  Napo- 
leon, Paris,  1893;  the  same,  Negociations  avec  la  Russie  relatives  au 
second  manage  de  Napoleon,  "Rev.  hist.,"  vol.44,  Paris,  1900;  A.  Becker, 
Der  Plan  der  zweiten  Heirat  Napoleons  in  "  Mittheilungen  des.  Inst, 
fiir  Osterr.  Geschichtsforschung,"  vol.  19,  Innsbruck,  1898;  H.  Wel- 
schinger,  Le  roi  de  Rome,  1811-1832,  Paris,  1897;  E.  Wertheimer,  Der 
Herzog  v.  Reichstadt,  cin  Lebensbild,  Stuttgart,  1902;  A.  Lumbroso, 
Napoleone  II,  Roma,  1903;  Sassenay,  le  Marquis  de,  Napoleon  P""  et  la 
Fondation  de  la  Republique  Argentine,  Paris,  1892.] 

CHAPTER  XVI 

At  the  Zenith.     1810-1812 

For  the  negotiations  with  the  Pope:  Haussonville,  L'Eglise  romaine 
et  le  premier  Empire,  vols.  Ill  and  IV  (fundamental).  Also,  Majol  Je 
Lup6,  Un  Pape  prisonnier,  in  the  "  Correspondant "  for  1887;  H,  Chotard, 
Le  Pape  Pie  VII.  k  Savonne,  1887  (based  on  the  correspondence  of  the 
prefect  Chabrol  and  the  memoirs  of  Lebzeltem);  De  Pradt,  Les  quatre 
Concordats;  Mettemich,  "  Nachgelassene  Papiere,"  vol.  II  [Eng.  tr.  by 
Napier  as  "Memoirs,"  etc.,  London,  1880].  For  relations  with  Spain: 
The  Memoires  of  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  of  Miot  de  M^lito  [Eng.  tr.]; 
Gurwood,  Wellington's  Despatches;  Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Spaniens 
vom  Ausbruch,  etc.,  vol.  I;  Thiers,  Consulat  et  Empire  [Eng.  tr.  by  Camp- 
bell, London,  1862],  vol.  XII;  Maxwell,  Life  of  Wellington,  London, 
1839-1841;  Pertz,  Die  politische  Bedeutung  des  Jahres  1810  (paper  before 
the  Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences,  1861,  containing  the  negotiations  with 
Asanza  from  Stein's  papers).  On  relations  with  Holland:  Jorissen, 
Napoleon  I.  et  le  Roi  de  HoUande,  186S;  F.  Rocquain,  Napoleon  I.  et  le 
Roi  Louis,  1875;  Louis  Bonaparte,  Documents  historiques  et  Reflexions 
sur  le  gouvernement  de  la  Hollande,  1820,  vol.  Ill  (Napoleon  denied 
their  authenticity  in  his  will,  but  it  has  been  fully  established  by  later 
research);  Du  Casse,  Les  rois  freres  de  Napoleon  I.  (.\ppendice).  On  the 
States  bordering  the  North  Sea:  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte  vom 
Tode,  etc.,  vol.  Ill;  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  P"",  vol.  XXII;  Have- 


772  Bibliography 


mann,  Das  Kurfiirstenthum  Hannover  unter  zehnjahriger  Fremdherr- 
schaft,  1803-1813,  Jena,  1867;  Monckeburg,  Hamburg  unter  dem  Drucke 
der  Franzosen  1806-1814,  Hamburg,  1863;  Wohlwill,  Die  Verbindung 
zwischen  Elbe  und  Rhein  durch  Kaniile  und  Landstrassen  nach  den 
Projekten  Napoleon  I.  (Transactions  of  the  "  Verein  fiir  Hamburger 
Geschichte,"  1884,  part  4).  On  the  Continental  system:  Kiesselbach, 
Geschichte  der  Kontinentalsperre,  1849.  On  Napoleon's  relations  with 
Denmark  and  Sweden:  Garden,  Histoire  generale  des  Traites,  vol. 
IX;  Lefebvre,  Histoire  des  Cabinets  de  I'Europe,  1866-9,  vol.  V; 
Thiers,  vol.  XII;  Swederus,  Schwedens  Politik  und  Kriege,  1808-1814 
(German  tr.  by  Frisch,  1866) ;  A.  W.  Schlegel,  Uber  das  Kontinentalsyst«m 
u.  d.  Einfluss  auf  Schweden,  1814;  Schinkel,  Minnen  ur  Sveriges  nyare 
historia,  Upsala,  1800  (contains  letters  of  the  Swedish  envoy  from  Paris 
in  the  year  1810,  unfortunately  translated  into  Swedish) ;  Suremain, 
Memoirs  (MSS. ;  extracts  were  published  in  the  "  Re^^Je  contemporaine  " 
for  1868);  Almfelt,  La  diplomatie  russe  h  Stockholm  en  1810  ("Revue 
historique,"  1888,  vol.  XXXVII.  In  regard  to  Naples:  Helfert,  Konigin 
Karoline  v.  Neapel  u.  Sicilien,  1878  (the  earlier  literature  is  quoted  in 
this  work);  by  the  same  author  also,  Maria  Karolina  v.  Osterreich: 
Anklagen  u.  Verteidigung,  1884;  0.  Browning,  Caroline  of  Naples  (in 
"  English  Historical  Review,"  1887,  no.  6,  based  on  the  despatches  of 
Bentinck).  On  Napoleon's  entanglement  with  Russia:  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon  P"";  Memoires  of  S^gur  [Eng.  tr.  of  first  part  by  Patchett-Martin, 
London,  1895],  of  Villemain,  and  of  Czartoryski  [Eng.  tr.  by  Gielgud, 
London,  1888];  Bernhardi,  Geschichte  Russlands,  vol.  II;  Lefebvre,  vol. 
V;  Thiers,  vol.  XIII;  Ranke,  Hardenberg  u.  Preussen  (vol.  48  of  his  com- 
plete works,  1879) ;  Jomini,  Precis  politique  et  militaire  des  campagnes 
de  1812  k  1814,  1886;  Martens,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus  par  la 
Russie,  vols.  Ill  and  VII;  Bogdanovitch,  Geschichte  des  Feldzugs  i, 
Jahre  1812  (German  tr.  by  Baumgarten,  1862-3),  vol.  I.  In  the  "Sbornik" 
of  the  Russian  Historical  Society  are  published  the  reports  of  Kurakin 
and  Tchemicheff ;  Harnack,  Zur  Gesch.  u.  Vorgesch.  d.  Krieges  von  1812, 
"  Historische  Zeitschrift, "  1889,  vol.  LXII;  Diplomatische  Geschichte 
d.  Krieges  von  1812,  in  Streffleur's  "  Ost.  mil.  Zeitschrift"  (wholly  devoid 
of  scientific  value).  On  internal  affairs  in  France  before  the  war  in  the 
north:  Thiers,  vol.  XIII;  Lanfrey-Kalckstein,  Gesch.  Napoleons  I.,  vol. 
VI;  Forneron,  Les  emigres  et  la  societe  frangaise  sous  Napoleon  I^"", 
vol.  Ill  of  his  Hist.  gi'n.  des  cmigri'-s;  Welschinger,  La  censure  sous 
le  premier  Empire,  1882;  same  author.  La  direction  g6n(5rale  de  I'impri- 
merie  et  de  la  librairie  in  the  periodical  "  Le  Livre,"  1887  and  1890; 
V^ron,  M<:?moircs  d'un  Bourgeois  de  Paris,  1856-7,  vol.  I;  Correspondance 
de  Napoleon  P'';  Fiev6e,  Correspondance  et  relations  avec  Bonaparte,  1837, 
vol.  Ill  (1809  to  March,  1813);  Mollien,  Souvenirs  d'un  ministre  du  tr^'-sor, 
1845.  On  relations  with  the  states  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine. 
Perthes,  Politische  Zustilnde  u.  Personen  in  Deutschland  zur  Zeit  dor 
franzosichen   Hcrrschaft,  1863,  vol.  II;   Winkoop,  Dor  Rheinische  Bund. 


Bibliography  773 

lSlO-12;  Moinoiros  ot  corresporidance  du  Roi  Ji-rome;  Du  Casse,  op. 
cit. ;  Gbcke,  Das  Konigreich  ^^'estfalon,  1888,  and  Das  Grosslicrzog- 
thuin  lierg,  etc.,  1877;  Beaulieu-Marconnay,  Karl  von  Dalberg  und  seine 
Zcit,  187'J;  Bemays,  Schicksale  dt-s  (jrosshorrzogtunis  Frankfurt,  1882; 
Schlossberger,  Polit.  u.  niilit.  Korrespondenz  Triedr.  v.  Wurtt-niberg  mit 
K.  Napoleon  I.,  1805-13,  1899,  and  also  Brief wechsel  d.  Konigin  Katha- 
rina  v.  Westfalen,  1887;  Montgelas,  Denkwiirdigkeiten;  La  Bavii^re  en 
1812  et  1813,  "  Revue  contemporaine, "  18(19 ;  Wohiwill,  Weltbvirgerthum  u. 
Vaterlandsliehe  der  Schwaben,  1875.  On  the  alliance  with  Prussia  and 
Austria:  Ranke,  Hardenberg;  Duncker,  Preussen  wiihrend  der  franzos. 
Okkupation  (from  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  of  Frederick 
William  III.);  Lehmann,  Scharnhorst,  1887,  vol.  II;  Delbriick,  Gneisenau, 
1882,  vol.  I;  Alfr.  Stem,  Abhandlungen  u.  Aktenstiicke  zur  Geschichte 
der  preu.ssischen  Reformzeit,  1807-13;  Martens,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus 
par  la  Russie,  vol.  Vll;  Bignon,  Histoire  de  France,  etc.,  1838-50,  vol. 
X;  Mettemich  Xachgelassene  Papiere,  vol.  II  [Eng.  tr.];  Binder  von 
Kriegelstein,  Precis  des  transactions  du  Cabinet  de  ^'ienne  de  1806  h, 
1816,  "Steiermiirk.  Geschichtsbliitter."  1884;  Martens,  op.  cit.  Ill;  Emouf, 
Maret;  Oncken,  Osterreich  und  Preussen  im  Befreiungskriege,  1876-9, 
vol.  II;  Foumier,  Stein  u.  Griiner,  Zur  Vorgeschichte  d.  Befreiungskriege, 
"Deutsche  Rundschau,"  1887. 

[In  addition  to  the  works  mentioned  earlier  in  the  supplementary- 
sections:  A.  Pirk,  Aus  der  Zeit  der  Not,  1806-15;  Schilderungen 
zur  preussischen  Gesch.  aus  dem  brieflichen  Nachlasse  des  Feldmar- 
schalls  Niedhart  von  Gneisenau,  Berlin,  1900;  A.  Kleinschmidt,  Ge- 
schichte des  Konigreichs  Westphalen,  Gotha,  1893;  R.  Holzapfel,  Das 
Konigreich  Westphalen,  Magdeburg,  1895;  F.  Thimme,  Die  innem 
Zustiinde  des  Kurfiirstentums  Hannover  unter  der  franzosisch-west- 
phali.«;chen  Herrschaft,  1806-13,  2  vols.,  Hannover,  1893-95;  A. 
Lumbroso,  Napoleone  I  e  I'lnghilterra,  Saggio  sulle  origini  del  blocco 
continentale  e  sulle  sue  conseguenze  economiche  (Bibliog.),  Rome,  1897, 
reviewed  and  summarized  by  W.  M.  Sloane  in  the  "  Political  Science 
Quarter)',"  June,  1898;  Hitzigrat,  Hamburg  und  die  Kontinentalsperre, 
Hambu  :,  1900;  J.  H.  Rose,  Napoleon  and  English  Commerce,  "Eng. 
Hist.  Rev.,"  VIII,  1893;  the  same.  Life  of  Napoleon  I.,  II,  95-115,  Lon- 
don, 1902;  A.  Vandal,  Napol<?on  et  Alexandre  I*""",  vol.  Ill,  La  rupture, 
Paris,  1896;  F.  Masson,  Napoleon  chez  lui,  la  Journte  de  I'Empereur, 
Paris,  1894  [Eng.  tr.  as  Napoleon  at  Home,  London,  1894];  J.  de  la  Ru- 
pelle,  Les  finances  de  guerres  de  France,  1796-'15,  "Annales  de  I'Ecole 
libre  des  sciences  pol.,"  Oct.  1892  and  Jan.  1893;  Geoffroy  de  Grandmaison, 
Napoleon  P""  et  les  cardinaux  noirs,  Paris,  1895;  Margueron,  Campagne 
de  Russie,  P""  Partie,  Tom.  I-III,  Jan.  1810— Jan.  1812,  Paris,  1897-1900.| 


774  Bibliography 


CHAPTER    XVII 
Moscow.     1812 

The  literature  on  the  Russian  campaign  is  enormous;  only  the  most 
important  is  given  here.  Besides  vol.  24  of  the  Correspondance  of  Napo- 
leon the  materials  comprise  the  memoirs  of  his  generals,  the  narratives 
of  the  Russian  generals,  the  accounts  of  German  and  French  officers, 
also  the  official  Russian  sources,  all  of  which  have  been  made  the  basis 
of  recent  historical  works  on  the  war.  Much  of  the  French  material  may- 
have  got  lost  on  the   retreat. 

I.  Memoirs  and  documents,  o.  From  French  side:  Du  Casse, 
Memoires  et  Correspondance  du  Prince  Eugene,  1858-60;  Memoirs 
of  Rapp,  1823;  Gouvion  Saint-Cyr,  1829-31;  S6gur  (vols.  4  and  5 
of  Histoire  et  Memoires) ;  Bausset,  Paris,  1827  [Eng.  tr.  Philadelphia, 
1828];  Constant,  Paris,  1830-31  and  1894  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1830,  new  ed. 
1894];  Gourgaud,  Napoleon  et  la  Grande  Armee  en  Russie  ou  examen 
critique  de  I'ouvrage  de  S^gur,  Paris,  1825  [Eng.  tr.  Paris,  1825];  Fain, 
Manuscrit  de  1812,  Paris,  1827;  Villemain,  Souvenirs  contemporains 
1855-6  (based  on  reminiscences  of  Narbonne) ;  Davout,  Correspondance 
(ed.  Mazade,  1885),  vol.  Ill:  Blocqueville,  Le  Marechal  Davout,  Paris, 
1879-80,  vol.  Ill  (containing  his  letters  to  his  wife);  Peyrusse,  Memorial 
et  Archives,  Carcassonne,  1869;  F^zensac,  Souvenirs  niilitaires,  Paris, 
1870  [the  Journal  de  la  Campagne  de  Russie  en  1812,  first  pub.  in  1850, 
Eng.  tr.  by  KnoUys,  London,  1852];  Denni^e,  Itin(5raire  de  I'Empereur 
Napoleon  pendant  la  campagne  de  1812,  1842;  Coignet  (already  an  officer 
in  this  campaign),  Cahiers,  1889  [Eng.  tr.  as  Narrative  of  Captain  C.]; 
L^her,  Lettre  d'un  capitaine  de  cuirassiers  sur  la  campagne  de  Russie, 
Paris,  1885 ;  Vaudoncourt,  Memoires  pour  servir  a  I'histoire  de  la  guerre  entre 
la  France  et  la  Russie  en  1812,  London,  1815;  Labaume,  Relation  cir- 
constanc^e  de  la  campagne  de  Russie  en  1812,  Paris,  1814,  and  later  [Eng. 
tr.  London,  1815,  ed.  by  Parker,  1844];  Larrey,  Memoires  de  chirurgie 
militaire,  1812-18  [Eng.  tr.  by  Hall,  Baltimore,  1814;  by  Waller,  London]; 
Bourgeois,  Tableau  de  la  campagne  de  Moscou,  Paris,  1814;  Puibusque, 
Lettres  sur  la  guerre  de  Russie,  Paris,  1816  and  later,  b.  From  the 
Allies:  V.  Lossberg,  Briefe  in  die  Heimat  geschrieben  wahrend  d.  Feld- 
zugs  1812  in  Russland,  Cassel,  1844;  Wolzogen,  Memoiren  des  Generals 
V.  Wolzogen,  Leipzig,  1851;  Ponitz,  Militiirische  Briefe  eines  Verstorbenen, 
Adorf,  1841-5;  Roos,  Ein  Jahr  aus  meineni  Leben,  St.  Petersburg,  1832; 
Von  Meerheim,  Erlcbnisse  eines  ^\>teranen  der  grossen  Arm^e  wahrend  des 
Feldzugs  in  Russland  im  Jahre  1812,  Dresden,  1860;  Theodor  Goethe, 
Aus  dem  Leben  e.  silchsischen  Husaren,  Leipzig,  1853;  Funck,  Erinne- 
rungen  aus  dem  Kcldzuge  des  sachsischen  Corps  1812,  Dresden,  1829; 
Legler,  Dcnkwiirdigkciten  aus  dem  russischen  Feldzuge,  Glarus,  1868; 
Leisnig,  l''riimcruiigcn  e.  sachsischen  Dragoneroffiziers,  Leipzig,  1828; 
Rbder  v.  Bornsdorf,  Mitteilungen  aus  dem  russischen  Feldzuge,  Leipzig, 


Bibliography  77^ 

1810;  Stoltyk,  NapoU-on  on  Rvis*;ie,  Paris,  183G;  Albrecht  Adam,  Aus  d. 
Leben  e.  Schlachtenmahlers,  Stuttgart,  1886  (he  was  in  Eugene's  head- 
quarters at  Moscow) ;  Wessenberg,  "  Denkschrift  iiber  den  russischen 
Feldzug"  in  the  "  Deutsche  Revue"  for  1881.  c.  From  the  Russian  camp: 
Herzog  Eugen  v.  Wiirtemberg,  Memoiren,  Frankfort,  18G2  (ef.  Helldorf, 
Aus  d.  Leben  des  Prinzen  Eugen  v.  Wiirtemberg) ;  Bernhardi,  Denkw  urdig- 
keiten  d.  Generals  Toll,  Leipzig,  1865,  vols.  I  and  II;  Tchitchagoff,  M&- 
moires  in<''dits,  Berlin,  1855  (cf.  Harnack,  Zur  Vorge.schichte  u.  Gcsch. 
d.  Krieges  v.  1812,  in  "  Hi.st.  Zeitschrift,"  vol.  LXI).  The  numerous  un- 
printed  journals  of  Russian  generals  have  been  used  by  Bogdanovitsch 
(see  infra) ;  Wilson,  Narrative  of  Events  during  the  Invasion  of  Russia, 
London,  1800.  [Also,  Private  Diary  during  the  Campaigns  of  1812- 
1814,  London,  1861.] 

II.  Historical  narratives  of  the  campaign:  Chambray,  Histoire  de 
I'expedition  de  Russie,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1823  and  later  (fundamental). 
The  Avorks  of  the  Russian  historians  Buturlin,  Paris,  1824,  Michal- 
lowsky-Danilewsky  [Ger.  tr.  Leipzig,  1840];  Ker- Peter,  Smitt,  Leipzig, 
1861,  are  all  superseded  by  the  comprehensive  narratiAC  of  Bogdano- 
vitsch, based  on  authentic  sources  in  the  Ru.s.sian  archives  for  military 
topography,  but  without  making  use  of  Napoleon's  correspondence. 
Yorck  uses  the  latter  and  is  accordingly  fuller  on  certain  points  in  his 
Napoleon  als  Feldherr,  1887-8,  vol.  II  [Eng.  tr.];  also  Thiers,  XXII  and 
XIV;  Jomini;  Forster,  Napoleons  I  russischer  Feldzug,  1857;  Beitzke, 
Gesch.  d.  russ.  Krieges,  Bremen,  1883;  Clausewitz,  Hinterlassene  Werke, 
1862-89,  VII  [Eng.  tr.  of  part  on  Rus,sian  camp.,  London,  1843];  Lanfrey- 
Kalckstein,  ^'L  Tolstoi's  little  book.  Napoleon  et  la  campagne  de  Russie,  is 
an  attempt  as  brilliant  as  it  is  unsuccessful  to  combine  fiction  and  his- 
tory'. Special  pha.ses  of  the»war:  a.  Preparations  and  beginning  of  cam- 
paign: De  Pradt,  Histoire  de  I'ambassade  dans  le  Grande-Duche  de 
Varsovie  en  1812,  Paris,  1815,  and  later  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1816];  Bignon, 
Souvenirs  d'un  diplomate,  Paris,  1864;  Lensky,  Notice  historique,  sur  les 
armements  qui  eurent  lieu  en  Lithuanie  pendant  I'occupation  fran^-aise 
en  1812;  Emouf,  Maret,  due  de  Bassano;  Zusammenstellung  d.  diplom. 
u.  milit.  Massnahmen  Napoleon  I.  zur  Einleitung  des  Feldzuges 
von  1812,  "Jahrb.  f.  d.  deutsche  Armee  u.  Marine,"  1878;  Liebert,  Die 
Riistungen  Napoleons  fur  d.  Feldzug  1812,  appended  to  part  9,  1888,  of  the 
"  Militar-Wochenblatt."  b.  On  the  battle  of  Borodino:  Pelet,  La  Bataille 
de  la  Moskwa,  "Spectateur  militaire,"  1881;  Hofmann,  Die  Schlacht 
bei  Borodino,  Coblenz,  1846;  Ditfurth,  Die  Schlacht  bei  Borodino,  Mar- 
burg, 1887;  Roth  von  Schreckenstein,  Die  Kavallerie  in  d.  Schlacht  a.  d. 
Moskwa,  Miinster,  1858;  I'ber  d.  Mitwirkung  d.  siichs.  Kiirassier- Brigade 
i.  d.  Schlacht  a.  d.  Moskwa,  "Osterr.  Mihtiir-Zeitschrift,"  1824.  c.  On 
the  burning  of  Moscow:  Histoire  de  la  Destruction  de  Mo.-^cou  en  1812; 
Rostopchine,  La  verite  sur  I'ineendie  de  Moscou,  Paris,  1823;  Sumigue, 
Lettres  sur  I'ineendie  de  Moscou,  Paris,  1823.  d.  On  e\ents  at  the 
crossing  of   the  BeresLna  cf.  the  general   histories,  in  particular  Bogda- 


7/6  Bibliography 

novitsch,  and  the  recollections  of  participants;  also  Mosbach,  Der 
Uhergang  iiber  die  Beresina  aus  ungedruckten  Denkw.  d.  polnischen 
Oiiersten  Bialkowski,  Streffleur's  "  Osterr.  militar.  Zeitschrift,"  1875; 
Clausewitz  (who  was  with  Wittgenstein),  "  Uber  die  Schlacht  a.  d. 
Beresina,"  letter  to  Stein,  pubhshed  in  the  "Hist.  Zeitschrift"  for  1888; 
Pf  uel,  Der  Riickzug  d.  Franzosen  a.  Russland,  ed.  Forster,  Berlin,  1867. 

e.  On  the  share  of  the  Allies  in  the  campaign:  Welden,  Der  Feldzug  d. 
Osterreicher  gegen  Russland  i.  J.  1812,  Vienna,  1870;  Angeli,  Die  Teil- 
nahme  d.  osterr.  Auxiliarkorps  im  Feldzuge  Napoleon  I.  gegen  Russland, 
"  Mitteilungen  des  k.  k.  Kriegsarchivs,"  1884;  Droysen,  Leben  d.  Feld- 
marschalls  Yorck,  Leipzig,  1890;  Guretzky-Cornitz,  Gesch.  d.  ersten 
Brandenburger  Flanenregiments,  Berlin,  1866;  Cerrini,  Die  Feldzuge 
d.  Sachsen  1812  u.  1813,  Dresden,  1821;  Zezschwitz,  Die  Feldzuge  d. 
Sach.  1812  u.  1813;  f  Burkersroda,  Die  Sachsen  in  Russland,  Naumburg, 
1846;  Holtzendorff,  Gesch.  d.  konigl.  sachs.  leichten  Infanterie;  Liebenstein, 
Die  Kriege  Napoleons  gegen  Russland  1812  u.  1813,  Frankfort,  1888; 
Minckwitz,  Die  Brigade  Thielmann  im  Feldzuge  v.  1812,  Dresden,  1879; 
Krauss,  Gesch.  d.  bayrischcn  Heeresabteilung  im  Feldzuge  gegen  Russ- 
land, Augsburg,  1857;  Heilmann,  Feldmarschall  Fiirst  Wrede,  Leipzig, 
1881,  and  Die  Bayrische  Kavallerie-Division  Preysing  i.  J.  1812,  "Jahrb. 

f.  d.  deutsche  Armee  u.  Marine,"  vol.  7;  Miller,  Darstellung  d.  P'eldzuges 
d.  franzos.  verbiindeten  Armee  gegen  d.  Russen  i.  J.  1812  mit  besondere 
Riicksicht  auf  d.  Teilnahme  d.  kgl.  wiirttembergischen  Truppen,  Stutt- 
gart, 1823;  Bernays,  Die  Schicksale  des  Grossherzogtums  Frankfurt  und 
seine  Truppen,  Berlin,  1882;  Biidlnger,  Die  Schweizer  i.  Feldzug  v.  1812, 
"Histor.  Zeitschrift,"  XIX. 

IIL  On  Malet's  plot:  Lafon,  Histoire  de  la  conjuration  du  g^ndral 
Malet,  Paris,  1814;  Histoire  des  societes  secretes  de  I'armee  et  des  con- 
spirations militaires  qui  ont  eu  pour  objet  la  destruction  de  gouverne- 
ment  de  Bonaparte,  Paris,  1815;  Desmarest,  Quinze  ans  de  haute  police, 
Paris,  1833,  new  ed.  1900;  Savary,  Memoires,  Paris,  1829,  vol.  VI  [Eng. 
tr.];  Fi^v^e,  Correspondance  et  relations  avec  Bonaparte,  III;  Hamel, 
Histoire  des  deux  conspirations  du  g^n^ral  Malet,  Paris,  1873;  Passy, 
Frochot,  pr^fet  de  la  Seine,  Evreux,  1867;  A.  Duruy,  "La  conspiration 
du  general  Malet"  in  his  Etudes  d'histoire  militaire,  Paris,  1888.  On 
the  attempts  to  assassinate  Napoleon:  Bemhardi,  Toll,  vol.  II;  Senfft, 
"M6moires,"  Leipzig,  1863;  Bernays,  Schicksale,  etc.;  Forster,  Napoleon 
I.  russischer  Feldzug;  Bourgoing,  Itin(5raire  de  Napoli'on  de  Smorgoni 
k  Paris,  Paris,  1862.  A  narrative  l)y  Wousowicz  on  Napoleon's  journey 
back  to  Paris,  which  Emouf  quotes  in  his  ^\■o^k  on  Maret  (p.  467),  I  have 
not  had  access  to. 

[A.  Vandal,  Napol6on  et  Alexandre  P'"",  III;  A.  Maag,  Die  Schicksale 
der  Schweizer-Hegiiuentcr  in  Napoleons  I  Feldzug  nach  Russland, 
1812,  Biel,  1890;  G.  Bertin,  La  canipagne  de  1812  d'apres  des  tomoins 
oculaires,  Paris,  1S95;  M.  Exner,  Der  Anted  der  Konigl.  Siichsischen 
Armee  am  Feldzug  gegen  Russland,  1812,  Leipzig,  1896;  H.  B.  George, 


Bibliography  777 

Napoleon's  Invasion  of  Russia,  London,  1899;  J.  Ullmann,  Studio  iiber 
die  Ausriistung  und  das  Verpflegs-  und  Nachschubweson  im  Feldzuge 
Napoleon  I.  gegen  Russland  im  Jahre  1812,  Wien,  1891;  Sergent  F.  Bour- 
gogne,  Mi^-nioires  1812-1813,  ed.  by  Cottin  and  Renault,  Paris,  1S98 
[Eng.  trans.  London,  1899];  Von  der  Osten-Sacken,  Milit.  polit.  Geschichte 
d.  Befreiungskrieges  im  Jahr  1813,  vol.  I,  "  \'om  Njemen  bis  zur  Elbe," 
Berlin,  1902;  A.  de  Pastoret,  De  Witebsk  k  la  B(:T(:'sina,  "Rev.  de 
Paris,"  Ann<'>e  9,  'I'.  2,  1902;  G.  Fabry,  Campagne  de  Russie,  1812,  Opera- 
tions Militaires,  I-IO  aout,  Paris,  1902.] 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

Leipzig.    1813 

I.  Before  the  spring  campaign,  a.  On  Napoleon's  war  preparations 
and  the  internal  political  measures  to  promote  them:  his  Correspond- 
ance;  Councillor  of  State  Fi^v^e,  Correspondance  et  Relations  avec  Bona- 
parte, vol.  Ill;  Memoires  of  Savary  and  Mollien,  Paris,  1837,  new  ed. 
1898;  Fain,  Manuscrit  de  I'an  '13,  Paris,  1824;  Thiers,  vol.  XV;  Lanfrey- 
Kalckstein,  vol.  VI;  Rousset,  La  grande  arm^e  de  1813,  Paris,  1371;  Pelet, 
Tableau  de  la  Grande  Armee  en  1813.  The  most  complete,  howe  r,  is  Die 
franzos.  Armee  i.  J.  1813,  Berhn,  1889.  b.  On  the  defection  of  Prussia: 
Droysen,  Yorck,  I;  Eckardt,  Torek  und  Paulucci,  Leipzig,  1865;  Ebeling, 
Torek's  Konvention  von  Tauroggen,  "  Jahrb.  f.  d.  deutsche  Armee  u.  Ma- 
rine," XXXVIII;  Natzmer,  Aus  d.  Leben  O.  v.  Natzmers,  Berlin,  1876; 
Henckel  v.  Donnersmarck,  Erinnerungen  aus  meinem  Leben,  Zerbst,  1847 ; 
Ranke,  Hardenberg;  Duncker,  Preussen  wiihrend  der  franz.  Okkupation 
in  his  Aus  d.  Zeit  Friedrich  d.  Grossen  u.  Friedrich  Wilhelm  III.; 
Lehman,  Scharnhorst,  II,  presents  a  different  view;  Oncken,  Oster- 
reich  und  Preussen  im  Befreiungskriege,  2  vols. ;  a  condensed  account  in 
his  Das  Zeitalter  d.  Revolution,  d.  Kaiserreichs,  u.  d.  Befreiungskriege, 
1884-6,  vol.  II;  Stern,  Abhandlungen  und  Aktenstiicke,  etc  ,  containing 
reports  of  the  French  ambassador  in  Berlin;  Aegidi,  Knesebecks  Sendung 
i.  d.  russ.  Hauptquartier,  "  Hist.  Zeitschrift,"  X\T ;  Lehman,  Knesebeck 
u.Schon,  Leipzig,  1875;  Pertz,  Das  Leben  Steins,  Berlin,  1849-55,  vol.  Ill; 
Martens,  Recueil  des  traites  conclus  par  la  Russie,  vols.  VII  and  III; 
Emouf,  Maret.  c.  On  the  uprisings  and  armaments  in  Germany:  Gilde- 
meister.  Finks  u.  Bergers  Ermordung,  Bremen,  1814;  Rist,  Lebenserin- 
nerungen,  Gotha,  1880;  Wohlwill,  Die  Befreiung  Hamburgs  am  18  Marz, 
1813,  Hamburg,  1888,  and  Z.  Gesch.  Hamburgs  i  J  1813  ("Transactions 
of  the  Vereinf.  Hamb-  Gesch.,"  1888);  Vamhagen,  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  vol 
III;  Lefebvre,  op.  cit.  III.  On  Prussian  armaments  in  particular-  Hausser, 
Deutsche  Geschichte,  vol.  IV;  Ompteda,  Politischer  Xachhiss,  Jena,  1869; 
Steffens,  Was  ich  erlebte,  Breslau,  1840-4,  vol  VII;  Lehmann,  \'orstel- 
lungen  u.  d.  Ausbruch  d.  Krieges  von  1813,  "  Hist.  &itschr., "  XX VH;  fur- 


jj^  Bibliography 

ther,  the  biographies :  Delbiiick's  Pertz-Gneisenau ;  Euler's  Jahn,  Lehmann's 
Schamhorst;  Wigger's  Bliicher,  Schwerin,  1870-9;  Eyssenhardt's  Niebuhr, 
Gotha,  1886;  Vamhagen's  Biilow  and  his  Tettenborn,  etc.;  Ziehlberg, 
Ferdinande  von  Schmettau;  Koberstein,  Lutzows  wilde  verwegene 
Jagd  in  "Preuss.  Bilderbuch,"  1887;  K.  v.  L.  Adolf,  Lutzows  Freikorps, 
Berlin,  1884.  d.  On  the  Saxon  question  and  the  formation  of  the  co- 
alition: Flathe,  Gesch.  Sachsens,  Gotha,  1873,  vol.  Ill;  Senfft,  Memoires; 
Castlereagh's  Correspondence,  London,  1851-3;  Bemhardi,  Gesch.  Russ- 
lands,  Leipzig,  1863-77,  vol.  II;  Apergu  des  transactions  politiques  du 
Cabinet  de  Russie  in  the  "  Sbornik  "  of  the  Russian  Hist.  Soc,  vol.  XXXI; 
Garden,  Hist.  gen.  des  Traites,  vol.  XIV;  Thorsoe,  Danske  Stats  politiske 
historie  1800-1814,  Copenhagen,  1873;  Nielsen,  Bidrag  til  Sveriges  poli- 
tiske historie  1813,  1814;  v.  Schmidt,  Schweden  unter  Karl  XIV.  Johann, 
Heidelberg,  1842;  Touchard-Lafosse,  Hist.  Charles  XIV,  1838;  also  the 
work  of  Schwederus  above  mentioned,  and  lastly  Lefebvre,  vol.  V. 

II.  Spring  campaign  of  1813;  Only  a  few  memoirs  are  available. 
Mannont  and  Saint-Cyr  furnish  but  little  material;  S^gur  and  F6zensac 
were  not  on  the  scene  of  war ;  the  Memorial  of  Peyrusse  is  of  little  account 
here.  The  only  French  sources  of  considerable  importance  are  the  Me- 
moires of  Eugene  (ed.  Du  Casse),  the  papers  of  Day  out  (ed.  Mazade  and 
BlocquevUle),  and  especially  the  reminiscences  of  the  Saxon  officer  Ode- 
leben  in  Napoleons  Feldzug  in  Sachsen  [Eng.  tr.];  consult  also  the  work 
of  Fain  mentioned  above,  Norvin's  Portefeuille  de  1813,  and  above  all 
the  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  I.,  vol.  XXV.  On  the  other  side: 
Bemhardi,  Toll;  Muffling,  Aus  meinem  Leben,  2d  ed.,  1855;  Eugen  v. 
Wiirttemberg's  Memoiren,  vol.  Ill;  Wolzogen,  Memoiren;  Helldorff's 
Eugen  von  Wiirtemberg:  Prittwitz,  Beitrage  z.  Gesch.  d.  J.  1813; 
Wilson,  Private  Diary  of  1812,  1813,  1814.  General  works;  Schulz, 
Gesch..  d.  Feldzug  v.  1813;  Muffling,  Zur  Kriegsgesch.  d.  Jahre  1813  u. 
1814;  Friccius,  Gesch.  d.  Krieges  i.  d.  Jahre  1813  u.  1814;  Michailowski- 
Danielewski,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  a.  d.  Kriege  v,  1813  [German  tr.  1837]; 
Plotho,  Der  Krieg  in  Deutschland  u.  Frankreich  1813  u.  1814,  1817; 
Beitzke,  Gesch.  d.  Freiheltskriege  (2d  ed.  by  Goldschmidt.  1883; 
Charras,  Histoire  de  la  guerre  de  1813  en  Allemagne,  1870;  Bog- 
danovitsch,  Gesch.  d.  Krieges  v.  1813  [German  tr.  by  A.  S.,  1863-9]; 
Jomini,  Precis  politique  et  militaire  des  Campagnes  de  1812  h,  1814; 
Yorck,  Napoleon  als  Feldherr  [Eng,  tr. ),  vol.  II.  On  the  battle  of  Baut- 
zen in  particular:  Meerheimb,  Die  Schlachten  bei  Bautzen  am  20-  u.  21. 
Mai  1813,  Berlin,  1873. 

HI.  The  period  of  the  truce  and  Austria's  defection:  Correspondance 
de  Napok'on  I.,  vol  XXVI;  Bignon,  Histoire  de  France,  vols.  X  and  XII; 
Thiers,  vol-  XVI  (based  on  information  given  by  Metternich).  On  the 
other  side:  Emouf,  Maret,  with  memoranda  of  the  minister's,  and  Metter- 
nich, Nachgelassene  Papiere,  vols.  I  and  IT  [Eng  tr  ],  The  report  of  the 
interview  of  June  26th  at  Dresden,  composed  in  1820,  is  found  in  Helfert, 
Marie  Louise,  in  the  appendix;  Broglie,  Souvenirs,  voL  1, 1886-7  [Eng.  tr,]; 


Bibliography  779 

Radetzky,  Denkschriften  niilit.-polit.  Inhalts,  1S58;  cf.  Wehner,  Ubcr 
zwei  Denkschriften  Radetzkys  a.  d.  Friihjahr  1813;  Hormayr,  Lebens- 
hilder  a.  d.  Befreiungskriege ;  Gentz,  iVprdios  inc'ditcs  aux  Hospodars 
de  la  Valachie,  eil.  Proke.sch,  187G-7,  vol.  I;  De  Clercq,  Recuoil  des  trait<^s 
de  la  France,  vol.  IT;  Martens,  Recueil,  a.s  above,  vol.  III.  General 
accounts  are  gi\en  in  Oncken,  Ostcrreich  und  Preussen,  etc.,  a.s  above, 
fundamental,  although  not  final;  Ranke,  Hardciibcrg;  Lefebvre,  vol.  V. 
On  life  at  the  court  of  Napoleon  in  Dresden:  Odeleben,  Napoleons  F'eld- 
zug  in  Sachsen. 

IV.  The  fall  campaign  of  1S13:  In  addition  to  works  already  named 
we  have  here  again  the  .Memoires  of  Marmont,  ^■ol.  V,  F^zensac,  S€gur, 
Saint-Cyr,  and  Berthezfene;  also  Du  Casse,  ^■andanlnu'.  The  foregoing 
are  on  the  French  side.  On  the  side  of  the  Allies:  Reiche,  Memoiren, 
ed.  Weltzien,  1857;  Colomb,  Aus  dem  Tagebuche  d.  Rittmeisters  v. 
Colomb  1813  u.  1814,  Berlin,  1854;  Blasendorff,  Fiinfzig  Briefe  Bluchers, 
"Hist.  Zeitsch.,"  LIV;  Radetzky,  Erinnerungen  in  "  Mitteil.  d.  k.  k. 
Kriegsarchivs, "  1887;  Prokesch-Osten,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  a,  d.  Leben 
d.  Fiirsten.  V.  Schwarzenberg,  new  ed.  1861;  Thlele,  Erinnenmgen  a.  d. 
Kriegerleben  eines  82jahrigen  Yeteranen  d.  osterr.  Arinee,  A'ienna,  1863; 
Heilmann,  Fiirst  Wrede,  1881;  Bianchi,  Duca  di  Ca.salanza;  Richard 
Metternich,  Osterr.  Teilnahme  a.  d.  Befreiungskriegen,  1887  (with  letters 
from  Gentz,  Metternich,  and  Schwarzenberg).  Supplementary  to  the 
narratives  in  the  general  histories  of  this  special  campaign  we  have: 
Londonderry,  Narrative  of  the  AVar  of  1813  and  1814;  Burghersh,  Opera- 
tions of  the  Allied  Armies  under  Prince  Schwarzenl)erg  and  Marshal 
Bliicher,  1822;  Hofmann,  Gesch.  d.  Feldzuges  v.  1813,  Berlin,  1843; 
Pelet,  Tableau  de  la  grande  armde  en  septembre  et  octobre  1813  (not 
reliable);  Gesch.  d.  Nordarmee  i.  J.  1813,  Berlin,  1859;  Aster,  Schilde- 
rung  d.  Kriegsereignisse  in  u.  uni  Dresden,  1856;  Wagner,  Die  Tage 
v.  Dresden  u.  Kulm;  Aster,  Schilderung  d.  Kriegsereignisse  zwischen 
Peterswalde,  Pima,  Konigstein  u.  Priesten,  und  d.  Schlacht  bei  Kulm, 
1845;  Helfert,  Die  Schlacht  bei  Kulm;  Kleist,  Von  Dresden  nach 
Nollendorf,  supplement  to  "  Militarwochenblatt,"  1889,  3;  Helldorf, 
Z.  Gesch.  d.  Schlacht  bei  Kulm,  1856;  Minis,  D.  Treflfen  b.  Warten- 
berg,  1863;  Schell,  D.  Operationen  d.  Korps  Bubna,  "Osterr.  mil. 
Zeitschr.,"  vol.  III.  On  the  battle  of  Leipzig,  first  of  all.  Aster,  Die 
Schlachten  bei  Leipzig,  2d  ed.,  1856;  in  addition,  the  works  of  Hofmann, 
1835,  Naumann,  1863,  and  Wuttke,  1863;  Dorr,  D.  Schlacht  bei  Hanau, 
1851;   Bochenheimer,  Gesch.  d.  Stadt  Mainz,   1813  u.   1S14. 

[E.  Wiehr,  Napoleon  und  Bernadotte  im  Herbstfeldzuge,  1813,  Berlin, 
1893;  G.  von  Schimpf,  1813;  Napoleon  in  Sachsen,  Dresden,  1894;  G. 
Bertin,  La  campagnc  de  1813,  publ.  d'apres  des  tdmoins  oculaires,  Paris, 
1896;  F.  Luckwaldt,  Osterreich  und  die  Anfiinge  des  Befreiungskrieges 
von  1813:  Xom  Abschluss  der  AUianz  mit  Frankreich  bis  zum  Eintritt 
in  die  Koalition,  Berlin,  1894;  G.  Fabry,  Journal  des  Operations  des  3. 
et  5.  corps  en   1813,  pub.  of  the  Hist.   Sect,   of  the   Gen.   Staff,   Paris, 


780  Bibliography 

1902;  Foucart,  Bautzen:  Une  bataille  de  deux  jours,  20-21  mai  1813, 
Paris,  1897;  the  same.  La  poursuite  jusqu'^  rarmistice  22  mai — 4  juiu 
1813,  Paris,  1901;  A.  G.,  Strategic  napoleonienne.  La  campagne  d'au- 
tomne  de  1813  et  les  lignes  interieures,  Paris,  1897;  Friedrich,  Der 
Herbstfeldzug  1813,  vol.  I,  Vom  Abschluss  d.  Waffenstillstand  bis  z. 
Schlacht  bei  Kulm,  Berlin,  1902.] 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Elba.  1814 

I.  Before  the  renewal  of  the  war.  On  the  first  negotiations  for  peace : 
Castlereagh's  Correspondence;  Mettemich,  Memoirs,  vols.  I  and  II,  cf. 
Bailleu,  Metternich's  Memoiren  in  "Hist.  Zeitschr.,"  XLIV;  Rich.  Met- 
temich, Osterreichs  Teilnahme,  etc.;  Fain,  Manuscrit  de  1814;  Emouf, 
Maret;  Bignon,  Histoire  de  France,  vol.  XIV;  Angeberg,  Le  Congres  de 
Vienne,  vol.  I;  Oncken,  Aus  den  letzten  Monaten  d.  J.  1813,  "Hist. 
Taschenbuch,"  1883,  and  Das  Zeitalter  d.  Rev.,  u.  d.  Befreiungskriege, 
1884-6,  2  vols.  On  internal  relations  in  France:  Correspondance  de 
Napoleon  I.,  vols.  XXVI  and  XXVII;  Buchez  et  Roux,  Histoire  Parle- 
mentaire  de  la  Rev.  franc^aise,  vol.  XXXIX,  Bulletin  des  lois;  Memoirs 
of  Mollien,  Miot,  Bausset,  Savary;  Meneval,  Napoleon  et  Marie  Louise, 
1845,  vol.  II;  B^ranger,  Ma  biographic,  1859;  Rodriguez,  Relation  de  ce 
qui  s'est  pass6  k  Paris  k  I'^poque  de  la  decheance  de  Buonaparte,  1814 
Journal  d'un  prisonnier  anglais,  in  "  Revue  Brittanique,"  vols.  V  and  VI 
Journal  d'un  officier  anglais  pendant  les  quatre  premiers  mois  de  1814 
ibid.,  vol.  IV;  V^ron,  Memoires  d'un  bourgeois  de  Paris,  vol.  I;  Broglie, 
Souvenirs,  vol.  I;  Thiers,  vol.  XVII;  Vaula belle.  Hist,  des  deux  restaura- 
tions;  Lubis,  Hist,  de  la  restauration,  1848;  Houssaye,  1814,  Paris,  1888 
(fundamental  for  internal  history),  in  which  the  literature  for  the  local 
history  for  that  year  is  indicated. 

II.  The  war  in  France.  On  the  campaign;  Correspondance,  vol. 
XVII;  Memoires  du  roi  Joseph,  1855;  Memoirs  of  Marmont,  Belliard, 
Pajol,  Lavalette,  Koch,  Fabvier,  Journal  des  operations  du  6^""^  corps; 
Girard,  La  campagne  de  Paris  en  1814;  Beauchamps,  Histoire  des  cam- 
pagnes  de  1814  et  1815;  Vaudoncourt,  Histoire  des  campagnes  de  1814  et 
1815;  Du  Casse,  Le  general  Arrighi.  Sources  other  than  French,  besides 
the  works  already  cited:  Danitz,  Gesch.  d.  Fcldzugs  v.  1814,  4  vols.; 
Schels,  Die  Operationen  d.  verbihideten  Heere  gegen  Paris,  "  Osterr. 
mil.  Zeitschr.,"  1845;  Thielen,  Der  Feldzug  d.  vcrbimdeten  Heere;  Schulz, 
Cesch.  d.  Fcldzugs  v.  1814,  2  vols. ;  Nostiz,  Tagcbuch,  "  Kriegsgeschicht. 
Einzclschiften,"  vols.  5  and  6;  Delbriick,  Cncisenau,  vol.  II;  Colomb. 
Bliicher  in  Bri(;f(!n;  Boie,  Die  Stuude  d.  Entschcidung  vor  Beginn  d. 
ungl.  Kampfe  i.  Febr.  1814,  "Jahrb.  f.  d.  dcutscho  Annce  u.  Marine," 
1878;    Danilewsky,  Der  Feldzug  in  Frankreich;   Bogdanovitsch,  Gesch. 


Bibliography  78 1 


d.  Kriegs  V.  1814  (German  tr.  1800).  On  diplomatic  negotiations  during 
the  war,  in  addition  to  above-cited  sources:  Oncken,  Lord  Castlereagh 
u.  d.  Minister-Koiiferenz  zu  Langres,  "Hist.  Taschcnb.,"  1885,  and  his 
Die  Krisis  d.  letzten  Kriegsverhandlungen  niit  Napoleon  I.,  ibid.,  1880; 
Houssaye,  1814,  based  on  the  protocols  of  the  Congress  of  Chatillon; 
Pons  de  I'H^rault,  Le  Congr^s  de  Chatillon,  1825;  Lap^rouse,  Le  Congr^s 
de  Chatillon.  On  Napoleon's  fall,  besides  the  more  general  works  already 
named:  Memoires  of  Boiirrienne,  1829-31  [Eng.  tr.  by  Phipps,  1889]; 
A.  B.,  Bourrienne  et  ses  erreurs,  vol.  II;  Talleyrand,  Lettres  in(5dite8 
k  la  Princesse  de  Courlande,  "Revue  d'histoire  diplomatique,"  vol.  I; 
Vitrolles,  Memoires  et  relations  politiques,  1884,  vol.  I;  De  Pradt,  R6cit 
des  (?venements  qui  ont  amene  la  restauration  do-  la  royaute;  Rapetti, 
La  defection  d'Essonnes;  Chateaubriand,  Memoires  d'Outretombe  [P"ng. 
tr.  by  Texeira  de  Mattos,  1902].  The  Souvenirs  du  Due  de  Vicence 
by  Mme.  Sorr  are  not  authentic.  Also  the  following  newspapers:  Moni- 
tcMT,  Journal  de  I'Empire,  Gazette  de  I'rance,  Journal  des  Debats.  Pam- 
phlets against  Napoleon  are  exceedingly  numerous.  A  collection  of 
them  with  excerpts  is  given  by  Germond  de  Lavigne,  Les  Pamphlets 
de  la  fin  de  I'Empire,  des  100  jours  et  de  la  Restauration,  1879. 

III.  Napoleon  at  Elba.  On  the  journey  to  Elba:  Helfert,  Napoleons 
Fahrt  von  Fontainebleau  nach  Elba,  1874,  based  on  reports  of  the  Austrian 
plenipotentiary.  General  KoUer;  Waldburg-Truchsess,  plenipotentiary 
of  Prussia,  N.  Honapartes  Reise  v.  Fontainebleau  nach  Fr^jus,  Berlin, 
1815;  Campbell,  England's  plenipot..  Napoleon  at  Fontainebleau  and 
Elba,  1809;  J.  Fabre,  De  Fontainebleau  k  I'ile  d'Elbe,  1887 — worthless. 
On  his  residence  at  Elba:  Correspondance,  vol.  XXVII;  Campbell's  Notes; 
Pichot,  Napoleon  h  File  d'Elbe,  1873,  based  on  preceding;  Peyrusse, 
Memorial,  1809.  .\lso,  Lancelotti,  Napoleon  auf  Elba,  Dresden,  1815; 
Foresi,  Napoleone  I.  all'  isola  dell'  Elba,  1884;  Livi,  Napoleone  all'  isola 
d'Elba,  1888;  Pellet,  Napoleon  k  TQe  d'Elbe,  1888  (these  last  two  works 
rely  too  much  on  reports  of  the  secret  police) ;  Napoleon's  own  dictated 
narrative  under  the  title  L'ile  d'Elbe  et  les  Cent  Jours  in  vol.  XXXI  of 
his  "Correspondance"  (like  all  his  dictations,  biassed  by  a  distinct 
purpose,  unreliable);  Jiing,  Lucien  Bonaparte  et  ses  Memoires,  vol.  Ill; 
Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  Memoires  de  la  vie  privee,  du  retour  et  du  r^gne 
de  Napoleon  en  1815,  London,  1820  [Eng.  tr.  London,  1820] — describes 
his  mission  at  the  behest  of  Maret;  H6risson,  Le  Cal)inet  noir,  1887;  also 
Thiers,  vols.  XMII  and  XIX;  Lubis,  vol.  Ill;  Vaulabelle,  vol.  II;  Lan- 
frey-Kalckstein,  vol.  VII.  The  literature  on  the  Menna  Congress  does 
not  belong  here;  yet  cf.  for  Tall;\vrand's  attitude  on  the  question  of  Elba 
Pallain,  correspondance  de  Talleyrand  avec  Louis  X\'III.,  and  M.  Leh- 
mann,  D.  Tagebueh  d.  Frh.  v.  St^in  wiihrend  des  Wiener  Kongresses, 
"Hist.  Zeitsclir.,"  1888;  also  Foumier,  Talleyrand  in  "Deutsche  Rund- 
schau," 1888.  With  regard  to  the  blunders  of  the  Bourbons,  cf.  the 
Memoirs  of  Vitrolles,  vol.  II,  of  V^ron,  vol.  I,  of  Broglie,  vol.  I,  and  of 
Montgelas. 


782  Bibliography 

[F.  von  Hiller,  Geschichte  des  Feldzuges  '14  gegen  Frankreich  unter 
besonderer  Beriicksichtigung  der  Anteilnahme  der  Konigl.  wiirtenibergi- 
schen  Truppen,  etc.,  Stuttgart,  1893;  G.  Bertin,  La  campagne  de  1814, 
d'apres  des  temoins  oculaires,  Paris,  1897;  A.  Fournier,  Der  Congress 
von  Chatillon,  Die  Politik  im  Kriege  von  1814,  Vienna,  1900;  Das  Nachtge- 
fecht  bei  Laon  am  9.  Marz  1814,  in  series  of  monographs  pub.  by  the 
Greneral  Staff,  Berlin,  1890;  G.  Roloff,  Politik  imd  Kriegfiihrung  wahrend 
des  Feldzuges  von  1814,  BerUn,  1891;  A.  Chuquet,  L' Alsace  in  1814, 
Paris,  1900;  H.  Houssaye,  Napoleon  k  Tile  d'Elbe,  "Rev.  Hist.,"  vol. 
51,  Paris,  1893;  A.  Fournier,  Marie  Louise  et  la  chute  de  Napoleon,  "  Revue 
hist.,"  mai — ^juin  1903;  L.  G.  Pelissier,  Le  registre  de  I'ile  d'Elbe,  Lettres 
et  ordres  inedits  de  Napoleon  P--,  28  mai  1814—22  fevr.  1815,  Paris,  1897; 
A.  Pingaud,  Le  congres  de  Vienna  et  la  politique  de  Talleyrand,  "  Revue 
hist.,"  vol.  70,  Paris,  1900;  Correspondance  diplomatique  des  ambas- 
sadeurs  et  ministres  de  Russie  en  France  et  de  France  en  Russie  avec 
leurs  gouvemements  de  1814  h  1830,  ed.  by  A.  Polovtsoff,  vol.  I,  1814- 
1816,  edit,  ae  la  Soc.  imp.  d'tiist.  de  Russie;  Correspondance  diplomatique 
de  C"^  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  ambassadeur  de  Russie  en  France  et  du  C^  Nessel- 
rode  depuis  la  restauration  des  Bourbons,  etc.,  1814-1818,  2  vols,  Paris, 
1890,   1897.] 


CHAPTER  XX 

Watekloo.    1815 

I.  The  Hundred  Days'  reign:  Correspondance,  vol.  XXVIII;  Napoleon, 
L'ile  d'Elbe  et  les  Cent-Jours,  in  Correspondance,  XXXI.  In  particular 
on  Napoleon's  journey  from  Cannes  to  Paris:  A.  D.  B.  Mounier,  ITne 
annee  de  la  vie  de  I'Emp.  Napoleon,  1815;  the  Memoirs  of  Vitrolles,  vol. 
I,  Villemain,  vol.  II,  Broglie,  vol.  I,  Lucien  Bonaparte,  vol.  Ill  (ed.  Jung.), 
Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  vols.  I  and  II,  Peyrusse,  Mollien,  Miot  de  M^lito, 
vol.  Ill,  V€ron,  vol.  I.  Further,  Benjamin  Constant,  Mcmoires  sur  les 
Cent-Jours,  2d  ed.,  1829;  Sismondi,  Notes  sur  1' Empire  et  les  Cent-Jours, 
"Revue  historique,"  IX,  and  letters  to  his  mother,  "Revue  hist.,"  VI — 
unreliable ;  Hobhouse,  the  substance  of  some  Letters  written  by  an  English- 
man at  Paris  during  the  last  reign  of  Emperor  Napoleon,  London,  1817 
(cf .  Napoleon's  comments  in  Correspondance,  XXXI) ;  Davout,  Corres- 
pondance, vol.  IV,  ed.  Mazade;  Blocqueville,  Le  Mar(5chal  Davout,  vol. 
IV;  B€ranger,  Ma  biographic;  Lord  Holland,  Foreign  Reminiscences, 
London,  1851;  Picaud,  Carnot,  1885;  F.  v.  Weech,  Franzosische  Zustiinde 
wilhrend  d.  hvmdert  Tage  u.  d.  Okkupation,  "  Hist.  Zeitschr.,"  XVI,  1866, 
based  on  Wellington's  Supplementary  Despatches,  X.  In  addition,  the 
narrative  histories,  Thiers,  vol.  XIX,  Vaulabelle,  vol.  II,  Lubis,  vol.  Ill, 
Bignon,  vol.  XIV;  Thibaudeau,  Hist,  du  Cons,  et  de  I'Empire,  vol,  X; 


■f 


Bibliography  783 

H^lie,  Les  Constitutions  de  la  France,  1875-9;  Politz,  Europaisclio  Wr- 
fassungen,  1833,  vol.  Ill;  Archives  parlenientaires,  2*^""'  sC-nv;  Germond 
de  Lavigne,  Les  pamphlets  de  la  fin  de  I'Enipire,  etc.  In  addition  to 
the  newspapers  already  named,  L'Aristarque,  L'lnd^pendant,  Le  Patriote 
de  '89,  and  Le  Nain  Jaune,  comic. 

II.  The  campaign  of  1815.  Napoleon's  Correspondance  is  hardly 
of  account  here.  His  narrative  of  the  war,  dictated  to  Gourgaud  at  St. 
Helena  and  afterwards  published  under  the  latter's  name  as  La  campagne 
de  1815,  has  served  as  the  basis  for  several  historical  works,  that  of  Thiers 
among  others,  although  it  at  once  provoked  other  writ<'rs  to  reply  and 
to  correct  its  misstatements.  Among  the  latter  cf.  in  particular:  Grouchy, 
Observations  sur  la  relation  de  la  camp,  de  1815  publi^'-e  par  Gourgaud, 
Paris,  1819;Heymfes,  Relation  de  la  campagne  de  1815  pour  servir^l'histoire 
du  Mardchal  Ney,  Paris,  1829;  D'Elchingen,  Documents  in^dits  sur  la 
campagnes  de  1815,  Paris,  1840;  Gerard,  Quelqucs  documents  sur  la 
bataille  de  Waterloo,  Paris,  1829.  Cf.  also  the  Memoirs  of  Berthezfene, 
Lamarque,  Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  etc.  Our  knowledge  to-day  is  based 
chiefly  on  Charras,  Hist,  de  la  campagne  de  1815,  5th  ed.,  1868,  and 
Ollech,  Gesch.  d.  Feldz.  v.  1815,  nach  archivalischen  Quellen,  Berlin, 
1876,  although  they  are  not  wholly  free  from  prejudice  in  their  criticisms. 
All  the  older  general  works  have  been  superseded  by  these  and  by  the 
following:  Quinet,  Hist,  de  la  campagne  de  1815,  Paris,  1862;  Chesney, 
Waterloo  Lectures,  3d  ed.,  1875;  Gardner,  Quatrebras,  Ligny,  and  Water- 
loo, Boston,  1882;  Yorck,  Napoleon  als  Feldherr,  vol.  II  [Eng.  tr.].  Some 
earlier  works  deserve  consideration  on  account  of  the  abundant  ma- 
terial they  contain  from  original  sources:  Sibome,  History  of  the  War  in 
France  and  Belgium  in  1815,  3d  ed.,  London,  1848,  cf.  Fransecky  in  the 
"Militiirwochenblatt"  for  1845;  Clausewitz,  "  D.  Feldz.  v.  1815,"  in 
Hintergelassene  Werke,  vol.  VIII.  1862-89;  Plotho,  D.  Krieg  d.  Ver- 
biindeten  gegen  P>ankreich  i.  1815,  Berlin,  1818;  Wagner,  Plane  d.  Schlach- 
ten  u.  Treffen;  Hofmann,  Z.  Gesch.  d  Feldz.  v.  1815,  2d  ed.,  1849; 
Schulz,  Geschichte  der  Kriege,  vols.  XIV  and  XV;  Loben-Sels,  Precis  de 
la  camp,  de  1815,  La  Haye,  1849,  Dutch  view;  Pringle,  Remarks  on  the 
Campaign  of  1815;  Jomini,  Precis  polit.  et  milit.  de  la  camp,  de  1815, 
Paris,  1839  [Eng.  tr.  New  York,  1853];  Cerens,  Dissertation  sur  la  par- 
ticipation des  troupes  des  Pay-Bas  a  la  campagne  de  1815,  1880;  La  Tour 
d'Auvergne,  Waterloo,  Etudes  de  la  campagne  de  1815,  Paris,  1870  (under 
Bonapartist  influence).  Also,  Wellington's  Despatches,  ed.  Gurwood, 
vol.  XII,  and  Supplementary  Desp.,  vol.  X;  Reiche,  Memoiren,  ed.  Welt- 
zien,  Leipzig,  1857;  Muffling,  Aus  meinem  Leben;  Pertz-Delbriick,  Gnei- 
senau,  vol.  IV;  Delbriick,  D.  Leben  d.  F.-M.  Gneisenau,  vol.  II,  1882; 
M.  Lehmann,  Zur  Gesch.  d.  Feldz.  v.  1815,  "  Hist.  Zeitschr.,"  1877;  Bem- 
hardi,  Gesch.  Russlands,  vol.  I;  Treuenfeld,  Die  Tage  v.  Ligny  u.  Belle- 
Alliance,  Hanover,  1880.  On  the  beginning  of  the  flight  of  the  French: 
Biidinger,  Wellington  (in  the  appendi.x).  On  Cambronne  and  the  de- 
struction of  the  Guard:  Knesebeck,  Leben  d.  Freih.  Hugh  v.  Halkett, 


784  Bibliography 

Stuttgart,  1865;  Poten,  article,  "Halkett"  in  Allgem  d.  Biographie; 
Fransecky  in  the  "  Militarwochenblatt "  for  1876,  no.  47.  On  Murat: 
Helfert,  Joachim  Murat,  seine  letzen  Kampfe  u.  s.  Ende,  Vienna, 
1878. 

[J.  C.  Ropes,  The  Campaign  of  Waterloo :  a  Military  History,  Boston, 
1892;  Wolseley,  Field  Marshal  Viscount  Lord,  The  Decline  and  Fall  of 
Napoleon,  London,  1895;  H,  Houssaye,  1815,  Waterloo,  Paris,  1898  [Eng. 
tr.  London,  1900];  W.  O'Connor  Morris,  The  Campaign  of  1815,  London, 
1900;  E.  L.  S.  Horsburg,  Waterloo:  a  Narrative  and  a  Criticism,  London, 
1895;  G.  Bustelli,  L'Enigma  di  Ligny  e  di  Waterloo:  Studiato  e  Sciolto, 
3  vols.,  Viterbo,  1897;  A.  Lumbroso,  La  campagne  de  Murat  en  1815, 
Paris,  1899.  In  addition  to  the  earlier  works  mentioned  by  Fournier, 
attention  may  be  called  to  the  observations  on  the  Hundred  Days  to 
be  found  in  John  Quincy  Adams's  Memoirs,  vol.  Ill,  Philadelphia, 
1874.] 


CHAPTER  XXI 

St.  Helena.     1815-1821 

On  the  last  days  in  France:  Fleury  de  Chaboulon,  vol.  II;  Sismondi; 
Savary,  vol.  Ill;  Lucien,  vol.  Ill;  Miot,  vol.  Ill;  Vitrolles,  vol.  Ill; 
Montholon,  Historj^  of  the  Captivity  of  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena,  London, 
1846,  vol.  I;  Las  Cases,  Memorial  de  Ste.  H41ene,  vol.  I,  Paris,  1823  [Eng. 
tr.];  Villemain,  vol.  II;  Lafayette,  M^moires,  Paris,  1837  [Eng.  tr.  London, 
1837];  Broglie,  vol.  I  [Eng.  tr.];  Villfele,  M^moires,  1888-90;  Quinet,  Hist, 
de  la  camp,  de  1815;  Castlereagh's  Correspondence;  finally,  the  news- 
papers above  mentioned  and  the  pamphlets  in  Germond  de  Lavigne's 
collection.  As  to  Napoleon's  residence  at  St.  Helena,  the  above-men- 
tioned works  of  Montholon  and  Las  Cases  are  important  sources;  but 
the  most  thorough  is  Forsyth's  History  of  the  Captivity  of  Napoleon 
at  St.  Helena,  1853,  3  vols.,  based  on  the  English  Government  docu- 
ments. The  Lettres  du  Cap  de  Bonne  Esp^rance,  dictated  by  Napoleon 
(included  in  Correspondance,  vol.  XXXII)  and  published  in  1818,  laid 
th(^  basis  for  the  legend  of  martyrdom,  which  was  also  confirmed  by 
O'Meara,  Napoleon  in  Exile,  or  a  Voice  from  St.  Helena,  London,  1822, 
2  vols.,  and  by  Antommarchi,  Derniers  moments  de  Napoleon,  Paris, 
1825,  2  vols.  Cf.  also:  Capt.  Maitland,  Narrative  of  the  Surrender  of  Bonar- 
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written  on  board  H.  M.  S.  "  Northumberland"  and  at  St.  Helena,  I^ondon, 
1816;  Abell  (tlie  younger  daughter  of  Mr.  Balcombe),  Recollections  of 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  during  the  first  three  years  of  his  captivity  on 
the  island  of  St.  Helena,  London,  1844;  Henry  (an  officer  of  the  garrison 
of  St.  Helena),  Events  of  a  Military  Life,  vol.  II,  London,  1843;  valuable 
contributions  also  in  Scott's  Life  of  Napoleon,  1827,  vol.  IX;  Yonge,  The  Life 


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LIST  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  MEMOIRS,  CORRESPONDENCE,  AND 
BIOGRAPHIES  WHICH  HAVE  APPEARED  SINCE  THE 
PREPARATION  OF  FOURNIER'S  BIBLIOGRAPHY  AND 
WHICH  FOR  THE  MOST  PART  HAVE  NOT  BEEN  IN- 
CLUDED IN   THE   SUPPLEMENTARY   NOTES. 

Alexandre  P*"  et  Napoleon  d'apres  leur  correspondance  in^>dite  de 
1801  k  1812,  ed.  by  S.  Tatistcheff,  Paris,  1891.  See  aLso  Vandal's  Napo- 
leon et  Alexandre  P*";  Barante,  A.  G.  P.  B.,  Baron  de,  Souvenirs,  publ. 
par  son  petit  fils  C.  de  Barante,  4  vols.,  Paris,  1890-94;  Barras,  P.  J. 
F.  N.,  Comte  de,  M(?moires,  publ.  avec  une  introduction  par  G.  Duruy, 
4  vols.,  Paris,  1895-96,  Eng.  tr.  by  C.  E.  Roche,  London,  1895-96. 
Bemadotte:  Schefer,  Bernadotte  roi,  1810-18-44,  Paris,  1S09;  L.  Pin- 
gaud,  Bernadotte,  Napol(^on  et  les  Bourbons,  Paris,  1901.    Boulard,  Baron 


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1889-90;  F.  Meinecke,  Das  Leben  des  Generalfeldmarschalls  H.  von 
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Journal  de,  1804-1862,  Paris,  1895-97,  vol.  I;  Chaptal,  Jean  A.  C, 
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Davout,  Marochal  d'Empire,  due  d'Auerstadt,  prince  d'Eckmiihl,  1770- 
1823,  par  son  arriere-peiit-fils,  avec  introd.  par  F.  Masson,  2  vols.,  Paris, 
1898.  Dedem  de  Gelder,  Baron,  Memoires,  LTn  general  hollandais  sous 
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officier  de  la  grande  armee,  1800-1830,  Paris,  1895.  Friedrich  August 
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roi  de  Saxe  et  grand-due  de  Varsovie,  1763-1827,  Paris,  1902.  Friedrich 
Wilhelm  III:  Brief wechsel  Konig  F.  W.  III.  und  der  Konigin  Luise  mit 
Kaiser  Alexander  I.,  hrsg.  von  P.  Bailleu,  Leipzig,  1900.  Gentz,  F.  v.: 
E.  Guglia,  F.  v.  Gentz,  eine  biografische  Studie,  Vienna,  1901.  Gneisenau: 
H.  Delbriick,  Das  Leben  des  Feldmarschalls  Grafen  Neidhart  von  Gnei- 
senau, 2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1894.  Gourgaud,  Baron,  Sainte-Hel^ne,  Journal 
inMit  de  1815  k  1818,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1899,  Eng.  tr.  by  Larimer,  Chicago, 
1903.  Jerome  Bonaparte  :  J.  Turquan,  Le  roi  Jerome,  1784-1860, 
Paris,  1903;  M.  S.  Kaisenberg,  Konig  Jerome  Napoleon,  ein  Zeit-  und 
Lebensbild  nach  Briefen,  etc.,  Leipzig,  1899.  Johann,  Archduke  of  Aus- 
tria: F.  Ritter  vonKrones,  AusdemTagebuche  Erzherzog  Johanns  von  6s- 
terreich,  1810-15,  etc.,  Innsbruck,  1891;  P.  Heinrich,  Erzherzog  Johann, 
Vienna,  1901.  J.  B.  Jourdan,  Marshal,  Memoires  militaires  (guerre  d'Es- 
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Karl  Friedrich,  Grand-duke  of  Baden,  Politische  Correspondonz,  1783- 
1806,  ed.  by  ErdmannsdiJrffer  and  Obser,  vols.  Ill  and  IV,  1797-1804, 
Heidelberg,  1893-96.  Karl,  Archduke  of  Austria:  H.  Ritter  v.  Zeissberg, 
Erzherzog  Carl  v.  Osterreich,  ein  Lebensbild,  etc.,  2  vols.,  Vienna,  1895; 
M.  Edler  von  Angely,  Erzherzog  Carl  von  Osterreich  als  Feldherr  und 
Heeresorgiuiisator,  etc.,  0  vols,  in  5,  Vienna,  1896-97.  J.  ii.  K16ber, 
General:  H.  Klaber,  L(^ben  und  Thaten  des  franzosischen  Generals  J. 
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lifere-L^peaux,  Mriuoirt's,  pvihl.  par  son  fils  sur  le  nianuscrit  aiitographe 
de  I'auteur,  etc.,  3  vols.,  Paris,  189.5;  Lejeune,  General,  Meinoires,  publ. 
par  G.  Papst,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1895,  Eng.  tr.  by  .\.  Bell,  2  vols.,  London, 
LS97  Macdonald,  Marshal,  SouNenirs,  avec  une  introd.  par  C.  Rousscl, 
Paris,  lcS92,  Eng.  tr.  as  Recollections,  by  S.  L.  Simeon,  London,  1892 
and  1893;  Marbot,  General,  Memoires,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1891,  Eng.  tr.  bv 
A.  J.  Butler,  3  vols.,  London,  1892-3  and  1897.  Marie  Louise:  F. 
Masson,  L'Imperatrice  Marie-Louise,  Paris,  1902.  Massc'^na,  General :  E. 
Gachot,  Histoire  Militaire  de  Mas.s(^na,  La  premiere  campagne  d'ltalie, 
1795-1798,  Paris,  1901.  Meneval,  Baron  de,  Memoires  pour  servir  ^ 
I'histoire  de  Napoleon  P""  depuis  1802-1815,  publ.  par  son  petit-fils, 
le  Baron  M.  J.  E.  de  Meneval,  3  vols.,  Paris,  1894,  Eng.  tr.  by  Sherard, 
3  vols.,  London,  1894.  Montgaillard,  Comte  de.  Souvenirs,  publ.  d'apres 
des  documents  inedits,  extraits  des  archives  du  ministdre  de  rint(;''rieur, 
Paris,  1895;  Memoires  diplomatiques,  1805-1819,  Extraits  des  archives 
du  mini.sterc  de  I'interieur,  ed.  by  C.  Lacroiz,  Paris,  1896.  Moreau,  General: 
Le  GenC'ral  Moreau,  1763-1813,  par  J.  Dontenville,  Paris,  1899.  Napo- 
leon: Lettres  in^dites  de  Napol(^^on,  An  YllI,  1815,  publ.  par  L^on  Le- 
cestre,  2  vols.,  Paris,  1897,  Eng.  tr.  by  Lady  Mary  Loyd,  London,  1897; 
Lettres  in^dites  de  Napoleon,  publ.  par.  L.  de  Brotonne,  Paris,  1898; 
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pub.  by  A.  Vandal,  '"Revue  Bleue,"  1895.  Nelson,  Horatio,  Admiral: 
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Sieves,  1748-1836,  d'apres  documents  inedits,  Paris,  1900.  Stael,  Mme. 
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Memoires,  publ.  sous  les  auspices  de  sa  fille  Mile  C.  Thiebault  d'apres 
le  manuscrit  original  par  F.  Calmettes,  5  vols.,  Paris,  1893-95.  Thiel- 
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INDEX 


Aargau,  the,  109,  120. 

Abdication,  the,  of  Napoleon,  675. 

Ahensherg,  battle  of,  407. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  648. 

Abo,  interview  at,  between  Bema- 
dotte  and  Alexander,  .560,  595. 

Aboukir,  defeat  of  French  fleet 
near,  132  f.,  141;  brilliant  victory 
of  Napoleon  at,  148,  150,  151. 

Abrial,  231. 

Abrantes,  duke  of,  45. 

Achmed  Pa.sha  (Jezzar),  135  f.;  in- 
cursion of,  into  Egvpt,  137. 

Acqui,  in  Italy,  48,  80. 

Acre,  siege  of,  141  ff. ;  siege  of, 
raised,  145, 147, 151,193 

Act,  additional,  to  the  Constitu- 
tions of  the  Empire,  702,  705. 

Act  of  mediation,  257. 

Adam.  Albrecht,  546,  557. 

Adda,  the,  81  ff.,  200,  291. 

Addington,  214;  remarks  of,  on 
peace  with  France,  217;  yields  to 
public  opinion,  264. 

Aclige,  84  ff. ;  proposed  Austrian 
boundary,  99,  101,  108  f.;  Brune 
cresses,  206;  as  Austrian  bound- 
ary, 207 

Adrianople,  144. 

Adriatic  Sea,  mastery  of,  95,  111; 
English  fleet  absent  from,  99, 286, 
340. 

Aguesseau,  d',  ordinances  of,  231. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  289  f. 

Ajaccio,  2,  3;  Napoleon  returns  to, 
25. 

Ajaccio,  club  in,  26,  30,  35;  pious 
Catholics  in,  31 ;  estate  of  Volnev 
at,  113,  127, 155. 

Alba,  80. 

Albania,  346. 

Albanian  sharpshooters  at  Acre, 
143. 

D'Alembert,  13. 

Aleppo,  144. 


Alessandria,  80,  199,  201. 

Alexander  the  Great,  ideal  of  Na- 
poleon, 95;  estimate  of,  by  Ray- 
nal,  124  f.,  129,  191. 

Alexander  I.,  Czar,  208;  succeeds 
Paul  I.,  214;  releases  English 
ships,  214;  England  seeks  peace 
with,  215;  Napoleon  seeks  good 
will  of,  21.5;  renounces  support  of 
Bourbons,  217;  assent  of,  to  Ger- 
man question  expectec',  260;  re- 
sumes policy  of  Cathari  !  •  II. ,  287, 
313;  refuses  terms  propo.sed  by 
Napoleon  Nov.,  1805,  314;  de- 
feated at  Austeriitz,  317,  319, 
320,  327,  344,  346,  348,  350,  354, 
365,  376,  381,  383,  384;  at  Tilsit, 
385  ff.,  416  ff.,  430,  433  n.,  438 
ff.,  455  ff.,  473,  480  ff.,  515,  516, 
517,  518,  519,  521,  528,  530,  540 
ff.,  553  ff.,  560,  561,  581,  586,  591, 
594,  599,  600,  610  fT.,  654,  658; 
his  plan  for  advance  on  Paris 
oppo.sed  bv  Austria,  662,  666; 
enters  Paris,  672  ff.,  709. 

Alexandria,  Napoleon  arrives  at, 
128;  capture  of,  129;  disappoint- 
ment caused  by,  130.  148;  Sir 
Sidney  Smith  at,  149  f. ;  French 
defeated  before,  215;  surren- 
dered, 216;  English  refuse  to 
evacuate,  266;  Napoleon  leaves, 
151;  defenceless,  152;  voyage 
from  Toulon  to,  154. 

Alfieri,  on  United  Italv,  253. 

Algarve,  428. 

Allies,  the,  580,  582,  593;  army 
of,  under  Wittgenstein  weaker 
except  in  cavalry,  607;  re- 
enforced,  611;  Barclay  replaces 
Wittgenstein  as  com. -in-chief, 
613;  terms  to  be  offered  Napo- 
leon, 616;  .strengthened  and  im- 
proved, 623;  chief  com.  in  hands 
of  Schwarzenberg,  625 ;  dejection, 
789 


790 


Index 


All  ies — Continued. 

627;  reinforced,  631,  637,  648; 
manifesto  of,  to  the  French  peo- 
ple, 650;  cross  Rhine  and  enter 
France,  653;  issue  manifesto  to 
the  French,  669;  move  on  Paris, 
669;  proclamation  to  Senate,  673; 
treaty  with  Napoleon,  677;  enter 
Paris,  727;  sign  treaty  of  Paris, 
729,  735. 

Alps,  passage  of,  197  ff. ;  Swiss, 
communication  by  way  of,  255. 

Alquier,  422. 

Alsace,  Austrians  driven  from,  46; 
elements  of  discontent  in,  272, 
661  n. 

Altenburg,  negotiations  at,  479,  481 

Alvinczy,  character  of,  89;  defeat 
at  Arcole,  90  f. 

America,  Moreau  banished  to,  271; 
Emperor  of,  title  to  be  assumed 
by  King  of  Spain,  428. 

Amiens,  treaty  of,  217,  230,  254, 
262;  stipulations  of,  not  kept, 
264  f . 

"Amis  de  la  Constitution,"  at 
Valence,  29. 

Ancients,  Council  of,  decrees  trans- 
ference of  Legislature,  170  f.;  at 
St.  Cloud,  173  f . ;  address  of  Lu- 
cien  to,  179;  ratify  decree  of 
provisional  government,  180 

Ancona,  surrendered  to  French,  84, 
93;  impression  of,  on  Napoleon, 
95;  effect  of,  on  Venice,  102;  Aus- 
trian garrison  in,  202,  330. 

Andalusia,  500. 

Andernach,  109. 

Andigne,  237. 

Andr^-ossy,  127,  136,  364,  376,  377, 
437  n. 

d'Angel}',  Regnauld  de  Saint-Jean, 
723. 

Angouleme,  Duke  of,  700. 

Anna,  Grand-duchess  of,  486,  487, 
488. 

Ansbach,  313,  320,  342,  346. 

Anstett,  619. 

Antilles,  acquired  by  England,  215, 
263- 

Antommarclii,  735,  736,  740  n. 

d'Antraigues,  Comte,  agent  of 
lioin-bons,  101. 

Antwerp,  4S0. 

Apennines,  passage  over,  77  IT. 


Apollonius,  211. 

Arch-chancellor  of  empire,  279. 

Arcis  [sur  Aube],  the  battle  of,  667  f . 

Arcole,  battle  of,  90  f 

Arenberg,  285,  338 

d'Argenson,   Colonial  idea  of,  113. 

Argenteau,  defeat  of,  80. 

Army,  rewards  of,  401. 

Arnault,  "  Souvenirs  d'un  Sexa- 
g^naire,"  64  f. 

Arndt,  Ernst  Moritz,  352;  battle- 
cry  of,  457 

Arrajon,  500- 

Arrondissement,  223 

d'Artois,  Charles,  brother  of  Louis 
XVI.,  head  of  Royalists,  270; 
party  to  plot  against  Napoleon, 
272, "683,  732,  741. 

Ascalon,  146, 

Aspern  [and  Essling],  battle  of,  470- 
475. 

Astorga,  453. 

Aubry,  52. 

Auersperg,  Prince  of,  311. 

Auerstadt,  Duke  of,  see  Davout. 

Auerstiidt,  battle  of,  359,360. 

Augereau,  in  Italian  campaign,  80 
bold  advice  to  Napoleon,  86  f. 
sent  by  Napoleon  to  Paris,  104 
compromises  Napoleon,  105;  com- 
mander-in-chief of    army  of  the 
Rhine,    105;    radical,    167,    169, 
173;  appointed  marshal,  280,  284, 
367;    attack    upon    Russians    at 
Prussian    Evlau,    372;    becomes 
Duke    of    Castiglione,   400,   500, 
674,  690,  692. 

Augsburg,  314. 

Augusta,  of  Bavaria,  335  ff.,  355. 

Aulic  Council,  86. 

Austerlitz,  battle  of,  Dec.  2d,  1805, 
316-318;  one  of  the  four  decisive 
battles  in  Napoleon's  career, 
325,  369,  370. 

Austria,  war  declared  against,  32; 
army  of,  in  Italy,  45;  militarj' 
preparations,  50;  receives  no  aid 
from  Russia,  77;  neglects  army  of 
Italy,  77;  army  defeated  at  Lodi, 
81 ;  efforts  to  regaii  influeiK  e 
in  Italv,  85;  importance  of  Man- 
tua to,  87;  losses  of,  S8,  efforts  to 
maintain  prc^stige  in  Italy,  89; 
l)artition  of  I'oland  1)V,  91 ;  agree- 
ment with  Pius  VI.,  93;  value  of 


Index 


791 


Austria — Continued. 

Italy  to,  9G;  losses  of,  in  Italian 
campaign  of  1797,  98;  diplomatic 
defeat  at  Leoben,  99  f.;  acquires 
Venetian  mainland,  100;  defeat 
by  Hoche,  100,  107;  treaty  with 
France,  terms  of,  108  f.;  pro- 
tection of  Tuscany  and  Naples, 
125;  agreement  with  Russia,  160; 
regains  Lombardy,  102;  defeated 
in  Switzerland,  105;  losses  of,  at 
Marengo,  202,  203,  204;  nego- 
tiates with  France,  205  IT.;  hos- 
tile to  France,  249;  Catholic 
Erincipalities  loyal  to,  258;  to  be 
ept  back  from  Rhine,  259,  261, 
287,  288;  conciliatory  attitude  of, 
toward  Napoleon,  288  ff.,  291, 
349,  364,  365,  376-379,  384,  389, 
397;  attitude  of,  454-457,  460  IT  ; 
campaign  against,  465  IT.,  477, 
492;  attitude  of,  527  ff.;  after 
Russian  campaign,  594  ff.;  arms 
for  purposes  of  mediation,  604, 
615;  convinced  of  impossibility 
of  reconciliation  with  Napoleon, 
620;  declares  w^ar,  621;  joins 
Prussia  and  Russia,  632,  654,  686. 

Autun,  College  of,  5;  Bishop  of,  8, 
222. 

Auxonne,  17,  23. 

A\-ignon,  39,  589. 

Azauza,  501. 

Bacciochi,  247. 

Badajoz,  treaty  of,  210. 

Baden,  88;  Napoleon  in,  115,  232; 

treaty  with,  260,  323;   elector  of, 

334,  335;   becomes  grand-duchv, 

338,  524. 
Bagdad,  141. 
Bagration,  311,  312,  540,  541,  54.5, 

550  ff. 
Bajalich,  91. 
Balearic  Islands.  345. 
Balkan  Peninsula,  287,  323,  417. 
Bank  of  England,  effect  of  war  on, 

503,  513. 
Rank  of  France,  229,  513,  645. 
Barante,  Souvenirs  of,  quoted,  105, 

193. 
Barbsiry  States,  142. 
Barb<!'-Marbois,  221 ;  head  of  treas- 

urj-  department,  229,  396. 


Barclay  de  Tolly,  5^10  ff. ;  deposed 
from  command,  553,  611,  612, 
613. 

Bard,  Fort,  199. 

Barras,  leader  of  Thermidorians, 
49;  supports  Napoleon,  50;  on 
committee  to  niainuiin  order,  56 
ff. ;  directfjr,  59;  popularity,  61; 
relations  with  Josephine,  64,  76; 
Memoires  quot<'d,  veracity  of,  64; 
advises  Napoleon  to  marry  Jose- 
phine, 66,  82,  96;  in  Directory, 
102;  helped  i>y  Augereau,  104; 
chief  of  Directory,  115,  158;  sides 
with  Sieycs,  1(13  I. ;  resigns  from 
Directory,  172  f. ;  charged  by 
Napoleon  with  plot,  175,  181. 

Bar  sur  Aube,  662,  6(54,  666. 

Bartenstein,  treaty  of,  Apr.  26th, 
1807,  377,  378,  379,  383. 

Barthelemy,  charge  d'affaires,  75; 
in  Director}',  102;  dropped  from 
Directory,  104. 

Basle,  109.' 

Bassano,  Duke  of,  see  Maret,  duchy 
of,  328. 

Bastia,  26,  48. 

Bastille,  22,  103. 

"Batavian  Repuljlic,  the,"  consti- 
tuted in  Holland,  72;  alliance  of, 
with  France,  119  f . ;  coup  d'etat 
in,  119;  new  constitution  for,  252; 
enters  league  with  France,  268. 
See  also  Holland. 

Bautzen,  battle  of,  476  n.,  611-613, 
615,  628. 

Bavaria,  72;  part  of,  ceded  to 
Austria,  109;  in  Campo  Foniiio, 
207;  Austria  excluded  from,  209; 
treaty  with  France,  217;  elector 
of,  to  be  king,  320;  acknowledged 
by  Austria,  323;  territorj'  in- 
creased, 323. 

Bavaria,  Kingdom  of,  to  be  recog- 
nized by  Frederick  William,  335 
ff.,  342",  355;  changes  in,  after 
war  of  1809,  524;  army  of,  in 
Ru-ssia,  546;  sends  one  division, 
594,  604,  609;  joins  coalition, 
632. 

Bavaria,  Rhenish,  Code  Napol(?on, 
in  force  in,  232;  king  of,  to  be 
appointed  bv  France,  250;  Passau 
allotted  to,  261. 


792 


Index 


Bayanne,  Card.,  423-24. 

Baylen,  435. 

Bayonne,  Napoleon  goes  to,  425; 
Spain  concedes  to  France  right 
to  assemble  troops  in,  428;  inter- 
view in,  between  Napoleon  and 
Spanish  royal  family,  431,  434, 
644. 

Bayreuth,  349,  355. 

Beaucaire,  abandoned  by  insur- 
gents, 40. 

Beauhamais,  Eugene,  marriage, 
335,  423,  460;  defeat  of,  at  Por- 
denone  and  Fontana  Fredda, 
464,  474,  475,  477,  485,  489,  524, 
538,  539,  546;  at  Malojarosla- 
vetz,  563,  565,  567  ff.,  573,  577; 
succeeds  Murat  as  commander 
of  broken  army,  598;  occupies 
Saxony,  602,  605,  606  n.,  607, 
608 ;  directed  to  gather  new  army 
in  Italy  to  keep  Austria  in  check 
in  the  south,  610,  649,  661,  708. 

Beauhamais,  General,  C3. 

Beauhamais,  Hortsnse,  married  to 
Louis  Bonaparte,  237. 

Beaulieu,  Gen.,  80,  83  ff.,  89. 

Becker,  General,  726. 

Belfort,  662. 

Belgium,  incorporation  of,  with 
France,  75;  session  of,  92  ff.,  100, 
108  f.,  180;  monasteries  in,  con- 
fiscated, 227,  649. 

Belgrade,  288  n. 

Belle-Alliance,  715  ff. 

Bellegarde,  Gen.,  204. 

"Bellerophon,"  Napoleon  embarks 
on,  727,  728. 

Belliard,  Gen.,  548. 

Belluno,  Duke  of,  see  Victor,  duchy 
of,  328. 

Benevento  bestowed  upon  Talley- 
rand, 329. 

Bennigsen,  Gen.,  advances  to  relief 
of  Kutusoff,  312;  commands  one 
of  the  Russian  armies,  367;  at.- 
tt>mpts  to  annihilate  Ney  on  the 
march,  371;  force  rescued  by 
Schamhorst  at  Prussian  Eylau, 
373;  decamps  after  l)attle,  371; 
slowness  of,  380:  at  l)attle  of 
Friedlaiul,  3X2.  383,  (  31 ,  635,  636. 

Bentinck,  Lord,  511  n. 

Berchtesgaden,  259,  261,  481. 


Berg,  duchy  of  Cleves  and,  338, 
346,  347;  duke  of,  508. 

Bergamo,  84,  109. 

Berlier,  221 ;    revises  code,  231  n. 

Berlin,  Napoleon  enters,  in  triumph, 
Oct.  27th,  1806,  361;  decree  of, 
Nov.  21st,  1806,  366,  581,  610. 

Beme,  120. 

Bernadotte,  general  of  revolutionary 
troops,  47;  marriage  of,  62;  rep- 
resentative of  France  at  Vienna, 
dismissed,  126,  159  f . ;  radcial, 
167;  appointed  marshal,  280;  in 
command,  284,  313;  at  Austerlitz, 
316;-  receives  Prince  of  Fonts 
Corvo,  329,  357,  368,  371,  372, 
419,  420,  469,  474;  chosen  heir 
to  Swedish  throne,  known  as 
Crown  Prince  Charles  John,  511; 
anxious  to  ingratiate  himself 
with  Sweden,  530,  531 ;  urges  Czar 
to  be  steadfast,  560,  594,  603; 
sends  public  letter  to  Napoleon 
renouncing  allegiance,  603,  619, 
623,  629,  630,  632  ff.,  662;  hopes 
of  French  throne,  654,  673. 

Beme,  treasure  of,  120. 

Berthier,  commanded  to  enter 
Rome,  119;  beside  Napoleon  on 
19th  Brumaire,  175;  minister  of 
war,  182;  secret  orders  of  Na- 
poleon to,  197;  as  witness  on 
Marengo,  202 ;  appointed  marshal, 
280;  Grand  Master  of  the  Hounds, 
280;  order  to  prepare  embarca- 
tion  at  Boulogne,  298;  arrests 
bearer  of  news  of  Russian  ad- 
vance, 316,  349,  350;  martial  law 
against  Nuremberg  publishers, 
352,  355,  375;  becomes  Prince  of 
Neuchatel,  400;  deserts  Napo- 
leon, 400,  446;  given  command 
of  German  army,  464;  goes  to 
Vienna,  490,  500,  508  n.,  525, 
549,  587,  639,  660,  669,  671,  679. 
BerthoUet,  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
124;  dispute  with  Napoleon, 
137;  accompanies  Napoleon  from 
Egvpt,  151. 
Bertrand,  Gen.,  311;  sent  to  Prus- 
sian king  witli  terms  for  separate 
tr(>atv  with  France,  377,  607,  608, 
631  n.,  ()37,  638,  680,  681,  688, 
708,  719  n.,  726,  729,  730. 


Index 


793 


I 


Bessi^res,  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
127;  appointed  marshal,  280; 
becomes  Duke  of  Istria,  400,  413, 
435,44(3,451. 

Beyle,  remark  on  Egyptian  expe- 
dition, 123. 

Beyme,  Prussian  minuter,  457. 

Bianchi,  6C0. 

Bianco,  canal,  109. 

Bible,  in  Napoleon's  library  as 
"politics,"  124. 

Bisamberg,  Austrian  armies  united 
at  the,  469,  475,477. 

Blake,  Gen.,  448;  defeated  at  Es- 
pinosa,  and  obliged  t-o  flee  to 
Asturias  to  escape  capture  by 
Soult,  448. 

Bliicher,  Gen.,  348,  353;  detach- 
ment of,  surrendered  after  heroic 
resistance,  361 ;  in  Pomerania, 
474,  586,  607,  612,  623,  624,  625; 
victory  over  Macdonald  at  Wahl- 
statt,  627,  629;  Bliicher  and 
Bemadotte  join  forces  and  evade 
Napoleon,  630  ff.,  640,  654  fT.; 
his  forces  called  by  Napoleon 
"the  best  aniiv  of  the  allies," 
658  fT.,  659,  660,  662  fT.,  709;  at 
Waterloo,  711  f . ;  advances  on 
Paris,  725,  731,737. 

Bologna,  surrendered  to  French,  84; 
Napoleon  incites  revolt  in,  89; 
cession  of,  94;  ceded  to  Venice, 
100,  423. 

Bon,  MUe.,  15. 

Bon,  in  invasion  of  Palestine,  139. 

Bonaparte,  family,  of  the  nobility, 
3 ;  financial  straits  of,  15. 

Bonaparte  [Buonaparte],  Carlo,  2; 
career  in  Ajaccio,  3;  adheres  to 
France,  4;  Napoleon's  feeling 
toward,  9. 

Bonaparte,  Caroline,  marries  Murat, 
248;  intriguing  against  Beau- 
hamais  family,  248. 

Bonaparte,  Elisa,  marries  Bac- 
ciochi,247;  salon  of,  248. 

Bonaparte,  Jerome,  in  United 
States,  247;  married  to  Katha- 
rine of  Wiirtemljerg,  336,  413; 
made  king,  336;  kingdom  of 
Westphalia  fonned  for,  387,  388, 
413;  receives  Hanover,  509,  524, 
538;    given    command    of    third 


division  of  the  Grand  .\miy  with 
\'andamme  as  ad\iser,  539;  do- 
posed  from  command  of  third 
amiv  and  returns  to  his  king- 
dom", 545,  593,  594,  604.  611,  621 ; 
leaves  Westphalia,  643;  appoint- 
ed to  house  of  peers,  708. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  studies  of,  5,  6; 
letter  of  Napoleon  about,  8; 
adopts  military  profession,  15;  in 
municipal  council,  26,  53;  niai^ 
ri:ige,  62;  French  en\oy  at  Lun^- 
vilie,  205  f. ;  republican  tendencies 
of,  246;  in  imperial  constitution, 
279;  appointed  Grand  Elector, 
280;  to  succeed  Napoleon  as 
Emperor,  279;  on  the  power  of 
Napoleon,  283  fT. ;  takes  posses- 
sion of  Naples,  328,  330,  344, 
345;  testifies  to  Napoleon's  in- 
tentions in  regard  to  India,  366  n. ; 
recognized  as  king  of  Naples,  388, 
422;  is  offered  Spanish  crown, 
430,  432;  enters  Madrid,  Julv, 
1808,  434;  withdraws  with  his 
army  to  northern  Spain,  435; 
flight  from  Madrid,  439,  441; 
threatens  to  resign,  450,  500,  501, 
509,  649,  667,  671;  authorizes 
capitulation  of  Paris,  672,  708, 
720,  726. 

Bonaparte,  Josephine  (Beauhar- 
nais),  birth  of,  63;  marriage  of, 
63;  imprisomiient,  64;  relations 
^NTth  Barras,  64,-  described,  65; 
impression  of,  on  Napoleon,  66; 
marriage  of,  68 ;  coquettish  nature 
of,  70  ff. ;  conduct  during  her 
husband's  absence,  71 ;  house  of, 
116;  on.Egyptian  expedition,  165; 
invites  Gohier  to  breakfast,  173; 
gives  audience,  244;  as  link  be- 
tween nobility  and  Napoleon's 
court.,  246;  talk  of  divorce  of, 
247;  pleads  for  d'Enghien,  273; 
religious  marriage  of,  292  f . ;  inti- 
mations of  divorce,  410;  marriage 
dissolved  Dec.  16th,  1809,  485; 
retires  to  Malmaison,  486,  489, 
496. 

Bonaparte,  Lsetitia,  4  fT.,  15;  es- 
capes from  Ajaccio,  36;  life  of, 
at  Napoleon's  palace,  248,  682, 
688. 


794 


Index 


Bonaparte,  Louis,  judgment  of,  by 
Napoleon,  27  f . ;  rescues  Napoleon, 
90;  to  succeed  Napoleon  as  Em- 
peror, 279;  appointed  Grand 
Elector,  280;  becomes  King  of 
Holland,  333,  357,  388;  declines 
Spanish  crown,  432  n. ;  abdicates 
Dutch  throne  in  favour  of  younger 
son,  508;  older  son  of,  made  Duke 
of  Berg,  March,  1809,  508,  509. 

Bonaparte,  Lucien,  character  for 
veracity,  14;  on  Josephine,  64; 
urged  by  Napoleon  to  marry 
Queen  of  Etruria,  70;  moderate 
repubhcan,  163,  165  n.,  167;  in- 
forms Napoleon  of  Sieyes'  plans, 
168;  president  of  Five  Hundred, 
171 ;  saves  the  day  for  Napoleon, 
177  ff. ;  minister  of  interior,  182; 
advises  appeal  to  nation,  240; 
republican  tendencies  of,  246; 
remark  of,  on  designs  of  Na- 
poleon, 251  n. ;  banishment  of, 
332;  declines  Spanish  crown,  430 
n. ,  488  n. ;  appointed  deputy, 
707  ff.,  723. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon  III.  omits  let- 
ter of  Napoleon  from  edition  of 
correspondence,  46 ;  connection 
with  d'Enghien  relics,  274  n., 
411  n.,  707,742. 

Bonaparte,  Pauline,  marries  Gen. 
Le  Clerc,  248;  marries  Prince 
Borghese,  248,  328,  682,  688. 

Bordeaux,  anny  at,  269;  English 
occupy,  669. 

Borissov,  engagement  at,  570  ff. 

Bormida,  164,  200  ff. 

Borodino,  battle  of,  554  ff. ;  repre- 
sented to  Czar  as  Russian  victory, 
555,  556,  565,  581. 

Bosnia,  111;  to  be  offered  to  Aus- 
tria, 288  n. 

Bosphonis,  135. 

I^ossuet,  497. 

Bottot,  172. 

Boulak,  132. 

Bourbons,  105,  106,  157,  166,  188; 
restoration  of,  208  n. ;  Czar  re- 
nounces support  of,  217;  no  hope 
for,  237;  guariuitcc  against  re- 
turn of,  243;  on,  273;  plot  against 
Nanoleon,  270,  327 ;  in  Sicilv,  51 1 , 
616,  646,  «;.5(\;    attitude  of  "popu- 


lace  toward  return  of,  672,  683, 
688  n.,  695,  700,  739. 

Bourrienne,  appointed  to  Stuttgart, 
33,  115,  121;  restrains  Napoleon, 
175,  179. 

Braganza,  House  of,  429. 

Brandenburg,  strengthened  by  secu- 
larization on  Rhine,  259,  610,  611. 

Braunau,  fortress  of,  340,  352; 
evacuated  by  French,  421 

Breisgau,  109,  207,  314. 

Brescio,  84. 

Breslau,  convention  signed  at,  601, 
603,  614. 

"Briars,"  the,  730,  737. 

Brienne,  militarv  school  at,  5,  7, 10, 
12,  280:  battle  of,  655. 

Brigido,  Colonel,  90. 

Brindisi,  occupied  by  French,  268. 

Brinkmann,  Swede,  letter  on  coup 
d'etat,  176,  179. 

Brittany,  royalist  province,  39; 
linen  industry  in,  225. 

Brixen,  98;  allotted  to  Grand  Duke 
of  Tuscan V,  261. 

de  Broglie,  485  n.,  620,  693,  705. 

Boulogne,  Napoleon  at,  283. 

Brueys,  Admiral,  at  Aboukir,  132. 

Bruix,  Admiral,  149;  confidant  of 
Napoleon,  172. 

Brumaire,  18th,  169  ff.,  241;  19th, 
173  ff.,  193. 

Brune,  General,  defeats  English  in 
Holland,  165;  succeeds  Mass6na 
in  Italy,  206;  appointed  marshal, 
280;  commands  armv  of  defence 
on  coast  of  North  Sea,  376,  708. 

Briinn,  310,  311,  314,  315,  316,  321, 
477. 

Brunswick,  Frederick  William, 
Duke  of,  473. 

Brunswick,  Charles,  Duke  of,  mis- 
sion to  St.  Petersburg,  344. 

Brunswick,  Duchy  of,  387. 

Bnmswick,  Duke  of,  Prussian  com- 
mander, 354;  at  Auerstadt,  359, 
360. 

Bruyere,  to  secure  Cattaro,  287. 

BulMia,  General,  469,  478  n.,  480, 
.597,  (')09,  610,  616,  632. 

Billow,  471,  .5S(),  614,  623,  627,  629, 
630,  (•).52,  663,  664,  715,  717,  718. 

Burgos,  conquest  of,  448;  proscrip- 
tion in,  450. 


Index 


795 


Busaco,  battle  at,  501. 

Buttafuoco,  General,  elected  to 
States- General,  24;  opposes  mili- 
tia, 25,  26. 

Buxhoewden,  General,  310,  367. 

Cabanis,  deputy,  168. 

Cabamis,  Madame,  64. 

Cadore,  Duke  of,  see  Champagny; 
duchy  of,  328. 

Cadoudal,  Georges,  leader  of  Ven- 
deans,  237 ;  in  plot  against  Napo- 
leon, 270  ff. ;  shot,  271;  testi- 
mony against  Bourbon  princes, 
271  ff. 

CaflfareUi,  136;  death  of,  143. 

Cairo,  revolt  against  Napoleon,  135; 
Napoleon  leaves,  143;  divan  of, 
147;  surrendered,  215. 

Calendar,  Gregorian,  replaces  Revo- 
lutionary, 293. 

Calonne,  21. 

Calvi,  2;  taken  by  English,  48. 

Cambac^res,  deputy,  57,  70;  min- 
ister of  justice,  182;  consul,  186; 
scheme  of,  for  code,  231 ;  advises 
Napoleon  against  coup  d'etat, 
238;  advises  appeal  to  nation, 
240;  advises  against  trial  of  d'En- 
ghien,  273;  appointed  grand  dig- 
nitary, 279,  374  n.,  394,  398; 
becomes  Duke  of  Pamia,  400  n., 
621,694. 

Cambronne,  689,  719  n. 

Campan,  Madame,  summoned  to 
court  of  Napoleon,  281. 

Campbell,  680,  687,  688. 

Campo  Foniiio,  peace  of,  72;  treaty 
of,  108  ff.,  116,  152,  195,  203  ff., 
207,  257,  259. 

Candia,  128. 

Cape  Corso,  48. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  102,  215. 

Caprara,  Cardinal  Legate,  concurs 
m  preparation  of  Napoleonic 
catechism,  409,  423. 

Cardinals,  Napoleon  demands  num- 
ber of  to  be  increased,  423. 

Camiola,  482. 

Camot,  member  of  Directory,  68, 
76,  83;  organizer  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary' anny,  86;  suspicions  of, 
concerning  Napoleon,  94;  in  Di- 
recton,-,   102;  dropped  from  Di- 


rectory, 104;  from  National  In- 
stitute, 115;  needed  in  France, 
161;  minister  of  war,  182;  at 
Talleyrand's  house,  203;  argues 
against  Empire,  278,  576,  695, 
700,  710,  723,  724. 

Caroline,  Queen  of  Naples,  286,  327, 
328,  511  n. 

Carrara,  99. 

Carteaux,  sent  against  rebels  at 
Avignon,  39;  captures  Marseilles, 
41  ff. 

Cassano,  162. 

Castanos,  General,  448. 

Castiglione,  Duke  of,  see  Augereau. 

Castiglione,  195,  280. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  654  n. ;  influences 
the  question  of  tenns  to  be  pro- 
posed to  Napoleon,  655,  665, 
686  n.,  687,  688,  698,  728. 

Catalonia,  500. 

Catechism, political,ofNapoleon,409. 

Catharine,  Queen  of  Westphalia,  see 
Wiirtemberg,  Katharine  of. 

Catharine  II.,  compared  to  Jose- 
phine, 70;  joins  Austria  and  Eng- 
land, 73;  death  of,  92;  her  policy 
renounced,  287. 

Cattaro,  Gulf  of,  to  be  delivered  to 
the  French,  287;  to  be  retained 
by  Russia,  288  n. ;  united  with 
kingdom  of  Italy,  323;  Russian 
squadron  ordered  to  occupy,  340, 
345,  346,  388. 

Caulaincourt,  Grand  Master  of 
Ceremonies,  280;  Duke  of 
Vicenza,  400;  succeeds  Saviuy 
as  Ambassador  Extraordinary  to 
St.  Petersburg,  417,  419  ff.;"  in- 
structed to  discuss  partition  of 
Turkey,  420,  433  n.,  487,  489  ff., 
516,  536,  549,  578,  610 ;  sent  by 
Napoleon  to  Alexander,  611,  613, 
615;  sent  to  Prague,  618;  in- 
stmeted  "to  conclude  a  peace 
that  would  be  glorious,"  619, 
620,  649,  651,  654,  655;  given 
"carte  blanche"  at  Chiitillon, 
657;  proposals  not  accepted,  661, 
662,  665,  666,  671,  673,  674,  675, 
677,  723, 724. 

Censorship  of  press,  403,  404,  522. 

Centralists,  faction  in  Switzerlandi 
256. 


796 


Index 


Ceremonies,  Grand  Master  of,  280. 

Ceva,  in  passage  over  the  Apen- 
nines, 79. 

Ceylon,  Holland  loses  to  England, 
215  ff. ;  promised  to  Batavian 
Republic,  268,  333. 

Chaboulon,  Fleury  de,  685,  687 

Chamber  of  Deputies,  constituted, 
21 ;  first  labours,  21  f . ;  in  new 
constitution,  167. 

Champagne,  gloom  of,  5. 

Champagny,  becomes  Duke  of  Ca- 
(iore,  400  n. ;  minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  414;  letter  of,  to  Caprara 
about  Papal  States,  423,  424; 
kept  in  ignorance  of  Treaty  of 
Fontainebleau,  428,  479,  481,  482, 
525. 

Champaubert,  battle  of,  658,  659. 

Champs  de  Mai,  692,  705  ff. 

Chandermagore,  acquired  by  Eng- 
land, 215. 

Chaptal,  221. 

Charente,  paper  industry  in,  225. 

Charlemagne,  model  of  Napoleon, 
95,  293;  Napoleon  holds  court 
in  palace  of,  289,  513,  515,  534, 
647. 

Charleroi,  711. 

Charles  [Carl]  John,  Crown  Prince 
of  Sweden,  see  Bernadotte. 

Charles,  Grand-duke  of  Baden,  643. 

Charles  IV.  disposes  of  Louisiana, 
268  fT.,  425,  429  ff. 

Charles  V.,  127. 

Charles  X.,  see  Duke  of  Artois. 

Charles  XIII.,  King  of  Sweden,  511, 
530. 

Charles,  Archduke  of  Austria,  suc- 
ceeds Wurmser  in  Italy,  88;  de- 
feats Jourdan,  88;  in  Italian 
campaign  of  1797,  97;  defeat  of, 
97  ff. ;  in  command  of  Austrians, 
160  IT. ;  in  southern  Germany,  194 ; 
retires  from  command,  196,  307; 
advances  toward  Vienna,  312, 
316;  endeavours  to  obtain  moder- 
ation of  terms  of  Treaty  of  Press- 
burg,  322,  377,  461 ;  sends  declarji- 
tion  of  war  to  Munich,  462; 
addresses  his  anny,  4()2-3,  468  ff. ; 
seeks  diplomatic  rather  than 
military  gain  from  Aspem,  472; 
fails  to  accept  conditions  of  Prus- 


sia, 473;  retires  from  command, 
479,  490. 

Charles  XIV.  of  Sweden,  62  n. 

Chateaubriand,  in  salon  of  Elisa 
Buonaparte,  248;  banished  and 
property  confiscated,  402. 

ChatiUon,  congress  at,  655,  661; 
negotiations  resumed,  662;  tenns 
demanded  by  allies  refused  by 
Napoleon,  662;  ultimatum  of 
allied  powers  at,  665,  666. 

Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  665,  666; 
renewed,  698. 

Chazal,  dropped  from  legislature, 
239. 

Chenier,  Joseph,  dropped  from  leg- 
islature, 239;  author  of  "Tibe- 
rius" and  "Cyrus,"  405. 

Cherasco,  80 

Chevreuse,  Mme.  de,  banished, 
402  n. 

Choiseul,  colonial  ideas  of ,  113. 

Christian  VII.,  King  of  Denmark, 
415. 

Church,  estates  of,  confiscated, 
73;  confusion  in  affairs  of, 
73  ff . ;  Directory  encroaches  on, 
93;  property  of,  confiscated,  202; 
peace  between  State  and,  213; 
States  of,  restored  to  Pius  VII., 
213. 

Cisalpine  Republic,  120;  vanishes, 
162;  re-established,  202;  in  treaty 
of  Lun^ville,  252;  replaced  by 
Italian  Republic,  253. 

Cividale,  97. 

Civita  Vecchia,  127. 

Clarke,  General,  on  religion  in 
France,  212;  guardian  to  King  of 
Tuscany,  255;  becomes  Duke  of 
Feltre,  400,  478,  614,  672. 

Clarv,  Julie,  62;  D6sir6e,  62. 

Clausewitz,  600,  606  n. 

Clerfayt,  77. 

Clergy,  standing  of,  in  France  be- 
fore Revolution,  19  ff.,  684,  689. 

Cleres,  320;  Cleves  and  Berg,  duchy 
of,  338,  346  f. 

Cobenzl,  negotiates  with  Napoleon, 
108,  115;  in  conference  with 
Neufchdteau,  160:  difficult  task 
at  Lun^ville,  205  if. ;  agrees  to 
treat  separately,  206;  on  exten- 
sion of   French   power  in  Italy, 


Index 


797 


Cobenzl — Continued. 

254;  remark  on  Napoleon's  real 
intentions,  291 ;  conipelled  to  re- 
sign in  favour  of  Stadion,  322; 
opinion  in  regard  to  Napoleon's 
purposes,  390. 

Cockbum,  Admiral,  730. 

"Code  complet,"  118. 

"Code  Napoleon,"  committee  on, 
230;  discussions  on,  231;  com- 
pletion of,  231  ff. ;  credit  of,  due  to 
Napoleon,  232,  238  n.,  396,  399. 

Coignet,  Captain,  on  Fort  Bard,  199; 
receiving  the  cross,  283;  remarks 
on  Napoleon's  appearance  at 
Berlin,  301,374,  679. 

Colli,  Piedmontese  general,  80. 

Colombier,  Madame  de,  12. 

Colonna  di  Cesare  Rocca,  24. 

Commissariat,  di  faculties  attend- 
ing,  in   Russian  campaign,   370. 

Commission,  on  constitution,   185. 

Committee  of  public  safety,  ap- 
pointment of,  38;  opposition  to, 
39;  undertakes  reconquest  of 
Corsica,  48;  party  of  peace  in, 
74;  edict  of,  quot-ed,  75;  con- 
firms nomination  of  Napoleon  as 
Brigadier-General,  44,  53;  edict 
of,  on  conquest,  75;  Siey^s  be- 
fore, 258. 

Commons,  House  of,  117. 

Communal  property,  sale  of,  590, 
645. 

('ommunes,  183. 

Concordat,  236,  239,  248. 

Concordat  of  Fontainebleau,  496, 
589,  647. 

Concordat-(1801),684. 

Cond^,  Frmce  de,  relations  with 
Pichegru,  104. 

Condorcet,  recommendations  of,  on 
public  instruction,  233 

Conegliano,  Duke  of,  see  Moncey, 
duchy  of,  328. 

Confederation  of  the  States  of  the 
Rhine,  336-339;  forces  of,  made 
useful  in  all  Napoleon  s  wars,  338, 
341,  345,  347,  349,  362,  377,  379, 
388,  394.  413,  440,  481,  506  n. ; 
Princes  of,  ordered  to  hold  con- 
tingents rcadv,  524;  changes  in, 
after  war  of '1809,  524;  threat- 
ened by  Napoleon,  525  ff. ;  sub- 


serviency of  Princes  of,  to  Na- 
poleon, .532,  .592,  .593,  594,  601, 
609,  615,  620,  (J33,  637;  con- 
federation of  tlie  Rhine  arrayed 
against  Napoleon,  ()43. 

Congress  of  Vienna,  685,  697  ff. 

Consalvi,  Cardinal,  sent  to  Paris, 
213;  favours  journey  of  Pius  VII. 
to  Paris,  292;  Menioires  of,  on 
conduct  of  Napoleon  to  Pope, 
292  n. ;  deposed  from  office,  331. 

Conscription  (ISIO),  4.59. 

Con.scription  of  181 1,  meets  with  no 
enthusiasm,  523;  "Law  of  Hos- 
tages" enforced  bvniilitarv,  524, 
584,  645. 

Conservatives,  in  Corsica,  24. 

Conservatives,  in  control  of  legis- 
lature, 102;  in  opposition,  158  ff. 

Conservatoire  des  arts  et  mdtiers, 
233. 

Constable,  in  empire,  279. 

Constant,  Benjamin,  leader  of 
Liberal  Constitutionists,  236;  op- 
poses Napoleon's  absolutism,  236; 
dropped  from  legislature,  239, 
692,  695ff.,702ff. 

Constantine,  Grand-duke,  383,  560. 

Constantinople,  Napoleon  requests 
mission  at,  59;  distance  from 
Ancona,  95,  135;  in  dispat<'h  of 
Directory,  142,  191 ;  Russia  aims 
to  conquer,  287 ;  Russia  to  retain, 
288  n. 

Constitution,  new,  formulated  1791, 
28;  Paoli  favours,  35;  discus- 
sion on,  in  Souper  de  Beau- 
caire,  41;  1795,  54;  provisions 
of  latter,  ,54 ;  provides  for  changes, 
69;  Directory  accused  of  violat- 
ing, 103;  of  year  III,  founded 
on  reason,  116  ff.,  1()3;  require- 
ment of,  for  age  of  Directors,  118, 
166;  of  Sieyes,  166;  of  year  III 
cited,  170  n. ;  proposed  new,  173; 
violated  by  Director}',  175;  pro- 
posed amendments  to,  179;  of 
Sieyes,  182,  183;  of  1795  abol- 
ishes municipalities,  223;  of  year 
VIII  guarantees  ownership  of 
land,  22S  n. ;  of  1791  promises 
new  code,  230;  provision  for 
system  of  pulilic  instniction,  233; 
forbids  return  of  Emigres,  236; 


798 


Index 


Constitution — Continued. 

provision  of,  for  renewal  in  mem- 
bership of  legislature,  238;  of 
1799  hated  by  Napoleon,  239;  of 
Empire,  278  ff. ;  bishops  taking 
oath  of,  restored  to  church,  293. 

Constitutional  jury  (Sieyes),  184; 
changed  into  Senate,  185. 

Consul,  first.  Napoleon  as,  226  fT., 
231,  236,  238,  239  f.,  244,  246,  249. 

Consular  Guard,  200. 

Consulate,  153  IT. ;  to  replace  Direc- 
tory, 167;  retains  principles  of 
Directory,  188  ff. ;  inherits  na- 
tional domains,  229;  fonnulates 
complete  civil  code,  231  ff. ;  last 
years  of,  242. 

Consuls,  appointment  of,  180; 
duties  of  (Sieyes),  184;  first  C. 
replaces  Grand  Elector,  184; 
duties  of  first  C,  184  ff. ;  salaries 
of,  186. 

Continent,  mastery  of,  by  Napoleon, 
262,  265  n. ;  to  be  tributary  to  Na- 
poleon, 267 ;  from  Italy  to  Arctic 
Ocean,  under  Napoleon's  influ- 
ence, 512,  530. 

Continental  System,  415,416,422, 
426,  482,  483,  503,  504,  510,  511, 
514,  516,  518,  519,  520,  580,  593, 
611,  611 n. 

Contraband  trade  developed,  505; 
edict  against,  from  Trianon,  505; 
edict  against,  from  Fontaine- 
bleau,  506. 

"Contrat  Social,  Le,"  quoted,  1; 
Napoleon's  admiration  for,  13. 

Convention,  requires  arrest  of  Paoli, 
35;  aims  to  crush  opposition, 
39  f. ;  as  centre  of  unity,  41;  ap- 
points Napoleon  brigadier-gen- 
eral, 43  f. ;  ignorant  of  Napole- 
on's Italian  plans,  45;  factions 
in,  53;  difficult  situation  of,  55, 
56;  arrangements  for  defence  of, 
57;  saved  by  Napoleon,  58;  ap- 
points Napoleon  commander-in- 
chief,  58;  incorporakis  Beljj;ium 
in  France,  75;  succeeded  by  Di- 
rectory, 76 ;  instructions  to  annies, 
97;  paper  money  under,  226;  de- 
cree on  public  debt,  227;  laws  of 
partial,  231 ;  work  of,  in  public 
instruction,  233. 


Corfu,  37,  102;  position  in  Adriatic, 
111;  Russian  troops  in,  286;  to 
be  retained  by  Russia,  288,  327, 
340;  ordered  fortified  by  Napo- 
leon, 418. 

Corps  Legislatif,  185;  filled  by 
Senate,  187  ;  membership  of, 
annually  renewed,  238;  in  im- 
perial constitution,  279,  392,  399, 
404,  591,  592,  650-652;  closed, 
652. 

"Correspondence  of  the  French 
Army  in  Egypt,"  142. 

Corsica,  war  of  independence  with 
Genoa,  1 ;  acquired  by  France 
2;  Napoleon  longs  to  free,  9 
"Lettres  sur  I'Histoire,  etc.,"  24 
two  parties  in,  24;  militia  in 
suggested  by  Bonaparte,  25 
made  French  province,  26;  ad- 
heres to  Paoli,  35  ff. ;  importance 
of,  in  Mediterranean,  95;  reoccu- 
pation  of,  111  ff. ;  incorporated 
with  France,  422. 

Corte,  birthplace  of  Napoleon,  4. 

Corvisart,  412. 

Council  of  State,  185;  Napoleon  ap- 
points members  of,  187;  value  of, 
to  Napoleon,  221 ;  discusses  new 
constitution,  228,  285;  counter- 
feit paper  money  used  by  Napo- 
leon in  Russia,  544. 

Coup  d'etat,  first,  30;  of  Directors, 
104;  in  Batavian  Republic,  119; 
Napoleon  thinks  of,  126;  of  19th 
Brumaire,  154  ff. ;  of  18th  Fructi- 
dor,  157;  impracticable,  163; 
considered,  166;  plan  of,  167; 
feared,  174;  cause  of,  seems  lost, 
177;  accomplished,  178  ff. ;  ap- 
proved by  France,  180;  cotem- 
poraneous  accounts  of,  181;  con- 
fidence inspired  by,  182,  192,  209; 
thought  of,  276. 

"Courier  d'Egypte,  Le,"  136. 

Coutumes,  law  of  northexn  France, 
230;  used  in  code,  231. 

Cretct,  221. 

Croatia,  Austrian  armaments  in, 
89;  troops  in  battle  of  Arcole,  90; 
to  be  offered  to  Austria,  288  n., 
482. 

Cromwell,  Napoleon  playing  part 
of,  174. 


Ind 


ex 


799 


Cuneo,  25. 

Curc^e,  278. 

(Cyprus,  150. 

Czartoryski,  Adam,  on  Oriental 
policy  ot'  Russia,  288  n. ;  to  Alex- 
ander I. ,  311)  n. ;  on  Russian  anny 
after  Austerlitz,  317;  testimony 
to  fidelity  of  Austrian  Emperor, 
320  n.,  517,  528,  500. 

Dalberg,  Archbishop  of  Mainz,  336; 
addresses  memorial  to  Napoleon, 
337;  plans  for  national  derman 
church  with,  337-8;  given  city 
and  territory  of  Frankfort  on  the 
Main,  338;  at  court  of  France  to 
solemnize  marriage  of  Jerome  to 
Katharine  of  Wiirtemberg,  413; 
territory  created  archduchy  of 
Frankfort,  52-4;  servility  and 
oppression  of,  524 ;  equips  troops 
for  Napoleon,  593,  092. 

Dalmatia,  Duke  of,  see  Soult;  of- 
fered to  Francis  II.,  90,  100,  321, 
323,  328,  340,  346,  377,  609. 

Damascus,  143, 144. 

Danton,  45,  49. 

Danube,  principalities  on,  "Code 
de  Commerce"  in  force  in,  232. 

Danzig,  Duke  of,  see  Lefebvre; 
communication  with,  cut  off  from 
allied  armies,  370,  375;  zealously 
besieged  by  French,  375;  brought 
to  yield,  Mav  24th,  1807,  379,  388, 
610,611,615,621. 

Dardanelles,  to  be  retained  by 
Russia,  288  n. 

Daru,  374  n.,  578,  631. 

Daunou,  dropped  from  legislature, 
239 

Davidovich,  87.  89,  91. 

Davout,  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
127;  secret  police  agency  under, 
246;  appoint.ed  marshal,  280;  in 
command,  284;  forces  Austrian 
corps  to  flight,  310,  311,  313; 
summoned  to  assist  at  Auster- 
litz, 316;  defeats  Brunswick  at 
Auerstadt,  359,  360,  367,  372-3; 
becomes  Duke  of  Auerstadt,  400, 
413;  remains  with  his  corps  in 
Poland  and  Prussia,  417;  or- 
dered back  into  Silesia  from  Po- 
land, 437;  in  Gennany,  459-462, 


464,  466-7,  469,  470;  storms 
heights  of  Markgraf-Neusiedl  and 
decides  battle  of  Wagram,  477, 
520,  .539;  appointed  to  command 
of  thirtl  army  to  succeed  Jerome, 
542;  hinders  junction  of  Bagra- 
tion  with  Barclay,  547;  sum- 
moned with  anny  to  Vitebsk, 
548,  552,  554  f.,  565;  his  corps 
disintK-grated,  566,  569,  573,  602, 
605,  ()()(),  606  n.,  614,  622,  623, 
694,  70S,  725. 

De  Bry,  224. 

Decade  Egyptienne,  La,  136. 

Decadi,  replaced  by  Sunday,  243. 

Decrds,  287,  410,  694. 

Defermon,  221. 

Dego,  48 

Delille,  402 

Denmark,  joins  Russia  against  Eng- 
land, 208;  takes  up  arms  against 
England,  214;  retires  from  league, 
216,  377,  389;  attacked  by  Eng- 
land, 415;  concludes  alliance  with 
France,  415;  proscribes  cargoes 
of  neutral  ships,  510;  hatred  tow- 
ard England,  510. 

Departments,  223. 

De  Pradt,  579,  681. 

Desaix,  sails  from  Civita  Vecch'a, 
127;  at  the  Pyramids,  131,  148: 
in  battle  of  .\boukir,  148;  in  com- 
mand in  Italy,  200;  real  victor 
at  Marengo,  201  ff.;  death  of, 
202. 

Descartes,  233. 

Desgenettes,  137. 

Diderot,  14. 

Diebitsch,  580. 

Diocletian,  Napoleon  compares  him- 
self with,  405. 

Direction  generale  de  1' Instruction 
publique,  234. 

Directory,  established,  .54;  Napo- 
leon friend  of  66;  appoints  .Napo- 
leon commander-in-chief  of  Army 
of  Italy,  68;  endangered,  78; 
signs  treaty  with  Sardinia,  82; 
yields  to  Napoleon,  83;  charge  to 
Napoleon  on  spoils  of  war,  84 ; 
mistake  with  regard  to  the 
church,  94;  system  of,  95;  hat^d 
for  war  policy,  9A  ;  supported  by 
Napoleon,  96,  103  ff. ;  attempted 


8oo 


Index 


Directory — Continued. 

peace  with  Austria,  98;  ratifies 
treaty  of  Leoben,  100;  report  of 
Napoleon  to,  102;  elections  un- 
favourable to,  102;  accused  of 
prolonging  war,  103;  new,  com- 
plies with  Napoleon's  wishes,  105; 
plans  for  Italy,  107[;  anxiety  of, 
concerning  Napoleon,  11-4;  Bar- 
ras,  chief  of,  115;  welcome  of,  to 
Napoleon,  115;  age  requirement 
of,  118,  119;  grants  request  of 
Swiss  in  Vaud,  120;  decides  on 
expedition  to  Orient,  122;  Napo- 
leon rival  of,  123;  postpones  in- 
vasion of  England,  134;  despatch 
from,  141  ff. ;  letter  of,  recalling 
Napoleon  quoted,  149;  changes 
in,  155;  tyranical  course  of,  158; 
violates  constitution,  158;  un- 
prepared for  war,  161 ;  loses  pres- 
tige, 162  ff.;  accused  of  "deport- 
ing" Napoleon,  165;  to  be  re- 
placed by  Consuls,  167,  170; 
action  of,  arrested,  172;  ceases  to 
exist,  173,  180,  188;  anarchy  of, 
190  n. ;  concerns  itself  with  India, 
191;  Gemian  policy  of,  191;  con- 
trol of,  over  coast,  191 ;  financial 
method,  193;  on  war  footing 
with  United  States,  209;  makes 
Rome  and  Naples  republics,  211; 
attitude  toward  Papacy,  212; 
neglects  religious  wants  of  the 
people,  212;  causes  death  of  as 
many  as  Napoleon,  220;  reforms 
police  force,  225;  arbitrary  finan- 
cial course  of,  226 ;  sale  of  govern- 
ment lands  by,  227;  resorts  to 
forced  loans,  228;  national  do- 
mains left  by,  229;  neglects  "  con- 
servatoire," 233  f. ;  law  on  return 
of  Emigres  of,  235;  importance 
of  Helvetia  to,  256;  policy  of, 
continued,  287,  349,  351,  493, 
505  n.,  537. 

Divan,  of  Cairo,  147. 

DoUtz,  636. 

Donmiartin,  General,  143. 

Dora,  Baltea,  199. 

Domberg,  472. 

Douai,  Merlin  de,  104. 

Drehsa,  611. 

Dresden,     536;    Napoleon    enters, 


May  8th,  608,  609,  611 ;  battle  of, 
624-7. 

Drissa,  545. 

Drouot,  General,  of  artillery,  641, 
674,  680,  708,  710. 

Duben,  634. 

Dubois  de  Cranc6,  commissioner 
sent  against  Lyons,  39;  reforms 
organization  of  anny,  46;  or- 
ganizer of  revolutionary  army, 
86. 

Duchatel,  221. 

Ducos,  see  Roger-Ducos. 

Dufresne,  in  Napoleon's  council  of 
state,  221. 

Dugommier,  replaces  Carteaux,  42. 

Dugua,  General,  in  Egyptian  ex- 
pedition, 127;  at  the  Pj'ramids, 
132. 

Dumouriez,  agent  of  Royalists, 
270 ;   emissary  of  England,  272. 

Duphot,  General,  death  of,  119. 

Dupont,  General,  429,  435. 

Duroc,  sent  to  Berlin,  209;  sent  to 
St.  Petersburg,  215;  secret  police 
agency  under,  246 ;  marshal  of  the 
palace,  280,  373,  383;  becomes 
Duke  of  Triuli,  400, 428,  537, 549; 
killed  at  Bautzen,  613,  622  n. 

Diirmstein,  battle  of,  310. 

Duteil,  General,  in  command  of 
artillery,  42. 

Ebelsberg,  battle  of,  469. 

Ecclesiastical  schools  done  away 
with,  406. 

Eckmiihl,  battle  of,  467. 

Edelsheim,  336. 

Eggenwald,  100. 

Egypt,  expedition  to,  71,  95,  111 
ff.,  166;  Napoleon's  designs  on, 
113;  significance  of  expedition  to, 
123;  Alexander  in,  124  ff. ;  under 
Mamelukes,  130;  sufferings  of 
French  army  in,  130;  as  vantage- 
ground  against  England,  133; 
voyage  from,  154;  Napoleon's 
work  in,  181  ff.,  193;  blockade 
of,  by  Eng.,  194;  conquest  of,  by 
England,  215;  Napoleon's  ex- 
pedition to,  262;  report  of 
S6bastiani  on,  266;  Davout 
in,  280;  in  Napoleon's  schemes, 
291. 


Index 


8oi 


Egyptian  troops  reviewed  at  Lyons, 
253. 

Eichsfeld,  260  n. 

Eichstadt,  2(Jl,  314. 

El  Arisch,  137;  garrison  of,  sur- 
renders, 139;  massacre  of  garri- 
son   140  ff. 

Elba  ceded  to  France,  210;  de- 
clared French  province,  255;  in- 
corporated with  France,  422; 
assigned  to  Napoleon,  677. 

Elbe,  mouth  of,  191 ;  mouth  of, 
closed  to  England,  268. 

Elchingen,  Duke  of,  see  Ney; 
victory   of   Ney   at,  306. 

Elliot,  Sir  Gilbert,  48. 

Enibabeh,  131. 

Emigres,  683,  684,  685,  689,  692. 

Emperor  of  the  Gauls,  proposed 
title  of  Napoleon,  275. 

Emperor,  Napoleon  becomes,  279; 
in  new  constitution,  279. 

Engen,  199. 

d'Enghien,  Prince,  arrest  of,  272; 
trial  and  execution  of,  273  ff. ; 
excluded  from  Austria,  289;  exe- 
cution of,  353,  741. 

England,  revolution  in,  21 ;  at  war 
with  France,  35;  Paoli  in,  35; 
troops  of,  at  siege  of  Toulon,  43 ; 
influence  of,  in  Corsica,  48;  co- 
alition with  Russia  and  Austria, 
73;  subsidizes  Austrian  forces  in 
Gennany,  77;  withdraws  fleet 
from  Naples,  91 ;  frustrates  peace 
with  Austria,  98;  disappoints 
Austria,  99;  comnumication  of, 
with  India,  111 ;  invasion  of,  114; 
constitution  of,  characterized  by 
Napoleon,  117;  invasion  of,  121 
ff.,  128,  134;  revolt  of  Irish 
against,  134;  Tippo  Sahib  enemy 
of,  138;  alliance  of,  with  Russia, 
160;  defeated  in  Holland,  1G5;  an- 
tagonist of  France,  190;  King  of. 
Napoleon  writes  to,  194;  claims 
of,  to  be  isolated  from  her  allies, 
205;  seizes  Malta,  208;  deserted 
by  Russia,  208;  Napoleon  aims 
at  maritime  supremacy  of,  208  ff. ; 
Portugal  to  desert,  210;  ports  of 
Portugal  and  Naples  closed  to, 
210  ff. ;  European  ports  closed 
to,  from  Holland  to  Sicilj',  213; 


allies  take  up  arms  agairLst,  214; 
proposals  of  peace,  214;  acquisi- 
tions of,  215;  seeks  reconciliation 
in  treatv  of  Amiens  with  France, 
216;  with  Alexander  I.,  215; 
peace  with  France  of,  216  ff. ; 
hostile  to  France,  249;  aid  of, 
asked  from  Switzerland,  257; 
European  ports  closed  to,  262; 
opposes  ascendency  of  France, 
262;  peace  with,  endangered,  264; 
freedom  of  press  in,  265;  threat- 
ened invasion  of,  265;  forced  by 
Napoleon    to   declare   war,    267; 

Elans  of  Napoleon  against,  267; 
lockade  and  threatened  inva- 
sion of,  269;  pensions  d'Enghien, 
272;  complicity  of,  in  plot  against 
Napoleon,  271;  conditions  pro- 
posed by  Czar  to,  287;  hostilities 
of,  with  France,  288;  fails  to  win 
over  Austria,  289 ;  uneasiness  over 
Napoleon's  victories,  343;  nego- 
tiations with  Napoleon,  344—5; 
announces  plan  to  send  forces  to 
coast  of  North  Sea,  376;  Berlin- 
decree  blockades,  366;  refuses 
subsidies  to  Russia,  384;  attacks 
and  carries  off  Danish  fleet,  415; 
learns  of  contents  of  Treaty  of 
Tilsit,  415;  Russia  declares  war 
against,  415;  affords  sj-mpathy 
to  Spain,  435;  lands  troops  in 
Portugal,  435;  obtains  mastery 
in  Portugal,  436;  sends  force  to 
Portugal  under  Sir  John  Moore, 
449;  sends  new  anny  to  Spain 
under  Wellesley,  479;  troops  of, 
kept  from  Antwerp,  507;  sends 
expedition  against  Naples,  51 1 ; 
takes  possession  of  most  Euro- 
pean colonies,  512;  distressed 
manufacturers  of,  513,  514,  515, 
519,  521;  threatens  Turkey,  531; 
at  war  with  United  States,  581 ; 
secures  peaceful  settlement  with 
Russia,  581 ;  signs  treaty  with 
Sweden  and  Prussia,  603,  609- 
611,  616,  637,  647,  665. 

Enza,  99. 

Erfurt,  interN-iew  at,  439-444,  447, 
456,  519. 

d'Eril,  Melzi,  chosen  president 
of   Cisalpine  Republic,   253;  re- 


8o2 


Index 


d '  Eril — Continued. 

ports  Napoleon's  policy  in  Italy, 
291. 

Erzermn,  Pasha  of,  378. 

Espinar,  Pass  of,  452. 

Essen,  260  n.,  347. 

Essen,  General,  312. 

Essling,  battle  of,  470. 

Etruria,  Queen  of,  70. 

Etruria,  kingdom  of,  name  for  Tus- 
cany, 210;  queen  of.  Napoleon 
wants  Lucien  to  marry,  247; 
dowager  queen  of,  ordered  to 
surrender  Tuscany  to  France  and 
receive  compensation  in  Portugal, 
422,  428. 

Ettenheim,  272. 

Europe,  Federation  in,  76;  balance 
of  power  in,  107;  French  mas- 
tery of,  114;  ruling  ideas  in,  116; 
ports  of,  closed  to  England,  190; 
Napoleon  seeks  mastery  of,  194; 
field  of  Napoleon's  designs,  216; 
future  of,  detennined  by  secret 
compact  of  France  and  Russia, 
217;  peace  in,  217;  political  sys- 
tem of,  impaired,  218;  France  to 
set  up  federation  in,  218;  peace 
in,  a  mere  halting-place,  219;  war 
declared  on,  by  France,  226; 
Napoleon  directs  political  course 
of,  248;  war  and  peace  in,  249; 
under  a  single  head,  250;  need  of 
recuperation  in,  251 ;  Napoleon  to 
change  the  face  of,  266;  nations 
of,  oppose  united  resistance  to 
Napoleon,   622;  battle  of,  372-5. 

Eylau,  battle  of,  372-5,  381,  556. 

Falkenstein,  109. 

Federalists,  in  Switzerland,  256. 

Feldkirch,  161. 

Fellaheen  in  Egypt,  129. 

Feltre,  Duke  of,  see  Clarke;  duchy 
of,  328. 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  in  command, 
1805,  303;  assembles  a  corps  in 
Bohemia,  312,  461 ;  enters  War- 
saw, 464,  468,  472,  487,  488  n. 

Ferdinand  IV.  of  Naples,  treaty 
with  Napoleon,  211. 

Ferdinand  [Bourbon],  King  of 
Naples,  345,  346,  425. 

Ferdinand,  Crown  Prince  of  Spain, 


427,  429,  430;  king,  431;  confined 
within  boundaries  of  France,  434; 
alone  recognized  as  king  by 
Spaniards,  435,  498,  646. 

F6re  Champenoise,  671. 

Ferrara,  surrendered  to  French,  84, 
94;  ceded  to  Venice,  100,  424. 

Fesch,  imcle  of  Napoleon,  5;  keeps 
Napoleon  informed  on  Corsica, 
25;  appointed  cardinal,  248;  ap- 
pointed grand  almoner,  280; 
solemnizes  religious  marriage  of 
Napoleon  and  Josephine,  293. 
Napoleon's  representative  at  Pa- 
pal court,  330,  337,  588,  708,  735. 

Feuillants  restrain  Jacobins,  29. 

Fezensac,  374,  446,  540  n. 

Fichte,  addresses,  352. 

Fieore,  578. 

Filangieri,  13. 

Finances,  administration  of,  396-7. 

Finkenstein,  castle  of,  375. 

Finland,  obstacle  to  agreement  be- 
tween Russia  and  Sweden,  385, 
416,  419,  486;  faUs  to  Russia,  510, 
530,  540. 

"Five  Hundred,  Council  of,"  54,  96; 
majority  of  Moderates  in,  102, 
158;  coalition  in,  163,  167,  170; 
Radicals  in,  173  f. ;  Napoleon  at 
session  of,  176;  session  broken  up 
by  soldiers,  178. 

Flahault,  General,  672. 

Flanders,  flatboats,  of,  265. 

Fleurus,  battle  of,  46;  victory  at, 
280. 

Floreal  22d,  159,  175. 

Florence,  treaty  of,  211. 

Fontainebleau,  Napoleon  at,  IT; 
court  of  France  at,  414;  secret 
treaty  between  France  and  Spain 
signed  at,  Oct.  27th,  1807,  428; 
decree  issued  at,  506;  the  Pope 
at,  588;  new  concordat  signed 
at,  Jan.  25th,  1813,  589,  647,  672; 
treaty  of,  677. 

Fontana  Fredda,  464. 

Fontanes,  248;  subjects  talents  to 
Napoleon's  desires,  402. 

Forfait,  182. 

Fort  Carr6,  46. 

P'ort  I'Eguillette,  taken  by  Napo- 
leon, 43. 

Fort  St.  Nicholas,  44. 


Index 


803 


FoucW,  Minister  of  Police,  164,  182; 
at  Talleyrand's  house,  203,  222; 
leams  of  plot  to  assassinate  Na- 
poleon, 237;  deposed  from  office, 
246;  advises  trial  of  d'Enghien, 
273;  seeks  to  recover  his  office, 
276;  included  in  imperial  govern- 
ment, 278;  becomes  Duke  of 
Otranto,  400  n. ;  induces  nobility 
to  be  presented  at  court,  412-13, 
453,  499,  620,  695,  699,  706, 
722-5. 

Fourcroy,  in  Napoleon's  Council  of 
State.  221 ;  plan  of  education  of, 
rejected  by  Napoleon,  235;  re- 
port made  by,  407. 

Fox,  meets  Napoleon,  217;  apprises 
Napoleon  of  conspiracy  against 
his  life,  344;  withdraws  from 
agreements  with  Napoleon,  345; 
death  of,  345. 

France,  int^^rposes  between  Grenoa 
and  Corsica,  2;  takes  Corsica  as 
security,  2;  despotic  tendency  of 
government  in,  19;  failure  of 
harvests  in,  23 ;  favours  peace,  96; 
on  eve  of  war,  30;  declares  war 
against  Austria,  31 ;  at  war  with 
England,  35;  plunged  into  war 
with  Europe,  38;  allied  foes  of, 
43;  treaty  of,  with  Prussia,  50; 
people  of,  to  vote  on  constitution, 
55;  disturbance  of  internal  af- 
fairs in,  73;  question  of  boun- 
daries of,  74;  incorporation 
of  Belgium  with,  75;  policy 
of  foreign  concjuest,  75;  treaty 
with  Sardinia,  81 ;  effect  of 
Napoleon's     victories     in,     81; 

Seace  with  Wiirtemberg  and 
laden,  88;  acquires  Belgium, 
100,  120;  treaty  with  Austria, 
108;  Rheni.sh  boimdary,  109;  re- 
tains portion  of  "S'enetian  terri- 
tory, 111;  treaty  with  Genoa,  112; 
masters'  of,  on  Mediterranean, 
113;  alliance  of,  with  Batavian 
Republic,  119;  communication 
of,  with  Lombardy,  120;  ineffi- 
ciency of  navy  of,  121 ;  fleet  of,  in 
Egyptian  expedition,  124;  inter- 
ference of,  in  Eastern  question, 
125 ;  Turkey  declares  war  against, 
135;  at  war  with   Naples^   138; 


Switzerland  ally  of,  142;  inter- 
course with,  difficult,  142;  at  war 
with  Naples  and  Sardinia,  142; 
disasters  to,  in  Europe,  149,  157 
fT. ;  hopes  of,  fastened  on  Napo- 
leon, 157;  ascendency  of,  in  Italy, 
160;  declares  war  on  Austria, 
160;  losses  of,  in  Italy,  ifSl  ff. ; 
desire  for  peace  in,  165;  pivot  of 
her  destinies,  168;  approves  coup 
d'etat,  180;  notables  of,  183; 
approval  of  new  constitution, 
186;  love  of  equality,  188;  finan- 
cial distress  in,  189;  republics  de- 
pendent on,  189;  England  an- 
tagonist of,  190;  tragedy  of 
history  of,  192;  finn  position  of 
Napoleon  in,  203;  negotiations 
with  Austria  at  Lun^ville,  205  ff. ; 
partition  of  Italy,  206;  suprem- 
acy of,  on  Continent,  209;  Italian 
dependencies  of,  210;  influence 
of,  in  Spain,  210;  becomes  Catho- 
lic again,  212 ;  clamours  for  peace, 
214;  thwarted  on  Peninsula,  216; 
peace  with  England,  216;  treaty 
of,  with  Russia  on  Emigres,  216; 
treaty  of,  with  Turkey,  and  lia- 
varia,  217;  enthusiasm  in,  for 
Napoleon  as  founder  of  peace, 
217;  supremacy  of,  feared,  217; 
to  set  up  federation  in  Europe, 
218;  recognizes  no  boundaries, 
219;  reorganizing  of,  221;  finan- 
cial reorganization  of,  226  ff. ; 
public  debt  of,  227  ff. ;  survey  of 
real  estate  in,  228 ;  bank  of,  estab- 
lished, 229;  credit  of,  230;  diver- 
sity of  law  in,  before  Revolution, 
230;  changes  in,  in  law  due  to 
Revolution,  231;  "Code  Napo- 
leon" in,  232;  fimigr^s  flocking 
back  to,  236;  vote  on  consulship 
for  life,  239;  lost  \agour  restored 
to,  241 ;  effect  in,  of  peace  of  1802, 
242;  Europe  hostile  to,  249; 
hegemony  of,  250;  constitution 
of,  model  for  dependent  repub- 
lics, 251 ;  Ell)a  incorporated  with, 
255;  Switzerland  submissive  to, 
257 ;  Alps  and  Rhine  as  bounda- 
ries of,  257;  mortmain  abolished 
in,  258;  to  protect  Rhenish  states, 
259;  to  decide  Gennan  question, 


8o4 


Ind 


ex 


France — Continued. 

260;  treaty  with  Wiirtemberg, 
260;  ports  of,  closed  to  England, 
262;  ascendency  of,  opposed  by 
England,  262;  failure  of,  in  San 
Domingo  and  Louisiana,  264; 
peace  of,  with  England  endanger- 
ed, ^64 ;  war  declared  with  Eng- 
land, 267;  forms  league  against 
England,  268;  horror  in,  at  death 
of  d'Enghien,  274;  effect  of  bold 
policy  in,  275;  receives  new  con- 
stitution, 278 ;  vote  of,  on  heredi- 
tability of  Empire,  281 ;  distinc- 
tion between  "State"  of,  and 
Empire,  281 ;  losses  in  commerce 
of,  284;  sacrifices  of,  285;  con- 
ditions proposed  by  Czar  to,  287 ; 
rupture  of,  with  Russia,  288 ;  pub- 
lic opinion  in,  391 ;  material  situ- 
ation of,  398;  Tuscany,  Corsica, 
and  Elbe  declared  constituent 
parts  of.  May  30th,  1808,  422; 
financial  situation  of,  459-60; 
people  of,  inwardly  discontented 
with  Napoleon,  483;  people  of, 
desire  Napoleon  to  acquire  direct 
heir  through  new  marriage,  484; 
rejoicing  among  people  of,  at 
new  marriage,  491 ;  patriotic 
feeling  in,  against  ambition  of 
Napoleon,  494;  financial  situa- 
tion of,  514;  compared  with 
Austria,  Russia,  and  England, 
513;  honours  conferred  in,  on 
scholars  and  artists,  523;  ap- 
proved at  first  of  expedition  to 
Russia,  576;  good-will  of  the 
people  of,  necessary  to  suc- 
cess, 585,  587;  financial  situa- 
tion of,  589,  590;  public  sentiment 
of,  clamours  for  peace,  614;  en- 
thusiasm for  Napoleon  gone  from, 
645;  financial  condition  of,  de- 
plorable, 645;  mass  of  people  of, 
still  imperialists,  646;  resists  con- 
scriptions, 646;  longs  for  peace, 
648;  attempt  by  Napoleon  to 
rouse  old  Revolutionary  spirit 
in,  650;  internal  crisis  in,  avoided 
only  through  external  danger, 
652;  popular  enthusiasm  for  Na- 
poleon revives,  663;  attitude  of 
peasants  in,  670. 


Francis  II.  [of  Holy  Roman  Empire], 
averse  to  peace,  72;  orders  relief 
of  Mantua,  87;  prejudice  against 
Thugut,  92;  dominion  of,  in  Italy, 
99;  consents  to  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio,  109,  116;  reply  of,  to 
Napoleon's  letter  on  peace,  203; 
asks  for  extension  of  truce,  204; 
cedes  Frickthal,  255;  protests 
division  of  spoils,  261 ;  attitude  of, 
on  case  of  d'Enghien,  289;  de- 
cides to  enter  coalition,  296,  311, 
314,316,319,322-3. 

Francis  I.  renounces  Imperial 
Crown  of  Germany,  339  ff.  (hence- 
forward called  Francis  I.  of 
Austria),  349,  378,  457,  469,  471, 
479,  480,  481,  482,  489,  517,  518, 
527  f.,  532,  543,  596,  602,  604, 
609,  610,  615,  617  n.,  623,  632, 
636,  643,  648,  649,  652,  665, 
666,  672,  677. 

Franconia,  88. 

Frankfort,  granted  to  Dalberg,  338; 
re-created  archduchy  of  Frank- 
fort, 524;  ultimatum  at,  648, 
650  ff. ;  "  old  boundaries  "  basis, 
662,  665. 

Frederick  Augustus  [King  of  Sax- 
ony], 579,  602,  609;  made  pris- 
oner by  allies,  640,  643. 

Frederick  the  Great,  military  theory 
of,  86,  356;  Napoleon  beside  the 
tomb  of,  361. 

Frederick,  Prince  Regent  of  Den- 
mark, alliance  with  France,  415, 
510. 

Frederick  I.,  King  of  Wiirtemberg, 
643. 

Frederick  William  III.,  consents  to 
mediate  between  France  and  Rus- 
sia, 209;  indemnified  by  treaty 
with  France,  260;  remains  neutral, 
286,  288;  writes  to  Czar  asking 
for  support,  348;  orders  to  mo- 
bilize the  anny  issued  by,  Aug. 
9th,  1806,  348;  considers  abdi- 
cating the  throne,  354;  orders 
retreat  to  Weimar,  360;  refuses 
terms  offered  by  Napoleon,  377; 
granted  interview  with  Napo- 
leon as  prot/'ge  of  Alexander, 
June  2(it.li,  1S07,  38(5;  visits  Czar, 
455;  national  feeling  not  repre- 


Index 


805 


Frederick  William  TIL — Continued. 
sented  by,  457;  again  thinks  of 
abdicating,  457;  condemns  war- 
like uprising  in  Prussia,  472; 
consents  to  secret  preparations 
for  war,  473;  alliance  with 
Austria,  480,  526,  529,  532,  580, 
594,  595.  59<),  598,  599,  (500,  601. 
602,  603,  610,  619,  643,  661,  666; 
enters  Paris,  672. 

Fr^jus,  680. 

Fr^Ton,  43,  49,  50,  58,  211  n. 

Frickthal,  109,  120;  ceded  to  Napo- 
leon, 255. 

Friedrichshamm,  treaty  of,  486. 

Friedland,  battle  of,  June  14th, 
1807,  382,  611. 

Friesland,  323. 

Frische  Haff,  370. 

Friuli,  Duke  of,  see  Duroc. 

Friuli,  89,  92;  duchy  of,  328. 

Frondeurs,  692. 

Fructidor  ISth,  104,  105,  157,  159, 
175,  212,  278. 

Fuent<>s  de  Onoro,  defeat  of  Soult 
at,  502. 

Fulda,  524. 

Fulton,  submits  project  for  steam- 
boat, 284. 

Gaeta,  328. 

Gagem,  Baron  von,  375. 

Galicia,  Russian  troops  in,  160,  364, 
481,482,  528,  530,  661  n. 

Gallo,  99,  101. 

Garda,  86. 

Gaudin,  minister  of  finance,  182, 
228  n.,  432  n.,  694  n. 

Gaza,  taken  by  French,  139 ;  march 
through,  146. 

Gemblou.x,  714. 

Genoa,  war  with  Corsica,  1 ;  ad- 
heres to  France  in  Seven  Years' 
War,  2 :  in  operations  of  the  Armv 
of  Italy,  45;  Tilly  at,  46;  pro- 
ceedings of  Napoleon  against, 
112;  treaty  of,  with  France, 
112,  120;  anny  sails  from,  127; 
retained  by  French,  197;  be- 
sieged by  btt,  198;  taken  by 
Austrians,  200;  government  of, 
changed,  255;  obliged  to  furnish 
sailors,  269;  Mass«^'na  at,  280, 
657. 


Gentili,  sent  to  Ionian  Isles,  111; 
occupies  Corsica,  112. 

Gentz,  answers  Haut^^rive's  pam- 
phlet on  state  of  Europe,  218;  on 
Napoleon's  Empire  as  successor 
to  Revolution,  290,  353;  Czar  im- 
pressed bv  representations  of, 
384,  4()3,  653  n. 

George  III.  of  England,  invites 
Paoli,  48;  offers  ultimatum  to 
Napoleon,  267,  418. 

G<:'rard,  653,  658,   660,  674,  710. 

Gennan  Empire,  constitution  of, 
imitated  by  Napoleon,  250;  sec- 
ularization endangers,  258;  in- 
terests of  Austria  great-er  than 
those  of,  259;  peace  of,  violat^ed, 
286;  concern  of  all  Europe,  260; 
princes  of,  negotiate  with  Na- 
poleon, 260;  loss  of  their  tem- 
poral power,  261 ;  sway  of  Na- 
poleon over,  291 ;  comes  to  an 
end,  Aug.  6th,  1800,  through 
resignation  of  Francis  II. ,  340.  • 

Germany,  republican  propaganda 
in,  76,  159;  policy  of  Napoleon 
toward,  191 ;  French  influence  in, 
207;  Austria  excluded  from,  209; 
Russia  and  France  agree  to  de- 
cide questions  in,  217;  reac- 
tion of  people  against  Napo- 
leonic system,  351;  hatred  of, 
for  French  fostered  by  murder 
of  Palm,  353;  principalities  and 
dukedoms  mediatized,  338,  349, 
350,  351,  352,  353,  418;  smoul- 
dering fires  of  resistance  be- 
coming perceptible  in,  436;  re- 
generation of,  437,  438,  457,  458, 
459,  460;  Napoleon's  opinion  of, 
537,  577;  national  movement 
of,  600;  plans  for  liberation  of, 
601 ;  awakening  of  national  feel- 
ing in,  643. 

"Gennany  in  her  Deep  Abase- 
ment," 352. 

Germany,  North,  occupation  of, 
348,  349,  420;  princes  of,  4()1. 
469,  494,  521,  601. 

Germany,  South,  princes  of,  fol- 
low Napoleon's  call  to  arms. 
334 ;  Napoleon's  plans  to  secur.' 
fidelity  of,  by  marriage  witli 
his  own    family,    335;    military 


8o6 


Index 


Germany,  South — Continued. 
occupation    of,    341,    347,    351, 
356. 

Gibraltar,  191,  418. 

Girondists,  government  of,  33;  de- 
feated, 38;  plunge  Europe  into 
war,  38;  fugitives  incite  oppo- 
sition, 39;  in  "Le  Souper  de 
Beaucaire,"  41 ;  recalled,  49;  on 
expansion,  76;  ideal  of  liberty, 
95;  originate  Gennan  policy  of 
Napoleon,  191 ;  in  Napoleon's 
Council  of  State,  221. 

Gitschin,  agreement  of,  623. 

Gneisenau,  comments  on  cowardly 
yielding  of  Prussian  commanders, 
361 ;  writes  to  Stein  of  excellence 
of  Prussian  army,  623;  chief  of 
staff  of  Bliicher,  628,  652,  659, 
663  n. 

Goding,  317. 

Godoy,  "Prince  of  the  Peace,"  210; 
considers  resistance  to  Napoleon, 
269,  425 ;  subservient  to  France, 
425,  427,  428,  430,  434. 

Goerz,  97. 

Goethe,  his  "Werther"  read  by 
Napoleon,  16;  in  Napoleon's 
libiary,  124;  admitted  to  audi- 
ence with  Napoleon,  443 ;  repre- 
sentations of  Faust  forbidden, 
522,  533. 

Gohier,  in  Directory,  163;  on  age 
requirement,  166;  made  power- 
less, 173. 

Golo,  battle  at,  2. 

Goltz,  Count,  4.55. 

Golymin,  engagement  at,  368. 

Gorz,  482. 

Gourgaud,  General,  726,  729,  731, 
735  n.,  738. 

Grand  Elector,  in  constitution  of 
Sieyes,  183;   in  Empire,  279. 

Graudenz,  fortress  of,  383. 

Grawert,  General,  539;  succeeded 
by  Yorck,  586. 

"Great  Book  of  the  Public  Debt," 
227. 

Great  Council,  in  Venice,  forced  to 
abdicate,  101. 

Greece,  116;  "Code  de  Commerce" 
in,  232. 

Greeks,  Napoleon  opens  relations 
T,ith,  111. 


Gregorian  Calendar,  re-established, 
293. 

Grenier,  599,  724. 

Grenville,  Lord,  344. 

Grisons,  rule  of,  in  Switzerland,  120; 
Austrian  troops  enter,  142. 

Grolmann,  663. 

Gross-Gorschen,  608. 

Gross- Beeren,  627. 

Grouchy,  659,  708,  710,  712,  714, 
715,  717,  720,  722,  725,  737,  738. 

Guadarrama  Pass,  452. 

Guadeloupe,  215. 

Guard,  complaints  of,  369;  alone 
allowed  to  return  to  France  after 
Tilsit,  401. 

Guard,  the  old,  356,  369,  373,  382, 
401,  446,  459,  491,  539,  555,  558, 
565;  Napoleon's  favouritism  for, 
567  ff.,  574,  582,  607,  608,  612, 
622,  624,  641,  653,  660;  Napo- 
leon's farewell  to,  679,  680,  685, 
689  n. ;  at  Waterloo,  716,  718,  719. 

Guard,  young,  539,  544,  573. 

Guastalla,  328. 

Gustavus  IV.  of  Sweden,  his  alli- 
ance with  England,  419,  510. 

Gyulai,  General,  accompanies  Sta- 
dion,  314. 

Hal,  715. 

Hamburg,  602. 

Hamelin,  Mme.,  61. 

Hanau,  524;  battle  of,  640,  641. 

Hanover,  French  troops  enter,  268; 
Bemadotte  in,  284;  occupation 
of,  286;  evacuation  of,  proposed, 
287,  320,  341,  342,  343,  344,  348, 
388,510,601,605,637. 

Hanseatic  Towns,  507,  515,  522, 
609,  615. 

Hardenberg,  prevents  Prussian  par- 
ticipation m  the  war,  313;  ad- 
vises Prussian  disarmament,  341 ; 
idolized  by  Prussian  anny,  353, 
526,  595,  596,  598,  599,  601,  722. 

Hartha,  611. 

Haugwitz,  advises  occupation  of 
Hanover,  286;  sent  to  negotiate 
with  Napoleon,  313;  detained  at 
Iglau,  314;  compelled  to  form 
close  offensives  and  defensive  al- 
liance with  Napoleon  at  Schon- 
brunn  Dec.  15th,  1805,  320,  341; 


Index 


807 


Haugwitz — Continued. 

compelled  to  sign  new  treaty, 
Feb.  15th,  ISUO,  342;  advises  to 
arm  and  prepare  for  war,  348, 
353;  army  demands  dismissal  of, 
353. 

Hauser,  Kaspar,  believed  to  be  son 
of  Napoleon,  336. 

Haut«rive,  author  of  pamphlet  on 
France,  218;  programme  of,  250; 
report  of,  from  Switzerland,  257  n. 

Have,  Sainte,  La,  715,  717,  718, 
7"19. 

Hubert,  45. 

HMouville,  337. 

Heilsberg,  382. 

Helder,  the,  victory  on,  280. 

Helvetia,  Republic  of,  120;  in 
treaty  of  Lun^ville,  252;  required 
to  cede  Valais,  255. 

Henry,  Prince  of  Prussia,  353. 

Herat,  214. 

Hesse,  Rhenish,  232;  treaty  of,  with 
France,  260. 

Hesse,  Elector  of,  338;  remains 
neutral,  354,  387. 

Hesse-Darmstadt,  338,  524. 

Hildhesheim,  260  n. 

Hiller,  461,  462;  defeated  at 
Landshut,  466,  468;  defeated  at 
Ebelsberg,  469,  644. 

Hoche,  conquers  Austrians,  46,  49; 
general  admiration  of,  69;  Na- 
poleon jealous  of,  97;  fruitless 
^^ctory  of,  over  Austrians,  100; 
death  of,  105;  military  genius  of, 
221. 

Hochkirch,  612. 

Hohenlinden,  French  \'ictory  at, 
206. 

Hohenlohe,  at  Jena,  359;  capitu- 
lates to  Murat,  361. 

HohenzoUem,  Prince  of,  338;  House 
of,  377,  601,  605. 

Holitsch,  317,  319,  321. 

Hollabrunn,  312. 

Holland,  conquered,  72,  120;  defeat 
of  English  in,  165,  193,  195; 
prisoners  taken  in,  208;  con- 
tributes to  French  treasury,  213; 
loses  Ceylon  and  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  215;  Code  Napoleon  in 
force  in,  232;  Stadtholder  of, 
appointed  by  France,  250;  new 


constitution  in,  252;  Stadtholder 
of,  to  be  indemnified,  2.')9;  ports 
of,  closed  to  England,  262;  evacu- 
ation of,  required  by  England, 
267;  lo.sses  in  commerce  of,  284, 
313,  331 ;  Louis  Bonaparte  made 
king  of,  May  24th,  1806,  333; 
a  victim  to  the  "license  "  system, 
507;  intention  of  Napoleon  to 
incorporate,  507;  annexed  to 
Empire  with  Lebrun  as  Vicerov, 
508-9;  draft-riots  in,  539,  609, 
616, 637;  revolt  against  Napoleon 
in,  .544,649. 

Holland,  Lord,  734. 

Holstein,  191. 

Hompesch,  Herr  von,  grand-master 
at  Malta,  127. 

Hortense,  see  Bonaparte,  Hortense. 

Hougomont,  716  ff. 

Humboldt,  A.  von,  353. 

Ibrahim  Bey,  130;  retreat  of,  132; 
pursuit  of,  133;  learns  of  Turk- 
ish reinforcements,  148. 

Blyria,  formation  of,  482;  ceded  to 
Wiirtemberg,  524,  530;  draft- 
riots  in,  539,  609,  615,  620, 
621. 

India,  communication  with  Eng- 
land, 111 ;  route  to,  113;  in  Egyp- 
tian plans,  122;  proposed  march 
to,  138;  power  of  England  in,  138; 
in  despatch  of  Directory,  142; 
Director^'  concerned  with,  191 ; 
Napoleon  constantly  intent  upon, 
366,  367,  418;  makes  treaty 
with  Persia  with  view  to  expe- 
dition against,  379;  England's 
position  in,  would  be  made  in- 
■vulnerable  by  dismemberment  of 
Turkey,  417,  433  n. ;  steps  taken 
toward  exj)edition  to,  433,  515, 
520. 

Indian  project  postponed  into  re- 
mote future  593. 

Ingolstadt   surrendered,  205. 

Inn  River,  109,  205  f. 

Inn,  quarter,  ceded  to  Napoleon, 
321,  481. 

Inquisition,  Romish,  93. 

"Institute"  in  Egypt,  136. 

Instruction,  public,  funds  dedicated 
to,  229. 


8o8 


Index 


International  element  of  new 
feudal   system,   329. 

International  Empire  falls  to  pieces, 
644. 

Interior,  Army  of  the,  Napoleon 
appointed  commander  -  in  -  chief 
of,  58;  Augereau  commander-in- 
chief  of,  104. 

Ionian  Isles,  ceded  to  France,  109; 
welcome  French  rule,  111,  135, 
159,345,388. 

Irish,  revolt  of,  against  England, 
134. 

Isar,  French  on,  205. 

Isola  Rassa,  revolts,  26. 

Isonzo,  in  Italy,  88,  97. 

Istria,  offered  to  Francis  I.,  96,  100. 

Istria,  Duke  of.  see  Bessieres. 

Istria,  321,  323,  328,  340. 

"Italian  Federation,"  422. 

Italian  Republic,  replaces  Cisal- 
pine Republic,  2.53;  Napoleon  as 
president  of,  290;  Cobenzl  on 
fate  of,  291. 

Italy,  Viceroy  of,  see  Beauhamais, 
Eugene. 

Italy,  attitude  of,  Napoleon  tow- 
ard, in  "Memorial,"  51;  cam- 
paigns in,  72  ff. ;  Austria  seeking 
gains  in,  72;  Republican  propa- 
ganda in,  76 ;  designs  of  Napoleon 
regarding,  94,  192;  contributions 
levied  in,  94;  plans  of  Directory 
for,  107,  116;  spirit  of  revolution 
in,  125;  advance  of  Russians  to, 
142;  campaign  in,  Napoleon's 
course  during,  152;  revolts  in, 
159;  ascendency  of  France  in, 
160;  Austrian  territory  in,  194; 
Austria  regains  power  in,  195; 
armies  in,  197;  partition  of,  be- 
tween France  and  Austria,  206; 
Napoleon's  dealings  with,  after 
Luneville,  210;  contributes  to 
French  treasury,  213;  Russia  and 
France  agree  to  decide  q\iestions 
in,  217;  king  of,  to  be  appointed 
by  PYance,  250;  extension  of 
French  autliority  in,  252;  upper 
ports  of,  dosed  to  England,  262; 
evacuation  of,  proposed,  287; 
Austrian  possessions  in,  threat- 
ened, 290;  designs  of  Napoleon 
and   Austria   upon,   291;    troops 


from,  379, 394;  boundary  of,  421 
suffers   under  Napoleon's   domi 
nation,  422,  458,  482,  524,  592 
610,  637,  643,  649,  657. 
Ivrea,  taken,  199. 

Jacobins,  radical  party,  29 ;  enemies 
of,  31 ;  declare  in  favour  of  Repub- 
lic, 32;  govermnent  of,  character- 
ized, 38;  abhorrence  of,  expressed, 
49;  defeated,  50;  revolt  of,  53; 
unite  with  Thermidorians,  55,  76'; 
have  protection  of  Napoleon,  96; 
prevail  in  Directory,  102;  clubs 
reorganized,  158;  oppose  govern- 
ment, 159;  in  league  with  Moder- 
ates, 163;  in  opposition,  164; 
open  club,  164,  166,  167;  at  St 
Cloud,  174;  raise  tumult,  176; 
hatied  felt  toward,  181;  deputies 
of,  sentenced,  183;  oppose  Napo- 
leon's government,  236;  deporta- 
tion of,  242,  270. 

Jaffa,  storming  of,  139;  massacre 
of  prisoners  at,  140,  141;  suffer- 
ings on  march  to,  145. 

Janina,  111. 

Janissaries,  381. 

Jaucourt,  580. 

Jena,  battle  of,  359,  360,  391,  534. 

Jews,  rights  of  citizenship  granted 
to,  by  Revolution,  231 ;  specula- 
tion among,  alone  saved  ■  army 
from  starvation,  369;  usury 
practised  by,  cause  of  poverty  in 
eastern  departments,  395;  assem- 
bly of  rabbis,  March,  1807,  396; 
Napoleon  promulgates  law  bear- 
ing upon,  396;  appealed  to  by 
Napoleon  to  relieve  distress,  544; 
provisions  at  Orsha  secured  by 
aid  of,  570. 

Joachim ,  King  of  Naples,  see  Murat. 

Jolni  VI.  of  Portugal,  closes  ports 
to  England,  210. 

John,  Crown  Prince  of  Portugal, 
427,  428,  429. 

John,  Arcluluke,  replaces  Kray,  204 ; 
defeated  by  Moreau,  20(5,  461; 
defeats  l*>ench  at  Porilenone  and 
Fontana  Fredda,  464,  468;  de- 
feated by  Beauharnais  at  Raab, 
474;  arrives  too  late  to  aid  at 
Wagram,  477. 


Ind 


ex 


809 


Jomini,  257  n.,  318  n.,  453;  ap- 
pointed to  oversee  transport  of 
provisions,  542,  555,  606  n.,  611, 
611  n..  612,  654. 

Jordan,  143. 

Joseph  II.,  plan  of,  for  division  of 
Turkey,  113;  hopes  of  conquest 
of,  207;  fails  in  diplomacy  with 
Pope,  213;  scheme  of  secular- 
ization under,  259. 

Joubert,  in  Italian  campaign  of 
1797,97;  in  command  of  Dutch 
troops,  1 19;  in  command  of  army 
of  Italy,  142;  death  of,  155,  161; 
succeeds  Moreau,  164;  defeated 
by  Suvaroff,  144 ;  confidence  of 
Sieyes  in,  168. 

Jourdan,  victorious  over  Austrians, 
46;  repulsed  by  Austrians,  76; 
defeat  of,  88;  in  conmiand  of 
Army  of  the  Rhine,  142;  Jacobin, 
159;  defeated  bv  Arcliduke 
Charles,  161;  radical.  167,  169, 
173;  sentenced,  183;  proclaims 
incorporation  of  Piedmont,  254; 
appomted   marshal,   280,   708. 

Joux,  fortress,  264. 

Junot,  aide  of  "Napoleon,  45;  in 
Egyptian  expedition,  127;  secret 
police  agency  under,  246;  crosses 
border  with  annv  into  Por- 
tugal, Oct.  18th,  1807,  428,  429, 
446;  surrenders  at  Cintra,  449, 
500,  564  n.,  573. 

Juntas  in  Spain,  435,  449,  498,  499. 

Kaiser-Ebersdorf ,  469 ;  archduke 
attempts  to  destroy  bridge  at, 
470;  Napoleon  at,  after  battle  of 
Aspem,  471 ;  bridge  at,  guarded 
and  protected  by  Napoleon, 
474. 

Kaia,  608. 

Kalish,  600;  convention  signed  at, 
601. 

Kalkreuth,  General,  360,  417  n. 

Kamenski,  General,  367. 

Kapzevitsch,  658,  ()59. 

Katharina,  Grand-duchess  of  Rus- 
sia, 486. 

Kaunitz,  92 ;  fails  in  diplomacy  with 
Pope,  213. 

Kellennan,  General,  ordered  to 
share  command  with  Napoleon, 


82;  order  to,  retracted,  83;  the 
younger,  at  Marengo,  201,  395. 

Khiva,  in  plans  of  Paul  I.,  214. 

Kienmayer,  307,  311. 

"King  of  Rome,"  birth  of,  March 
20th,  1811,  492,  512,  513,  671, 
673,  674,  675,  682;  Napoleon  II., 
724,  740. 

Klagenfurt,  98. 

Kk'ber,  general  of  revolutionary 
troops,  47;  in  Egyptian  expe- 
dition, 127,  139,  143,  144;  in 
battle  of  Aboukir,  148;  left  in 
Egypt,  151 ;  assassination  of, 
215. 

Klein-Gorschen,  608. 

Kleist,  611,  627,  628,  658,  659. 

Knesebeck,  sent  to  Vienna  by 
Pnissia,  596,  598,  599,  (JOO,  602. 

Knobelsdorff,  General,  sent  from 
Berlin  to  demand  evacuation  of 
Gennanj^  350. 

Kolberg,  fortress  of,  383. 

KoUowrat,  475. 

Konigsberg,  371,  611. 

Konigswartha,  612. 

Koran,  in  Napoleon's  library  as 
politics,  124;  Napoleon  refers  to, 
129;  Napoleon  as  an  adherent 
of,  291. 

Krasnoi,  battle  at,  568-9. 

Kray,  162;  in  Suabia,  196;  delay 
of,  in  receiving  orders,  197 ;  re- 
placed by  Archduke  John,  204. 

Krusemarck,  Prussian  envoy  at 
Paris,  520  n.,  521,  587. 

Kuhn,  628,  629. 

Kurakin,  387. 

KutusofT,  leader  of  the  Russians 
and  combined  armies,  310,  311, 
312,  315;  succeeds  Barclay  in 
command  of  Russian  armv,  553, 
554,  556,  560,  561,  563,  564,  565, 
569,  571  f.,  595,  602,  607. 

Labanov,  383,  384. 

Labedoyere,  Colonel,  691,  728. 

Labesnardiere,  337. 

Lac^pede,  235. 

Lacoste,  723. 

La  Cour  de  France,  672. 

Lafavett«,  203,  723. 

La  Fere,  regiment  of,  10,  12,  23,  2a 

Laffitte,  736. 


8io 


Index 


Laf  oret,  French  ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, Jan.  1806,  341. 

Laharpe,  80,  654. 

Laibach,  97. 

Lain6,  651,  692. 

Lalanne,  "Les  derniers  jours  du 
Consulat,"  cited,  208  n. ;  on 
relics  of  d'Enghien,  274  n. 

Lallement,  General,  726. 

Landshut,  battle  of,  476. 

Lanfrey,  453. 

Langeron,  655. 

Lanjuinais,  708,  724. 

Lannes,  success  of,  against  Papal 
troops,  93;  in  Egyptian  expedi- 
tion, 127,  139 ;  in  battle  of  Abou- 
kir,  148;  accompanies  Napoleon 
from  Egypt,  151 ;  in  command  in 
Italy,  200;  appointed  marshal, 
280,  311,  312,  313;  at  Jena- 
Auerstadt,  359,  367,  368,  369, 
382;  becomes  Duke  of  Monte- 
bello,  400,  413,  446;  only  one  of 
Napoleon's  marshals  who  con- 
tinued to  address  him  as  "thou," 
413;  defeats  Spanish  at  Tudela, 
448,  467,  469 ;  attacks  at  Essling, 
470;   mortally  wounded,  471. 

Laon,  battle  of,  664,  666. 

Laplace,  182. 

La  R6velliere-L^peaux,  member  of 
Directory,  76,  102,  158,  163. 

La  Rochefoucauld,  Royalist  pre- 
fect, 224;  figures  in  Napoleon's 
court,  280. 

La  Rothiere,  battle  at,  656,  658. 

Las  Cases,  Count,  726,  729,  731, 
733,  735. 

Latin,  acquirements  of  Napoleon 
in,  7. 

Latour-Maubourg,  639. 

Lauer,  blunders  of,  204. 

Lauriston,  General,  sent  by  Na- 
poleon to  KutusofT  to  make  over- 
tures, 560,  607,  639. 

La  Vallette,  Bonaparte  family  at, 
40;  yielded  to  Napoleon,  127; 
seized  by  English,  208,  671. 

Lebrun,  consul,  186;  revises  code, 
231;  in  case  of  d'Enghien,  273; 
appointed  grand  dignitary,  279; 
becomes  Duke  of  Piae^enza,  10() 
n. ;  made  Vicerov  of  Holland,  509. 

Lech,  160. 


Leclerc,  General,  marries  Pauline 
Bonaparte,  248;  expedition  to 
San  Domingo,  263. 

Lecombe,  710. 

Lefebvre,  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
127;  becomes  Duke  of  Danzig, 
400,  446;  reprimanded  by  Na- 
poleon, 448,  466,  469,  474,  611  n., 
653,  675,  708. 

Leghorn,  84;  see  also  Livomo. 

Legion  of  Honour,  established,  235, 
239;  cross  of,  distributed,  283, 
399. 

Legnano,  314. 

Leibnitz,  colonial  ideas  of,   113. 

Leipzig,  325,  607,  608;  battle  of, 
638,  639. 

Lemarrois,  General,  424. 

Lemercier,  president  of  Council  of 
Ancients,  175. 

Leoben,  preliminaries  of,  99,  108, 
152;   Austrian   flight  from,   310. 

Leopold,  Grand-duke  of  Tuscany, 
confinns  nobility  of  Bonaparte 
family,  3. 

L'Estocq,  commander  of  East  Prus- 
sian corps  allied  with  Russians, 
367,  370,  372,  373 ;  corps  defeated 
by  French,  June  14th,  1807,  382, 
383. 

Letoumeur,  76. 

"Letters  from  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,"  733,  737,  738. 

Leyen,  Von  der,  338. 

Liberal  Constitutionalists  in  Cham- 
bers, 236. 

Liebertwolkwitz,  engagement  at, 
635. 

Liechtenstein,  on  appearance  of  Na- 
poleon, 19;  commands  Austrian 
corps  at  Austerlitz,  317;  nego- 
tiator for  Austria  with  Talley- 
rand, 321,  338;  decides  battle  of 
Aspcrn  for  Austria,  471 ;  given 
conunand  of  Austrian  army,  479, 
481. 

Lienz,  98. 

Ligny,  712,  720,  721,  737. 

Ligurian  Republic,  constituted,  112; 
dissolved,  162;  re-established, 
202,  210;  in  tnuity  of  Lun^ville, 
252;  new  constitution  for,  254. 

Literature  and  politics,  servility 
in,  402-405. 


Index 


8ii 


Lithuania,  536,  580. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  728. 

Livorno  (Leghorn),  naval  battle  at, 
48;  English  goods  stored  at,  422. 

Loano,  victory  ol,  77. 

Lobau,  island  in  Danube,  469,  471, 
474,  475. 

Lodi,  victory  at,  8L 

Loinbardy,  53;  sought  by  Aus- 
tria, 72;  offered  to  Austria, 
77;  as  source  of  supplies  for  Na- 
poleon, 78;  sought  for,  from 
Francis  IL,  196;  Republic  of, 
100;  coninmnication  of,  with 
France,  120;  regained  by  Aus- 
tria, 162;  wanted  by  Austria,  194 ; 
Napoleon  plans  to  enter,  197; 
new  constitution  for,  252,  256. 

Lonato,  defeat  of  Austrians  at,  91. 

London,  preliminaries  signed  at, 
216;  agents  of  Napoleon  in,  271. 

Longwood,  730,  731;  burial  of 
Napoleon  at,  736,  737. 

Louis  Ferdinand,  Prince  of  Russia, 
353;  killed  at  Saalfeld,  358. 

Louis  XIV.,  colonial  idea  presented 
to,  113;  surpassed  by  Napoleon, 
216;  bureaucracy  under,  224. 

Louis  XV.,  19. 

Louis  XVL,  good  intentions  of,  19; 
convokes  States-General,  21 ;  de- 
cides to  flee,  28;  accepts  Con- 
stitution, 29;  opposes  decrees 
against  priests,  32;  declares  war 
against  Austria,  32;  deposed 
from  monarchy,  33;  execution 
of,  35. 

Louis  XVII..  54. 

Louis  XVIII. ,  55;  Royalists  loval 
to,  237,  673,  675,  681;  Con- 
cludes peace  with  powers,  683; 
grants  constitution,  683;  dis- 
affection of  anny  toward,  685; 
manifesto  to  anny  of,  692,  700; 
returns  to  Paris,  727,  741. 

liOuise,  Queen  of  Prussia,  286,  353, 

389. 
Louisiana,  Spain  agrees  to  give 
up,  210;  in  Napoleon's  colonial 
scheme,  263;  sold  by  Napoleon 
to  United  States,  268. 
Louverture,  Toussaint,  263 ;  de- 
feat, imprisonment,  and  death  of, 
264. 


Lowe,  Sir  Hudson,  730,  731,  732, 
734,  735. 

Liibeck,  port  of,  closed,  342. 

Lucca,  Republic  of,  provided  with 
constitution,  2.55,  328. 

Lucchesini,  Prussian  envoy,  on 
French  foreign  policy,  190  n. ; 
on  d'Enghien  case,  275;  on  im- 
perial plans  of  Napoleon,  275; 
on  state  of  feeling  toward  Na- 
poleon, 277  n. ;  as  to  invasion  of 
England,  284;  sends  word  from 
Paris  that  Hanover  is  about  to 
be  restored  to  England,  348; 
sent  with  full  powers  to  sign 
preliminaries  of  peace,  362. 

Lun^ville,  peace  of,  205,  210,  213; 
effects  of,  229,  2.52,  255,  257  ;  con- 
firms Rastatt,  258;  Grand-duke 
of  Tuscany  in,  259. 

Liitzen,  battle  of,  607-8;  result  of, 
608,  609. 

Luxembourg,  115;  sessions  of  exe- 
cutive at,  173. 

Lyc^es,  established,  234. 

Lyons,  39,  157;  Fesch  archbishop 
of,  248;  representatives  of  Loin- 
bardv  invited  to,  252 ;  silk  indus- 
try in,  225. 

Macdonald,  General,  founds  Par- 
thenopean  Republic,  160;  evacu- 
ates Naples,  162;  becomes  Duke 
of  Taranto,  400,  539,  548,  582, 
608,  625,  627,  628,  632,  633,  635, 
639,  640,  653,  658,  659,  660,  667 
f.,  670,  675  f.,  677. 

Macchiavelli,  246. 

Mack,  General,  142,  160;  his  as- 
sumptions in  1805,  302;  his  con- 
duct of  campaign,  303;  his  de- 
feat at  Ulm,  306,  359,  550. 

Madrid,  ministry  in,  210;  excite- 
ment at,  on  sale  of  Louisiana, 
269;  road  to,  open  to  Napoleon, 
449 ;  surrenders  to  Napoleon  Dec. 
4th,  1808,  4.50. 

Magallon,  at  Cairo,  113. 

Magnano,  Austrian  victory  at, 
162. 

Maillebois,  Count  de,  campaign 
in  Italy,  51. 

Mainot«s,  111. 

Mainz,    yielded    to    France,    109; 


8l2 


Index 


Mainz — Continued. 

archbishopric     of,      left     undis- 
turbed, 260,  605. 

Maison,  674. 

Maistre,  J.  de,  testimony  of,  to 
fideUty  of  Austrian  emperor, 
320  n. 

Maitland,  Captain,  727. 

Malet,  conspiracy  of.  to  overthrow 
the  Empire,  576,  583. 

Malexolle,  230. 

Mabnaison,  park  at,  patrolled  by 
police,  245  f.,  247. 

Malojaroslavetz,  battle  at,  563. 

Malta,  37;  letter  of  Napoleon  on, 
112;  Napoleon  to  seize,  122; 
captured  by  Napoleon,  127,  159, 
193;  blockade  of,  by  England, 
194;  offered  to  Paul  T.,  208; 
Alexander  I.  renounces,  214 ;  ac- 
quired by  England,  215;  restored 
to  Knights  of  St.  John,  215;  on 
route  to  India,  264;  Englisli  re- 
fuse to  evacuate,  266;  evacua- 
tion proposed  by  Czar,  287; 
return  of,  offered  by  Napoleon 
to  England,  344,  418! 

Mamelukes,  128  ff.,  131;;  in  S6bas- 
tiani's  report,  266. 

Mantua,  in  plans  for  "Army  of 
Italy,"  51;  siege  of,  86;  impor- 
tance of,  to  Austria,  87  ff.;  ca- 
gitulation  of,  91;  in  Cisalpine 
Republic,  109;  capitulation  of, 
162,  199. 

Marboeuf,  Coimt,  3,  15;  death  of, 
25. 

Marceau,  General,  46. 

Marchfeld,  Archduke  seeks  po- 
sition on,  instead  of  attacking 
French,  472,  475-477. 

Marciana,  681. 

Marengo,  battle  of,  200  if.,  210, 
212,  218,  253,  325. 

Maret,    Secretary    of     State,   223; 

Erepares  constitution  for  Lom- 
ardy,  252;  becomes  Duke  of 
Bassano,  400  n. ;  souvenirs  of, 
453,  575,  579;  assures  ambassa- 
dors that  the  French  are  anning 
on  large  scale,  587,  617,  636; 
removed  from  conduct  of  foreign 
affairs  and  succeeded  by  Caulain- 
court,   651  j  Secretary   of  State, 


657,  658,  658  n.,  671,  687,  694, 
702. 

Marie  Louise,  Grand-duchess  of 
Austria,  marriage  to  Napoleon 
proposed,  488;  marriage  of,  490; 
not  pleasing  to  Parisians,  491  ff., 
534,  619,  648,  667;  flees  from 
Paris,  671,  677,  681  f.,  699. 

Mariotti,  682,  686,  688. 

Mark,  Prussian  county  of,  347. 

Markgraf  -  Neusiedl,  heights  of, 
stomied  by  Davout,  476,  477. 

Markleberg,  Wachau,  and  Liebert 
woolkwitz,  battle  at,  635,  636. 

Markow,  Russian  ambassador,  leaves 
Paris,  288. 

Markranstadt,  607. 

Marmont,  aide  of  Napoleon,  45, 
53;  rescues  Napoleon,  90;  in 
Egyptian  expedition,  127;  on 
numbers  of  Mamelukes,  131; 
memoir  quoted,  133  f. ;  in  Alex- 
andria, 147;  remark  of  Na- 
poleon to,  on  return  to  France, 
150;  accompanies  Napoleon  from 
Egypt,  151;  reports  a  remark  of 
club  orator,  155;  general  of 
division,  284,  299,  313,  381; 
becomes  Duke  of  Ragusa,  400; 
testifies  to  confusion  in  French 
army,  472,  474,  477;  succeeds 
Mass6na  in  command  in  Spain. 
502;  defeat  by  WeUington,  554, 
606,  607,  608,  625,  628,  634,  635, 
636,  637,  639,  653,  655,  658,  659, 
660,  663,  664;  despairs  of  Na- 
poleon's cause  and  grows  negli- 
gent, 665,  667,  671,  672,  674; 
deserts  to  enemy,  676,  690,  692. 

Marshal,  office  in  Empire,  279;  ap- 
pointments to,  280;  of  palace, 
280;  at  court,  413;  spoken  of 
disrespectfully  by  Napoleon,  413. 

Marseilles,  Jacobin  club  at,  31; 
Jacobins  overcome  in,  39;  over- 
come by  government  troops,  40 
ff. ;  importance  of,  95;  commerce 
of,  225,  248. 

Martinique,  63;  in  Napoleon's  co- 
lonial scheme,  263. 

Mass^na,  in  Italian  campaigns,  80, 
97 ;  ordered  to  seize  pass  at  Neu- 
markt,  98;  enters  Leoben,  99; 
checked    by   Austrians,    161   f.; 


Index 


813 


Mass^na — Continued. 

defeats  Russians  and  Austrians, 
165;  defeats  Rvissians,  194;  in 
command  in  Italy,  196;  replaced 
by     General     Brune,     206;     ap>- 

Sointcd  marshal,  280;  sent  to 
faples,  327,  375;  becomes  Duke 
of  Rivoli,  400,  460,  464,  466,  471, 
474;  ordered  to  engage  main 
body  of  Austrians  at  Wagram, 
476;  sent  to  command  in  Spain, 
500;  battle  at  Busaco,  501;  de- 
feated at  Torres  Vedras,  501; 
defeat<?d  at  Fuentes  de  Onoro, 
502;  deprived  of  command,  502; 
ablest  marshal  of  the  Empire,  502, 
521,  691. 

Maupeou,  Chancellor,  230-31. 

Mecklenburg,  Duke  of,  413,  593. 

Medical  school,  233. 

Medina  de  Rio  Seco,  ^nctory  of 
Bessidres  at,  435. 

Mediterranean,  the,  95,  112,  128; 
Russia  seeks  power  on,  287. 

Meias,  victorious  at  No\d,  197; 
surprised,  199;  nearly  defeats 
Napoleon,  201 ;  losses  of,  at 
Marengo,  202. 

Memel,377,  420. 

Menou,  in  command  of  troops  of 
Convention,  55;  in  Egyptian 
expedition,  127;  defeated  in 
Egypt,  215;  surrenders  Alex- 
andria, 216. 

M6ran,  98. 

Merlin,  leader  among  Thermi- 
dorians,  49;  in  Director^',  163. 

Merveldt,  General,  representative 
of  Austria,  99;  Austrian  com- 
mander at  Leoben,  310;  captured 
at  Di  litz,  636,  637,  648. 

Mett«mich,  Count«ss,  489. 

Mettemich,  doubt  of,  as  to  invasion 
of  England,  284,  433,  442; 
documents  of,  show  occasion  for 
Napoleon's  hasty  return  to 
France,  453;  exaggerated  ques- 
tions of  political  intrigue,  453-4; 
goes  to  Vienna  to  urge  war 
against  Napoleon,  454,  4.56.  459, 
479;  fosters  plan  of  marriage  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  Marie  I^ouise, 
488,  489,  517,  518,  .521  n.,  .528, 
529,  529  n.,  530,  541,  542  n.,  591; 


plan  of,  for  general  pacification, 
596-98,  603-04,  609,  610,  615, 
616,  643,  648,  649,  6.50;  int<!r- 
view  of,  with  Napoleon  at  Dres- 
den, 617,  620,  621,  650,  (551,  652, 
654,  660,  666  n.,  677,  699. 

Meurthe,  Boulay  de  la,  leader  of 
Moderates,  163,  221;  revises 
code,  231. 

Michel,  General,  719  n. 

Milan,  entry  of  Napoleon  into,  81; 
he  incites  revolt  in,  89;  in  Leoben 
compact,  99;  in  Cisalpine  Re- 
pubUc,  109,120;  Austrian  troops 
enter,  162;  Napoleon  advances 
on,  199;  enters,  202;  consents  to 
new  constitution,  252;  author- 
ities at,  to  consider  relation  to 
Napoleon,  290;  decree  of,  581. 

Milhaud,  718. 

Millesimo,  79,  80. 

Mincio,  the,  81,  202;  Brune  crosses, 
206 ;  as  Austrian  boundary,  20(5. 

Minorca,  acquired  by  England,  215. 

Miollis,  General,  ordered  to  march 
into  Tu.scany  and  confiscat-e  Eng- 
lish goods,  422 ;  ordered  to  occupy 
Rome  and  assume  administra- 
tion of  affairs  of  the  country, 
425. 

Miot  de  M6lito,  astonished  by 
changes  at  Paris,  243;  Memoires 
cited,  250;  on  state  of  feeling 
toward  Napoleon,  277;  doubt  of, 
as  to  invasion  of  England,  284; 
speech  of  Napoleon  quoted  in 
Memoires,"  286;  testifies  that 
Napoleon  had  thoughts  of  hav- 
ing himself  crowned  Emperor  of 
the  West,  331,  398;  testifies  to 
Joseph's  attempt  to  ingratiate 
himself  with  the  Czar,  430  n., 
514,  649,  700. 

Modena,  Duke  of,  concludes  truce 
with  Napoleon,  84;  in  compact 
of  Leoben,  99;  in  Cisalpine  Re- 
public, 109;  Breisgau  assigned  to, 
207;  duchy  of,  annexed  to  Ligu- 
rian  Republic,  210;  in  Austro- 
Russian  treaty,  291. 

Moderates,  in  league  with  Radicals, 
163;  in  power,  164;  in  Napoleon's 
Council  of  State,  221 ;  Moreau 
leader  of,  270. 


8i4 


Index 


Modlin,  fortifications  erected  by 
French  near,  420. 

Moeskirch,  Austrians  defeated  at, 
199. 

Mohammed,  189. 

Mohammedans,  respect  for,  incul- 
cated, 129. 

Moldavia,  to  be  offered  to  Austria, 
288  n.,  365,  416. 

Mol^,  Count,  587-8,  641,  701. 

Mollien,  Minister  of  the  Treasury, 
in  charge  of  sinking  fund,  229; 
protests  against  Napoleon's  finan- 
cial measures,  590,  693,  694. 

Moncey,  secret  police  agency  under, 
246;  appointed  marshal,  280; 
becomes  Duke  of  Conegliano, 
400,  446,  449. 

Mondovi,  defeat  of  Austrians  at, 
80. 

Monfalcone,  482. 

Monge,  report  of,  about  Napoleon, 
10;  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
124;  accompanies  Napoleon  from 
Egypt,  151,  708. 

Moniteur,  the,  172,  190;  infonns 
Austrian  ambassador,  261 ;  story 
in,  of  plot  against  Napoleon,  271. 

Monk,  General,  242,  270. 

Montebello,  Duke  of,  see  I.annes. 

Montenegro,  bishop  of,  bribed,  287. 

Montenotte,  80. 

Montesquieu,  13 

Montesquiou,  280. 

Montgelas,  Bavarian  Minister,  Den- 
wiirdigkeiten,  322,  335,  354  n., 
378,  397,  489. 

Montholon,  726,  729,  731,  732,  734, 
736,  739,  740  n. 

Montmirail,  battle  of,  659,  661. 

Mont  Saint-Jean,  714,  715,  720,  721. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  commands  British 
army  in  Spain,  449;  pursued  by 
Soult  and  Napoleon,  451,  452. 

Morea,  Napoleon's  designs  on,  278, 
291. 

Moreau,  defeat  of,  88;  Napoleon 
jealous  of,  97;  conservative,  159; 
defeated  by  Austrians,   162;  re- 

E laced  by  Joubert,  164;  con- 
dence  of  Siey6s  in,  168;  ban- 
quet in  honour  of,  169;  in  com- 
mand of  Switzerland,  196;  anny 
of,  reduced,  197;    grants  exten- 


sion of  truce,  204;  defeats  Aus- 
trians at  Hohenlinden,  206;  signs 
armistice,  206;  troops  under, 
sent  to  San  Domingo,  263 ;  leader 
of  Moderates,  270 ;  banishment  of, 
271,  275,  576. 

Morfontaine,  treaty  of,  209. 

Mortier,  appointed  marshal,  280; 
atDiirmstein,310;  at  Mainz,  357; 
becomes  Duke  of  Treviso,  400;  to 
remain  in  Franconia,  437;  com- 
mander of  Young  Guard,  544; 
left  behind  in  Moscow  with  8000 
men,  562;  ordered  to  blow  up 
Kremlin  on  leaving  Moscow,  564, 
635,  653,  663,  664,  667,  671,  672, 
674,  708. 

Moscow,  ultimate  goal  in  Napo- 
leon's mind,  541,  550;  open  to 
Napoleon,  556;  French  enter, 
556;  deserted  and  burned  by 
Russians,  557;  plundered  by 
French,  558,  559;  retreat  from, 
561  f.,  576,  581. 

Moulins,  in  Directory,  163;  made 
powerless,  173;  charged  by  Na- 
poleon with  plot,  175,  181. 

"Mountain,"  the,  ascendency  of, 
38;  in  "Le  Souper  de  Beau- 
caire,"  41 ;  deposes  Robespierre, 
49. 

Mount  Isel,  battle  on,  473. 

Mouton,  General,  471,  549,  564, 
578,  710,  717,  718. 

Mozart,  "Don  Juan"  of,  403. 

Miiffing,  718. 

Miiller,  Johannes  von,  353. 

Munich,  occupied,  203. 

Mur,  98. 

Murad  Bey,  Egyptian  commander, 
130;  offers  battle,  131  j  defeat 
of,  131;  negotiations  with,  133, 
148. 

Murat,  on  the  13th  Vend^miare, 
58;  in  Egyptian  expedition,  127; 
in  Palestine,  143;  in  battle  of 
Aboukir,  148;  accompanies  Na- 
poleon from  Egypt,  151 ;  leads 
soldiers  into  council-hall,  178; 
marries  Caroline  Bonaparte,  248; 
guardian  to  King  of  Tuscany, 
255;  appointed  marshal,  280. 
305;  hastens  to  Vienna,  310; 
prevents    destruction    of    Tabor 


Index 


8is 


Murat — Continued. 

bridge,  311-13;  counsels  con- 
tinuing war  against  Austria,  321 ; 
made  Grand-duke  of  Berg  and 
Cleves,  338;  assumas  name  of 
Joachim  I.,  347;  appropriates 
coal-fields  and  Essen,  347,  348, 
356,  359,  361,  367,  372,  373,  374, 
383;  hopes  to  gain  kingdom  lor 
himself  m  Portugal,  428;  com- 
mander-in-chief of  forces  in 
Spain,  430;  ceded  throne  of 
Naples,  434,  494,  495,  500,  511; 
talk  of  annexing  Naples  and  of 
disgrace  of,  512  n. ;  commands 
cavalry  in  Russia,  539,  545,  547, 
549,  551,  555,  561,  563;  "Butcher 
of  cavalry,"  567,  577,  582; 
saddled  with  blame  for  loss  of 
the  army,  587,  588,  597,  598, 
604;  political  vacillation  guarded 
against  by,  623,  626,  632,  633, 
634;  leaves  Napoleon  before 
battle  of  Hanau,  643,  649;  joins 
Austria,  655,  682,  686  n.,  709. 

Mysore,  Sultan  of,  138. 

Nabulusians,  146. 

Namur,  713,  714. 

Nangis,  battle  of,  660. 

Naples,  joins  coalition,  73;  agrees 
to  remain  neutral,  84;  Queen 
of,  92 ;  ambassadors  of,  at  Monte- 
bello,  107;  republicanism  in,  125; 
Nelson  at,  127;  Knights  of  St. 
John  under,  128;  at  war  with 
France,  138;  troops  of,  take  the 
field,  142;  declares  war  against 
France,  142;  kinship  with  Aus- 
tria, 160;  evacuated  by  Mac- 
donald,  162;  Napoleon  deals 
with,  210,  217;  Russia  inter- 
cedes for,  211;  ports  of,  closed 
to  England,  211;  occupation  of, 
286;  dispossession  of  Royal 
House  of,  required  by  Na- 
poleon, 321 ;  Napoleon  an- 
nounces that  Bourbon  dynasty 
had  ceased  to  reign  in,  327,  340, 
345;  throne  of,  ceded  to  Murat, 
434,  511. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  his  family 
of  noble  origin,  3;  character  in 
boyhood,    5;     early    enthusiasm 


for  Paoli,  5;  school  life  at 
Brienne,  6;  fondness  for  mathe- 
matics, 8;  revolutionary  ideas 
of,  10;  decides  to  enter  artillery, 
10;  removes  to  Paris,  10; 
lilcole  militaire,  10;  passes  ex- 
amination. 10;  conunissioned 
as  second  lieutenant,  10-  dreary 
prospects  12;  possible  love 
affair,  12;  his  "Dialogue  on 
Love,"  13;  works  that  influ- 
enced his  thinking,  13;  youthful 
writings  of,  13,  14;  extract  from 
diary  of,  15;  double  nature  of, 
18;  plans  of,  for  gaining  control 
of  Corsica,  25;  drills  Corsican 
guard,  26;  joins  Paoli,  27;  first 
lieutenant,  27;  contracts  debts, 
28;  further  literary  projects  of, 
28;  subscribes  to  oath,  29;  at- 
titude of,  during  early  days  of 
Revolution,  29;  attack  upon, 
in  Ajaccio,  31;  his  embarrass- 
ment, 33;  appointed  captain, 
34 ;  returns  to  Corsica,  34 ;  breaks 
with  Paoli,  36;  plans  attack  on 
Ajaccio,  3();  growth  of  ambition 
of,  37;  artillery  officer  at  Avig- 
non, 40;  "Le  Souper  de  Beau- 
caire,"  40;  upholds  Convention, 
41 ;  promoted  in  artillery  regi- 
ment, 42;  his  share  in  siege  of 
Toulon,  42;  appointed  colonel, 
43;  appointed  brigadier-general, 
43;  disclaims  nobility  of  origin, 
44;  republicanism  of,  44;  his 
plan  of  operations  for  Anny 
of  Italy,  45;  general  of  artil- 
lery in  Army  of  Italy,  15;  im- 
prisoned in  Fort  Carr^,  46;  de- 
clares his  patriotism,  47;  released 
from  prison,  48;  in  expedition 
against  Corsica,  48;  ordered  to 
Army  of  the  West,  48;  returns 
to  Paris,  49;  difficulties  of  his 
situation  at  Paris,  50 ;  protests 
against  removal  to  the  Vend^^, 
52;  his  letter  to  Joseph  B., 
quoted,  53;  his  petition  rejected, 
53;  summoned  to  protect  legis- 
lature, 56;  saves  the  Convention, 
58 ;  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  of  Anny  of  the  Interior, 
58;    fatalism    of,    59;     personal 


8i6 


Index 


Napoleon — Coniinued. 

clescription  of,   61 ;    enters   soci- 
ety,   62;      thinks    of    marrying, 
62;   Mine.   Bourrienne's    descrip- 
tion of  his  appearance,  65;  state 
of    health     of,    66;     impression 
of    Josephine    on,    66;     advised 
to  marry  her,  66;    marriage  of, 
68 ;      appointed     commander-in- 
chief  of  Army  of  Italy,  68;  de- 
tested by  Parisian  populace,  69; 
his  plan  of  campaign  in  Italy,  77 ; 
assumes   conmiand   of  Army  of 
Italy,  78;    his  address  to  Army 
of    Italy,  78;    theory   of   attack, 
79;    his  first  success  in  Italian 
campaign,    80;    wins   confidence 
of    his    soldiers,     80;     disobeys 
Directory,    81,    94;     victory    of, 
at  Lodi,  81 ;  his  entry  into  Milan, 
81;      makes     treaty     with     Sar- 
dinia, 82 ;   his  letter  to  Directory 
on    management    of    campaign, 
82;  freedom  of,  to  act  in  Italy, 
83;    enters    Venetian    territory, 
concludes  truce  with  Panna  and 
Modena,  84;   wonderful  achieve- 
ments of,  in  Italy,  85;    strategy 
of,    85;      student     of    Frederick 
the    Great,    86;     defeats    Quos- 
danovich     and     Wumiser,      87; 
importance  of  successes  to,  88; 
his    opinion    of    Austrian    amiy, 
89;   loss  of,  at  Verona,  90;   dan- 
ger of,   in  battle  of  Arcole,  90; 
at     Rivoli,     91 ;      declares    war 
against    Pius    VI.,    93;    refrains 
from    capture    of    Rome,    93    f. ; 
makes  treaty  with   Pius  VI.,  94; 
designs  of,  in  Italy,  94;    contri- 
butions levied  by,  in  Italy,  94; 
his     vision     of     Alexander     the 
Great,    95;    his    military    fame 
after  Italian   campaign,   96;    in 
Italian    campaign    of    1797,    97; 
his  proposals  of  peace  to  Arch- 
duke    Charles,     98;      his    nego- 
tiations with  Austria  at  Leoben, 
99;    his  diplomatic  victory  over 
Austria,    100;     accuses    Austria 
of  designs  on  Venice,   100;    de- 
clares war  on  Venice,    100;    his 
agreement    with     Venetian     pa- 
triots,  101;  his  report  to  Direc- 


tory, 102;  supports  the  Directory, 
103;     his     manifesto    to    army, 
103;     his    meniorials    justifying 
his  course  in  Venice,  104;  service 
rendered  by,   to   Directors,   104; 
pretends   to    the    amiy  to  have 
saved  the  Republic,   105;  holds 
court  at  villa  of  Montebello,  107; 
threatens   resignation,    107;    his 
negotiations  with  Cobenzl,   108; 
satisfaction     of,     on     treaty    of 
Campo  Formio,  110;  designs  of, 
110;    acquires  Ionian  Isles,  111; 
proceeds     against    Corsica    and 
Genoa,  112;    his  letter  to  Direc- 
tory  on    Egypt,    112;     his   de- 
signs  on    Egypt,    113;     anxiety 
of    Directory     concerning,     114; 
proclamation  of,  to  fleet,  114;  let- 
ter of,  to  Talleyrand  on  invasion 
of    England,    114;     commander- 
in-chief    of    Army    of    England, 
114;    his  designs  for  supremacy 
in    France,    114;     his   return    to 
Paris,     115;    affects     simplicity, 
115;     his   reply   to   Talleyrand's 
address,  115;  letter  of,  to  Talley- 
rand on  Constitution,  117;  "Code 
Complet"  of,  117;    his  thoughts 
of    '^Coup    d'fitat,"     119;      ap- 
jjearance  of,  119;    plans  revolu- 
tion in  Switzerland,    120;    Ber- 
nese treasure,  120;  not  admitted 
to    Directory,   121 ;     dangers    to, 
from   unpopularity,    121 ;   argues 
against     invasion     of     England, 
122;    rival    of    Directory,     123; 
library     of,     in     Egyptian     ex- 
pedition, 124;   advocates  French 
mterference  in   East,    125;    tar- 
ries   in     Paris,     126;     captures 
Malta,     127;      passage     of,     to 
Alexandria,    128;     naval    genius 
of,     128;     proclamation    of,    to 
soldiers     at     Alexandria,      129; 
proclamation    of,   to   Egyptians, 
129;  proceeds  to  Cairo,  131;  his 
remark  on  h'ing,    131 ;    his  dif- 
ficulties at  Cairo,   132;    receives 
news    of    Aboukir,    133;      igno- 
rance   of,  as    to   Turkey's  atti- 
tude,   135;    suppresses   revolt  in 
Cairo,   135;    founds  "Institute" 
in  Egypt,  136;   his  dispute  with 


Index 


817 


Napoleon — Continued. 

scientists,  137;  compared  to 
Mephistophelps,  137;  interest  in 
miracles  of  Moses,  137 ;  dream  of 
Asiatic  conquest,  138;  invades 
Palestine,  139;  at  siege  of  Acre, 
141;  his  plans  of  return  to 
France,  143;  his  feeling  at  re- 
sistance of  Acre,  144;  his  false- 
hoods regarding  siege  of  Acre, 
147;  returns  to  Egypt,  147; 
his  brilliant  victory  at  Abou- 
kir,  148;  his  remark  to  Marmont 
on  return  to  France,  150 1  sails 
from  Alexandria,  151 ;  his  dis- 
cussion of  his  return  to  France, 
151  fT. ;  his  course  of,  in  Italian 
campaign,  152;  in  Corsica,  154; 
learns  of  French  losses,  155; 
decides  to  go  to  Paris,  155,  es- 
capes from  English  squadron, 
155  f. ;  his  letter  to  Directory 
announcing  his  arrival,  156;  pro- 
fits from  French  losses,  1G4; 
renewed  confidence  in,  165;  de- 
scribes his  course  to  Madame 
de  Remusat,  166;  infonned  of 
Sieyes'  plans,  168;  favours  con- 
stitutional commission,  168;  ban- 
quet in  honour  of,  169;  charged 
with  execution  of  decree  of 
council,  170;  his  address  on 
receiving  appointment,  171;  his 
proclamation  to  National  Guard, 
172;  demands  resignation  of 
Barras,  172;  outburst  of,  174; 
accuses  directors  of  plot,  175; 
danger  to,  from  tmnult,  176;  wild 
language  of,  175,  178;  consul 
in  provisional  government,  180; 
in  full  possession  of  executive 
power,  181 ;  ridicules  consti- 
tution of  Sieyds,  184;  his  letter 
to  Talleyrand  on  legislature, 
185;  master  of  France,  187,  192; 
his  manifesto  on  new  constitu- 
tion, 187;  on  vanity  of  French, 
188;  his  rapid  advancement, 
188;  principle  of  conquest  in- 
herited by,  189;  Prussian  en- 
voy on,  190  n. ;  Eastern  plans 
of,  anticipated,  191 ;  partici- 
pates in  plans  of  Revolution, 
192;    his   difiiculties   in   way   of 


peace  in  1800,  192;    needs  war, 
194  ;  his  letter  of,  to  Austria,  194 ; 
his  insincerity  in  offers  of  peace, 
195;     his   secret   orders   to    Ji(r- 
thier,  197;  aims  to  be  the  author 
of   peace,    197;    his   passage   of 
the     Alps,     199;      his     advance 
upon    Milan  nearly  defeated  at 
^larengo,     201 ;      his     misrepre- 
sentations    on     Marengo,     202; 
finn  position  of,  in  France,  203; 
his    letter    to     Francis     II.     on 
peace,   203;    insists  on  separate 
agreement    with    Austria,     205; 
closes  annistice,  205;    separates 
Russia    and    Austria,    208;    his 
policy  with  absolute  monarchies, 
208;  strikes  at  England's  mari- 
tune     supremacy,     208;      raises 
enemies    against    Austria,    209j 
his  dealings  in  Italy  and  Spain, 
210;  ridicules  " idealogues,"  211; 
treaty   with     Ferdinand   IV.    of 
Naples,    211;    religious    attitude 
of,  211;    recognizes  political  im- 
portance   of    Papacy,    212;     his 
agreement  with  Pius  VII.,  212; 
succeeds  where  others  had  failed 
in    diplomacy   with    Pope,    213; 
his  despair  at  news  from  Russia, 
214;    accepts  proposal  of   Eng- 
land,   215;     seeks    good-will    of 
Czar,  215;    pr nposes    to    resume 
negotiations,    216;     his    oriental 
dream     ended,     216;       resumes 
support  of  Poles,  217;    fame  of, 
as    establisher    of    peace,     217; 
aun  of,  in  securing  peace,  218; 
seeks  hegemony  of  France,  218; 
advancing  to  universal  dominion, 
219;     reorganizes    France,    221; 
chooses  councillors  from  dilTerent 
parties,  222;  re-establishes  com- 
munes,   223;    reorganizes    "gen- 
dannerie,"   225;    his  remark  on 
taxation,  228;    his  management 
of    national    domains,    229;    ap- 
points committee  on  code,  230; 
assists    in    revising    code,    231; 
credit    due    to,    for    code,    232; 
work   of,   in   public   instruction, 
233 ;   aim  of,  in  decrees  on  public 
instruction,  234  fT. ;  his  attitude 
on  education,  235j    repeals  law 


8i8 


Index 


Napoleon — Continued. 

excluding  Emigres,  236;  auto- 
cratic government  of,  236; 
Jacobin  plan  to  assassinate,  236 
f. ;  orders  deportation  of  Radi- 
cals and  Jacobins,  238  f. ;  his 
arbitrary  acts,  238;  gets  rid  of 
opposition  in  legislature,  239; 
made  consul  for  life,  239  f. ; 
monarchical  surroundings  of,  244 ; 
intolerant  of  opposition,  244  f.; 
moroseness  of,  245;  his  habits 
described  by  Madame  de  Remu- 
sat,  245;  mistrusts  every  one, 
246;  ideas  of  honesty  and  ver- 
acity, 246;  stepchildren  of,  247; 
marriage  of  sisters  of,  247  f. ; 
mother  of,  at  palace,  248;  his 
remark  on  peace  and  war  in 
Europe,  249;  scheme  of  empire 
over  Europe,  250;  provides  new 
constitutions  for  Holland  and 
Lombardy,  252  f. ;  presidency 
of  Cisalpine  Republic  offered  to, 
253 ;  incorporates  Piedmont,  254 ; 
incorporates  Elba,  255;  suc- 
ceeds in  securing  control  in 
Switzerland,  256  f. ;  has  same 
motive  as  Revolution,  258;  Ger- 
man princes  negotiate  with,  260; 
power  of,  felt  beyond  the  Rhine, 
261 ;  closes  European  ports  to 
England,  262;  colonial  scheme 
of,  263  ff. ;  protests  against 
attacks  of  English  newspapers, 
265;  his  instructions  to  am- 
bassador in  London,  265;  may 
change  the  face  of  Europe,  266; 
aims  to  force  England  into  war, 
266  f. ;  George  III.  offers  ulti- 
matum to,  267;  arrests  English- 
men in  France,  267;  plans  of, 
against  England,  267;  forces 
dependent  states  into  league, 
268;  plot  against  270;  popu- 
larity of,  increased,  271 ;  orders 
arrest,  trial,  and  execution  of 
d'Enghien,  272;  revulsion  of 
feeling  toward,  274  f. ;  sym- 
pathy elicited  l)y,  274  f. ;  pro- 
posed impcriiil  title  of,  275;  part 
played  by,  276-  corrupt  muni- 
ncence  of,  276-  wants  legitimate 
successor,  276;  address  to,  from 


deputation  of  Senate,  277;  ar- 
ranges that  Republicans  offer 
hun  title  of  Emperor,  278;  his 
provisions  for  successor  of,  279; 
at  Boulogne,  283;  enthusiasm 
for,  283;  remark  on  power  of, 
283  f. ;  preparations  of,  for  con- 
tinental wai,  285  f. ;  Austria  con- 
ciliatory toward,  288  f. ;  at  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  289;  threatens  Aus- 
trian interests  in  Italy,  290; 
designs  of,  upon  Italy,  291 ; 
coronation  of,  before  Pius  VI., 
292;  religious  marriage  of,  with 
Josephine,  292;  concessions  of, 
to  the  Pope,  293;  challenges 
Austria  in  Italy,  294;  plans 
against  England,  297;  decides 
to  attack  Austria,  299;  his  self- 
confidence,  300;  his  opinion  of 
Mack,  302;  his  rapid  march, 
304;  liis  strategy  before  Uhn, 
306;  his  severity  toward  Ville- 
neuve,  309;  demands  not  ac- 
cepted, 311;  address  to  his 
troops  after  Austerlitz,  318; 
prevents  co-operation  between 
his  foes,  314;  culmination  of 
prosperity  of,  326 ;  victories  used 
to  advance  his  own  interests, 
327;  public  opinion  in  France 
turned  to  favour  of,  325;  de- 
clares himself  Emperor  of  Rome, 
Emperor  of  the  West,  334;  an- 
nounces in  Berlin  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  347;  infers  the  exist- 
ence of  a  new  coalition,  350; 
incredulous  of  Prussia's  inten- 
tion to  offer  armed  resistance 
to  him,  355;  starts  forces  secretly 
to  re-enforce  army  in  Germany, 
355;  his  plan  of  campaign 
against  Prussia,  356;  orders  to 
various  corps,  .357;  defeats  Ho- 
henlohe  at  Jena,  359,  360;  de- 
termines to  assume  the  offensive, 
371 ;  hastens  from  Warsaw  north- 
wards, 372;  his  plan  of  attack 
upon  Russians  condemned  by 
critics,  but  perhaps  due  to  in- 
tention to  spare  Russians,  381; 
his  return  to  Paris  after  Tilsit, 
392 ;  his  representations  to  people 


Ind 


ex 


819 


Napoleon — Continued.  ! 

of  France  in  regard  to  war  ' 
forced  upon  him,  393-4;  turns 
his  attention  to  affairs  of  the 
interior,  394;  his  financial  dis- 
positions, 396,  397;  provides  for 
personal  vanity  of  l-rench,  398; 
his  measures  against  the  press, 
401 ;  discourages  discussion  of 
laws,  402;  restricts  mental  ac- 
tivity of  people,  402;  his  inordi- 
nate ambition,  410;  surrounds 
himself  with  ceremony,  411;  his 
life  and  manners,  412;  his 
treatment  of  friends,  417;  re- 
fuses to  dismember  Turkey,  417; 
assembles  fleet  to  conquer  Malta 
and  Sicily,  and  attack  Gibraltar, 
418;  asks  permission  of  Turkey 
for  passage  of  troops  through 
Albania,  418;  checkrnates  Rus- 
sia's Oriental  schemes,  418,  419; 
demands  Russia's  authorization 
to  French  annexation  of  Prus- 
sian Silicia,  418;  induces  Turkey 
to  keep  ports  closed  against 
England,  419;  "counsels"  in 
Spanish  affairs,  429 ;  meets  Joseph 
in  Venice  to  offer  him  the  Span- 
ish crown,  430;  appoints  inter- 
view in  Bayonne,  431;  whole 
Continent  subject  t<.  orders  of, 
432;  forced  to  withdraw  some  of 
his  troops  from  Gennany  to  aid 
in  Spain,  436,  437;  his  suprem- 
acy on  Continent  tottering,  438; 
his  purpose  in  showing  respect 
to  poets  and  men  of  genius  in 
Gennany,  444;  takes  veterans 
to  Spain  to  regain  his  prestige, 
445;  severitv  of,  450;  hastens 
to  Paris  Jan.  17th,  1809,  452; 
infonned  of  Austrian  agitations, 
458;  demands  conscription  of 
1810,  459;  reassembles  army 
in  Gennany,  459;  Austria  to 
be  considered  aggressor  by,  460; 
strategic  arrangement  of  forces 
by,  4(50;  arrives  upon  Danube 
just  in  time  to  rescue  anny  from 
peril,  4()5;  his  generalship  dis- 
plaj-ed  in  Austrian  campaign, 
465;  surprisetl  at  earl\-  attack 
of    Austrians,    464;     hastens    in 


four  days  to  Donauworth,  465; 
gives  orders  to  advance  upon 
Vienna,  467;  considers  battles 
of  Abensberg,  Landshut,  and 
Ekmiilil  most  adroit  of  his 
military  manoeuxTes,  467 ;  enters 
Vienna,  iMay  13th,  1809,  469; 
draws  to  himself  all  troops  at 
his  disposal,  474 ;  his  sleep 
during  battle,  476  n. ;  decides 
to  accept  armistice,  July  12th, 
1809,  478;  loses  faith  in  battle 
as  means  of  success,  478; 
genuinely  desirous  of  peace,  479; 
acknowledges  desire  for  peace, 
480;  announces  conclusion  of 
peace  to  Viemiese,  481 ;  re- 
turns in  triumph  to  Paris,  483; 
his  contempt  for  middle  classes 
a  grievance  deeply  felt,  483; 
rouses  indignation  by  expul- 
sion of  Pope,  484;  seeks  to  in- 
gratiate himself  w4th  French 
people  by  means  of  new  mar- 
riage, 484;  divorce  accepted 
by  Church,  Jan.  1810,  486; 
choice  of  new  wife,  486 ;  instnicts 
Caulaincourt  to  ask  for  hand  of 
Grand-duchess  Aiina  of  Russia, 
487;  secret  project  for  marriage 
with  Archduchess  Marie  Louise 
of  Austria,  488;  his  conduct 
toward  the  Poles,  487;  abandons 
project  of  Russian  marriage, 
489.  490;  his  marriage,  490;  his 
letter  to  foreign  ambassadors, 
492;  lacking  in  appreciation  of 
instinct  of  nationality,  493 ;  denies 
complicity  in  arrest  of  the  Pope, 
496;  orders  Papal  court  and 
archives  removed  to  Paris,  496; 
private  funds  resulting  to,  from 
decree  against  smuggling,  505; 
issues  edict  against  neutrals, 
505;  his  "license  system,"  506; 
summons  powers  of  Europe  to 
adopt  the  tariff  of  Trianon,  506; 
becomes  distrustful  of  his 
brothers  and  abandons  family 
system  of  rule,  509:  "I  am  not 
the  successor  of  the  French 
kings,  but  of  Charlemagne," 
513;  openly  reject-^  all  thoughts 
of  peace,  513,  515,  516;  his  plan  of 


820 


Index 


Napoleon — Continued. 

universal  empire  set  forth,  515; 
convinced  that  he  must  first 
fight  Russia  to  ruin  England, 
519,  520;  sends  reply  to  Russian 
ultimatum  and  starts  for  Dres- 
den to  make  threatening  demon- 
stration, 532;  ranked  with  the 
great  men  of  history  by  Goethe, 
533;  not  without  misgivings 
while  at  Dresden,  536;  leaves 
Dresden  for  Konigsberg,  May 
.28th,  1812,  538;  overestimates 
Russian  forces  and  plans  accord- 
ingly, 540;  his  plan  of  campaign, 
540-542;  disaster  to,  through 
continued  pursuit  of  Russians, 
541,  542;  hardships  and  distress 
of,  546;  expects  battle  at  Vitebsk, 
delays  attack  and  loses  chance, 
547;  his  excitement  at  Vitebsk, 
549;  declares  campaign  of  1812 
closed,  and  then  decides  to  pro- 
ceed on  road  to  Moscow  with 
hope  of  victory  at  Smolensk, 
549 ;  breaks  camp  at  Vitebsk,  549 ; 
his  plan  condemned  by  Clause- 
witz,  550;  sees  before  him  only 
an  amiy  to  be  beaten  and 
a  cabinet  to  accept  tenns, 
552;  unlike  himself  at  Borodino, 
ill  and  neglectful  of  task,  555; 
for  the  first  time  does  not  inter- 
vene in  person,  556;  expects 
overtures  of  peace  from  Czar 
in  vain,  558;  wastes  five  weeks 
at  Moscow  in  hope  of  peace,  561 ; 
orders  retreat  from  Moscow,  561 ; 
his  last  hope  of  peace  destroyed 
by  defeat  of  Murat,  561;  de- 
cides for  road  via  Kaluga,  562; 
avoids  meeting  enemy,  563; 
rouses  hard  feeling  by  favourit- 
ism for  the  Guard,  567;  urges 
Victor  to  make  new  advance, 
568;  strong  and  prudent  in 
face  of  failure,  571 ;  writes  to 
Maret  that  his  presence  may  be 
necessary  in  Paris,  575-6;  hears 
of  Malet  conspiracy,  576;  at 
Smorgoni  tells  of  his  decision  to 
leave  troops  under  command 
of  Murat,  who  is  to  lead  them 
beyond  the  Niemen,  577;    enters 


Paris,  Dec.  18th,  1812,  579;  his 
prestige  shattered,  580;  has  no 
thoughts  of  giving  up  his  su- 
premacy in  Europe,  582;  in- 
stitutes preparations  for  arma- 
ment at  once  upon  reaching 
France,  582;  his  speech  to 
deputation  of  Senate,  583;  his 
speech  to  council  of  state,  583; 
activity  in  Jan.  1813,  585; 
impressed  by  news  of  con- 
vention of  Tauroggen,  587; 
makes  peace  with  the  Pope,  588- 
9;  desires  to  be  head  of  the 
Church,  589;  plans  to  dissolve 
Corps  Legislatif  and  reorganize 
Senate  and  Council  of  State, 
•591;  gives  up  plan,  592;  his 
plans  fonned  in  days  of  highest 
glory  impracticable,  592;  calls 
upon  princes  of  Rhenish  Con- 
ference for  new  contingents, 
593;  sends  to  Prussia  and  Aus- 
tria asking  reinforcement  of  their 
contingents,  594;  his  reply  to 
Austria  leaves  little  prospect  of 
peace,  597;  neglects  chance  to 
secure  Prussia  to  his  interests, 
599;  sends  Narbomie  to  Vienna 
to  secure  troops,  604;  forced  by 
alliance  of  Northern  powers  to 
open  war  earlier  than  he  had 
planned,  605;  makes  "greatest 
mistake  of  his  life"  and  con- 
sents to  armistice,  614;  con- 
tinues truce,  617,  618;  accepts 
armed  intervention  of  Austria, 
617;  desires  general  rather  than 
mere  Continental  peace,  618; 
sees  himself  confronted  with 
powerful  coalition  and  seeks  to 
break  it  up,  620;  his  plan  of 
campaign,  624;  his  illness  on 
road  to  Pima  after  battle  of 
Dresden,  627;  plans  enterprise 
against  Berlin,  but  is  thwarted  by 
Bliicher,  628;  enemy  escapes,  and 
defeats  his  generals,  630;  orders 
retreat  to  left  bank  of  the  Elbe 
and  abandons  the  right,  630; 
makes  approaches  to  Austria 
without  success,  632;  counts  on 
pitch(>d  battle,  but  enemy  retires, 
633;    plans    to    threaten    Berlin 


Index 


821 


Napoleon — Continiied. 

and  attack  main  army,  634; 
strategically  conquered,  his  sole 
hope  m  a  decisive  battle,  634; 
determined  to  attack  Schwar- 
zenberg,  who  is  approaching 
Leipzig,  634;  recognizes  his 
desperate  situation,  636;  sends 
Mers'eldt  to  Francis  with  pro- 
posals of  peace,  637;  hints  as 
to  how  much  of  his  position  in 
Europe  he  was  ready  to  give 
up,  637;  makes  ready  for  re- 
treat, 637-8;  neglectful  of  ener- 
getic steps  until  too  late,  637; 
describes  himself  as  kind-hearted 
toCoimt  M0I6,  641;  tells  Metter- 
nich  "a  man  like  me  cares  little 
for  the  lives  of  a  million  men," 
642;  ruled  by  idea  of  collect- 
ing another  army,  642;  opposi- 
tion of  European  peoples  to, 
643-4;  his  prestige  shaken,  644; 
determines  to  release  Ferdinand 
VII.  of  Spain  to  get  use  of 
troops  in  Spain,  646-7;  pre- 
vented by  Talleyrand,  647;  pro- 
poses to  release  Pope  on  cession 
of  Papal  States  to  kingdom  of 
Italy,  648;  terms  offered  by 
allied  monarchs,  648;  sends 
procrastinating     reply     to     pro- 

Sosed  terms,  649,  650;  assem- 
les  Corps  L^gislatif ,  651 ;  orders 
Caulaincourt  to  write  Metter- 
nich  of  his  acceptance  of  pro- 
posed basis  of  peace,  651 ;  in  hour 
of  need  the  military  leader  rather 
than  sovereign  to  French  people, 
652;  plans  to  collect  forces  at 
Paris  and  decide  matters  in  a 
battle,  653;  decides  to  accept 
terms  of  allies,  657;  resolves 
upon  dealing  Bliicher  a  blow,  658; 
detects  desire  of  enemy  for  truce 
and  determines  to  insist  on 
Frankfort  terms,  661 ;  learns 
of  Bliicher's  advance  on  Paris 
and  is  forced  to  pursue  him, 
664;  hastens  toward  Paris,  671; 
overtures  for  peace,  673;  forced 
to  abdicate,  675;  plans  to  operate 
in  Italy,  676;  offered  Elba,  677; 
renounces  thrones  of  Italy  and 


France,  677;  signs  treaty  of 
Fontainebleau,  677;  leaves 
Fontainebleau,  679;  arrives  at 
Portoferrajo,  679;  activity  on 
Elba,  680  f . ;  abduction  of, 
planned,  686;  plans  for  siege, 
687;  leaves  Elba  for  Continent, 
688;  issues  manifesto,  690;  wins 
over  anny,  691 ;  issues  decree, 
692;  forms  cabinet,  694;  pro- 
scribed by  powers,  698;  grants 
new  constitution,  702;  takes  the 
offensive  against  allied  armies, 
710 ;  at  battle  of  Waterioo,  71 1  f . ; 
flight  from  Waterloo,  719;  in 
Paris,  721 ;  abdicates  in  favour 
of  son,  724;  leaves  Paris  for 
Malmaison,  725;  escapes  to 
Rochefort,  726;  embarks  on 
"Bellerophon,"  727;  St.  Helena 
fixed  upon  as  abode  of,  728; 
embarks  for  St.  Helena,  729; 
treatment  of,  at  St.  Helena,  730; 
quarters  and  activity  at  liOng- 
wood,  731;  plans  for  rescue  of, 
732;  attempts  to  influence  public 
opinion,  733;  ill-health  of,  735; 
dictates  testament,  736;  death 
of,  736;  literary  remains  of, 
737;  his  hopes  for  his  dynasty, 
740 ;  body  removed  to  Paris,  742. 

Napoleon  II.,  see  King  of  Rome. 

Napoleon  III.,  see  Bonaparte,  Na- 
poleon III. 

Narbonne,  Adjutant  General  of 
Napoleon,  his  conversation  with 
Napoleon,  405,  520,  532,  538, 
^  543,  604,  618. 

Nasiedlowitz,  scene  of  conference 
between  Napoleon  and  Emperor 
Francis,  319;  annistice  of,  signed, 
Dec.  6th,  1805,  320;  tenns  of 
peace  at,  offered  by  Napoleon, 
319. 

Nassau,  338. 

National  Assembly,  suspends  royal 
authority,  29;  creates  battalions 
of  volunteers,  30;  laws  of,  par- 
tial, 231. 

Natural  boundaries,  idea  of  Rous- 
seau, 74. 

National  Council,  convoked,  497. 

Nationalists,  in  Corsica,  24. 

Necker,  13,  21. 


822 


Index 


Neipperg,  597  n. 

Nelson,  Admiral,  in  search  of 
French  fleet,  127  f.;  defeats 
French  fleet,  132;  at  Syracuse, 
154;  repulsed  by  French  fleet, 
216;    at  Trafalgar,  309. 

Nesselrode,  advocates  junction  of 
central  powers  of  Europe  against 
Napoleon,  595,  615,  617,  648. 

Neuchateau,  Frangois  de,  received 
into  Directory,  104;  in  conference 
with   Cobenzl,    160. 

Neuchatel,  Prince  of,  see  Berthier. 

Neuchatel,  320. 

Neumarkt,  pass  at,  98,  195. 

Neuville,  Hyde  de,  representa- 
tive of  Vendeans  in  Paris,  237. 

Newspapers,  suppressed,  238. 

Ney,  marches  into  Switzerland, 
257,  265;  appointed  marshal, 
280;  in  command,  284,  313;  com- 
mands advance-guard  at  Jena, 
359,  367,  375;  attacked  by  Ben- 
nigsen,  380;  attempts  to  find 
better  quarters  for  troops,  371; 
lingers  to  harass  Prussian  corps, 
372,  373,  382,  437,  446;  becomes 
Duke  of  Elchingen,  400,  413 ;  sent 
to  cut  off  Spanish  line  of  retreat, 
448,  449,  451,  500,  539,  545,  551, 
555,  567,  568;  left  to  his  fate  by 
Napoleon,  569;  takes  place  of 
Oudinot,  574,  607,  608,  609,  611; 
overcautious  at  Bautzen,  612, 
613;  defeated  at  Dennewitz, 
629;  wounded  at  Leipzig,  639, 
653,  660;  attacked  near  Torcy, 
668,  675,  677,  691,  708,  712,  714, 
716  f.,  718;  death  of,  728,  737, 
738. 

Nile,  valley  of,  113;  Egyptian  flo- 
tilla on,  130;  battle  of,  132; 
delta  of,  145. 

North  Lusitania,  Kingdom  of,  to 
be  given  to  Queen  of  Etniria 
as  compensation  for  Tuscany, 
428. 

North  Sea,  coast  of,  importance  to 
France  of,  191. 

Norwav,  530,  560,  595,  603. 

Normal  School,   233. 

Notables,   183. 

Novi,  d(>feat  of  French  at,  155,  164, 
197;  road  from,  to  Genoa,  200. 


Niiremberg,  publishers  of,  352. 

Ocafio,  battle  of,  500 

Odeleben,  606  n.,   639. 

Oglio,  proposed  boundary  line  for 
Austria,  99,  101,  206. 

Oldenburg,  duchy  of,  annexed,  519; 
offered  Erfurt  as  compensation, 
519,  521,  602,  609,  610. 

Oldenburg,  Duke  of,  486. 

Olmiitz,  312,  317. 

Olssufief,  658,  659. 

Om  Dinar,  engagement  at,   131. 

O'Meara,  367  n.,   729,  735. 

Orange,  Prince  of,  353;  House  of, 
644. 

Ordener,  General,  arrests  d'En- 
ghien,  272. 

Orders  in  Council  of  1807,  504; 
Dutch  pennitted  to  demand 
revocation  of,  507,  509,  581. 

Orient,  Napoleon's  plan  of  cam- 
paign in,  121 ;  Napoleon  general- 
in-chief  of,  122;  amiy  of,  124; 
effect  of  French  in,  134;  armj- 
of,  composition  of,  152;  expedi- 
tion, 194;  plans  of  Napoleon  in, 
286;  policy  of  Russia  in,  288  n., 
290. 

Orleans,  Maid  of,  birthday  of,  re- 
vived,  267. 

Osterach,  defeat  of  French  at,  161. 

Osterode,  Napoleon  at,  375,  376. 

Ostrolenka,  367. 

Otranto,  Duke  of,  see  Fouche. 

Otranto,  occupied  by  French,  268, 
328. 

Ott,  besieges  Genoa,  198;  takes 
Genoa,  200. 

Otto,  French  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don, 265,  267,  284,  366. 

Ottoman  Empire,  see  Turkey. 

Oubril,  Russian  ambassador  sent  to 
Paris,  345,  346;  refuses  to  treat 
in  conjunction  with  England, 
346  n. ;  promises  Bav  of  Cattaro 
to  Napoleon,  346,  349. 

Oudinot,  becomes  Duke  of  Reggio, 
400,  413,  l.'SO,  460,  464,  539, 
545,  518,  570,  571;  leads  his 
forces  to  Studjanka,  572;  wound- 
ed, 574,  606,  614,  ()23,  624,  627, 
635,  636,  ()58,  660,  664,  666,  675. 

Ouvrard,   397. 


Index 


8 


3 


Padua,  328. 

Pagerie,  Joseph  Gaspard  Tascher 
de  la,  father  of  Josephine,  63. 

Paget,  34G  n. 

Paiol,  General,  713. 

Palafox,  commander  of  Spanish 
right  wing,  448. 

Palestine,   invasion  of,    139. 

Palm,  Niiremberg  bookseller,  352; 
indignation  aroused  by  murder 
of,  353. 

Pampeluna,  644. 

du  Pan,  Mallet,  quoted  on  plan  of 
expansion,  76;  reports  French 
plans  in  Italy,  77;  prophetic  re- 
mark regarding  Napoleon,  95; 
cont-enipt  expressed  for  Napo- 
leon, 96 ;  letter  on  French  policy, 
125;  on  character  of  Revolu- 
tion, 190;  on  activity  of  Direc- 
tory,   191,    504    n. 

Paoli,  Pasquale,  government  of 
Corsica  by,  1 ;  his  flight  to  Eng- 
land, 2;  his  return  from  exile, 
26;  chosen  President  of  Coun- 
cil, 27,  31 ;  his  altercation  with 
Napoleon,  35;  favours  constitu- 
tional monarchy,  35;  accused  by 
Napoleon,  36 ;  invited  by  George 
III.,   48. 

Papacy,  Napoleon  recognizes  politi- 
cal importance  of,  212;  act  of 
Senatus  consultum  in  regard  to, 
496. 

Papal  government,  ransoms  Rome, 
84;  troops,  cowardice  of,  93; 
states,  118,  125. 

Papal  Legations,  in  Austro-Russian 
treaty,  281. 

Papal  States,  vacated  by  Naples, 
211;  attempt  to  include  in 
"Italian  Federation,"  422;  Na- 
poleon threatens  to  annex  lega- 
tions of  Urbino,  Macerata,  and 
Ancona  in,  424;  converted  into 
French  province,  Apr.  1808, 
425,  436,  495,  496,  648. 

Paris,  riots  in,  22;  effect  of  defeat 
of  French  troops  in,  33;  re\'ul- 
sion  of  feeling  in,  49;  anns 
against  the  Convention,  55;  so- 
ciety in,  described  by  Napoleon, 
62;  need  of  rest  felt  in,  74; 
change  of  affairs  in,  102;    popu- 


larity of  Napoleon  in,  115; 
Napoleon's  estimate  of  populace 
of,  115,  121;  Napoleons  trium- 
phal journey  to,  157;  garri.son 
of,  169;  quiet  in,  on  19th  Hru- 
niaire,  179;  report  of  Napoleon's 
defeat  at,  203;  churches  of, 
crowded,  212;  Cardinal  Consalvi 
.sent  to,  213;  robbers  in  the 
outskirts  of,  224;  prefect  of 
police  in,  225;  manufactures  in, 
225;  foreigners  flock  to,  242; 
changes  at,  243 ;  delegation  from 
Porto  Ferrajo  summoned  to,  255 : 
fifty  deputies  from  Switzerlana 
summoned  to,  257;  work  of 
Pichegru  in,  270;  arrival  of 
d'Enghien  at,  273:  brief  career 
of  "Liberty"  in,  281;  Pius  VII. 
arrives  at,  292;  treaty  of,  signed 
at,  July  20th,  1806,  345,  346,  347; 
advance  of  allied  annies  on,  670; 
capitulation  of,  672;  treaty  of, 
698,  729. 

Parma,  Duke  of,  see  Cambacdres. 

Panna,  Duke  of,  concludes  truce 
with  Napoleon,  84;  Prince  of, 
marries  .Spanish  princess,  210; 
principality  of,  ceded  to  France, 
210,  328;    duchy  of,  677. 

Parthenopean  Republic,  founded, 
160:    ended,  162. 

Passariano,  negotiations  at,  108; 
peace  of,  205. 

Passau,  allotted  to  Bavaria,  261. 

Paul  I.,  refuses  to  aid  Austria,  91; 
prejudiced  in  favour  of  Napoleon, 
208;  schemes  against  India,  214; 
death  of,  214;  defends  Sardinia, 
251. 

Paulucci,  586. 

Pavia,  200. 

Peraldi,  Corsican  patriot,  25,  112. 

Pennon,  Madame,  sought  in  mar- 
riage by   Napoleon,  63. 

Persia,  Shah  of.  Napoleon's  ad- 
vances toward,  138. 

Persia,  rebellion  in,  191,  365; 
Napoleon  tries  to  rouse,  against 
Russia,  378-9. 

Petit,  General,  679. 

Peyrusse,  567  n.,  622  n.,  701. 

Phelippeaux,  at  siege  of  Acre,141, 
143. 


824 


Index 


Philipsburg,  surrendered,  205. 

Piacenza,  Duke  of,  see  Lebrun. 

Piacenza,  81,  199,  328. 

Pichegru,  in  army  of  the  north,  46, 
76;  relations  with  Cond^,  104; 
president  of  "Five  Hundred," 
104;  agent  of  RoyaUsts,  270; 
death  of,  271 ;  d'Enghien  denies 
connection  with,  273. 

Piedmont,  51 ;  ambassadors  of,  at 
Montebello,  107 ;  wanted  by  Aus- 
tria, 194;  Napoleon  in,  200; 
assessed  a  million  and  a  half, 
202;  fate  of,  undecided,  210; 
fate  of,  discloses  Napoleon's  de- 
signs, 253;  incorporated  as  a 
French  province,  253;  to  be 
retained,  287;  in  Austro-Russian 
treaty,  291,  346,  658. 

Pitt,  concludes  treaty  with  Thu- 
gut,  72;  retains  Malta  and 
Egypt,  194;  retires  from  British 
government,  214;  death  of,  343; 
succeeded  by  Grenville  ministry 
led  by  Fox,  344,  494,  603  f. 

Piombino,  ceded  to  France,  211. 

Pius  VI.  and  VII.,  see  Pope. 

Plancenoit,  715,  717,  718,  719. 

Platoflf,  Cossack  corps  of,  harasses 
rear-guard  commanded  by  Da- 
vout,  565,  569,  573. 

Po,  the,  81,  99,  109,  200. 

Poischwitz,  annistice  signed  at 
614;    terms  of  annistice  of,  614 

Poland,  Austria  seeking  territory 
in,  72;  partition  of,  91,  96 
aided  by  France,  159;  Napo 
leon  renounces  support  of,  217 
rumours  that  Napoleon  was 
about  to  re-establish,  362,  363 
Napoleon  encourages  insurrec- 
tion in,  364;  extensive  Polish 
territories  included  in  Austria, 
364,  370,  387,  391;  Napoleon's 
conduct  toward,  487,  516;  bone 
of  contention  between  Czar  and 
Napoleon,  516,  517;  Czar  recog- 
nizes cause  of  Napoleon's  concern 
for,  517,  528,  .530,  541,  543; 
Napoleon's  feeling  in  regard  to 
restoration  of,  543,  549,  559, 
592,  594,  595,  596;  Czar  again 
considers  project  of  united  Po- 
land   under    Russian    rule,    528, 


596,  601,  602,  610,  611,  637, 
661  n.,  686. 

Polytechnic  School,  233. 

Pomerania,  347. 

Pomerania  (Swedish),  falls  to 
France  from  Sweden,  510;  occu- 
pied by  French  to  prevent 
smuggling,  531,  603. 

Pondicherry,  acquired  by  England, 
215. 

Poniatowski,  commander  of  na- 
tional forces  of  Warsaw,  487, 
536,  539,  623;  drowned  at 
Leipzig,   639. 

Pontebba,  97. 

Ponte  Corvo,  Prince  of,  see  Ber- 
nadotte. 

Ponte  Corvo,  329. 

Pontecoulant,  Doucet  de,  successor 
of  Aubry,  52;  Girondist  prefect, 
224. 

Pope  Pius  VI.,  refuses  proposals 
of  Directory,  93;  agreement 
with  Austria,  93 ;  his  treaty  with 
Napoleon,  94;  deposed,  119,  129; 
at  coronation  of  Napoleon,  292 

Pope  Pius  VII.,  agreement  of, 
with  Napoleon,  212;  objects 
attained  by,  293;  Napoleon's 
conduct  toward,  329;  refuses  to 
dissolve  marriage  of  Jerome 
with  Elizabeth  Patterson,  330; 
his  complete  rupture  with  Na- 
poleon, 331 ;  letter  of  Napoleon 
to,  334,  337;  refuses  Napoleon's 
demands,  423;  refuses  ratifica- 
tion of  treaty,  425;  deprived 
of  temporal  power,  425;  allies 
himself  with  popular  resistance, 
495;  publishes  bull  of  excom- 
munication, 495;  arrested  by 
Murat  at  instigation  of  Na- 
poleon, 495;  resists  Napoleon, 
who  restricts  his  prisoner  more 
severely,  496-98;  Napoleon  seeks 
settlement  of  contest  with,  588; 
chooses  Avignon  for  residence, 
589;  peace  made  with,  pub- 
lished, 589,  592,  647;  refuses  to 
negotiate  \\ith  Napoleon  and  is 
kept  prisoner,  648. 

Pordenone,  French  defeated  at,  464. 

Portalis,  222,  230. 

Portugal,    joins    coalition,    73;    to 


Index 


825 


Portugal — Contimiecl. 
desert  England,  210;  contributes 
to  French  treasurj^  213;  con- 
quest of,  urged  on  Spain,  215; 
concludes  peace,  216;  enters 
league  with  France,  268,  389; 
Napoleon  makes  demands  upon, 
to  provoke  opposition,  427-8; 
John,  Prince  Regent  of,  loses  his 
throne,  428-9;  royal  family  of, 
flee  to  Brazil,  429,  430,  436/449, 
452,  480,  482,  501,  502,  512 

Posen,  367. 

Poterat,  Marquis  of,  74. 

Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Corsican  patriot, 
25;  sent  by  Russia  as  envoy  to 
Vienna,  364;  conversation  with 
Stadion,  385  n.,  386,  386  n. 

Prague,  609,  congress  at,  619; 
negotiations  of,  conducted  in 
writing  through  Austria,  619, 
621  n.,  647. 

Prairial,  1st,  50;    30th,  175. 

Pr^ameneu,  Bigot  de,  280. 

Prefects  of  the  palace,  in  Empire, 
280. 

Prenzlau,  361. 

Pressburg,  treaty  of,  signed  Dec. 
26th,  1805,  321-23,  334;  14th 
article  of,  339;  financial  stress 
impels  Napoleon  to  conclusion  of, 
335,  397,  458,  475,  477. 

"Prince  of  the  Peace,"  title  of 
Godoy,  210,  269. 

Provence,  peasant  uprising  in, 
23;  central  committee  in,  39. 

Pro  vera,  91. 

Prussia,  treaty  with,  50;  with- 
draws from  coalition,  51,  72; 
offers  of,  for  peace  refused,  73; 
purposes  of,  99;  plans  of  Di- 
rectory and  of  Napoleon  for, 
191;  joins  Russia  against  Eng- 
land, 208;  to  arm  against  Aus- 
tria, 209;  to  be  kept  back  from 
Rhine,  259;  treaty  of,  with 
France,  260;  share  of,  too 
large,  261 ;  advised  to  occupy 
Hanover,  286;  Russia  tries  to 
win  over,  288;  need  of,  to  act 
with  Austria,  290;  assents  to 
Russia's  petition  for  passage  for 
her  troops,  313;  promises  to 
demand     restriction     of    French 


sj^stem  of  expansion,  318 ;  greater 
part  of  army  of,  disbanded  Jan. 
1806,  342;  ratifies  treaty  of 
Schonbrunn,  342;  occupation 
of  Hanover  by,  343;  sends  to 
Russia  to  bring  about  an  under- 
standing, July  1st,  1806,  344; 
the  French  advance  upon,  348; 
refuses  to  disarm  and  renews 
demand  for  withdrawal  of  French 
army,  354;  audacity  in  opposing 
resistance  to  Napoleon,  355; 
war  against  Napoleon  begun, 
Sept.  25th,  1806,  355;  King  of, 
undecided,  357;  in  Napoleon's 
power,  36i ;  appeal  of,  for  f)eace 
to  Napoleon  declined,  362;  Na- 
poleon's oppressive  conditions, 
363;  Queen  Louise  of,  appears 
before  Napoleon  to  ask  mercy 
for,  389;  Napoleon  delays  evacu- 
ation by  continual  exactions,  417; 
compelled  to  recall  ambassador 
from  London,  420;  formation 
of  Tugendbund  in,  437;  Scham- 
horst  and  Stein  in,  437,  439,  440; 
counted  upon  by  Austria,  455; 
elated  at  successes  of  Austria,  472, 
473;  Bliicher  and  Biilow  plan 
military  uprising  of,  against 
Napoleon,  474;  plan  for  parti- 
tion of,  525;  territories  of, 
threatened  on  all  sides,  526; 
offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance with  Napoleon,  526;  terms 
deeply  humiliating  to,  527;  dis- 
memberment of,  an  assured  fact 
to  Mettemich,  528;  advised 
by  Metternich  to  join  Russia, 
529,  527,  529,  534,  537,  538; 
people  of,  ready  to  throw  off  yoke 
of  alliance  with  Napoleon,  585; 
rage  against  foreigners,  580; 
public  opinion  in,  forces  Yorck 
to  refuse  to  fight  against  Russia, 
586;  proposal  of  Czar  to  restore 
to  position  of  1806,  586,  595; 
senas  envoy  to  Vienna,  595; 
Czar's  overtures  to,  shaped  by 
Nesselrode's  scheme,  595;  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Russia  of,  598, 
599;  enthusiasm  and  martial 
spirit  of  people  of,  600;  new 
treaty  between  Russia  and,  Mar. 


826 


Ind 


ex 


Pnissi  a — Continued. 

19th,  1813,  601;  king  of,  calls  out 
the  Land  we  hr,  601 ;  declaration  of 
war  handed  to  French  ambas- 
sador, 601,  605,  607,  609,  610, 
615,  617,  621,  623,  624;  Land- 
wehr  of,  629,  632,  665;  party 
to  treaty  with  Russia  and  Aus- 
tria, 686,  698;  mobilizes  army, 
709. 

Public  instruction,  406-409;  girls 
not  included  in,  408. 

Pultusk,  battle  at,  368;  plan  of 
battle  before,  367 ;  valour  of  Rus- 
sians at,  370,  375. 

Punjab,  Russian  expedition  against, 
214. 

Pyramids,  battle  of,  131;  Napo- 
leon's famous  remark  on,  131, 
135. 

Quatre-Bras,  712,  714. 
Quosdanovich,    Austrian    General, 

86;    defeated  by   Napoleon,   87; 

in  command  of  division,  89. 

Raab,  475. 

Radetzky,  criticism  of  Austrian 
plan  of  campaign  bv,  466  n., 
652,  666  n. 

Radicals,  29,  31 ;  ministry  of,  dis- 
missed, 33;  restored,  34;  Na- 
poleon joins,  44;  Napoleon  cuts 
loose  from,  50;  rule  of,  in  France, 
157;  excluded  from  council, 
159;  in  league  with  Moderates, 
in  Napoleon's  Council  of  State, 
221;  deportation  of,  237. 

Ragusa,  Duke  of,  see  Marmont. 

Ragusa,  Bruyere  consul  at,  287;  to 
be  offered  to  Austria,  288  n.; 
Republic  of,  365. 

Ramolino,  Letitia,  Napoleon's 
mother,  3. 

Ranke,  on  the  Convention  of 
Tauroggen,  586. 

Rapp,  openly  acknowledges  dis- 
taste for  Russian  war,  539; 
represents  distress  of  troops  to 
Napoleon,  .552,  605,  710. 

Rastatt,  congress  at,  109;  Napo- 
leon at,  114,  126,  1.59,  207; 
question  of  iiidenmity  at,  257. 

Ratisbon,    diet   of,    not   to   decide 


German  question,  260;  organ- 
ization of  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  officially  announced  at 
diet  of,  Aug.  1st,  1806,  339;  ap- 
pointed as  headquarters  for 
Napoleon's  army  in  Germany, 
460 ;  taken  by  Archduke  Charles, 
466;  battle  at,  lost  bv  Charles, 
467. 

Raynal,  his  "Histoire  philoso- 
phique,"  13;  in  Napoleon's  li- 
brary, 124. 

Razumoffsky,  346  n. 

R^camier,  Madame  de,  61;  rival 
of  Josephine,  65 ;  banished,  402  n. 

Reggio,  Duke  of,  see  Oudinotj 
dukedom  of,  328. 

Refonnists,   in  Chambers,   167. 

Reichenbach,  terms  of  treaty  of, 
signed  June  27th,  1813,  616. 

ReiUe,  500,  710. 

R^musat,  Madame  de,  11;  "M6- 
moires"  quoted,  56;  describes 
Josephine,  65;  love  letter  of 
Napoleon  from  "Memoires"  of, 
68;  faithful  friend  of  Josephine, 
70;  remarks  of  Napoleon  quoted, 
83,  105,  123,  138,  144,  188; 
lady-in-waiting  to  Josephine, 
245;  description  of  Napoleon's 
habits,  245;  remark  on  d'En- 
ghien  case,  275;  doubt  of,  as  to 
invasion  of  England,  284;  obser- 
vation on  new  nobilit}^,  329; 
Napoleon's  views  on  new  nobil- 
ity, 399  n. ;  her  selection  of 
plays  for  stage,  403;  disliked 
Napoleon,  405  f. 

Remusat,  M.  de,  Prefect  of  Palace, 
414. 

Rentes,  see  Securities. 

Republic,  Jacobins  favour,  32; 
Napoleon  opposes,  34;  in 
"Souper  de  Beaucaire,"  44; 
Napoleon  useful  to,  47;  clings  to 
conquests,  73;  Napoleon  on,  in 
address  to  soldiers,  103;  aids 
Poland,  159;  changes  names  of 
streets,  244. 

Republican  monarchy,  240  n. 

Republicans  oppose  empire,  277  n. 

Revolution,  French,  Chapter  II., 
passim;  sp(>ll  of,  on  Napoleon, 
95;  relation  of  Napoleon  to,  105, 


Inde 


X 


827 


165;  established  aspirations  of, 
74;  armies  of,  85,  187;  not  at 
an  end,  188;  Consulate  retains 
principles  of,   189;    plans  of  ex- 

f)ansion  of,  191 ;  Napoleon  fol- 
ows  plans  of,  192;  support  of, 
by  priests,  212;  effect  of,  in 
Europe,  218;  talent  developed 
by,  221 ;  government  of  prov- 
inces during,  223;  suppresses 
chambers  of  commerce,  229; 
changes  law  of  the  land,  230; 
abolishes  hereditary  nobility,  231 ; 
work  of,  in  education,  233;  cal- 
ender of,  in  use,  243;  abolishes 
mortmain,  258;  ejects  Cardinal 
de  Rohan  from  Strasburg,  272; 
fixes  penalty  of  death  for  treason, 
273;  empire  founded  upon,  290; 
calendar   of,  abolished,  293. 

Rewbell,  directs  foreign  policy,  75; 
in  Directory,  102;  in  Switzer- 
land,   120;  "director,    158. 

Reynier,  in  Egyptian  expedition, 
127,  139;  conmiands  Saxons  in 
Russia,  539,  548,  570,  597,  012, 
635,  636,  638,  639. 

Rhenish  Confederation,  see  Confed- 
eration of  the  States  of  the 
Rhine. 

Rhenish  princes,  confederation  of, 
191. 

Rhine,  natural  boundary'  of  France, 
74;  frontier  of,  92;  armies  on, 
97,  109,  193,  195;  frontier  of 
France,  207,  209;  ecclesiastical 
provinces  on,  258;  Prussia  and 
Austria  to  be  kept  back  from, 
259 

Rhodes,  145. 

Richelieu,  224,  275. 

Richepanse,  at  Hohenlinden,  206; 
sent  to  Martinique,  263. 

Ricord,  44. 

Riviera,  40,  44,  48,  193. 

Rivoli,   Duke  of,  see  jMassdna. 

Rivoli,  battle  of,  91,  195,  280. 

Robespierre,  leader  of  Radicals,  38 : 
fall  of,  45,  49,  50,  60,  64,  79,  196. 

Robespierre  the  younger,  at  Avig- 
non, 41 ;  recommends  confidence 
in  Napoleon,  44;  Napoleon  con- 
sults,  192. 

Robespierre,  Mile.,  44. 


Roederer,  126,  221. 

Roger-Ducos,  in  Director}-,  163; 
in  provisional  government,  168; 
resigns  from  Directory,  172; 
ready  for  flight,  177;  consul  in 
provisional  govenuuent,  180; 
withdraws  from  govenunent, 
181 ;  not  prominent,  181 ;  sena- 
tor,  186. 

Rohan,  Charlotte  de,  marries 
d'Enghien,  272;  his  last  message 
to  her,  274  n. 

Romagna,  93,  94 ;  ceded  to  Venice, 
100,  424. 

Roman  law,  in  South  of  France, 
230;   in  Code,  231. 

Romanzoff,  459,   560,  595. 

Rome,  fall  of,  imminent,  93;  Ber- 
thier  enters,  119,  120;  negotia- 
tions and  treaty  on,  210,  217. 

Ronco,  90. 

Rosbach,  11 

Rosenburg,  467. 

Rosetta,  130. 

Rostopchin,  Count,  orders  firing  of 
Moscow,  558  n. ;  denounces  Na- 
poleon  as  unbaptized,   559. 

Rousseau,  J.  J.,  1 ;  works  of,  read 
by  Napoleon,  13;  efTect  of,  on 
Napoleon,  14,  16;  influence  of, 
on  "boundary"  question,  74; 
in  Napoleon's  library,  124;  repu- 
diated as  Revolutionary,  244. 

Roustan,  476. 

Ro\igo,  Duke  of,  see  Savarj', 
duchy  of,  328. 

Royalists,  emigration  of,  27,  33; 
faction  of,  53,  54;  attitude  on 
expansion,  76;  in  control  of 
legislature,  102;  vanquished, 
103;  in  opposition,  158;  depart- 
ments of,  164;  devoted  to  Bona- 
parte, 181 ;  in  Napoleon's  Coun- 
cil of  State,  221 ;  remain  loyal  to 
Louis  XVIII. ,  237;  headquarters 
of,  in  England,  270;  oppose  em- 
pire, 277  n. 

Rvichel,  353;  commands  Prussian 
right  wing,  358;  summoned  bj' 
Hohenlohe,  360. 

Russia,  supports  Austria,  72; 
sends  no  aid  to  Austria,  77,  99; 
partition  of  Poland  by,  91 ;  re- 
sents    French     interference      in 


828 


Index 


Russi.i — Continued. 

East,  125;  Czar  of,  protector  of 
Knights  of  8t.  John,  128;  wins 
over  Turkey,  135;  advance  of, 
toward  Italy,  142;  cold  of,  com- 
pared with  heat  of  Syria,  146; 
enemy  of  France,  159;  alUance 
with  England  and  Turkey,  160; 
agreement  of,  with  Austria,  160; 
quarrel  of,  with  Austria,  194; 
separated  from  Austria,  208 ;  from 
England,  208;  Prussia  to  medi- 
ate between  France  and,  209; 
jealousy  of,  209;  intercedes  for 
Naples,  211;  takes  up  anns 
against  England,  214;  treaty 
with  France,  on  emigres,  216  f. ; 
secret  compact  with  them,  217, 
251,  261 ;  admonition  of,  to  Napo- 
leon, 256;  House  of  Wiirtemberg 
related  to,  260;  Napoleon  vio- 
lates agreement  with,  286;  occa- 
sion of  previous  war  with.  287; 
rupture  of,  with  France,  288; 
oriental  policy  of,  288  n. ;  fails  to 
win  over  Austria,  289;  Austria 
concludes  treaty  with,  291;  war 
party  in,  regains  the  ascendant, 
346,  350,  354,  362-390,  passim; 
alliance  with,  proposed  by  Napo- 
leon, 381 ;  concludes  truce  with 
Napoleon,  June  22d,  1807,  384; 
declares  war  against  England, 
Nov.  7th,  1807,  415;  oriental 
schemes  of,  checkmated  by  Na- 
poleon, 418;  troops  of ,  cross  bor- 
der of  Finland,  Feb.  1808,  419; 
Napoleon  offers  Danubian  prin- 
cipalities to,  438;  fate  of  Europe 
depends  on  decision  of,  439; 
remains  allied  with  Napoleon, 
456;  national  feeling  not  repre- 
sented by  Czar  of,  457,  479; 
advises  Francis  I.  to  make  peace 
with  France,  480,  481;  distrust- 
ful of  Napoleon,  487,  488,  494; 
Napoleon  attempts  to  close  ports 
of,  against  England,  516;  refuses 
to  confiscate  neutral  vessels,  518; 
financial  situation  in,  518;  an- 
nexation of  Oldenburg  flagrant 
violation  of  treaty  of  Tilsit,  519; 
Czar  addresses  letter  of  protest 
to   European   powers,   520;    pre- 


pares for  war  with  France,  520; 
desire  to  exchange  Oldenburg 
for  Warsaw  refused  by  Napoleon, 
521 ;  attempt  of  Napoleon  and 
Austria  to  make  out  Czar  as 
party  breaking  peace,  521 ;  sends 
ultimatum  to  Napoleon  Apr. 
30th,  1812,  532;  hatred  of  Na- 
poleon, 535;  national  pride,  536; 
Napoleon's  expedition  against, 
538-44,  553,  577,  581,  587,  591, 
593-618,  623,  624,  627,  632, 
636,  665;  party  to  treaty  with 
Prussia  and  Austria,  686. 

Saalfeld,  battle  of,  358. 

Sachsen,  General,  142. 

Sacken,  659, 660. 

"Sacred  Heart,"  554. 

Saint-Aignan,  Baron  de,  648;  urges 
Napoleon  not  to  put  off  nego- 
tiations a  day,  648,  651,  652,  655. 

St.  Antoine,  suburb  of,  33. 

St.  Armand,  713. 

St.  Bernard,  pass,  199. 

St.  Cloud,    chambers  at,    169-173. 

Saint-Cyr,  general  of  Revolu- 
tionary troops,  47;  in  Italy,  268, 
545,  546,  548,  560,  567,  623,  624, 
625,  626,  632. 

Saint-Germain,  243. 

Saint-Gothard,  passage  of,  199. 

St.  Helena,  79,  146,  151,  467,  728  ff. 

St.  John,  Knights  of  the  Order  of, 
in  Malta,  127  f. 

St.  Julien,  Joseph  de,  Count,  204, 
345. 

Saint-Ruf,  Abb6  de,  12. 

St.  Vincent,  456. 

Salamanca,  554,  581. 

Salicetti,  elected  to  States-General, 
24;  advice  of,  on  Corsica,  26; 
gives  certificate  to  Napoleon, 
40;  at  Avignon,  41;  clears  Na- 
poleon, 44;  accu.ses  Napoleon, 
45  f.;  resumes  defence  of  Napo- 
leon, 47;  accompanies  Napoleon 
to  Italy,  81 ;  to  manage  diplo- 
macy in  Italy,  82;  delivers  con- 
stitution to  Genoese,  254. 

Salzburg,  ceded  to  Austria,  109; 
archbishopric  of,  demanded  by 
Austria,  259;  allotted  to  Grand- 
duke  of  Tuscany,  261,  323,  481. 


Index 


829 


San  Domingo,  base  of  Napoleon's 
colonial  scheme,  263,  325. 

Sandoz-Kollin,  180. 

San  Ildefonso,  treaty  of,  210. 

San  Sebastian,  fortress  of,  644. 

Saragossa,  435. 

Sardinia,  expedition  against,  85; 
king  of,  in  plans  for  the  army 
of  Italy,  51;  joins  coalition, 
73;  effort  to  separate  from 
Austria,  77;  cedes  St.  Pierre, 
112;  at  war  with  Trance,  142; 
in  Napoleon's  course,  154;  de- 
fended by  Paul  I.,  253,  313; 
King  of,  346. 

Savary,  secret  police  agency 
under,  246;  M^moires  of,  on 
conduct  of  Napoleon  with  Pope, 
292  n.,  376;  becomes  Duke  of 
Rovigo,  400;  sent  to  Alexander  I. 
to  ask  for  armistice  and  parley, 
314;  Turkish  principalities  de- 
manded of,  by  Czar,  416;  keeps 
Napoleon  informed  of  opposition 
in  Russia,  416;  succeeded,  Dec. 
1807,  by  Caulaincouit,  416; 
sent  to  Madrid  to  induce  Fer- 
dinand VII.  to  meet  Napoleon 
in  Bayonne,  431,  576,  651,  726, 
729. 

Savona,  fortifications  of,  45;  road 
from,  over  Apennines,  79,  80; 
Pope  at,  588. 

Savoy,  incorporated  into  France, 
210. 

Saxe-Teschen,  Albert,  Duke  of,  472, 
474, 

Saxonv  declares  herself  neutral, 
88,  348;  only  ally  left  to  Prussia 
slow  in  making  preparations  for 
war,  354;  King  of,  to  rule  War- 
saw, 390 ;  made  a  member  of  the 
Confederation  of  States  of  the 
Rhine,  Dec.  1806,  390;  arms  in 
haste,  especially  in  Warsaw, 
524;  wavers  in  question  of 
alliance  with  Napoleon,  594; 
policy  of,  dependent  on  Austria 
and  Prussia,  594;  attempts  of 
Prussia  and  Russia  to  secure 
alliance  with,  602;  concludes 
secret  alliance  with  Austria, 
602,  604,  606,  608,  609;  Fred- 
erick Augustus,  King  of,  decides 


to  join  Napoleon,  009,  611,  615, 
620,  631,  637,  640;  King  of, 
sent  to  iierlin  a  pri.soner,  640; 
Stein  becomes  executive  head 
of,  in  name  of  allied  monarchs, 
640;  at  Congress  of  Vienna, 
686,  698. 

Say,  J.  B.,  Political  F.conomy  of, 
forbidden  by  Napoleon,  506  n. 

Scharnhorst,  Colonel,  plan  of  at- 
tack of,  sacrificed,  357;  counsels 
attack  upon  Napoleon's  flank, 
358;  rescues  Bemiigsen  at  Prus- 
sian Evlau,  373;  dissatisfaction 
with  Bennigsen's  retreat,  374; 
valour  of,  376,  494;  urges  Fred- 
erick William  to  arm  against 
Napoleon,  526;  goes  to  Vieima 
to  ascertain  intentions,  527,  529, 
586,  599,  606. 

Schdrer,  in  command  of  Army 
of  Italy,  77;  refu.ses  to  carry 
out  Napoleon's  plans,  78;  de- 
feated, 150;  in  command  of 
Army  of  Italy,  161;  retires 
before   Austrians,    162. 

Schill,  472. 

Schimmelpennick,  332. 

Schleiermacher,  sermons  of,  upon 
the  value  of  nationality,  352. 

Schleiz,  battle  of,  358. 

Scholer,  416  n. 

Schonbrunn,  312;  treaty  of  alli- 
ance signed  at,  Dec.  15th,  1805, 
320;  sent  for  ratification  in 
altered  form,  Jan.  1806,  341; 
revised  treaty  of,  342;  treaty 
of,  signed  bv  Liechtenstein,  Oct 
13th,  1809,  481;  terms  of  treaty 
of,  4S1-2;  Napoleon's  life  at- 
tempted at,  482. 

Schulmeister,  a  spy,  305. 

Schwarzenberg,  Prince,  Austrian 
Ambassador  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, 456,  488  n.,  489,  516  529, 
539,  548,  560,  570,  572,  582,  593, 
625,  626,  630,  633-636,  652,  654- 
660;  suggests  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities, 661,  662,  663,  666,  666  n., 
667,   668,   676. 

S6bastiani,  report  of,  from  Egypt, 
266;  sent  on  mission  to  Con- 
stantianople,  365;  instructed 
to   rouse  Persia,  378;    in   Spain, 


830 


Index 


Sebastian! — Continued. 

480;  assured  by  Napoleon  that 
the  Dwina  would  not  be  crossed 
that  year  by  the  French,  542, 
639, 

Securities,  Government,  376,  397  f., 
590,  645,  667,  671,  700. 

S^gur,  Grand  Master  of  Cere- 
monies, 280;  Memoires  of,  316, 
536,  537,  538  n.,  540  n.,708. 

Selim,  I.,  overcomes  Mamelukes, 
130. 

SeUm  III.  dispossesses  the  Woi- 
wodes,  and  rouses  Russian  ire, 
365;  induced  to  make  war  upon 
Russia  from  the  Dniester  while 
Napoleon  operates  from  the 
Vistula,  365;  unsuccessful  in 
war  against  Russia,  376;  Na- 
poleon's purposes  in  regard  to, 
shipwrecked,  381 ;  succeeded  by 
Mustapha,  hostile  to  France, 
381. 

Selz,  conference  at,  160. 

Senate,  in  new  constitution,  167, 
184;  Sieyes  president  of,  186; 
obeys  Napoleon,  239;  accorded 
right  of  iimendment,  276;  depu- 
tation of,  addresses  Napoleon, 
277;  acts  on  new  constitution, 
278;  in  imperial  constitution, 
279;  co-operates  with  Napoleon, 
404,  583,  591 ;  grants  new  levy 
of    troops,    644,    645,    646;     de- 

Eoses  Napoleon,  673;  proclaims 
ouis  XVIII.  king,  677. 

Senatus  consultum,  Aug.  4th,  1802, 
increases  Napoleon's  power,  240; 
decrees  statue  of  Peace,  240  n. 

Servia,  518,  523. 

Seymour,  Lord,  344. 

Shebreket,  Murad,  at,  131. 

Sicily,  Nelson  at,  127;  passage 
between,  and  Tunis,  154;  King 
of  Naples  flies  to,  160;  Napoleon 
lenient  with,  211;  alone  left  to 
Queen  Caroline,  328;  to  remain 
to  the  Bourbons,  344;  Napoleon 
insists  upon  cession  of,  to  Joseph, 
345,  346,  418,  511. 

Sieyds,  leader  of  Jacobins,  76; 
not  in  favour  of  constitution  of 
year  III,  118,  126;  admitted 
to    Directory,    155;    chosen    Di- 


rector, 163  f.;  loses  prestige, 
164;  constitution  of,  166  f.; 
plans  of,  168;  yields  to  Napoleon, 
168;  resigns  from  Directory, 
172;  advice  to  Napoleon,  173; 
ready  for  flight,  177;  consul 
in  provisional  government,  180; 
not  prominent,  181 ;  constitu- 
tion of,  183  f. ;  president  of 
Senate,  186;  plan  of,  in  German 
principalities,  191 ;  report  of, 
from  Berlin,  191 ;  at  Talleyrand's 
house,  203;  his  project  of 
secularization,  258,  260;  votes 
against  new  constitution,  278, 
336,  395;  in  conspiracy,  495, 
510,  708. 
Silesia,  conquest  of,  by  Prussia, 
72;  open  to  Russians  in  case  of 
defeat  in  Moravia,  313,  364,  377, 
387,  418,  457,  528;  question  of, 
to  be  settled  by  first  mistake  01 
Prussia,  529;  to  be  procured 
for  Austria,  530,  601,  604,  610, 
631,  661  n. 
Simplon,  pass,  255. 
Slobosia,     preliminary    treaty    of, 

416. 
Smith,  Adam,  "  Wealth  of  Nations" 

read  by  Napoleon,  3. 
Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  at  siege  of  Acre, 
141;    at    Aboukir,    147;     leaves 
for  Cyprus,   150,  154. 
Smolensk,   542,   549;    Russian  de- 
feat near,  550;    Russians  evacu- 
ate,   551,    559,    562,    563,    565, 
566;      supplies      at,     567,    568, 
580. 
Soissons,  forced  to  yield  to  allies, 

664. 
Somosierra,  pass  of,  449. 
Sonnini,  113. 

Soult,  appointed  marshal,  280; 
in  command,  284,  305;  atttacked 
at  Austerhtz,  Nov.  27th,  316; 
attack  on  Russian  centre  at 
Austerhtz,  317,  356,  367,  368, 
372;  becomes  Duke  of  Dal- 
maria,  400,  413,  446,  448;  pur- 
suit of  British  vmder  Moore  by, 
451,  452;  directed  to  occupy 
Portugal,  452,  480,  502,  644,  646, 
667,  674,  708. 
"Sou per  de  Beaucaire,  Le,"  40  f. 


Index 


831 


Spain,  troops  of,  in  siege  of  Toulon, 
43;  negotiations  witli,  50;  with- 
draws from  coalition,  72;  Napo- 
leon interferes  in  policy  of,  210; 
cedes  Parma  and  Elba  to  France, 
210;  also  Louisiana,  210;  cedes 
Trinidad  to  England,  215;  urged 
to  conquer  Portugal,  215;  con- 
cludes separate  peace  vvith  her, 
210;  enters  league  with  France, 
208;  forced  into  war  with  Eng- 
land, 269;  threatens  to  make 
difficulties,  376;  people  of,  suf- 
fering under  rule  of  Godoy,  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  425;  in  war  with 
England,  425;  government  of, 
weak  and  unpopular,  427;  called 
upon  to  co-operate  against  Por- 
tugal, 427,  429;  French  army 
sent  into,  430;  Ferdinand  set 
upon  throne  of,  431 ;  Napoleon 
refuses  recognition  of  Ferdinand 
in,  431 ;  Napoleon  makes  Joseph 
Bonaparte  king  of,  June  6th, 
180S,  432;  people  of,  resist  Na- 
poleon, 434;  revolt  in,  spreads, 
435 ;  soldiers  of,  stationed  abroad, 
desert  French  army  and  re- 
turn to,  435-6;  lack  of  prepa- 
rations for  war  made  by,  447; 
conduct  of  war  in,  by  Napoleon, 
448,  452;  country  of,  uncon- 
quered,  452;  campaigns  in,  458, 
459,  478  n.,  479,  480,  482,  483, 
494;  people  of,  influenced  by 
fate  of  Pope,  498;  guerilla  war- 
fare in,  499,  500;  last  regular 
troops  of,  defeated  by  French 
at  Ocano,  500;  conquered  t<»rri- 
tor\'  of,  to  be  incorporated  into 
France,  501,  521;  hatred  of 
Napoleon  in,  535,  580,  587,  597, 
610;  Bourbons  in,  616,  619,  620, 
637,  647,   649. 

Stackelberg,  596. 

Stadion,  sent  as  negotiator  to 
Briinn,  314;  refuses  to  act  with- 
out Haugwitz,  314,  319;  suc- 
ceeds Cobenzl,  322;  approached 
by  both  F'rance  and  Russia, 
remains  neutral,  364,  385  n. ; 
duped,  421 ;  argues  for  immedi- 
ate war,  454-6;  Emperor  Francis 
under  influence  of,  468,  494,  609. 


Stadion,   Count  Fred.,   468. 

Stai'l,  Madame  de,  60;  Siat<;ment 
of,  on  Bernese  treasure,  121; 
remark  of,  on  Egyptian  expedi- 
tion, 123;  remark  of,  on  Napo- 
leon, 219  n. ;  constant  iutimat-c 
friend  of,  236;  opposes  Napo- 
leon's absolution,  236;  excluded 
from  Austria,  288  f. ;  banished, 
402,  408  n. 

Stage,  the.  Napoleon  devotes  espe- 
cial attention  to,  403. 

Staps,  Frederick,  attempts  life  of 
Napoleon  at  .Schonbrunn,  482; 
ordered  shot  in  secrecy,  483. 

Starhemberg,  Count,  353,  421 ;  de- 
mands passports  in  London,  420. 

■States  General,  19;  convoked  in 
1789,  21 ;  character  of,  21 ;  session 
of  4th  of  August,  22. 

Steigentesch,  Colonel,  470. 

Stein,  minister  of  finance,  353; 
deposed  from  office,  455,  560,  586, 
600,  623,  640. 

Stephanie,  niece  of  Josephine,  mar- 
ried to  Hereditary  Prince  of 
Baden,  335;  alleged  intunacy  of, 
with  Napoleon,  336. 

Steyer,  armistice  signed  at,  206, 
310. 

Stockach,  defeat  of  French  at,  161 ; 
Austrians  defeated  at,   199. 

Studjanka,  crossing  of  French  at, 
572-5. 

Stutterheim,  Colonel,  462  n. 

Suabia,    161,  352. 

Suchet,  500,  644,  645,  674,  708, 
710. 

Suard,  405. 

Sucy,  30. 

Suez,  Isthmus  of,  piercing  of,  113, 
122. 

Suliote,  assisted  by  France,  287. 

Sultan,  see  Turkey. 

Suvaroff,  General,  161 ;  \-ictory  of, 
over  Moreau,  162;  over  Joubert, 
162;  opposes  Austria  in  Italy, 
194;    defeat-ed  by  MassL^na,  194. 

Sweden,  joins  Russia  against  Eng- 
land, 208;  takes  up  amis  against 
England,  214,  347,  350,  376, 
377,  385,  389,  416;  Gustayus 
IV.  of,  adheres  to  alliance  with 
England,  419,  420,  486;    change 


832 


Index 


Sweden — Continued. 

in  political  statas  of,  510;  de- 
clares war  against  England,  511; 
Charles  XIII.  of,  chooses  Ber- 
nadotte  as  his  successor,  511; 
concludes  alliance  with  liussia, 
530,  531,  595,  597  n.,  603. 

Switzerland,  republican  propa- 
ganda in,  76;  treasure  conveyed 
to,  95;  Napoleon's  influence  in, 
119;  as  dependent  republic,  120; 
revolt  in,  159;  seat  of  war,  161; 
regained  by  Austrians,  162;  de- 
feat of  Austrians  in,  165,  193; 
victory  of  Massena  in,  194; 
Moreau  in,  196;  Landamman  of, 
to  be  appointed  by  France,  250; 
under  sway  of  France,  256; 
neutrality  of,  violated,  265;  evac- 
uation of,  demanded,  267;  enters 
league  with  France,  268;  agents 
of  England  in,  272;  evacuation 
of,  proposed,  287,  313. 

Sj'ria,  Nelson  sails  for,  128;  gov- 
ernor of,  135  f. ;  Napoleon  plans 
to  enter,  138;  Napoleon's  letters 
from,  144;    heat  in,  145. 

Tabor,  Mount,  143,  146. 

Tacitus,  405. 

Talavera,  battle  of,  480,  499. 

Talleyrand,  107,  111,  112;  enters 
into  plans  of  Napoleon,  112; 
paper  of,  on  colonies,  113; 
address  to  Directory  of,  on  Napo- 
leon, 116;  letter  of  Napoleon 
to,  on  Constitution,  117,  126; 
ordered  to  deceive  Sultan,  134, 
163;  forced  to  resign,  164; 
brings  Napoleon  and  Sieyes  to- 
gether, 168;  confident  of  Napo- 
leon, 172;  ready  for  flight,  177; 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  182; 
proposes  Campo  Fonnio  as  basis, 
195;  secures  acceptance  of  it, 
204;  assisted  by  Hautcrive, 
218;  recommendations  of,  in 
public  instruction,  233;  sarcasm 
on  habitues  of  Napoleon's  court, 
244;  secures  presidency  of('isal- 
pine  Republic  for  Napoleon,  2.53; 
favour  of,  sought  by  Giinnaii 
princes,  260;  instigator  of  colo- 
nial scheme,  263 ;  advises  trial  of 


d'Enghien,  273;  included  in  im- 
perial govenmient,  278;  remains 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  280; 
grand  chamberlain,  280;  assists 
Napoleon  in  fonning  Confedera- 
tion of  the  States  of  the  Rhine, 
336;  federal  constitution  drafted 
by  Labesnardiere  and,  337; 
counsels  peace  with  Austria,  321; 
intercedes  in  behah  of  Austria, 
323;  becomes  Prince  of  Bene- 
vento,  329;  instructed  to  renew 
relations  with  Prussia,  377 ;  signs 
Treaty  of  Tilsit,  387;  suggests 
marriage  between  Spanish  Crown 
Prince  and  a  French  princess, 
427 ;  kept  in  ignorance  of  Treaty 
of  Fontainebleau,  428;  deprived 
of  ministry  of  foreign  affairs,  414; 
pennanent  adviser  to  Napoleon, 
414,  419,  423,  433,  434;  sides 
against  Napoleon,  441 ;  con- 
spires against  Napoleon,  453; 
Napoleon's  distrust  of,  499, 
580,  604;  "the  Emperor  Napo- 
leon" must  be  King  of  France, 
604;  prevents  restoration  of 
King  Ferdinand  to  Spain,  647, 
658,  673,  676,  677;  plenipoten- 
tiarv  of  Louis  XVIII.  at  Congress 
of  Vienna,  685,  692,  699. 

TaUien,  leader  among  Thermido- 
rians,  49,  57 ;  secures  Josephine's 
release,  64;  on  policy  of  con- 
quest, 75. 

TaUien,  Mme.,  rival  of  Josephine,  65. 

Taranto,  French  troops  main- 
tained at,  211;  coast  from,  to 
Hanover,  265,  267;  occupation 
of,  286. 

Taranto,  Duke  of,  see  Macdonald; 
duchy  of,  328. 

Tasso,  124. 

Tauenzien,  634. 

Tauroggen,  convention  of,  declares 
Torek's  corps  a  neutral  body,  586; 
(incouragement  from,  to  Gennany, 
586. 

Tchatchniki,  engagement  at,  568. 

Tchitchagoff,  Admiral,  553  n. ; 
conunands  Russian  army  from 
IMoldavia,  .560;  drives  French 
from  Borissov  and  bums  bridge, 
570,  571,  572,  575. 


i 


Index 


833 


Terror,  Rei^  of,  55;  effect  on 
polite  society  of,  Gl,  63,  192; 
rouses   opposition,    39,  ti3,  274. 

Terrorists,  oppose  Napoleon's  gov- 
ernment, 236  £.;  deported, 
237. 

Thermidor  7th,  49. 

Thennidorians,  faction  of  "Moun- 
tain," 49,  53;  unite  with  Jaco- 
bins, 55,  76. 

Thorn,  occupied  by  French,  367. 

Thouvenot,  500. 

Thugut,  prime  minister  of  Francis 
II.,  72;  concludes  treaty  with 
Pitt,  72;  infonned  of  French 
plans  in  Italy,  77;  diplomacy  of, 
with  Russia  regarding  Italy,  91 ; 
persistency  of,  92;  at  Leoben, 
99,  101;  difficulties  met  by,  in 
treaty  of  Campo  Foniiio,  108; 
feelings  of,  on  treaty,  109;  dis- 
regards France,  160;  demands 
Piedmont,  194-  demands  as- 
surances, 195;  loses  office,  207, 
254;  fails  in  diplomacy  with 
Pope,  213,  504. 

Ticmo,  81,  200. 

Tilly,  46. 

Tilsit.  382,  383,  384;  meeting  be- 
tween Napoleon  andAlexander  at, 
385,  386;  treaty  signed  at,  386, 
390;  union  with.  Rus.sia  by 
marriage  discussed  at,  411,  430, 
433,  519,  611. 

Tippoo  Sahib,  138. 

Titles,  328,  329,  399-401. 

Tolentino,  treaty  of,  94;  battle  of, 
709. 

Tolstoi,  439. 

Tc  rgau,  609. 

Tormassof ,  548,  560,  607. 

Torres  Vedras,  French  defeated  at, 
501,  545. 

Tortona,  Napoleon  arrives  at,  200, 
201. 

Totis,  480. 

Toulon,  Jacobin  club  at,  31;  Na- 
poleon and  family  witlidraw  to, 
36;  siege  of,  38;  Jacobins  over- 
come in,  39;  Napoleon  at,  123; 
preparations  at,  126;  projected 
return  to,  134;  Napoleon  as  con- 
queror of,  196;  wretched  con- 
dition of,  224. 


Trachenberg,  conference  at,  619; 
plans  for  anny  discussed  at,  623. 

Trafalgar,  313. 

Trancqueiuont,  General,  630, 

Trebbia,  1.55,  162. 

Trent,  51,87,  261. 

Treviso,  Duke  of,  see  Mortier; 
duchy  of,  328. 

Trianon,   edict  issued  at,  505,  506. 

lYibunate,  185;  oppo.sition  of,  to 
Napoleon,  238;  initiative  for 
Empire  comes  from,  278;  in 
imperial  constitution,  279;  si- 
lence imposed   upon,  404. 

Triest,  102,  323,  482. 

Trinidad,  ceded  to  England,  215, 
216. 

Tripoli,  communication  with,  142. 

Troves,  666. 

Tronchet,  in  committee  on  code, 
230. 

Tudela,  battle  of,  Nov.  23d,  1808, 
448. 

"Tugendbund,"  437,  526. 

Tuileries,  rabble  enters,  1792,  33; 
defended  by  Napoleon,  58;  Na- 
poleon at,  171  f.;  residence  of 
consuls  in,  186;  residence  of 
Napoleon,  244;  re%-iew  of  troops 
at,  245;    etiquette  at,  281. 

Turin,  road  from  Savona  to,  79; 
Austrian  troops  enter,  162;  Melas 
tries  to  reach,  199,  200. 

Turkey,  destinies  of,  95;  crum- 
bling, 112;  disintegration  of,  134; 
Austria  seeking  territory  in, 
72;  proximity  of,  to  Ancona, 
95;  downfall  of,  predicted  by  Na- 
poleon, 111;  plan  for  division  of, 
114;  declares  war  against  France, 
135,  137,  142;  pressure  upon, 
138;  sends  re-enforcements  to 
Acre,  144;  troop  of,  in  Egypt, 
147;  English  join  troops  of,  in 
Eg3'pt,  215;  treaty  of,  with 
France,  217;  at  war  with  Pelo- 
ponnesus, 287,  345,  346  n.,  3(')4, 
376,  377,  378,  381,  386,  388,  389, 
390,  416;  makes  advances  tow- 
ard England,  417;  induced  to 
keep  port-s  closed  to  P^ngland, 
419,  420,  433;  revolurion  in,  4.38, 
441,  442,  479,  486,  518,  530; 
threatened    by     England,     531; 


834 


Index 


Turkey — Continued. 

treaty  of  peace  with  Russia  con- 
cluded May,  1S12,  532. 

Tuscany,  treaty  with  France,  72; 
republicanism  in,  125;  Austrian 
garrison  in,  202;  Duke  of,  losses 
and  compensations  of,  207;  in 
Luneville,  259 ;  compensation  of, 
261 ;  acquisition  of,  by  France, 
210;  promised  to  Spanish  prin- 
cess, 210;  dependent  on  France, 
255;  in  Austro-Ilussian  treaty, 
291 ;  incorporated  with  France, 
422,  436. 

Tyrol,  in  Italian  campaign,  84, 
314,  319;  ceded  to  Bavaria,  321, 
323;;  incited  to  rebellion  by 
Austria,  459,  461 ;  hatred  of,  for 
Bavaria,  463,  472,  473 ;  peasants 
of,  moved  by  fate  of  Pope,  498. 

Udme,  97;  negotiations  at,  108. 

Ulm,  Austrians  driven  to,  199j 
surrendered,  205,  524. 

United  States,  Napoleon  makes 
approaches  towards,  209;  Jerome 
Bonaparte  in,  247;  opposes 
French  influence  in  Louisiana, 
264;  forbids  commerce  with 
Europe,  504;  vessels  of,  threat- 
ened by  Napoleon  with  confisca- 
tion, 505;  Napoleon  plans  to 
escape  to,  725;  declare  against 
England,    581. 

University,  Imperial,  406  ff. 

Urbino,  93. 

Valais,  120;  yielded  by  Helvetia, 
255 ;  f omied  into  a  republic,  256, 
510. 

Valangin,  342. 

Valence,  10,  12,  30,  31. 

Valencia,  435. 

Valengay,  treaty  of,  647. 

Val  Sugana,  93. 

Valtelline,  120. 

Valutina  Gora,  551. 

Vandamme,  testifies  to  Napoleon's 
power  over  him,  413,  467,  474, 
539,  623,  625,  626,  628,  710. 

Var,  Melas  at,  198. 

Vanihagen,  480. 

Vaubois,  sails  from  Ajaccio,  127. 

Vauchamps,  battle  of,  659. 


Vaucluse,  crime  In,  224. 

Vaud,  120. 

Vendee,  the,  royalist  province,  39, 
43;  civil  war  in,  55;  in  revolt, 
196;  pacified,  196;  pacification 
of,  212;  is  regarded  as  a  truce 
by  Royalists,  270;  Cadoudal, 
leader  in,  271. 

Vendemiaire  13th,  57,  62,  78,  96, 
104,115,  159,  169,  242,  270. 

Venetia,  Austrian  garrisons  in, 
291,  314,  319,  321,  323,  328,  424. 

Venice,  sought  by  Austria,  72; 
territory  of,  84;  mainland  of, 
offered  to  Austria  by  Napoleon, 
99;  war  declared  against,  100; 
offered  to  Austria,  101 ;  harsh 
judgment  of,  by  Napoleon,  102; 
Napoleon's  dealings  with,  criti- 
cised, 103;  ceded  to  Austria,  109; 
portion  of  territory  of,  resei^ved 
to  France,  111 ;  Pius  VII.  elected 
in,  212;  ceded  to  Austria,  215; 
demanded  by  Napoleon  in  treaty 
of  Pressburg,  321. 

Verhuell,  Admiral,  sent  as  head  of 
deputation  to  Paris,  332. 

Verona,  Louis  XVIII.  at,  55,  86, 
89;  counter-revolution  in,  101, 
314. 

Viasma,  562;   fight  at,  565-6. 

Vicenza,  Duke  of,  see  Caulain- 
court;    duchy  of,  328. 

Victor  Amadeus,  signs  treaty  with 
France,  81;  of  Sardinia  not 
mentioned  in  treaty  of  Amiens, 
254. 

Victor,  in  command  in  Italy,  200; 
becomes  Duke  of  Beiluno,  400, 
413,  437,  446,  451,  480,  556, 
565,  567,  568,  570,  572-5,  606  n., 
625,  636,  653,  658. 

Vielcastel,  64. 

Vienna,  76,  95;  defence  of,  after 
Italian  campaigns,  99;  feeling 
at,  after  Campo  Formio,  109, 
144;  Bernadotte  in,  159;  plan 
of  Napoleon  to  maich  on,  198; 
excitement  at,  on  French  author- 
it>-  in  Italy,  254;  archives  of, 
qiioted,  254;  object  of  Murat's 
pursuit,  310,  477. 

\illach,  97,  482. 

Villars,  115. 


Index 


835 


Villeneuve,  Admiral,  osoapo  of, 
133;  ordered  to  the  C'liannel, 
297;  returns  to  Cadiz,  2<J9;  at 
Trafalgar,  309. 

Vilna,  Napoleon  hopes  for  resist- 
ance at,  542;  no  enthusiasm 
awaiting  Napoleon  at,  543; 
French  troops  to  return  to, 
under  Murat,   577. 

Vincennes,  trial  of  d'Enghien  at, 
273. 

Vincent,  Austrian  ambassador  at 
Paris,  339;  inter\ie\v  of,  with 
Napoleon,  340. 

Vitebsk,  Barclay  marches  towards, 
546-7;  army  given  rest  at,  548, 
549. 

Vittoria,  Wellington's  victory  at, 
G19. 

Viscaya,  500. 

Volney,  113. 

Voltaire,  interest  of,  in  Corsica  and 
Paoli,    1 ;    writings  read  by  Na- 

f)oleon,    13;    imitated  by   Napo- 
eon,  211;   repudiated  as  revolu- 
tionarv,  244. 
Voltri,  80. 

Wachau,  engagement  at,  635  f. 

Wagram,  battle  of,  Julv  5th  and 
6th,  1809,  475-477,  478. 

Waldstatt,  627. 

Walcheren,  507. 

Walewska,  Countess,  681. 

Walewski,  Count,  681. 

Wallachia,  288  n.,  365,  416,  418, 
540. 

Wallmoden,  Count,  457-8. 

Warsaw,  committee  of  insurrec- 
tion at,  fostered  by  Napoleon, 
363;  occupied  by  French,  367; 
Napoleon  in,  371 ;  duchy  of,  387; 
to  be  ruled  by  King  of  Saxonv, 
390,  472,  481,  482,  516,  521; 
immense  stores  at,  524,  526,  543, 
595,  597,  598,  599,  600,  602,  609, 
610,  611,  615,  621. 

Wartensleben,  retreats  before  Jour- 
dan,  88. 

Washington,  death  of,  209. 

Waterloo,  325,  714,  722,  737. 

Wa\Te,  713,  715,  717,  737. 

Weimar,  358,  360. 

Weissenburg,  46. 


Wei.s.sig,  612. 

Welleslev,  see  Wellington 

^^■(•llingtou,  479,  480;  sent  to 
Spain,  499;  acts  on  defensive 
and  holds  enemy  in  check,  499, 
500,  501;  defeats  Mannont  at 
.Salamanca,  July  22d,  1812, 
554,  581;  defeats  French  at 
^'ittoria,  619,  620  n.;  conquers 
San  Sebastian  and  Pampeluni., 
644,  647,  653,  667,  683,  698, 
709,  710  If. 

Wesel,  fortress  of,  surrendered  to 
France,  320;  Napoleon  does  not 
give  up,  to  Cle\es,  but  occupies 
with  his  own  troops,  347. 

Weser,  mouth  of,  191,  268. 

Westphalia,  peace  of,  secularization 
in,  259;  to  be  taken  from  Prus- 
sia, 348;  kingdom  of,  387;  nearly 
ruined  by  extravagance  of  King 
Jerome,  524.  525,  599,  611. 

Wevrother,  Colonel,  315. 

Whitworth,  249. 

Wieland,  Napoleon's  conversation 
with,  443. 

William,  Prince  of  Prussia,  353, 
443. 

Willot,  General,  169  n. 

Wimpffen,  General,  471  n. 

Winzingerode,    663,    664,   670. 

Wittgenstein,  General,  545,  548, 
550,  560,  568,  571,  572,  573, 
574,  607,  611,  612,  613,  660. 

Wrede,  Ba\arian  general,  516,  594, 
640,  656. 

Wurmser,  repulses  French  army, 
77;  replaces  Beaulieu  in  Italy, 
85 ;  defeat  of,  by  Napoleon,  SO  f . ; 
attempts  relief  of  Mantua,  87; 
succeeded  by  Archduke  Ciiarles 
in  Italy,  88;  Napoleon's  opinion 
of,  89. 

Wurschen,    616. 

Wiirtemberg,  makes  peace  with 
France,  88;  separate  treaty  of, 
with  France,  260;  elector  of, 
acknowledged  King  bv  Austria, 
323;  King  of,  334,  '338,  594; 
Katharina  of,  married  to  Jerome 
Bonaparte,  August  23d,  1807, 
336,  413,  512  n.,  525;  changes 
in,  after  war  of  1809,  524;  King 
of,  arms  new  contingent,  594. 


836 


Index 


Wiirzburg,  surrendered  by  Bavaria, 
323;  occupied  by  French  troops, 
348 

Yarmouth,  Lord,  348. 

YeUn,  of  Ansbach,  author  of  "Ger- 
many in  her  Deep  Abasement," 
352. 

Yorck,  von  Wartenburg,  historian, 
judgment  of,  on  the  massacre  at 
Jaffa,  140,  31S  n. 

Yorck,  von  Wartenburg,  general, 
succeeds  Grawert  in  command  of 


Prussian  contingent,  586;  defec- 
tion of.  586,  587,  593,  594,  600, 
611,  655,  658,  659. 

Zante,  111. 

Zastrow,  von,  362. 

Zichv,  460. 

Zifcthen,  718,  719. 

Znaim,  310;  Austrian  forces  con- 
centrated at,  477;  truce  of  Julv 
12th,  1809,  478-9. 

Zurich,  victory  of  Masstoa  at,  194, 
208,  280. 


Medieval  Europe 

395-1270. 

By  CHARLES  BEMONT  and  G.   MONOD. 

Translated  by   MARY  SLOAN,  with  notes  and  revisions  by  PROF. 
GEORGE   BURTON   ADAMS,  of  Yale. 


556  pp.,  I2mo,  51.60  net. 


^  The  original  work  has  come  to  be  well- 
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"Combines  happily  simplicity  of  statement  with  a  greater  fullness  of 
detail.  By  grouping  details  around  the  most  important  facts  in  prefer- 
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a  certain  unity." 

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NEIV  rORK.  (x,'oj).  CHICAGO, 


SEIGNOBOS'S  POLITICAL  HISTORY  OF  EUPOPE 

since  1814. 

By    Charles    Seignobos."    Translation    ecfited    by   Prof. 
Silas  M.  MacVane,  of  Harvard  University,     xx  -f  881  pp. 

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SEIGNOBOS'S  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROMAN  PEOPLE 

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—Prof.  Brewster  O.  Higley,  of  Ohio  University. 

llcNrvY      rivJLl       OC     L-Vj.     378  Wabash  Ave., 'chica«o 
V'o* 


GORDY>S  POLITICAL  PARTIES  IN  THE  UNITED 

STATES     Vol.  I,  1733-1809.     59S  pp.     i2mo.     $1.75,  nc-t,  speciiil. 

A  work  intended  for  the  thoughtful  reader  without  much  pre- 
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is  to  come." 

LEE'S    SOURCE   BOOK   OF   ENGLISH   HISTORY 

Edited  by  Dr.  Guv  C,\rlton  Lee.     609  pp.     i2mo.     $2.00,  nei. 
Some  200  documents  and  selections  from  contemporaries  from 
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HENDERSON'S     SIDE     LIGHTS     ON     ENGLISH 
HISTORY 

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Accounts  and  pictures  by  contemporaries  ingeniously  arra:.,iired 
to  give  the  effect  of  a  continuous  history,  and  dealing  with  such 
topics  as  the  personality  of  Queen  Elizabeth,  the  execution  of 
Mary  Stuart,  characteristic  traits  of  Cromwell,  the  return  of 
Charles  IL,  the  Stuarls  in  e.\ile.  Queen  Anne  and  the  Marlbor- 
oughs,  etc.,  etc.,  illustrated  by  80  portraits,  fac-si miles,  caricatures, 
etc.,  reproduced  directly  from  the  rarest  original  mezzotint  and 
line  engravings. 

N.  V.  Tribune  :  "  It  is  not  unlikely  that  he  who  has  dipped  into 
this  book  in  the  early  afternoon  will  find  himself  still  reading  when 
night  comes.  ...  A  better  book  to  pnt  in  the  hands  of  the  lover 
of  history,  whether  he  be  a  beginner  or  an  old  student,  we  do 
not  know." 

WALKER'S  DISCUSSIONS  IN  ECONOMICS  AND 

tsTATT<>TTCS         ''>'  ''"^    ^'-^^^   General    Fkancis    A.   Walker. 
aJ.AliaiXV./0         j,j.^^^  ^^,  p^^j    j5^^_^  j^     Dewey. 

With  portrait.     454-1-481  pp.     2  vols.    8vo.    %6.ooy  net  special. 
The  Dial :  "Clear  and  interesting  to  the  general .  "•ader,  as  well 
as  instructive  to  the  careful  student." 


BREAL'S   SEMANTICS      uvi  +  336  pp.   i^mo,  $2.50,  net. 

Studies  in  the  Science  of  Significations,  as  distinguished  from 
the  Science  of  Sounds  (Phom-tics).  The  style  is  pleasing,  and  the 
enjdvment  of  the   bciok  reiiuircs  no  firevious  philolf>gic.il   training. 

SWEET'S  PRACTICAL   STUDY  OF  LANGUAGES 


By  Prof.  HiiNKY  Swiiiix  of  Oxford,     izmo.     fi.50,  net. 

(2) 


2d  impression  of  "a  novel  of  marked  power,  great  originality, 

and  intense  interest."— i)';/^^^  Cotninerciul. 

Owen's   RED-HEADED    GILL-$i.5o 

Red-Headed  Gill  is  a  splendid  young  country  gentlewoman  of 
Cornwall.  Under  a  weird  East  Indian  influence,  she  is  forced  to  live 
over  again  part  of  the  life  of  a  beauty  of  the  days  of  Queen  Bess— 
the  famous  Gill  Red-Head 

N.  y.  Sun:  "The  author  has  created  a  charming  girl  whom  the 
reader  will  watch  with  interest  to  the  end.  She  manages  to  trans- 
port her  back  into  the  life  of  her  Tudor  ancestress  over  and  again 
naturally,  and  with  great  effect." 

iV.  v.  Times  Saturday  Keviciv :  "  The  reader's  attention  is  at  once 
enlisted,  and  it  is  not  allowed  to  flag." 

JV.  y.  Tribune:  "  A  very  striking  figure  is  the  beautiful  but  stub- 
born Gillian." 

Book  News  :  "  There  is  much  originality  and  bamor." 


•^Something  more  than  an  historical  romance  pure 
and  simple  ...  a  really  vivid  and  at  the  same  time 
conscientious  sketch  of  the  last  years  of  Peter  the 
Great." £>i'ii- 

Hope's  (G.)  TRIUMPH  OF  COUNT 

OSTERMANN-S1.50 

Count  Ostermann,  the  one  incorruptible  man  in  Peter  the  Great's 
court,  is  a  most  interesting  historical  figure.  His  brave  struggle  to 
carry  out  Peter's  reforms  in  a  way  recalls  Hamilton's  struggles  with 
the  Presidents  that  followed  Washington.  The  story  of  Ostermann's 
public  life  and  his  strange  romantic  marriage  is  told  in  this  terse 
and  earnest  novel. 

Times's  Saturday  Rei'iew :  "It  is  well  written  and  interesting 
...  an  excellent  picture  is  given  of  the  savage  Russia  of  the 
early  eighteenth  century,  and  the  reader  gets  a  good  impression  of 
Peter  the  Great." 

Providence  Journal :  "  The  tale  has  an  exciting:  plot  which  keeps 
the  reader's  interest,  and  contains  at  the  same  time  a  vivid  picture 
of  the  times." 

Philadelphia  Press :  "Good  work  .  .  .  distinctly  well  written, 
in  spirited  style." 


HENRY  HOLT  &  CO.  ^Sw^^^o^;r" 


Scott's  MONEY  AND  BANKING 

By  Prof.  W.  A.  Scorr,  University  of  Wise.     381  pp.     8vo.     $2.00  net. 

"rof.  J.  W.  Crook,  of  Amherst: — "In  my  judgment  it  will 
easily  supersede  all  other  texts  on  the  subject.  .  .  .  The  book  is  a 
clear-cut  discussion,  popular  but  scientific,  and  I  have  no  doubt 
will  prove  a  boon  to  scholars." 

The  Financier  : — "  Banking  in  every  phase  is  carefully  ex- 
plained. Currency  is  treated  in  a  masterful  manner ;  '  Banking 
Machinery  and  Methods '  forms  one  of  the  most  interesting  chapters. 
...  In  fact,  the  work  is  a  complete  treasure-house  of  information 
to  all  interested  in  the  study  of  money  and  banking." 

Adams's  SCIENCE  OF  FINANCE 

By   Prof.     Henry    C.    Adams,    University   of    Mich.      573  pp.      8vo. 
$2.75  net. 

Prof.  E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  of  Colutubia,  in  Political  Science 
Quarterly  : — "Will  at  once  command  attention  as  a  lasting  con- 
tribution to  economic  literature.  .  .  .  The  emphasis  is  everywhere 
laid,  not  upon  facts  and  figures,  but  upon  the  principles  involved ; 
and  to  those  who  approach  the  subject  for  the  first  time,  as  well  as 
to  those  already  familiar  with  the  general  nature  of  the  problems, 
the  serried  phalanx  of  argument  upon  argument,  of  closely  reasoned 
analysis  upon  analysis,  must  be  both  a  surprise  and  a  delight." 

Daniels's  ELEMENTS  OF  PUBLIC  FINANCE 

By   Prof.  WiNTHROP    Moue  Daniels,  of  Princeton.      373  pp.      i2mo. 
$1.50  net. 

Prof.  C.  J.  BULI.OCK,  of  Harvard: — "It  seems  tome  to  be 
admirably  adapted  to  the  needs  of  undergraduate  students." 

Prof.  E.  L.  BoGART,  of  Oberlin,  in  the  A^cw  York  Cotnmercial 
Advertiser: — "Not  only  is  the  book  to  be  commended  for  its 
subject-matter,  but  its  literary  finish  also  deserves  mention.  The 
style  is  throughout  clear  and  incisive  ;  at  times  it  is  even  some- 
what racy  and  picturesque — we  fancy  a  smile  went  with  the  spoken 
word.  ...  A  distinct  contribution  to  economic  literature." 


29  West  23d  Street 


HTLT^U      «-,-      r*^  29  West   23cl  S 

enry    Holt     OC     L.O.  New  York 


DATE  DUE 


JAN  2 

4  1973 

'  !^ '  J  '''' 

"^p  ?.7 

1973 

FEB  14 

1973  T 

WAR 

11-  1973 

NOVi 

8  IQTC 

-ma 

1374.^. 

GAYLORD 

PRINT  ED  IN  U    S    A 

UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  Llpo»"v  i  r^ru  ,ty 


liii  III  III  mil 
AA      001377  926        9 


